tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31628874392654025202024-03-27T16:54:02.808-07:00soul searching or just looking for fights<em>corpus inscriptionum semiophrensium</em>Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger913125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-87932594100810757182024-01-16T01:29:00.000-08:002024-01-16T01:29:37.254-08:00A Revival of Interest in Cooley<!-- A Revival of Interest in Cooley
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Cooley,Sociology,Psychology
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--><li><a href="#ross03">Ross 1903. Review of <em><strong>Human Nature and the Social Order</strong></em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kelsey03">Kelsey 1903. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#vincent03">Vincent 1903. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#house56">House 1956. Review of <em><strong>The Two Major Works of Charles H. Cooley</strong></em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#eliasberg56">Eliasberg 1956. Review of <em><strong>Social Organization and Human Nature and the Social Order</strong></em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#titiev57">Titiev 1957. Review of <em><strong>The Two Major Works of Charles H. Cooley</strong></em> and Borgatta; Meyer (eds)., <em>Sociological Theory</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#vincent09">Vincent 1909. Review of <em><strong>Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind</strong></em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kelsey09">Kelsey 1909. Review of <em>Social Organization</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#loos09">Loos 1909. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#ellwood10">Ellwood 1910. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#monroe10">Monroe 1910. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#sellars43">Sellars 1943. Review of <em><strong>Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory</strong></em> by E. C. Jandy</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#slice70">Slice 1970. Review of <em><strong>Cooley and Sociological Analysis</strong></em> by A. J. Reiss</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#gecas80">Gecas 1980. Review of <em><strong>Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, Varieties, and Criticism</strong></em> by Meltzer, Petras & Reynolds</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bruce88">Bruce, 1988. Review of <em><strong>Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method</strong></em> by Herbert Blumer</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#joasmillding05">Joas, Miller & Dingwall 2005. Review of <em><strong>Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism</strong></em> by Reynolds & Herman-Kinney</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#schubert07">Schubert 2007. Review of <em><strong>Charles Horton Cooley: Imagining Social Reality</strong></em> by Glenn Jacobs</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#wolfe20">Wolfe 1920. Review of <em><strong>Social Process</strong></em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#craig19">Craig 1919. Review of <em>Social Process</em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#young25">Young 1925. Review of <em><strong>The Basis of Social Theory</strong></em> by Balz & Pott</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#barnes25">Barnes 1925. Review of <em>The Basis of Social Theory</em> by Balz & Pott</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#house33">House 1933. Review of <em><strong>Introductory Sociology</strong></em> by Cooley, Angell & Juilliard</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#brooks35">Brooks 1935. <strong>For Beginners in Sociology</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#young41">Young 1941. Review of <em><strong>Human Nature and the Social Order</strong></em> by E. L. Thorndike</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#terman41">Terman 1941. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by E. L. Thorndike</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#parsons41">Parsons 1941. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by E. L. Thorndike</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#young37">Young 1937. Review of <em><strong>Social Psychology</strong></em> by Freeman and <em>Elements of Social Psychology</em> by Gurnee</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#swanson53">Swanson 1953. Review of <em><strong>Social Psychology</strong></em> by Solomon E. Asch</a></li><!--
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--><li><a href="#odum48">Odum 1948. Review of <em><strong>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</strong></em> by H. E. Barnes</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#myres51">Myres 1951. Review of <em>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</em> by H. E. Barnes</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#davis59">Davis 1959. Review of <em><strong>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</strong></em> by David. W. Noble</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#homan59">Homan 1959. Review of <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em> by David W. Noble</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#cochran59">Cochran 1959. Review of <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em> by David. W. Noble</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#igo03">Igo 2003. Review of <em><strong>The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820—1920</strong></em> by J. Sklansky</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#harp04">Harp 2004. Review of <em>The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820—1920</em> by J. Sklansky</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#mecklin22">Mecklin 1922. Review of <em><strong>The Principles of Sociology</strong></em> by E. A. Ross</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#park22">Park 1922. Review of <em><strong>Human Traits and Their Social Significance</strong></em> by I. Edman</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bernard27">Bernard 1927. Review of <em><strong>Recent Developments in the Social Sciences</strong></em> by E. C. Hayes</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hocking28">Hocking 1928. Review of <em><strong>The Individual and the Social Order</strong></em> by J. A. Leighton.</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#angell30">Angell 1930. Review of <em><strong>Human Nature: A First Book in Psychology</strong></em> by Max Schoen</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#vance30">Vance 1930. Review of <em><strong>Sociological Theory and Social Research</strong></em> by C. H. Cooley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hughes36">Hughes 1936. Review of <em><strong>The Concept of Our Changing Loyalties</strong></em> by H. A. Bloch</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bain35">Bain 1935. Review of <em><strong>Social Psychology: The Natural History of Human Nature</strong></em> by L. G. Brown</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#ross44">Ross 1944. Review of <em><strong>Dictionary of Sociology</strong></em> by H. P. Fairchild</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#foote50">Foote 1950. Review of <em><strong>Social Psychology</strong></em> by T. M. Newcomb</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hartung51">Hartung 1951. Review of <em><strong>Social Psychology: An Integrative Interpretation</strong></em> by S. S. Sargent.</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#strong51">Strong 1951. Review of <em><strong>Emergent Human Nature: A Symbolic Field Interpretation</strong></em> by W. Coutu</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#meyer56">Meyer 1956. Review of <em><strong>Sociological Theory: Present-Day Sociology from the Past</strong></em> by E. F. Borgatta and H. J. Meyer</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bolton56">Bolton 1956. Review of <em><strong>The Direction of Human Development</strong></em> by M. F. A. Montagu</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#martel61">Martel 1961. Review of <em><strong>The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory</strong></em> by Don Martindale</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hulett64">Hulett 1964. Review of <em><strong>Communication and Social Order</strong></em> by H. D. Duncan</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#killian65">Killian 1965. Review of <em><strong>Symbolic Leaders: Public Dramas and Public Men</strong></em> by O. E. Klapp</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#francis65">Francis 1965. Review of <em><strong>The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge</strong></em> by W. P. McEwen</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#wolff68">Wolff 1968. Review of <em><strong>International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences</strong></em> by D. L. Sills</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#mitchell71">Mitchell 1971. Review of <em><strong>The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Sociology</strong></em> by R. A. Nisbet</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#motz71">Motz 1971. Review of <em><strong>Assumptions of Social Psychology</strong></em> by R. E. Lana</a></li><!--
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--><li><a href="#petersorbach72">Peters & Orbach 1972. Review of <em><strong>Social Relationships</strong></em> by G. J. McCall <em>et al</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#glass74">Glass 1974. Review of <em><strong>Sociology for the Modern Mind</strong></em> by I. Seger</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hinkle74">Hinkle 1974. Review of <em><strong>The Structure of the Life-World</strong></em> by A. Schutz and T. Luckmann</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#heydebrand74">Heydebrand 1974. Review of <em><strong>The Making of Sociology</strong></em> by R. Fletcher</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#strasser75">Strasser 1975. Review of <em><strong>Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation. Essays and Documents</strong></em> by W. J. Cahnman</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#braude75">Braude 1975. Review of <em><strong>The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment</strong></em> by J. Israel and H. Tajfel</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#sztompka75">Sztompka 1975. Review of <em><strong>The Foundation of Sociological Theory</strong></em> by T. Abel</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#dibble76">Dibble 1976. Review of <em><strong>The Sociologists of the Chair</strong></em> by H. Schwendinger and J. R. Schwendinger</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#soper77">Soper 1977. Review of <em><strong>Knowledge and Politics</strong></em> by R. M. Unger</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#manning77">Manning 1977. Review of <em><strong>Drawa in Life: The Uses of Communication in Society</strong></em> by J. E. Combs and M. W. Mansfield</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#giddens79">Giddens 1979. <strong>Schutz and Parsons: Problems of Meaning and Subjectivity</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#orum80">Orum 1980. <strong>The Varieties of Sociological Experience</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#avison81">Avison 1981. Review of <em><strong>Conceiving the Self</strong></em> by M. Rosenberg</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#reynolds81">Reynolds 1981. Review of <em><strong>School and the Social Order</strong></em> by F. Musgrove</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bannister82">Bannister 1982. <strong>The Historical Case of Sociological Knowledge</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#smith82">Smith 1982. <strong>Introducing Sociology: Left, Right, and Conventional</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#pfohl82">Pfohl 1982. Review of <em><strong>The Sociology of Knowledge in America: 1883—1915</strong></em> by E. R. Fuhrman</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#campbell84">Campbell 1984. Review of <em><strong>The Individual and the Social Self</strong></em> by G. H. Mead and D. L. Miller</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#krohn84">Krohn 1984. Review of <em><strong>The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries</strong></em> by A. Brannigan</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#carter88">Carter 1988. Review of <em><strong>Introduction to Sociology</strong></em> by Coser <em>et al</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#czitrom90">Czitrom, 1990. <strong>Communication Studies as American Studies</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#franks91">Franks 1991. Review of <em><strong>Social Sensitivity: A Study of Habit and Experience</strong></em> by J. M. Ostrow</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kuhnert92">Kuhnert 1992. Review of <em><strong>MicroSociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structuce</strong></em> by T. J. Scheff</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#emirbayer95">Emirbayer 1995. Review of <em><strong>The Semiotic Self</strong></em> by N. Wiley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#dhanagare03">Dhanagare 2003. <strong>Antinomies in Ideologies and Institutions</strong></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#mee05">Mee 2005. Review of <em><strong>Inside Social Life: Readings in Sociological Psychology and Microsociology</strong></em> by S. E. Cahill</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bernard28">Bernard 1928. <strong>Some Recent Trends in Psychology and Social Psychology</strong></a></li><!--
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--><h4><a id="ross03"></a>Ross, Edward Alsworth 1903. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>Journal of Political Economy</em> 11(4): 647-649. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1819322">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="ross03p647a"></a>Professor <strong>Cooley's conception of social relations is based upon a different theory of personality from that hithero prevailing in social philosophy</strong>. The current sociological doctrine, he thinks, is a veiled materialism, seeing that it regards society as an association of human organisms, rather than as an association of persons. As these organisms are plainly separate, the only way of cementing them into a social aggregate is to assume some special trait - sociability, altruism, or the like. (Ross 1903: 647)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley's unique contribution is his emphasis on imagination.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="ross03p647b"></a>Professor <strong>Cooley</strong>, on the other hand, <strong>insists that social order is a matter of conduct, conduct is a matter of motive, and motive springs from "personal ideas," <em>i.e.</em>, ideas of persons</strong>. The problem of social order can be nothing else than a psychical problem, <em>how to harmonize organisms</em>. "<strong><u>My association with you consists in the relationship between my idea of you and the rest of my mind</strong>." "The immediate social reality is the personal idea.</u>" Society itself "<u>is a relation among personal ideas</u>." (Ross 1903: 647)</blockquote><!--
--><p>An explanation of Cooley's "personal ideas".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="ross03p648"></a>Taking this <strong>strictly psychical view of human relations</strong>, Professor Cooley proceeds to discuss in a delightful way such special cases as communion, conformity and nonconformity, rivalry, hero-worship, leadership, confession, personal degeneracy, freedom, etc. Throughout he avoids the jargon of the schools and <strong>utters his thought in pure and graceful English sown with polished phrases and pointed epigrams</strong>. The skeleton of psychological analysis is overlaid with a wealth of illustrative material drawn from literature and autobiography. The book, moreover, has the ozone of independent and unacademic thinking, and will not age rapidly. (Ross 1903: 648)</blockquote><!--
--><p>For me, the aspect of personal idas did appear in most chapters but more as a passing perspective - the strands left in various chapters did not form a single string.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="ross03p649"></a>Surely this ethereal psychology goes with three meals a day and a bank account. <strong>The mirroring of the selves of all in the mind of each may keep in order sated, comfortable people, but hardly persons with unsatisfied wants yapping at their heels</strong>. One wonders if the study of moral psychology in the confessions of Montaigne, Rousseau, Emerson, Goethe, and other geniuses, may not mislead one as to the forces that hold commonplace persons in orderly relations. (Ross 1903: 649)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Could just as well be an epigraph to a discussion of Stapledon's sexual telepathy groups.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kelsey03"></a>Kelsey, Carl 1903. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</em> 8(4): 105-106. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1009947">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey03p106a"></a>"<u>Individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in rank than sociality - <strong>the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from one to the other</strong></u>." Society "<u>in its immediate aspect <em>is a relation among personal ideas</em></u>." "<u>The imaginations which people have of one another are the <em>solid facts</em> of society, and - to observe and interpret these must be the chief aim of sociology</u>." (Kelsey 1903: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Simpler societies create simpler individuals; more complex societies create more complex individuals.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey03p106b"></a>"<u><strong>Society</strong> is rather a phase of life than a thing by itself; it <strong>is life regarded from the point of view of personal intercourse</strong>. And personal intercourse may be considered either in its primary aspects, such as are treated in this book, or in secondary aspects, such as groups, institutions or processes. Sociology, I suppose, is the science of these things</u>." (Kelsey 1903: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pretty concise.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey03p106c"></a>There will be many to object to his classification of sociology as a purely subjective science. <strong>In his desire to set forth the psychological elements the author seems to lose touch with the material basis both of individual and social existence</strong>. (Kelsey 1903: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I didn't notice this in the second edition but that may be because I read the second edition, which made a point to emphasize the sociable aspect of the material base.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="vincent03"></a>Vincent, George E. 1903. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 8(4): 559-563. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2762056">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p559a"></a>In terms of his own thesis Dr. Cooley has transformed the social materials of his times into a personal product; <strong>his mind has reorganized and reproduced the suggested material in accordance with its own structure and tendency</strong>. (Vincent 1903: 559)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That does sound like him.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p559b"></a>All will agree that the result is a "<u>new and fruitful employment of the common material</u>." This common material has been accumulating rapidly during the last two decades. <strong>James's notable chapter on "<u>The Consciousness of Self;</u>" Royce's papers on social consciousness; Dewey's insistence on the essentially abstract nature of both the individual and socity conceived as separate ideas</strong>; Tarde's system with its trinity of imitation, invention, and opposition; Baldwin's dialectic of personal and social growth; Ross's vivid presentation of the ways in which society cleverly <strong>cozen</strong>s its members; Giddings's consciousness of kind and analysis of the social mind - these and many others are the current ideas upon which Dr. Cooley has freely drawn. The result is not, however, an "<u>imitation,</u>" but an "<u>invention.</u>" (Vincent 1903: 559)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p559c"></a>Although the work has a distinct unity, the reader often gets the impression of clever and discriminating essays covering a wide range of human experience. <strong>The volume is something of an anomaly in sociological literature, but it is none the less welcome for its very nonconformity</strong>. A number of illustrations are drawn from a study of the author's children, but the doting parent is successfully subordinated to the scientific observer. (Vincent 1903: 559)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Why so few reviews then?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p560a"></a>Coming to closer quarters with the person, the author traces the process by which <strong>intercourse builds up personal ideals</strong>. All persons are declared to be imaginary or constructed in the mind out of the materials received through intercourse and interpretated by experience. Society is defined as "<u>a relation among personal ideas.</u>" The vagueness and ambiguity of this phrase are guarded by the warning that <strong>the unquestioned independent reality of a person is not to be confused with the ideas entertained about him; these ideas, however, constitute the immediate social reality</strong>. (Vincent 1903: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley's "personal ideas" seems to be the most remarkable takeaway for his contemporaries.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p560b"></a>Sympathy or communion is next discussed, not as a form of pity, but as an imaginative extension of one's life by the interpretation of other persons. <strong>A man's range of sympathy thus becomes a measure of his personality</strong>. Society, on the other hand, is the totality of the <strong>acts of communion by which the person is related to others</strong>. (Vincent 1903: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Views very closely akin to those of my source material.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p560c"></a>Self-assertion is declared to be respectable, unless it is inconsistent with personal or social moral standards, when it is stigmatized as egotistic. <strong>To be selfish, then, is to fail to appreciate the social situation as it is generally conceived</strong>. The proper antithesis of selfishness is not altruism, but rather right, justice, or magnanimity. A person may act out a narrower or a wider self; there lies the distinction, rather than in a setting off against each other the really interpenetrating self and other. (Vincent 1903: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Reading the room.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p560ja561"></a>Hostility is described as a personally protective activity which at <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> the same time performs <strong>the useful social function of preserving type</strong> and eliminating degenerate variation. It is conceived of as developing from an instinctive to a rational, ethical form. Emulation is treated consistently from the personal point of view and is subdivided into conformity, rivalry, and hero-worship. <strong>In the case of so-called non-conformity there is</strong> not so much a personal protest against all social control as <strong>a conformity with some social group or set of ideas other than those immediately, physically present</strong>. Hero-worship is an imaginative construction of personal ideals which become true and effective social forces. (Vincent 1903: 560-561)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I take it that "preserving type" is a term borrowed from Giddings. The issue of nonconformity summarized.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p561a"></a>Leadership is characterized, not as the creation of original ideas, but as vivid definition and organization of vague tendencies already existent. <strong>The leader must have the power to construct in imagination by sympathy the personal lives of his followers</strong>. The leader is a true social cause, as independent as a cause can be which is a part of a living whole; "impersonal tendency" is a mere abstraction, and while the phrase may be used, the examination of such tendencies will always disclose personal nuclei. (Vincent 1903: 561)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again, eerily similar to La Barre's take on the cult of the leader.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p561b"></a>Freedom is "<u>opportunity for right development.</u>" Restraint is narrowing or contraction of personality. <strong>The person is seldom in conscious conflict with his social <em>milieu</em> because he realizes his higher personal ideals by means of it</strong>. Growth of freedom involves certain stress and strain with incidental degeneracy which can never be wholly eliminated, but may be indefinitely reduced. (Vincent 1903: 561)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I didn't get that at all.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="vincent03p562"></a>As a destructive criticism alike of the artificial individualism which we have inherited from the last two centuries and of the sociological concepts which <strong>Mr. Spencer and the "<u>social forces and tendencies</u>" school</strong> have popularized, this book renders effective service. The old hard-and-fast distinctions, the clean-cut logical counters "individual" and "society" are badly blurred and fused. Under this concrete, detailed study of the person new complexities emerge and the old, simple labels seem pitifully inadequate. (Vincent 1903: 562)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If that was Spencer's deal then Cooley didn't get away from Spencer enough.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="house56"></a>House, Floyd N. 1956. Review of <em>The Two Major Works of Charles H. Cooley</em>. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 62(2): 227-228. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2773366">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="house56p227"></a>Scarcely a textbook prepared in recent years for the "<u>general introductory course</u>" in sociology lacks allusions to - and usually quotations from - what Cooley wrote on the primary group and the looking-glass self. Indeed, these concepts, modified somewhat in the brilliant writings of George Mead and <strong>Ellsworth Faris</strong>, are today features of the generally accepted sociological frame of reference. (House 1956: 227)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ellsworth_Faris">Ellsworth Faris</a> "<u>was an influential sociologist of the Chicago school</u>".</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="house56p227ja228"></a>I suspect, however, that <strong>many of the younger sociologists of today and promising graduate students, facing today's massive sociological literature, have never paid much attention to Cooley's original texts</strong>. That the original editions of <em>Social Organization</em> and <em>Social Process</em> and the 1922 revision of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> have been allowed to go out <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> of print is evidence that they have not been in very great demand in recent years. (House 1956: 227-228)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Seems likely, yeah, given the scarce amount of secondary literature.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="eliasberg56"></a>Eliasberg, W. G. 1956. Review of <em>Social Organization and Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science</em> 4794): 474. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1140436">10.2307/1140436</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1140436">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="eliasberg56p474"></a>Cooley's interests and readings, as is well known, were as much outside the pale of academic psychology as inside. <strong>Goethe, Thoreau, James, De Tocqueville, Brice were among the wellsprings of his sociology</strong>. (Eliasberg 1956: 474)</blockquote><!--
--><p>True.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="titiev57"></a>Titiev, Mischa 1957. Review of <em>The Two Major Works of Charles H. Cooley</em> and Borgatta; Meyer (eds)., <em>Sociological Theory</em>. <em>American Anthropologist</em> 59(2): 388-389. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/665270">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="titiev57p388a"></a>There is something to be gained by reading the works of a great man in the form in which he originally issued them; bu tin one sense <strong>Cooley has suffered the fate of all pioneers whose penetrating ideas, original in their own day, have become part of the stock-in-trade of modern practitioners</strong>. Today, even the most pedantic and routine sociologists are likely to have incorporated into their thinking, writings, and lectures, much that was fresh and original when first presented by Cooley. (Titiev 1957: 388)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley's ideas have become some commonplace that it may be difficult to grasp their original uniqueness.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="titiev57p388b"></a>Cooley, whose books appeared in the first decade of this century, made several outstanding contributions to social sciences. He was <strong>the first to recognize the importance of the face-to-face primary group</strong>; he was quick to realize the difference between inherited biological behavior and learned cultural conditioning; and he was one of the leaders in stressing the value of studying objectively the behavior of infants as they became socialized. It may even be argued that he anticipated the field of psychosomatics, since <strong>he recognized that such things of the mind as ideas and emotions may influence the workings of the physical body</strong>. (Titiev 1957: 388)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "primary group" must have been in another work (here it was only hinted at, was my impression); the psychosomatics I didn't notice at all.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="titiev57p388ja389"></a>Despite his personal failings and the paucity of world-wide sociological data available in his day, Cooley still holds a commanding position in some fields of sociology. This is made evident by the number of times he is represented in <em>Sociological Theory</em>. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>Ten passages from Cooley's writings are included in the volume edited by Borgatta and Meyer</strong>, and all but one first appeared in the works reprinted by The Free Press. By contrast, there are only six extracts from Durkheim, five from Linton, and four from Simmel. <strong>The editors have been eclectic rather than unitary in their approach</strong>, and there are excerpts from sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists and philosophers. (Titiev 1957: 388-389)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Borgatta, Edgar F.; Meyer, Henry J. (eds.), 1956. <em>Sociological Theory: Present-day Sociology from the Past</em>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="vincent09"></a>Vincent, George E. 1909. Review of <em>Social Organization, a Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 15(3): 414-418. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2762521">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p414a"></a>Designed from the standpoint of method to place in a larger setting the social person treated in the author's <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>, this second volume is even more striking as a survey of modern society in Western Europe and the United States. In a way the book is a series of lucid and discriminating essays upon the chief social problems of the day. But it is more, for running through the whole is a theory which gives unity to a wide range of topics. <strong>The thesis worked out in the earlier volume that individual and society are both abstractions from a single life process, is reiterated and amplified in the later</strong>. To this theory is added the leading idea that <strong>organization is the clue to social evolution and the hope of future progress</strong>. (Vincent 1909: 414)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Isn't one of his books titled literally <em>Social Process</em>?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p414b"></a>Thirty-seven chapters, grouped into five parts, deal consecutively with <strong>face-to-face groups</strong> which are described <strong>as the source of primary ideals</strong>, e.g., loyalty, truth, sorvice, lawfulness, etc.; show how <strong>by communication these groups are unified over vast areas and how public opinion is co-operatively created by leaders and the masses</strong>; then analyze castes and classes with discussions of <strong>capitalistic ascendency</strong>, organization of workers, the problem of poverty and the character of class hostility; next define institutions in relation to individuals, to progress, and to disorganization with special reference to the family, the church, business, education, and art; and finally treat <strong>the public will as a slowly emerging force</strong>, finding only partial expression in government, and groping toward a more rational guidance of social evolution. (Vincent 1909: 414)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Some themes did carry over. I'm especially interested in "capitalist ascendency". Ascendency was treated a little in this one but could definitely go further. His take on public opinion is no doubt awfully naive.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p415a"></a>Professor Cooley is emphatic about the nature of the public mind and of public opinion. "<u>Descartes might have said we think, <em>cogitamus</em>, on as good grounds as he said <em>cogito</em></u>" (p. 9). One should not be disturbed by differences, dissensions, and conflicts in social groups, or look for identity, like-mindedness, constant consensus. "<u><strong>The unity of the social mind consists not in agreement but in organization</strong></u>" (p. 4), although in order that minds may influence each other and so co-operate there must of course be an underlying likeness of nature. "<u>That all minds are different is a condition, not an obstacle to <strong>the unity that consists in a differentiated and co-operative life</strong></u>" (p. 11). This is a frank way of meeting the common objection that the social mind never achieves more than a partial unanimity, is often a majority lording it over a minority. (Vincent 1909: 415)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Totality is the unity of manifold</em> type deal. Cooley probably made the same point with his treatment of rivalry, and merely expanded it here.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p415b"></a>Consciousness is said to have three phases: self-consciousness or what I think of myself; social consciousness (in its individual aspect) or what I think of other people; and public consciousness, or <strong>a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicating group</strong>" (p. 12). It is hard to see where this third form would have its seat. There seems to be danger of objectifying such a concept until it becomes a thing abstract and lifeless. It reminds one of the <em>Zeitgeist</em> and other elusive notions of the early <em>Völkerpsychologie</em>. If Professor Cooley regards this "collective view" as a phase of personal consciousness <strong>the terms are not happy and are open to the charge of vagueness</strong>. (Vincent 1909: 415)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Triadism to my liking.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p415c"></a>As to the relative susceptibility of rural and urban populations to the crowd influence, Professor <strong>Cooley</strong> takes issue squarely with Ross. The former <strong>regards country-folk as more easily swept away by the mob spirit. Ross declares the city crowd is less likely to keep its head</strong>. (Vincent 1909: 415)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A familiar debate.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p416"></a>Professor Cooley combats the "dead-level" theory which DeTocqueville associated with democracy, and which modern communication, by the rapid diffusion of uniform suggestions, is supposed to create. There are said to be "<u>two kinds of <strong>individuality</strong>, one <strong>of isolation and</strong> one <strong>of choice</strong> - modern conditions foster the latter while they efface the former</u>" (p. 93). That is, provincialism is doomed while the swift diffusion of countless ideas increases the chance of discovering and developing special aptitudes and latent variations. (Vincent 1909: 416)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Voluntary isolation would be individuality of choice.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="vincent09p418"></a>It is not easy to sum up in a paragraph the purpose and value of a book like <em>Social Organization</em>. It is not primarily a textbook, although it will prove valuable as collateral reading in courses on social theory. It lacks on the one hand the technical arrangement and apparatus for the work of the classroom, and on the other the "source" material now so much in demand to supplement library facilities. Nor can the volume be regarded as research in social psychology or psychological sociology. This statement should perhaps be qualified to this extent. <strong>As an illuminating organization of material generally familiar it does constitute a contribution</strong>. The chief service of the book will be to present to reflective readers who are likely to be repelled by technical sociology a clear and convincing interpretation of modern life in terms of the new psycholoy, personal and social. (Vincent 1909: 418)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhere between science and philosophy.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kelsey09"></a>Kelsey, Carl 1909. Review of <em>Social Organization</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social science</em> 34(2): 212-213. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1011228">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey09p212a"></a>I do not know when I have read a book marked by such even quality. The author's thought is on a high plain. His insight clear, his attitude very fair and unprejudiced. <strong>There is no striving for bizarre effects in language or style. It is not brilliant</strong>. It is a serious and thought provoking study which escapes being heavy or monotonous. The author is to be complimented. (Kelsey 1909: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhat backhanded.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey09p212b"></a>I recall that in criticizing Professor Cooley's earlier volume, "<u>Human Nature and the Social Organism,</u>" I objected to his seeming elimination of the physical. Such criticism Dr. Cooley now forestalls by saying that he supposes <strong>each person may discuss those aspects of society he feels he understands</strong>. (Kelsey 1909: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad. There is indeed a myriad of avenues to study society.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey09p213a"></a>Self and society are twin born, they are different aspects of the same thing. <strong>Human nature is essentially the same in all ages and places</strong>. "<u>The ideal of moral unity I take to be the mother, as it were, of all social ideals.</u>" So we have our great primary groups such as the family which is permanent no matter what froms it may assume or what changes it undergoes. We are coming now to see that "<u>in general the wrongs of the social system come much more from inadequacy than from ill intention.</u>" In other words, social machinery must be changed. (Kelsey 1909: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is not a direct quote so I'm hoping that Kelsey paraphrases a lot away.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kelsey09p213b"></a>This leads to the consideration in Part III of the Democratic Mind. "<u>The central part in history, from a psychological point of view, may be said to be <strong>the gradual enlargement of social consciousness and rational co-operation</strong>.</u>" Democracy does not mean as many have feared, the rule of the mob. Routine activities are caused by specialists. The people can choose personalities wisely, but will not pass intelligent judgment on technical questions. Hence even the referendum has limited application. <strong>Specialists must immediately abide by the verdict of their associates - only indirectly controlled by the body at large</strong>. The masses contribute sentiment. Crowds may be right as well as wrong. Ideals of brotherhood and service are growing. (Kelsey 1909: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first point is on par with Stapledon's outlook. On the second point I already got a bit heated over his treatment of the role of specialists in rivalry, which may be viewed as an overt blueprint of Cooley's more covert thinking on other matters.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="loos09"></a>Loos, Isaac A. 1909. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Economic Bulletin</em> 2(2): 171-172. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/222143">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="loos09p171"></a>Under Primary Aspects of Organization are considered social and individual aspects of mind; primary groups, such as the family, play-ground, and neighborhood; and primary ideals in their origin, embracing a consideration of concepts of loyalty, truth, service, kindness, lawfulness, freedom, and an extension of these primary ideals as they underlie democracy and Christianity. <strong>Communication our author regards as a fundamental characteristic of human nature</strong>. Its growth is traced, from pre-verbal communication through the rise of speech to the invention of printing, by <strong>bold sketches of the succeeding stages in human intercourse</strong>. In the author's opinion <strong>individuality does not tend to be sacrificed to dead-level uniformity in the progress of the human mind</strong>. (Loos 1909: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Some context for Spencer's "dead-level".</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="loos09p171ja172"></a>Probably the best portion of the book is the third which is devoted to a discussion of The Democratic Mind. He breaks bravely with the often expressed view that group opinion is <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> inferior to individual opinion. "<u>A little common sense and observation will show that <strong>the expression of a group is nearly always superior for the purpose in hand to the average capacity of its members</strong></u>" (p. 124). (Loos 1909: 171-172)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Likely the main point in contemporary polemics.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="loos09p172"></a>In devoting a separate part to Public Will as distinguished from the Democratic Mind, he aims to direct attention to <strong>public will as the deliberate self-direction of any social group as distinguished from the conscious and unconscious processes which blend in any treatment of the social mind</strong>. Social wrongs, as he points out, are not commonly willed at all. Government is conspicuously the expression of public will, but it is not its only agent. (Loos 1909: 172)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Looks interesting. And this is the second reviewer who doesn't mention whas those other expressions of public will are.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ellwood10"></a>Ellwood, Charles A. 1910. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>International Journal of Ethics</em> 20(2): 228-230. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2376864">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="ellwood10p228"></a>Those whose estimate of sociology has been formed largely through their knowledge of Herbert Spencer and other writers of his school, will find a pleasant surprise in this book. The older sociology was physical and even materialistic. <strong>The new sociology is frankly dependent upon psychology</strong>. It is, indeed, frequently not to be distinguished from psychology except in <strong>its point of view</strong>, which <strong>is</strong> not that of individual consciousness, but that of <strong>the collective life</strong>. (Ellwood 1910: 228)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley opposed to Spencer.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="ellwood10p229"></a>In spite of the fact that many other forms of association exist in the complex social life of the present, "<u>the fact that <strong>the family and neighborhood groups</strong> are ascendant in the open and plastic time of childhood makes them even now incomparably more influential than all the rest.</u>" These groups, then, <strong>are the springs of life</strong>, not only for the individual, but for social institutions. They especially <strong>give rise to our social ideals, which become the motive and test of social progress</strong>. Our notions of love, freedom, justice and the like are goffet very largely from life in these primary groups. (Ellwood 1910: 229)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Context for "primary groups".</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="ellwood10p230"></a>In Part II Professor <strong>Cooley gives, for the first time</strong> in sociological literature, strange as it may seem, <strong>full an adequate recognition of "communication" as a fundamental fact in the social life</strong>. Through communication, or all forms of interstimulation and response by means of symbols, the moral and spychical unity of society is made possible. "<u>By means of this structure (the social communicating apparatus), the individual is a member not only of a family and a class and a state, but of a larger whole reaching back to prehistoric men whose thought has gone to build it up. <strong>In this whole he lives as an element drawing from it the materials of his growth, and adding to it whatever constructive thought he may possess</strong>.</u>" From this point of view Professor Cooley discusses the enlargement and perfection of means of communication in modern life and the resulting effect upon government, religion, and culture. (Ellwood 1910: 230)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah, so there's his unique contribution!</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="monroe10"></a>Monroe, Will S. 1910. Review of <em>Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods</em> 7(2): 50-51. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2010904">10.2307/2010904</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010904">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="monroe10p50"></a>In a previous book on "Human Nature and Social Order" Professor Cooley presented <strong>society as it exists in the social nature of man</strong>; in the present volume, on the other hand, <strong>he conceives life as one human whole, and approaches it from the mental rather than from the material side</strong>. "<u>If we cut it up,</u>" he says in his preface, "<u>it dies in the process; and so I conceive that the various branches of research that deal with this whole are properly distinguished by <strong>chance in the point of sight rather than by any division in the thing seen</strong>.</u>" Hence, the view-point of the author in the book before us is focused on <strong>the enlargement and the diversification of intercourse</strong>. (Monroe 1910: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again, congenial to Stapledon, on both counts (wholeness of life, point of view)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="monroe10p51"></a>Professor Cooley's method of approach is what he calls <strong>sympathetic introspection, in which the student puts himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons</strong> and allows them to awake in himself a life similar to their own, "<u>which he afterwards, to the best of his ability, recalls and describes.</u>" (Monroe 1910: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Okay. Somewhat woo.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="sellars43"></a>Sellars, Roy Wood 1943. Review of <em>Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory</em> by E. C. Jandy. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 49(1): 81-83. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2770713">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sellars43p82a"></a>The continuing influence of Goethe, Emerson, Thoreau, Bryce, and Darwin upon Cooley's way of thinking is substantiated in detail; and yet the originality of the man in his chosen field is not thereby diminished. One sees ever more clearly how <strong>he brooded upon and felt the complex matrix of social relations</strong> and how he quickly moved beyond biological analogies to the empirical realities of social psychology. Jandy brings out clearly the fact that <strong>it was this man's artistic sensitiveness which made him aware of facts which more obtuse people could hardly glimpse</strong>. It is sometimes forgotten that the artist is an acute observer of compositions and values whose existence can surely not be denied, since they constitute the very nature of a work of art, but which are not readily apprehended by unprepared and unattuned minds. (Sellars 1943: 82)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Strong aesthetics woo.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sellars43p82b"></a>Cooley's well-kept diary is a mine of information on the early years. It took him long to find himself and his life-work. He was not pressed by his father to make up his mind, and so he tried one thing after another until the right subject appeared. It is clear that <strong>he had unusual opportunities</strong>, in many ways like those of William James, <strong>to travel and make social contacts</strong>. But, to use his own later terminology, his was <strong>an endogeneous personality, extremely sensitive and introspective and yet withal perspicaciously interested in the social scene</strong>. This introspective quality he counterbalanced in some measure by his training as an engineer and as a statitician. (Sellars 1943: 82)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As if probing for the metaphorical "looking-glass theory of self" in Cooley's biography.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sellars43p82c"></a>The part devoted to theory is at once expository and controversial. Here Jandy moves with competence, as both his handling of such topics as <strong>the growth of the self, and the self-idea</strong>, primary groups and social classes, and his excellent Bibliography show. Always, the journal is used to throw additional light. A good instance of this use is to be found in his discussion of the term "primary group." I found illuminating his treatment of the genesis of the self-idea, <strong>beginning with James and Baldwin and proceeding through Cooley to Mead</strong>. (Sellars 1943: 82)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Jandy, Edward Clarence 1942. <em>Charles Horton Cooley: His Life and His Social Theory</em>. New York: Dryden Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Charles-Horton-Cooley-Social-Theory/dp/B0007DZ7SK">$45.00</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="sellars43p83"></a>My impression is that <strong>Cooley reflected the philosophical climate of the time and of his favorite sources of suggestion</strong> but that he was not an overt idealist in any technical sense, let alone a solipsist. It must be remembered that the organic, or objective, idealism of the time was not strong in epistemology. There was much of the so-called objective mind about it and little clarity as to how one passed back and forth between objective mind and private mind. And it is probable that Cooley long felt that the social mind could be known by individuals only as they creatively reproduced this social mind in terms of the ideas of other selves. <strong>Do we not know <em>through</em> ideas?</strong> For a very long time Cooley rather avoided epistemological distinctions and the methodological problems tied up with them. (Sellars 1943: 83)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Was Cooley at fault with his use of "idea" similar to Locke? I.e. his own use might have been congruent but gave off misunderstandings?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--c02 Slice-AmericanSociologicalReview-1970
--><h4><a id="slice70"></a>Slice, Austin Van der 1970. Review of <em>Cooley and Sociological Analysis</em> by A. J. Reiss. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 35(1): 127-128. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2093866">10.2307/2093866</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2093866">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="slice70p127a"></a>Professor Angell adds some fresh notes to the biography of his uncle and graduate mentor. In Cooley's writings he sees three major aspects: the emphasis on <strong>the mental faculty as the essence of society</strong>, the organic view, and the dynamic theme of tentative growth. (Slice 1970: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first one is most clear to me. The organic view is obtuse but understandable. The dynamic theme I'm not sure yet what that is in Cooley's work specifically.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="slice70p127b"></a>He tells us that Cooley wrote down his ideas each day on 4" by 6" slips of paper. He would brood over some problem and organize his jottings, which required only a few transitional sentences to complete a volume. <strong>The idea of the primary group was developed to fill a hiatus between the paragraphs on human nature and those on the growth of communication in his <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em></strong>. (Slice 1970: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What a weird man.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="slice70p127c"></a>In "Cooley and the Problem of Internalization," Talcott Parsons shows that Freud, Weber, and Durkheim - each starting with the Cartesian dichotomy of the knowing, thinking subject and the external world of objects - arrived at <strong>a position which saw the necessity of bringing the personality and the social and cultural systems into a unified whole</strong>. In the United States William James was independently arriving at the same point by another route. James came to regard not only the external world but also the "self" as objects. He also developed the conception of the pluralism of the self. <strong>Cooley and Mead brought this line of thought into American sociology and built a bridge to Durkheim and Weber</strong>. (Slice 1970: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "organic view" of self and society, or heredity and culture, etc.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- c03 Gecas-AmericanJournalSociology-1980
--><h4><a id="gecas80"></a>Gecas, Viktor 1980. Review of <em>Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, Varieties, and Criticism</em> by Meltzer, Petras & Reynolds. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 85(6): 1458-1459. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2778397">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="gecas80p1458"></a><strong><em>Symbolic Interactionism</em></strong>, by Bernard Meltzer, John Petras, and Larry Reynolds, is a useful little book, especially for sociology students trying to make sense of the symbolic interactionist tradition. As a theoretical perspective, symbolic interactionism <strong>is not known for homogeneity, parsimony, or consensus among its practitioners</strong>. This concise book brings clarity and comprehension to symbolic interactionism by reviewing its philosophical and historical origins, examining its major varieties, and considering the criticisms which have been directed toward the perspective. (Gecas 1980: 1458)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Same could be said of ethnomethodology and various types of semiotics.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="gecas80p1458b"></a>The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the origin and development of such basic interactionist ideas as the social origins of the self and human nature, self-reflection as the basis for symbolic interaction, and the view that action is a construction rather than simply a response. <strong>These are traced through the writings of W. James, C. H. Cooley, J. Dewey, W. I. Thomas, and G. H. Mead and grounded in the pragmatic philosophy of Peirce, James, and Dewey</strong>. (Gecas 1980: 1458)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Meltzer, Bernard N.; Petras, John W.; Reynolds, Larry T. 1975. <em>Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, varieties and criticism</em>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/symbolicinteract0000melt_c2a0">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="gecas80p1458c"></a>Part 2 deals with contemporary varieties of symbolic interactionism, especially four of the most prominent: the Chicago school, the Iowa school, the dramaturgical approach, and ethnomethodology. These four orientations, diverse as they are, <strong>all share the view that human beings construct their realities in a process of social interaction</strong>. Each orientation also accepts, to some degree, the methodological consequence of this position, that is, <strong>the necessity of "getting inside" the reality of the actor in order to understand what is going on</strong>. (Gecas 1980: 1458)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "sympathetic introspection" is palpable.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="gecas80p1459"></a>The main outsider criticism is the astructural bias in symbolic interactionism - the justifiable claim that the perspective is largely ahistorical, noneconomic, and <strong>has a limited view of social power and social organization</strong>. (Gecas 1980: 1459)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Which is odd, because Cooley deals with both.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- c04 Bruce-BritishJournalSociology-1988
--><h4><a id="bruce88"></a>Bruce, Steve 1988. Review of <em>Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method</em> by Herbert Blumer. <em>The British Journal of Sociology</em> 39(2): 292-295. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/590791">10.2307/590791</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/590791">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bruce88p292"></a>There is a lot to be said for the proposition that value and fecundity are inversely related in social theory. One of the best examples is Herbert Blumer, a superb teacher and supervisor who had something worthwhile to say and said it briefly. When he retired he promised to write a book elaborating and refining <strong>W. I. Thomas' 'definition of the situation' dictum</strong>; ten years later we are still waiting. <strong>For twenty years this slip collection of essays</strong>, available in hardback, <strong>represented almost all of Blumer's published work</strong>. (Bruce 1988: 292)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This famous dictum apparently being that "<u>if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences</u>", which is just a single step removed from Cooley's take on the collective "social".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bruce88p293"></a>The second premise is important because it distinguishes SI from philosophical realism and psychological reductionism. SI does not regard 'meaning as emanating from the intrinsic make-up of the thing that has meaning, nor does it see meaning as arising through a coalescence of psychological elements in the person' (p. 4). 'The meaning of everything and anything has to be formed, learned and transmitted through <strong>a process of indication</strong> - a process that is necessarily a social process' (p. 12). Although meaning is imputed, it is not an idiosyncratic creation. Unless one is to be confined to the madness of one's own world, meaning is a social production. Reality, even physical reality, is constructed but it is a social construction. (Bruce 1988: 293)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This does certainly sound like Blumer.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bruce88p295"></a><strong>SI</strong> was never a theory or even a school. It <strong>is a series of linked premises about the nature of social action and identity</strong> which gives rise to a particular apporach to explanation (<strong>what reasons do people have for their actions?</strong>) and a particular research style (get close to the people you study, understand their world). (Bruce 1988: 295)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These do seem to proceed from Cooley.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- c05 Joas-BOOKREVIEWFORUM-2005
--><h4><a id="joasmillding05"></a>Joas, Hanz; Miller, Gale; DingWall, Robert 2005. Review of <em>Handbook of Symbolic Interactionism</em> by Reynolds & Herman-Kinney. <em>Symbolic Interaction</em> 28(4): 597-604. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/si.2005.28.4.597">10.1525/si.2005.28.4.597</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/si.2005.28.4.597">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="joasmillding05p597a"></a>I find Larry Reynolds' decision completely reasonable - that is, to follow an older proposal by Jerome Manis and Bernard Meltzer and identify five main precursors: <strong>evolutionism, German idealism, Scottish moralism, pragmatism, and functional psychology</strong>. Cooley, Mead, and Thomas are presented as the most important early representatives. The entire handbook demonstrates <strong>a revival of interest in Cooley, who has often been unfairly marginalized in other reconstructions of the hestory of "social" or "sociological pragmatism."</strong> (Joas, Miller & Dingwall 2005: 597)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Familiar suspects. How distinct are Scottish moralism and functional psychology?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="joasmillding05p597b"></a>An unusual and original contribution in this part comes from Robert Prus. His interest is in <strong>the long philosophical "pre-history" of the fundamental motifs in symbolic interactionist thought</strong>, and he is right that <strong>it makes sense to relate</strong>, for example, <strong>the pragmatist venture to Aristotle's philosophy</strong>. But I would have preferred a more thorough discussion of one such connection over a necessarily hasty glance at a great number of philosophical figures. (Joas, Miller & Dingwall 2005: 597)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Prus's "<a href="https://books.google.ee/books?id=bjkTxML-wpEC&printsec=frontcover&hl=et#v=onepage&q&f=false">Ancient Forerunners</a>" sounds very interesting, though it cannot be read in full.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="joasmillding05p598"></a>I am a bit unhappy, however, to see that he has considerably increased his <strong>emphasis on "choice"</strong> - a concept crucial for a different school, the rational choice approach, and to me <strong>frequently implausible with regard to the phenomenology of human experience</strong> (for example, the emergence of our value commitments). But part four goes beyond the three main concepts and includes interesting studies about symbols, objects, and meanings by John Hewitt and chapters about "motives" by Cheryl and Daniel Albas, to name just a few. (Joas, Miller & Dingwall 2005: 598)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Uh, Cooley had a pretty healthy discussion of choice, will, and habit.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="joasmillding05p599"></a>It may be a linguistic problem that caused the editors to take almost nothing from this work into consideration - aside from a very few references to English-language publications of non-American authors. But this leads to serious distortions regarding the state of the art. I could give many examples. There is no doubt in my mind that <strong>the most innovative and comprehensive study on Charles Cooley is in German (by Hans-Joachim Schubert</strong>). It is not even mentioned here. Florian Znaniecki appears as W. I. Thomas's collaborator, but after their collaboration he seems to disappear from the screen, although his work gave rise to important traditions of Polish sociology. Lothar Krappmann's work on self and identity, one of the best ever written, is as neglected as the writings of Louis Quéré in France. Given the enormous importance of Mead for Jürgen Habermas, one would have liked to find references to his contribution to the developmental conception of self-formation here. Theoretical work based on symbolic interactionism and pragmatism in Europe is mostly ignored. (Joas, Miller & Dingwall 2005: 599)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The Americans being schooled. </p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- c06 Schubert-AmericanJournalSociology-2007
--><h4><a id="schubert07"></a>Schubert, Hans-Joachim 2007. Review of <em>Charles Horton Cooley: Imagining Social Reality</em> by Glenn Jacobs. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 113(2): 600-602. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/522412">10.1086/522412</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/522412">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="schubert07p600"></a>Cooley was a prominent member of the founding generation of American sociologists. He created a general sociological theory of social action, social order, and social change, a project he eventually accomplished with his trilogy <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> ([1902] Shocken 1964), <em>Social Organization</em> ([1909] Shocken 1963), and <em>Social Process</em> ([1918] Southern Illinois University Press 1966). <strong>Cooley's exceptional position in early American and European sociology lies in his point of origin - communication theory</strong>. Cooley's theoretical "<u>concept of the social,</u>" according to Jacobs, is "<u>based on the properties of communication</u> (p. 12). Men must - due to the plasticity of their nature - communicate with the help of standardized or significant symbols to coordinate actions and to develop a self. "<u>The social organism,</u>" according to Cooley, "<u>coheres by communicating</u>" (p. 107). (Schubert 2007: 600)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A little misnomer: there was no "communication theory" in 1901.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="schubert07p600ja601"></a>Jacobs clarifies that Cooley, in the term <em>communication</em>, means not only the rational resolution of validity claims (context <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> of justification), but also a creative act of bringing forth new ideas (context of discovery). For Cooley, social order consists of <strong>a constant "<u>imaginative reconstruction</u>" of meaning</strong>. "<u>Cooley embeds creatively in society, and society in creativity</u>" (p. 4). "<u>Creativeness is the integument of all of Cooley's thought and of the influences upon it. [...] His exaltation of creativeness sets him apart from his predecessors, his contemporaries, even his successors</u>" (p. 3). It is for this reason that Jacob's question is so interesting: "<u>If not Spencer, Ward, Giddings, and company, then who? <strong>From what does Cooley's framing of the social derive? The short answer is belles lettres and pragmatism</strong></u>" (p. 52). In the main chapter of his book, Jacobs attempts to lay open these two "<u>sources of inspiration</u>" of Cooley's work. (Schubert 2007: 600-601)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Creativity and imagination not exactly the same.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="schubert07p602"></a>While Cooley, in his sociological work, cites principally American and German idealists, Jacobs sees - supported by Cooley's diaries - a clear influence on the part of Montaigne and Pater. Has Cooley developed an analytical concept of creativity out of the literary writings and critiques on aesthetics of Montaigne and Pater? According to Jacobs, <strong>Cooley was influenced by the "<u>fragmentary format</u>" of Montaigne's writings and by his method of "<u>autobiographical discursiveness</strong></u>" (p. 138). Cooley's sociological work does not, however, consist of fragments. His sociology books are systematically constructed and in their entirety form a coherent sociological theory. (Schubert 2007: 602)</blockquote><!--
--><p>There was just a passage here about Cooley inventing the concept of "primary groups" to fill the space between two fragments.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d01 Wolfe-AmericanEconomicReview-1920
--><h4><a id="wolfe20"></a>Wolfe, A. B. 1920. Review of <em>Social Process</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The American Economic Review</em> 10(3): 576-571. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1809051">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wolfe20p567a"></a>The main interest of the economist in this work will naturally attach to Professor Cooley's treatment of valuation and to his continued pointed attack upon <strong>the economic interpretation of history</strong>. (Wolfe 1920: 567)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another complaint of ahistoricism.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wolfe20p567b"></a>But it has always been difficult to decide, however, whether his work is sociology or ethics, and it is just at this point that "hard-boiled" critics might assail him; for this book, like <strong>the entire theoretical part of <em>Social Organization</em> is shot through and through with an idealism which some methodologists would hold incompatible with a scientific treatment</strong>. (Wolfe 1920: 256)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Understandable.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d02 Craig-JournalPhilosophyPsychology-1919
--><h4><a id="craig19"></a>Craig, Wallace 1919. Review of <em>Social Process</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods</em> 16(17): 473-474. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2939958">10.2307/2939958</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2939958">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="craig19p473"></a>The unifying theme which gives the book its title, and which is most explicitly treated in the first and the last (seventh) parts, is the same that ran through the author's two previous books. <strong>All the facts of human life are parts of a process which is organic, social, living and growing</strong>. In order to understand a living process the investigator needs to participate in it; when not an actual participant he should imagine himself in it, with the sympathetic insight of the artist, the dramatist. (Craig 1919: 473)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A growing process.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="craig19p474"></a><strong>The ideal market would be an institution for the measurement and exchange of values of every sort</strong>. Why is it that our actual market falls so far short of the ideal, that it so often measures values falsely, and that it fails in great degree to measure the higher values at all? The answer is that the imperfections of the market, like the imperfections of any other institution, are due largely to historical origins, to lack of flexibility, and to administration by a special class of persons. Pecuniary valuation can be improved, not by taking the higher values out of the market, but by putting them into it. And conversely, <strong>the higher values, such as those of scholarship, can be more justly appraised and more adequately paid for only by getting them into the market</strong>. (Craig 1919: 474)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The ideal market would consider more factors than pecuniary value. (Including labor value?)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d03 Young-JournalSocialForces-1925
--><h4><a id="young25"></a>Young, Kimball 1925. Review of <em>The Basis of Social Theory</em> by Balz & Pott. <em>The Journal of Social Forces</em> 3(2): 359-361. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3005311">10.2307/3005311</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3005311">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="young25p359ja360"></a>In the opening chapter Professor Balz maintains, following the lead of Dewey and others, that <strong>the fundamental datum of psychology is really the social situation</strong> which includes the individuals and the necessary physical objects in differential juxtapositions. Psychology must constantly recognize <strong>the fact of group life</strong> if it is to contribute to the social sciences. The older "strict" psychology which borrowed its standpoint <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and technique from physics and from physiology of a half-century ago must give way to the more thorough recognition of the close interrelation of person to person in the origin and function of consciousness and behavior. Society is not an aggregation of individuals coming together from their peculiar separateness to form groups. <strong>The individual, in fact, as Cooley long ago showed is the highest product of group life</strong>. (Young 1925: 359-360)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The individual is a product of their society, etc.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="young25p360"></a>So too, the author well indicates the falso separation of the environment into "physical" and "psychic" or social. For the new-born infant there is no such distinction. In fact, it is just here that one sees the strength of the contention that the data of psychology are not strictly segregable into that which concerns the individual in his group life, on the one side, and in his relations with the objective, physical world, on the other. <strong>Even our responses to the physical world are socially determined in very large measure, and certainly all the higher features of the human mind are the product of the inter-play of mind on mind in groups</strong>. (Young 1925: 360)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Same overall point in other words.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="young25p361"></a>Through the socialization of the instinctive tendencies, through the recognition of the "<u>crucial importance of intellience</u>" we may hope to evolve <strong>a society where the group life will be of such a nature that the highest form of individualization is made possible</strong>. This is what the author seems to mean by his hope in "<u>an increasingly rational and enlightened control of social processes.</u>" (Young 1925: 361)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And the same movement towards complex societies with complex personalities.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d04 Barnes-PoliticalScienceQuarterly-1925
--><h4><a id="barnes25"></a>Barnes, Harry Elmer 1925. Review of <em>The Basis of Social Theory</em> by Balz & Pott. <em>Political Science Quarterly</em> 40(1): 132-134. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2142412">10.2307/2142412</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2142412">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="barnes25p132"></a>This is an eminently sane, well balanced and useful book, reminding one in tone and attitude of such earlier works as <strong>Baldwin's <em>The individual and Society</em></strong>, and Cooley's <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>. The purpose of the work is twofold: to prove that the "<u>basis of social theory</u>" is <strong>a sound and comprehensive social psychology</strong>, and that any valid psychology must likewise be social psychology. In the opinion of the reviewer both of these contentions are adequately substantiated. (Barnes 1925: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Baldwin, James 1911. <em>The Individual and Society: or Psychology and Sociology</em>. London: Rebman Limited.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/b28107688/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="barnes25p133"></a>But this conception of fixity in human nature most be viewed in a genetic and relativistic manner. "<u>The notion of the fixity of human nature must be taken with sufficient plasticity to be accommodated to the fact. <strong>Man has evolved; so it may be said that the 'constant' traits are not constant at all</strong>. Fixity then does not mean ultimate immutable minds.</u>" This human nature gives us three phases of our equipment with progressively greater power of diversification and adaptation - reflexes, instinctive tendencies and innate capacities. (Barnes 1925: 133)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Man has evolved, is evolving, and keeps on evolving.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d05 House-AmericanJournalSociology-1933
--><h4><a id="house33"></a>House, Floyd N. 1933. Review of <em>Introductory Sociology</em> by Cooley, Angell & Juilliard. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 39(2): 250-251. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2766738">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="house33p250"></a>The result is very much what anyone who is familiar with the writings of Cooley might expect - a textbook strong on the psychological side, frankly using <strong>a subjective or introspective approach to sociological problems</strong>, and handling topics which lend themselves well to that approach in an extremely illuminating manner. (House 1933: 250)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Introspective sympathy.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d06 Brooks-BeginnersSociology-1934
--><h4><a id="brooks35"></a>Brooks, Lee M. 1935. For Beginners in Sociology. <em>Social Forces</em> 13(1): 152-154. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2570236">10.2307/2570236</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2570236">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="brooks35p152"></a>As for the appoarance lately of so many texts, it might be suspected that in addition to the coöperative process so manifest in joint authorship, other elaborated social processes like competition have played their part. Not to be outrun, authors and publishers alike want to give and get their share. <strong>New ideas and systems, or newly dressed old ones, mean new books</strong>. Yet, whether or not we are as guilty as the automotive industry, we are in fact pushing new models onto the market. At any rate some exceedingly good ones are coming out. (Brooks 1935: 152)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Cooley, Charles Horton; Angell, Robert Cooley; Carr, Lowell Juilliard 1933. <em>Introductory Sociology</em>. London: Charles Scribner's Sons.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.260670">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Reuter, Edward Byron; Hart, Clyde William 1933. <em>Introduction to Sociology</em>. New York: McGraw-Hill.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/introductiontoso00reut/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Osborn, Loran David; Neumeyer, Martin Henry 1933. <em>The Community and Society</em>. Cincinatti: American Book Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/communitysociety00osbo/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Bogardus, Emory Stephen 1917. <em>Introduction to Sociology</em>. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press. </u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/cu31924013899962/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="brooks35p153"></a>With the beginning student in mind, Professor Reuter and Hart have stressed social interaction. Their approach and conceptual order show the Chicago influence. The first three chapters deal with <strong>human nature and personality</strong>, and the next four with social forces and groups. Then follows a discussion of <strong>isolation, contact, interaction, competition, conflict</strong>, etc. The authors make no cleam for originality, but seek to explain rather than merely to describe; so emphasize general processes rather than to present factual details. (Brooks 1935: 153)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds interesting.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d07 Young-AmericanJournalPsychology-1941
--><h4><a id="young41"></a>Young, Kimball 1941. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by E. L. Thorndike. <em>The American Journal of Psychology</em> 54(3): 448-449. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1417702">10.2307/1417702</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1417702">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young41p448a"></a>Nearly forty years ago Charles Horton Cooley, the social psychologist, published a volume by the same title as the present one. <strong>I doubt that Professor Thorndike ever read Cooley</strong>. At any rate the two books differ considerably. Cooley's is full of insight into the subtleties of human nature, full of knowledge of society and culture, and full of faith in the democratic world which he envisaged. Thorndike's reveals a distinctly quantitative standpoint, discusses highly specific traits and motives with only a modicum of appreciation of social-cultural factors, and exposes <strong>a projection of wishful thinking as to the future society in terms of biologically determined differences among individuals</strong>. (Young 1941: 448)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sad.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young41p448b"></a>In 1902, when Cooley's work was printed, there was scarcely an academic psychologist, except G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, and William James, who designed to consider <strong>everyday human and social affairs</strong> as the proper topic of professional concern. Today psychologists, including the experimentalists, are blossoming out with discussions of societal problems on all fronts. Everyone, of course, takes up his new interest in terms of his own <strong>apperceptive mass</strong>, and one of the most recent converts to this 'new love' is the author of the work under review. (Young 1941: 488)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Everyday Life Studies.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young41p448c"></a>Thorndike attempts to set up certain criteria in order to measure the adequacy or inadequacy of the <strong>civic, political, and economic behavior</strong> of individuals in our western society. (Young 1941: 448)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) economic, (2) political, and (3) civic.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d08 Terman-HumanNature-1941
--><h4><a id="terman41"></a>Terman, Lewis M. 1941. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by E. L. Thorndike. <em>Science</em> 94(2436): 236-238. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1668594">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="terman41p237"></a>Part I and Part II are essentially quite different. Part I is psychological throughout and is concerned almost exclusively with fields in which the author himself has made research contributions of high merit. Part II (600 pgaes) is not to any great degree psychological but gives <strong>the author's personal reactions on a vast miscellanea of problems in economics, political science and social welfare</strong>. The discussion of these problems, which lie so largely outside the realm of present-day psychological science, is rightly intended to emphasize the extent to which their solutions must take account of psychological phenomena. On a good many of the issues discussed in Part II the psychologist, as psychologist, can at present make little or no contribution. Some of the discussions could as well have been written by a mathematician, chemist, biologist or lawyer. <strong>What Thorndike has to say is nearly always thought-provoking, whether he speaks primarily as psychologists or not, but it is probably these excursions into alien territory that will draw the most criticism</strong>. (Terman 1941: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds a bit like a know-it-all who considers themself an expert in everything.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="terman41p238"></a>It may well be, however, that a vigorous presentation of this point of view will serve as a useful antidote to the <strong>sentimental political and social philosophies</strong> that ignore or deny heredity differences and attribute magic influences to factors of environment. (Terman 1941: 238)</blockquote><!--
--><p>To me it comes across like Thorndike borrowed the title from Cooley to emphasize their differences.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d09 Parsons-AmericanSociologicalReview-1941
--><h4><a id="parsons41"></a>Parsons, Talcott 1941. Review of <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> by E. L. Thorndike. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 6(2): 277-282. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2085558">10.2307/2085558</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2085558">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="parsons41p277"></a>Professor Thorndike's new book is a very bulky one. It might be said to be <strong>the kind of book which is the privilege of an elder statesman of his subject to publish</strong>. It is not a research monograph, nor a textbook, nor even a system of theory. It contains rather his mature comments on the nature and general bearings of his field, and on a whole range of its possible application to social welfare. (Parsons 1941: 277)</blockquote><!--
--><p>400 pages of theory + 600 pages of stream of consciousness.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="parsons41p279"></a>On a different level somewhat the same is true of anthropology. <strong>He</strong> quotes such writers as Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Margaret Mead on occasion, but <strong>seems to have little awareness of the emergence of a distinctive way of approaching and analyzing human behavior in a social system from the anthropological work of about a generation ago</strong>. Somewhat the same is true of his use of sociological writers. To take two of the most notable theorists: Durkheim is not mentioned at all, and although there are four references to Pareto's work, they are all to particular empirical points; none refer to his systematic conceptual scheme. (Parsons 1941: 279)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What was that distinctive way? Participant observation?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="parsons41p280"></a>Undoubtedly the most highly developed conceptual scheme in this field has been that of <strong>psychoanalysis. In its earlier phases</strong> this <strong>was not well articulated with theory on the social level</strong>, but recent work has made great progress in developing fruitful interrelations, notably in the recent works of Karen Horney and <strong>Kardiner</strong>. (Parsons 1941: 280)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Abram Kardiner mention.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="parsons41p281"></a>Moreover, its perspective has been comparative in that it tries to understand why one human individual, usually a "<u>pathological case,</u>" behaves differently from others, rather than "<u><strong>why we behave like human beings</strong>.</u>" The genesis on the social level has been similar. Theory has started more from an attempt to diagnose leading features of the concrete social situation - Durkheim's use of suicide as a symptomatic index of the state of an "individualistic" society is an excellent example. (Parsons 1941: 281)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Before perusing JSTOR reviews of social psychology I had no idea so much of it was dedicated to criminality and degeneracy, whatever that is.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d10 Young-AnnalsAmericanAcademy-1937
--><h4><a id="young37"></a>Young, Kimball 1937. Review of <em>Social Psychology</em> by Freeman and <em>Elements of Social Psychology</em> by Gurnee. <em>The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</em> 192: 245-246. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1020842">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young37p245a"></a>Freeman's volume has three outstanding features. First, it shows, as do one or two other recent books in the same field, that <strong>the academic psychologist has at last discovered society and culture</strong>. (Young 1937: 245)</blockquote><!--
--><p>They were bound to, eventually.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young37p245b"></a>The discussion opens with a defense of "<u>individual psychology</u>" as "<u>the frame of reference for social psychology,</u>" for while the author recognizes the place of culture, <strong>he wishes to avoid any implication that the group or human association is anything but the fiction of fuzzy minds</strong>. The discussion of mechanisms follows traditional psychology, and the nexus between individual and culture is made through language. However, the treatment of language is inadequate, because the author is so obsessed with his antagonism to the group-mind concept that he fails to see that the processes of interaction and communication as discussed by George H. Mead and John dewey rest upon a sound basis which reckons with individuals <strong>interstimulating</strong> each other. And once this fact is grasped, most of the "worry" about "group mind" can be avoided. (Young 1937: 245)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool-ey.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="young37p245c"></a>Instead of describing and analyzing the manner in which current practices in our modern industrial world were built up, or their functional interrelationship as they influence the individual, he falls into the habit of expressing regret that exploitation exists, that the profit system keeps men in economic dependence, and that art has any other than a moral - that is, for him, a social - purpose. Therefore, whether the use of cultural and societal concepts by social psychologists recruited from the laboratory will lead, as it does here and elsewhere, to a general practice of interpreting material in terms of some particular political and economic philosophy remains to be seen. Within the next few years I should not be surprised to see <strong>a social psychology text which interprets the data from a fascist view</strong>. In other words, writers like Brown and Freeman are living examples of men whose dealing with social phenomena is colored by a particular social theory of our time. (Young 1937: 245)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sociologist with an ideology.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="young37p246"></a>The chapter on language is filled with psychologizing of the kind which a cultural anthropologist would avoid, such as the statement about the inferior quality of non-inflectional languages. This chapter would be considerably improved by reference to the work of <strong>E. B. Holt, I. Latif, J. F. Markey, E. Sapir, D. McCarthy, J. J. Piaget, and F. Lorimer</strong>, to note but a few important contributors. (Young 1937: 246)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Linguistics of the 1930s.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d11 Swanson-AmericanSociologicalReview-1953
--><h4><a id="swanson53"></a>Swanson, G. E. 1953. Review of <em>Social Psychology</em> by Solomon E. Asch. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 18(4): 439-440. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2087562">10.2307/2087562</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2087562">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="swanson53p439"></a>It is rare when the author of a recent text in social psychology returns again to a serious discussion of <strong>the plasticity of human biology, of the seeking, exploring character of human action, of the conditions of volition in behavior, or of the nature of self control</strong>. Such topics do, in truth, find their way into the pages of most texts. What is distinctive about Asch is his treatment of them as controversial centers for the organization of his work. (Swanson 1953: 439)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Asch, Solomon Elliott 1952. <em>Social Psychology</em>. Now York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialpsychology00asch/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="swanson53p439ja440"></a>Then follow consideration of the development of a personal identity in the individual and of a distinctive culture in the group, and the conditions which the predispositions of the individual are modified in interaction. The major focus is that of <strong>the psychologist using the fact of social experience to help explain the dynamics of the individual</strong>, rather than of the sociologist <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> forced to state certain assumptions about individual behavior in order to explain some pattern of interaction. There are exceptions to this judgment, but it represents the central tendency. (Swanson 1953: 439-440)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As opposed to the contrary route evidently taken by the likes of Thorndike.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="swanson53p440"></a>Does the fact of cultural relativism preclude the development of validated universal principles of social behavior? <strong>Are current</strong> reinforcement <strong>theories</strong> of behavior <strong>adequate for the explanation of</strong> what he calls the experience of "obligation" and <strong>what Cooley would have phrased as the "sentiments?"</strong> Is the ego fundamentally ego-centered? Are variations in the strength of the social bond explained by variations in the "private profit" gained by the individuals involved? Is it the scientist or his subjects who really perceive the world through highly simplified stereotypes? (Swanson 1953: 440)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Probably not.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d12 Odum-PoliticalScienceQuarterly-1948
--><h4><a id="odum48"></a>Odum, Howard W. 1948. Review of <em>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</em> by H. E. Barnes. <em>Political Science Quarterly</em> 63(3): 444-446. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2144791">10.2307/2144791</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2144791">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="odum48p444"></a>More specifically Professor Barnes's volume is presented as the history and status of systematic sociology, in contrast to the study of later sociology which approximates more nearly specialization in restricted field of description and analysis. <strong>Its 960 pages comprise "<u>the most comprehensive summary of systematic sociological writing in any language.</u>"</strong> (Odum 1948: 444)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Barnes, Harry Elmer 1917. <em>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</em>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.148499/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="odum48p445"></a>Professor Barnes gives a brief introductory note on French sociology preceding chapters on Fouillée, Tarde, Le Bon, Durkheim and De Greef. Part five treats the English sociologists since Spencer. Although Barnes asserts that there were only two outstanding sociologists in this group, namely, Hobhouse and Geddes, he has additional chapters on Kidd, Westermarck, Briffault, Graham Wallas, and Toynbee. In Part six on "Sociological Theory in America", he has chapters on <strong>Giddings, Small, Thomas, Stuckenberg, Ross, Cooley, Elwood, Hayes, Sorokin</strong>, and a final chapter on Mariano H. Cornejo written by L. L. Bernard who has specialized for many years in South American sociology. (Odum 1948: 445)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The last ~150 pages of the book are about Giddings, Thomas, Ross, etc.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d13 Myres-12-1951
--><h4><a id="myres51"></a>Myres, John L. 1951. Review of <em>An Introduction to the History of Sociology</em> by H. E. Barnes. <em>Man</em> 51: 9. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2795672">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="myres51p9a"></a>'English Sociology since Spencer' has also some omissions. It begins with Benjamin Kidd and ends with Arnold Toynhee; Leonard Hobhouse stands in a class by himself, well supported however by Patrick Geddes (with his loyal colleague Branford) and Graham Wallas; Briffault and Westermarck plough their lonely furrows, and th elatter is unlucky in his spokesman. Smuts is not even in the index, but occurs once in the text. <strong>It is characteristic of the amateurish Englishmen outside the older universities, which have taught sociology under other names, that so many who have contributed to our outlook in these matters rank as historians, economists, or anthropologists</strong>. In London, on the other hand, there was not room for both Hobhouse and Geddes. (Myres 1951: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As if a counter to the previous reviewer who complained of this.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="myres51p9b"></a>Finally, 'Sociological Theory in America' is represented by <strong>Giddings</strong>, who <strong>might</strong> almost <strong>rank as a 'pioneer'</strong>; Small, W. I. Thomas, Stuckenberg, Ross, Cooley, Ellwood, and Hayes; <strong>Sorokin</strong> took refuge in Minnesota, and was called to Harvard, but 'even Spengler excels him in historical judgment' - which is poor praise, and Spengler is below the line - and his vast <em>Social and Cultural Dynamics</em> '<strong>combines the faults of European and American social science</strong>.' (Myres 1951: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Judgments on Giddings and Sorokin.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d14 Davis-ScienceSociety-1959
--><h4><a id="davis59"></a>Davis, Arthur K. 1959. Review of <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em> by David. W. Noble. <em>Science & Society</em> 23(2): 179-183. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40400639">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="davis59p179ja180"></a>The book by a young midwestern historian deals with the formation of the climate of opinion of American liberalism around the turn of the <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> century. Among the key contributors to this body of thought, according to the author, were Croly, Lloyd, Patten, <strong>Cooley</strong>, Johnson, Ely, Rauschenbusch, Baldwin, and Veblen. <strong>A chapter is devoted to each of these men</strong>. (Davis 1959: 179-180)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Noble, David W. 1958. <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em>. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://books.google.ee/books?id=sn38fN2sbfsC&lpg=PR4&hl=et&pg=PA103#v=onepage&q&f=false">Google Books</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="davis59p180a"></a>The theme of the school of thought which Noble traces in his nine writers is <strong>a religious belief in progress and social regeneration</strong>. He sees this intellectual movement, which matured between 1890 and 1910, as a healthy contribution of the post-Civil War industrial revolution. The author thus challenges a widespread view that science and industrialism have had negative effects on American values by fostering relativism and even chaos. (Davis 1959: 180)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As with the internet in the 1990s, there was a brief period of optimism.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="davis59p180b"></a>What is meant by the "paradox of progressive thought?" Briefly stated, <strong>the unique New World democracy which stems from industrialism eventually tends to turn into an obsession for conformity and a self-righteous drive for world leadership and an American empire of manifest destiny</strong>. This theory, which leans heavily on Turner's famous frontier thesis, has been developed by L. Hartz and H. N. Smith. (Davis 1959: 180)</blockquote><!--
--><p>More or less where we are now.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="davis59p182"></a>Yet there is unquestionably a deep, though still unfocused, uneasiness among many sections of the American people. <strong>Something at the heart of things is terribly wrong - that much is dimly sensed</strong>. Perhaps that is the most hopeful feature of American affairs. (Davis 1959: 182)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Reminds me of Stapledon's various sleepwalpers, the automatons who know somewhere in the back of their heads that something is missing.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="davis59p183"></a>After all, most of those tendencies, in some form or other, are inherent in industrialism. They were cut off, or counteracted - temporarily, at least - by such influences as two easy and profitable world wars, imperialist successes, the decline of rival capitalist powers, the immense productivity of the American industrial system, <strong>the hothouse unity of the cold war</strong>. (Davis 1959: 183)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something phatic: the in-group feeling of being on a (preferred) side of the iron curtain.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d15 Homan-JournalPoliticalEconomy-1959
--><h4><a id="homan59"></a>Homan, Paul T. 1959. Review of <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em> by David W. Noble. <em>Journal of Political Economy</em> 67(1): 90-91. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1826706">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="homan59p90ja91"></a>Professor Noble explores the philosophical underpinnings of the progressive reform movement in the United States from roughly 1880 to 1920 in separate essays on Croly, the editor-philosopher; Baldwin, the social psychologist; Lloyd, the publicist; Cooley, the sociologist; Rauschenbusch, the preacher; and Ely, Patten, and Veblen, economists. But what he builds is a structure, not a mosaic. He searches out the elements they had in common: all were serious students of society in the scientific sense. At the same time, <strong>they were seeking for intimations of social improvement within the disruptive process of industrialization</strong>. Their central <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> problem was the origin, nature of, and prospects for moral behavior within the intellectual context of evolution and the social context of industrialism. (Homan 1959: 90-91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A general theme of the era.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="homan59p91a"></a>To support their belief in progress, they rescued man from the status of being only <strong>the plastic resultant of institutional regimentation</strong>, endowed him with an innate propensity toward the good, and granted him a capacity for ordering his own social destiny. The task involved killing off some intellectual enemies, notably classical economics and Herbert Spencer. They adopted <strong>the Aristotelian conception of evolution as the perfection of a pre-existing potential</strong> and the eighteenth-century primitivist conception of human nature as essentially good but deformed by institutions. Progress requires only the conjuncture of circumstances necessary to break the mold of constricting institutions. (Homan 1959: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something to consider with regard to the galaxy seed programme in the end of <em>L&FM</em>.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="homan59p91b"></a><strong>The vision of inevitable progress was shattered by World War I and subsequent events</strong>. Successors to the progressive philosophers were left confused, and lost the capacity for a systematic treatment of values. (Homan 1959: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Given.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d16 Cochran-AmericanHistoricalReview-1959
--><h4><a id="cochran59"></a>Cochran, Thomas C. 1959. Review of <em>The Paradox of Progressive Thought</em> by David. W. Noble. <em>The American Historical Review</em> 64(3): 673-674. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1905232">10.2307/1905232</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1905232">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cochran59p673"></a>"Liberal" thought is based on the premise of <strong>the inherent goodness of human nature</strong>. The paradox that Mr. Noble finds in progressive thinking is that this inherent goodness <strong>was to be released</strong> not by a return to the primitive, as advocated by the French philosophers of the eighteenth century or the American Turnerians of the late nineteenth, but <strong>by the mechanisms of a perfected industrial civilization</strong>. (Cochran 1959: 673)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pretty standard.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="cochran59p674"></a>Developing industrialism offered the prospect of a democratic society of plenty. These optimists felt sure that man, with God's help, could reform the institutions of the ages of scarcity and allow natural instincts for cooperation and workmanship to mould a good society. As Noble puts it, these Americans wanted "<u>freedom from history,</u>" a society that in some revolutionary way would demolish its own past. It is not surprising that this generation bequeathed not "<u>tools of understanding</u>" but <strong>useless affirmations</strong> to their successors. (Cochran 1959: 674)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like a parallel universe to what Lotman and Uspensky talk about in relation with the history of Russian culture. What really striked me here is the "affirmations", used in the same phatic sense as does Malinowski, though I hadn't realized it before that "affirmations" are loaded so.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d17 Igo-SocialThoughtMaterial-2003
--><h4><a id="igo03"></a>Igo, Sarah E. 2003. Review of <em>The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820—1920</em> by J. Sklansky. <em>Reviews in American History</em> 31(2): 251-259. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30031766">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p251a"></a>As he demonstrates, <strong>influential intellectuals slowly but surely over the course of the nineteenth century revised their notions of selfhood so that they were in tandem with the rhythms and demands of the market</strong>. This was a period of tremendous economic disruption, during which an agrarian and commercial society was remade, often violently, by corporate capitalism. (Igo 2003: 251)</blockquote><!--
--><p>With Cooley this probably has to do with the urban/rural debate.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p251b"></a>Sklansky prefaces his study of nineteenth-century thought with a twenty-first-century concern, <strong>the disappearance of serious talk about class and social inequality from both political discourse and scholarly fashion</strong>. It is his project to introduce the economic and the material to what one might consider the most ethereal (albeit trendy) of topics: the history of selfhood. Sklansky's central interest is to explain <strong>how "psychic self-development" - our modern conception - came to displace an older understanding of "material self-rule"</strong> as the very substance of individual freedom (p. 72). How did the new model of selfhood gain ground? (Igo 2003: 251)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not uninteresting.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p252a"></a>Conceptions of selfhood, he argues, were fundamentally transformed by the supplanting of political economy - the old science of society - with an upstart <strong>social psychology, which Sklansky calls the "master science" of industrial capitalist society</strong>. (Igo 2003: 252)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p252b"></a>One of the book's insights is that <strong>theories of society and economy carry with them implicit constructs of human nature</strong>. (For evidence, one needs only think of the law's "rational man" or the self-interested actor of introductory economics texts.) <strong>A society thta would come to depend more on the language of association than contract, of sentiment or desire than willpower, required a different kind of self</strong>. Sklansky's book, in one reading, traces the search for a new modal individual to inhabit social scientists' models. (Igo 2003: 252)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We might be a different kind of people if we still appreciated and discussed <em>sentiments</em>, for example.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p254"></a>Sklansky chooses Emerson, Horace Bushnell, and Margaret Fuller - an ispired trio - to probe transcendentalism's urge to overcome the material self. As he shows us, each of these thinkers tilted more toward <strong>mental</strong> than material <strong>self-reliance</strong>, and formulated <strong>a spiritual, intuitive, and emotional self</strong> as an explicit counterpoint to political economy's ideal agent. (Igo 2003: 254)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley is definitely in this group.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="igo03p255"></a><strong>A new understanding of human beings as bundles of socialized habits</strong>, Sklansky points out, was keyed to developments in neoclassical economics, where the marginalist revolution was untethering value once and for all from the productive process. <strong>The final triumph of a socialized self and a psychologized market</strong>, however, <strong>is only manifest in Sklansky's closing chapter, an elegant reading of the intellectual careers of legal scholar Thomas M. Cooley and his son, social psychologist Charles H. Cooley</strong>. The father's appeal to a common law tradition in order to regulate corporations and the son's analytical turn away from tangible goods and toward "the stream of communication" each cut against producerist notions. But <strong>it is in the younger Cooley's celebrations of "self-expression," "interdependence," and "imaginative sociability" that Sklansky hears the death knell for economic man</strong> and the science that created him. (Igo 2003: 255)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Sklansky, Jeffrey 2002. <em>The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820-1920</em>. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- d18 Harp-EconomicManSocial-2004
--><h4><a id="harp04"></a>Harp, Gillis J. 2004. Review of <em>The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820—1920</em> by J. Sklansky. <em>The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era</em> 3(3): 309-311. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/25144378">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="harp04p309a"></a>The <em>Soul's Economy</em> examines a subject both substantial and significant. Between the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a fundamental transition from classical political economy to social psychology occurred, a shift evident in the writings of a handful of key American thinkers. "<u>While <strong>the new psychology described a much more seamless relationship between self and society</strong>,</u>" Sklansky argues, "<u>in so doing it tended to set aside older questions about the structure of political and economic power</u>". Although a gradual change, the ramifications of this transition were profound and wide-reaching. (Harp 2004: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>First mention of a real topic in said social psychology.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="harp04p309b"></a>On one level, the subjectivism of Transcendentalists offered emancipation from material concerns and some embraced their analysis as an avenue of liberation. Yet by focusing on a higher unity that linked individuals to their larger human community and to nature (and, ultimately, to the divine), <strong>American Romantics actually served to legitimate the market society sprouting around them</strong>. In Sklansky's apt phrase, their perspective "<u>ironically took the string out of the emerging class divide</u>". (Harp 2004: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Philosophy of poverty at a time of poverty?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="harp04p310"></a>George and Sumner "<u>provided a bridge between the antebellum innovations of Transcendentalist and Comtean writers and the postbellum emergence of professional, academic social sciences</u>". Sklansky's transition culminates in the <strong>Progressive sociology</strong> of Lester F. <strong>Ward</strong> and E. A. <strong>Ross</strong> and the social psychology of Charles H. <strong>Cooley</strong>. Building upon Ward's work, Ross turned (in works like <em>Social Control</em>, 1901) to an analysis of how society could control its members not on the basis of widely dispersed property ownership or through participatory democracy but through the <strong>expert manipulation of human desires and habits</strong>. Finally, pioneer social psychologist Charles Horton Cooley completed the movement from economic man to <strong>social self</strong>. Like some of his predecessors, Cooley concentrated on the means of exchange rather than those of production. He accepted the new corporate order and, indeed, believed it would "<u>foster new values that transcended the competitive pursuit of self-interest and that would 'humanize' the corporate order in turn</u>". (Harp 2004: 310)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Now I know that these guys were in a gang together.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e01 Mecklin-JournalPhilosophy-1922
--><h4><a id="mecklin22"></a>Mecklin, John M. 1922. Review of <em>The Principles of Sociology</em> by E. A. Ross. <em>The Journal of Philosophy</em> 19(8): 216-220. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2939395">10.2307/2939395</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2939395">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p216"></a>The <em>Principles of Sociology</em> is a bulky volume of over <strong>seven hundred pages</strong> and is evidently intended to be the author's magnum opus. (Mecklin 1922: 216)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/10/principles-of-sociology.html">It</a> felt shorter.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p217a"></a>William James, in a striking characterization of <strong>Herbert Spencer's philosophy</strong>, calls "<u>his whole system <strong>wooden, as if knocked together out of cracked hemlock boards</strong> - and yet the half of England wants to bury him in Westminster Abbey. Why?</u>" Because "<u>the noise of facts resounds through all his chapters</u>" (<em>Pragmatism</em>, p. 39f.). Ross like Spencer is factually minded. He is most skilful, in selecting striking, interesting and apposite illustrations. (Mecklin 1922: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Everybody sure loves beating down on ol' Herbert.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p217b"></a>The result is that Professor Ross is forced to adopt in many instances shorthanded not to say dogmatic solutions to moot questions. <strong>The absence of any comprehensive principle of interpretation</strong> likewise places the writer more or less at the mercy of the welter of factual details. This appears in the tendency to multiply social principles and processes. (Mecklin 1922: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>True, there wasn't as much of a through-line as there was to Cooley.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p218"></a>For Ross, together with the majority of American sociologists, leans towards a voluntaristic conception of society as opposed to the intellectualism of Comte and <strong>the biological materialism of Spencer</strong>. To be sure earlier writers such as Ward and Giddings were profoundly influenced by Spencer but drew away from him towards a more voluntaristic point of view. Ward, who was the dean of American sociologists, broke with Spencer when he insisted that the state, which to Spencer was anathema, is the brain of society and conceived of sociology as the science dealing primarily with the evolution of the social will. <strong>For Giddings society is not, as Spencer asserted, an organism but an organization of a number of individuals who by virtue of their "like-mindedness" embody a common will</strong>. But neither Ward nor Giddings quite emancipated themselves from Spencer's influence. (Mecklin 1922: 218)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Valuable context.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p219"></a>A decided impetus towards a more psychological and voluntaristic conception of society was given by Professor <strong>Small with his doctrine of interests suggested by Ratzenhofer</strong>. To resolve all social forces back into interests, as does Small, to find in interests the clue to social evolution and the key to social problems is to plant sociology firmly upon a psychological and voluntaristic basis. Civilization thus becomes synonymous with socialization, culture a matter of the disciplining of elementary human nature rather than of the conquest of natural forces. Out of these basic "interests" arise the social ends that condition society and social progress becomes a matter of the criticism, the evaluation and the realization of these ends. <strong>It is thus a distinct contribution on the part of Professor Small to have introduced the idea of value into sociology and in particular to have stressed the intimate connection between sociology and ethics</strong>. Small's contribution suffers however from the vagueness inseparable from the idea of interest, a term too broad, too many-sided and too unscientific to provide a satisfactory basis for the science of sociology, a fact which Small seems to recognize in his later work <em>The Meaning of Social Science</em>, where interest is no longer emphasized. (Mecklin 1922: 219)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I quite liked the topic of interests in Ross. This must be <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albion_Woodbury_Small">Albion Woodbury Small</a>.</p><!--
5-6 --><blockquote><a id="mecklin22p219ja220"></a>Owing to <!-- lk 220-->this distrust of the speculative and theoretical and in spite of the imposing array of terms and principles to describe social phenomena the book often gives the impression that we are still dealing with the impulses, contacts and interests of individuals. <strong>The writer fails to impress upon the reader that there is a social as opposed to an individual reality, as is done so skilfully in the works of Cooley</strong>. Even in the last part, devoted to "sociological principles," these principles are merely generalizations drawn from the facts. (Mecklin 1922: 219-220)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ross caught lacking.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e02 Park-AmericanJournalSociology-1922
--><h4><a id="park22"></a>Park, Robert E. 1922. Review of <em>Human Traits and Their Social Significance</em> by I. Edman. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 27(4): 524-525. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2764315">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="park22p524"></a>Few sociologists will today admit that human nature is "<u>a biological product.</u>" Since Cooley wrote his volume <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> nearly twenty years ago it has come to be pretty generally accepted that <strong>human nature is essentially a social, rather than a biological product</strong>. (Park 1922: 524)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tsk-tsk.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="park22p525"></a>This division is based upon the presupposition - which just now is the subject of a very searching criticism - that there is some fundamental distinction between the types of human behavior that are instinctive and, for that reason, innate and predetermined, and that same behavior under the influence of reflection, ideas, and ideals. <strong>The difficulties of maintaining such a distinction in practice are such that certain writers have gone so far as to deny the existence of anything that corresponds to instinct in human behavior</strong>. What we call instincts are merely habits that were learned early, and on the basis of very little experience. (Park 1922: 525)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Instinct" still a boogeyman.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e04 Bernard-ProgressSocialSciences-1927
--><h4><a id="bernard27"></a>Bernard, L. L. 1927. Review of <em>Recent Developments in the Social Sciences</em> by E. C. Hayes. <em>Social Forces</em> 6(2): 295-298. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3004710">10.2307/3004710</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3004710">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bernard27p295"></a>Dr. Ellwood is inclined to think that the four major tendencies in sociology since 1909, when Professor <strong>Cooley's <em>Social Organization</em> wrought a sort of transformation in the outlook of the subject</strong>, have been (1) "<u><strong>to stress the importance of the mental side of social life</strong>,</u>" (2) "<u>to overcome 'particularism' by an organic or synthetic views of social life,</u>" (3) "<u>to develop a composite method which shall synthesize all minor methods of social research and investigations,</u>" and (4) "<u>to develop sociology in the interest of ethical ideals and of social reconstruction.</u>" His treatment of his theme cuts across these major tendencies rather than develops them in detail. (Bernard 1927: 295)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A rundown of Cooley's main themes.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Hayes, Edward Carey (ed.) 1927. <em>Recent Developments in the Social Sciences</em>. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.90108/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bernard27p298"></a>Nearly two pages, first and last, are devoted to the discussion of <strong>Thomas' four wishes</strong>, but Thomas' name does not appear. (Bernard 1927: 298)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>They were: the wish for new experience, the wish for security, the wish for recognition, and the wish for response</u>."</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e04 Hocking-PhilosophicalReview-1928
--><h4><a id="hocking28"></a>Hocking, William Ernst 1928. Review of <em>The Individual and the Social Order</em> by J. A. Leighton. <em>The Philosophical Review</em> 37(5): 513-516. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2179843">10.2307/2179843</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2179843">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hocking28p514"></a>Professor Leighton describes his own position as <strong>social humanism</strong>; his comment on Kant furnishes a fair clue to the significance of this phrase. It implies an opposition to a dualistic supernaturalism: "<u>The improvement of the human lot depends on the development of the capacities resident in human nature. In the light of history and science we must put our faith, not in any intervention from supramundane sources, but in the development and functioning of the spiritual powers immanent in human nature</u>" (p. 225). (Hocking 1928: 514)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As opposed to what kind of humanism?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hocking28p515"></a>Neither does the author's humanism imply an overvaluation of the whole, whether social or cosmic, as over against the individual. <strong>The self is not a social product</strong>, in the sense proposed by Baldwin or Cooley (pp. 266 ff). Nor yet in the sense proposed by Mr. Dewey. <strong>It is "<u>at all stages of its career a living unity which strives to maintain and enhance its integral wholeness.</u>"</strong> Social patterns are agencies for its growth; but these patterns may be good or bad, and <strong>the self retains the function of selection, - it builds its own society</strong>. Nevertheless, through education and punishment society does much to mould the individual selector, who must be duly infused with a sense of "<u>the need and value of conduct in harmony with the social order</u>" (p. 292). Both sides of the persistent antinomy are duly presented; and the book may be said to be a discursive solution <em>in rebus</em>, rather than a solution in terms of abstract formulations. (Hocking 1928: 515)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I don't think this is actually opposed to Cooley, who discusses the formation of the self from external impulses and suggestions.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e05 Angell-AmericanJournalSociology-1930
--><h4><a id="angell30"></a>Angell, Robert C. 1930. Review of <em>Human Nature: A First Book in Psychology</em> by Max Schoen. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 36(3): 491-492. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2767297">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="angell30p491"></a>Human nature is defined as the psychological nature of the human individual and the book is, therefore, an elementary text in individual psychology. There is no explicit recognition of the fact that the greatest common divisor of human personality includes <strong>socially acquired attributes</strong>, though the discussion of the self implicitly recognizes this fact. (Angell 1930: 491)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Like an accent? Or a blue eye?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e06 Vance-CooleySmith-1930
--><h4><a id="vance30"></a>Vance, Rupert B. 1930. Review of <em>Sociological Theory and Social Research</em> by C. H. Cooley. <em>Social Forces</em> 9(2): 274-276. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2570320">10.2307/2570320</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2570320">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vance30p275a"></a>Twelve selected papers of an acknowledged master, a savant grown grey and honored in his science, lie on the table with the fugutive <span style="color: #fa4100">[sic]</span> papers of that science's most promising and eager neophyte, unhappily dead. <strnog>Cooley's place is secure. In a field of ponderous tomes his five slender volumes contain a contribution which no future sociologist will have the hardihood to ignore</strong>. (Vance 1930: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>; (2) <em>Social Organization: a Study of the Larger Mind</em>; (3) <em>Social Process</em>; (4) <em>Sociological Theory and Social Research</em>; and (5) <em>Introductory Sociology</em>, I assume. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vance30p275b"></a>Smith remains relatively unknown. He died at work on a <em>magnum opus</em> which, it is feared, may never see the light. But he left a record of his talks to his classes which Professor Giddings and Dean Hawkes have, as a labor of love, gathered in this small sheaf. Here may have ben <strong>an emerging Cooley, more filled with doubt and irony and a certain post-war weariness, but honest, questioning, and with the gift for the trenchant phrase</strong>. (Vance 1930: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Smith, Russell Gordon 1930. <em>Fugitive Papers</em>. Edited by Herbert Edwin Hawkes and Franklin Henry Giddings. New York: Columbia University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vance30p275c"></a>In this age of high-powered search and neglected undergraduates, Smith gave himself to his boys without saint. Students respond; critics of the goose-step notwithstanding. There has long been <strong>a Cooley cult</strong>; there is, no doubt, more ever-present help in Cooley's <em>Life and the Student</em> and Smith's <em>Fugitive Papers</em> to the searcher for approaches in teaching sociology than in many monographs. (Vance 1930: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Cooley, Charles Horton 1927. <em>Life and the Student: Roadside Notes on Human Nature, Society, and Letters</em>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/lifestudentroads00cool/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="vance30p275d"></a>Cooley's volume shows the range of his development. He begins with the economics of transportation and ends with <strong>the dialectic of personal growth</strong>. The William James of sociology, Cooley wrote <strong>a social psychology without terminology</strong> - which means, as far as his work is concerned, one <strong>good in any terminology</strong>. He was the first to see that heredity and environment were inextricably interfused. He gave us the concept of the primary group and an organic view of society very different from that of Spencer, but he founded no school of sociology, <strong>bound himself to no system of concepts</strong>. A style that was the man and <strong>a deep and sympathetic grasp of complex human life mark his work</strong>. (Vance 1930: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The praises continue to sing.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e07 Hughes-AmericanJournalSociology-1936
--><h4><a id="hughes36"></a>Hughes, Everett C. 1936. Review of <em>The Concept of Our Changing Loyalties</em> by H. A. Bloch. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 41(6): 818. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2768842">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hughes36p818a"></a>It has been some time since we have had a volume devoted almost entirely to the problem of the individual and society. Mr. Bloch has given us one, <strong>based largely on the fundamental conceptions of Mead, Dewey, Cooley, MacIver, and Baldwin</strong> (although the latter is not mentioned, unless I am mistaken). He has shown himself thoroughly familiar with the philosophical, psychological, and sociological literature pertinent to his prbolem. One would be rather at a loss to say just what is new in the work, unless it be an unusual emphasis on <strong>the dynamic aspects of the social individual</strong>. Even this, while unusual, is not new. The excellence of the work lies rather in its thoroughness in following out implications. (Hughes 1936: 818)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bloch, Herbert Arron 1934. <em>The Concept of Our Changing Loyalties: An Introductory Study into the Nature of the Social Individual</em>. New York: Columbia University Press.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hughes36p818b"></a>Mr. Bloch has not given the subject of mass behavior its due. One has a slight suspicion that he doesn't like mass behavior, and especially mass movements. Stripped of its rather heavy verbiage, his ideal state is one with an "<u>alert citizenry,</u>" which I take to mean our old friend <strong>the rational, free citizen, who does not share the unfortunate tendency of the larger mass of people "<u>to be irascibly averse to the prickings of a novel idea or theory</strong>.</u>" This suggests another suspicion; that the author, in spite of the care taken to define the limits of reason in human life, still implicitly over-emphasizes its rôle to the neglect of those less reasonable and less conscious aspects of the human mind which seem to be involved in mass movements. (Hughes 1936: 818)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very much like Trotter and Ross in their treatment of the mass's aversion to new ideas. Too bad the book is practically inaccessible.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e08 Bain-AmericanJournalSociology-1935
--><h4><a id="bain35"></a>Bain, Read 1935. Review of <em>Social Psychology: The Natural History of Human Nature</em> by L. G. Brown. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 40(6): 844-845. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2768359">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="bain35p844ja845"></a>Psychologists will probably resent having their field restricted to the organic functions, and logicians of science will question whether psychology tells <em>how</em>, while social psychology tells <em>why</em>, people <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> behave as they do. <strong>Psychological social psychologists are depending more and more upon cultural data</strong> even though they seldom give sociology and credit. Sociologists, on the other hand, will probably contend that much of Brown's material is merely elementary sociology. (Bain 1935: 844-845)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See cultural psychology.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bain35p845a"></a><strong>About seventy pages are bibliography</strong> and class "helps," about 400 are "case materials" and quotations, and the remaining 185 are Brown's own work. So it is really a combined case- and textbook. (Bain 1935: 845)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Reminds me of a fugitive idea of writing and publishing a treatise that cites everything I've read and quoted on this blog, just to create a piece of writing in which the bibliography far exceeds the length of the content.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bain35p845b"></a>This may be true, if research really confuses, but certainly undergraduates should not be given the idea that all is known when in reality so little is known. For example, <strong>attitudes</strong>, etc., <strong>seem to take the place left vacant by the moribund "instincts" with little more critical analysis than instincts used to receive</strong>. Watson's there "emotions" seem to be accepted as gospel with no reference to Sherman's work. (Bain 1935: 845)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Instincts and <strike>sentiments</strike> attitudes. Watson's three "emotions" are fear, love, and rage.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e09 Ross-AmericanCatholicSociological-1944
--><h4><a id="ross44"></a>Ross, Eva J. 1944. Review of <em>Dictionary of Sociology</em> by H. P. Fairchild. <em>The American Catholic Sociological Review</em> 5(3): 193-195. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3706476">10.2307/3706476</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3706476">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="ross44p193"></a>We have looked for an adequate dictionary of sociology for the use of students, and for handy reference for professionals, for a long time. <strong>Eubank's <em>Concepts of Sociology</em></strong> is useful for certain types of reference. (Ross 1944: 193)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Eubank, Earle Edward 1932. <em>The Concepts of Sociology: A Treatise Presenting a Suggested Organization of Sociological Theory in Terms of Its Major Concepts</em>. Boston, etc.: D. C. Heath and Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b604618&seq=7">Hathi Trust</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="ross44p194a"></a>Sometimes the author most clearly connected with a specialized term is cited, such as the association of Bagehot with the phrase <em>cake of custom</em>, or <strong>Durkheim with the term <em>social mind</em></strong>, or Comte with <em>positivism</em>. (Ross 1944: 194)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="ross44p194b"></a><em>Eugenics</em> is given, but not <strong><em>euthenics</em></strong>. (Ross 1944: 194)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>a science that deals with development of human well-being by improvement of living conditions</u>"</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e10 Foote-AmericanSociologicalReview-1950
--><h4><a id="foote50"></a>Foote, Nelson N. 1950. Review of <em>Social Psychology</em> by T. M. Newcomb. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 15(5): 581-683. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2086929">10.2307/2086929</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2086929">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681a"></a>Professor <strong>Newcomb</strong> directs at Michigan what is virtually a unique, separate department of social psychology, linking sociology and psychology. Although trained primarily in psychology, he <strong>has thus inherited Cooley's mantle</strong>. After many years of distinction as an original researcher, he has gathered his thinking into a textbook which will attract more than ordinary attention. The reader will be curious to examine it not only as a textbook, but also as <strong>a measure of progress in American social psychology since Cooley</strong> published his <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> in 1902. Its own contributions to this burgeoning field will be apparent. (Foote 1950: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tracing the lineage.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Newcomb, Theodore Mead 1950. <em>Social Psychology</em>. New York: The Dryden Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialpsychology00innewc/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681b"></a>The writing is admirably lucid, even-paced, workmanlike. <strong>Cooley</strong> admired writing for its own sake and his works <strong>abounded in the color, vigor and drama of the personal essay</strong>. Where Cooley was adorned with literary and timely allusions, Newcomb holds himself to incorporating the findings of professional experimenters; where cooley was moralistic, Newcomb is rather austerely detached. (Foote 1950: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A note on Cooley's style.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681c"></a>The teacher of social psychology is fortunate to be able to choose from four such excellent texts as those by Lindesmith & Strauss, Coutu, Sargent, and Newcomb, which have all appeared in the past year. It is piquant to note that Lindesmith & Strauss came from the same publisher as Newcomb. The publisher feels that the two do not compete. This is probably correct, since where <strong>Lindesmith & Strauss is a concise, trenchant and up-to-date statement of the symbolic interactionist point of view</strong>, Newcomb is encyclopaedic. (Foote 1950: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Lindesmith, Alfred R.; Strauss, Anselm L.; Denzin, Norman K. 1988. <em>Social Psychology</em>. Sixth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice Hall.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialpsychology0000lind_b7r1/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Coutu, Walter 1949. <em>Emergent Human Nature</em>. New York: A. A. Knopf.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/emergenthumannat0000cout/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Sargent, Stephen Stanfeld; Williamson, Robert C. 1966. <em>Social Psychology</em>. Third Edition. New York: The Ronald Press Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialpsychology0000sarg/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681d"></a><strong>Where Cooley was a Moses, Newcomb is a Noah</strong>. He comes not to lead his chosen people to the promised land, but to consolidate and harmonize, or, as the jargon has it now, to integrate. <strong>All the theoretical creations since Cooley's time</strong> - behaviorism, psychoanalysis, symbolic interactionism, gestaltism, functionalism, personality-and-culture, sociometry, group dynamics - <strong>after selection for compatibility, are packed aboard the ark</strong>, with scarce room left for Noah. His patently conciliatory tone discourages any stirring up of the animals; no tidings are given of unknown seas to be explored; if the various species are supposed to mate and produce fertile offspring, they cannot in the space and time given each; the whole effort of the pilot is to create the appearance of a happy family among his <strong>herd of unlike concepts</strong>. (Foote 1950: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The update package. Is it executable?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681e"></a>In general Newcomb conceives his task as that of <strong>bringing psychological motivation together with social structure through the medium of a concept of interaction</strong>. This does not, however, make him a symbolic interactionist of the Cooley-Mead-Dewey tradition. Dewey is never mentioned, nor his ideas; Mead's concept of taking the role of the other is utilized somewhat, and he is referred to as "plausible" and "influential," but Margaret Mead gets far more attention than George Herbert. (Foote 1950: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Interaction" as a central concept without commitment to symbolic interactionism.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p681ja682"></a><strong>The precise</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>functions of language in conducting the social process, where mentioned at all, are gloriously mixed with gestaltian "frames of reference."</strong> The author's conviction that he has mastered <strong>an interactional point of view</strong> with minimum benefit of a symbolic component gives special point to Dewey's preference for the term "transaction." (Foote 1950: 681-682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These "<u>gestaltian "frames of reference"</u>" may imply a compatibility with Jakobson's scheme of the linguistic functions of speech. (The necessity of Dewey's transactionism escapes me.)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p682a"></a>Newcomb starts not from the ongoing social process or the situation but <strong>individual motives</strong>. These are called methodologically necessary intervening <strong>variables inferred from behavior</strong>. They are compounded of drives and goals, but drives and goals in turn arise from <strong>the activation of attitudes</strong> ("<u>states of readiness for motive arousal</u>"). And <strong>attitudes</strong> in turn <strong>arise largely from shared frames of reference acquired through interaction with others</strong> à la Sherif's autokinesis experiment. <strong>Personality is organized mainly around certain self-other attitudes</strong>, which may be goal-oriented (secure) or threat-oriented (insecure), depending upon <strong>perceptions (not conceptions) of self in group situations</strong>. (Foote 1950: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Admittedly, "<u>activation of attitudes</u>" does sound alien. Otherwise it's a near-repeat of the sentiment debate. <em>Attitudes in interaction, sentiments in communion</em>. Kimball Young is probably involved in Americanizing this trend in British social psychology. That the personality is organized around "<u>self-other attitudes</u>" comes across as a summary of Cooley's looking-class self, with his "personal ideas" replaced by attitudes. In the end we have covered the whole triad of <em>the sources of selfhood</em> or something: (1) <em>perceptions</em> or self in group situations; (2) <em>conceptions</em> of self in social interaction; and (3) "personal ideas" of self in social intercourse.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p682b"></a>His concept of motivation is predispositional rather than situational. <strong>The organization of experience into systems of uniform response</strong>, which occurs through the powers of conceptualization shared by the common man as well as the social psychologists, is explained not through language but through <strong>the imputation of generalized predispositions</strong>. Though these are said to be inferred from behavior, Newcomb includes a chapter on attitude measurement - "<u>the most outstanding technical achievement of social psychologists</u>" - in which he scoffs at the insistence of certain methodologists that the validity of verbal report can only be established by reference to overt behavior. (Foote 1950: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Crystallization or ossification of signs into sign systems. I suspect that Newcomb's "<u>generalized predispositions</u>" might mirror Cooley's "<u>general tendency</u>" (cf. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2024/01/human-nature-and-social-order.html#cooley22p354">Cooley 1922: 354</a>). Sounds a bit like Schopenhauer's Will.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p682c"></a>In calling drives "<u>bodily states felt as restlessness, which initiate tendencies to activity,</u>" he merges an organic state of irritation, which sets a problem for the person, with an organic mobilization to perform the act appropriate for solving the problem. Moreover, <strong>like the functionalists, he talks of acquired drives which, directed toward acts originally instrumental to the relief of organic tension, mysteriously become "ends in themselves."</strong> Also, apparently accepting neither the direct discovery of values in experience nor the situational determination of instrumental and preferred values, he clings to the reductionist organism environment framework of the gestaltists, as well as their visual and field-of-forces-in-equilibrium analogies. (Foote 1950: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, somewhat Malinowskian. This was exactly the time when <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2018/02/about-malinowski.html#lee1940">Dorothy Lee</a> was writing brilliant papers on the role of means becoming ends in themselves (e.g. instrumental speech → phatic communion and other variations that can be reduced to work → play) through the concept of "futility". That is to say, Newcomb's psychology may be used to demonstrate the emergence of phatic communion just as well as Cooley's, Ross's, McDougall's, etc.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p682d"></a>The concept of role, however, he finds too sociological, and so he sets up a new concept, "<strong>role behavior</strong>," which is supposed to bridge the gap between individual variations in motive and behavior and the recognizable meeting of role specifications by others. A role behavior is something like Mead's social act, in that it is a sequence or episode of behavior in a social setting. It is delineated, however, not by the resolution of a problematic situation, but by the reduction of drive. That is, it is a special kind of <em>motive pattern</em>, which in turn is another synthetic bridging concept: "<u>a segment of behavior, <strong>a unit of performance-perception-thought-affect</strong> which continues so long as a single motive pattern prevails.</u>" The phrase "role behavior" thus becomes <strong>the pivot on which the whole book turns</strong> - the integration which is offered as the solution of the key problem of social psychology. (Foote 1950: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>"Rollikäitumine" kõlab samavõrd pentsikult kui "tähistamispraktikad"</em>. It looks like there's been some jangling with the triad: (1a) perception; (1b) affect; (2) performance; and (3) thought. They're set in a determinate process sequence - see how many debates were held over this in various symposia in <em>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em>. The doubling of firstness may not necessarily be the case. "<u>Affect</u>" could be read as a Fourth very easily if, for example, replaced or implemented with something like Cooley's "<um>affectation</u>", i.e. the futile need to "impress" (to try to improve one's self-image in an affected manner). In this case, though, the outcome might be a question of crystallization or ossification, e.g. enigmatic episodes becoming paradigmatic episodes (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2011/10/explanation-of-social-behaviour.html">Harré & Secord 1976</a>: 12).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="foote50p682e"></a>No doubt a phrase like "social psychology" itself combines two ideas, but it is one thing to use such a phrase to set a problem, that of <strong>specifying the relations of individual and group</strong>, and quite another to offer it as a solution. "Role behavior" as a concept sets a problem, it does not solve it; <strong>it defines what social psychology is after, not what it is achieved</strong>. Perhaps it is enough if the book has done this, but under the weight of years since 1902 we might have hoped for much more. (Foote 1950: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Newcomb is more theoretical (programmatic) than empirical (results-oriented), then? Or is this just a critique of this obtuse "role behavior" concept?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e11 Hartung-AmericanJournalSociology-1951
--><h4><a id="hartung51"></a>Hartung, Frank E. 1951. Review of <em>Social Psychology: An Integrative Interpretation</em> by S. S. Sargent. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 56(6): 607-608. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2772493">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p607"></a>Professor Sargent says that his purpose in this book is "<u>to present a systematic, integrated, dynamic, and useful social psychology.</u>" Part I contains four chapters on the general topic "<u>Socialization of the Individual</u>," a survey of <strong>the interaction of "<u>biological and social forces</u>" in individual development</strong>, specifying the major <strong>sociocultural influences</strong> upon personality and behavior, and treating <strong>socialization as a form of learning</strong>. Part II, "<u>The Dynamics of Social Behavior,</u>" discusses motivation, frustration, and mechanisms, and also "<u>ego-development and ego-involvement.</u>" Part III, <strong>"<u>The Patterning of Social Behavior,</u>" deals with language, the major forms of social interaction, the role of the person, leadership, and the person in social situations</strong>. Part IV, "<u>Understanding Social Phenomena,</u>" is devoted to the interpretation of public opinion, propaganda, fads, fashions, crowds, rumors, social change and social movements, and group differences and prejudice. The last two chapters (xix and xx) show that social psychology is useful today and will be more so tomorrow. (Hartung 1951: 607)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like Cooley's stuff, perhaps with a tinge of psychoanalysis. Part III once again the semiotic portion, as in Locke's essay. This summary of the 1950 edition looks very different, on surface, from the table of contents in the <a href="https://archive.org/details/socialpsychology0000sarg/page/n13/mode/2up">1966 edition</a> cited somewhere above. Instead of "<u>Socialization of the Individual</u>" there's "<u>The social setting of personality</u>"; instead of "<u>The Dynamics of Social Behavior</u>" there's "<u>Bases of social behavior</u>"; instead of "<u>The Patterning of Social Behavior</u>" there's "<u>Group Dynamics</u>"; and instead of "<u>Understanding Social Phenomena</u>" there's "<u>Mass communication and collective behavior</u>". It looks like the overall structure is the same but the terminology was updated until unrecognizable over just 15 years. (They didn't throw out "<u>Role Behavior</u>" tho - it's in the '66 edition still; or was it absent in '50 and added due to Newcomb?)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p608a"></a>It is a book by a psychologist who uses considerable anthropological and sociological material. If social psychology is defined as the study of the interaction of human beings, then <strong>not all statements about human behavior are social psychological, although Sargent appears to think they are. Statements as to how persons function as organisms are not social psychological because they imply no interaction</strong>. Nor are statements about persons which refer them to culture and to social structure social psychology, <strong>if they fail to refer to the collective psychological processes which are reflected in individual behavior. It may be interesting to read about the mores and the social processes of accommodation, and the like</strong>. (Hartung 1951: 608)</blockquote><!--
It is a book by a psychologist who used considerable anthropological and sociological material.
Nor are statements about persons which refer them to culture and to social structure social psychological, if they fail to refer to the collective psychological processes which are reflected in individual behavior
--><p>Oh wow. This Hartung thinks that Sargent muddies social psychology with personality psychology. Initially I thought this was about "folk social psychology", i.e. unempirical or hypothetical statements about human behavior in general which are sourced from social intercourse because it's basically gossip. The object of social psychology, though, is "<u>the collective psychological process</u>" - as in the Social Mind thinking of something and the individual person performing that something as a consequence. And now here's the kicker: Hartung suggests the study of social mores and "<u>processes of accommodation</u>", i.e. sociability, gregariousness, conviviality, altruism, futility or whatever else you may call it in <em>phatic communion</em>. That is, "<u>National Character</u>" (Sargent's ch. 3 in '66) comes about because a national community has as-if somehow collectively decided that they should all behave in such or such manner in social intercourse, and all (or at least most) members of said community somehow know this and act they way this ephemeral collective Will suggests one should act. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p608b"></a>However, Sargent has not integrated <strong>the individual and the social</strong> psychological, the anthropological and sociological approaches. He has just <strong>put</strong> them <strong>side by side</strong>, and said, <strong>as Cooley did fifty years ago</strong>, that <strong>they are heads and tails of the same coin</strong>. By "integrated" he means "<u>bringing together psychological, sociological, anthropological, and psychiatric techniques and findings</u>" (p. 31). But he <strong>has not effected an integration in the sense of a unity</strong>. (Hartung 1951: 608)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, "<u>a total social process</u>" is not "<u>a unity</u>"; mutual "<u>dependence</u>" is not "<u>integration</u>". Sounds to me like a quibble over terminology, again. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p608c"></a>In his third chapter, "<u>Culture and Personality,</u>" he presents, side by side, the conceptions of culture held by Linton, Kroeber, Benedict, <strong>Kardiner</strong>, and Horney. In Kraeber's view the individual behaves institutionally, for example, is religious, because of pre-existing culture patterns. But, according to Kardiner, <strong>institutions exist because of the "projective systems" of the individual</strong>. The student receives no assistance in resolving this conflict and is given the definite impression that <strong>the highly dubious "culture and personality" studies</strong> are valid. By way of evaluating them he says that we need more facts and more careful research. The discussion of personality is largely devoted to psychological aspects of learning and sociological aspects of variability due <strong>to differences in culture and experience</strong>. (Hartung 1951: 608)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This guy again. Lotman and <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2012/07/culture-as-praxis.html">Bauman</a> belong to this "<u>highly dubious</u>" tradition with their culture-personality isomorphisms. Abram Kardiner doesn't come across as very appealing from this short summary; I hope there's more to it. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p608d"></a><strong>Sargent</strong> leaves up in the air the problem of "what to believe" about motives (chap. vi). His treatment <strong>is</strong> individual-psychological, <strong>wholly omitting the significance of symbolization in behavior in general and in motives in particular</strong>. In the discussion of frustration in chapter vii Sargent <strong>in effect denies the pragmatist position</strong> that out of frustration intelligent behavior arises. In contrast, the potentiality of reasonable behavior resulting from frustrations is one of the basic ideas in Dewey's <em>Human Nature and Conduct</em> and Mead's <em>Mind, Self, and Society</em> and is also present in Cooley's <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>, all social-psychological works. Frustration, treated as a ubiquitous cause of irrational response, is one of the basic concepts in Sargent's work. (Hartung 1951: 608)</blockquote><!--
--><p>No <strike>bitches</strike> semiotics? Overreliance on psychoanalytic concepts is still unappealing for me. In any case it sounds like a thing to read after having first read some Freud and Kardiner, and another thing to afterwards revisit La Barre with Sargent (or a critique of his ideas) in tow.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hartung51p608e"></a>In chapter viii, "<u>Ego-Development and Ego-Involvement,</u>" Sargent makes it plain that he never realizes the basic conflict among the pragmatist social psychology of Cooley, Dewey, and Mead, and <strong>the irrationalistic individual psychology of psychoanalysis</strong>. The self will be more of a mystery to the student after reading this chapter than it was before. He fails to indicate the irrationalism basic to the psychoanalytic approach and also <strong>fails to link the self and symbolism</strong>. The universality of human nature thus escapes him, and he deals only with its changing aspects due to specific cultural and social influences. (Hartung 1951: 608)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This sounds like a valid critique. What an intense review.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e12 Strong-AmericanJournalSociology-1951
--><h4><a id="strong51"></a>Strong, Samuel M. 1951. Review of <em>Emergent Human Nature: A Symbolic Field Interpretation</em> by W. Coutu. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 57(2): 204-205. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2772094">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="strong51p204ja205"></a>The reader of this volume is confronted with <strong>a complicated statement</strong> of a complex system of social psychology. After mastering the many new terms, the reader realizes that this piece of work results from arduous study and observation <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> of diverse fields of knowledge of human behavior. The author conceives of it as <strong>a "<u>new social psychology</strong> [...] which synthesizes the situational or field approach with the symbolic interactionist approach.</u>" A large portion of the book is given to <strong>a description of the process of selective responsiveness of the person through the formulation of a "<u>theory of selectors.</u>"</strong> He conceives of personality as a dynamic system operating as <strong>an energy system in symbolic fields</strong>. The problem of motivation is dealt with by the author in terms of a situational field theory, the general point of view of the book being that "<u>man always behaves in accordance with <strong>what the situation means to him</strong>.</u>" (Strong 1951: 204-205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, the logical conclusion of Thomas's <em>definition of the situation</em>? This was certainly timed perfectly for one Erving Goffman. Sadly, "<u>field theory and operationalism</u>" are strangers to me.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="strong51p205a"></a>The study begins with a consideration of an appropriate unit of measure in order to identify a behavioral unit of analysis. Such units as stimulus-response, attitude, or act are not regarded as adequate units of measure. Instead, the author proposes the concept of <strong><em>tinsit</em></strong> as "<u>a unit process of action.</u>" This term was arrived at by abbreviating the phrase "<u><strong>tendency in situation</strong>.</u>" It is pointed out that "<u>tendency in situation</u>" is not to be confused with a form of vitalism or other internal drive. The guiding conception is that human personality and behavior are related to condition or situation. <strong>Tinsit "<u>includes all other behavioral units on all levels [...]; every time of act or mechanism earlier referred to as a tendency will hereafter be referred to as a <em>tinsit</em>, whether it be a habit, mental act, attitude, disposition, idea, impulse, trait, or any other behavior</strong>. <em>Tinsit</em> is defined as a probable behavior in a given situation or a behavior or a given probability under stated conditions. <strong>The <em>tinsit</em> is an inference based on frequency of a given behavior in a given situation</strong>.</u>" This, according to the author, would lead to the use of statistical operation in a study of individual as well as group behavior. <strong>One wonders how such a vague concept, that includes so many things, can be used as a unit of measure</strong>. And, further, is it feasible to regard the concept of tinsit, which the author also defines as an "inference" as suitable for statistical manipulation? (Strong 1951: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Behold! General tendency has become a statistical semiosphere of thirdness - a Tinsit!</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="strong51p205b"></a>In order to explain his conception of the development and meaning of human nature, the author introduces the concept of <em>personic</em>. The concept of <strong><em>personic</em></strong> isolates the person "<u>as <strong>a process or system of processes distinguishable from the other processes called the body</strong>.</u>" The author regards human nature as "<u><strong>personic nature</strong> which is fundamentally <strong>the ability to communicate with self and others by the use of symbols</strong>, in other words, the ability <strong>to participate in the symbolic process</strong>.</u>" (Strong 1951: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>My lord, I love this. Everything mental, spiritual, rational, cognitive, emotional, etc. is now simply <em>personic</em>. I wonder what the consequences of viewing human nature as personic nature are - in other words: what's the fluidity level? Everything being "symbolic" sounds just about right for 1950 (e.g. Cassirer and Wheelwright).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="strong51p205c"></a>It is perplexing that the author of this system of social psychology who uses symbolic interaction as a frame of reference should not have referred to the work of Cooley on human nature in the primary group. Surely, <strong>Cooley's discussion of the significance of communication in <em>Social Organization</em></strong> (pp. 61 ff.), in which he introduces the remarkable illustration in the case of Helen Keller by the statement "<u>without communication the mind does not develop a true human nature,</u>" <strong>and his chapters on</strong> "Sociability and Personal Ideas," "Sympathy or Understanding as an Aspect of Society," "The Social Self and the Various Phases of the I" (<strong><em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>), are worth considering in a treatise on human nature</strong>. (Strong 1951: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Claiming that there is an already viable theory of communication in Cooley's <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>, and implying that he had a workable understanding of human nature based on that theory. And the central thesis, I take it, is that without (linguistic) social intercourse a human being is not fully human. That is, the pivot is the semiotic domestication of human beings. This was another superb review. I think I like this era in scientific communication. The demon of terminological invention was reigning supreme.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e13 Jensen-SocialForces-1956
--><h4><a id="meyer56"></a>Meyer, Henry J. 1956. Review of <em>Sociological Theory: Present-Day Sociology from the Past</em> by E. F. Borgatta and H. J. Meyer. <em>Social Forces</em> 35(2): 166-167. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2573368">10.2307/2573368</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2573368">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="meyer56p166a"></a>It contains <strong>61 classical selections from sociological writings ranging over the past century which have required surprisingly little modification in the light of subsequent research</strong>. Indeed, some of the best contemporary research has contributed little more than precision of detail to the depth of insight and sophistication of theory already achieved by these sociological pioneers. Ten of the selections are from <strong>Cooley</strong>; six from <strong>Durkheim</strong>; five from <strong>Linton</strong>; four from <strong>Simmel</strong>; three each from <strong>Baldwin</strong>, <strong>Ross</strong>, and <strong>Thomas</strong> and <strong>Znaniecki</strong>; two from MacIver, Maine, K. Mannheim, Mead, Peaget, Radcliffe-Brown, <strong>Sapir</strong>, Thomas, and Veblen; and one from <strong>Le Bon</strong>, <strong>W. McDougall</strong>, L. H. Morgan, Park, <strong>Royce</strong>, <strong>Small</strong> and Vincent, <strong>Spencer</strong>, W. Waller, and M. Weber. The editors have added their own brief and incisive interpretations to each of the six parts into which the selections are divided, as well as a preface that should be read. (Meyer 1956: 166)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A real springboard, this. Too bad it's inaccessible. Amazon <strike>stole and withhholds</strike> sells a reprint for $50. Even Hathi Trust doesn't have it, though searching "Borgatta Meyer" does bring up a treasure-trove of interesting late 1950s and subsequent sociological research.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Borgatta, Edgar F.; Meyer, Henry Joseph (eds.) 1956. <em>Sociological Theory: Present Day Sociology from the Past</em>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="meyer56p166b"></a>The purpose of the editors is not to provide a substitute for extensive reading of the sources but to motivate students to turn to them for intellectual stimulation and for germinal ideas in their own work. The selections included are of such a nature that readers who feel that the study of the history of systematic social theory is a waste of time will have occasion to ponder <strong>how thoroughly our predecessors have plagiarized many of our best ideas</strong>. (Meyer 1956: 166)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh wow. Epigraphic! It's been a hot minute since I've come across something to the sting of quotes in the sidebar of this blog.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="meyer56p167"></a>One need not accept the full implications of the Durkheimian realism in order to recognize the wisdom of the selection from Durkheim which the authors have adopted as an epilogue to the volume, "<u>[...] from the moment that it is recognized that above the individual there is <strong>society</strong>, and that this <strong>is not a nominal being created by reason</strong>, but a system of active forces, a new manner of explaining men becomes possible.</u>" (Meyer 1956: 167)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Society" is <em>not</em> a figment of imagination?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e14 Bolton-AmericanJournalSociology-1956
--><h4><a id="bolton56"></a>Bolton, Charles D. 1956. Review of <em>The Direction of Human Development</em> by M. F. A. Montagu. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 61(5): 491-492. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2773498">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bolton56p491"></a>The thesis unfolds in three stages: (1) <strong>an attempt to show, Kropotkin-style, that co-operation, not competition, is the fundamental law of organic nature and hence that man is continuous with a biological descent in which co-operativeness is the basic mechanism of survival</strong>; (2) a variety of data to show that, in the absence of the mothering type of love, both human and subhuman infant organisms undergo severe and often irreparable physiological degeneration; and (3) evidence that a lack of supportive mothering in the early years produces a malfunctioning personality. (Bolton 1956: 491)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Rings a bell from a biosemiotics lecture.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="bolton56p491ja492"></a>The evidence is presented within the framework <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> of <strong>what Montagu calls "sociobiology," which turns out to be a combination of biology and psychoanalysis</strong>, with a shot of behaviorist learning theory <strong>and a dash of Malinowski's theory of basic and derived needs</strong>, to give the impression of comprehensiveness. Sociologists will find Montagu's biology much more palatable than his conceptions of the social. (Bolton 1956: 491-492)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is a parade of red flags.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bolton56p492a"></a>The invariably interactive character of the heredity-environment relation is handled with unusual consistency. However, his conception of the "social," which includes such things as purely symbiotic relations and the intrauterine period, is so broad as to be meaningless to sociologists. Anyone who takes Mead and Cooley seriously will feel that <strong>Montagu</strong> has erred most grievously in <strong>failing to place any emphasis upon the profound influence of language on the direction of human experience and behavior</strong>. (Bolton 1956: 492)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>No habla semiotica?</em></p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bolton56p492b"></a>This sort of book raises the question of whether consideration of the infant stage alone can account for the unique direction of human development. Aside from last-chapter rhapsodies, there is nothing in Montagu's prescription that would be varied for raising a troop of apes, no real recognition that the direction of man's social development is to transcend the biological by becoming <strong>a minded creature</strong> capable of molding, collectively, his own world and motivations through language and its ramifications. For all the abuses it is heir to, neither scientist nor social actor is long likely to turn his back on the image of himself as <strong>a creatively free, minded creature</strong>, in order to accept an image of himself as a biogenically directed creature of drives and emotions. (Bolton 1956: 492)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A thorough devastation of a review.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e15 Martel-AmericanJournalSociology-1961
--><h4><a id="martel61"></a>Martel, Martin U. 1961. Review of <em>The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory</em> by Don Martindale. <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> 67(3): 338-340. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2774367">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p338"></a>Martindale's book is a singularly valuable contribution to sociological theory. It is the first attempt since Sorokin's <em>Contemporary Sociological Theories</em> (1928) to present a comprehensive summary and comparative analysis of major theoretical approaches since Comte's time. <strong>Serious attention is given to works of more than fifty leading theorists</strong>, including most persons found on standard lists for the period and several welcome additions. Coverage divides fairly evenly between works produced before and after World War I, with considerable attention paid to contemporary viewpoints. (Martel 1961: 338)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Martindale, Don 1960. <em>The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory</em>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/naturetypesofsoc0000mart_z5w8/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p339a"></a>The two <strong>earliest schools</strong> were positivistic in orientation and <strong>placed emphasis on sociocultural systems over individuals</strong>. The original school (called "Positivistic Organicism") sought to combine an empirical methodology with an idealistic, <strong>organicist conception of social order</strong>. Organied society, vaguely conceived, was taken as the focal point, with social change viewed as an orderly transition from one organized state to another. First represented in the works of <strong>Comte, Spencer, and Ward</strong>, this school reached its zenith with <strong>Tonnies and Durkheim</strong>. Afterwards, tensions between empiricism and organicism led to its breakup, as indicated in the breach between Lundberg and Sorokin. (Martel 1961: 339)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And by "<u>sociocultural systems</u>" you mean <em>institutions</em>?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p339b"></a>During the same period a second school ("Conflict Theory") arose that accepted the empiricism of the first but held to a non-idealistic definition of social reality. As advocated by Marx, Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, and others, group <strong>conflict became the critical focus. Orderly social life was viewed as a problematic outcome</strong> within a broader continuing process of ferment. (Martel 1961: 339)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Early sociology was basically socialism, huh?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p339c"></a>The first subschool Martindale calls "Pluralistic Behaviorism." In France, <strong>Tarde approached social phenomena as the repetitive distributions of individual behaviors, reflecting personal beliefs and desires learned through imitation</strong>. This approach was expanded and modified by <strong>Giddings</strong>, Chapin, Ogburn, and others. (Martel 1961: 339)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wasn't aware of the Tarde → Giddings connection.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p339d"></a>Most influential in America was a second branch, pioneered by <strong>James, Cooley, Thomas, and Mead</strong> ("Symbolic Interactionism"). Individual socialization was brought to the core of attention, with <strong>human interaction viewed as a conscious process of communication</strong> between intersocializing individuals. (Martel 1961: 339)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good company. The Cooleyan paraphrase of this would run a little something like "<u>language</u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>can never be dissociated from personal intercourse in the mind</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2024/01/human-nature-and-social-order.html#cooley22p91ja92">Cooley 1922: 91-92</a>).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="martel61p340"></a>Thus, as Martindale seems to acknowledge, his account has a backward reference. His contribution is mainly one of substantially <strong>clarifying past sources of present theoretical viewpoints</strong>; leaving to others the related task of determining how differences can be constructively resolved within the framework of empirical science. (Martel 1961: 340)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These historians, I mean, it's like they're obsessed with the past or something.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e16 Jr-AVCommunicationReview-1964
--><h4><a id="hulett64"></a>Hulett, J. Edward Jr. 1964. Review of <em>Communication and Social Order</em> by H. D. Duncan. <em>AV Communication Review</em> 12(4): 458-468. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30217171">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p458"></a>A definitive statement of the relevance of the so-called "symbolic interactionist" doctrine for theory and research in communications is long overdue. The development of symbolic interactionist thought took place during <strong>the three decades after 1900</strong>, with C. H. Cooley, John Dewey, and W. I. Thomas as the principal early contributors. The modern form of the theory emerged during the late 1930's with the posthumous publication of three books by George Herbert Mead, and it has since had a lively career in sociology and in the sociological branch of social psychology. (Hulett 1964: 458)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This has somehow become one of my favorite eras.<!-- (Especially the 1920s I'd take over any of the decades after the 1970s.)--> I guess it may have something to do with the copyright expiration length. Everything up to 1928 is currently open.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p459a"></a>The book, described on the dust jacket as "<u>the result of many years of work and thought in the tradition of symbolic interactionism,</u>" begins with a chapter on "<strong>Symbolic Interaction in Freud's Work</strong>" and ends with a chapter on "A Sociological Model of Social Interaction as Determined by Communication." (Hulett 1964: 459)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jesus Christ, he's everywhere!</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p459b"></a>As it turns out, however, the little that <strong>the book</strong> contains on symbolic interactionism <strong>consists mainly of a sophisticated but rather too severe critique of Mead's work and</strong> an occasional use of some of the principles here and there to clarify <strong>a point of interpretation</strong>. The principal frame of reference chosen by Duncan for his analysis is not formal symbolic interactionism. Rather, the analysis is based on the concepts and categories of the offshoot of symbolic interactionism that goes under the name of "dramatism," or the "dramaturgical school," a method of interpreting human action that was developed principally by Kenneth Burke. (Hulett 1964: 459)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, so just internecine conflict.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p459c"></a>Despite the fact that the book was written by an author who is versed in the tradition of symbolic interactionism, and is based specifically on Burke's dramatism model, no formal theory of communication based on either of these approaches is presented. What we have here, instead, is <strong>a collection of brilliant insights, speculations, and after-the-fact interpretations of the uses and misuses of the grand symbol systems of the society in the establishment, maintenance, and manipulation of social structure</strong>. The specialists who will gain the most profit from the book are the sociologists, and particularly those sociologists who are interested in social processes in general and in the sociology of knowledge and of art. (Hulett 1964: 459)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well, this doesn't sound that bad for what it is.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Duncan, Hugh Dalziel 1962. <em>Communication and Social Order</em>. Totowa, N.J.: Bedminster Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/communicationsoc0000dunc">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p460"></a><strong>The first problem facing the sociologist</strong> seeking to understand the drama of society <strong>is</strong>, in Duncan's view, the problem of <strong>discovering which of the expressive symbol systems</strong> (art, drama, religion, mythology, and so on) <strong>of society most graphically reveals the struggle</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[</span>between authorities of widely different views<span style="color: #fa4100">]</span> <strong>in all its fullness</strong>. Of all these systems, art, and especially comic art, is the best source of the desired insights into <strong>the functions of symbols in establishing and changing the social order</strong>, the key to the understanding of society's dramaturgical <strong>striving for enduring social bonds</strong>. Not religion (which sociologists heretofore have considered the key), for religious rites cannot be taken as the universal symbolic struggle for social order, because they are founded upon an <strong>authoritarianism</strong> that cannot admit the possibility of, and so <strong>cannot examine and resolve, doubt, uncertainty, ambiguity. Only in the realm of art</strong>, "<u>where the expression of doubt, ambiguity, and difference is normal,</u>" <strong>do we find a social symbol system wherein the great drama of the struggle for social order can be fully manifested</strong>. Art gives us a form which makes it "<u>possible for us to <em>confront</em> our differences and thus brings them into consciousness so we can communicate with each other. [...] The study, then, of art, and particularly comic art, is the proper study of man in society, because it is <strong>the study of the resolution between order and disorder in society</strong></u>" (p. xxvii). (Hulett 1964: 460)</blockquote><!--
--><p>There is plenty here to compare with Lotman's theory (of the interactions between society, art, and science). The <em>authorianism can't art properly</em> argument certainly calls Lotman's theory to mind. That there's this Petersonian struggle "<u>between order and disorder in society</u>" on the other hand is off-putting. The order-loving Vorlon vs the chaotic Shadow.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p461"></a>"<u>Sociologists think of the nonsymbolic realm as clear, while the symbolic realm is hazy and 'subjective' [...]</u>" (p. 145), and even the symbolic interactionists <strong>Cooley</strong>, Mead, <strong>and Dewey</strong>, "<u>[...] and despite all their talk about symbolic action, <strong>tell us little about how art and language do all the things they are supposed to do</strong> [...]</u>" (p. 151). (Hulett 1964: 461)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Strong disagree. I can't vouch for Mead atm but Dewey wrote books on art theory (<em>consummatory</em> stuff, etc.), and Cooley wrote extensively on literary fiction (Goethe and the rest).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p462"></a>Duncan himself starts as if he were headed in the direction of science. He leads off with an introduction that states his purpose, and follows this with seven chapters dealing critically with the work of other scholars - <strong>Freud</strong>, <strong>Simmel</strong>, <strong>Malinowski</strong>, Dewey, Mead. (Hulett 1964: 462)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Why is it always you three?</em> There is a very slight possibility that Duncan may have discussed or at least alluded to phatic communion or something connected with it.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p466"></a>The symbolic interactionist model of the social (communicative) act, properly developed, can provide valuable leads to the solution of difficult problems in this area, such as those suggested by the following questions. How does the communicator select the symbols to be included in his message so as to be confident that it will transmit his intended meaning? Success in the selection of symbols depends upon several contingencies, the most important of which is <strong>the sender's image of the receiver</strong>. Further, since it may be taken as a truism that no message can be construted that contains in full detail the entire intent of the sender, the message as sent and as received will be incomplete, even when the channel is maximally efficient and free of "noise." Thus, the receiver is faced with at least two problems: <strong>how to exact from the received message</strong> the message intended by the sender (a process that depends upon <strong>the receiver's image of the sender</strong>, among other things) and how to supply the information needed to fill the gaps in the message. Most ordinary communicators probably are entirely unaware that such gaps exist in their messages. On the other hand, <strong>a skilled communicator</strong>, such as an orator or an advertiser, can "innocently" communicate forbidden or disapproved content by <strong>manipulating the inevitable gaps and ambiguities in his message in such a way that he can depend upon the receiver to insert approximately the desired content</strong>. How can he, or any other communicator, be sure the receiver will supply the "correct" material to fill the gaps? (Hulett 1964: 466)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh heck yeah, it's 1964! Cooley's personal idea meets communication theory. The example of such manipulation that comes to mind is <em>dog-whistles</em>. </p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="hulett64p467"></a>To return to an illustration used by Duncan, his analysis of Hitler's rhetoric does not and cannot fully explain its success. What else is needed is an analytical scheme that allows us to say something about <strong>the way Hitler solved the problem of selecting the symbols that would have the maximum appeal to that portion of the German population</strong> that was to give his movement its initial strength. (Hulett 1964: 467)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eerily reminiscent of La Barre's treatment of the <em>psychotic culture-bringer Hitler</em> and how his unique capability of phatic communication (i.e. "charisma", "sympathy", or whatever) one madman's ideas made a whole nation crazy or something.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e17 Killian-AnnalsAmericanAcademy-1965
--><h4><a id="killian65"></a>Killian, Lewis M. 1965. Review of <em>Symbolic Leaders: Public Dramas and Public Men</em> by O. E. Klapp. <em>The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</em> 360: 196-197. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1035066">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="killian65p197"></a>He [Klapp] argues that, while structure lends stability to social life, the whole world is a potential audience ready to identify with a hero and, in the process of drama, make and break statuses, <strong>shift mass preoccupations</strong>, and create new organizations. The capacity for sympathy and the common stock of sentiments which Cooley postulated as the essence of human nature are held to be basic to the universality of drama as <strong>a solvent transcending stable structures</strong>. (Killian 1965: 197)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Celebrification theory in the early 1960s?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e18 Francis-SociologicalQuarterly-1965
--><h4><a id="francis65"></a>Francis, Roy G. 1965. Review of <em>The Problem of Social-Scientific Knowledge</em> by W. P. McEwen. <em>The Sociological Quarterly</em> 6(1): 68-70. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4105299">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="francis65p69"></a>In a preliminary jousting with various school of philosophical thought, McEwen provides <strong>a gimmick or paradigm which turns out to be a firly effective tool</strong>. He proposes inquiry into <strong>the value-situation</strong> (including the dominant motive of the described researcher), <strong>the meaning-situation</strong> (the kind of knowledge which can be acquired if the particular point of view is rigorously held to), and <strong>the knowledge-situation</strong> (the issue of method and criterion by which beliefs are warranted). (Francis 1965: 69)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is most definitely triadic but why "value" and "meaning", I can't surmise without reading it.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="francis65p69ja70"></a><strong>The book suffers from the author's lack of acquaintance with those who</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>based their work on Cooley</strong> (who, incidentally, is cited twice). The reason I say this so categorically is that the "symbolic-interactional" school represents not only a theory of behavior but contains its own epistemology. We propose to explain meaning, by our theory, as well as how it is that man comes to have the view of the world he does (the sociology of knowledge). (Francis 1965: 69-70)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, ok. That might explain why McEwen's book comes across as very "muddy", at least in Francis's exposition.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e19 Wolff-AmericanSociologicalReview-1968
--><h4><a id="wolff68"></a>Wolff, Kurt H. 1968. Review of <em>International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences</em> by D. L. Sills. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 33(5): 808-813. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2092893">10.2307/2092893</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2092893">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="wolff68p809a"></a>Among those of sociologists and near-sociologists, the following strike me as comparably excellent but in need of brief comments: <em>Auguste Comte</em> (René König <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span>); <strong><em>Charles Horton Cooley</em> (Robert C. Angell</strong>; there might be a bit more on the several meanings Cooley attached to "primary" in "primary group"; the "looking-glass self" and Cooley's potential contribution to the sociology of knowledge might have been mentioned; <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Wolff 1968: 809)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Angell, Robert Cooley 1968. Cooley, Charles H. In: Sills, David S. (ed.), <em>International encyclopedia of the social sciences</em>. Vol. 3. New York: Macmillan, 378-383.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="wolff68p809b"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <em>Herbert Spencer</em> (Robert L. Carneiro; Spencer's paper on his reasons for dissenting from Comte, Spencer's dichotomy of military and industrial societies, Durkheim's critique of Spencer's notion of the origin of religion, and <strong>the recent revival of Spencer and evolutionism, notably by Parsons, might have been pointed out</strong>; the last remark also applies to René König's article on <em>Leopold von Wiese</em> [16: 548a]); <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Wolff 1968: 809)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have also missed the memo.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="wolff68p810"></a>Least satisfactory to me among the biographies are Talcott Parsons' of <em>Durkheim</em> and <em>Pareto</em>, both of which present their writer's and his subjects' ideas in a synthesis known to the reader of <em>The Structure of Social Action</em> and later works by Parsons, but hardly enabling the novice to distinguish between Parsons and Durkheim or Parsons and Pareto. In the Durkheim article, I missed something on the significance of <em>Suicide</em> for causal analysis and on <strong>Durkheim's interpretation of pragmatism</strong>. (Wolff 1968: 810)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again, where was I when this memo was spread around?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e20 Mitchell-BritishJournalSociology-1971
--><h4><a id="mitchell71"></a>Mitchell, G. D. 1971. Review of <em>The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Sociology</em> by R. A. Nisbet. <em>The British Journal of Sociology</em> 22(2): 216-217. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/588216">10.2307/588216</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/588216">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mitchell71p217a"></a>The second main criticicsm lies in the particular predilections of the author, who seems to be committed to social behaviourism and symbolic interaction theory. This raises in this reviewer's mind the question of how far an introductory text-book can with propriety rely so heavily on a particular methodological approach. For whilst <strong>this approach may have its roots in the writings of</strong> Mead and <strong>Cooley</strong> and indeed of the great Max Weber, it should not pass un-noticed as being the current popular fashion. Whilst a text-book need not be old-fashioned it should at least be concerned with the received tradition rather than emphasize theoretical novelties. (Mitchell 1971: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Nisbet, Robert Alexander 1970. <em>The Social Bond: An Introduction to the Study of Sociology</em>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialbondintro00nisb/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mitchell71p217b"></a><em>The Social Bond</em> is <strong>well written, interesting and informative</strong>. As the title indicates it focuses attention on a discipline which is fundamentally concerned with social order, the social nature of human life and as such is non-reductive and opposes attempts to reduce the study of social life to the biological nature of man. (Mitchell 1971: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh wow: (1) well written; (2) interesting; and (3) informative.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e22 Motz-AmericanSociologicalReview-1971
--><h4><a id="motz71"></a>Motz, Annabelle B. 1971. Review of <em>Assumptions of Social Psychology</em> by R. E. Lana. <em>American Sociological Review</em> 36(5): 963-964. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2093749">10.2307/2093749</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2093749">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="motz71p964a"></a>Throughout the book Lana strains to reduce the complexity of the ideas of various social psychologists to a few major "elements" (cause, necessary connections, inductions, etc.); but he constantly has to point out that the perspectives discussed contains elements of ambiguity. Decisive distinctions are difficult to come by. The result is <strong>a confusion of terminology, abstruseness, and circumlocution</strong>. (Motz 1971: 964)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Exactly why causality and free will are such unappealing topics. My impression is that after 150 years the philosophical problems with free will are much the same as in E. R. Clay's treatise but now constructed with precise and verbose terminology.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="motz71p964b"></a>There is no mention of sociological social psychologists, <strong>not a single reference to</strong> G. H. Mead, Stryker, Deutscher, <strong>Cooley</strong>, Strauss, Clausen, Becker, or Blumer! Obviously, Lana has restricted his investigations to the work of modern social psychologists who are affiliated with psychology departments and to persons of psychoanalytic persuasion. (Motz 1971: 964)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Too bad.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e23 Peters-SociologicalQuarterly-1972
--><h4><a id="petersorbach72"></a>Peters, George R.; Orbach, Harold L. 1972. Review of <em>Social Relationships</em> by G. J. McCall <em>et al</em>. <em>The Sociological Quarterly</em> 13(1): 140-142. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4105832">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p140a"></a>This slim, but meaty and challenging volume contains five independently prepared essays which focus upon <strong>the structure, character, and functions of social relationships</strong>, and a collaborative final chapter. While each of the authors emphasize somewhat different aspects of social relationships, there are common elements which tie the papers together. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>McCall, George J.; McCall, Michal M.; Denzin, Norman K.; Suttles, Gerald D.; Kurth, Suzanne B. 1970. <em>Social Relationships</em>. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialrelationsh0000unse/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p140"></a>The authors emphasize the importance of <strong>the symbolization or recognition of the relationship by its members</strong>. To a considerable extent such recognition <strong>determines the probability of recurring interaction</strong>. The form which interaction in a social relationship assumes is based upon some <strong>functional fit</strong> between members respective roles and/or selves. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Brilliant! This may very well be the source for this emphasis in John Laver's treatment of "<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2015/09/functions-of-phatic-communion.html"><u>Communicative functions of phatic communion</u></a>" (1975).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141a"></a>Finally, there is agreement that it is useful <strong>to view social relationships as a form of social organization</strong>. The reader will not, however, find a systematic and tightly argued treatment of this proposition throughout the book. Rather, the theoretical bases of the proposition are outlined in chapter one (by G. McCall) and reviewed in the collaborative final chapter. The final essay attempts to show how the remaining four papers - each of which could stand by itself - touch upon various <strong>organizational aspects of social relationships</strong>. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just plain weird.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141b"></a>In chapter one G. McCall develops a framework for analyzing social relationships as a type of social organization. He argues that social relationships exhibit certain organizational features - <strong>bonds which tie members together into a common collectivity, structure, and culture</strong>. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Le <em>bonds of union</em>.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141c"></a>In chapter two M. McCall suggests that all social organizations may be analyzed in terms of their <strong>focus and boundary rules</strong>. She discusses these structural characteristics <strong>as found in encounters (<em>à la</em> Goffman) and social relationships</strong>. Her analysis produces an interesting and potentially fruitful paradigm which points up the complementarity or reciprocality between the focus and boundary rules of social relationships and encounters. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Focal/peripheral is an appealing distinction (e.g. Polanyi's focal and subsidiary attention) but "rules" not so much.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141d"></a>In chapter three Denzin is concerned with the rules (norms) of social relationships, which he distinguishes from <strong>the rules of the civil-segal order and rules of civil propriety</strong>. He suggests that the latter two categories <strong>are daily violated in enduring social relationships, indeed, such relationships are built on a deliberate violation of such rules</strong>. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I don't get it. I had to read this passage several times because I initially thought he was saying the exact opposite, that this process of <em>daily and deliberately violating the rules for the sake of building up the relationship</em> concerns "<u>the rules (norms) of social relationships</u>". As in, your relationship with an intimate partner may have stages or phases such as becoming comfortable passing gas in each other's company. Or "inside jokes" which break the rules of everyday language and would sound like nonsense to third persons. Or humans meowing at each other (or other cats, or dogs - who don't even know the language) or talking "baby talk" with children. Phatic communion on the whole, in this very general sense, is a violation of the norm of conveying ideas in a communicative situation; yet a necessary phase for social relationships to form (this is like saying "the beginning is important").</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141e"></a>More significant, however, is his excellent discussion of the process by which relational rules are developed, elaborated and imposed within social relationships. His treatment of the internal structure of social relationships in terms of deviation from relational rules and of <strong>the ties between relational morality and the broader social order</strong> should be of significance to the student of social relationships. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh damn. I'm becoming increasingly convinced that this book <em>is</em> the basis of Laver's theory. I may <em>have to</em> read it.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141f"></a>In chapter four Suttles discusses <strong>friendship as a social institution</strong>. He shows how rules of public propriety are distinctly transformed with friendship relations. <strong>Deviation from the rules of public propriety may serve as one basis for the formation of friendship since it is one means of presenting a "real self,"</strong> an essential component in friendship. Occasions for such deviation may become institutionalized. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The exact point I was making a paragraph earlier. Generally, I would tie it to the topic of sincerity or authenticity in phatic communion. I.e. the somewhat unexplored area of why it is that some persons saying some words wins you over while other persons saying the same words have negative or no impact. Perfunctory phatic communion vs profound personal communion. The point that these "<u>deviations may become institutionalized</u>" sounds valid; like children's summer camps, or parents insisting that their children <em>go out and make trouble and friends now</em> (I think it's a sitcom trope).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141g"></a>In chapter five Kurth contrasts <strong>The personal and social functions</strong> of friendship and friendly relations and examines differences between the two types of relationships in terms of bases of <strong>attraction, maintenance rules, and change</strong>. She focuses upon the character of interaction within friendship and friendly relations with a discussion of the differential impact of conflict and third parties upon the two types of relationships. (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Could just as well call them <em>personic functions</em>. Now "<u>attraction, maintenance rules, and change</u>" sounds awfully lot like <em>establishing, prolonging and discontinuing</em> (Jakobson), or <em>approaching, relationship maintenance, and detachment</em> (Ruesch).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p141h"></a>Since the authors call attention to what they see as the relative neglect of the study of <strong>social relationships as a phenomenon <em>sui generis</em></strong> - that is as something other than simply the expression, however expanded or indirect, of "role relationships" - there is criticism, both implicit and explicit, of "role theory" <em>à la</em> Parsons as well as other frameworks for diverting "<u>sociologists interested in interpersonal phenomena from their concern with social organization.</u>" (Peters; Orbach 1972: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm really starting to form the impression that many people didn't like Talcott Parsons.</p><!-- Is it his writing style? Personally, I've had to peruse a passage of his due to Bateson and I didn't even get the gist of what the passage was supposed to say. That's why I haven't made any effort to become more acquainted with Parsons.
4 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p142a"></a>No sooner is the distinction made (by G. McCall) between "role" relationships and "social" relationships than it becomes clear that "role" relationships are viewed as "social" relationships at one end of <strong>a continuum whose basic dimension is formality-informality</strong>. That is, when the primary constraints upon behavior in social relationships are the assembled characteristics of the roles attendant upon positions the persons occupy, we have <em>formal</em> (social) relationships; <strong>when the primary constraints upon behavior are the interactors' conception or knowledge of the other and of themselves as persons, we have personal (social) relationships</strong>. However, what is not made clear - although implicitly recognized by the assertion that all social relationships are partly formal and partly personal - is the point that the sociological notion of role <em>à la</em> Mead is not "<u>an abstract pattern of expectations, rights, and duties,</u>" and that <strong>there is no inherent opposition of role relationships and personal relationships</strong>; in fact, personal relationships are role relationships, albeit of a different character than formal relationships. One example is <strong>the social role of being a "true friend."</strong> This problem becomes central when McCall seeks to differentiate the structure of social relationships by arguing that the essential shape of formal relationships is determined by "<u>the fit between a pair of roles</u>" while that of personal relationships is "<u><strong>the fit between the <em>personas</em> that members of a relationships present to one another</strong>.</u>" But <em>persona</em> has been defined for us as any one of revealed sub-sets of role identities that constitute the self-structure of an individual and role identities are "<u><strong>a person's imaginative view(s) of himself as he likes to think of himself being and acting as an occupant of a particular social position</strong>.</u>" In short, the distinction breaks down because the author implicitly recognizes the central <strong>Meadian</strong> contribution to our <strong>understanding</strong> of social persons - <strong>that all social characteristics arise out of the meanings imparted by the role behavior we learn and our individualized adaptation of these</strong>. In this connection one might note the curious fact that although <strong>Cooley</strong>, Simmel and Weber are <strong>cited and quoted favorably</strong>, Mead is somehow not even mentioned or cited in a single one of these essays! (Peters; Orbach 1972: 142)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wow. The "<u>formality-informality</u>" continuum is very basic stuff, and I've had to think along these lines many a times in relation with e.g. phatic communion during service encounters or doctor visits (e.g. Couplands arrive here two decades later through Laver). With "<u>the interactors' conception or knowledge of the other</u>" we're returning to Cooley's looking-glass self, social imagination, personal ideas, etc. The overall point here can be traced to Ruesch and Bateson's metacommunication, too (wouldn't be surprised if they were amongst the sources) - e.g. knowledge of the life and consciousness of others, and mutual recognition of this recognition. As to Mead's conspicuous absence, the situation is similar with my until-now confusion as to why Laver cites Malinowski and his contemporaries and fellow travelers then why does Laver's overall theoretical framework look like it was copy-pasted from several points in Jakobson's work (e.g. beginning, middle and end of the communication process; focus on past, present, and future; iconic, indexical and symbolic aspects, etc.). This <em>Social Relationships</em> being an intermediary would definitely explain it.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="petersorbach72p142b"></a>One other critical point should be noted. <strong>McCall consistently treats personal relationships as if only dyadic relationships qualify</strong>, following no doubt from his concern to exclude role considerations, while the other contributors make no such assumption and Denzin explicitly speaks of "<u>two or more people engag(ing) in either <strong>symbolic or co-present interaction</strong>.</u>" (Peters; Orbach 1972: 142)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just like Laver. The quote heavily implies that symbolic interaction is non-co-present interaction, i.e. communication via letters, and thus may not discriminate between real and fictional communicants, much like Cooley's "personal ideas". This review has been very valuable for my further research.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e24 Glass-ContemporarySociology-1974
--><h4><a id="glass74"></a>Glass, John F. 1974. Review of <em>Sociology for the Modern Mind</em> by I. Seger. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 3(1): 83-85. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2063477">10.2307/2063477</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2063477">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="glass74p84a"></a>Chapter 3, entitled "The Classical Period of Sociology," discusses in some detail the contributions of Weber, Simmel, Pareto, and Durkheim. A much too brief section on human socialization compares <strong>Durkheim, Freud, Cooley</strong>, and Mead as four independent discoverers in common: "<u>They discern a process, <strong>a slow development of the personality through the interaction of something given and something acting on it from the outside that then becomes part of the personality, is exposed to further influences, and so on</strong></u>" (p. 74). (Glass 1974: 84)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Why is it always you three?</em> This very obvious statement is exactly what I'm currently grappling with - the boundary of the semiosphere and how an external input is selected and semiotized into the personality-culture of its target. Sadly practically inaccessible:</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Seger, Imogen 1972. <em>Sociology for the Modern Mind</em>. New York: Macmillan.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="glass74p84b"></a>Seger, although her sympathies are neo-<strong>Parson</strong>ian (i.e., Mertonian), fairly presents different sides of the controversy and, to her credit, does not neglect <strong>Sorokin</strong>'s work as an alternative position. (Glass 1974: 84)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Echoes of some sociology department troubles.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="glass74p84c"></a><strong>Etzioni's "active society"</strong> is held out as an example of progress in sociological theory, a new, non-deterministic theory, which does not necessarily equate power with coercion and conflict, and allows for cooperation. (Glass 1974: 84)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Etzion, Emitai 1968. <em>The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Processing</em>. New York: Free Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b4152556*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e25 Hinkle-ContemporarySociology-1974
--><h4><a id="hinkle74"></a>Hinkle, Gisela J. 1974. Review of <em>The Structure of the Life-World</em> by A. Schutz and T. Luckmann. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 3(2): 112-114. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2062873">10.2307/2062873</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2062873">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hinkle74p112"></a>There has been during the last decade of American sociology a renewed interest in questions of social meaning, fundamental principles, and qualitative relationships which has encouraged awareness of more subjective-idealist theoretical orientations. <strong>Rather than seeking ideas in earlier American writings</strong> - <strong>such as</strong> those of <strong>Cooley</strong>, Small, Ellwood and the symbolic interactionists, <strong>these more recent theoretical concerns have focused on</strong> segments of Continental social philosophy. A unique figure in this movement has been <strong>Alfred Schutz</strong> who has become the major theoretical spokesman for phenomenological sociology and who has posthumously become a godfather to ethnomethodology. (Hinkle 1974: 112)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pragmatism vs phenomenology. Peirce and Husserl having proxy arguments.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hinkle74p113"></a>Furthermore, this life-world is structured in terms of various dimensions. First, it is the major realm of reality; the realms of <strong>fantasy</strong>, <strong>dreams</strong>, <strong>religion</strong>, and <strong>science</strong> being others. Secondly, it is distributed spatially both in the physical sense and in terms of social distance. Thirdly, it has temporal arrangements from the perspective of homogeneous or externally spatially measured time and of inner time or <em>dureé</em>. All of these affect the interaction and understanding of the ego or actor and the other and of ego's actions. (Hinkle 1974: 113)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like there's a primary modelling system (umwelt, natural language) and secondary modelling systems (art, play, and science<!-- orgaaniline triaad! Jurad Hocman! -->).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hinkle74p114"></a>Having examined the hypothetical case of two persons stranded (like Robinson Crusoe) on an island, they conclude that a "society" has indeed been formed because a society may consist of only two people if they share "<u><strong>a common fate</strong>, i.e., typically similar problems, a factual social structure, in this case limited to a we-relation, a common language, and a common stock of knowledge</u>" (p. 289). Grounding society in the physical organisms of two (or more) people seems hardly in keeping with the priority of individual consciousness basic to phenomenology! (Hinkle 1974: 114)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If society is sharing a common fate then where do you draw the line? Is all humanity a society? Is all <em>life</em> a society?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e26 Heydebrand-ContemporarySociology-1974
--><h4><a id="heydebrand74"></a>Heydebrand, Ruth V. 1974. Review of <em>The Making of Sociology</em> by R. Fletcher. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 3(3): 222-224. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2062567">10.2307/2062567</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2062567">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="heydebrand74p222a"></a>Sociology is conceived of in broad terms, a "humane" subject; consequently psychology, history, anthropology, and social philosophy all require consideration:<blockquote><strong>Sociology</strong> - I hope to show - is <em>not</em> only one subject among others, but a subject which pervades, informs and transforms all others. It is a subject which stems from, and <strong>attempts</strong> to satisfy, the modern need <strong>to articulate all human knowledge into one large ordered perspective both for the sake of <em>understanding</em></strong>, in itself, <strong>and</strong> to provide a basis <strong>for a sane and well-balanced social <em>reform</em></strong>. It is the subject of central importance in and for our time (V. 1, p. 5, italics in original).</blockquote>This statement should certainly cheer up <strong>those among us who have somehow been made to feel that there is little they can do in order to affect the course of events</strong>. (Heydebrand 1974: 222)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hopeful.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="heydebrand74p222b"></a>Practical need and curiosity, inherent in human nature, are the basis of common-sense, which is actually "<u>science in embryo.</u>" <strong>Any science is a critical reflection on and an elaboration of commonsense assumptions</strong>. (Heydebrand 1974: 222)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phraseology. Made me think of how "phatic communion" is "<u>a critical reflection on and an elaboration of commonsense assumptions</u>" about everyday conversation, social intercourse, small talk, etc. ...Seeing that Cooley, too, has all the elements of phatic communion on his pages, I suspect that the notion is so common because it as-if sprouts naturally; it is conceived in a more-or-less recognizable form in so many places because the practical need and curiosity finds it everywhere.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="heydebrand74p222c"></a>Societies are systems of interconnected institutions, and particular institutions can only be understood in the context of such systems, or associational processes. In addition, society must be seen as essentially an historical process developing from simple to complex forms, but <strong>diversity of types of societies is limited because of universal features of human nature</strong>; thus universal generalizations are possible in sociology. (Heydebrand 1974: 222)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And here we have the science-fiction question: if human nature were more fluid than we thought, then the natural consequence would be more diverse types of human societies.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="heydebrand74p223a"></a>The need for a science of society as a means of control marks with few exceptions all further contributions to the field. <strong>Comte proclaims sociology as science, Mill sets down the rules, Spencer adds the dimension of evolution</strong>. Emphasizing consistency and continuity, or "system-building," Fletcher amply documents that sociology is moving toward the position he endorses. (Heydebrand 1974: 223)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Bada-bing, bada-boom.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="heydebrand74p223b"></a>In the second volume, Fletcher covers the contributions of the following sociologists: Toennies, Westermarck, Hobhouse, <strong>Durkheim</strong>, Weber, MacDougall, <strong>Cooley</strong>, Mead, <strong>Freud</strong>, Pareto, Malinowski, and Radcliffe-Brown. (Heydebrand 1974: 223)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Why is it always you three?</em> I'm starting to get all too familiar with this crowd.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e27 Strasser-ContemporarySociology-1975
--><h4><a id="strasser75"></a>Strasser, Herman 1975. Review of <em>Ferdinand Tönnies: A New Evaluation. Essays and Documents</em> by W. J. Cahnman. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 4(5): 545-547. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2063656">10.2307/2063656</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2063656">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="strasser75p545a"></a>Although Tönnies is widely recognized as one of the founders of <em>modern</em> sociology, his role in American sociology has largely been that of <strong>a textbook celebrity</strong>. (Strasser 1975: 545)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Coming out of the gate hot.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="strasser75p545b"></a>It is true that Tönnies owes much to Marx's and Spencer's work - sociological classics that were in America for a long time either expelled from consideration as sociology, or declared dead. Undoubtedly, Tönnies discursive rather than systematic view of <strong>the comprehensive problem of human relations does make great demands on the student's erudition</strong>. However, there are numerous examples that a difficult style does not prevent a sociologist from becoming prominent. Rather, the obscure style of sociologists like Tönnies may have protected their work against adverse criticism. (Strasser 1975: 545)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh yeah, the <em>Gemeinschaft</em> vs <em>Gesellschaft</em> guy. Indeed, in many a textbook but rarely included in the active discussion of anything anymore, or so it feels.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="strasser75p546a"></a>In his study of the German academic community between 1890 and 1933, F. K. Ringer has recently shown that this represented a grave misunderstanding of Tönnies' scientific as well as political intentions The reactionary arguments (against modern society and for a romanticized revival of community) which others derived from his social theory made his work suspect to <strong>liberals and socialists</strong>. On the other hand, since <strong>Tönnies accepted socialism as a logical outcome of his social presuppositions of modern society</strong>, and since he also integrated Marxian ideas into his work, he had little chance to gain enduring acceptance by many <strong>conservatives</strong>. And yet, socialist intellectuals lacked comprehension of his work, the voluntaristic emphasis of which appeared alien to them. (Strasser 1975: 546)</blockquote><!--
--><p>On the fence and rejected by both sides? "<u><em>They're throwing eggs!</em> — They did this last time.</u>"</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="strasser75p546b"></a>Tönnies' point of departure in pure or <em>theoretical</em> sociology is the idea that <strong>all social interactions and groups (i.e., social entities) are creations of human thought and will</strong>. Since social relationships exist only insofar as they are <strong>recognized and willed</strong> by the participants, social entities are conceived as being established by will which, in turn, is differentiated according to its relation to ends and means. Consequently, Tönnies arrives at two opposed <em>and</em> complementary types of social organization: one based on <strong>natural will (leading to <em>Gemeinschaft</em>)</strong>, the other based on <strong>rational will (leading to <em>Gesellschaft</em>)</strong>. The parallelism to Weber's types of social action is obvious. (Strasser 1975: 546)</blockquote><!--
--><p>To me, this just looks like a serious case of the Missing Firstness.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="strasser75p547"></a>Although Tönnies held that the inevitability of the outcome of the historical process as claimed by Marx was unsubstantiated, and although <strong>the dissolution and transformation of the ties of community was to be considered a tragic necessity</strong>, he did envision, within rational modern society, <strong>the development of new types of social relations based on rational ethics</strong>. This would eventually lead to <strong>a socialistic order</strong>, which he viewed as dialectically uniting <em>Gemeinschaft</em> and <em>Gesellschaft</em> on a new, higher level. (Strasser 1975: 547)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Traditional community, modern society, and then put a little mash-up remix in there, <em>bada-bing, bada-boom</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e28 Braude-ContemporarySociology-1975
--><h4><a id="braude75"></a>Braude, Lee 1975. Review of <em>The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment</em> by J. Israel and H. Tajfel. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 4(3): 296-297. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2063236">10.2307/2063236</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2063236">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="braude75p296a"></a>This is an important book that deserves to be read by sociologists trained largely within the North American ambit. It is <strong>a difficult book to read</strong>, perhaps because 3 of 11 chapters are translations; nevertheless, the necessary diligence pays off handsomely in providing the reader an insight into European perspectives on social psychology that transcend geographic or cultural boundaries. (Braude 1975: 296)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Israel, Joachim; Tajfel, Henri 1972. <em>The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment</em>. New York: Academic Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/contextofsocialp0000isra/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="braude75p296b"></a>Moscovici examines "Society and Theory in Social Psychology" (Chap. 2) and concludes that the field has failed to develop a central theoretical focus, despite myriad experimentation. He argues for <strong>linguistic communication as inter-individual linkages as such a focus</strong>. (Braude 1975: 296)</blockquote><!--
--><p>To me this comes across as regular run of the mill "<em>fact of communication</em>"-phaticism.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="braude75p297a"></a>Johan Asplund suggests that any theoretical approach to human behavior is freighted with value; Weber notwithstanding, a <em>wertfrei</em> social psychology is impossible. When once the evaluational character of these approaches is recognized, it will be found that the "classics" - notably the symbolic interactionism of <strong>Cooley</strong> and Mead - <strong>can still provide clues to an understanding of conduct that are meaningful even in our supposedly amoral contemporary world</strong>. (Braude 1975: 297)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"All sign systems are ideological" type claim.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="braude75p297b"></a>Finally, in Chapter 11, <strong>Rom Harré</strong> maintains that social psychology ought to be concerned with <strong>the meanings that individuals bring to overt behavior</strong>. In order to understand interaction, a model must be generated that has some reference to the real world of human beings; the study that leads to such a construction Harré calls "ethogeny." The variables to be studied are the interrelation of meanings that occur among the participants in episodes, and the normative frameworks that structure the genesis and persistence of meanings. (Braude 1975: 297)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It is 1975, after all. It would have been weird if Rom Harré did not come crawl out of the woodwork.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e29 Sztompka-PolishSociologicalBulletin-1975
--><h4><a id="sztompka75"></a>Sztompka, Piotr 1975. Review of <em>The Foundation of Sociological Theory</em> by T. Abel. <em>The Polish Sociological Bulletin</em> 31/32: 78-80. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/44815614">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="sztompka75p78a"></a><strong>Theory is a life-long preoccupation of Theodore Abel. Sometimes it is a source of distress, and sometimes - satisfaction</strong>. This is usually the case with people who are true to one idea despite changing circumstances. (Sztompka 1975: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Fellow traveler.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="sztompka75p78b"></a>The big asset of Abel's book is, that it is neither purely historical nor purely analytical. Instead it attempts to combine both approaches to sociological theory; <strong>discusses history of sociology from the point of view of its contemporary significance, and discusses contemporary theories from the point of view of its historical roots</strong>. (Sztompka 1975: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The ideal.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sztompka75p79a"></a>Whereas the synthetic tradition is concerned with the comprehensive interpretation of the <strong>origin</strong>, the <strong>continuity</strong> and the <strong>destiny</strong> of human society, and clinical tradition with the alleviation of current social problems, analytical tradition takes up the study of the nature of human collectivities and social relations in their concrete varieties. (Sztompka 1975: 79)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Didn't I at one point invent a makeshift term for these process-triads that remind be of Jakobson's <em>establish-prolong-discontinue</em>?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sztompka75p79b"></a>The analytical approach focuses exclusively on <strong>"social factors," i.e. those determinants of human conduct that are generated by human associations and interactions</strong>. It attempts to provide propositions about the uniform relations of social factors with other social factors, or with factors of the different order, in either quantitative or qualitative (ideal-typical) terms. (Sztompka 1975: 79)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Reminds me of this: "<u>Nor are statements about persons which refer them to culture and to social structure social psychological, if they fail to refer to the collective psychological processes which are reflected in individual behavior.</u>" (<a href=#hartung51p608a">Hartung 1951: 608</a>, <em>above</em>)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e30 Dibble-HistoryTheory-1976
--><h4><a id="dibble76"></a>Dibble, Vernon K. 1976. Review of <em>The Sociologists of the Chair</em> by H. Schwendinger and J. R. Schwendinger. <em>History and Theory</em> 15(3): 293-321. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2504731">10.2307/2504731</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2504731">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p293"></a>This very important book "<u>is a study of the relationship between the newly emerging science of sociology</u>" in the United States during <strong>the forty years around the turn of the century</strong> and "<u>a particular phase in the development of liberalism.</u>" Sociology was born in an era when "laissez-faire liberalism was reconstituted and a new mode of thought, corporate liberalism, emerged as the dominant liberal ideology</u>" (xvii). "<u><strong>Sociology was essentially a liberal response to the great conflicts of the times</strong></u>" (3). It was and is, in large measure, an apologetic for corporate capitalism. The writings of the founders of American sociology were "<u>patently ideological statements</u>" in which the authors were "explicit" about their "<u>ideological defense of capitalism, imperialism, racism, and sexism</u>" (6). (Dibble 1976: 293)</blockquote><!--
--><p>My fav era. The claim about sociology reminds me of some economics history professor I heard on a podcast who said that most economics departments in the U.S. teach bunk and are paid to teach bunk just to stave off the competition of Marxist economics. In any case, right off the bat this sounds like advanced level reading better put off till later. [Also, 600-page "basic books" — nu-huh.]</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Schwendinger, Herman; Schwendinger, Julia R. 1974. <em>The Sociologists of the Chair: A Radical Analysis of the Formative Years of North American Sociology (1883-1922)</em>. New York: Basic Books.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/sociologistsofch0000unse">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p296"></a>Second, in response to the urgent need for "<u>new instruments of social control,</u>" the American sociologists "<u>became preoccupied with the concept of social control [and] generally refrained from analyzing the systematic use of violence for the maintenance and expansion of capitalism.</u>" Instead, they stressed "<u><strong>mutual obligations and value consensus</strong></u>" (443). The authors suggest that this "<u>concentration on <strong>moral relationships</strong></u>" stemmed from "<u>the close identification between sociology and [...] social work, public welfare, and sectarian or non-sectarian philanthropic agencies</u>" which attempted to "<u>ameliorate the problems of working-class people chiefly through <strong>moral means</strong></u>" and <u>without recourse to outright political (much less revolutionary) tactics</u>" (444, emphasis omitted). (Dibble 1976: 296)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Abstinence for sexual education and abortion, church for alcoholics and narcotics addicts, prayer for school shootings, community donations instead of universal healthcare, etc. etc. until you have a perfect society with no catastrophic moral failings at all. | Vegetarianism and "green lifestyle" are moral choices for the consumer and not something factory farming and fossil fuel companies have any involvement with.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p297"></a>In religious versions of natural law, its ultimate source is the divine will. God established nature, and human society was subordinate to nature. Hence, the ultimate origin of society was God's will. When natural law became secularized, however, <strong>the ultimate origin of human society was</strong> no longer God, but <strong>human nature</strong>. For example, Hobbes "<u>regarded natural human purposes to be chiefly organized around <strong>the desire for self-preservation</strong>: it was therefore man's earthly characteristics which justified social relationships, rather than the natural necessity to move closer to God</u>" (11, emphasis omitted). (Dibble 1976: 297)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted because of "human nature" being a common theme between Cooley and Stapledon.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p298a"></a>First, societies are rooted in the human nature of individual persons. Second, whether human beings seek primarily to <strong>defend themselves</strong> against others (Hobbes), or to <strong>experience pleasure</strong> (Bentham), or rationally to <strong>calculate advantages</strong> to themselves in exchange relationships (Smith), they are egoistic in their competition for scarce goods. There is a basic contradiction between "individual" and "society." Hence, as William A. Whyte wrote in 1920, "<u>the problem of society is to integrate their activities</u>." That "integration" might be "sovereignty" as in Hobbes; the "social contract" as in Locke; or the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith and of laissez-faire liberalism. <strong>Under corporate liberalism it was "socialization" and "social control."</strong> Quoting Whyte again: "<u><strong>The individual in his cultural progress brings his instincts under increasingly better control</strong></u>" (362). (Dibble 1976: 298)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) experience pleasure; (2) defend themselves; and (3) calculate advantages. Bringing instincts under better control of reason being a novelty I deem suspect; what about the virtue of modesty or steadfastness in reigning in one's passions in Ancient Greece? I have the impression that the very earliest philosophy was largely about self-control and the repression of passions or our "animal nature" or whatever else. — In fact, I'm pretty sure that it went like this: Step 1 — Everything is water, fire, earth, and air; Step 2 — Man is part animal, part god, and the godly part must subdue the animalistic part; Step 3 — Triangles all the way down.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p298b"></a>As Ross and others used this concept, it bridged the most macrosociological and the most microsociological topics. It could refer to the reconciliation of conflicting interest groups by the state; to internal controls which depend, in the words of Ross, on "<u><strong>a developed self-sense</strong></u>" (207); and to many things in between, such as tradition and public opinion. (Dibble 1976: 298)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Arenenud enesetunnetus</em>. This must be Ross's <em>Social Control</em> (1900) — damn, earlier than I thought (I was off by a decade into the 20th c.).</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p299"></a>Their reading is based, first of all, upon the plain meaning of published words. <strong>When Albion Small writes that he sees no alternative to capitalism, no great interpretative leap is required to assert that he was not a socialist</strong>. When Franklin Giddings writes that "<u><strong>the combination of small states into larger political aggregates</strong> must continue until all the semi-civilized, barbarian, and savage communities of the world are brought under the protection of the larger civilized nations,</u>" no great interpretive leap <strong>is</strong> required to assert that he supported <strong>imperialism</strong>. But the meaning of words is not always plain. (Dibble 1976: 299)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is European Union an example of imperialism? Are there many empires in history that expanded through diplomacy and voluntary membership?</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p301a"></a>On some points their case would have been weaker. But on others it would have been stronger. For example, they assert that the "<u>absence of socialist writings</u>" from the <em>American Journal of Sociology</em> under Albion Small's editorship "<u>is the most affirmative indicator of the ideologically restricted boundaries of the field during the formative years</u>" (509). They could have strengthened their case by pointing out that one of Small's purposes in founding the <em>Journal</em> was precisely to combat socialist or other radical ideas, and to promote reformism. In a letter of April 25, 1895 to President Harper of the University of Chicago, Small proposed that the university found <strong>a journal of sociology</strong> and argued that such a journal <strong>was "<u>needed both to exert restraint upon utopian social effort</strong> and to encourage and direct well advised attempts at social cooperation.</u>" (Dibble 1976: 301)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Of course.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p301b"></a>Again, the significance of the fact that E. A. Ross avoided "<u>any reference to a ruling class or oligarchy in modern differentiated societies cannot be overestimated. In his work, <strong>the dynamic functions of a ruling class in capitalist societies were replaced by vague references to a mystical collective mind and public consciousness</strong></u>" (209). (Dibble 1976: 301)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have to say, I think I've come around to it. Now "<u>a mystical collective mind</u>" sounds kinda cool and I want to know the background of this idea.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p302"></a>For example <strong>suppose that the concern of Cooley and of Mead with selves and with self-images was an attempt to bring the values and the individualistic modes of cognition</strong> characteristic of free-market capitalism, and of laissez-faire liberalism, <strong>into the era of Big Business</strong> and of monopoly capitalism. Once we have the concept of "self" and of "self-image," however, we can ask questions about other societies which we could not otherwise ask. For example, what was it about medieval society, for all its definition of persons in terms of structural position and ascribed social location, that generated literature (such as <strong>troubador romances</strong>) <strong>in which selves seem strongly present</strong>; while selves are virtually absent from, say, Homeric epics? (Dibble 1976: 302)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The supposition leaves me a little baffled. Does the author think that the philosophers' concern with the self began in the Victorian age? The other point comes from Julian Jaynes' <em>Bicameral Mind</em>?</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p303"></a>For example, Durkheim's concept of "anomie," and the importance of that concept in his thought, depended upon his more or less Hobbesian view of human nature. <strong>Anomie is tormenting only because the human passions</strong>, unlike those of the lower animals, <strong>are inherently open-ended</strong>. Hence, in the absence of external control over the passions, human beings cannot gratify any desires, and are doomed to unending torments. (Dibble 1976: 303)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Beautiful.</p><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p308"></a>It does seem sensible, however, and helpful for clarity of communication, to reserve that term to describe people who, first of all, support a revolutionary change from capitalism to socialism, and ultimately to communism, in a sense which includes <strong>the abolition of commodity production and of commodity exchange</strong>; and who also accept and use in their thinking a large number of the concepts and laws of motion mentioned above. (Dibble 1976: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Degrowth and stopping this obscene waste.</p><!--
20-21 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p311ja312"></a>For example, <strong>the founders of American sociology rarely footnoted or took over terminology from their colleagues</strong>. Cooley's "larger mind" or <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> "larger whole" had affinities with Small's "social process" and with Giddings's "consciousness of kind." But, so far as I know, none of these three ever attempted in print to figure out the overlap and the differences between their central concepts. <strong>Were they in a market that required product differentiation in the packaging?</strong> And could this fact be the source of the "terminological chaos" to which the authors refer? Cooley's <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em> (1902) was reviewed in dozens of daily newspapers all over the United States. Shortly after the turn of the century Ross went in for popular travel books. Small lectured to lay grounds and, like Giddings, wrote for non-scholarly readers in non-scholarly journals. These facts suggest that <strong>the market for the ideas of the founders of American sociology was to a significant extent in a mass public</strong>. They were not writing simply for each other, but were also competing for attention in the market. They were attempting not only to converge into a science, but also to maintain their product differentiation. (Dibble 1976: 311-312)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So glad I didn't quit before getting to this (I briefly considered it - 30 pages is <em>overstaying one's welcome</em> for a book review.) This is the first note I have, I think, of someone pointing out how tedious it is that all these American writers all have their own unique little idioms for everything (Mead and Goffman are especially at fault with this). Well, it might as well be marketing. <em>We're talking about</em> the definition of the situation™.</p><!--
26 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p317"></a>The founders could not have learned Marxism in the German universities where Small, Ross, Cooley, Park, and Mead studied. Members of the socialist party, Marxist or not, were exclided from university faculties there. So they had to learn Marxism on their own, just as they might have learned the teachings of Confucius, Aquinas or Mary Baker Eddy. And, <strong>when you try to learn Marxism on your own, the chances are very good that you will simply misunderstand it</strong>. (Dibble 1976: 317)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>You need to come learn Marxism with us and no you can't call your mother, she's an enemy of the people</em>.</p><!--
27-28 --><blockquote><a id="dibble76p318ja319"></a>Finally, in the absence of such an uprooting from their liberal heritage, as the founders of American sociology looked around the society in which they lived, they saw many issues - such as the place of immigrants, <strong>the</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>relations between state governments and the federal government (on which Cooley's father wrote a book)</strong>, and controversies over prohibition - to which Marxism did not appear to speak. (Dibble 1976: 318-319)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Cooley, Thomas M. 1871. <em>A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union</em>. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/cu31924019912736/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e31 Soper-MichiganLawReview-1977
--><h4><a id="soper77"></a>Soper, Philip 1977. Review of <em>Knowledge and Politics</em> by R. M. Unger. <em>Michigan Law Review</em> 75(7): 1539-1552. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1287810">10.2307/1287810</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1287810">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1541"></a>On the one hand, the morality of desire projects a portrait of the self as an unconnected sequence of arbitrary, changing desires, having nothing <em>necessarily</em> in common with the same self over time or wit hthe rest of mankind. It thus denies both "<u><strong>The continuity and the humanity of the self</strong></u>" (p. 57). The morality of reason, on the other hand, whose formal, indeterminate laws ignore individual strivings, has an opposite and equally unhappy consequence: negation of the self's "<u>capacity for moral innovation and its individual identity</u>" (p. 57). (Soper 1977: 1541)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I can't follow this reviewer at all but this phrase sold it for me.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Unger, Roberto Mangabeira 1975. <em>Knowledge and Politics</em>. New York: The Free Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/knowledgepolitic00ungerich">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1542"></a>This is not to say that one must accept Christian dogma in order to accept Unger's invitation. Unger is not attempting to persuade one of the existence of a heavenly kingdom, but of <strong>the possibility of establishing a kingdom of man on earth that significantly improves on the only kingdom that Unger believes liberalism is capable of supporting</strong>. Like Marx and Weber, Unger is sensitive to the connection between theoretical doctrine and social experience and to <strong>the difficulty of meaningfully altering the one without simultaneously altering the other</strong>. (Soper 1977: 1542)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This author has such a tentacle-like style of writing that it is a torture to read. It's like listening to Ben Shapiro talk. Here's more:</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Soper, Philip 1984. <em>A Theory of law</em>. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Soper, Philip 2002. <em>The Ethics of Deference: Learning from Law’s Morals</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5-6 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1542ja1543"></a>It is a view that rejects both <strong>extreme individualism (under which community collapses)</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and <strong>extreme collectivism (under which self disappears)</strong>. (Soper 1977: 1542-1543)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is this Herbert Spencer's "dead-level" theory?</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1545"></a>One <em>can</em> reason about ends more or less likely to produce happiness (perhaps by reference to those same aspects of human nature than Unger describes), even though <strong>the proof that happiness itself is the ultimate end rests, like all first principles, beyond the reach of reason</strong>. (Soper 1977: 1545)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I don't know what it is about this writer but these 15 pages are twice as torturous as the devout marxist's 30 pages on how to be a devout marxist.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1547"></a>But unlike treatises that confine their analyses to "<u>the order of ideas,</u>" Unger continually compares the theoretical order with "<u><strong>the order of social consciousness</strong>,</u>" giving life to abstract discussion by reference to experiences ranging from personal, romantic, and perverse love (pp. 218-19) to the philosopher's quest for ontological proof of the existence of God (p. 293). (Soper 1977: 1547)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It's too bad the reviewer waxes on about whatever worms are rotting his brains and only quotes out-of-context phrases because these out-of-context phrases themselves sound extremely rad in comparison.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1548a"></a>Utopian theories have, after all, received a bad philosophical press of late, not so much or only because they are implausible, but because they do not appear necessarily preferable to nonutopian alternatives. Unger insists that his is not a plan for utopia, because utopias envision a static society isolated in history, whereas Unger contemplates <strong>continued reciprocal development of society and self through history</strong> (p. 237). (Soper 1977: 1548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Every sentence an unclear insinuation. Even the paraphrase sounds rad and in line with Cooley and stuff.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="soper77p1548b"></a>But if the motivation for the establishment of organic groups is provided by an ideal that seeks complete resolution of uncertainty in the central aspects of human existence, then <strong>the recognition that only God can achieve the ideal</strong> perhaps should and will at some point eliminate the motivation. (Soper 1977: 1548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Well, first of all, through God all things are possible, so jot that down.</u>"</p><!-- 13/15 DNF
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e32 Manning-ContemporarySociology-1977
--><h4><a id="manning77"></a>Manning, Peter K. 1977. Review of <em>Drawa in Life: The Uses of Communication in Society</em> by J. E. Combs and M. W. Mansfield. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 6(6): 733-735. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2066398">10.2307/2066398</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2066398">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="manning77p734"></a>The problem of symbolic interactionism, reflected in this collection, is that it has become a litany, <strong>a responsive reading</strong>, a ritualized program to be extolled on cue, performed mechanistically, exhorted and exclaimed. (Manning 1977: 734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>a liturgical form or process in which leader and congregation read passages aloud alternatively</u>"</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="manning77p734"></a>Rituals are not easily eviserated; <strong>etiolate</strong>d or not, they continue to mark the outer boundaries of a sacred concern, and lie at the heart of any perspective. (Manning 1977: 734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Can you be! "<u>to bleach and alter the natural development of (a green plant) by excluding sunlight</u>"</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="manning77p734ja735"></a>Is all dramaturgical analysis "humanistic," or rooted in concern for the individual, his/her feelings, moods, and situationally negotiated choices? I would argue it is not, and would further argue that although Goffman is consistently labeled here as a dramaturgical sociologist, that he is not focused upon or concerned with interaction (<em>Encounters</em>, 35); it is interested in the rules that <em>organize</em> and make meaningful experience, not experience itself (<em>Encounters</em>, 28, 41; <em>Frame Analysis</em>, chapter 10; and is not interesting in individuals, but their situations (<em>Interaction Ritual</em>, 3). Rather than showing the inherent freedom of individuals, Goffman aims to show <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> the profound limits upon them. Rather than elaborating <strong>the joy of creative meaning construction</strong>, he trods on the balloon of meaning showing that it, like computer tape, is as thin as any other strip of human doing. <strong>The orderly nature of human society</strong> is not fragile, not constructed by humans (as the litany goes), but in Goffman's terms, <strong>is based upon an ever-so-powerful invisible code</strong>. That it may be occasionally perceived as being fragile is an important datum, but its abiding invisibility is far more significant. We have often in employing dramaturgical analysis grasped at straws, failing to see what winds were carrying them. (Manning 1977: 734-735)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This writer's style I enjoy immensely. Vivid imagery, rare words, and scotching critique - it has everything. (I've apparently read <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2012/09/various-seminar-texts-3.html">one piece here</a> before from this reviewer - I was certain the name was familiar.)</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="manning77p735"></a>But Bourdieu, Bernstein, Leach, and Goffman do hold forth a less eclectic version of drama, <strong>a vision rooted</strong>, not floating, in neo-symbolic meanings unattached to the system of signs constituting the rules of experience. (Manning 1977: 735)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Even the <em>a titles</em> are grand. This one really sounds like a band name.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e33 Giddens-SchutzParsonsProblems-1979
--><h4><a id="giddens79"></a>Giddens, Anthony 1979. Schutz and Parsons: Problems of Meaning and Subjectivity. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 8(5): 682-685. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2065417">10.2307/2065417</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2065417">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="giddens79p682a"></a>This framework was first of all outlined in <em>The Structure of Social Action</em>, originally published in <strong>1937</strong>. There are many (including myself) who would regard this <strong>formidably long and dense volume</strong> as a greater achievement than any other single work or essay-collection that Parsons has published subsequently. (Giddens 1979: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Parsons, Talcott 1949. <em>The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers</em>. New York: Free Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/structureofsocia00pars/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="giddens79p682b"></a>Schutz read <em>The Structure of Social Action</em>, when it appeared, with much more attention and excitement than his own work had awoken in Parsons, as the exchange of letters reported in the book under review reveals. Parsons read Schutz's book, he says, "<u>shartly after it appeared,</u>" but "<u>did not find it of primary significance</u>" for the issues he was working on in his researches for <em>The Structure of Social Action</em>. Schutz acquired a copy of Parsons' book early in 1938 and "<u>realised immediately the importance and value</u>" of the system of thought which it outlined. (Giddens 1979: 682)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement.</u>"</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="giddens79p683"></a>The exchange of letters terminates in an intellectual impasse, but also takes on a tone of slight bitterness. Schutz's reply to Parsons' defence of his point of view is one of rather hurt reproach. He sent his paper to Parsons, he says, only as a draft, in order to elicit Parsons' comments, and in the belief that most of his ideas were complementary to Parsons' own. But <strong>Parsons "<u>interpreted it exclusively as a criticism</u>" of his work</strong> and, Schutz felt, rejected it in its entirety. Parsons replied in a conciliatory way, agreeing that his critical remarks "<u>were rather sharply formulated,</u>" but adding "<u>I did not in the least intend them to be derogatory but only to state my own position as clearly as I possibly could.</u>" (Giddens 1979: 683)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The human ego is a hellova drug.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e34 Orum-VarietiesSociologicalExperience-1980
--><h4><a id="orum80"></a>Orum, Anthony M. 1980. The Varieties of Sociological Experience. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 9(6): 746-754. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2065258">10.2307/2065258</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2065258">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="orum80p748"></a>He <span style="color: #fa4100">[</span>Kenneth Bock<span style="color: #fa4100">]</span>, like several other authors in the book, mentions <strong>the pivotal role of Condorcet</strong> in fashioning the conceptual imagery of the stages of development and progress in mankind. And later, it becomes clear that <strong>Auguste Comte's images of progress and of history, of the three stages through which mankind is presumed to pass, owes much to the inspiration and genius provided by Condorcet</strong>. (Orum 1980: 748)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm still confusing Condorcet and <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-factor-of-cohesion.html#marsciani86a">Condillac</a>.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="orum80p751"></a>But Freund's Weber is not the only one represented here. Take the Weber of Dawes, for example. Here Weber is the scholar in whose eyes the <strong>creativity and emotional activities of human beings <em>become transformed into institutions</em></strong> metaphorically conveyed as the iron cage. (Orum 1980: 751)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not far removed from "<u>institutions exist because of the "projective systems" of the individual</u>" (<a href="#hartung51p608c">Hartung 1951: 608</a>, <em>above</em>).</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="orum80p752"></a>Yet, by and large, <strong>the work of the American theorists would appear to be simply that of social reform</strong>, and a smattering of insights here and there. George Herbert Mead, whose ideas have begun to take hold among a wide variety of students, particularly those interested in the character of <strong>language</strong> insofar as it involves and <strong>presupposes relationships and interaction</strong>, comes off as virtually paltry and unrecognizable. Charles Horton <strong>Cooley, a most interesting figure who has prompted a variety of scholarly endeavors</strong>, also seems here to be very uninteresting and rather intellectually timid. (Orum 1980: 752)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That the early American social theorists (including Cooley) were all gung-ho for eugenics and social control reminds me of an anecdote told possibly by Lorenz (maybe, possibly in a book about <em>Instincts</em> that I don't think ended up on this blog) about zoology goes: <em>the Europeans started with the study of worms, fish and birds to work their knowledge up to understand mammals whereas the Americans started with the study of dogs, dolphins and chimpanzees to work their knowledge up to manipulate humans</em>. </p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="orum80p753"></a>Thus, in various places, American sociology is passed off as mere positivism, as simple-minded empiricism, as <strong>the vapid social anthropology of W. Lloyd Warner</strong>, or, in the case of America's most eminent social theorist, Parsons, as mere borrowing, and subsequent distortion, of European ideas. But perhaps Americans come off the very worst for their obvious virtues. That which Americans have done so well, in Dawes' words, for instance, <strong><em>ah docing</em> and <em>eclecting</em></strong>, for these achievements they are portaryed here as the Devil incarnate, furthering the tendencies, let us say, of Weber, rather than offering the hope of restoring the necessary critical judgment and reason to the "<u>course of the world.</u>" (Orum 1980: 753)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Mis sa eklektid siin?</em> This out-of-nowhere jab at whoever this unconnected social anthropologist is made me look him up: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._Lloyd_Warner">W. Lloyd Warner</a>'s "<u>research included important studies of black communities in Chicago and the rural South</u>" and "<u>Warner's focus on uncomfortable subjects made his work unfashionable</u>". Which is it, then: vapid or uncomfortable?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e35 Avison-CanadianJournalSociology-1981
--><h4><a id="avison81"></a>Avison, William R. 1981. Review of <em>Conceiving the Self</em> by M. Rosenberg. <em>The Canadian Journal of Sociology</em> 6(2): 212-214. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3340091">10.2307/3340091</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3340091">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="avison81p212a"></a>A major difficulty that often confronts the scientist is the problem of distancing oneself from one's research. This is all the more difficult for the social scientist who studied his fellow human beings. The problem is further exacerbated for <strong>the social psychologist</strong> by the fact that he <strong>studies how others think</strong>. For him, the pitfalls are <strong>to explain by empathy and introspection</strong> and to confuse what we say with what we think. These are traps into which symbolic interactionists are inevitably enticed. (Avison 1981: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Comes across a bit blunt and reductionistic.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="avison81p212b"></a>How does social life - <strong>interpersonal interaction, immediate social context, broader social structure</strong> - help to shape the individual's views of what he is and wishes to be? (Avison 1981: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Rosenberg, Morris 1979. <em>Conceiving the Self</em>. New York: Basic Books.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="avison81p212ja213"></a>Part 1 of <em>Conceiving the Self</em> devotes two chapters to the first two questions. Rosenberg asserts that the self-concept has three broad "regions." <strong>The extant self represents how the individual sees himself</strong>. For Rosenberg, any consideration of this region must necessarily consider its various parts, their interrelationships, and the limits of the extant self. The desired self reflects how the individual would like to see himself while the third region, the presenting self, describes how the individual shows himself to others.<br />Rosenberg then focuses on two motives, <strong>self-esteem</strong> and <strong>self-consistency</strong>, that are related to the self-concept. He advances four principles that purport to account for diffecences in self-esteem. The principles of reflected appraisals, social comparison, self attribution, and psychological centrality are all derived <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> from well-known sources such as Sullivan, Mead, <strong>Cooley</strong>, Thibault, and Kelley. These principles are described and elaborated in what is perhaps the key chapter in this monograph. (Avison 1981: 212-213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Doesn't sound that bad. Sadly it is currently practically inaccessible.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e36 Reynolds-BritishJournalSociology-1981
--><h4><a id="reynolds81"></a>Reynolds, David 1981. Review of <em>School and the Social Order</em> by F. Musgrove. <em>British Journal of Sociology of Education</em> 2(1): 105-113. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1392662">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="reynolds81p105ja106"></a>Four pages later he argues that "<u>The serious unbridgable gap is not between</u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <u>middle class teachers and working class pupils but between teachers who are actually working in schools and educationists who proscribe for them. Teachers in slum areas of big cities know that their <strong>middle classness</strong> is not part of the problem of educational failure and <strong>is</strong> in any event <strong>an invention of sociologists</strong></u>". (Reynolds 1981: 105-106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The madeupness of middleclassness.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="reynolds81p106"></a><strong>The thoughts of Pierre Bourdieu are "<u>concealed in verbose language and a tedious and pretentious terminology</strong>. The only saving grace would be that he is sometimes right. He seldom is</u>" (p. 26). Paolo Friere writes "<u>quite incredible verbiage</u> and in any case is "<u>only saying one thing of note, which any competent teacher knows anyway</u>" (p. 57). (Reynolds 1981: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Why would you say something so controversial yet so brave?</u>"</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="reynolds81p108"></a>This 'middle ground' of Musgrove's, his espousal of the ideas of Cooley, "<u>who found <strong>a convincing middle ground between</strong> emphasis on <strong>society as a 'thing'</strong>, on the one hand, <strong>and</strong> as <strong>an idea on the other</strong></u>" (p. 15) and his assertion of the importance of institutional definitions of the situation as well as individual re-definitions, mark mould, looking at how reality and identity are formed and re-formed both by individual definitions of the situation and 'institutional' constraints. (Reynolds 1981: 108)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Musgrove, Frank 1979. <em>School and the Social Order</em>. New York: Wiley.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/schoolsocialorde0000musg">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="reynolds81p111a"></a>Musgrove comments - with obvious relish - that "<u>The middle class child socialised to <strong>a universe of transcendant meanings</strong> can find school only persecutory, a sustained assault on his essential self</u>" (p. 52). (Reynolds 1981: 111)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What meanings are those?</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="reynolds81p111b"></a>Ultimately, though, Musgrove's book must stand faulted by its own sizeable deficiencies in scholarly merit. There are many examples of statements that are (by all conventional canons of validity) simply wrong - on page 190, for example, we are told that "<u><strong>The Public School must be abolished</strong>. This is not because they are strongholds of privilege - in fact they are highly meritocratic</u>". (Reynolds 1981: 111)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh look, it's the 1980s already! The reviewer is extremely critical of the book and I noticed that just like <a href="#soper77p1542">Soper, <em>above</em></a>, the Reynolds quotes short sentences frequently.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e37 Bannister-HistoricalCaseSociological-1982
--><h4><a id="bannister82"></a>Bannister, Robert C. 1982. The Historical Case of Sociological Knowledge. <em>History of Education Quarterly</em> 22(2): 239-244. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/367754">10.2307/367754</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/367754">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bannister82p239"></a>The authors focus on six figures who shaped the discipline in the decades before World War I: <strong>Lester F. Ward, William Graham Sumner, Franklin H. Giddings, Albion W. Small, Edward A. Ross</strong>, and <strong>Charles H. Cooley</strong>. In addition, Professors Smith and Lewis examine the contributions of the philosophers Peirce, James, Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, while extending the list of sociologists to include William I. Thomas, Charles A. Ellwood, and Edward C. Hayes. (Bannister 1982: 239)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Fuhrman, Ellsworth R. 1980. <em>The Sociology of Knowledge in America 1883-1915</em>. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/sociologyofknowl0000fuhr/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Hinkle, Roscoe C. 1980. <em>Founding Theory of American Sociology, 1881-1915</em>. Boston, etc.: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/foundingtheoryof0000hink/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Lewis, J. David; Smith, Richard L. 1980. <em>American Sociology and Pragmatism: Mead, Chicago Sociology, and Symbolic Interaction</em>. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/americansociolog0000lewi/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="bannister82p240ja241"></a>Although Hinkle limits himself to an essentially descriptive summary of university expansion, changes in related social <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> sciences and European influences, he leaves the impression that the rise of sociology was somehow an inevitable stage in the growth of science, a thesis not unlike that <strong>Albion Small</strong> urged half a century ago in his <em><strong>Origins of</strong> Modern <strong>Sociology</em> (1924)</strong>. (Bannister 1982: 240-241)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Small, Albion W. 1967. <em>Origins of Sociology</em>. New York: Russell & Russell.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/originsofsociolo0000unse/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bannister82p242a"></a>Not only did Hayes never significantly refer to Durkheim then or later (despite awareness of his work), but he explicitly criticized <strong>the social realism of Luther Bernard</strong>'s "Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control" (1911), a thesis by <strong>a maverick Chicagoean</strong> who owed a much clearer debt to Durkheim. In line with his own attack on the "<u>social forces error</u>", Hayes welcomed Bernard's assault on <strong>theorists who rooted institutions in desire (Ward)</strong> but would not accord society the priority over the individual that Bernard proposed, insisting rather that the test of social standards remains "<u>democratic individual satisfactions.</u>" (4) (Bannister 1982: 242)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bernard, Luther Lee 1911. <em>The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control</em>. A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Sociology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/transitiontoobje00bernrich/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bannister82p242b"></a>Although at Columbia and Chicago sociology assumed different forms in the 1920's, the outcome of these developments had some common characteristics: an emphasis on methodology over substance; an attack on "metaphysical" speculation now associated with pre-war evolutionism; and <strong>a cult of neutrality that seemed to place social science at the service of anyone who would pay the tab</strong>. (Bannister 1982: 242)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Saucy.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="bannister82p243"></a>The fashionable emphasis on "social control" also misses an irony in the ideological aims of these founders. In <em>Dynamic Sociology</em> Ward's purpose was "radical", not merely "in part", but in <strong>the fundamental conviction that the only end of social organization was the satisfaction of "desire"</strong>, a view closer to the sexual radicalism of the 1960s than of the Taylorism of the 1910s. A shift in this balance from liberation to order, from subjective desire to their behavioral manifestations - evident in different ways in Small's theory of "interests", in Giddings' measurements of "social pressure", and even in Ward's <em>Pure Sociology</em> (1903) - was a complex process that cannot be reduced to taxonomy. (Bannister 1982: 243)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Ward, Lester F. 1926. <em>Dynamic Sociology, or Applied Social Science: As Based Upon Statical Sociology and the Less Complex Sciences</em>. In two volumes. Vol. I. New York; London: D. Appleton and Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.186930/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u><a href="https://archive.org/details/dynamicsociology0002lest_i4y4/page/n3/mode/2up">Vol. II</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e38 Smith-IntroducingSociologyLeft-1982
--><h4><a id="smith82"></a>Smith, Kenneth J. 1982. Introducing Sociology: Left, Right, and Conventional. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 11(4): 377-379. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2068778">10.2307/2068778</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2068778">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith82p377a"></a>The discipline of sociology really does not need <strong>four more introductory text books</strong>. In spite of the overwhelming number of textbooks in print, however, the four reviewed here are worth considering. (Smith 1982: 377)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Benkin, Richard L. 1981. <em>Sociology: A Way of Seeing</em>. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/sociologywayofse0000benk">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Giner, Salvador 1975. <em>Sociology</em>. London: Robertson.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3215953*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Otten, C. Michael 1981. <em>Power, Values, and Society: An Introduction to Sociology</em>. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Zeitlin, Irving m. 1981. <em>The Social Condition of Humanity: An Introduction to Sociology</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialconditiono00zeit">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith82p377b"></a>Giner's <em>Sociology</em> is a translation and revision of a work originally published in Catalan, and first published in English in 1974. The functionalist point of view pervades this <strong>short, terse, and unelaborated</strong> work; the book is not really suitable for an introductory sociology course. (Smith 1982: 377)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool. There's a copy at the library. I might try a chapter.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="smith82p378a"></a>Otten's chapter on culture is the linchpin of the final section, "Structures of Consciousness." <strong>Culture is not an integrated entity but is driven by a dialectic of competing material and nonmaterial ideas</strong>. Technology and power are the dominant forces influencing culture. The upper culture controls the "<u>modes of mental production</u>" and legitimizes the distribution of wealth and power; however, the cultural world has a degree of autonomy. While material interests are the stronger influence, occasionally cultural values can upset material cultures. (Smith 1982: 378)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As basic as it gets.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="smith82p378b"></a>Benkin brings in the work of <strong>Freud, Cooley, and Mead</strong> to emphasize the social nature of human learning. (Smith 1982: 378)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Why is it always you three?</em></p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e39 Pfohl-SocialForces-1982
--><h4><a id="pfohl82"></a>Pfohl, Stephen J. 1982. Review of <em>The Sociology of Knowledge in America: 1883—1915</em> by E. R. Fuhrman. <em>Social Forces</em> 61(1): 302-304. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2578096">10.2307/2578096</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2578096">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="pfohl82p302"></a>Fuhrman examines the work of <strong>William Sumner, Lester Ward, Franklin H. Giddings, Albian W. Small, Edward. A. Ross</strong>, and <strong>Charles H. Cooley</strong>. These "founding fathers" are selected because each is said to have contributed significantly to the "intellectual tone" of early American sociology, occupied a position at one of the important early centers of graduate training (Brown, Yale, Columbia, Wisconsin, Chicago, and Michigan), and served as president of the American Sociological Association (then Society). (Pfohl 1982: 302)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Already on the list.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="pfohl82p303a"></a>Other indices of early American sociology's propensity to legitimize and rationally improve the existing capitalist order are suggested in Fuhrmann's consideration of how the major theorists dealt with the problem of knowledge. Each, in one way or another, conceived of knowledge as derived from the whole society in its organic totality. <strong>None, with the possible exception of Cooley, viewed the production and distribution of knowledge as guided by political-economic interests</strong>. (Pfohl 1982: 303)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Thus far I've only read one book by Cooley and don't yet recognize what this might be referring to.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="pfohl82p303b"></a>Fuhrman's description of the similarities and dissimilarities in the thinking of the six early <strong>theor1sts</strong> and his attempt to excavate their implicit political commitments are the strong points of this book. (Pfohl 1982: 303)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sem1toic!</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e40 Campbell-TransactionsCharlesS-1984
--><h4><a id="campbell84"></a>Campbell, James 1984. Review of <em>The Individual and the Social Self</em> by G. H. Mead and D. L. Miller. <em>Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society</em> 20(1): 72-75. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40320035">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="campbell84p72a"></a>George Herbert Mead died in April of 1931, having published during his lifetime a substantial number of suggestive articles. However, were these articles all that we knew of Mead's ideas, it is unlikely that he would have become a major figure in American philosophy. They hinted at, but did not develop, a systematic philosophical position. Over the years there has been a great deal of discussion about why Mead did not publish more, most of it generally conforming to <strong>Dewey's view that Mead was continually seeing "<u>new phases and relations</u>" in his thinking</strong>. (Campbell 1984: 72)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Similar ordeal as with Malinowski: both lived at a time when scientific paradigms were swapping left and right.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="campbell84p72b"></a>Soon after his death, it was some of these same students and colleagues who undertook the project which eventually saw into print four volumes of manuscripts and transcriptions of classroom lectures: <strong><em>The Philosophy of the Present</em> (1932), <em>Mind, Self and Society</em> (1934), <em>Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century</em> (1936), and <em>The Philosophy of the Act</em> (1938)</strong>. This material, affixed onto the skeleton of his published articles, made Mead's systematic philosophical position apparent and finally raised him to the position of a major American thinker. (Campbell 1984: 72)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Mead, George Herbert 1932. <em>The Philosophy of the Present</em>. London: The Open Court Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/philosophyofthep032111mbp/page/n11/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Mead, George Herbert 1934. <em>Mind, Self and Society: From the standpoint of a Social Behaviorist</em>. Edited, with introduction, by Charles W. Morris. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/mindselfsociety0000unse/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Mead, George Herbert 1936. <em>Movement of Thought in the Nineteenth Century</em>. Edited by Merritt H. Moore. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/movementsofthoug00mead/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Mead, George Herbert 1938. <em>The Philosophy of the Act</em>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/philosophyofact00meadrich/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Mead, George Herbert 1982. <em>Mead The Individual and the Social Self: Unpublished Works of George Herbert Mead</em>. Edited with an Introduction by David L. Miller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/individualsocial0000mead">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="campbell84p73"></a>In any case there is no 'new' Mead to be found in <em>The Individual and the Social Self</em>. The figures whom Mead discusses are the same ones he discusses elsewhere: <strong>Wundt and Darwin, James and Cooley, Thorndike and Watson</strong>. The examples Mead uses are the same as well: fighting dogs, baseball teams, boxers and fencers, parrots and songbirds, oxen and primates. And the ideas and concepts are the ones that Mead worked on all his life: <strong>the naturalized mind, consciousness and self-consciousness, the gesture and the significant symbol, the I and the me</strong>, etc. (Campbell 1984: 73)</blockquote><!--
--><p>My impression is that if one has read <em>Mind, Self and Society</em>, they have read it all.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="campbell84p74"></a>Behind Miller's efforts is the belief that Mead had <strong>an overall vision of the</strong> social and <strong>reflective origin and nature of the self</strong> which he repeatedly tried to get into words. As Miller writes, Mead "<u>spent most of his intellectual life unraveling the implications of this insight</u>" (pp. 10-11). (Campbell 1984: 74)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Personally, I too find the nexus of <em>imagination, reflection, and society</em> in Cooley's writings appealing, and would like to examine if it can be translated into other semiotic idioms. There's definitely a real nugget in there.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e41 Krohn-CanadianJournalSociology-1984
--><h4><a id="krohn84"></a>Krohn, Roger 1984. Review of <em>The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries</em> by A. Brannigan. <em>The Canadian Journal of Sociology</em> 9(1): 102-106. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3340473">10.2307/3340473</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3340473">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="krohn84p103"></a>Brannigan is also historical in his in-depth review of the literature, <strong>ultimately locating his own formulations as the reversal of an original sixteenth-century Platonic mystique about the non-rational sources of discovery</strong>. Brannigan's critique of the explanation of discovery by special talent or "genius" extends also to a critique of Gestalt psychology, in which he fails to find any opening for an investigation of the cognitive moves made by an inventor/discoverer. (Krohn 1984: 103)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Revelation?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="krohn84p104a"></a>Brannigan sees the psychological line of study (Polanyi, Popper, Koestler, and Kuhn) and the cultural maturation line as sharing <strong>a "mentalistic" conception of discovery, as assuming that the key events of discovery occurred "<u>inside someone's head</u>"</strong> and as ignoring (Popper, Koestler) or underplaying (Kuhn) the social process by which claims come to be taken as discoveries. This mentalistic conception is to be countered by his social constructivism. (Krohn 1984: 104)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Brannigan, Augustine 1981. <em>The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries</em>. New York: Cambridge University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="krohn84p104b"></a>The cultural maturation line of studies has also a dialectical structure (not Brannigan's term), originating in social Darwinism (F. Galton) stressing the role of hereditary genius and the difference of science from mere common sense, and of creative from mere routine science. The social Darwinists were opposed on the one side by <strong>social progressives (Ward, Baldwin, Cooley)</strong> and on the other by the cultural maturationists (D. Thomas, Ogburn, Kroeber, Merton) who used multiple independent discoveries rhetorically to undermine the uniqueness of discovery and to refute any necessary role for extraordinary talents in discovery. (Krohn 1984: 104)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pretty intense discussion.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="krohn84p105"></a>These cases together reveal and illustrate the considerable interpretive work involved in establishing a knowledge claim, and the operation of the common, but not necessarily well articulated, four-fold definition of discovery scientists use. The claimed finding must be (1) <strong>possible</strong> - expected, plausible, coherent with existing knowledge, (2) <strong>motivated</strong> - purposefully, seriously sought, (3) <strong>valid</strong> - taken to be true, (4) <strong>unprecedented</strong> - the first public presentation of the findings ("<u>originality is not enough</u>"). This is his <span style="color: #fa4100">[.|.</span>Brannigan's<span style="color: #fa4100">]</span> combustion. (Krohn 1984: 105)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A triad with/plus novelty: (1) possible claims; (2) motivated claims; (3) valid claims; and (4) unprecedented claims.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e42 Carter-TeachingSociology-1988
--><h4><a id="carter88"></a>Carter, Gregg Lee 1988. Review of <em>Introduction to Sociology</em> by Coser <em>et al</em>. <em>Teaching Sociology</em> 16(3): 306-308. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1317539">10.2307/1317539</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1317539">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="carter88p307"></a>In my first 12 semesters of teaching Principles of Sociology, I changed texts eight times. Part of the problem was that I shied away from books that didn't practice mainline "standard American sociology" (S.A.S.); for example, I would not adopt Eitzen (1987) because they expect too much from conflict theory, nor <strong>Hewitt and Hewitt (1986) and Shibutani (1986), who demand too much from the symbolic interactionist orientation</strong>. (Carter 1988: 307)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Coser, Lewis A.; Nock, Steven L.; Steffan, Patricia A.; Rhea, B. 1987. <em>Introduction to Sociology</em>. 2nd ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Hewitt, John P.; Hewitt, Myrna Livingston 1986. <em>Introducing Sociology: A Symbolic Interactionist Perspective</em>. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/introducingsocio0000hewi">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Shibutani, Tamotsu 1986. <em>Social Processes: An Introduction to Sociology</em>. Berkeley: University of California Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialprocessesi0000shib">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e43 Czitrom-CommunicationStudiesAmerican-1990
--><h4><a id="czitrom90"></a>Czitrom, Daniel 1990. Communication Studies as American Studies. <em>American Quarterly</em> 4294): 678-683. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2713172">10.2307/2713172</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2713172">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p678"></a>Over the past twenty years, James W. Carey has produced an impressive body of work that has enlarged and revitalized the field of communication studies. Offering nothing less than <strong>a radically alternative understanding of how to study and think about communication</strong>. Carey's writings have provided a potent intellectual antidote to the prescribed nostrums that dominate communications departments, journalism schools, and their attendant conferences. (Czitrom 1990: 678)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Carey, James W. 1988. Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society</em>. Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/communicationasc0000care">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p679a"></a>He offers an original and subtle analysis of American history and culture by focusing on <strong>the key role played by communications technology in shaping the republic</strong>, and he persuasively outlines and extends an American intellectual tradition as our best hope for understanding media and democratizing scholarly discourse on communication. (Czitrom 1990: 679)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Worth checking out, then. The history of the concept of phaticity is largely a history of communication technologies.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p679b"></a>A social theorist, Carey emerges as the missing American link to the British tradition of cultural studies. He effectively demonstrates the connections between his American heroes - <strong>John Dewey, William James, Harold Innis, and Perry Miller</strong>, to name a few - and the ideas of <strong>Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall</strong>. As a historian and critic, Carey shows us how to deepen our understanding of American history and culture by rethinking our basic assumptions and metaphors about communication, media, and technology. (Czitrom 1990: 679)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not sure I know all of these guys.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Innis, Harold A. 1951. <em>The Bias of Communication</em>. Introduction by Marshall McLuhan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/biasofcommunicat0000haro_s6d0/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Miller, Perry 1939. <em>The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century</em>. New York: The Macmillan Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/newenglandmindse1939mill/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Hoggart, Richard 1957. <em>The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life</em>. London: Chatto & Windus Ltd.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.506119/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Williams, Raymond 1958. <em>Culture and Society: 1780-1950</em>. New York: Harper & Row.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/culturesociety170000raym_a4q3">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Hall, Stuart; Whannel, Paddy; Dyer, Richard 2018. <em>The Popular Arts</em>. Durham: Duke University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p679ja680"></a>By contrast, the ritual view of communication is much older than transmission, as is implied by <strong>the linguistic ties between "communication," "communication," and "community."</strong> It is directed "<u>not toward the extension of messages in space but toward <strong>the maitenance of society in time</strong>; not the act of imparting information but <strong>the representation of shared beliefs</strong></u>" (18). Here the central meaning of the communication process is understood to lie not in the transmission of information at a distance but "<u>in the construction and maintenance of <strong>an ordered, meaningful cultural world</strong></u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <u>that can serve as a control and container for human action</u>" (18-19). Whereas a transmission view of the news, for example, focuses on the press as an agent for disseminating information and changing attitudes, a ritual view sees <strong>news writing and reading as dramatic acts, inviting our participation in an arena of dramatic forces and action</strong>. (Czitrom 1990: 679-680)</blockquote><!--
--><p>All of this is otherwise quite appealing but the suspiciously Goffmanian "dramatic acts" act as a red flag.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p680"></a>Drawing on Dewey and his descendants in the Chicago School (<strong>Charles Horton Cooley</strong>, Robert Park, George Herbert Mead, and Erving Goffman), as well as the interpretive anthropology of Clifford Geertz, Carey offers a new definition of <strong>communication</strong> aimed at redressing the imbalance: "<u><strong>a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed</strong></u>" (23). (Czitrom 1990: 680)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The true novelty here is <em>repairing</em>. Communication repairs reality? A similar issue sometimes appears in post-Couplandian phatics, which wishes to keep the Jakobsonian emphasis on prolongation but also reintroduce the Ruesch-Batesonian communicative relationship maintenance aspect. (I say "reintroduce" because this aspect was immanent in Malinowski's phatic communion, though expressed in terms we no longer consider very scientific, e.g. <em>bonds of personal union</em>.) In any case Carey's approach sounds more and more appealing.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p681"></a>His plea is for a reorientation to a "<u>cultural studies approach,</u>" one that insists (and here the echo of Dewey is clear) that <strong>communication</strong> "<u>is a form of action - or, better, interaction - that not merely represents or describes, but <strong>actually molds or constitutes the world</strong></u>" (94). Cultural studies of communication concentrate on the hermeneutic issues of meaning and interpretation, in contrast to the search for laws and functions. They seek to illuminate the human activity of communication - the complex practices, conventions, and expressive forms that are empirically observable in time and space. (Czitrom 1990: 681)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Really just a few feet removed from Cooley.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="czitrom90p683"></a>The common sense view holds that modern media "<u>have drastically altered the ordinary terms of experience and consciousness, the ordinary structures of interest and feeling</u>" (1-2). Yet, the stories we tell ourselves about technologies, "<u>the talk of a communications revolution and exalted hopes and equally exaggerated fears of the media, are <strong>repetitions so predictable as to suggest undeviating corridors of thought</strong></u>" (2). (Czitrom 1990: 683)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phraseology. <em>Kõrvalekaldumatud mõttekoridorid</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e45 Franks-ContemporarySociology-1991
--><h4><a id="franks91"></a>Franks, David D. 1991. Review of <em>Social Sensitivity: A Study of Habit and Experience</em> by J. M. Ostrow. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 20(6): 948-949. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2076224">10.2307/2076224</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2076224">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="franks91p948a"></a>This book is <strong>small in pages and thick in thought</strong>. On completing it, one has traveled a long way against traditional intellectual currents. It is <strong>about the relationship between symbolic, interpretive processes and coherent experience</strong>. (Franks 1991: 948)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Ostrow, James M. 1990. Ostrow Social Sensitivity: A Study of Habit and Experience</em>. Albany: State University of New York Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialsensitivit00ostr">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="franks91p948b"></a>Ostrow argues convincingly that <strong>not all human experience is linguistically interpreted, and that words are insufficient to capture experience in its totality. (Mead did agree with this</strong>, though his emphasis was different.) In chapters that <strong>critique Cooley</strong>, Mead, and Goffman, the author argues instructively that <strong>self is more than a process of self-representation and reflexive impression management</strong>. His critique of Goffman's notion of "<u>expressions given off</u>" is especially relevant for those interested in emotions. Wherein Mead lodges the self in taking the role of the other and reflexivity, Ostrow argues for <strong>a prereflexive, corporeal sense of self that is more fundamental than self-awareness, but thoroughly social</strong>. He describes how we can be sensitive to our own presence in the world prior to being objects to ourselves. (Franks 1991: 948)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds good. Almost like the viewpoint I would end up in if I started seriously considering the linguistic self in Mead. Especially because my preferred version would stem from Clay's recognition concept ("that man is my father"), which is sort-of echoed in Cooley. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="franks91p949"></a>In order to portray the domain of experience that is "<u>more than words can capture,</u>" Ostrow uses Merleau-Ponty's distinction between <em>sense</em> and <em>signification</em> or enactive, motor knowledge and abstract, symbolic knowledge. Knowledge on the prereflective level of <em>sense</em> is reflected in the common assertion, "<u>I can't tell you how I do it, just watch me.</u>" Action on this level is not self-conscious, but <em>habitual</em>. Reflectively telling yourself "to concentrate" can distract you from the <em>unmediated immediacy</em> of true concentration. Any good driver takes advantage of this prearticulated level of sense given through habit and corporeal sensitivity. Though he does not say it precisely this way, Ostrow's argument assumes that <strong>we gain our capacity for self-awareness, and the behavioral control that it makes possible, at the cost of our alienation or separation from the world as experienced</strong>. Cognition distances us from the unreflective givenness of an unquestioned world. <strong>Ostrow is critical of Schutz's phenomenology for not appreciating the distinction between actual experience and our talk about it</strong>, thus overintellectualizing his model of knowledge. (Franks 1991: 949)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think E. R. Clay sharpened his psychological terminology exactly for these kinds of discussions.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e46 Kuhnert-HumboldtJournalSocial-1992
--><h4><a id="kuhnert92"></a>Kuhnert, JoAnn 1992. Review of <em>MicroSociology: Discourse, Emotion and Social Structuce</em> by T. J. Scheff. <em>Humboldt Journal of Social Relations</em> 18(2): 177-180. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/23262752">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p177a"></a>How do humans really communicate? What part does communication play in the development of a society and social bonds within that society. Using references and studies from all the social sciences as well as philosophy, computer science, humanities and the arts, Thomas Scheff attempts <strong>an enormous undertaking, linking human emotion, response to language and social bonding on a micro level, to a macro level of community social development</strong>. He attempts to show how unacknowledged emotions such as shame can be responsible for alienation, both personal and social, in our modern world. (Kuhnert 1992: 177)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Scheff, Thomas J. 1990. <em>MicroSociology: Discourse, Emotion and social Structure</em>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/microsociologydi0000sche/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p177"></a>This text presents what Professor Scheff refers to as a new theory and method for studying relationships between roles, <strong>social bonds</strong> and social solidarity. He directs his theory toward <strong>the significance of emotion in relations between humans</strong>. Incorporating the emotions of shame, pride, self-identity and self-esteem into language interpretation, he advocates a new way of looking at human relations ranging from the interpersonal level to the international level. (Kuhnert 1992: 177)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds a bit like Weston La Barre but with the language of "<u>social bonds</u>".</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p177ja178"></a>Professor Scheff organized this work into five parts, with the first section examining <strong>human nature</strong> and the social bond as well as a discussion of the micro-macro worlds of community and society. Here the author states that <strong>the maintenance of human bonds</strong> is critical to all issues of human behavior. He cites work from a number of theorists, including <strong>Bowen antd Kerr (1988)</strong>, Durkheim (1897, 1902, 1906) and <strong>Etzioni (1989)</strong> regarding <strong>models of social bonding</strong> and its various subsystems. He also uses material drawn from Goffman and Cooley in his discussion of communication and emotion, and their relationship to social bonding. In this first section, Scheff's main points focuses on the idea <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> that <strong>all humans must have a sense of social bonding, a feeling of belonging in order to be fully functional, and that this</strong> sense of bonding whether it is present or not, <strong>is a factor in interpersonal relationships</strong>. He takes the issue of social bonding from the personal to the community level and points to language as a primary factor in the development of social bonding, and he also examines compensatory actions taken by individuals and societies when such bonding is lacking. (Kuhnert 1992: 177-178)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Kerr, Michael E.; Bowen, Murray 1988. <em>Family Evaluation: An Approach Based on Bowen Theory</em>. New York: W. W. Norton Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/familyevaluation00mich">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Etzioni, Amitai 1989. Humble Decision Making. <em>Harvard Business Review</em> 67(4): 122-126.</u> [<u><a href="https://hbr.org/1989/07/humble-decision-making">Harvard Business Review</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p178"></a>From the very beginning of this intriguing text, the author addresses an issue sociologists have been wrestling with for as long as sociologists have argued theory, the micro-macro link. The author incorporates work by Shibutani (1955) involving community and society into a framework for research on the micro-macro link, stating that "<u>Although Shibutani limits his analysis to <strong>the interpersonal level</strong>, there is no inherent reason that it may not also be applied to <strong>the societal level</strong></u>" (24). (Kuhnert 1992: 178)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Easy-peasy.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p178ja179"></a>In the second section, <em>Understanding: A Verstehende Soziologie</em>, Scheff discusses the structure and process of interpretation. He argues that interpretation of language requires understanding the implications of a discourse, understanding the deeper levels and forms of interactive conversation. Scheff writes that "...<u>natural language, as it occurs in <strong>spontaneous conversation, is always ambiguous because most words and gestures each have more than one conventional meaning and because, in varying degrees,</strong></u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <u><strong>meanings are unconventional, improvised at the moment of encounter</strong></u>" (39). Statements such as the one above reinforced my original opinion, that much of the author's theory was closely aligned and indeed based upon symbolic interactionist theory, particularly when he describes interpersonal interpretation of language (verbal and nonverbal) as a basis for understanding a situation. (Kuhnert 1992: 178-179)</blockquote><!--
--><p>To me it sounds like Scheff rediscovered phatic communion.</p><!--
4-5 --><blockquote><a id="kuhnert92p179ja180"></a>Giddens also says that this book is not written in a narrative fashion, and that the style is "<strong>idiosyncratic</strong>." This analysis is definitely true. Unfortunately it is <strong>not smooth reading</strong> nor easy to follow, and is somewhat rambling in its presentation. While Professor Scheff's theories, are most intriguing, getting them out of <strong>a morall of verbiage</strong> is an undertaking of some magnitude. Particularly complex and difficult to process were chapter six and seven. Using an analysis of Goethe's novel <em>Werther</em> as an example of the use of non-verbal cues, the author's purpose became somewhat confusing and the <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> reader may become somewhat frustrated trying to understand the point being made in a long and involved transcript of a conversation. (Kuhnert 1992: 179-180)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ooh, nice. And the most cryptic chapters are about concourse?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e47 Emirbayer-ContemporarySociology-1995
--><h4><a id="emirbayer95"></a>Emirbayer, Mustafa 1995. Review of <em>The Semiotic Self</em> by N. Wiley. <em>Contemporary Sociology</em> 24(6): 733-736. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2076661">10.2307/2076661</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2076661">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p733ja734"></a>Pragmatism offers to sociology new ways of overcoming such familiar dualisms as objectivism and subjectivism, structure and agency, and society and individual; by <strong>taking <em>interactions</em></strong> (not persons or societies) <strong>as its analytical point of departure,</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> it provides a promising alternative to <strong>neofunctionalism</strong>, systems theory, and rational choice perspectives, and resonates with recent work, for exampl, in network analysis and semiotics. Moreover, it suggests the outlines of a new critical theory of society, one that avoids <strong>the</strong> rationalism and <strong>transcendentalism of</strong> recent <strong>German social thought</strong> and <strong>the irrationalism</strong> and historicism <strong>of French post-structuralism</strong>. (Emirbayer 1995: 733-734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Much like cultural semiotics takes its departure from the creative communicative act. I should look into what this "neofunctionalism" referred to in the early 1990s. </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p734a"></a>In this provocative and important new book, Norbert Wiley turns back to the insights of Peirce, Dewey, James, and Mead for <strong>a new <em>dialogical</em> theory of the self (or subject)</strong>, and with it a new grounding for the ideals of American liberal democracy. What is needed, claims Wiley, is an account of <strong>a "<u>universal human nature</strong>, characterizing all human beings in the same generic way</u>" (p. 1), one to oppose to their discrete social "identities," which are historically specific and particular. Such an account is required as a basis for the ideals of equality (since <strong>all selves possess an identical structure</strong>), freedom (since all selves' dialogic processes are relatively autonomous), and intrinsic worth (since all the capable of what Wiley terms "internal solidarity"). (Emirbayer 1995: 734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>IDK, nailing down "<u>human nature</u>" is not very appealing. Its fluidity, on the other hand...</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p734b"></a>Wiley's own theory is a neopragmatist one, centering on <strong>an image of the self as a structure consisting of three elements: the I, you, and me</strong>. (The idea of an "i-you" polarity derives from Peirce, while that of an "I-me" polarity comes from Mead; the key move of the book, which Wiley generously credits to philosopher Vincent Colapietro, consists in synthesizing the two into <strong>a complex new structure, or "triad."</strong>) The I/you/me triad Wiley further associates with two others: a temporal one of present, future, and past, respectively (selves are "<u>'three-legged' [structures], with one leg in the present, a second in the future, and a third in the past</u>" [p. 216]), and a semiotic one of sign, interpretant, and object. <strong>The self becomes an overlay of these three structures, of a "triad of triads,"</strong> in relation to which particularistic identities are as parts to a whole: "<u>subordinat, contained, dependent</u>" (p. 36). Wiley sees these various elements as in continual interaction with one another, in an ongoing "semiotic flow" of meaning: The self is "<u>a kind of public square <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> the members of which are in constant conversation</u>" (p. 72). This idea of <strong>an internal "trialogue,"</u> an internal conversation, dovetails nicely with recent theories of the "dialogic self" offered by such writers as Charles Taylor</strong>. (Emirbayer 1995: 734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh boy, okay. So, in "<u>the I, you, and me</u>" the I has a reflexive thirdness: <strong>I</strong> communicate with <strong>you</strong> to find out who is <strong>me</strong>. At this point, I think, there are two alternatives. The emotive <strong>I</strong> and the conative <strong>you</strong> remain in place but depending on whether the third item is (a)bove or (b)elow<!-- oh, kui äge! -->, it could go either: (1) <strong>I</strong> communicate with <strong>you</strong> to find out what is <strong>it</strong>; and (b) <strong>I</strong> communicate with <strong>you</strong> to find out who is <strong>we</strong>. In other words, a referential <strong>it</strong> or a phatic <strong>we</strong>. As to the "<u>triad of triads</u>" I can't fathom - before reading Wiley - why exactly the temporal and the semiotic, and not, for example, spatial (one, many and all) and psychological (emotion, volition and reason). After all, you can construct <em>the structure of the self</em> out of whatever you want. The term "<u>trialogue</u>" I like!</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Taylor, Charles 1991. The Dialogic Self. In: Hiley, David; Bohnman, James; Shusterman, Richards (eds.), <em>The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture</em>. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 304-314. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501735028-017">10.7591/9781501735028-017</a></u> [<u><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501735028-017/html">degruyter.com</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p734c"></a>In the two most abstract and difficult chapters of the book, Wiley develops a theoyr of two other important properties of the generic self: reflexivity and solidarity. Reflexivity means that the internal trialogue is circuitous in nature: "<u>the I communicates directly with the me</u>" (p. 83). All thought is reflexive, and some is also reflexive in a "second-order" way: i.e., "<u>thought about thought.</u>" <strong>Solidarity</strong>, for its own part, <strong>means a kind of "self-feeling"</strong> (<strong>Wiley here draws</strong> more <strong>upon</strong> James - and <strong>Cooley</strong> - than Peirce and Mead), <strong>an internal sense of "sacredness," energy, or force</strong>. Wiley theorizes it by <strong>bringing Durkheim's</strong> "macro" account of solidarity, ritual, and <strong>effecvescence down to the "micro" level of the individual, and in the process "semiotizing" Durkheim</strong>. (Emirbayer 1995: 734)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This sounds exactly like something I've been yearning for. The "<u>sacredness</u>" is a red flag, but it would be nice to find out what this paradoxical <em>solidarity is a kind of self-feeling</em> might mean, and taking the <em>collective</em> out of Durkheim's collective effervescence sounds exciting. Though, what neat stuff I did find from Durkheim I think is more serviceably approached through Cooley. That is, I suspect that Cooley is much easier semiotized.</p><!--
4-5 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p735ja736"></a>As Wiley himself notes on several occasions, all four of his <strong>symbolic levels</strong> - the <strong>self</strong> <em>but also</em> <strong>interaction, social organization</strong>, and <strong>culture</strong> - have semiotic properties. Hence any account that establishes all levels upon a common semiotic footing needs to integrate <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> a systematic theory of "structural holes," blockages, and the like <em>into each</em>. <strong>What applies to the self extends to all the other levels, and vice versa</strong>. (Emirbayer 1995: 735-736)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Merely a variation of Ruesch's cylinder (intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, society). I've noticed in recent readings a variation that went <em>ego, dyad, community, society</em> (e.g. the latter two were <em>Gemein-</em> and <em>Gesell-</em> after Tönnies). I have very little against placing culture (i.e. unprecedented claims) as the fourth but "<u>social organization</u>" still rubs me the wrong way.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="emirbayer95p736"></a>One can imagine interesting applications to cognitive sociology, for example, or to research on the emotions (much here is reminiscent of <strong>Randall Collins</strong>'s excellent work in that area), but these, like other such possibilities, are left relatively unexplored. (Emirbayer 1995: 736)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Collins, Randall 1998. <em>The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change</em>. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/sociologyofphilo00coll">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e48 Dhanagare-AntinomiesIdeologiesInstitutions-2003
--><h4><a id="dhanagare03"></a>Dhanagare, D. N. 2003. Antinomies in Ideologies and Institutions. <em>Economic and Political Weekly</em> 38(44): 4661-4672. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4414221">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4661a"></a>The subtitle of the book, however, provides cues to the contents. <strong>Quintessentially the essays are about ideas, ideologies and institutions</strong>. They focus mainly on <strong>the nature of contradictions</strong> one encounters <strong>in ideas and ideologies</strong>, among intellectuals and the positions they do or do not take on social and political issues, inconsistencies between what they preach and what they ractise, in <strong>the functioning of institutions like the state, universities and civil society</strong>, and also in ideas like secularism, governance and empowerment. (Dhanagare 2003: 4661)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad. Could use some more ideas.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4661b"></a>The affinity of <strong>the notion of antinomies</strong> with the dialectical tradition, that brought the word into <strong>currency in social philosophy in the first quarter of 19th century, has to be placed centre stage</strong> while critically looking at the essays in this volume. It means that an in-depth explication of the concept of 'antinomies' is essential for clarifying the methodology of discourse analysis that the essays in this volume are about. Though most scholars tend to use terms like 'antinomy' and 'contradiction' interchangeably almost as synonyms, <strong>the finer nuances of the term 'antinomy' as spelt out by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant</strong> cannot, and must not, be overlooked. (Dhanagare 2003: 4661)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh no. (1) "<u>the known world</u>; (2) "<u>the mind that knows</u>; and (3) "<u>an attempt to think of a whole that includes both</u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>which Kant calls 'the ideal of pure reason'</u>" (<em>ibid</em>., 4661). </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4662"></a>Secondly, had he probed the fourfold typology of antinomies seriously, such an exercise would have revealed to him that the nature of contradictions, inconsistencies and tensions in <strong>ideas, values and institutions in Indian society</strong> are akin to the last two antinomies. Hence, while talking about secular and fundamentalist forces, about universities of excellence and of mediocrity and about governance and empowerment, both the statements of thesis and antithesis can be, or tend to be, true at the same time. (Dhanagare 2003: 4662)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This may be a good supplementary reading to David Zilberman's stuff. Sadly inaccessible:</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Beteille, Andre 2000. <em>Antinomies of Society: Essays on Ideologies and Institutions</em>. Delhi: Oxford University Press.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4663a"></a>That ideologies have built-in streaks of mystification (and false consciousness) is by now an accepted view that need not be disputed. History provides ample instances of such mystifications. What is noteworthy is that <strong>Beteille has attempted to project ideology as akin to symbolism than to theory</strong>. Although ideology is indispensable for launching <strong>a struggle for power</strong>, what <strong>ignites</strong> any struggle is not just the reason and rationality but also <strong>people's emotions and intuition of political ideologues that creates images and deploys symbols deftly</strong> in mass mobilisation. The full meaning of symbols, however, remains hidden (pp 20-24). This position of Beteille is basically a restatement of views of Georges Sorel (1970: see for instance, the section on 'the Proletarian strike' pp 119-50). (Dhanagare 2003: 4663)</blockquote><!--
--><p>To me this looks like a meeting of La Barre's take on phatic communication in political leadership and Durkheim's collective effervescence.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Sorel, Georges 1915. Reflections on Violence</em>. Authorised translation by Thomas Ernest Hulme. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/reflectionsonvio00soreuoft/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4663b"></a>His submission is that these laboratories have performed well in creating space for eminent scientists as well as for young budding researchers with potential to contribute significantly to scientific discoveries and technological innovations (p 68). However, it needs to be recognised that, barring notable exceptions of visionaries like <strong>Homi J Bhabha, Meghanad Saha, Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, P C Mahalanobis</strong>, and others, most scientists tend to be committed less to 'science', 'pursuit of knowledge' as an end in itself and more as means to achieve professional ends. (Dhanagare 2003: 4663)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bhabha, Homi J. 1994. <em>The Location of Culture</em>. New York: Routledge.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/locationofcultur0000bhab/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4663c"></a>Even using Beteille's own yardstick ('<u>the role of the intellectual is associated with <strong>critical, creative and contemplative activities</strong></u>' p 61) every scientist in a national laboratory or a faculty member of a university may not measure up to his expectations. To this reviewer, in ways more than one, <strong>an intellectual is one who has capacity to form poinions independently, perform conscience-keeping function in society, and who can act as an opinion maker and social catalyst when needed</strong>. (Dhanagare 2003: 4663)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How would Stapledon's "skeptic" compare with Dhanagare's intellectual?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4665a"></a>However, it needs to be stressed that there is <strong>a strong tendency among social scientists to view complex social reality through a simple binary prism</strong>. The most hackneyed dichotomies that come to mind immediately are 'gemeinschaft and gesselschaft' (community and society by F Tonnies0, mechanistic and organic solidarity (E Durkheim), <strong>primary and secondary (Charles Cooley)</strong>, folk-urban (Robert Redfield), joint and nuclear family and the like. This trend of dichotomising social reality is more pronounced in sociology than in its sister social science disciplines. (Dhanagare 2003: 4665)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Huh. My reading has indeed been limited. I didn't even know there were <em>secondary</em> groups.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4665b"></a>Dumont, on the contrary, hold the view that the ideology of caste system in India revolves around the basic idea of differentiation and complete <strong>separation of 'status' from 'power'</strong>. Those who enjoyed the first (namely, the <strong>priestly status in ritual hierarchy</strong>) had no access to the second, while <strnog>the kings, princes and monarchs</strong> who might have <strong>control</strong>led <strong>the temporal</strong> - <strong>economic and political</strong> - power could never violate sanctity and sacred status of the priestly order. In fact the temporal power almost always sought its legitimisation by the priestly class that commanded spiritual and ecclesiastical authority and that represented sort of '<strong>a moral order</strong>' [Dumont 1972: 73-76; also 104-12]. (Dhanagare 2003: 4665)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wow, Dumont making some sense?! This differentiation between priestly status and kingly power is at the heart of Plato's proposal in the <em>Republic</em>: the prince should be priestly, i.e. a philosopher. The philosopher-king does have economic and political power, but he is merely the pinnacle of a priestly caste of philosophers who bestow him this status, and ideally the philosophers are not interested in economic and political power for their own self-interest - what with their blood already containing gold - but in the welfare and interests of the commoners and the guards. How "<u>power could</u> <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>violate sanctity and sacred status</u>" played out in the drama of Rome and Vatican.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Dumont, Louis 1974. <em>Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications</em>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/homohierarchicus00dumorich/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4665ja4666"></a>It would be a more sensible, and also historically correct, to say that some elements of 'modernity' (as an ideal type) and secular disposition always coexisted in what is depicted today as 'traditional societies'. In contrast some traditional beliefs and irrational practices, including <strong>at times blatantly communal sentiments</strong>, persisted even in those societies that have all along enjoyed the image of being modern, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> egalitarian and secular. (Dhanagare 2003: 4665-4666)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This gives me an idea. The "phatic complaint" in modern society - is it an expression of "communal sentiments"?</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4666"></a>Indian religions have emerged historically as responses to creative attempts to blend three otherwise inseparable parts as their constituents: they are - (a) <strong>a cosmology</strong> and broader world view; (b) <strong>an ethical</strong> - prescriptive as well as proscriptive - <strong>code</strong> of conduct often carrying religious sanctions with them that regulated every day life; and (c) <strong>a system of</strong> ritual practices or <strong>ritual symbolism</strong> to propitiate the supernatural. The extent and degree of intensity of each of the three components vary in different religions with varying permutations and combinations. But Beteille appears content with limiting his discussion to 'theology' alone (p 102) and thereby leaving out the ways in which a broad world view gets translated into <strong>norms and patterns of every day life</strong> (i e, practical ethics and ritual behaviour). (Dhanagare 2003: 4666)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This I like. It's part of the discussion of "what is religion", i.e. not just transcendental beliefs but also ritual practices, identity, etc. Here: (1) the saint has a system of ritual symbolism; (2) the revolutionary has an ethical code; and (3) the skeptic has a cosmology.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4667"></a>Perhaps those in the faculty who think that they are more 'academic' than others do not mind even if academic programmes receive a setback as a result of their indefensible intolerance vis-a-vis the administration. In this context Beteille goes to the extreme of arguing: "<u><strong>If one is serious about academic work it is better to be a victim of the administration than to join it in the hope of improving things</strong></u>" (p 119). (Dhanagare 2003: 4667)</blockquote><!--
--><p>University, kids, don't do it!</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4668"></a>In doing so he weaves in ideas that are essentially drawn from Newman's (1976) classic work as well as from Nehru's oft-quoted convocation speech at Allahabad University. That <strong>universities are expected to be the homes of intellectual adventure</strong> was also emphasised by the Radhakrishnan Committee report. While continuing the relentless pursuit of <strong>truth, science and scholarship</strong>, universities ought to stand for excellence in research and in quality of education <strong>as an end in itself</strong> (pp 131-33). (Dhanagare 2003: 4668)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Newman, John Henry 1873. <em>The Idea of a University: Defined and Illustrated</em>. Third Edition. London: Basil Montagu Pickering.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/a677040500newmuoft/page/n13/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!-- Unity and Diversity / Divvy and University
--></small></ul><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4671"></a>While reading this chapter, a reader feels that Beteille has viewed <strong>'governance' as</strong> no more than <strong>a functional extension of formal bureaucracy</strong>, and therefore insights into the dynamics of power relationships and also into rising expectations of people from the state have been missed completely. (Dhanagare 2003: 4671)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Governmental institutions are functional projections of formal bereaucratic desires</em>.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="dhanagare03p4672"></a>Secondly, ideas and concepts in the writings of Hegel, Marx, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, Merton, or Habermas and Foucault have originated in non-Indian contexts. But this has not prevented sociologists from using and applying some of those concepts freely, at times indiscriminately, in Indian context. (Dhanagare 2003: 4672)</blockquote><!--
--><p>12 pages in 3 columns is a bit much for a review. The reviewer went on several different screeds throughout this piece. It wasn't bad but it did drag on for too long.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- e49 Mee-TeachingSociology-2005
--><h4><a id="mee05"></a>Mee, Alisa Potter 2005. Review of <em>Inside Social Life: Readings in Sociological Psychology and Microsociology</em> by S. E. Cahill. <em>Teaching Sociology</em> 33(1): 116-118. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4127578">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="mee05p116"></a>The theoretical and rhetorical selections included in part I explore <strong>the cultural and social nature of human experience</strong>, while parts II, III, and IV examine the social construction of the self and people's subjective responses as they interact in various social contexts. Parts V and VI investigate how social interaction is organized and patterned, as well as how relationships are socialyl constructed. The next two sections of the text, parts VII and VIII, tackle the various ways social structures are built out of and maintained by micro-level interaction patterns. Part IX presents the political nature of social reality and reminds readers that power allows some parties to define the social realities that constrain other individuals and groups. Finally, part X highlights two competing postmodern approaches to the self in contemporary society. (Mee 2005: 116)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Cahill, Spencer E. (ed.) 1998. <em>Inside Social Life: Readings in Sociological Psychology and Microsociology</em>. Second edition. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/insidesociallife00spen/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mee05p117"></a>Eight of the readings could be considered "classic," from the work of <strong>Charles Horton Cooley</strong>, George Herbert Mead, Lev Vygotsky, <strong>Howard Becker</strong>, Erving Goffman, and Herbert Blumer. (Mee 2005: 117)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Becker, Howard S. 1963. <em>Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance</em>. New York: The Free Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/outsidersstudies00beck">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- f1 Bernard-RecentTrendsPsychology-1928
--><h4><a id="bernard28"></a>Bernard, L. L. 1928. Some Recent Trends in Psychology and Social Psychology. <em>Social Forces</em> 7(1): 160-166. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/3004564">10.2307/3004564</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3004564">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p160a"></a>Psychology as a science is becoming highly self-conscious, but in the purposive manner of earl maturity rather than in the bashful way of adolescence. (Bernard 1928: 160)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Weld, H. P. 1928. <em>Psychology as Science</em>. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.191030">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Perrin, F. A. C.; Klein, D. B. 1926. <em>Psychology: Its Methods and Principles</em>. New York: Henry Holt & Co.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Berman, Louis 1927. <em>The Religion Called Behaviorism</em>. New York: Boni & Liveright.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/religioncalledbe0000berm/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Herrick, Charles Judson 1926. <em>Brains of Rats and Men: A Survey of the Origin and Biological Significance of the Cerebral Cortex</em>. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/brainsofratsmens00herr/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Storck, John 1927. <em>Man and Civilization</em>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.77154/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Alverdes, Friedrich 1927. <em>Social Life in the Animal World</em>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.221570/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>de Laguna, Grace Andrus 1927. <em>Speech: Its Function and Development</em>. New Haven: Yale University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.90310/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Sprowls, Jesse William 1927. <em>Social Psychology Interpreted</em>. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Co.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Young, Kimball 1927. <em>Source Book for Social Psychology</em>. New York: Alfred A Knopf.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/soucebookforsoci00youn/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Thomas, William I.; Znaniecki, Florian 1927. <em>The Polish Peasant in Europe and America</em>. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/polishpeasantine01thom/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Burrow, Trigant 1927. <em>The Social Basis of Consciousness: A Study in Organic Psychology Based upon a Synthetic and Societal Concept of the Neuroses</em>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/socialbasisofcon0000burr/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Roback, A. A. 1927. <em>The Psychology of Character</em>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/psychologyofchar0000draa/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Bagby, English 1928. <em>The Psychology of Personality: An Analysis of Common Emotional Disorders</em>. New York: Henry Holt & Co.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Myerson, Abraham 1927. <em>The Psychology of Mental Disorders</em>. New York: The Macmillan Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.213294/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Valentine, P. F. 1927. <em>The Psychology of Personality</em>. New York: D. Appleton & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/psychologyofpers0000unse_p2a6/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Vaughan, Wayland F. 1928. <em>The Lure of Superiority: A Study in the Psychology of Motives</em>. New York: Henry Holt & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/lureofsuperiorit00vaug/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>de Man, Henry 1928. <em>The Psychology of Socialism</em>. New York: Henry Holt & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/dli.ernet.237948/page/3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Edwards, Lyford P. 1927. <em>The Natural History of Revolutions</em>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/naturalhistoryof0000lyfo/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p160n"></a>For example, he <span style="color: #fa4100">[</span>Weld<span style="color: #fa4100">]</span> divides social psychology into the <strong>genetic psychology of peoples and collective psychology</strong>. Why he omits the psychology of personality integration from this grouping is difficult to understand, unless the author has failed to realize the importance of sociology for psychology. <strong>The integration of personality is social or it is nothing, as the work of Cooley and others has abundantly demonstrated</strong>. (Bernard 1928: 160)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Personal, social, and integration.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p161"></a>A humorous little book by an ardent and somewhat resentful rival religionist is Berman's <em>The Religion Called Behaviorism</em>. It is humorous because it illustrates so well the author's own doctrinaire dogmatism in defense of his glandular hypothesis and his criticism of Watsonianism. Dr. Berman does not seem to realize that <strong>there are two conceptions of behaviorism. The one, held</strong> by Perrin and Klein and <strong>by practically all psychologists</strong>, which looks upon it as merely the study of behavior, seems to be unknown to our author. <strong>The other</strong>, which regards it as another term to cover Dr. <strong>Watson's personal views on some metaphysical questions</strong>, is the one invariably selected by religionists and dogmatists of various stripes to bolster up their own disintegrating faiths by means of the well-known device of pronouncing vituperative anathema. (Bernard 1928: 161)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I get the impression that the reviewer is not themselves a religionist.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p162"></a>Mrs. de Laguna's work on <em>Speech</em> represents the opposite trend. To be sure it is not a concrete study of either animal or human behavior in association, but rather an attempt to generalize the significance and modes of <strong>a certain aspect of this associative behavior</strong> - that of speech. Here again we see the sociological conception to the fore as a background for psychological interpretation. Speech is not so much an attempt to give expression to inner impulses as it is <strong>to secure response in an adjustment situation</strong>. (Bernard 1928: 162)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Secure response from whom about what?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p163"></a>Trigant Burrow, in <em>The Social Basis of Consciousness</em>, has implied the sociological background of psychology in a somewhat different way. Himself a psychoanalyst, he has carried the individualistic psychoanalytic philosophy to its logical conclusion. Chief of all of our repressions is that which comes from <strong>the necessity of comforting to the mores</strong>. Society imposes its standards and traditions upon us remorselessly. Hence <strong>social consciousness becomes a consciousness of inferiority</strong>, and right and wrong are moral bludgeons which smash the unity of our personalities. Conformity is the chief of the neuroses and <strong>the most moral are the most neurotic</strong>. (Bernard 1928: 163)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Psychoanalysts sure are funny.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p164"></a><em>The Lure of Superiority</em> by Vaughan illustrates once more (and do the volumes by Burrow, Bogby, and Myerson) the growing influence of psychoanalytic theory upon social psychology. But it is a much chastened and refined psychoanalytic psychology which is being taken over by the writers on personality. <strong>The crude Freudian metaphysics and mythology have an effectually disappeared from it as has</strong> the metaphysics of the mediaeval theologians and <strong>neo-Platonists from our modern (scientific) psychology</strong>. But much of the psychoanalytic terminology is here, and also its basic concepts. (Bernard 1928: 164)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think I liked the neo-Platonist metaphysics of 19th century philosophical psychology more.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="bernard28p165"></a>We are due for a new revolution in about three generations, to establish industrial democracy on a par with political and social democracy. This theory of revolutions is much less negativistic and appeals less to the facts of abnormal psychology than does the theory of E. D. <strong>Martin</strong> in his <strong><em>The Behavior of Crowds</em></strong>, but at times one is reminded of this book. (Bernard 1928: 165)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Martin, E.dodkk Ddal 1920. <em>The Behavior of Crowds: A Psychological Study</em>. New York; London: Harper & Brothers Publishers.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/behaviorofcrowds00martuoft/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-13340945629123945422024-01-16T00:26:00.000-08:002024-01-16T00:26:22.384-08:00Human Nature and the Social Order<!-- Human Nature and the Social Order
Lang: English,Source: WEB,Sociology,Psychology,Cooley
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7C_qPSSGaWAb-VK3n_1Y-P5fot2GRL10y6nHs5euweU68KPcmGLRnDddaxP986akqWcfpYaxNprA-XsJVKdwTIG2GhagLYdSj2GAqhlzmIPL5R0mrnnz3c_n8MyDCVEkGUlVOVukSQzV8rix_35G-HCpLT0kTlMtst1o_UtYN4fSmHciY2GFijDixxWDF/s1977/jja_pilt_cooley_1922_human_nature_and_the_social_order.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1977" data-original-width="1143" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi7C_qPSSGaWAb-VK3n_1Y-P5fot2GRL10y6nHs5euweU68KPcmGLRnDddaxP986akqWcfpYaxNprA-XsJVKdwTIG2GhagLYdSj2GAqhlzmIPL5R0mrnnz3c_n8MyDCVEkGUlVOVukSQzV8rix_35G-HCpLT0kTlMtst1o_UtYN4fSmHciY2GFijDixxWDF/s320/jja_pilt_cooley_1922_human_nature_and_the_social_order.jpg" width="185" /></a></div><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="cooley22"></a>Cooley, Charles Horton 1922. <em>Human Nature and the Social Order</em>. New York: Scribner. [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/humannaturesocia00cool/page/n11/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</h4><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch0"></a>INTRODUCTION: HEREDITY AND INSTINCT</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p3ja4"></a>We have come in recent years to look upon all questions of human life <strong>from an evolutionary points of view</strong>. It may be worth while to recall something of what that phrase means.<br />It means, for one thing, that all our life has a history, that nothing happens disconnectedly, that everything we are or do is part of a current coming down from the remote past. <strong>Every word we say, every movement we make, every idea we have, and every feeling, is, in one way or another, an outcome of what our predecessors</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>have said or done or thought or felt in past ages</strong>. There is an actual historical continuity from their life to ours, and we are constantly trying to trace this history, to see how things come about, in order that we may understand them better and may learn to bring to pass those things we regard as desirable. (Cooley 1922: 3-4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Historical determinism.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p4"></a><strong>Life</strong>, it appears, <strong>is all one great whole</strong>, a kinship, unified by a common descent and by common principles of existence; and our part in it will not be understood unless we can see, in a general way at least, how it is related to other parts. (Cooley 1922: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>We are all one, man, like, far-out!</em> etc.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p4ja5"></a>The stream of this <strong>life-history</strong>, whose sources are so remote and whose branchings so various, appears to <strong>flow</strong> in <strong>two rather distinct channels</strong>. Or perhaps we might better say that there is a stream and a road running along the bank - two lines of transmission. <strong>The stream is heredity or animal transmission; the road is communication or social transmission</strong>. One flows through the germ-plasm; the other comes by way of <strong>language, intercourse, and education</strong>. The road is more recent than the stream: it is an improvement <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> that did not exist at all in the earliest flow of animal life, but appears later as <strong>a vague trail alongside the stream</strong>, becomes more and more distinct and travelled, and finally develops into <strong>an elaborate highway</strong>, supporting many kinds of vehicles and a traffic fully equal to that of the stream itself. (Cooley 1922: 4-5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Evolutionary stream and cultural highway.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p6"></a>Suppose, for example, that an American family in China adopts a Chinese baby and brings it home to grow up in America. The animal life-history of that baby's past will lie in China. It will have the straight black hair, the yellowish skin and other physical traits of the Chinese people, and also <strong>any mental tendencies that may be part of their heredity</strong>. But his social past will lie in America, because he will get from the people about him the English speech and the customs, manners, and ideas that have been developed in this country. (Cooley 1922: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhat dubious, though (if epigenetics is to be believed) not completely. What exactly are "mental tendencies", though?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p7a"></a>Nor is there any doubt, though it is not so obvious, that he gets from this source his <strong>original mental endowment</strong>. A child of <strong>feeble-minded</strong> ancestors is usually feeble-minded also, and one whose parents had unusual ability is apt to resemble them. (Cooley 1922: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>I.Q. is heritable</em> type claim?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p7b"></a>Heredity brings us not only tendencies to a definite sort of physical development, but also <strong>capacity, aptitude, disposition, lines of teachability</strong>, or whatever else may call <strong>the vague physical tendencies</strong> that all of us are born with. (Cooley 1922: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If they are admittedly vague, how do you know they are hereditary?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p7c"></a>And from social transmission, through the environment, come all the stimulation and teaching which cause these tendencies to develop in a definite form, which lead us to speak a particular language, to develop one <strong>set of ideas</strong> or <strong>kind of ambition</strong> rather than another, to feel patriotism for America rather than for England or Italy. (Cooley 1922: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Missing firstness.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p10"></a>Suppose, for example, there is a Southern county in which there are five thousand negroes and five thousand whites, and that the average number of children raised in negro and white families is about the same. <strong>Now if, in some way, you can cause the white families to raise more children, or the negroes fewer, the complexion of the county will gradually be altered</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 10)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This reads like a manual for what has actually happened in the U.S. over the past century just by imprisoning black people at a higher rate than white people.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p12"></a>There has, in fact, arisen a science of Eugenics, or Race-Improvement, seeking to stimulate the propagation of desirable types of human heredity and prevent that of undesirable types. There are many difficulties in this, and it is not clear how much we may expect to accomplish, but <strong>there is no doubt that some things can and should be done</strong>. Scientific tests should be made of all children to ascertain those that are feeble-minded or otherwise hopelessly below a normal capacity, followed by a study of their families to find whether these defects <!-- <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> -->are hereditary. (Cooley 1922: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>A screening test for Down's syndrome, Edwards' syndrome and Patau's syndrome is available between weeks 10 and 14 of pregnancy.</u>" - Beyond that it gets into the nightmare territory of "<u>capacity, aptitude, disposition, lines of teachability, or whatever else</u>".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p13"></a>On the other hand, the educated and prosperous classes show a tendency to limit the number of their children that is often spoken of as Race-Suicide. This limitation appears to be due partly to <strong>the taste for ease and luxury</strong> fostered by wealth, partly to increasing <strong>social ambition</strong> and greater <strong>desire for self-development</strong>. These latter, excellent no doubt in themselves, draw upon our means and energy, and are apt to cause us to postpone marriage or to have fewer children after marriage than we otherwise would. Since they <strong>grow with democracy</strong>, it may well be that democracy antagonizes the birth-rate. (Cooley 1922: 13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Firstness no longer missing - Cooley's are ease and luxury, so basically Plato (and not, for example, Aesara). Weird how Cooley starts out with the right conclusion - <em>people have fewer children with education and prosperity</em> - and ends up with the wrong conclusion - <em>democracy inherently antagonistic to birth-rate</em>. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p13ja14"></a><strong>The upper classes</strong> are falling far short of their quota, and if we assume that they <strong>represent the abler stocks</strong> it would seem that the race is being impaired by their diminution. Is it not desirable, and perhaps practicable, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> to induce them to become more prolific? Even if they do not represent abler stocks than the middle class, is there not danger that <strong>the small-family tendency</strong> will pervade that class also? It has already done so in France. (Cooley 1922: 13-14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Abler for what? Amassing wealth? Usury? Exploitation? Self-interestedness? This also illustrates the lax nature of "tendencies". If education and prosperity lead to having fewer children and we see this all over the world, then it means that humanity has a natural small-family tendency that is only hampered by poverty and lack of education. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p14a"></a>Others give their apprehensions a still wider range and see an imminent Yellow Peril in the fecundity of the oriental peoples, which threatens, they think, to put an early end to the ascendancy of the white races and of <strong>white civilization</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Literally replacement theory.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p14b"></a>The spread of education, the abolition of slavery, the growth of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, and automobiles, <strong>the formation of a society of nations and the abolition of war</strong> - all this kind of thing is social and may go on indefinitely with no improvement in heredity. (Cooley 1922: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first edition was published before WWI when such hopes might have been commonplace.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p15"></a>Heredity and environment, as applied to the present life of a human being, are, in fact, abstractions; the real thing is <strong>a total organic process</strong> not separable into parts. (Cooley 1922: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Holistic thinking.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p16a"></a>Speech well illustrates the inextricable union of the animal and social heritages. It springs in part from the native structure of the vocal organs and from a hereditary impulse to use them which we see at work in the chattering of idiots and of the deaf and dumb. <strong>A natural sensibility to other persons and need to communicate with them also enters into it</strong>. But all articulate utterance comes by communication; it is learned from others, varies with the environment and has its source in tradition. <strong>Speech is thus a sociobiologic function</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not too shabby. The "natural sensibility to other persons" reminds me of this: "<u>There are people who, without sympathy or antipathy, have pleasure in the intuitive ascription of emotion to others.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p16b"></a>And so it is with ambition and all our socially active impulses: <strong>We are born with the need to assert ourselves</strong>, but whether we do so as hunters, <strong>warriors</strong>, fishermen, <strong>traders</strong>, politicians, or <strong>scholars</strong>, depends upon the opportunities offered us in the social process. (Cooley 1922: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Thus, "<u>the taste for ease and luxury</u>", "<u>the social ambition</u>" and "<u>desire for self-improvement</u>" are <em>socially active impulses</em> in Cooley's terminology.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p18a"></a>But are there also, or are there not, subtle differences of <strong>temperament, mental capacity or emotional gifts</strong>, which are both hereditary and important, which render the races incapable of living together in peace, or make one of them superior to the other? (Cooley 1922: 18)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Temperament" is Second?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p18b"></a>And again, with reference to the rich and powerful classes. Is their ascendancy that of natural ability, of a superior breed, and so, perhaps, just and beneficial? <strong>Or is it based on social privileges in the way of education and opportunity, and hence, as many think, unfair and detrimental?</strong> Unsolved questions of this kind arise whenever we try to make out just how we may better the course of human life. (Cooley 1922: 18)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The latter.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p21ja22"></a>The great majority of us gain our food, after we have left the parental nest, through what we call a job, and <strong>a job</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>is any cativity whatever that a complex and shifting society esteems sufficiently to pay us for</strong>. It is very likely, nowadays, to last only part of our lives and to be something our ancestors never heard of. Thus whatever is most distinctively human, our adaptability, our power of growth, our arts and sciences, our social institutions and progress, is bound up with the indeterminate character of human heredity. (Cooley 1922: 21-22)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Almost like a rebuttal to the "if you can't describe your job in 3 words you have a bullshit job" meme.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p23ja24"></a>Moreover, although our outward actions had ceased to be determined by heredity, it <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> seemed that we still had <strong>inward emotions and dispositions</strong> that were so determined, and had an immense influence on our conduct. The question, then, was, and is, whether human behavior, guided in a genaral way by these hereditary emotions and dispositions, shall be called instinctive or not. (Cooley 1922: 23-24)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Animals have instinctive first and second, humans only instinctive first.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p25"></a>It is fairly clear that we have at least half a dozen well-marked types of instinctive emotional disposition that are social in that they concern directly our attitude toward other persons. I might name, as perhaps the plainest, the dispositions to anger, to fear, to maternal love, to male and female sexual love, and to <strong>the emotion of self-assertion or power</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 25)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not the standard list of universal emotions.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p28"></a>Much the same may be said of the employement, of <strong>a supposed gregarious instinct</strong>, or "instinct of the herd," to explain a multiplicity of phenomena, including <strong>mob-excitement, dread of isolation, conformity to fads and fashions, subservience to leaders and control by propaganda</strong>; which require, like war, a detailed study of social antecedents. This is, as Professor Findlay remarks, "an easy, dogmatic way of explaining phenomena whose causes and effects are far more complicated than these authors would admit." Indeed <strong>I am not aware that there is any such evidence of the existence of a gregarious instinct as there is of an instinct of fear or anger</strong>; and many think the phenomena which it is used to explain may be accounted for by sympathy and suggestion, without calling in a special instinct. <strong>It seems to me to be the postulate of an individualistic psychology in search of some special motive to explain collective behavior</strong>. If you regard human nature as primarily social you need no such special motive. (Cooley 1922: 28)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And some people still (anno domini 2023) believe that humans have this instinct. Cooley's metapsychological judgment seems correct to me. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p28ja29fn"></a>The notion that collective behavior is to be attributed to <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> an <stronG>"instinct of the herd" seems to owe its vogue in great part to Nietzsche</strong>, who made much use of it, in a contemptuous sense, to animate his anti-democratic philosophy. (Cooley 1922: 28-29, fn)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Apt. "<span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>the antitheses between "egoistic" and "altruistic" presses more and more heavily on the human conscience - it is, to use my own language, the <em>herd instinct</em> which finds in this antithesis an expression in many ways.</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2019/03/the-genealogy-of-morals.html#nietzsche21p4ja5">Nietzsche 1921: 5</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p30"></a>Indeed, reason is itself an instinctive disposition, in a large use of the term, a disposition <strong>to compare, combine, and organize the activities of the mind</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 30)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These sound like the laws of association.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p31ja32"></a>And, finally, just what do we mean by <strong>Human Nature?</strong> The phrase is used vaguely, but there are at least three meanings that can be distinguished with some precision. And as we distinguish them we may be able, at the same time, to answer the perennial question, Does Human Nature change?<br />It may mean, first, the strictly hereditary nature of man, borne by the germ-plasm, <strong>the formless impulses and capacities that we infer to exist at birth, but of</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>which we have little definite knowledge because they do not manifest themselves except as a factor in social development</strong>. This nature appears to change very slowly, and we have no reason to think we are very much different at birth from our ancestors of, say, a thousand years ago. (Cooley 1922: 31-32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Notably this type of human nature <em>does</em> change, yet imperceptibly slowly.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p32"></a>It may mean, second, a social nature developed in man by simple forms of intimate association or "primary groups," especially the family and neighborhood, which are found everywhere and everywhere work upon the individual in somewhat the same way. This nature consists chiefly of <strong>certain primary social sentiments and attitudes, such as consciousness of one's self in relation to others, love of approbation, resentment of censure, emulation, and a sense of social right and wrong formed by the standards of a group</strong>. This seems to me to correspond very closely to what is meant by "human nature" in ordinary speech. We mean something much more definite than hereditary disposition, which most of us know nothing about, and yet something fundamental and wide-spread if not universal in the life of man, found in ancient history and in the accounts of remote nations, as well as now and here. (Cooley 1922: 32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This type of human nature consists of vague observations on the general emotive dispositions of mankind. It nevertheless merely assumes fixity and uniformity.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p33"></a>Perhaps <strong>the commonest fallacy</strong> we meet in this connection <strong>is that which assumes that human nature does not change</strong>, points out respects in which it has worked deplorably, and concludes that it will always work so. An unchanging human nature, it is said, has given us wars and economic greed; it always will. (Cooley 1922: 33)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We popped out of Eden 6000 years ago exactly as we are now and God or Devil or someone put the fossils of our evolutionary ancestors in the ground to play a trick on the archaeologists.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch1"></a>I. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p35"></a>If we accept the evolutionary point of view we are led to see the relation between society and the individual as an organic relation. That is, we see that <strong>the individual is not separable from the human whole, but a living member of it, deriving his life from the whole through social and hereditary transmission as truly as if men were literally one body</strong>. He cannot cut himself off; the strands of heredity and education are woven into all his being. And, on the other hand, <strong>the social whole is in some degree dependent upon each individual, because each contributes something to the common life that no one else can contribute</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 35)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Society conditions the individual and individuals constitute the society.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p38ja39"></a>If this is true there is, of course, a fallacy in that not uncommon manner of speaking which sets the social and the individual over against each other as separate and antagonistic. <strong>The word "social"</strong> appears to be used in at least three fairly distinct senses, but in none of these does it mean something that can properly be regarded as opposite to individual or personal.<br />In its largest sense it denotes that which pertains to <strong>the collective aspect of humanity</strong>, to society in its <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> widest and vaguest meaning. In this sense the individual and all his attributes are social, since they are all connected with the general life in one way or another, and are part of a collective development.<br />Again, social may mean what pertains to <strong>immediate intercourse</strong>, to the life of conversation and face-to-face sympathy - sociable, in short. This is something quite different, but no more antithetical to individual than the other; it is in these relations that individuality most obviously exists and expresses itself.<br />In a third sense the word means <strong>conducive to the collective welfare</strong>, and thus becomes nearly equivalent to moral, as when we say that crime or sensuality is unsocial or anti-social; but here again it cannot properly be made the antithesis of individual - since wrong is surely no more individual than right - but must be contrasted with immoral, brutal, selfish, or some other word with an ethical implication. (Cooley 1922: 38-39)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Individuals viewed as a kind of totality; the communication between individuals; and things that benefit that totality.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p42"></a>Most people not only think of individuals are society as more or less separate and antithetical, but they look upon the former as antecedent to the latter. That persons make society would be generally admitted as a matter of course; but that <strong>society makes persons</strong> would strike many as a startling notion, though I know of no good reason for looking upon the distributive aspect of life as more primary or causative than the collective aspect. (Cooley 1922: 42)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perfectly acceptable even in phrases like "he was a product of his upbringing", which amounts to "that society made this kind of person". </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p43ja44"></a>Next is <em>double causation</em>, or a partition of power between society and the individual, thought of as <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> separate causes. This notion, in one shape or another, is the one ordinarily met with in social and ethical discussion. It is no advance, philosophically, upon the preceding. There is the same premise of the individual as a separate, unrelated agent; but over against him is set a vaguely conceived general or collective interest and force. It seems that <strong>people are so accustomed to thinking of themselves as uncaused causes, special creators on a small scale</strong>, that when the existence of general phenomena is forced upon their notice they are likely to regard these as something additional, separate, and more or less antithetical. (Cooley 1922: 43-44)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The human being is a pebble that spontaneously takes flight and lands where it wishes.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p45a"></a>Thirdly we have <strong><em>primitive individualism</em></strong>. This expression has been used to describe the view that sociality follows individuality in time, is a later and additional product of development. This view is a variety of the preceding, and is, perhaps, formed by a mingling of individualistic preconceptions with a somewhat crude evolutionary philosophy. <strong>Individuality is usually conceived as lower in moral rank as well as preceding in time. Man <em>was</em> a mere individual, mankind a mere aggregation of such, but he had gradually become socialized, he is progressively merging into a social whole</strong>. Morally speaking, the individual is the bad, the social the good, and we must push on the work of putting down the former and bringing in the latter. (Cooley 1922: 45)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This seems to me the common view, perhaps due to urbanization. As in, the rural farmers were a mere aggregation of mankind but when they moved into the city they became a "society" due to more frequent interpersonal contact.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p45b"></a>Of course the view which I regard as sound, is that individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in moral rank than sociality; but that <strong>the two have always existed side by side</strong> as complementary aspects of the same thing, and that <strong>the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other</strong>. If the word social is applied only to the higher forms of mental life it should, as already suggested, be opposed not to individual, but to animal, sensual, or some other word implying mental or meral inferiority. If we go back to a time when the state of <strong>our remote ancestors</strong> was such that we are not willing to call it social, then it must have been equally underserving to be described as individual or personal; that is to say, they <strong>must have been just as inferior to us when viewed separately as when viewed collectively</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 45)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is golden - and has its bearing upon Stapledon's vision of humanity's future.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p46a"></a>To question this is to question the <strong>vital unity</strong> of human life. (Cooley 1922: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hmm.</p><!-- subvital units?
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p46b"></a>Finally, there is <strong><em>the social faculty view</em></strong>. This expression might be used to indicate those conceptions which regard <strong>the social</strong> as including <strong>only a part</strong>, often a rather definite part, <strong>of the individual</strong>. Human nature is thus divided into individualistic or non-social tendencies or faculties, and those that are social. Thus, <strong>certain emotions, as love, are social; others, as fear or anger, are unsocial or individualistic. Some writers</strong> have even treated the intelligence as an individualistic faculty, and <strong>have found sociality only in some sort of emotion or sentiment</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This appears to be the position of those who speak of "the social function of language", for example, as if all functions of language were not always already social.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p46ja47"></a>This idea of instincts or faculties that are peculiarly social is <strong>well enough if</strong> we use this word in the sense of <strong>pertaining to conversation or immediate fellow feeling</strong>. Affection is certainly more social in this sense than fear. But if it is meant that these instincts or faculties are in themselves morally higher than others, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> or that they alone pertain to the collective life, the view is, I think, very questionable. At any rate the opinion I hold, and expect to explain more fully in the further course of this book, is that <strong>man's psychical outfit is not divisible into the social and the non-social; but that he is all social in a large sense, is all a part of the common human life</strong>, and that his social or moral progress consists less in the aggrandizement of particular <strong>faculties</strong> or instincts and the suppression of others, than in <strong>the discipline of all with reference to a progressive organization of life which we know</strong> in thought as <strong>conscience</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 46-47)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This explains Ch. 10, "The social aspect of conscience". </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p48"></a>3. Is the individual a product of society?<br />Yes, in the sense that <strong>everything human abou thim has a history in the social past</strong>. If we consider the two sources from which he draws his life, <strong>heredity and communication</strong>, we see that what he gets through the germ-plasm has <strong>a social history</strong> in that it has had to adapt itself to past society in order to survive: the traits we are born with are such as have undergone <strong>a social test</strong> in the lives of our ancestors. And what he gets from communication - language, education, and the like - comes directly from society. <strong>Even physical influence, like food and climate, rarely reach us except as modified and adapted by social conditions</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A summary of the preceding. Though Cooley did not mean it in this sense, we now do indeed experience climate as modified by social conditions.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p50"></a>The evolutionary point of view encourages us to believe that life is a creative process, that we are really building up something new and worth while, and that the human will is a part of the creative energy that does this. Every individual has his unique share in the work, which no one but himself can discern and perform. Although his life flows into him from the hereditary and social past, his being as a whole is new, a fresh organization of life. <strong>Never any one before had the same powers and opportunities that you have, and you are free to use them in your own way</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A great perspective.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch2"></a>II. SUGGESTION AND CHOICE</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p51"></a>The word <strong>suggestion</strong> is used here to denote <strong>an influence that works in a comparatively mechanical or reflex way</strong>, without calling out that higher selective activity of the mind implied in choice or will. Thus the hypnotic subject who performs apparently meaningless actions at the word of the operator is said to be <strong>controlled by suggestion</strong>; so also is one who catches up tricks of speech and action from other people without meaning to. From such instances <strong>the idea is extended to embrace any thought or action which is mentally simple and seems not to involve choice. The behavior of people under strong emotion is suggestive; crowds are suggestible; habit is a kind of suggestion</strong>, and so on. (Cooley 1922: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I very much needed this definition.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p52ja53"></a>We speak suggestion as mechanical; but it seems <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> probable that all psychical life is selective, or, in some sense, choosing, and that <strong>the rudiments of consciousness and will may be discerned or inferred in the simplest reaction of the lowest living creature</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 52-53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Touching the lower semiotic threshold.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p53"></a>In our own minds the comparatively simple ideas which are called suggestions are by no means single and primary, but each one is itself a living, shifting, multifarious bit of life, a portion of the fluid "stream of thought" formed by some sort of selection and synthesis out of simpler elements. On the other hand, <strong>our most elaborate and volitional thought and action is suggested in the sense that it consists not in creation out of nothing, but in a creative synthesis or reorganization of old material</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Beautiful.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p53"></a>Precisely as the conditions about us and the ideas suggested by those conditions become intricate, are we forced to think, to choose, to define the <strong>useful</strong> and the <strong>right</strong>, and, in general, to work out <strong>The higher intellectual life</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The laborers are useful, the guards are right, and the philosopher-kings work out the higher intellectual life, right?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p55fn"></a>Take, for instance, the case of a member of Congress, or of any other group of <strong>reasoning, feeling, and mutually influencing creatures</strong>. Is he free in relation to the rest of the body or do they control him? The question appears senseless. He is influenced by them and also exerts an influence upon them. (Cooley 1922: 55, fn)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) feeling; (2) mutual influence; (3) reasoning.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p57"></a>It can hardly be doubted that <strong>the choosing and formative vigor of the mind is greater under the age of twenty-five than after</strong>: the will of middle age is stronger in the sense that it has more momentum, but it has less acceleration, runs more on habit, and so is less capable of fresh choice. (Cooley 1922: 57)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How did Cooley know that the brain keeps developing until the 25th year?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p60"></a><strong>The imitative act, however, was often an end in itself</strong>, an interesting exercise of his constructive faculties, pursued at first without much regard to anything beyond. This was the case with the utterance of words, and, later, with spelling, with each of which he became fascinated for its own sake and regardless of its use as a means of communication. (Cooley 1922: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Like the pleasure one gets from re-typing a fragment of text without much thought of actually using it for anything in particular.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p61"></a><strong>It is very natural to assume that to do what some one else does requires no mental effort</strong>; but this, as applied to little children, is, of course, a great mistake. They cannot imitate an act except by learning how to do it, any more than grown-up people can, and for a child to learn a word may be as complicated a process as for an older person to learn a difficult piece on the piano. <strong>A novel imitation is not at all mechanical, but a strenuous voluntary activity, accompanied by effort and followed by pleasure in success</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It could be argued that imitation is more difficult than being original because originality usually proceeds from an extensive experience of previous imitations. Imitating an original may take more effort because it proceeds without that background experience.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p65a"></a>Children imitate much because they are growing much, and <strong>imitation is a principal means of growth. This is true at any age</strong>; the more alive and progressive a man is the more actively he is admiring and profiting by his chosen models. (Cooley 1922: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well put.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p65b"></a>A second reason is that <strong>adults imitate at longer range, as it were</strong>, so that the imitative character of their acts is not so obvious. <strong>They</strong> come into contact with more sorts of persons, largely unknown to one another, and <strong>have access to a greater variety of suggestions in books</strong>. Accordingly they present a deceitful appearance of independence simply because we do not see their models. (Cooley 1922: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Also very true.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p65ja66"></a>The common impression among those who have given no special study to the matter appears to be that suggestion has little part in the mature <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> life of a rational being; and though the control of involuntary impulses is recognized in tricks of speech and manner, in fads, fashions, and the like, it is not perceived to touch the more important points of conduct. The fact, however, is that <strong>the main current of our thought is made up of impulses absorbed without deliberate choice from the life about us</strong>, or else arising from hereditary instinct, or from habit; while <strong>the function of higher thought and of will is to organize and apply these impulses</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 65-66)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Signs grow</em> inside us, etc.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p67ja68"></a>It is a truth, though hard for us to realize, that if we had lived in Dante's time we should have believed in a material Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, as he did, and that our doubts of this, and of many other things which his age <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> did not question, have nothing to do with our natural intelligence, but are made possible and necessary by competing ideas which the growth of knowledge has enabled us to form. <strong>Our particular minds or wills are members of a slowly growing whose, and at any given moment are limited in scope by the state of the whole, and especially of those parts of the whole with which they are in most active contact</strong>. Our thought is never isolated, but always some sort of a response to the influences around us, so that we can hardly have thoughts that are not in some way around by communication. (Cooley 1922: 67-68)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This "slowly growing whole" we call <em>culture</em> around these parts.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p73ja74"></a>We can scarcely rid ourselves of the impression that the way of life we are used to is the normal, and that other ways are eccentric. <strong>Doctor Sidis holds that the people of the Middle Ages were in a quasi-hypnotic state</strong>, and instances the crusades, dancing manias, and the like. But the question is, <strong>would not our own time</strong>, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>viewed from an equal distance, appear to present the signs of abnormal suggestibility?</strong> Will not the intense preoccupation with material production, the hurry and strain of our cities, the draining of life into one channel, at the expense of breadth, richness, and beauty, appear as mad as the crusades, and perhaps of a lower type of madness? (Cooley 1922: 73-74)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Usable in relation with how Stapledon's Eighteenth Men might see us First Men.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Sidis, Boris 1924. <em>The Psychology of Suggestion: A Research into the Subconscious Nature of Man and Society</em>. New York: Appleton.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/psychologyofsugg00sidi_0/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p75"></a>I have already said, or implied, that the activity of the will reflects the state of the social order. A constant and strenuous exercise of volition implies complexity in the surrounding life from which suggestions come, while in a simple society choice is limited in scope and life is comparatively mechanical. <strong>It is the variety of social intercourse or, what comes to the same thing, the character of social organization, that determines the field of choice</strong>; and accordingly there is a tendency for the scope of the will to increase with that widening and intensification of life that is so conspicuous a feature a recent history. This change is bound up with <strong>the extension and diffusion of communication, opening up innumerable channels by which competing suggestions may enter the mind</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 75)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is demonstrated both by the Internet and whatever the heck is going on with Stapledon's 96-member groups.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p75ja76"></a>We are still dependent upon environment - life is always a give and take with surrounding conditions - but environment is becoming very wide, and <strong>in the case of imaginative persons may extend itself to almost any ideas that the past or present life of the race has</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>brought into being</strong>. This brings opportunity for congenial choice and characteristic personal growth, and at the same time a good deal of distraction and strain. (Cooley 1922: 75-76)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Today we need less imagination to achieve this.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p77"></a><strong>An orator, for instance, first unifying and heightening the emotional state of his audience</strong> by some humorous or pathetic incident, <strong>will be able</strong>, if tolerably skilful, to do pretty much as he pleases with them</strong>, so long as he does not go against their settled habits of thought. (Cooley 1922: 77)</blockquote><!--
--><p>You can smell the Durkheim in the air.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch3"></a>III. SOCIABILITY AND PERSONAL IDEAS</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p81"></a>In this chapter I hope to show something of <strong>the origin and growth of social ideas and feelings in the mind of the individual</strong>, and also something of the nature of society as we may find it implies in these ideas and feelings. If it appears that <strong>the human mind is social</strong>, that <strong>society is mental</strong>, and that, in short, <strong>society and the mind are aspects of the same whole</strong>, these conclusions will be no more than a development of the propositions advanced in the first chapter. (Cooley 1922: 81)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Whole process.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p83"></a>The general impression left upon one is that <strong>the early manifestations of sociability indicate less fellow feeling</strong> than the adult imagination likes to impute, <strong>but are expressions of a pleasure which persons excite chiefly because they offer such a variety of stimuli of sight, hearing, and touch</strong>; or, to put it otherwise, <strong>kindliness</strong>, while existing almost from the first, <strong>is vague and undiscriminating</strong>, has not yet become fixed upon its proper objects, but <strong>flows out upon all the pleasantness the child finds about him</strong>, like that of St. Francis, when, in his "Canticle of the Sun," he addresses the sun and the moon, stars, winds, clouds, fire, earth, and water, as brothers and sisters. (Cooley 1922: 83)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Damn infants and their undiscriminating joys.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p85"></a>It is the same throughout life; alone one is like fireworks without a match: he cannot set himself off, but is a victim of <em>ennui</em>, the prisoner of some tiresome train of thought that holds his mind simply by the absence of a competitor. <strong>A good companion brings release and fresh activity, the primal delight in a fuller existence</strong>. So with the child: what excitement when visiting children come! He shouts, laughs, jumps about, produces his playthings and all his accomplishments. <strong>He needs to express himself, and a companion enables him to do so</strong>. The shout of another bay in the distance gives him the joy of shouting in response. (Cooley 1922: 85)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phatic communion.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p86"></a>I take it that <strong>the child has by heredity a generous capacity and need for social feeling</strong>, rather too vague and plastic to be given any specific name like love. It is not so much any particular personal emotion or sentiment as <strong>the undifferentiated material of many: perhaps sociability is as good a word for it as any</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 86)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Sociability is the undifferentiated material of many emotions and sentiments</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p87"></a>In children and in simple-minded adults, <strong>kindly feeling may be very strong and yet very naïve, involving little insight into the emotional states of others</strong>. A child who is extremely sociable, bubbling over with joy in companionship, may yet show a total incomprehension of pain and a scant regard for disapproval and punishment that does not take the form of a cessation of intercourse. In other worlds, <strong>there is a sociability that asks little from others except bodily presence and an occasional sign of attention, and often learns to supply even these by imagination</strong>. It seems nearly or <strong>quite independent of that power of interpretation which is the starting-point of true sympathy</strong>. While both of my children were extremely sociable, R. was not at all sympathetic in the sense of having quick insight into others' states of feeling. (Cooley 1922: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>God damn. Phatic communion, again.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p88"></a>The chief difference between normal people and imbeciles in this regard is that, while the former have more or less of this simple kindliness in them, <strong>social emotion is also elaborately compounded and worked up by the mind into an indefinite number of complex passions and sentiments, corresponding to the relations and functions of an intricate life</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sociability does not social emotion make.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p88ja89"></a>But, in either case, after a child learns to <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> talk and the social world in all its wonder and provocation opens on his mind, it floods his imagination so that <strong>all his thoughts are conversations</strong>. He is never alone. Sometimes the inaudible interlocutor is recognizable as the image of a tangible playmate, sometimes he appears to be purely imaginary. Of course each child has his own peculiarities. (Cooley 1922: 88-89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How does this differ from the thoughts of adults?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p89ja90"></a>The main point to note here is that <strong>these conversations are</strong> not occasional and temporary effusions of the imagination, but are <strong>the naïve expression of a socialization of the mind that is to be permanent and to underlie all later thinking</strong>. The imaginary dialogue passes beyond the thinking aloud of little children into something more elaborate, reticent, and sophisticated; but it never ceases. <strong>Grown people</strong>, like children, <strong>are usually unconscious of these dialogues</strong>; as we get older we cease, for the most part, to carry them <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> on out loud, and some of us practise a good deal of apparently solitary meditation and experiment. But, speaking broadly, it is true of adults as of children, that <strong>the mind lives in perpetual conversation</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 89-90)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, it doesn't. This is eerily reminiscent of Juri Lotman's dialogism. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p91ja92"></a>The fact is that <strong>language</strong>, developed by the race through personal intercourse <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and imparted to the individual in the same way, <strong>can never be dissociated from personal intercourse in the mind</strong>; and since higher thought involves language, it is always a kind of imaginary conversation. The word and the interlocutor are correlative ideas. (Cooley 1922: 91-92)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I cannot find fault with this.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p92ja93"></a>And it was doubtless because he had many such thoughts which no one was at hand to appreciate, that he took to writing essays. <strong>The uncomprehended of all times and peoples have kept diaries for the same reason</strong>. So, in general, <strong>a true creative impulse in literature or art is</strong>, in one aspect, <strong>an expression of this simple</strong>, childlike <strong>need to think aloud or <em>to</em> somebody</strong>; to define and vivify <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> thought by imparting it to an imaginary companion; by developing that communicative element which belongs to its very nature, and without which it cannot live and grow. (Cooley 1922: 92-93)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I feel this. I started writing a long letter to someone who can never receive it, and it was incredibly easy to write that way.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p95ja96"></a>If is worth noting here that there is no separation between real and imaginary persons; indeed, <strong>to be imagined is to become real, in a social sense</strong>, as I shall presently point out. An invisible person may easily be more real to an imaginative mind than a visible one; <strong>sensible presence is not necessarily a matter of</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>the first importance</strong>. A person can be real to us only in the degree in which <strong>we imagine an inner life which exists in us</strong>, for the time being, <strong>and which we refer to him</strong>. The sensible presence is important chiefly in stimulating us to do this. <strong>All real persons are imaginary in this sense</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 95-96)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Theory of mind (ToM)? It reminds me of this: "<u>Knowledge of the life and consciousness of others is not ascribable to sensational discernment nor to apperception, but the knowledge is universally allowed to originate in experience.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p96"></a>If, however, we use imaginary in the sense of illusory, an imagination not corresponding to fact, it is easy to see that visible presence is no bar to illusion. <strong>Thus I meet a stranger on the steamboat who corners me and tells me his private history. I care nothing for it, and he half knows that I do not; he uses me only as a lay figure to sustain agreeable illusion of sympathy, and is talking to an imaginary companion quite as he might if I were elsewhere</strong>. So likewise good manners are largely a tribute to imaginary companionship, a make-believe of sympathy which it is agreeable to accept as real, though we may know, when we think, that it is not. (Cooley 1922: 96)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh god damn it. Phatic communion yet again: "<u>Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p99"></a>Facial expression is one of the later things to be imitated, for the reason, apparently, that the little child cannot be aware of the expression of his own countenance as he can hear his own voice or see his own hands; and therefore does not so soon learn to control it and to make it a means of voluntary imitation. <strong>He learns this only when he comes to study his features in the looking-glass</strong>. This children do as early as the second year, when they may be observed experimenting before <strong>the mirror</strong> with all sorts of gestures and grimaces. (Cooley 1922: 99)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well, now I finally know what the "looking-glass self" refers to. Somehow I didn't connect the dots that it is just the mirror and not the magnifier or something.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p106ja107"></a>That which we usually speak of as "<strong>personality</strong>," in a somewhat external sense, <strong>is a sort of atmosphere</strong>, having its source in <strong>habitual states of feeling</strong>, which each of us unconsciously communicates through facial <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and vocal expression. If one is cheerful, confident, candid, sympathetic, he awakens similar feelings in others, and so makes a pleasant and favourable impression; while gloom, reserve, indifference to what others are feeling, and the like, have an opposite effect. We cannot assume or conceal these states of feeling with much success; <strong>the only way to appear to be a certain sort of person is actually to become that sort of person by cultivating the necessary habits. We impart what we are without effort or consciousness, and rarely impart anything else</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 106-107)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another dang phaticism: "<u>It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p107"></a>This is evidently the case in those arts which imitate the human face and figure. <strong>Painters and illustrators</strong> give the most minute study to facial expression, and <strong>suggest various sentiments by bits of light and shade so subtle that the uninitiated cannot see what or where they are, although their effect is everything as regards the depiction of personality. It is the failure to reproduce them that makes the emptiness of nearly all copies of famous painting or sculpture that represents the face</strong>. Perhaps not one person in a thousand, comparing the "Mona Lisa" or the "Beatrice Cenci" with one of the mediocre copies generally standing near them, can point out where the painter of the latter has gone amiss; yet <strong>the difference is like that between life and a wax image</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 107)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This reads exactly like current discourse on AI generated art, which is widely regarded as <em>soulless</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p109"></a>Poetry, however, usually refrains from <strong>minute description of expression, a thing impossible in words</strong>, and strikes for a vivid, if inexact, impression, by the use of such phrases as "a fiery eye," "a liquid eye," and "The poet's eye in <strong>a fine frenzy</strong> rolling." (Cooley 1922: 109)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Verbal description of nonverbal communication is indeed tricky. Also, A Fine Frenzy is a literal band name.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p114ja115"></a>It is not to be supposed, for instance, that such feelings as <strong>generosity, respect, mortification, emulation,</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>the sense of honor</strong>, and the like, are an original endowment of the mind. Like all the finer and larger mental life these arise in conjunction with communication and could not exist without it. <strong>It is these finer modes of feeling, these intricate branchings or differentiations of the primitive trunk of emotion, to which the same sentiments is usually applied</strong>. Personal sentiments are correlative with personal symbols, the interpretation of the latter meaning nothing more than that the former are associated with them; while <strong>the sentiments</strong>, in turn, <strong>cannot be felt except by the aid of the symbols</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 114-115)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I feel like this is not an improvement over Shand's definition of sentiments as something akin to <em>ideational emotions</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p117"></a>If a person is more his best self in a letter than in speech, as sometimes happens, he is more truly present to me in his correspondence than when I see and hear him. And in most cases <strong>a favorite writer is more with us in his book</strong> than he ever could have been in the flesh; <strong>since, being a writer, he is one who has studied and perfected this particular mode of personal incarnation, very likely to the detriment of any other</strong>. I should like as a matter of curiosity to see and hear for a moment the men whose works I admire; but I should hardly expect to find further intercourse particularly profitable. (Cooley 1922: 117)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A fairly convincing point. Good writes may be lousy conversationalists because they have dedicated themselves to the art of writing, not to the art of conversation.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p118ja119"></a>So far as the study of immediate social relations is concerned <strong>the personal idea is the real person</strong>. That <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> is to say, it is in this alone that one man exists for another, and acts directly upon his mind. <strong>My association with you evidently consists in the relation between my idea of you and the rest of my mind</strong>. If there is something in you that is wholly beyond this and makes no impression upon me it has no social reality in this relation. <strong><em>The immediate social reality is the personal idea</strong>;</em> nothing, it would seem, could be much more obvious than this. (Cooley 1922: 118-119)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think I've finally reached the portion for which this text was given to read in this course. This is more-or-less a summary, extension or generalization of Cooley's theory of mind, <a href="#cooley22p95ja96">above, pp. 95-96</a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p119"></a>Society, then, in its immediate aspects, <em>is a relation among personal ideas</em>. <strong>In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere</strong>; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind. Where else? <strong>What other possible <em>locus</em> can be assigned for the real contact of persons, or in what other form can they come in contact except as impressions or ideas formed in this common <em>locus?</em> Society</strong> exists in my mind as the contact and reciprocal influence of certain ideas named "I," Thomas, Henry, Susan, Bridget, and so on. It <strong>exists in your mind as a similar group, and so in every mind</strong>. Each person is immediately aware of a particular aspect of society: and <strong>so far as he is aware of great social wholes</strong>, like a nation or an epoch, <strong>it is by embracing</strong> in this particular aspect ideas or sentiments which he attributes to his countrymen or contemporaries in <strong>their collective aspect</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 119)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This, on the other hand, basically expands the first definition of "social", given <a href="#cooley22p38ja39">above, pp. 38-39</a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p120a"></a>Yet most of us, perhaps, will find it hard to assent to the view that the social person is a group of sentiments attached to some symbol or other characteristic element, which keeps them together and from which the whole idea is named. The reason for this reluctance I take to be that we are accustomed to talk and think, <strong>so far as we do think in this connection, as if a person were a material rather than a psychical fact</strong>. Instead of basing our sociology and ethics upon what <strong>a man</strong> really is as part of our mental and moral life, he <strong>is vaguely and yet grossly regarded as a shadowy material body, a lump of flesh, and not as an ideal thing at all</strong>. But surely it is only common sense to hold that <strong>the social and moral reality is that which lives in our imaginations and affects our motives</strong>. As regards the physical it is only the finer, more plastic and mentally significant aspects of it that imagination is concerned with, and with them chiefly as <strong>a nucleus or centre of crystallization for sentiment</strong>. Instead of perceiving this we commonly make the physical the dominant factor, and think of the mental and moral only by a vague analogy to it. (Cooley 1922: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This makes way too much sense. Society is not a collection of human bodies, it is made up of our subjective impressions and associations. Each person basically lives in a separate and unique Umwelt constituted by suggestions from all of his interpersonal contacts and book knowledge.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p120b"></a>Persons and society must, then, be studied primarily in the imagination. It is surely true, <em>prima facie</em>, that the best way of observing things is that which is most direct; and <strong>I do not see how any one can hold that we know persons directly except as imaginative ideas in the mind</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"I am a product of ideology and imagination", etc.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p121a"></a>What, for instance, could the most elaborate knowledge of his weights and measures, including the anatomy of his brain, tell us of the character of Napoleon? Not enough, I take it, to distinguish him with certainty from an imbecile. <strong>Our real knowledge of him is derived from reports</strong> of his conversation and manner, from his legislation and military dispositions, from the impression made upon those about him and by them communicated to us, from his portraits and the like; <strong>all serving as aids to the imagination in forming a system that we call by his name</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hot damn, this is one of the best takes on the topic of "man is sign" that I've ever seen.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p121b"></a>I by no means aim to discredit the study of man or of society with the aid of physical measurements, such as those of phychological laboratories; but I think that these methods are indirect and ancillary in their nature and are most useful when employed in connection with <strong>a trained imagination</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Merely a striking <em>a title</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p121ja122"></a>I conclude, therefore, that <strong>the imaginations which people have of one another are the <em>solid facts</em> of society, and that to observe and interpret these must be a chief aim of sociology</strong>. I do not mean merely that society must be studied <em>by</em> the imagination - that is true of all investigations in their higher reaches - but <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> that the <em>object</em> of study is primarily an imaginative idea or group of ideas in the mind, that <strong>we have to imagine imaginations</strong>. The intimate grasp of any social fact will be found <strong>to</strong> require that we <strong>divine what men think of one another</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 121-122)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Me peame ettekujutusi ette kujutama</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p122"></a>It is important to face the question of <strong>persons who have no corporeal reality</strong>, as for instance the dead, characters of fiction or the drama, ideas of the gods and the like. <strong>Are</strong> these <strong>real people</strong>, members of society? I should say that <strong>in so far as we imagine them they are</strong>. Would it not be absurd to deny social <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> reality to Robert Louis Stevenson, who is so much alive in many minds and so potently affects important phases of thought and conduct? He is certainly more real in this practical sense than most of us who have not yet lost our corporeity, more alive, perhaps, than he was before he lost his own, <strong>because of his wider influence</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 122)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is where things approach <em>parasocial relationships</em> and things get iffy: are famous people more "real" than non-famous people merely because more people can imagine them? </p><!-- In that case I am practically non-existent and Kim Kardashian and Kanye West are gods among men.
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p123"></a>On the other hand, a corporeally existent person is not socially real unless he is imagined. <strong>If the nobleman thinks of the serf as a mere animal</strong> and does not attribute to him a human way of thinking and feeling, the latter is not real to him in the sense of acting personally upon his mind and conscience. <strong>And if a man should go into a strange country and hide himself so completely that no one knew he was there, he would evidently have no social existence for the inhabitants</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 123)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Today I watched a video on Equatorial Guinea and how currently (anno domini 2023, again) people who do not live in the cities are considered animals and slavery is merely discouraged. On the other hand, hiding themselves completely for a time is what some very admirable people (Uku Masing, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and possibly others) have done.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p128"></a><strong>If you have no definite idea of personality or self beyond the physical idea, you are naturally led to</strong> regard the higher phases of thought, which have no evident relation to the body, as in some way external to the first person or self. Thus instead of psychology, sociology, or ethics we have <strong>a mere shadow of physiology</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Catchy.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p134"></a>According to this view of the matter <strong>society is simply the collective aspect of personal thought</strong>. Each man's imagination, regarded as a mass of personal impressions worked up into <strong>a living, growing whole</strong>, is a special phase of society; and Mind or imagination as a whole, that is human thought considered in the largest way as having a growth and organization <strong>extending throughout the ages</strong>, is the <em>locus</em> of society in the widest possible sense. (Cooley 1922: 134)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm genuinely surprised how well Cooley's thought interlaces with Stapledon's.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch4"></a>IV. SYMPATHY OR UNDERSTANDING AS AN ASPECT OF SOCIETY</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p136"></a>The growth of personal ideas through intercourse, described in the preceding chapter, implies a growing power of <strong>sympathy</strong>, of <strong>entering into a sharing the minds of other persons</strong>. To converse with another, through words, looks, or other symbols, means to have more or less understanding or <strong>communion</strong> with him, to get on common ground and <strong>partake of his ideas and sentiments</strong>. If one uses sympathy in this connection - and it is perhaps the most available word - one has to bear in mind that it denotes <strong>the sharing of any mental state that can be communicated</strong>, and has not the special implication of pity or other "tender emotion" that it very commonly carries in ordinary speech. (Cooley 1922: 136)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It really is a very small step from here to phatic communion.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p138"></a>Thus although to get one's finger pinched is a common experience, it is impossible, to me at least, to recall the sensation when another person has his finger pinched. So <strong>when we say that we feel sympathy for a person who has a headache, we mean that we pity him, not that we share the headache</strong>. There is little true communication of physical pain, or anything of that simple sort. (Cooley 1922: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Heterogeneous sympathy.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p139ja140"></a><strong>Social experience is a matter of imaginative, not a material, contacts</strong>; and there are so many aids to the imagination that little can be judged as to one's experience by the merely external course of his life. An imaginative student of a few people and of books often has many times the range of comprehension that the most varied career can give to <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> a duller mind; and a man of genius, like Shakespeare, may cover almost the whole range of human sentiment in his time, not by miracle, but by a marvellous vigor and refinement of imagination. <strong>The idea that seeing life means going from place to place and doing a great variety of obvious things is an illusion natural to dull minds</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 139-140)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Don't become a tourist; read some books</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p140"></a>We often hear people described as sympathetic who have little mental power, but are of a sensitive, impressionable, quickly responsive type of mind. The sympathy of such a mind always has some defect corresponding to its lack of character and of constructive force. <strong>A strong, deep understanding of other people implies mental energy and stability; it is a work of persistent, cumulative imagination</strong> which may be associated with a comparative slowness of direct sensibility. On the other hand, we often see the union of a quick sensitiveness to immediate impressions with an inability to comprehend what has to be reached by reason or constructive imagination. (Cooley 1922: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"My brain contains the contents of his but in the junk drawer."</p><!-- Quote attributed to Vaush in a video titled "Second Thought Doesn't Understand Socialism". https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vjnOc5UBbU&t=5412s
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p140ja141"></a><strong>Sympathy is a requisite to social power. Only in so far as a man understands other people and thus enters into the life around him has he any effective</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>existence</strong>; the less he has of this the more he is a mere animal, not truly in contact with human life. And if he is not in contact with it he can of course have no power over it. This is a principle of familiar application, and yet one that is often overlooked, practical men having, perhaps, a better grasp of it than theorists. It is well understood by men of the world that <strong>effectiveness depends at least as much upon address, <em>savoir-faire</em>, tact, and the like, involving sympathetic insight into the minds of other people, as upon any more particular faculties</strong>. There is nothing more practical than social imagination; to lack it is to lack everything. (Cooley 1922: 140-141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A common insight both in discussions of phatic communion and in Dale Carnegie type self-help literature.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p142"></a>A person of definite character and purpose who comprehends our way of thought is sure to exert power over us. He cannot altogether be resisted; because, <strong>if he understands us, he can make us understand him, through the word, the look, or other symbol, which both of us connect with the common sentiment or idea</strong>; and thus by communicating an impulse he can move the will. Sympathetic influence enters into our system of thought as a matter of course, and affects our conduct as a matter of course, and affects our conduct as surely as water affects the growth of a plant. (Cooley 1922: 142)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This reads a bit like something out of Frank Herbert's <em>Dune</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p144a"></a>Much the same may be said regarding mental health in general; its presence or absence may always be expressed in terms of sympathy. The test of sanity which every one instinctively applies is that of <strong>a certain</strong> tact or <strong>feeling of the social situation</strong>, which we expect of all right-minded people and <strong>which flows from sympathetic contact with other minds</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 144)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A sane person can <em>read the room</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p144b"></a>A man's sympathies as a whole reflect the social order in which he lives, or rather they are a particular phase of it. Every group of which he is really a member, in which he has any vital share, must live in his sympathy; so that <strong>his mind is a microcosm of so much of society as he truly belongs to</strong>. Every social phenomenon, we need to remember, is simply a collective view of what we find distributively in particular persons - public opinion is a phase of the judgments <!-- | -->og individuals; <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Cooley 1922: 144)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Every person is a microcosm of their society.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p146a"></a>The main reason for thisk, I take it, is that the social imagination is not so hard worked in the one case as in the other. In the mountains of North Carolina the hospitable inhabitants will take in any stranger and invite him to spend the night; but this is hardly possible upon Broadway; and the case is very much the same with the hospitality of the mind. <strong>If one sees few people and hears a new thing only once a week, he accumulates a fund of sociability and curiosity very favorable to eager intercourse; but if he is assailed all day and every day by calls upon feeling and thought in excess of his power to respond, he soon finds that he must put up some sort of a barrier</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 146)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wonder if this has any implications on our ICT use. If you are addicted to the assailing feed of short form videos, will this lead to intellectual incuriosity?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p146b"></a>Sensitive people who live where life is insistent take on <strong>a sort of social shell</strong> whose function is <strong>to deal mechanically with ordinary relations</strong> and preserve the interior from destruction. They are likely to acquire <strong>a conventional smile and conventional phrases for polite intercourse</strong>, and a cold mask for curiosity, hostility, or solicitation. (Cooley 1922: 146)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Back to phatic communion.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p148"></a><strong>A man may be regarded as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles representing social groups</strong>, having as many ares passing through him as there are groups. This diversity is connected with <strong>the growth of communication</strong>, and if another phase of the general enlargement and variegation of life. Because of the greater variety of imaginative contacts it is impossible for a normally open-minded individual not to lead a broader life, in some respect at least, than he would have led in the past. (Cooley 1922: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The gems keep on coming.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p150"></a>It is surely a matter of common observation that <strong>a man who knows no one thing intimately has no views worth hearing on things in general</strong>. The farmer philosophizes in terms of crops, soils, markets, and implements, the mechanic generalizes his experience of wood and iron, the seaman reaches similar conclusions by his own special road; and if the scholar keeps pace with these it must be by an equally virile productivity. (Cooley 1922: 150)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Know at least one thing thoroughly and the rest will follow</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p153"></a>The <strong>likeness</strong> in the communicating persons is necessary <strong>for comprehension</strong>, the <strong>difference for interest</strong>. We cannot feel strongly toward the totally unlike because it is unimaginable, unrealizable; nor yet toward the wholly like because it is stale - identity must always be dull company. The power of other natures over us likes in a stimulating difference which causes excitement and opens communication, in <strong>ideas similar to our own but not identical</strong>, in states of mind attainable but not actual. (Cooley 1922: 153)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very much the stuff of Juri Lotman's notion that if if A and B completely overlap then there is nothing to communicate but if A and B do not overlap at all then it is impossible to communicate.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p155"></a>Each sex represents to the other a wide range of fresh and vital experience inaccessible alone. Thus the woman usually stands for <strong>a richer and more open emotional life</strong>, the man for <strong>a stronger mental grasp</strong>, for control and synthesis. (Cooley 1922: 155)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Gender stereotypes.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p159ja160"></a>Love, in this sense of kindly sympathy, may have all degrees of emotional intensity and of sympathetic penetration, from a sort of passive good-nature, not involving imagination or mental activity of any sort, up to an all-containing human enthusiasm, involving the fullest action of the highest faculties, and bringing with it so strong a conviction of complete good that the best minds have felt and taught that <strong>God is love</strong>. Thus understood, it is not any specific sort of emotion, at least not that alone, but a general outflowing of the mind and heart, accompanied by that gladness that the fullest life carries with it. When <strong>the apostle John</strong> says that God is love, and that every one that loveth knoweth God, he evidently means something more than personal affection, something <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> that knows as well as feels, that takes account of all special aspects of life and is just to all. (Cooley 1922: 159-160)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Briefly thought that this was about Spinoza.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch5"></a>5. THE SOCIAL SELF — 1. THE MEANING OF "I"</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p168"></a>"Self" and "ego" are used by metaphysicians and moralists in many other senses, more or less remote from the "I" of daily speech and thought, and with these I wish to have as little to do as possible. What is here discussed is what psychologists call <strong>the empirical self</strong>, the self <strong>that can be apprehended or verified by ordinary observation</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ego, then, is a theoretical self?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p170"></a>This view is very fully set forth by Professor Hiram M. Stanley, whose work, "The Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling," has an extremely suggestive chapter on <strong>self-feeling</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 170)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Stanley, Hiram Miner 1895. <em>Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling</em>. London: S. Sonnenschein & Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/studiesinevoluti01stan/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p174"></a>We all have thoughts of the same sort as these, and yet <strong>it is possible to talk so coldly or mystically about the self that one begins to forget that there is, really, any such thing</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 174)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A truism.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p174ja175"></a>Self-feeling of a reflective and agreeable sort, an appropriative zest of contemplation, is strongly suggested by the word "gloating." To gloat, in this sense, is as much as to think "mine, mine, mine," <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> with a pleasant warmth of feeling. Thus <strong>a boy gloats over something he has made with his scroll-saw, over the bird he has brought down with his gun</strong>, or over his collection of stamps or eggs; <strong>a girl gloats over her new clothes, and over the approving words or looks of others</strong>; a farmer over his fields and his stock; a business man over his trade and his bank-account; a mother over her child; the poet over a successful quatrain; the self-righteous man over the state of his soul; and in like manner every one gloats over the prosperity of any cherished idea. (Cooley 1922: 174-175)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>While boys are taken up with what they are doing, girls live much in their imagination of how they appears to others.</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/10/principles-of-sociology.html#ross20p119">Ross 1920: 119</a>)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p184"></a>A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: <strong>the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification</strong>. The comparision <span style="color: #fa4100">[sic]</span> with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. <strong>The thing that moves us to pride or shame is</strong> not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but <strong>an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind</strong>. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. (Cooley 1922: 184)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cue all the websites and subreddits in the style of "am I hot or not?"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p186ja187"></a>And it has been observed that the demand for the continued and separate existence of the individual soul after death is an expression of self-feeling, as by J. A. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Symonds, who thinks that it is connected with the intense egotism and personality of the European races, and asserts that <strong>the millions of Buddhism shrink from it with horror</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 186-187)</blockquote><!--
--><p>For buddhists, Christianity is cringe.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p188"></a>But if love closes, the self contracts and hardens: the mind having nothing else to occupy its attention and give it that change and renewal it requires, busies itself more and more with self-feeling, which takes on narrow and disgusting forms, like avarice, arrogance, and <strong>fatuity</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 188)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phatic? "<u>1. a: something foolish or stupid. b: stupidity, foolishness. 2. archaic: the condition of being affected with intellectual disability or dementia.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p196"></a>She has tasted <strong>the joy of being a cause, of exerting social power</strong>, and wishes more of it. She will tug at her mother's skirts, wriggle, girgle, stretch out her arms, etc., all the time watching for the hoped-for effect. These performances often give the child, even at this age, an appearance of what is called <strong>affectation</strong>, that is, she seems <strong>to be unduly preoccupied with what other people think of her</strong>. Affectation, at any age, exists when the passion to influence others seems to overbalance the established character and give it an obvious twist or pose. (Cooley 1922: 196)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wow, I had no idea this was the meaning of the word <em>affectation</em> - "<u>behaviour, speech, or writing that is pretentious and designed to impress.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p202"></a>Sex-difference in the development of the social is apparent from the first. Girls have, as a rule, a more impressible social sensibility; they care more obviously for the social image, study it, reflect upon it more, and so have even during the first year an appearance of subtlety, <em>finesse</em>, often of affectation, in which boys are comparatively lacking. <strong>Boys are</strong> more taken up with muscular activity for its own sake and with construction, their imaginations are <strong>preoccupied somewhat less with persons and more with things</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 202)</blockquote><!--
--><p>More on those gender stereotypes.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p207"></a>There is a vague excitement of the social self more general than any particular emotion or sentiment. Thus <strong>the mere presence of people</strong>, a "sense of other persons," as Professor Baldwin says, and <strong>an awareness of their observation</strong>, often causes a vague discomfort, doubt, and tension. One feels that there is a social image of himself lurking about, and not knowing what it is he is obscurely alarmed. Many people, perhaps most, feel more or less agitation and embarrassment under the observation of strangers, and for some even sitting in the same room with unfamiliar or uncongenial people is harassing and exhausting. (Cooley 1922: 207)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again something deeply rooted in Malinowski's meanderings on phatic communion.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch6"></a>VI. THE SOCIAL SELF — 2. VARIOUS PHASES OF "I"</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p213"></a>And I cannot think of any strong man I have known, however good, who does not seem to me to have had intense self-feeling about his cherished affair; <strong>though if his affair was a large and helpful one no one would call him selfish</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Elon Musk's overall affair may be large and helpful but the man himself has an overbearing affectation in the above-given sense. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p215"></a><strong>A lack of tact in face-to-face intercourse very commonly gives an impression of egotism, even when it is a superficial trait not really expressive of an unsympathetic character</strong>. Thus there are persons who in the simplest conversation do not seem to forget themselves, and enter frankly and disinterestedly into the subject, but are felt to be always preoccupied with the thought of the impression they are making, imagining praise or depreciation, and usually posing a little to avoid the one or gain the other. <strong>Such people are uneasy, and make others so; no relaxation is possible in their company, because they never come altogether out into open and common ground, but are always keeping back something</strong>. It is not so much that they have self-feeling as that it is clandestine and furtive, giving one a sense of insecurity. Sometimes they are aware of this lack of frankness, and try to offset it by reckless confessions, but this only shows their self-consciousness in another and hardly more agreeable aspect. Perhaps the only cure for this sort of egotism is to cherish very high and difficult ambitions, and so drain off the superabundance of self-feeling from these petty channels. <strong>People who are doing really important things usually appear simple and unaffected in conversation, largely because their selves are healthfully employed elsewhere</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Once again a discussion that would fit perfectly into a treatment of phatic communion.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p216"></a>One who has tact always sees far enough into the state of mind of the person with whom he is conversing to adapt himself to it and to seem, at least, sympathetic; he is sure to feel the situation. <strong>But if you tread upon the other person's toes, talk about yourself when he is not interested in that subject, and, in general, show yourself out of touch with his mind, he very naturally finds you disagreeable</strong>. And behavior analogous to this in the more enduring relations of life gives rise to a similar judgment. (Cooley 1922: 216)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Likewise, phatic communion. Don't monopolize the conversation to talk only about yourself or your interests.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p234"></a>Language seldom distinguishes clearly between a way of feeling and its visible expression; and so the word <strong>vanity</strong>, which <strong>means primarily emptiness, indicates either a weak or hollow appearance of worth put on in the endeavor to impress others, or the state of feeling that goes with it</strong>. It is the form social self-approval naturally takes in a somewhat unstable mind, not sure of its image. <strong>The vain man, in his</strong> more confident moments, sees a <strong>delightful reflection of himself</strong>, but knowing that it <strong>is</strong> transient, he is afraid it will change. He has not fixed it, as the proud man has, by incorporation with a stable habit of thought, but, being <strong>immediately dependent for it upon others, is at their mercy and very vulnerable, living in the frailest of glass houses which may be shattered at any moment</strong>; and, in fact, this catastrophe happens so often that he gets somewhat used to it and soon recovers from it. (Cooley 1922: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very much in line with what others (like Ross) have written on the subject of vanity. Especially about its fickle nature.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p234ja235"></a>It is characteristic of him to be so taken up with his own image in the other's mind that he is hypnotized by it, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> as it were, and sees it magnified, distorted, and out of its true relation to the other contents of that mind. He does not see, as so often happens, that he is being managed and made a fool of; he "gives himself away" - <strong>fatuity being of the essence of vanity</strong>. On the other hand, and for the same reason, <strong>a vain person is frequently tortured by groundless imaginings that some one has</strong> misunderstood him, <strong>slighted him</strong>, insulted him, <strong>or otherwise mistreated his social effigy</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 234-235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very reminiscent of <em>the greatest president in America's history, greater than Lincoln, even</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p237"></a><strong>We like the manner of a person who appears interested in what we say and do, and not indifferent to our opinion, but has at the same time an evident reserve of stability and independence</strong>. It is much the same with a writer; we require of him a bold and determined statement of his own special view - that is what he is here for - and yet, with this, an air of hospitality, and an appreciation that he is after all only a small part of a large world. (Cooley 1922: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The second part is what makes "active listening" so pernicious. Asking further clarifying questions without putting forth a view of your own comes across as insincere.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p255"></a>An astronomer may be indifferent when you depreciate his personal appearance, abuse his relatives, or question his pecuniary honestry; but <strong>if you doubt that there are artificial canals on Mars you cut him to the quick</strong>. And poets and artists of every sort have always and with good reason been regarded as a <em>genus irritabile</em>. (Cooley 1922: 255)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The Mars Rover cut very deep.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p259"></a>The peculiar relations to other persons attending any marked personal deficiency or peculiarity are likely to aggravate, if not to produce, abnormal manifestations of self-feeling. Any such trait sufficiently noticeable <strong>to</strong> interrupt easy and familiar intercours with others, and make people <strong>talk</strong> and think <em>about</em> a person or <strong><em>to</em> him rather than <em>with</em> him</strong>, can hardly fail to have this effect. (Cooley 1922: 259)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And yet once again, something akin to phatic communion.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch7"></a>VII. HOSTILITY</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p266"></a>But <strong>for a social, imaginative being, whose main interests are in the region of communicative thought and sentiment, the chief field of anger, as of other emotions, is transferred to this region</strong>. Hostility ceases to be a simple emotion due to a simple stimulus, and breaks up into innumerable hostile sentiments associated with highly imaginative personal ideas. In this mentally higher forms it may be regarded as hostile sympathy, or <strong>a hostile comment on sympathy</strong>. That is to say, we enter by sympathy or personal imagination into the state of mind of others, or think we do, and if the thoughts we find there are injurious to or uncongenial with the ideas we are already cherishing, we feel <strong>a movement of anger</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 266)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Intellectualized hostility. Antipathy? — Yes. </p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bryant, Sophie 1895. Antipathy and Sympathy. <em>Mind</em> 4(15): 365-370.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2247537">JSTOR</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p271"></a>It is thus possible rudely to classify hostilities under three heads, according to the degree of mental organization they involve; namely, as<ol><li><strong>Primary</strong>, immediately, or animal.</li><li><strong>Social</strong>, sympathetic, imaginative, or personal, of a comparatively direct sort, that is, without reference to any standard of justice.</li><li><strong>Rational</strong> or ethical; similar to the last but involving reference to a standard of justice and the sanction of conscience.</li></ol>The function of hostility is, no doubt, to awaken a fighting energy, to contribute <strong>an emotional motive force</strong> to activities of self-preservation or aggrandizement. (Cooley 1922: 271)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Unsurprisingly a triadic division.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p273"></a><strong>The mass of mankind are sluggish and need some resentment as a stimulant</strong>; this is its function on the higher plane of life as it is on the lower. Surround a man with soothing, flattering circumstances, and in nine cases out of ten he will fail to do anything worthy, but will lapse into some form of sensualism or dilettanteism. There is no tonic, to a nature substantial enough to bear it, like chagrin - "erquickender Verdruss," as Goethe says. Life without opposition is Capua. No matter what the part one is fitted to play in it, <strong>he can make progress in his path only by a vigorous assault upon the obstacles, and to be vigorous the assault must be supported by passion of some sort</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 273)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is Nietzschean (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#midgley80p213">Midgley 1980: 213</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p274ja275"></a>His [Thomas Huxley's] hatred was of a noble sort, and the reader of his Life and Letters can hardly doubt that he was a good as well as a <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> great man, or that his pugnacity helped him to be such. <strong>Indeed I do not think that science or letters could do without the spirit of opposition</strong>, although much energy is dissipated and much thought clouded by it. (Cooley 1922: 274-275)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Made me think of Charles Fourier's three antagonistic passions.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p275"></a>A just resentment is not only a needful stimulus to aggressive righteousness, but has also a wholesome effect upon the mind of the person against whom it is directed, by awakening a feeling of the importance of the sentiments he has transgressed. On the higher planes of life <strong>an imaginative sense that there is resentment in the minds of other persons performs the same function that physical resistance does upon the ower</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Patten, Simon N. 1896. <em>The Theory of Social Forces</em>. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/cu31924030365666/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p289"></a><strong>The diversity of human minds and endeavors seems to be an essential part of the general plan of things, and shows no tendency to diminish</strong>. This diversity involves a conflict of ideas and purposes, which, in those who take it earnestly, is likely to occasion hostile feeling. This feeling should become less wayward, violent, bitter, or personal, in a narrow sense, and more disciplined, rational, discriminating, and quietly persistent. That it ought to disappear is certainly not apparent. (Cooley 1922: 289)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Humans, stay mad</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch8"></a>VIII. EMULATION</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p298"></a><strong>There is joy in the sense of self-assertion: it is sweet to do one's own things</strong>; and if others are against him one feels sure they <em>are</em> his own. To brave the disapprova of men is tonic; it is like climbing along a mountain path in the teeth of the wind; <strong>one feels himself as a cause, and knows the distinctive efficacy of his being</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 298)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The language of "being a cause" again. Somehow this otherwise pretty casual motive has begun to strike me.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p304"></a>"<strong>Men are conservatives when they are least vigorous, or when they are most luxurious</strong>. They are conservatives after dinner, or before taking their rest; when they are sick or aged. In the morning, or when their intellect or their conscience has been aroused, when they hear music, o when they read poetry, they are radicals." (Cooley 1922: 304)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is "<u>Emerson, address on New England Reformers.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p307"></a>There is thus nothing moraly distinctive about rivary; it is harmful or beneficient according to the objects and standards with reference to which it acts. All depends upon the particular game in which one takes a hand. It may be said in a broad way, however, that <strong>rivalry supplies</strong> a stimulus wholesome and needful to the great majority of men, and that it is, on the whole, <strong>a chief progressive force</strong>, utilizing the tremendous power of ambition, and controlling it to the furtherance of <strong>ends that are socially approved</strong>. The great mass of what we judge to be evil is of a <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> negative rather than a positive character, arising not from misdirected ambition but from apathy or sensuality, from <strong>a falling short of that active, social humanity which ambition implies</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 307)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The fact that humans have ambition implies a "<um>social humanity</u>". Rivalry, in which ambition can express itself, is a social force but it is a matter of how it is used or not used. Ch. Fourier's take on it was the social stimulation rivalry gives should be used to make competition a part of work and thus make it more like play, and more social. Rival teams of workers who can cooperate, compete, shit-talk each other, exchange members, etc. according to the free flow of human passion.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p308"></a>In order to work effectively in <strong>the service of society</strong> rivalry must be disciplined and organized. This means, chiefly, that <strong>men must associate in specialized groups</strong>, each group pursuing ideals of technical efficiency and social service, <strong>success</strong> in this pursuit <strong>being the object of rivalry</strong>. Consider, for example, how achievement in athletics is attained in our colleagues. In the first place, there is a general interest in sports and <strong>an admiration for success</strong> in them which makes it an object of general ambition. Many candidates are "tried out" and assigned, according to their promise, to special squads for training, in football, baseball, running, jumping, and so on. In each of these little groups rivalry is made <strong>intense, definite, and systematic</strong> by traditions, by standards of accomplishment, by regular training, and by <strong>expert appreciation and criticism</strong>. Occasional public contests serve <strong>to arouse the imagination</strong> and to exhibit achievement. The whole social self is thus called in to animate a course of endeavor <strong>scientifically directed</strong> to a specific end. (Cooley 1922: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mostly all well and good but this take does have its limitations. Success should not be the only object of rivalry. I think his take proceeds primarily from secondness and doesn't go much beyond this. The sportsman, guard, policeman is appreciated for his <em>effective</em> doing of something. Some things are done for the feel of it, for friendship and love, and some things are done for the thought of it, like studying and reasoning, philosophizing, discoursing, investigating, determining, codifying, etc. In Cooley's understanding, rivarly should be "<u>scientifically directed</u>" to specific ends by experts towards ends that are socially approved, and only then do we get to social imagination: what the self thinks that the audience of others its society possibly imagines that it's doing, and... The latter appears to be the same elite group of experts of those particular professional groups. It is indeed "<u>social control</u>" that goes from experts to mindless performers in this social game of rivalry and cooperation and whatever else, and what the performers think that their experts think they should be doing in terms of efficiency and success. The actual society, or the whole of society, does not participate in this scheme of social control. Mere friends and lovers are not in it as points of actual influence; only the guard and the policeman and armed mobs and gangs in the role of the doer, and the expert at the top as the scientific director or World Controller. What about magic instead of science? Can we have magically directed society? Where are our political technomages techno-sorcerers and Digital Enchanters? Maybe the object of rivalry should originate from the imagination of the whole society? I.e. not just experts and enforcers and the rest downgraded to mere entertainees. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p309"></a>The general fact is that the most effective way of utilizing human energy is through <strong>an organized rivalry</strong> which by specialization and <strong>social control</strong> is, at the same time, organized co-operation. (Cooley 1922: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Organize rivalry into cooperation.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p309ja310"></a>There appears to be nothing to prevent the <strong>higher emulation</strong> from becoming general if we can provide the right conditions for it. If college boys, soldiers, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and many sorts of professional men will put their utmost energies into the attainment of excellence, without pecuniary reward, <strong>impelled only by loyalty to a group ideal and the hope of appreciation</strong>, it is clear that the lack of this spirit in other situations is due not to human nature but to the kind of appeal that is made to it. (Cooley 1922: 309-310)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Gamifying the self-actualization at the very top of Maslow's pyramid. Is this about meta-needs?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p311"></a>Some critics of the present condition speak of it as "wage-slavery," and if the essence of slavery is being compelled to do work that is in no sense <em>yours</em>, it is true that our industrial work is largely of this kind. <strong>It is done under a sense of compulsion, without real participation, and hence is servile in spirit, whatever its form</strong>. "But," we are told, "if the workman doesn't like it, he can quit." Precisely; in other words, the situation is such that the ony way to assert one's self, to prove one's freedom and manhood, is to slight his job, or to strike. The self is not only outside the task but hostile to it. A strike is a time of glorious self-assertion against a hated domination. The misuse of human nature could hardly go further. (Cooley 1922: 311)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley the trade-unionist.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p315"></a>All persons are ideal, in a true sense, and those whom we admire and reverence are peculiarly so. That is to say, the idea of a person, whether his body be present to our senses or not, is imaginative, a synthesis, an interpretation of many elements, resting upon our whole experience of human life, not merely upon our acquaintance with this particular person; and the more our admiration and reverence are awakened the more actively ideal and imaginative does our conception of the person become. <strong>Of course we never <em>see</em> a person; we see a few visible traits which stimulte our imaginations to the construction of a personal idea in the mind</strong>.. The ideal persons of religion are not fundamentally different, psychologically or sociologically, from other persons; they are personal ideas built up in the mind out of the material at its disposal, and serving to appease its need for a sort of intercourse that will give scope to reverence, submission, trust, and self-expanding enthusiasm. (Cooley 1922: 315)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Personal idea" expanded.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch9"></a>IX. LEADERSHIP OR PERSONAL ASCENDANCY</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p317ja318"></a>It is plain that <strong>the theory of ascendancy</strong> involves the question of <strong>the mind's relative valuation of the suggestions coming to it from other minds</strong>; leadership depending upon the efficacy of a personal impression to awaken feeling, thought, action, and so to become a cause of life. While there are <strong>some men who seem but to add one to the population</strong>, there are <strong>others whom we cannot help thinking about</strong>; they lend arguments to their neighbors' creeds, so that the life of thei contemporaries, and perhaps of following generations, is notably different because they have <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> lived. The immediate reason for this difference is evidently that in the one case there is something seminal or generative in the relation between the personal impression a man makes and the mind that receives it, which is lacking in the other case. (Cooley 1922: 317-318)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think this may be about <em>charisma</em>. Some people are immediately forgetable while others may us obsess over them. The line of the argument seems to be similar as in La Barre: the objects of hero-worship are people who make a deep personal impression, i.e. something like Lemon's phatic experts.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p318"></a>We are born with <strong>a vaguely differentiated mass of mental tendency</strong>, vast and potent, but unformed and needing direction - <em>informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum</em>. (Cooley 1922: 318)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A vague uncharted nebula... Before Saussure?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p318ja319"></a>At any particular stage of individual existence, these elements, together with the suggestions from the world without, are found more or less perfectly organized into a living, growing whole, a person, a man. <strong>Obscurely locked within him, inscrutable to himself as to others, is the soul of the whole past, his</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>portion of the energy, the pasion, the tendency, of human life</strong>. Its existence creates a vague need to live, to feel, to act; but he cannot fulfil this need, at least not in a normal way, without incitement from outside to loosen and direct his instinctive aptitude. (Cooley 1922: 318-319)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This turned very mystical very fast. <em>The soul of the whole past?</em></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p320"></a>Every healthy organism evolves energy, and this must have an outlet. In the human mind, during its expanding period, <strong>the excess of life takes the form of a reaching out beyond all present and familiar things after an unknown good</strong>; no matter what the present and familiar may be, the fact that it is such is enough to make it inadequate. So we have <strong>a vague onward impulse, which is the unorganized material, the undifferentiated protoplasm, so to speak, of all progress</strong>; and this, as we have seen, makes the eagerness of hero-worship in the young, imaginative, and aspiring. So long as one minds and hearts are open and capable of progress, there are persons that have a glamour for us, of whom we think with reverence and aspiration; and although the glamour may pass from them and leave them commonplace, it will have fixed itself somewhere else. (Cooley 1922: 320)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A sort of defense of utopianism.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p321"></a>The explanation is perhaps something like this: When we receive these mysterious influences we are usually in a peculiarly impressionable state, with nervous energy itching to be worked off. There is pressure in the obscure reservoirs of hereditary passion. In some way, which we can hardly expect to define, this energy is tapped, an instinct is disengaged, <strong>the personal suggestion conveyed in the glance is felt as the symbol, the master-key that can unlock hidden tendence</strong>. It is much the same as when electricity stored and inert in a jar is loosed by a chance contact with wires that completes the circuit; the mind holds fast the life-imparting suggestion; cannot, in fact, let go of it. (Cooley 1922: 321)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley's semiotics is weird. Body movements can be felt as symbols because they convey a personal suggestion, and the movement-felt-as-symbol can unlock "tendencies"...</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p322"></a>Thus it is likely that all leadership will be found to be such by virtue of defining the possibilities of the mind. "If we survey the field of history," says Professor William James, "and ask what feature all great periods of reival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common, we shall find, I think, simply this; that each and all of them have said to the human being, '<strong>the inmost nature of the reality is congenial to <em>powers</em> which you possess</strong>'; and the same principle evidently applies to personal leadership. (Cooley 1922: 322)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How cryptic. The result is something like Umwelt-theory, I guess? <em>Reality is more-or-less what you experience it as.</em> (Though someone who possesses greater powers may find the inmost nature of reality even more congenial to his powers.)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p326ja327"></a>Consequently these heroes of the popular imagination, especially those of war, are enabled to serve as <strong>the instigators of a common emotion in great masses of people</strong>, and thus to produce in large groups <strong>a sense of comradeship and solidarity</strong>. The admiration and worship of such heroes is possibly the chief feeling that people have in common in all early stages of civilization, and <strong>the main bond of social group.</strong>. Even in our own time this is more the case than is understood. It was easy to see, during the Spanish-American <strong>Wor</strong>, that the eager interest of the whole American people in the military operations, and the general and enthusiastic admiration of every trait of heroism, <strong>was bringing about a fresh sense of community</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>throughout the country and so renewing and consolidating the collective life of the nation</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 326-327)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another damn phatic communion trope. <em>War - it's at least something to talk about with your refugee neighbours!</em></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p327ja328"></a>It is because a man cannot stand for anything except as he has a significant individuality, that self-reliance <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> is so essential a trait in leadership: except as a person trusts and cherishes his own special tendency, different from that of other people and usually opposed by them in its inception, he can never develop anything of peculiar value. <strong>He has to free himself from the domination of purposes already defined and urged upon him by others, and bring up something fresh out of the vague underworld of subconsciousness</strong>; and this means <strong>an intense self, a militant, gloating "I."</strong> Emerson's essay on self-reliance only formulates what has always been the creed of significant persons. (Cooley 1922: 327-328)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Compare this to the culture-bringer psychotic in La Barre.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p328"></a>On the other hand, success in unfolding a special tendency and giving vogue to it, depends upon being in touch, through sympathy, with the current of human life. All leadership takes place through the communication of ideas to the minds of others, and <strong>unless the ideas are so presented as to be congenial to those other minds, they will evidently be rejected</strong>. It is because the novelty is not alien to us, but is seen to be ourself in a fresh guise, that we welcome it. (Cooley 1922: 328)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Makes me think of how we shun Kanye West because his message is not new or congenial but old and hateful.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p329ja330"></a>Another may impress us with his power, and so exercise ascendancy over us, either by grossly performing the act, or by exhibiting traits of personality which convince our imaginations that he can and will do the act if he wishes to. <strong>It is</strong> in this latter way, <strong>through imaginative inference, that people mostly work upon us in ordinary social intercourse</strong>. It would puzzle us, in many cases, to tell just how we know that a man is determined, dauntless, magnanimous, intrinsically powerful, or the reverse. Of curse reputation and past record count for much; but we judge readily enough without them, and if, like Orlando in "As You Like It," he "looks successfully," we believe in him. <strong>The imagination is a sort of clearing-house through which great forces operate by convenient symbols and with a minimum of trouble</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 329-330)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This, too, could have been stated more clearly earlier on. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p335"></a>As our first speaker proceeds, he continues to create a sense that he feels the situation; we ae at home and comfortable with him, because he seems to be of our sort, having similar views and not likely to lead us wrong; it is like the ease and relaxation that one feels among old friends. There can be no perfect eloquence that does not create this sense of <strong>personal congeniality</strong>. But this deference to our character and mood is only the basis for exerting power over us; he is what we are, but is much more; is decided where we were vacillating, clear where we were vague, warm where we were cold. <strong>He offers something affirmative and onward, and gives it the momentum of his own belief</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 335)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another instance of phatic communion hidden between the lines.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p337"></a>He must have a humanity so broad that, in certain of our moods at least, it gives <strong>a sense of</strong> congeniality and <strong>at-homeness</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 337)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I don't think I've met this expression in English before.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p340ja341"></a>It is a very natural result of the principles already noted that <strong>the fame and power of a man often transcends</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>the man himself</strong>; that is to say, the personal idea associated by the world with a particular name and presence has often little basis in the mind behind that name and presence, as it appears to cool and impartial study. The reason is that <strong>the function of the great and famous man is to be a symbol</strong>, and the real question in other minds is not so much, What are you? as, <strong>What can I believe that you are?</strong> What can you help me feel and be? How far can I use you as a symbol in the development of my instinctive tendency? (Cooley 1922: 340-341)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Man is myth.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p342"></a>The world needed to believe in a spiritual authority as a young girl needs to be in love, and it took up with the papacy as the most available framework for that belief, just as <strong>the young girl is likely to give her love to the least repugnant of those who solicit it</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 342)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jesus Christ, what is this imagery.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p343"></a>Another phase of the same truth is the ascendancy that persons of belief and hope always exercise as against those who may be superior in every other respect, but who lack these traits. The onward and aggressive portion of the world, the people who do things, the young and all having surplus energy, need to hope and strive for an imaginative object, and they will follow no one who does not encourage this tendency. The first requisite of a leader is, not to be right, but to lead, to show a way. The idealist's programme of political or economic reform may be impracticable, absurd, demonstrably ridiculous; but it can never be successfully opposed merely by pointing out that this is the case. A negative opposition cannot be wholly effectual: <strong>there must be a competing idealism; something must be offered that is not ony less objectionable but more desirable, that affords occupation to progressive instinct</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 343)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This portion sounds like a fascist playbook. <em>You know what you need to tame the idealistic youth? Offer a competing idealism that takes over the progressive instinct but effectively defends the status quo</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p349"></a>It was a maxim of Goethe that where there is no mystery thee is no power; and something of the perennial vitality of his writings may be attributed to the fact that <strong>he did not trouble himself too much with the question whether people would understand him, but set down his inmost experiences as adequately as he could, and left the rest to time</strong>. The same may be said of Browning, and of many other great writers. (Cooley 1922: 349)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like writing a diary.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p350"></a>If we divine a discrepancy between a man's words and his character, the whole impression of him becomes broken and painful; he revots the imagination by his lack of unity, and even the good in him is hardly accepted. Nothing, therefore, is more fatal to ascendancy than perceived <strong>insincerity</strong> or doubt, and <strong>in immediate intercourse</strong> it <strong>is hard to conceal</strong> them. (Cooley 1922: 350)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cf. the presidential candidacy of Ron DeSantis.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p354"></a>Does the leader, then, really lead, in the sense that the course of history would have been essentialy different if he had not lived? Is the individual a true cause, or would things have gone on about the same if the famous men had been cut off in infancy? <strong>Is not general tendency the great thing, and is it not bound to find expression independently of particular persons?</strong> Certainly many people have the impression that in an evolutionary view of life single individuals become insignificant, and that all great movements must be regarded as the outcome of vast, impersonal tendencies. (Cooley 1922: 354)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The great god named General Tendency made everything so.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch10"></a>X. THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF CONSCIENCE</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p361"></a>The mind in its fullest activity is denied and desecrated; we are split in two. To violate conscience is to act under the control of an incomplete and fragmentary state of mind; and so to become less a person, to begin to disintegrate and go to pieces. An unjust or incontinent deed produces remorse, apparently because <strong>the thought of it will not lie still in the mind, but is of such a nature that there is no comfortable place for it in the system of thought already established there</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 361)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something like the beginnings of cognitive dissonance theory.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p366"></a>The view that the right is the rational is quite consistent with the fact that, for those who have surplus energy, the right is the <em>onward</em>. <strong>The impulse to act</strong>, to become, to let out the life that rises within from obscure springs of power, <strong>is the need of needs</strong>, underlying all more special impulses; and this onward <em>Trieb</em> must always count in our judgments of right: it is one of the thing conscience has to make room for. (Cooley 1922: 366)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A metaneed would be one that channels the impulse to act.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p368"></a>When, on the other hand, we say that right is largely determined by habit, we only emphasize the other aspect of that progressive mingling of continuity with change, which we see in mental life in all its phases. <strong>Habit, we know, makes lines of less resistance in thought, feeling, and action</strong>; and the existence of these tracks must always count in the formation of a judgment of right, as of any other judgment. It ought not, apparently, to be set over against novel impulses as a contrary principle, but rather thought of as a phase of all impulses, since <strong>novelty always consists</strong>, from one point of view, <strong>in a fresh combination of habits</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 368)</blockquote><!--
--><p>William James's vinyl grooves.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p376"></a>In the first sense, which carries no moral implication at all, is its <strong>altruistic</strong> to give to the beggar, but the word <strong>is also applicable to the greater part of our actions, since most of them are suggested by others in some way</strong>. And, of course, many of the actions included are what are generally called selfish ones. To strike a man with whom we are angry, to steal from one of whom we are envious, to take liberties with an attractive woman, and all sorts of reprehensible proceedings <strong>suggested by the sight of another person</strong>, would be altruistic in this sense, which I suppose, therefore, cannot be the one intended by those who use the word as the antithesis to egoistic. (Cooley 1922: 376)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I've never met anyone use "altruistic" in this sense.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p380ja381"></a>Here, then, we have a simple manifestation of a moral force than acts upon every one of us in countless ways, and every day of his life - <strong>the imagined approval</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>or disapproval of others</strong>, appealing to instinctive emotion, and giving the force of that emotion to certain views of conduct. (Cooley 1922: 380-381)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The domestication process.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p386"></a>And these instances are typical of the general fact that our higher elves, our distinctivey right views and choices, are dependent upon imaginatie realization of the points of view of other persons. <strong>There is, I think, no possibility of being good without living, imaginatively of course, in good company</strong>; and those who uphold the moral power of personal example as against that of abstract thought are certainy in the right. A mental crisis, by its very difficulty, is likely to cal up the thought of some person who have been used to lok to as a guide, and the confronting of the two ideas, that of the person and that of the probem, compes us to answer the question, <strong>What woud he have thought of it?</strong> (Cooley 1922: 386)</blockquote><!--
--><p>WWJD?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p387"></a><strong>Whateer publishes our conduct introduces new and strong factors into conscience</strong>; but whethe this pubicity is wholesome or otherwise <strong>depends upon</strong> the character of the public; or, more definitely, upon <strong>whether the idea of ourselves that we impute to this public is edifying or degrading</strong>. In many cases, for instance, it is ruinous to a person's character to be publicly disgraced, because he, or she, presently accepts the degrading self that seems to exist in the minds of others. (Cooley 1922: 387)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The Generalized Other is not very clearly put here.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p391"></a>In these days of geneal literacy, <strong>many get their most potent impressions from books</strong>, and some, finding this sort of society more select <strong>and</strong> stimulating than any other, <strong>cultivate it to the neglect of palpable persons</strong>. This kind of people often have a very tender conscience regarding the moral problems presented in noves, but a rather dull one for those of the flesh-and-blood life about them. In fact, a large part of the sentiments of imaginative persons are purely literary, created and nourished by intercourse with books, and only indirectly connected with what is commonly caled experience. Nor should it be assumed that these literary sentiments are necessarily a mere dissipation. <strong>Our highest ideals of life come to us largely in this way, since they depend upon imaginative converse with people wo do not have a chance to know in the flesh</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 391)</blockquote><!--
--><p>People whose primary company are books tend not to carry their literary sentiments into the real world but our highest ideals are suggested to us by literature. Literature, in short, reprograms metaneeds.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p392ja393"></a><strong>Idealization</strong>, of this or any other sort, <strong>is not to be thought of as sharply marked off from experience and memory</strong>. It seems probable that the mind is never indifferent to the elements presented to it, but that its very nature is to select, arrange, harmonize, idealize. That is, the whole is always acting upon the parts, tending to make them one with itself. What we call distinctivey an ideal is only a relatively complex and finished product of this activity. <strong>The</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>past, as it lives in our minds, is never a mere repetition of old experience, but is always colored by our present feeling, is always idealized in some sense; and it is the same with our anticipation of the future</strong>, so that to wholesome thought expectation is hope. Thus the mind is ever an artist, re-creating things in a manner congenial to itself, and special arts are only a more delibeate expression of a general tendency. (Cooley 1922: 392-393)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Quotable! Idealization on a gradient with experience and memory. Past and future are both idealizations.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p393"></a><strong>An ideal</strong>, then, <strong>is</strong> a somewhat definite and felicitous poduct of imagination, <strong>a harmonious and congenial reconstruction of the elements of experience</strong>. And a personal ideal is such a harmonious and congenial reconstruction of our experience of persons. Its active function is <strong>to symbolize and define the desirable, and by so doing to make it the object of definite endeavor</strong>. The ideal of goodness is only the next step beyond the good man of experience, and performs the same energizing office. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, <strong>there is</strong> no separation between actual and ideal persons, <strong>only a more or less definite connection of personal ideas with material bodies</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 393)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm beginning to notice how much heavy lifting a "congenial" does in a Cooley type statement. The definition itself comes across as vaguely semiotics; i.e. I'm pretty sure that the same point could be expressed in terms of cultural semiotics.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p394"></a>This <strong>building up of higher personal conceptions</strong> does not lend itself to precise description. It is mostly subconscious; the mind is continually at work ordering and bettering its past and present experiences, working them up in accordance with its own <strong>instinctive need for consistency and pleasantness</strong>; ever idealizing, but rarely producing clean-cut ideals. It finds its materials both in immediate personal intercourse and through books and other durable media of expression. (Cooley 1922: 394)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This could just as well describe cultural autocommunication and the integration of self-descriptions.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p397"></a>This is, of course, a phase of the reflected self, discussed in the fifth chapter. Some people "see themseves" so constantly, and strive so obiously to live up to the image, that they give a curious impression of always acting a part, as if one should compose a drama with himself as chief personage, and then spend his life playing it. <strong>Perhaps something of this sort is inevitable with persons and vivid imagination</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 397)</blockquote><!--
--><p>iamthemaincharacter</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p400a"></a>Otherwise they only increase the distraction. But <strong>a <em>credible creed</em></strong> is an excellent thing, and the lack of it is a real moral deficiency. (Cooley 1922: 400)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cooley's takes on morality are not my cup of tea; here I'm just marvelling how well the phrase could have been "a <em>credible source</em>".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p400b"></a>This state of things involves some measure of demoralization, although it may be part of a movement generally beneficient. <strong>Mankind needs the highest vision of personality, and needs it clear and vivid, and in the lack of it will suffer a lack in the clearness and cogency of moral thought</strong>. It is the natural apex to the pyramid of personal imagination, and when it is wanting there will be an unremitting and eventually more or less successful striving to replace it. (Cooley 1922: 400)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wish this didn't read like "And this is why we need a Führer..."</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p401"></a>Matters of decency, as in dress or manners, are almost wholly conventional, as appears, for instance, when <strong>certain Africans spit upon one as a sign of good-will</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 401)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Damn Fremen.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch11"></a>XI. PERSONAL DEGENERACY</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p402"></a>It is the nature of the mind to form standards of better or worse in all matters toward which its selective activity is directed; and this has its collective as well as its individual aspect, so that not only every man but <strong>every group has its preferences and aversions, its good and bad</strong>. The selective, organizing processes which all life, and notably the life of the mind, presents, involve this distinction; it is simply a formulation of the universal fact of preference. (Cooley 1922: 402)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Preferences and aversions" in phatic communion from a collective aspect.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p414"></a>As a matter of fact, the very worst men of the hard, narrow, fanatical, or brutal sorts, often live at peace with their consciences. <strong>I feel sure that any one who reflects imaginatively upon the characters of people he has known of this sort will agree that such is the case</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 414)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One nurse to another: "What are the test results?" - "Oh," goes the other who forgot to do them before now, concentrates really hard and <em>reflects imaginatively</em> on the results of said test.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p415"></a>The idea, cherished by some, that crime or wrong of any sort is invariably pursued by remorse, arises from <strong>the natural but mistaken assumption that all other people have consciences similar to our own</strong>. The man of sensitie temperament and refined habit of thought feels that he would suffer remorse if he had done the deed, and supposes that the same must be the case with the perpetrator. (Cooley 1922: 415)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Idiomorphization.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p420"></a>When a boy is caught stealing brass fixtures from an unfinished house the judge of the Juveile Court will first of all blame the boy, but, far from stopping there, he will bring into court also the leader of the gang who set him the example, and his parents, who failed to give him suitable care and discipline. The judge may well censure, also, the school authorities for not interesting him in healthy work and recreation, and the city government and influential classes for failing to provide a better environment for him to grow up in. <strong>The tendency of any study of indirect causes is to fix more and more responsibility upon those who have wealth, knowledge, and influence, and therefore the power to bring a better state of things to pass</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 420)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Woke.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ch12"></a>XII. FREEDOM</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p426"></a>The only test of all these things - of right, freedom, progress, and the like - is the instructed conscience; just as <strong>the only test of beauty is a trained æsthetic sense, which is a mental conclusion of much the same sort as conscience</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 426)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Beauty, conscience, and what's the third?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p427"></a>The growth of freedom is most questionable in the industrial system; but even here we have <strong>ideals, agitation, and experiments</strong> in the free participation of the individual in the process. These <strong>give us hope that the present organization - for the most part unfree - may gradually be liberalized</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 427)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nope, more alienated than ever.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p428"></a>In fact, <strong>institutions</strong> - government, churches, industries, and the like - <strong>have properly no other function than to contribute to human freedom; and in so far as they fail, on the whole, to perform this function, they are wrong and need reconstruction</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 428)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The fossil fuel industry now threatens human freedom.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p431"></a>A child born in a slum, brought up in a demoralized family, and put at some confining and mentally deadening work when ten or twelve years old, is no more free to be healthy, wise, and moral than a Chinese child is free to read Shakespeare. <strong>Every social ill involves the enslavement of individuals</strong>. (Cooley 1922: 431)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One of the very last pages in the book and just throwing this out there.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p432"></a><strong>In our view of freedom we have a right to survey all times and countries</strong> and from them form for our own social order an ideal condition, which shall offer to each individual all the encouragements to growth and culture that the world has ever or anywhere enjoyed. (Cooley 1922: 432)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And that is how you get Moonfall.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="cooley22p433"></a>Consequently <strong>every general increase of freedom is accompanied by some degeneracy</strong>, attributable to the same causes as the freedom. This is very plainly to be seen at the present time, which is one, on the whole, of rapid increase of freedom. Family life and the condition of women and children have been growing freer and better, but along with this we have the increase of divorce and of spoiled children. Democracy in the state has its own peculiar evils, as we all know; and in the church the decay of dogmatism and unreasoning faith, a moral advance on the whole, has nevertheless caused a good many moral failures. In much the same way <strong>the enfrancisement of the negroes is believed to have caused an increase of insanity among them</strong>, and the growth of suicide in all countries seems to be due in part to the strain of a more complex society. (Cooley 1922: 433)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The famous freedoms-degeneracy constant of the universe. Increasing freedom increases degeneracy. You throw previously enslaved people on the streets, they're allowed to complain, and whaddayouknow - they now have mental health issues? Brilliant. What a weird note to end the book on.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-24001778262995231062023-12-01T04:55:00.000-08:002023-12-01T04:55:39.190-08:00A Writer's Writer<!-- A Writer's Writer
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#cole95">Cole 1995. The Future Belongs to Anthropology</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#coleyama90">Cole; Yamaguchi 1990. Paradigms of human development</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#samuelson90">Samuelson 1990. Review of <em>The Legacy of Olaf Stapledon</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#shelton95">Shelton 1995. Review of <em>Olaf Stapledon: Speaking for the Future</em> by Robert Crossley</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#shelton97">Shelton 1997. Review of <em>An Olaf Stapledon Reader</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#magyar93">Magyar 1993. Science Fiction for Technical Communicators</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#r99">R. 1999. Review of <em>Enduring Love</em> by Ian McEwan</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#dick96">Dick 1996. Other Worlds: The Cultural Significance of the Extraterrestial Life Debate</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#wolk90">Wolk 1990. Challenge to Boundaries: An Overview of Science Fiction and Fantasy</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#gesselt04">Gessert 2004. Review of <em>Oryx and Crake</em> by Margaret Atwood</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#wilczek06">Wilczek 2006. On Absolute Units, III: Absolutely Not?</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#dick09">Dick 2009. The postbiological universe and our future in space</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#robinson07">Robinson 2007. Still looking at the stars</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#robinson09">Robinson 2009. The fiction of now</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#schneider11">Schneider 2011. The question "Are we alone?" in different cultures</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#gunn05">Gunn 2005. Tales From Tomorrow</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#cirkovic07">Cirkovic 2007. Review of <em>Natural History</em> by Justina Robson</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#baxter03">Baxter 2003. Baby Boomers: Writers and Their Origins</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#cocks04">Cocks 2004. Quo vadis <em>Homo sapiens</em>?</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#herrick09">Herrick 2009. Sci-Fi's Brave New World</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#fogg00">Fogg 2000. The ethicas dimensions of space settlement</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#porter01">Porter 2001. Medical futures</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#eliot09">Eliot 2009. Review of <em>Darwinism and Its Discontents</em> by Michael Ruse</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hughes08">Hughes 2008. Back to the future: Contemporary biopolitics in 1920s' British futurism</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 2 an.1995.36.5.1.3
--><h4><a id="cole95"></a>Cole, Sam 1995. The Future Belongs to Anthropology. <em>Anthropology News</em> 36(5): 1; 4. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/an.1995.36.5.1.3">10.1111/an.1995.36.5.1.3</a> [<u><a href="https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/an.1995.36.5.1.3">wiley.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="cole95p1a"></a>The topic of this year's <em>AN</em> theme, "Whither Our Subjects - And Ourselves?" is set against the backdrop of the next millennium, which portends a new world political and economic order, <strong>increasingly rapid technological and social change, and widespread ethnic conflict and cultural chaos</strong>. (Cole 1995: 1)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not wrong. Smartphones and social media, but also a seemingly never-ending string of wars.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="cole95p1b"></a>Even to predict the future to just beyond the millennium is a challenge for forecasters. But as the time horizon moves further and further away, forecasters lose the comfort of empirical data and the possibilities for extrapolation; <strong>they must move to scenario writing and then to inspired "gee whiz here comes the future" guesses</strong>. One million years takes us to a horizon that few science fiction authors have even attempted! (Cole 1995: 1)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) extrapolation; (2) scenario-building; (3) pure guesswork.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cole95p4a"></a>Where the forecasts appear to depend largely on the resurgent trend in anthropology enrollments since the mid-1980s, <strong>a tempocentric bias</strong> is introduced. (Cole 1995: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Never heard of this term but there are over 1,000 search results, mostly in highfalutin anthropology papers.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cole95p4b"></a>Conversely, Bailey interprets current rising nationalism as the rebirth of the non-Western world. With a different view, Vladimic Markotic envisages three great superpowers in the making: <strong>a New World led by the US, an Asian block led by China and a Eurasia led by Germany</strong> - a tripartite power structure reminiscent of George Orwell's <em>1984</em> (November 1994 <em>AN</em>, p 4). (Cole 1995: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pretty much.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cole95p4c"></a>Anthropologists, too, "fantasize" about the future in provocative ways. <strong>Ben Finney's "Cosmic Humanities"</strong> (November 1994 <em>AN</em>, p 1) invites us to contemplate how <strong>we might respond to global resource pressures by returning to our roots as exploring animals</strong>; where searching for new planets scattered through space will become a natural way of life, as it was for the ever home-seeking Micronesians and Polynesians. Is this a metaphor for the future of anthropology? <strong>Finney's piece rekindles futurist Olaf Stapledon's vision of humans evolving through multifarious forms adapting to air, sea and space</strong>. In his <em>Last and First Men</em> (1931), Stapledon speculated on the human past and future over a span of some 40 million years! Although his writings of the 1920s now seem dated, they are still relevant to immediate anthropological concerns with the future of humanity that stretch between views that <strong>biotechnology will soon determine human form, and views that evolutionary pressures are offset by technological and social innovation</strong>. (Cole 1995: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"40 million years" and "1920s" are miss the mark. </p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Finney, Ben 1994. Cosmic Humanities? <em>Anthropology News</em> 35(8): 1; 6. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/an.1994.35.8.1.2">10.1111/an.1994.35.8.1.2</a></u> [<u><a href="https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/an.1994.35.8.1.2">wiley.com</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 3 0016-3287%2890%2990001-x
--><h4><a id="coleyama90"></a>Cole, Sam; Yamaguchi, Kaoru 1990. Paradigms of human development. <em>Futures</em> 22(10): 999-1001. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(90)90001-X">10.1016/0016-3287(90)90001-X</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/001632879090001X">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="coleyama90p999"></a>While there is a current tendency for communist and social democracy movements to shift in the direction of capitalism, the latter has manifest problems of <strong>inequality, insecurity and alienation</strong>. Moreover, the most 'efficient' and 'successful' societies are being poisoned by their own toxic waste. (Cole; Yamaguchi 1990: 999)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Succinct.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="coleyama90p1000a"></a>Lorne Tepperman and Hilja Laasen's article asks how we might measure the success of human development given that <strong>economic growth as a measure of improved well-being becomes an increasingly redundant concept for prosperous societies in an ecologically constrained world</strong>. (Cole; Yamaguchi 1990: 1000)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Infinite economic growth is impossible, yet that is still what we're going for, 33 years after this was written.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="coleyama90p1000b"></a>Part of the inability of futurists and social scientists generally to address the full range of possibilities for the future is that <strong>we are constrained by our own intellectual present</strong>. (Cole; Yamaguchi 1990: 1000)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is this tempocentrism?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="coleyama90p1001"></a>Finally Jim Dator's article steps beyond this to embrace the possibility of new human physical states. His provocative paper forces us to look beyond the constraints of our human existence and to accept the possibility that <strong>the logical conclusions of our technological success are new beings which will benignly relegate humans to zoo-park curiosities</strong>. The article is in some ways more challenging that Olaf Stapledon's classic tale of <em>The Last and First Men</em>, since today our electro-mechanical ingenuity has placed us a stone's throw from the non-human future he envisages. (Cole; Yamaguchi 1990: 1001)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Dator, Jim 1990. It's only a paper moon. <em>Futures</em> 22(10): 1084-1102. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(90)90009-7">0.1016/0016-3287(90)90009-7</a></u> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0016328790900097">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 3 Samuelson-UtopianStudies-1990
--><h4><a id="samuelson90"></a>Samuelson, David N. 1990. Review of McCarthy, Patrick A.; Elkins, Charles; Greenberg, Martin Harry eds. <em>The Legacy of Olaf Stapledon</em>. <em>Utopian Studies</em> 1(1): 148-149. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20718977">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p148a"></a><strong>Olaf Stapledon ranks with Verne and Wells as one of the pillars of science fiction</strong>. His utopianism resembled Wells' more than Verne's, but its expression was <em>sui generis</em>. No one else ever had his <strong>cosmic reach</strong>, and his philosophy and fiction both <strong>defied generic expectations</strong>. So <strong>idiosyncratic</strong> was his style that his four major fictions are still <strong>more honored than read</strong>, his other writings largely forgotten. (Samuelson 1990: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>High praise. <em>Sui generis</em> meaning "in a class of his own" (that's how <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-mystical-joining.html#huxley51">Julian Huxley (1951)</a> described Stapledon). A local science fiction researcher has said "<u>It is more interesting to read about Stapledon than to read <em>him</em>.</u>" (J. A., personal communication)</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p148b"></a>Stapledon's <strong>obvious "legacy"</strong> is to science fiction (e.g., <strong>Clarke, Lem, Lessing, Simak, Sturgeon</strong>). Measured against the vastness of space and time, <strong>even his own utopian ideals he found wanting</strong>, yet his <strong>ambivalence toward human schemes of perfection is a vital part of utopian thinking today</strong>. The past decade's advances of human research into the cosmos, renewed awareness of our fragile planetary environment, and historical challenges to capitalist and socialist ideals all underline his contemporary relevance. (Samuelson 1990: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It may probably be said that the modern attitude towards utopianism is more akin to Stapledon's preface than to Aldous Huxley's epigraph.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p148c"></a><strong>Minimal before the 1970s, Stapledon studies</strong> more than doubled in the next decade with a bibliography, a volume of correspondence, a special issue of <em>Science-Fiction Studies</em>, and other essays, including <strong>three monographs</strong>. Not for beginners, this slim volume adds more "contexts" (Patrick McCarthy's term) in which to view Stapledon's achievements. (Samuelson 1990: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is indeed the picture we get when looking back with the aid of scientific databases. The bibliography is probably <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4238888">Curtis Smith's (1974)</a>. The correspondences must be Crossley's <em>Talking Across the World</em> (1987). The three monographs must be Patrick McCarthy's <em>Olaf Stapledon</em> (1982), Leslie Fiedler's <em>Olaf Stapledon: a man divided</em> (1983), and John Kinnaird's <em>Olaf Stapledon</em> (1986). All three are reviewed by <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239590">Philmus 1984</a>.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p148d"></a>In "The Moral Philosophy of Olaf Stapledon," Robert Shelton recovers some of the non-fiction, pointing out <strong>the unity of Stapledon's philosophical, political, and religious ideas about morality</strong> with his own personal involvement in all three. "His prose and his life offer a complex answer to that quintessential utopian question, 'how then shall we live?'" (Samuelson 1990: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Would not be surprised to meet consistency bordering on tediousness in Stapledon's whole oevre.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p148e"></a>In <em>A Modern Theory of Ethics</em> (1929), <em>Waking World</em> (1934), and <em>Saints and Revolutionaries</em> (1939), Stapledon's work became progressively more colloquial, but each book moved from the "present dilemma" (corrosive doubt on cosmological, psychological, and ethical levels) to "speculations." Asserting the <strong>need for spiritual experience and socialist ideals</strong>, he ultimately proposed <strong>transcending individualism via a two-fold dialectic</strong> - thesis, complement, symbiosis - <strong>seen in saints, revolutionaries, <em>and skeptics</em></strong>. (Samuelson 1990: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>First explicit mention I've come across thus far of his "socialist ideals". I have met mention of his self-descriptive "agnostic mysticism".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p149a"></a>Herr's "Convention and Spirit in Olaf Stapledon's Fiction" shows his awareness that reaching his spiritual goals required <strong>overcoming language and the self, cultural artifacts defining the limitations of the human conditions</strong>. (Samuelson 1990: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Both make sense in light of Stapledon's obsession with telepathy and collective consciousness.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p149b"></a>Neither titular argument coalesces with an accompanying attempt to trace literary parallels, although Elkins does place Stapledon firmly in <strong>a tradition of high seriousness</strong> ranging from Hegel, Darwin, Marx, and Arnold to Spengler, Leavis and Bloch. (Samuelson 1990: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Kõrgtõsisuse traditsioon</em>.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p149c"></a>Despite his Victorian style, he did share certain attitudes with the great Modernist writers: <strong>anti-historicism, faith in aesthetic order, literary reflexiveness</strong> (manipulation of perspective, consciousness of language limitations, spatial form), <strong>and internationalism</strong>. (Samuelson 1990: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>All ring true from what little I've read.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="samuelson90p149d"></a>Crossley argues cogently that the familiar letter was the most essential form to Stapledon, and claims about as much as can be said for these letters: echoing central issues of his work, they also show his later melancholy and urgency for the future. "Worldliness" is their subject, knowing the world thoroughly in preparation to know <strong>a self-conscious universe</strong>. (Samuelson 1990: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The so-called Universal Mind.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 4 Shelton-UtopianStudies-1995
--><h4><a id="shelton95"></a>Shelton, Robert 1995. Review of <em>Olaf Stapledon: Speaking for the Future</em> by Robert Crossley. <em>Utopian Studies</em> 6(1): 138-140. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20719381">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138a"></a>Robert Crossley's vital, engaging new biography of the English philosopher, <strong>peace activist</strong>, and science fiction writer Olaf Stapledon (1886-1950) should reinvigorate the restitution of <strong>an important figure in modern utopian thought and practice</strong>. (Shelton 1995: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I recall something about him changing his mind on pacifism at the onset of WWII. Also, what is <em>utopian practice</em>?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138b"></a>The <strong>Stapledon revival</strong> got off to something of a <strong>false start</strong> a decade ago when the publication of <strong>three book-length studies</strong> (by Patrick A. McCarthy, John Kinnaird, and Leslie Fiedler) <strong>generated surprisingly little furthe rresearch</strong> on Stapledon. (Shelton 1995: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well, "Stapledon studies" have to begin somewhere. That very little research immediately followed is somewhat understandable, given that Stapledon is still underrated. There is <em>something</em> off-putting about his literary output.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138c"></a>Because of its broader considerations of Stapledon's fiction, non-fiction, and political activism, perhaps Crossley's biography will spur more interest in Stapledon's <strong>challenging</strong> oeuvre. (Shelton 1995: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps that is it. Stapledon is all too <em>challenging</em>.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138d"></a>Before the biography's first numbered chapter (a flashback set at <strong>an international peace congress held in Manhattan in 1949 under the watchful eye of the US State Department</strong>), Crossley addresses the basic question lurking behind his project: "Olaf who?" (Shelton 1995: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>There is a palpable analogy with Bronisław Malinowski dying of a heart attack immediately "<u>after delivering an address at the inaugural meeting of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in New York</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2018/02/about-malinowski.html#symmonolewiczs1959">Symmons-Symonolewicz 1959</a>: 23). What is with these public intellectuals dying of heart attacks soon after lecturing about peace or war on U.S. soil in the 1940s?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138e"></a>Then he makes the stronger case that the life story of Olaf Stapledon is "an index of the modern era [...] the era that embraced <strong>the death of God, the birth of a new physics, the shrinking of the planet, and the threat of human extinction</strong>" (3). (Shelton 1995: 138)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A pretty good run-down of the religious, scientific, and historical context surrounding Stapledon's life.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p138ja139"></a>The list catalogues topics Stapledon devoted his life and art to, from his youthful poetry to his mature <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> cosmic masterpiece on the God-question, <em>Star Maker;</em> from his Wellsian calls for a world state in such books as <em>Walking World</em> and <em>Saints and Revolutionaries</em> to his post-Hiroshima keynote speeches in Wroclaw, New York, and Paris on peace and culture, where <strong>he was one of the first activists to warn about Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD, or as Stapledon called it, "irreparable mutual destruction"</strong> [325]). (Shelton 1995: 138-139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another one of these curious "firsts" that can be appended to his name.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139a"></a>Stapledon corresponded with many of the most famous people of the twentieth century and shared featured speaker platforms with the likes of E.M. Forster, Julian Huxley, J.B. Priestley, W.E.B. DuBois, Thornton Wilder, Norman Mailer, and Dimitri Shostakovich. He is even <strong>the model for the villain (Professor Weston) in C.S. Lewis's <em>Out of the Silent Planet</em></strong>. (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Too bad this doesn't specify with whom he corresponded and with whom he merely shared the stage.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139b"></a>Yet for decades, Stapledon was known (if at all) as <strong>a writer's writer</strong>, the acknowledged resource for ideas developed by Arthur C. Clarke, Theodore Sturgeon, Doris Lessing, Freeman Dyson, and many others. As a fiction writer, Stapledon was <strong>a creatior of mythic, grand visions of the cosmos</strong>. (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>In one of my own false-starts I've described him as "the science fiction writer's science fiction writer".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139c"></a>Crossley's biography helps us see where many of his strangest notions came from. As a nonfiction writer, Stapledon was <strong>a teacher with a strong utopian inclination</strong>. Crossley's biography helps us even more to see Stapledon's political efforts within the specific, year-by-year historical contexts of challenges to capitalism and empire. Here I would highlight Crossley's detailed account of <strong>Stapledon's active membership in the Common Wealth Party, Richard Acland's "prototype of liberation theology"</strong> (278). (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wonder if Crossley addresses Stapledon's attendance in Cecil Reddie's Abbotsholme School (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#searby89p12">Searby 1989: 12</a>). I will no doubt have to look into the history of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Wealth_Party">Common Wealth Party</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Acland">Richard Acland</a> at some point.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139d"></a>Olaf Stapledon was a late-bloomer, a Peter Pan who spent nearly four decades in prolonged adolescence, <strong>like</strong> (as Crossley observes) <strong>the Divine Boy</strong> of <em>Last and First Men</em>, <strong>Stapledon's breakthrough</strong> first novel, published in 1930 <strong>when</strong> Olaf <strong>was forty-four years old</strong>. (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nothing to be ashamed of. Juri Lotman didn't discover semiotics until he was 40.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139e"></a>That novel and the <strong>eight</strong> that followed it are almost exclusively the basis of Stapledon's limited fame today. Stapledon wrote <strong>an equal number of nonfiction works</strong>, which were, in Stapledon's lifetime, more popular and more influential than the fiction. <strong>Crossley stresses the central importance of Stapledon's philosophical, sociological, and psychological works to our full understanding of his science fiction</strong>. He shows how we might connect the events of Stapledon's life (indirectly) to his fiction and (most directly) to his nonfiction. (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This much I suspected. Seventeen books is a lot to chew on.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p139f"></a>Crossley carefully incorporates his textual analyses within the biographical narrative. For example, <strong>Stapledon's most disturbing novel, <em>Sirius</em></strong>, is read, in part, as an analogue of Stapledon's late-life love affair with Evelyn Wood Gibson, who becomes, for Crossley, the model for Plaxy, the "sister" and lover of that novel's super-canine. (Shelton 1995: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>There's plenty disturbing in <em>L&FM</em>. Can't imagine what could make <em>Sirius</em> more disturbing than <em>Odd John</em>.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="shelton95p140"></a>Writing from the suburbs of Liverpool, Olaf Stapledon traveled further into our future than probably anyone else in this century. In our troubled present, we should look again at <strong>the maps to utopia he left for us</strong>. (Shelton 1995: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Did he? Which utopia?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 4 Shelton-UtopianStudies-1997
--><h4><a id="shelton97"></a>Shelton, Robert 1997. Review of Crossley, Robert ed. <em>An Olaf Stapledon Reader</em>. <em>Utopian Studies</em> 8(2): 132-134. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20719700">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton97p132a"></a>Olaf Stapledon (1886-1950) has become modern science fiction's John Milton - <strong>an eloquent, deep explorer of great, cosmic themes whom next to no one reads anymore</strong>. Nowadays he is more unknown than known and more known than read, but between 1930 and 1944, Stapledon produced at least <strong>four masterpieces</strong> of the genre - <em>Last and First Men, Odd John, Star Maker</em>, and <em>Sirius</em>. Rich and complex, these four novels place Stapledon second only to H.G. Wells as <strong>the most important science fiction and utopian writer of the twentieth century</strong>. (Shelton 1997: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The highest praises... For the author whom next to no-one reads anymore.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton97p132b"></a>At the level of <strong>sheer inventiveness</strong>, Stapledon has no equal, from any era, in any genre. So why is "Olaf Who?" the first question readers are likely to ask when they hear his name? It would take a career to answer that question, and (most of) a career is precisely what Robert Crossley has devoted to resurrecting Olaf Stapledon, Liverpool's <strong>saint, revolutionary, and skeptic</strong> (to use Stapledon's <strong>categories of world views</strong>). (Shelton 1997: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These categories sound a bit like some sort of inversions of the classical triad (commoner, guardian, philosopher).</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="shelton97p132c"></a>The second dilemma is caused by <strong>the gap being so large between the quality of Stapledon's works and their obscurity</strong>. As an analogy, consider the situation many of us, particularly literature professors, find ourselves in when we try (or wonder if we dare try) to introduce our students to a favorite author, one we suspect only few of them have heard of and none has read. (Shelton 1997: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What's the "gap" here? I would assume that <em>quality is high</em> and <em>obscurity is high</em> also. The "gap" imagery makes me think that one of these must be <em>low</em>. Obscurity it is not, so is Shelton saying that Stapledon's works are of low quality? </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="shelton97p133"></a>The book is divided into five sections designed to put "on exhibit a generous sampling of Stapledon's <strong>prophetic utterances</strong> in a variety of genres and voices" (x). (Shelton 1997: 133)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It most definitely sounds like Crossley was a "believer".</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="magyar93"></a>Magyar, Miki 1993. Science Fiction for Technical Communicators. <em>Proceedings Professional Communication Conference The New Face of Technical Communication: People, Processes, Products'</em>, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 5-8 October 1993. IEEE, 107-111. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/IPCC.1993.593787">10.1109/IPCC.1993.593787</a> [<u><a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/593787">ieee.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="magyar93p107"></a><strong>Science fiction</strong> (SF) <strong>offers a set of experts who can talk to us from very different points of view about language, communication, interpersonal interactions, and the problems of dealing with innovation and change</strong>. We know that we learn best by example and experience, and SF provides examples and experiences (vicarious, but valid) that can be obtained in no other way. (Magyar 1993: 107)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A near-perfect epigraph for the second chapter (semiophatic analysis of <em>L&FM</em>).</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="magyar93p108a"></a><strong>With Olaf Stapledon</strong> (<em>Last and First Men</em>) and Aldous Huxley (<em>Brave New World</em>) in the '30s, Van Vogt (<em>Slan, The World of Null-A</em>), Orwell (<em>1984</em>), and C. S. Lewis (<em>Perelandra</em> trilogy) in the '40s, <strong>we can see the beginnings of a more mature literature, dealing with real people, not cardboard cut-outs, and with real problems, and adhering to a more general standard of good writing</strong>. This was especially true in Europe, where SF was never so ghettoized as in this country. They set a new standard for American SF, which began to flower in the '50s and has continued in a more international arena ever since. (Magyar 1993: 108)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wells is not mature?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="magyar93p108b"></a>Orson Scott Card offers "a good, simple, semi-accurate rule of thumb: <strong>If the story is set in a universe that follows the same rules as ours, it's science fiction. If it's set in a universe that doesn't follow our rules, it's fantasy</strong>. Or in other words, science fiction is about what <em>could be</em> but isn't; fantasy is about what <em>couldn't</em> be." (Card 1990) And, as he correctly points out, the boundaries of SF and fantasy exist as challenges, not as barriers. (Magyar 1993: 108)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Science fiction adheres to a possible "reality", has some connection with it.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="magyar93p108ja109"></a>Joanna Russ says, "Most serious SF is too intellectual a form for most readers to be able to respond to. It's <strong>a highly analytic, critical, intellectual form</strong>. Readers approaching SF have to read with a dual vision, a split consciousness of the writing's action and critical stance, and most readers simply <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> don't want or don't know how to do that." (McCaffrey 1990) While there is plenty of light entertainment available in the genre, the best of SF is <strong>a real mind-stretcher</strong>. (Magyar 1993: 108-109)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Verbs and adjectives.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="magyar93p109"></a><strong>Another difference is that SF readers tend to expect unusual combinations of words to be taken literally, not figuratively</strong>. "She felt the texture of his thoughts" would imply to an SF reader that she is a telepath or empath, not that she is simply sensitive to undertones of communication. "The house invites him in" assumes a technology that has computer-controlled entrances with voice capability, not just an attractive residence. (Magyar 1993: 109)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is a valid point that I may have to quibble with in my thesis. <em>Some</em> science fiction may be figurative in nature, at least in part.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 6 a%3A1017231603833
--><h4><a id="r99"></a>R., M. 1999. Review of <em>Enduring Love</em> by Ian McEwan. <em>Biology and Philosophy</em> 14(4): 623-628. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017231603833">10.1023/A:1017231603833</a> [<u><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1017231603833">springer.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="r99p623"></a>And yet! The paradox is that, just when Charles Darwin's contributions to science were most controversial, majesty was being comforted by evolutionism of the most blatant and notorious kind! Tennyson, a student of William Whewell in the 1830s at Trinity College, was ever interested in science. Reading Charles Lyell in the early 1840s, he had absorbed the message of <strong>uniformitarianism - nature is caught in an endless process, without reason or hope</strong>. (R. 1999: 623)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This was controversial?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="r99p624a"></a>Given Nature "red in tooth and claw" - this is the source of this famous phrase - nothing seems to make any sense. <strong>Not only individuals are pointless mortals, but so also are groups</strong>. We are born, we live, and then we die - usually painfully. Nothing makes sense or has meaning. There are just endless Lyellian cycles. (R. 1999: 624)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, good.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="r99p624b"></a>Then towards the end of the decade, the poem stalled perhaps indefinitely, Tennyson read Robert Chambers's evolutionary tract: <em>Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation</em>. At least, he read a detailed review of <em>Vestiges</em>, learning that the whole of organic nature is progressing upwards, from the blob to the human, from the monad to the man. At once, Tennyson saw the way out of Lyellian-induced depression. <strong>Life's history does have meaning</strong>. (R. 1999: 624)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Humans becoming fully human, etc.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Chambers, Robert 1844. <em>Vestiges of the natural history of creation</em>. London: J. Churchill.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/vestigesofnatura00unse/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="r99p624ja625"></a>Chambers wrote before Charles Darwin. Expectedly, we find that in the years after the <em>Origin</em> writers have returned many times to evolutionary themes. One of the best-known examples was the novella by <strong>the Huxley-educated, school teacher, H. G. Wells</strong>. <em>The Time Machine</em>, with its story of <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> future human degeneration in the gentle, child-like Eloi, and the monstrous cannibalistic troglodites, the Morlocks, reflects faithfully the <em>fin de siècle</em> obsession with decline and fall. (R. 1999: 624-625)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Henry_Huxley">Thomas Henry Huxley</a> was his academic advisor. (E.R. Clay wrote his book as a response to T. H. Huxley's view of free will in animals.) Wells taught at "<u>Thomas Morley's Commercial Academy, a private school founded in 1849</u>" (Wikikpedia).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="r99p625"></a>Another example in the early 1930s was Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>: <strong>a fantasy about the various species into which we will evolve, it was influenced by the thinking of such speculative evolutionists as J.B.S. Haldane</strong>, and in turn served as stimulus to the youthful John Maynard Smith. (R. 1999: 625)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Okay. Noted. I've indeed already met Haldane's name in the same breath as Stapledon (cf. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-catapathic-grouping.html#martin99p521a">Martin 1999: 521</a>).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="r99p625"></a>At which point, another of the group, a young man Jed Parry, becomes obsessed with Joe. We learn later that Jed suffered from a psychological disease, de Clérambault's syndrome, which manifests itself as <strong>instantaneous erotic attraction to a total stranger</strong> - an attraction with religious undertones. ("<strong>God intended this love</strong>" etc). (R. 1999: 625)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Twin flame? This de Clérambault's syndrome is also known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erotomania">eratomania</a>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 6 Dick-WorldsCulturalSignificance-1996
--><h4><a id="dick96"></a>Dick, Steven J. 1996. Other Worlds: The Cultural Significance of the Extraterrestial Life Debate. <em>Leonardo</em> 29(2): 133-137. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1576349">10.2307/1576349</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1576349">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p133"></a>First, the extraterrestial life debate points out, as no other scientific controversy does so sweepingly, <strong>how completely the concept of cosmic evolution has triumphed in Western civilization</strong>. Indeed, much of the twentieth century debate may be seen as a test of cosmic evolution, or <strong>the idea that matter and life are naturally evolving throughout the universe</strong>. Percival Lowell understood at the beginning of this century that the solar system was evolving; his vivid picture of a dying Mars whose inhabitants were desperately trying to distribute their water resources epitomized a solar system constantly subject to change. (Dick 1996: 133)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We have come to realize the improbability of intelligent life emerging on only one planet in the whole universe.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p134"></a>Second, a salient characteristic of the extraterrestial life debate in the context of science is that it shows that there is, in fact, no monolithic scientific culture such as the one <strong>C.P. Snow</strong> defined more than 30 years ago <strong>in his writings contrasting science with the humanities</strong>. (Dick 1996: 134)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It looks like C. P. Snow, too, will be one of those characters that appear out of nowhere in unexpected places. So:</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Snow, C. P. 1998. <em>The Two Cultures</em>. With Introduction by Stefan Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p134ja135"></a>The idea of extraterrestials clearly fascinated a wide audience as early as 1686, when <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>Bernard le Bovier de Fontanelle's <em>Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds</em></strong> appeared. As Crowe and Guthke have shown, extraterrestials have been the subject of prose and poetry from the seventeeth century onward. (Dick 1996: 134-135)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Also probably one of those frequent mentions.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Fontenelle, Bernard de 1803. <em>Conversations on the plurality of worlds</em>. London: J. Cundee.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/conversationsonp00font_0/page/n11/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p135a"></a>But it was in science fiction that the alien came alive. In 1897, H.G. Wells brought the invading Martian into literature with his <em>War of the Worlds</em>. In the same year, the German Kantian philosopher <strong>Kurd Lasswitz</strong> ushered in a more benign Martian in <strong><em>Auf Zwei Planeten</em> (On Two Planets)</strong>. In an enormous number of works since then, the alien has become a standard theme of science fiction, used for a variety of purposes. (Dick 1996: 135)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Planets"><em>Two Planets</em></a>. "<u>The story covers topics like colonization, mutually assured destruction and clash of civilizations many generations before these topics came into politics.</u>"</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p135b"></a>The alien has evolved from the beings found in the predictable but immensely popular space opera adventures of Edgar Rice Burroughts to <strong>the philosophical beings of Olaf Stapledon</strong> to the subtle and almost ethereal creatures of Bradbury's <em>Martian Chronicles</em> (1950). C.S. Lewis, in his space trilogy beginning with <em>Out of the Silent Planet</em>, used the alien theme in defense of Christianity. (Dick 1996: 135)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Philosophical beings?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="dick96p135c"></a>In short, during the first half of this century, aliens helped man explore traditional themes from a new and less parochial perspective. One sees in cosmic and theological alien literature <strong>a pattern of search for a higher truth and wisdom, whether embodied in Stapledon's <em>Star Maker</em> or in a variety of other superior beings</strong>. Throughout it all, one also sees the terrestial theme of good versus evil played out across the universe. (Dick 1996: 135)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Looking forward to reading whether Stapledon's <em>Star Maker</em> contains a universal fight between good versus evil.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="wolk90"></a>Wolk, Anthony 1990. Challenge to Boundaries: An Overview of Science Fiction and Fantasy. <em>The English Journal</em> 79(3): 26-31. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/819230">10.2307/819230</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/819230">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wolk90p26"></a>Just what is science fiction? And what is fantasy? What delicious questions to play around with! When pressed, I can't resist the temptation to say that <strong>when a writer feels called upon to alter the vital fabric of the universe, that's science fiction</strong> (not "sci-fi," a term science-fiction writers avoid because it has the hallmark of the heavy-breathing Darth Vader and the BEM, or Bug-Eyed-Monster). For example, adding the person of Frederic Henry to the known world changes its molecular structure. Hence, <em>A Farewell to Arms</em> is science fiction. Enough whimsy. (Wolk 1990: 26)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds exactly contrary to Card's definition concerning "rules", above (cf. <a href="#magyar93p108b">Magyar 1993: 108</a>).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="wolk90p27"></a>Another approach to defining the genre is to separate science fiction from fantasy and both from "realist" literature. (The term "mainstream" really is too arrogant; throw away those brown-paper wrappers and live dangerously.) <strong>If you can work out a chronology and construct a map to get from when and where you are to when and where the story is, that's science fiction</strong>. But J. R. R. Tolkien's Middle Earth, C. S. Lewis's Narnia, and Ursula Le Guin's Earthsea are fantasy. (Wolk 1990: 27)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Still sticking with the topic of <em>possible reality</em>.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="wolk90p29"></a>I've already mentioned Arthur C. Clarke's <em>City and the Stars</em>, which unlocks the imagination in its portrayal of a young boy of the distant future whose curiosity sets him aside from every single person in his supposedly utopian community of Diaspar. Impatient with its sameness, he finds a way out, to Lys, a differently oriented community, in harmony wit hnature, not just mind. For his projections of future history, Clarke drew on Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), <strong>a philosophical novel with a time span that reaches 20,000,000 years from the present</strong>. (Wolk 1990: 29)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool. <em>The City and The Stars</em> is the only one of his works that I'm even remotely familiar with (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2015/04/technology-and-individualism.html">Konopka 2013</a>).</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b2 leon.2004.37.5.416
--><h4><a id="gesselt04"></a>Gessert, George 2004. Review of <em>Oryx and Crake</em> by Margaret Atwood. <em>Leonardo</em> 37(5): 416-417. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1162/leon.2004.37.5.416">10.1162/leon.2004.37.5.416</a> [<u><a href="https://direct.mit.edu/leon/article-abstract/37/5/416/44745/Oryx-and-Crake?redirectedFrom=fulltext">mit.edu</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="gesselt04p416a"></a>The end of the world keeps getting more final. In the past the gods guaranteed a sequel, which is why medieval paintings of Judgment Day are jammed with people, as crowded as subway cars at rush hour. The message is clear: Nobody really dies. Today most of us suspect otherwise: <strong>The end of the world may be absolute and irrevocable, with nothing resembling an afterlife, not even in works, ideas or community</strong>. (Gessert 2004: 416)</blockquote><!--
--><p>In the cosmology of Stapledon's Eighteenth Men we do meet up at the end in the Universal Mind.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="gesselt04p416b"></a>This vision is less than 200 years old. In 1816 Lord Byron expressed it in his poem "Darkness," in which the sun is extinguished. Humanity, at war with itself to the bitter end, dwindles and disappears. Darwin was not particularly concerned about the end of the world, but lent scientific credibility to the idea of human extinction, which for many people is the same thing. H.G. Wells confronted <strong>our extinction</strong> in <em>The Time Machine</em> (1895), and <strong>Olaf Stapledon explored it obsessively in <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), in which humans go extinct in 18 different ways</strong>. (Gessert 2004: 416)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Obsessively"?</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="gesselt04p416c"></a>Robinson Jeffers accepted <strong>our impermanence as a species</strong>, and used it to inform many of his poems. Despite these exceptions, however, few writers had much to say on the subject throughout the 19th century and well into the 20th century. <strong>Save for those rare individuals whe were gifted or burdened with a sense of geological time</strong>, human extinction was largely ignored until 1945. Hiroshima changed everything, including the future. Since World War II, artists, writers and moviemakers have energetically explored our end. (Gessert 2004: 416)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I guess Stapledon is counted among those rare individuals.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="gesselt04p417"></a>The boys play computer games together, favoring ones that involve extinction lore, historical battles or world conquest. They surf the net and discover sites dedicated to open heart surgeries, executions, animal torture and pornography. <strong>On a site called HottTotts, which features child sex in impoverished countries, they first see Oryx, an exquisitely beautiful child prostitute from somewhere in Southeast Asia</strong>. Both boys immediately fall for her, but each keeps his secret from the other. (Gessert 2004: 417)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Margaret Atwood, wtf?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b3 10_1_online
--><h4><a id="wilczek06"></a>Wilczek, Frank 2006. On Absolute Units, III: Absolutely Not? <em>Physics Today</em> 59(5): 10-11. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2216941">10.1063/1.2216941</a> [<u><a href="https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/article/59/5/10/750480/On-Absolute-Units-III-Absolutely-Not">aip.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wilczek06p10a"></a><strong>Absolute units</strong> have their natural home in a program whose roots <strong>go back to Pythagoras</strong>: to calculate the major properties of the physical world we observe in terms of a few input parameters. (He declared, "All things are number.") Given a system of absolute units, we can express all other physical quantities as pure numbers, which we must aspire to calculate theoretically. (Wilczek 2006: 10)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Of course.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wilczek06p10b"></a>But the most disturbing fact, if you're a believing fundamentalist Pythagorean, is that <strong>several of the parameters appear to have values that are fine-tuned to bring forth a universe that contains complex condensed structures, including life as we know it</strong>. If the electron or down quark were a bit lighter, or the up quark a bit heavier, then electrons and protons would combine into neutrons (emitting neutrinos). A world of neutrons does not support stellar burning, complex chemistry, or even the collapse of nebular clouds into solid structures. Make those masses slightly lighter, and deuterium becomes unbound, with catastrophic consequences for the workings of stars and production of nuclei more complex than hydrogen. (Wilczek 2006: 10)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Extremely good stuff.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="wilczek06p11a"></a>The idea that <strong>we find ourselves in one of many possible universes, each with different values of some basic physical parameters</strong>, has its positive sides as well. Famously - or notoriously - <strong>it could help explain the fine-tunings required for life</strong>. Most of the alternative universes would not have those fine-tunings, but there'd be no one around to notice. That sort of <strong>anthropic reasoning</strong> can be used constructively to make predictions if we tie the conditions necessary for life to other, superficially unrelated phenomena. (Wilczek 2006: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We live in the universe "made" for biological life, not in the one peopled by melodies.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="wilczek06p11b"></a>Eastern religions and science fiction writers agree that <strong>it is wondrous and awesome</strong> - not to mention correct - <strong>to contemplate an abundance of universes</strong>. I'll close with a quote from Olaf Stapledon's <em>Star Maker</em><blockquote>So I, in the supreme moment of my cosmic experience, emerged from the mist of my finitude to be confronted with cosmos upon cosmos, and by the light itself that not only illumines but gives life to all. Then immediately the mist closed in on me again.</blockquote>(Wilczek 2006: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Don't yet know what to make of this.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b3 j.futures.2009.04.023
--><h4><a id="dick09"></a>Dick, Steven J. 2009. The postbiological universe and our future in space. <em>Futures</em> 41(8): 578-580. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2009.04.023">10.1016/j.futures.2009.04.023</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328709000780?via%3Dihub">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="dick09p578a"></a>In particular, I want to argue that, <strong>if extraterrestial intelligence exists, cultural evolution must be taken seriously as a part of cosmic evolution</strong>. As we know from Earth, the rate of cultural evolution totally dominates other forms of cosmic evolution. Ten thousand years ago terrestial intelligence was not much different than it is today, still less astronomical objects. But <strong>cultural evolution has caused vast changes in human life since that time</strong>. If intelligent life exists in the universe, we must take into account the long time span during which that intelligence may have evolved culturally. <strong>In the fashion of Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em>, we must contemplate the possibilities of cultural evolution over thousands, millions, or billions of years</strong>. We cannot, of course, predict what might have happened, but we can pose plausible scenarios, scenarios that may have implications for our search. Here I explore one such scenario. (Dick 2009: 578)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We should consider that these visitors may have a much longer history of cultural evolution?</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="dick09p578b"></a><strong>The evolution of the universe</strong> from from the Big Bang to the present, and of its constituent parts include galaxies, stars and planets, has been confirmed only during the last 50 years. That evolution, now known from spacecraft to encompass 13.7 billion years, <strong>has three components: astronomical, biological and cultural</strong>. If cosmic evolution is primarily astronomical, ending in planets, stars and galaxies, we live in a <strong>physical universe</strong>. If the evolution of matter in the universe typically proceeds to life, mind and intelligence we live in what I term the "<strong>biological universe</strong>". And if intelligence is common, inevitably resulting in cultural evolution, I would argue that we may live in a "<strong>postbiological universe</strong>". A postbiological universe is one in which flesh-and-blood intelligence has been largely replaced by <strong>artificial intelligence</strong>. This possibility has been broached before but not seriously considered or taken to its logical conclusion. Each of the three cosmic evolution components, as yet unconfirmed, has implications for the long-term human future in spcae, and more dramatically, for human destiny. (Dick 2009: 578)</blockquote><!--
--><p>An Estonian lady bites some gray little dudes who came to abduct her and says they taste metallic. There's circumstantial alien lore that claims that the smaller grays are unemotional, biologically engineered worker-drones.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dick09p579a"></a>Darwin is justly famous not for proposing biological evolution, but for arguing that the mechanism for biological evolution is natural selection. Unlike natural selection for biology, <strong>there is no consensus on mechanisms for cultural evolution, even though it takes place before our eyes</strong>. Recent Darwinian models for cultural evolution abound, but remain highly controversial, ranging from Dennett's general application of "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" to E.O. Wilson's sociobiology, Boyd and Richerson's detailed version of gene-culture coevolution, and Richard Dawkins' memes. (Dick 2009: 579)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What does semiotics of culture propose for this mechanism?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="dick09p579b"></a>Lacking a robust theory of cultural evolution and its mechanisms, we are reduced to an extrapolation of current trends. There are many possibilities, but in sorting priorities I argue that all other possibilities are subservient to intelligence. I therefore adopt what I term the central principle of cultural evolution, which I refer to as the Intelligence Principle: <strong><em>the maintenance, improvement and perpetuation of knowledge and intelligence is the central driving force of cultural evolution</strong>, and that to the extent intelligence can be improved, it will be improved</em>. In Darwinian terms, knowledge has survival value, or selective advantage, as does intelligence at the species level, a fact that may someday be elucidated by an evolutionary theory of social behavior, whether group selection, selfish gene theory, evolutionary epistemology, or some other Darwinian model. The Intelligence Principle implies that, <strong>given the opportunity to increase intelligence (and thereby knowledge), whether through biotechnology, genetic engineering or artificial intelligence, any society would do so, or fail to do so at its peril</strong>. (Dick 2009: 579)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Does a tool like ChatGPT represent a leap forward in our cultural evolution?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="dick09p580"></a>Whether or not extraterrestials are postbiological, and whether or not <strong>our human successors</strong> become postbiological, one thing is certain: they <strong>will not be like us</strong>. (Dick 2009: 580)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Exceedingly good short paper that I may need to revisit and try to flesh out in my own terms.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b3 S0262-4079%2807%2963042-5
--><h4><a id="robinson07"></a>Robinson, Andrew 2007. Still looking at the stars. <em>New Scientist</em>, 196(2632): 59-60. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(07)63042-5">10.1016/S0262-4079(07)63042-5</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0262407907630425?via%3Dihub">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p59a"></a>By then he had fully embarked on his tireless advocacy of space travel in both fiction and non-fiction, through books such as <em>The Sands of Mars, A Fall of Moondust, The Exploration of Space</em> and <em>Profiles of the Future</em>. Nevertheless, he was amazed that the moon landing happened so soon, in 1969. He had not expected to see it in his lifetime. "<strong>And then I was also surprised, and disappointed, that it wasn't followed up</strong>. We abandoned space for decades." Clarke's screenplay and companion novel for the movie <em>2001: A Space Odyssey</em>, made by Stanley Kubrick in 1968, had imagined the construction of a moon base in the 1990s. (Robinson 2007: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yeah, why is that? (Cue conspiracy theories about ominous large spacecraft following the Apollo 11 moon-walkers with Neil Armstrong reporting "<u>They're here. They're parked on the side of the crater. They're watching us.</u>" over the medical channel. - <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNkmhY_ju8o">Youtube</a>)</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p59a"></a>There is an element of faith in Clarke's attitude to space, though not the religious type. His attitude is more like <strong>a boundless optimism in the power of intelligence</strong>. Such optimism underlies his best-known novels, <em>Childhood's End, 2001</em> and <em>Rendezvous with Rama</em>. Kubrick, who tended to be sparing with his praise, once said of his collaborator: "Arthur somehow manages to capture the hopeless but admirable human desire to know things that can really never be known." (Robinson 2007: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Replace "intelligence" here with "mentality" and you have a fully fledget Stapledonian.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p59c"></a>Many scientists - and astronauts - go further in their admiration, respecting Clarke for his unique combination of scientific knowledge, intellectual originality and literary flair. <strong>J. B. S. Haldane</strong>, Wernher von Braun, Luis Alvarez, Isaac Asimov and Carl Sagan were all <strong>personal friends of Clarke</strong>, as well as fans of his writing. (Robinson 2007: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Him again.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p59d"></a><strong>Moore considers the greatest science fiction books to be <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em> by Olaf Stapledon</strong>, but "these were Stapledon's only two great books, which is why on balance I must make him number two to Arthur". (Robinson 2007: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Moore who? "<u>British astronomer <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patrick_Moore">Patrick Moore</a></u>".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p60a"></a>Yet as a "failed recluse" addicted to email, he is ambivalent about the benefits of everyone being able to communicate instantaneously. "It's the fractal language," he says. "Although everybody is ultimately connected to everybody else, the branches of the fractal universe are so many orders of magnitude away from each other that really nobody knows anyone else. <strong>We will have no common universe of discourse</strong>. You and I can talk together because we know when I mention poets and so on who they are. But <strong>in another generation this sort of conversation may be impossible because everyone will have an enormously wide but shallow background of experience that overlaps by only a few per cent</strong>." (Robinson 2007: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Prophetic. This is presaged by "The Consequences of Literacy" (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/comparative-studies-in-society-and-history/article/abs/consequences-of-literacy/72D83FA8EBC8D43291BE3D7FC1CAEBC0">Goody & Watt 1963</a>).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="robinson07p60b"></a>It may sound like outlandish fantasy, but in 1945 so did communication satellites and landing on the moon. He doesn't always get it right, however: <strong>in 1999 he predicted the last coal mine would close in 2006</strong>. (Robinson 2007: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And we're still opening new ones!?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b3 S0262-4079%2809%2962496-9
--><h4><a id="robinson09"></a>Robinson, Kim Stanley 2009. The fiction of now. <em>New Scientist</em> 203(2726): 46; 48-49. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0262-4079(09)62496-9">10.1016/S0262-4079(09)62496-9</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0262407909624969">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="robinson09p46a"></a><blockquote>8th July 37<br />Dear Mr. Stapledon,<br />I would have thanked you for your book before, but I have been very busy and have only just had time to read it. I don't suppose that I have understood more than a small part - all the same I have understood enough to be greatly interested, and elated too, since sometimes it seems to me that <strong>you are grasping ideas that I have tried to express</strong>, much more fumblingly, in fiction. But you have gone much further and <strong>I can't help envying you - as one does those who reach what one has aimed at</strong>. Many thanks for giving me a copy,<br />yours sincerely,<br />Virginia Woolf</blockquote>This was Virginia Woolf's reply to the influential science fiction writer Olaf Stapledon after he had sent her a copy of his recently published novel <em>Star Maker</em>. In an earlier exchange of letters, she made it clear that <strong>she had also enjoyed previous works of his</strong>, probably including <em>Last and First Men</em> from 1931. These two novels, Stapledon's masterpieces, are <strong>enduring monuments of science fiction and of British literature generally</strong>. Within a decade of Edwin Hubble's discovery of the red shift, which revealed the universe to be vastly bigger than anyone had imagined, <strong>Stapledon's work compressed an entire poetic history of humanity and the cosmos into two slight volumes</strong>. (Robinson 2009: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So that's the Woolf connection. She is mentioned on Wikipedia as having been influenced by Stapledon.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="robinson09p46b"></a>These <strong>strange novels</strong> made a real impact on Woolf. <strong>After reading them, her writing changed</strong>. She had always been interested in writing historically, but her stream-of-consciousness style made that difficult to accomplish. Her character Orlando's fantastically long life, and the chapter "Time Passes" in <em>To the Lighthouse</em>, were two attempts at solving this problem. The modular structure of <em>The Years</em> was another. But after reading <em>Star Maker</em>, she tried harder stil.l In her last years she planned to write a survey of all British literature that she was going to call <em>Anon</em>; and her final novel, <strong><em>Between the Acts</em></strong>, concerns a dramaturge struggling to tell the history of England in the form of a summer village pageant. The novel <strong>ends with Stapledonian imagery, describing our species steeped in the eons</strong>. Woolf's last pages were a kind of science fiction. (Robinson 2009: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>An instance of Stapledon being <em>transformative</em>.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="robinson09p46c"></a>I tell this story here because it has not been told before (<strong>Woolf's letters to Stapledon are in his papers at the University of Liverpool</strong>, and were not included in her <em>Collected Letters</em>); and also because it shows so clearly how open Woolf was to science fiction. When it came to literature, she had no prejudices. She read widely and her judgment was superb. And so I am confident that if she were reading today, she would be reading science fiction along with everything else. And she would still be "greatly interested, and elated too" - because <strong>British science fiction is now in a golden age</strong>. (Robinson 2009: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wonder what else could be stored away there.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="robinson09p46d"></a>The explanation is multiple and complex. <strong>H. G. Wells and Stapledon gave things a tremendous start, of course</strong>. Then the weird, alpha-and-omega dichotomy of Arthur C. Clarke and J. G. Ballard - Clarke with his cheery leap to the stars, Ballard with his apocalyptic introversion - created between them an immense artistic space. (Robinson 2009: 46)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Did Wells and Stapledon set British science fiction on a different footing than colleagues in America?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b5 div-class-title-the-question-are-we-alone-in-different-cultures-div
--><h4><a id="schneider11"></a>Schneider, Jean 2011. The question "Are we alone?" in different cultures. <em>Proceedings of the International Astronomical Union</em> 5(S260): 213-217. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743921311002316">10.1017/S1743921311002316</a> [<u><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/proceedings-of-the-international-astronomical-union/article/question-are-we-alone-in-different-cultures/A211551D8B1E88613A6F2A677EE3B257">cambridge.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="schneider11p213"></a>The question of extraterrestial life in the literature since the Greeks has been compiled in the remarkable books "<strong><em>The Extraterrestial Life Debate 1750-1900 - The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell</em></strong>" (Crowe 1986) and "<strong><em>The Extraterrestial life debate, antiquity to 1915</em></strong>" (Crowe 2008). They are a must on this topic. They represent an almost exhaustive compilation of all authors having expressed an opinion on this debate. (Schneider 2011: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first one is available in parts on <a href="https://books.google.ee/books?id=Ygc5AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=et#v=onepage&q&f=false">Google Books</a>. The second can be <a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b5038594*est">read online</a> via ProQuest.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="schneider11p214a"></a>Another curiosity is that, while the debate has increased in intensity among the scientific community at the end of the 19th century, no philosopher after Schopenhauer was interested in this subject. <strong>Only C.S. Peirce and W. James did vaguely mention the question of extraterrestial life</strong>. This is strange because several philosophers at the beginning of the 20th century, such as Husserl, Cassirer, Wittgenstein, Bergson, were well aware of the scientific developments of their time. To me it remains a mystery. It cannot be explained by ignorance: many novelists like Charles Cros, H.G. Wells, A. Strindberg, Marconi, <strong>Stapledon</strong> and Tristan Bernard <strong>did contribute to an outreach of the extraterrestial life debate in the general culture</strong>. Only in the second half of the 20th century Paul Watzlawick, from the Palo Alto school in sociology, addressed seriously the question of communication with extraterrestials (Watzlawick 1976). (Schneider 2011: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Peirce has a weird habit of showing up in unexpected places.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="schneider11p214b"></a>There seems to be an apparent exception in Jewish literature: <strong>Moses Maimonides</stronG> (circa 1135 - c. 1204) in the "<em>Guide for the Perplexed</em>" says:<blockquote>"The whole mankind at present is existence [...] and every other species of animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the permanent universe [...] it is of great advantage that <strong>man should</strong> know his station, and <strong>not erroneously imagine that the whole universe exists only for him</strong>" (Chapter XII p. 268)</blockquote>But Maimonides was a European Jew living in Córdoba (Spain). He knew well ancient Greeks' work and participated in the cultural atmosphere also represented by Michael Scot (1175-1235) and Albertus Magnus (1193-1280) for instance who were among the Middle Age philosophers supporting the idea of extraterrestial life. (Schneider 2011: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Spinoza was into Maimonides. I wonder if he's included in those compendiums.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="schneider11p214c"></a>Olaf Stapledon (1886-1950), <strong>a British psychologist</strong>, envisaged communication with extraterrestial in his "<em>Last and First Men</em>" (Stapledon 1930). (Schneider 2011: 213, footnote)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A hwat?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="schneider11p215"></a>As such, it opened the possibility of <strong><em>extra</em>-polation, the possibility of transfering to distant objects characteristics of objects within our reach</strong>, like harboring life for "other worlds". (Schneider 2011: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I've met this term so much recently but I guess I didn't have a straightforward definition at hand.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b5 retrieve(4)
--><h4><a id="gunn05"></a>Gunn, James 2005. Tales From Tomorrow. <em>Science & Spirit</em> 16(4): 66-69. [<u><a href="https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA171212581&sid=googleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=abs&issn=10869808&p=AONE&sw=w&userGroupName=anon%7E18e77dd5&aty=open-web-entry">gale.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="gunn05p66ja67"></a>In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the themes sounded by Shelley and her contemporaries were echoed in Jules Verne's tales of exploration and in H. G. Wells' warnings of the cultural hubris preceding sudden downfall. Electronics entrepreneur <strong>Hugo Gernsbeck saw the new literature, which he termed "scientification," as a way of sparking an interest in science and technology among young readers</strong>. In 1926, he launched <em>Amazing Stories</em>, the first magazine devoted to science fiction. In it (and <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> in the magazine <em>Wonder Stories</em>, which appeared five years later), he published, as he explained in the inaugural issue, "the Jules Verne, H.G. Wells, and Edgar Allan Poe type of story - a charming romance intermingled with <strong>scientific fact and prophetic vision</strong>." The future, in Gernback's works, belonged to those who could understand science and put it to use - although villains also could twist science to their own nefarious ends. (Gunn 2005: 66-67)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Science fiction was meant to be "prophetic" almost from the beginning.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="gunn05p67"></a>While there were <strong>few science fiction books to speak of until 1946</strong>, what evolved through magazines like Gernsback's was a literature of ideas and, more important, a literature of change and anticipation. As <strong>a Darwinian fiction that has at its heart a belief in the adaptability of the human species</strong>, science fiction itself naturally evolves - and, indeed, science fiction is at its best when it is most innovative. At least for a time, a belief in the power of rationality and the survival - even the dominance - of the human species underpinned most works of science fiction. (Gunn 2005: 67)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It doesn't look to me like there were so very few science fiction books in that era. Perhaps I should start keeping track of the earliest ones.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="gunn05p69"></a>In some science fiction works, human beings transcend their limitations, often with the help of special powers and new abilities. <strong>Stanley Waterloo's <em>The Story of Ab</em></stronG> and <strong>Jack London's <em>Before Adam</em></strong>, both of which were published around the turn of the twentieth century and tell of humanity's first evolutionary steps, are early examples of stories of transcendence. W. Olaf Stapledone expanded on the theme with <em>Last and First Men</em>, <strong>a 1930 work that traces the future history of humanity through 2 billion years and seventeen evolutionary races</strong>. Humanity emigrates to Venus and finally to Neptune, where it faces its final doom with dignity and the hope of casting human spores upon the solar wind. (Gunn 2005: 69)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Waterloo, Stanley 1897. <em>The Story of Ab; A Tale Of The Time of The Cave Men</em>. Chicago: Way & Williams.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/storyofabtaleoft00wate/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>London, Jack 1907. <em>Before Adam</em>. New York: The Macmillan Company.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/beforeadam00londrich/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b5 retrieve(5)
--><h4><a id="cirkovic07"></a>Cirkovic, Milan M. 2007. Review of <em>Natural History</em> by Justina Robson. <em>Journal of Evolution and Technology</em> 16(1): 167-170. [<u><a href="http://jetpress.org/v16/cirkovic.html">jetpress.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p167"></a><blockquote>But as the millions of years go by, so too, if we may judge the future by the past, <strong>will humanity as we know it ultimately yield place to some other animal form?</strong> What form? Whence evolved? We cannot say. But some Casmic Intellect, watching the mature capacities of this unknown form, will almost certainly judge it to be more highly evolved, of greater value in the scheme of things, than ourselves. <strong>On Earth man has no permanent home</strong>; and if, as I believe, absolute values are never destroyed, those which humanity carries must be preserved elsewhere than on this globe. (Ernest W. Barnes, 1933: 503)</blockquote>Rare are the books where an excerpt from a philosophical or scientific tract, like the one quoted above, can be regarded as almost a <em>spoiler</em> of the intricate and densely woven literary plot. (Cirkovic 2007: 167)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hot damn. Sadly inaccessible:</p><!-- [1933: 503]
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Barnes, Ernest William 1933. <em>Scientific Theory and Religion, Gifford Lectures 1927-1929</em>. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p170"></a><strong>Barnes, the Bishop of Birmingham</strong>, was a distinguished mathematician, theologian and <strong>an early futurist</strong>, whose prescient ideas about <strong>cosmic evolution</strong> are closely related to the similar ideas of his more famous contemporaries, such as H. G. Wells, O. Stapledon, J. B. S. Haldane or <strong>K. E. Tsiolkovsky</strong>. (Cirkovic 2007: 170)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The others are already familiar names. The last one is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Konstantin_Tsiolkovsky">Konstantin Tsiolkovsky</a>.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Tsiolkovsky, Konstantin Eduardovich 1960. <em>The Call of the Cosmos</em>. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/tsiolkovsky-the-call-of-the-cosmos/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p167ja168"></a><strong>The Forged are still human</strong>, at least legally, <strong>but</strong> they are also unequivocally Other. <strong>Many are animal based</strong>: arachnids, hive-minded insectoids or avians (like one of the three main characters, an unconventional Forged engineer named Roc <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Handslicer Corvax). <strong>Others are vast spaceships</strong>. Between these are hybrids, like the shuttle Ironhorse AnimaMekTek Aurora, "a smooth blue oval with a long, graceful tail like a gigantic airborne manta ray" (p. 64), and beyond all of them are <strong>the Gaiaforms</strong>. These are, vast creatures designed to carry out the megaengineering terraforming tasks that have rendered the Moon and Mars habitable. (Cirkovic 2007: 167-168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Almost like Stapledon's Eighteenth Men.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p168a"></a>The title of the book is itself a delightful, multilayered provocation: Robson takes a half-forgotten term that encompassed much of what we now call the earth and life sciences, together with some aspects of astrobiology and planetary science, and makes it <strong>a symbol of the unity between cosmological, biological and cultural evolution</strong>. (Cirkovic 2007: 168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These categories again. (cf. <a href="#dick09p579a">Dick 2009: 579</a>)</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p168b"></a><em>Natural History</em> belongs to a sub-genre of science fiction that might be called "<strong>the transcendence novel</strong>". For classic prototypes, think of Clarke's <em>Childhood's End</em> and the Strugatsky brothers' <em>The Ugly Swans</em>. Egan's <em>Distress</em> and <em>Schild's Ladder</em>, Vinge's <em>A Fire upon the Deep</em>, Baxter's <em>Destiny's Children</em> trilogy, and Schroeder's brilliant <em>Lady of Mazes</em> are more recent work with the same theme. (By contrast, Wright's <em>Golden Transcendence</em> fails to join to this select club; it is more of an <em>anti</em>-transcendence novel, since it shows the reemergence of some all-too-human weaknesses and demerits in a "golden age".) <strong>Overarching all of these is the mighty cathedral of their great forebear, Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930)</strong>. (Cirkovic 2007: 168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="cirkovic07p170"></a>All in all, Robson's book is a worthy addition to the small library of novels that give serious and careful consideration to the ramifications of <strong>a Stapledonian vision of humanity's cosmic evolution</strong>. <em>Natural History</em> is not perfect, but it provides an enjoyable and colorful journey. If you are interested in the fate of humankind and what Georges Lemaitre called the "searching of souls as well as of spectra", you'll feel welcome on this lyrical voyage. (Cirkovic 2007: 170)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b5 S1743921311002316
--><h4><a id="baxter03"></a>Baxter, Stephen 2003. Baby Boomers: Writers and Their Origins. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 30(3): 477-482. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4241205">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="baxter03p477"></a>I wrote down my first real science fiction story in 1973, at the age of sixteen. Called "Barrier," it is a Fermi paradox story, with vague hints at <strong>Clarke-Stapledon uplift</strong>. Everybody dies in the end - I <em>was</em> just sixteen. This first story was thoroughly soaked with the concern about which I'm still writing now. (Baxter 2003: 477)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What's that?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="baxter03p478"></a>While before I had simply been engrossed by Mike Noble's marvelously drawn <em>Fireball XL5</em>, now I started to see how the <em>TV21</em> editors had tried to join up their raw material into a coherent, interconnected future history. It was a bit rickety, but it worked. I think this was my first introduction to <strong>the central rhetorical power of science fiction: these aren't just fantastic dreams; the future may not be like this, but it <em>could</em> be</strong>. I suspect it's no surprise that I would go on to develop my own future history. (Baxter 2003: 478)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The Possible Reality Principle, again.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="baxter03p480"></a>The stuff you discover at about that age, as you take conscious control of your interests, seems crucial. <strong>At twelve</strong> - having had his mind expanded by a book on Atlantis, and by Verne, and by a copy of Wells's <em>War of the Worlds</em> (1898) which he read surreptitiously at his local W.H. Smith's - <strong>Clarke himself discovered Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930) in the Minehead Public Library</strong>. When he was thirteen he found in W.H. Smith's window David Lasser's non-fiction book <em>The Conquest of Space</em> (1931), which he badgered his Aunt Nellie to buy. These books would, of course, set the pattern of Clarke's career. (Baxter 2003: 480)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So specific. Too specific?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b7 j.futures.2004.03.012
--><h4><a id="cocks04"></a>Cocks, Doug 2004. Quo vadis <em>Homo sapiens</em>? <em>Futures</em> 36(10): 1139-1145. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2004.03.012">0.1016/j.futures.2004.03.012</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328704000631?via%3Dihub">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1139"></a>Supposing we survive the next thousand years, <strong>will we eventually</strong> go extinct as most species do or will we <strong>evolve</strong> into a new species with which one might empathise? Or <strong>into a whole lineage of species as in Olaf Stapledon's gerat sci-fi novel</strong>, Last Men, First Men? And, supposingwe continue to evolve, <strong>will that new species or its descendants survive the death of the sun</strong> as an energy and light source in five billion or so years? Not to mention a clutch of other cosmic challenges, from asteroids to 55 hour days. Beyond that, there is the ultimate question as to if, when and how the universe will end and whether, in some sense, life might best that challenge. (Cocks 2004: 1139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How would we best that challenge? By hopping to a younger universe?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1140a"></a><strong>Even the hardest of sciences is wary of making sharp predictions nowadays</strong> and multiple scenarios of plausible possible futures are the future-gazer's primary tool. <strong>Scenarios are no more and no less than thoughtful hypotheses which time will test</strong>. Knowing what has happened in the deep to near past, and perhaps why, informs the <strong>scenariographer</strong>'s choice of what to ask about the long future and to suggest both optimistic and pessimistic answers. (Cocks 2004: 1140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Scenariographer" gives about 87 results. Did you mean scenographer?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1140b"></a>Politically, it looks as though we will have to live through <strong>another century of power politics</strong>, one in which America's struggle to strengthen its economic, cultural and political dominance will be increasingly challenged. (Cocks 2004: 1140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not wrong.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1141"></a>Shrugging and moving on, the good news for the third millenium, the next thousand years, is that it would be surprising to see the extinction of <em>Homo sapiens</em>. However, the millennium does contain the seeds of two 'worst case scenarios'. <strong>One is runaway global warming and climate disruption. The other is a rapid start to the next ice age</strong>, even as we exhaust the world's supplies of fossil energy, including uranium. Already, the 12 000 year inter-glacial we are enjoying is the longest of the last million years. (Cocks 2004: 1141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So it might become either too hot or too cold.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1142"></a>Perhaps what elites really fear is that making social goals explicit invites dissection of both their inherent worthiness and the speed at which they are being approached. There is also a fear of naïve <strong>utopian</strong>ism with its 3000 years of <strong>visions of societies pursuing ideal end-states which are foreseen to remain unchanged once achieved</strong>. (Cocks 2004: 1142)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Human nature is too fluid for a stagnant social state, etc.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="cocks04p1144"></a>Yet, there is something lacking. Making big plans and implementing demanding programs requires more time and knowledge than we will ever hvae. If people are to jump the cracks that will appear in the best laid plans, they will ned to be buoyed by passion and enthusiasm. And for that they will need to know what story they are part of. History and the historical sciences offer Darwin's children a 'creation myth', but <strong>where is the 'destiny myth' in modern secular societies</strong>? What is the role of the lineage in the unfolding evolutionary play? (Cocks 2004: 1144)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I know of one such myth-maker.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b7 retrieve
--><h4><a id="herrick09"></a>Herrick, James A. 2009. Sci-Fi's Brave New World. <em>Christianity Today</em>, February 6: 20-25. [<u><a href="https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2009/february/16.20.html">christianitytoday.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p21a"></a>Despite these far-out scenarios, viewers don't leave movies such as <em>Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull, Hancock, X-Men</em>, and <em>Contact</em> - or television programs such as <em>The X-Files</em> or <em>Heroes</em> - scratching their heads in confusion. We are intrigued, but not surprised. Why? Because <strong>stories of advanced extraterrestials, ancient human-alien contact, superior intelligences roaming the universe, and emerging super-races have grown familiar through repeated exposure</strong>. Thanks to the longstanding efforts of a wide range of artists, popular writers, and even scientists, <strong>we immediately recognize intelligent aliens and advanced humans</strong>. We now see space and the future as sources of hope. (Herrick 2009: 21)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Repeated exposure" another aspect to consider. How exposed were the contemporary readers of O.S. to the ideas he put forth?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p21b"></a><strong>The culture-shaping force of science fiction storytellers</strong> may be more significant and more widespread than we imagin. That's because they <strong>trade in myth</strong>. By <em>myth</em>, I mean <strong>a transcendent story</strong> that helps us make sense of our place in the cosmos. This common definition makes the Christian gospel, as C.S. Lewis suggested, "God's myth" - not because it is fiction, but because it is a story that gives ultimate meaning. <strong>We live in an age in which new myths</strong>, born mostly of science-fueled imaginations, <strong>are crafted and propagated at an unprecedented rate</strong>. (Herrick 2009: 21)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Quotable. O.S. set out to intentionally craft a new myth.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p22"></a>Recently deceased scientists and science fiction authors <strong>Sir Arthur C. Clarke</strong> captured a generation of readers with his spellbinding visions of the future. The English myth-maker <strong>built on the foundation of elder countrymen such as H. G. Wells and Olaf Stapledon</strong>. Clarke's early short story "The Sentinel" (1948) and novel <em>Childhood's End</em> (1953) set humanity in a cosmos controlled by evolution and advanced aliens. But his mesmerizing 1968 collaboration with Stanley Kubrick, <em>2001: A Space Odyssey</em>, revealed Clarke's force as a <em>religious</em> visionary. In that story, the new humanity arrives as an embryonic god floating in space, contemplating the planet of its origin. (Herrick 2009: 22)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I guess this mere mention of the Clarke-Stapledon connection will become a pattern.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p23a"></a>Science fiction is important to scientists interested in transcendent themes such as <strong>the design and purpose of the cosmos and the future of humanity</strong>. Dyson, <strong>a devoted reader of Stapledon</strong>, writes, "Science is my territory, but science fiction is the landscape of my dreams." Ironically, the universe that science stripped of the supernatural is being resupplied with <strong>deities and redemptive purposes</strong> by science fiction writers and moviemakers. Apparently, we cannot do without myths. (Herrick 2009: 23)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The design and purpose of the cosmos in <em>SM</em> and the future of humanity in <em>L&FM</em>. What are "redemptive purposes"?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p23b"></a>Recent polls indicate that a majority of <strong>American expect human contact with extraterrestials during this millennium</strong>. Moreover, we anticipate that the aliens will be "friendly" and "superior." Major scientific figures, including Nikola Tesla, Stephen Hawking, Francis Crick, and Carl Sagan, among others, have popularized their ideas. (Herrick 2009: 23)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Disclosure incoming sometime in the next 976 years...</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p23c"></a><strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong> (1886-1950), a philosopher by training, <strong>wrote science fiction</strong> in the 1930s and 1940s <strong>that some consider the most masterful even penned</strong>. In <em>Star Maker</em> (1937), this Englishman placed humanity on <strong>a cosmic evolutionary journey that ends in near divinity</strong>. In <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), he portrayed the possibility of genetic engineering. <em>Odd John</em> (1935) told the story of a post-human vanguard of highly evolved, inordinately intelligent children. Stapledon believed we needed a new mythology for the dawning technological age. <strong>At times, he even cast himself as a mystic with an urgent spiritual message</strong>. His influence on science fiction writers such as Sir Arthur C. Clarke, as well as scientists such as Freeman Dyson, was profound. (Herrick 2009: 23)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A decent summary.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p24a"></a>Kurzweil's vision squares with that of <stronG>earlier transhumanists such as biologist Sir Julian Sorell Huxley</strong>. Freeing our thinking from present biological limitations is "an essentially spiritual undertaking." (Herrick 2009: 24)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Julian Huxley was a transhumanist?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p24b"></a>Respected physicist Freeman <strong>Dyson</strong> (b. 1923) <strong>acknowledges Stapledon's impact on his thinking</strong>. Indeed, <strong>Dyson's imagined future</strong> of humans' limitless evolutionary advancement and technological development <strong>is much like Stapledon's</strong>. Dyson's speculative proposals - most notably, creating a vast sphere to capture a star's energy to fuel our future - have sometimes shown up in science fiction narratives. <strong>In <em>Imagined Worlds</em> (1997), Dyson speculates that humanity will continue to evolve, perhaps into separate groups, including ones that are part machine</strong>. Disagreements may arise, but space is vast enough to accommodate us all. (Herrick 2009: 24)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Dyson, Freeman J. 1998. <em>Imagined Worlds</em>. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/imaginedworlds00dyso/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p25a"></a>Controversial Princeton biologist <strong>Lee M. Silver</strong> (b. 1952) <strong>imagines a human future in which present biology is not destiny</strong>. What we are now is not what we shall become. Boundaries separating species are largely linguistic and moral constructions. Restrictions on human enhancement research - including cloning - reflect the lingering effects of ancient religious taboos. The word <em>eugenics</em> may scare people, but he believes it points to a hopeful use of science: human enhancement. Perhaps a new term is needed: <em>reprogenetics</em>, the blending of reproductive and genetic technologies. We already alter our bodies technologically in a variety of ways, and there is no good reason to obstruct the arrival of new enhancement technologies. So his argument goes. In <em>Remaking Eden: How Genetic Engineering and Cloning Will Transform the American Family</em> (1998) and <em>Challenging Nature: The Clash of Science and Spirituality at the New Frontiers of Life</em> (2006), Silver argues for radical openness to a new humanity. <strong>We must take charge of our own evolution. His scientific projections complement Stapledon's mythic vision of an ever-changing, ever-progressing human race</strong>. (Herrick 2009: 25)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah, one of the Third Men already living among us!</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p25b"></a><strong>The biblical account</strong> of human origins and purpose, of our predicament as well as our redemption, and of the nature and purpose of the cosmos we inhabit, <strong>is emotionalyl, spiritually, and rationally more satisfying</strong> than modern myths featuring aliens, starships, divine evolution, hidden knowledge, and biomechanical post-humanity. (Herrick 2009: 25)</blockquote><!--
--><p>[Citation needed]</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="herrick09p25c"></a>Concerned about the growing influence of writers like Stapledon and the popular scientist <strong>J. B. S. Haldane</strong>, Lewis crafted his trilogy for readers whose spiritual hope was being turned to contemplate the grandeur of a fresh Creation and the terrible potential of a catastrophic rejection of divine protection. (Herrick 2009: 25)</blockquote><!--
--><p>More evidence that Haldane might have been cool.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b7 s0265-9646%2800%2900024-2
--><h4><a id="fogg00"></a>Fogg, Martyn J. 2000. The ethicas dimensions of space settlement. <em>Space Policy</em> 16(3): 205-211. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/S0265-9646(00)00024-2">10.1016/S0265-9646(00)00024-2</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964600000242">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p205a"></a>Mars raises the questions of the rights and wrongs of the enterprise more forcefully because: (a) <strong>Mars may possess a primitive biota</strong>; and (b) it may be possible to terraform Mars and transform the entire planet into a living world. (Fogg 2000: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Dubious but not impossible.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p205b"></a><strong>One of the unique features of the human species is the ability of its individuals both to imagine and articulate future possibilities</strong>. The age-old dream of space travel, for example, is now a reality. The natural extension of this dream has it that where humans can travel and explore, they might also settle and so the idea of <em>space settlement</em> has never been far behind that of travel. <strong>Living somewhere else but Earth has been a theme in the space literature as far back as the writings of Tsiolkovskii</strong> and, if the space program can be said to have a purpose beyond that of exploration, this purpose is occasionally articulated in terms of settlement, such as in 1986 when the US National Commission on Space stated its conclusion that the proper long-lange ambition of the US civilian space program should be to establish free societies on new worlds "from the highlands of the Moon, to the plains of Mars". (Fogg 2000: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Grand opener. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky has already passed through here (cf. <a href="#cirkovic07p170">Cirkovic 2007: 170</a>, above).</blockquote><!--</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p206a"></a><strong>This concept</strong> of engineering habitable worlds out of barren ones is <strong>known as <em>terraforming</em></strong>. The concept <strong>first appeared in Olaf Stapledon's fictional tour de force <em>Last and First Men</em> in 1930</strong>, and was given its name by Jack Williamson in a short story <em>Collision Orbit</em> in 1942. Sagan, in 1961, was the first scientist to speculate about terraforming in the pages of a technical journal, nad by 1976 NASA had published the proceedings of a workshop examining the feasibility of terraforming Mars. (Fogg 2000: 206)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another <em>first</em> for Olaf.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p206b"></a>The mining of asteroids when there are so many, or quarries on the Moon when it is already so bleak, or settlement in empty space provoke few moral reflections; but the biological transformation of an entire world makes people sit up and think - to confront similar questions to those we are saking of our relationship with the Earth. We are increasingly seeing the need for <strong>an ethical relationship with our planet</strong>: should we be thinking similarly with respect to the extraterrestial environment? (Fogg 2000: 206)</blockquote><!--
--><p>No, lets destroy our planetary biosphere and go extinct with it. That's what good "gardeners" do. They poison the area and then die of the fumes.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p206c"></a>An early attempt to remedy this conceptual deficiency occurred at a multidisciplinary conference <strong>'Environmental Ethics and the Solar System'</strong>, held at the University of Georgia in 1985. <strong>The proceedings</strong>, with the varying views of space technologists, astronomers, philosophers, ecologists, lawyers and theologians <strong>were later published</strong>, but represented purely initial explorations in the subject rather than a consensus prescription for the future. This would be premature, but the approach is correct - since <strong>a <em>cosmocentric</em> environmental ethic</strong> aims to be proactive rather than reactive, it must proceed by thought experiment. (Fogg 2000: 206)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Hargrove, Eugene C. (ed.) 1986. <em>Beyond Spaceship Earth: Environmental Ethics and the Solar System</em>. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p209a"></a>Rolston, an exponent of <em>Preservationism</em>, has therefore defined the uniqueness set as containing any object - alive or not - of <strong>"formed integrity", or "worthy of a proper name", generated by the "spontaneous construction" that arises from the playing out of the laws of nature</strong>. His prescription is that, "humans ought to preserve projects of formed integrity wherever found". Mars, and all its features - large and small - would be entitled protection within Rolston's ethic. <strong>Rocks <em>would</em> have rights on Mars</strong>.<br />To those who are bemused by this idea, Marshall (another cosmic preservationist) ripostes with the belief that intrinsic value is not imposed by human beings, but merely involve human recognition of value. To him, rocks also have a viewpoint that commands respect: existing in, "<strong>a blissful state of satory only afforded to non-living entities</strong>". With respect to Mars especially, Marshall advocates strict enforcement policies to preserve the planet in its existing, or 'natural' state. (Fogg 2000: 209)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Made me think of how in <em>L&FM</em> many millions of years of human activity have eroded the largest mountains down to mere hills. Should mountains have a right to exist?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p209b"></a>To the zoocentrist, <strong>humans are</strong> unnecessary cruel to our fellow creatures; to the ecocentrist, we are seen on the one hand as nothing special, and on the other, <strong>uniquely arrogant and destructive</strong>. To the cosmic preservationist, the idea of letting loose such <strong>a wicked and cancerous species</strong> on the Universe at large is nothing short of an abomination. (Fogg 2000: 209)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Enter: the zoo hypothesis (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#mclaughlin83p313b">McLaughlin 1983: 313</a>).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="fogg00p210"></a>Consider two scenarios where life is brought to a barren Mars and the differing reactions environmental philosophers might have to each. For the purposes of the first, let us propose that we discover that microbial life from Earth has already reached Mars, having arrived there at some time in the distant past by some sort of <strong><em>panspermia</em></strong> process. The possibility that bacteria could make such a journey across space was first proposed by <strong>Arrhenius</strong> a century ago, and has been revived in a different guise recently when it was realised that planets exchange pieces of themselves following impacts energetic enough to propel debris into space. Bacteria living in the middle of an ejecta fragment might be sufficiently shielded from heat shock and radiation to survive many years in transit and the final trauma of touchdown onto the new world. (Fogg 2000: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Arrhenius, Svante 1908. <em>Worlds in the Making: The Evolution of the Universe</em>. Translated by H. Borns. New York; London: Harper & Brothers Publishers.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/worldsinmakingev00arrhrich/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b9 030801801679377
--><h4><a id="porter01"></a>Porter, Roy 2001. Medical futures. <em>Interdisciplinary Science Reviews</em> 26(1): 35-42. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/030801801679377">10.1179/030801801679377</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/030801801679377">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p35a"></a>More hopefully, back in 1936, Sir Crisp English informed readers of the British Medical journal that <strong>within twenty years 'it will be common practice for you to visit patients by aeroplane'</strong>. 'Telephones with television will be in regular practical use', he predicted: 'the doctor will see on the television screen the tongues and tonsils of his patients; [...] he will also see his guineas, but will be unable to reach them.' (Porter 2001: 35)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted for O.S. obsession with flying. In his vision of the future, the Second Men would indeed have flown everywhere - including doctors visiting their patients in another skyscraper.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p35b"></a>Raise the question of scientific utopias, and the historical tale is, by and large, clear cut. <strong>From the Bible and Plato through t othe Renaissance, dreams of ideal societies were neither futuristic - they were rooted in nostalgic fantasies of a lost golden age - nor were they high science and high tech</strong>. For Sir Thomas More, what made for utopia - meaning, literally, 'nowhere' - was peace, equality, and justice, and these were the fruits of reason. (Porter 2001: 35)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps why the premodern utopia is no longer in fashion. Very few today would prefer a life without modern technology.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p35ja36"></a>Optimism as to science's power to transform the world - in Bacon's words, for the 'glory of God and the relief of man's estate' - shines forth bright and clear in the writings of <strong>John Wilkins</strong>, Bishop of Chester and founder member of the Royal Society. Wilkins was sure great discoveries lay ahead, thanks in particular to the potential of mathematics and mechanics. His <strong>'Essay towards a real character, and a philosophical language' (1668)</strong> looked to <strong>a universal language</strong> to 'repair the ruins of Babel', <strong>reunify speech</strong>, and <strong>ensure the speedy progress of knowledge</strong>. Pinning high hopes upon mechanical inventions for benefiting humankind, not least <strong>'flying chariots' which would speed men to the moon</strong>, Wilkins radiated a noble optimism: 'there is an earnestness and hungering after <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> novelty, which dots still adhere unto all our natures; and it is part of that primitive image, that wide extent and infinite capacity at first created in the heart of man.' (Porter 2001: 35-36)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I've come across sufficiently many mentions of this work that I should add it to the list.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Wilkins, John 1668. <em>An Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language</em>. London: S. A. Gellibrand.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/AnEssayTowardsARealCharacterAndAPhilosophicalLanguage/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u><a href="https://www.google.ee/books/edition/An_Essay_Towards_a_Real_Character_and_a/BCCtZjBtiEYC?hl=en&gbpv=0">Google Books</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p36"></a>Faith in science's capacity to forge a better future became the lifeblood, of course, of the visions of progress typical of the Enlightenment. 'All knowledge will be subdivided and extended', declared that Dissenting polymath, Joseph Priestley, aware of the pedigree,<blockquote>and <em>knowledge</em>, as Lord Bacon observes, being <em>power</em>, the human powers will, in fact, be increased; nature, including both its materials, and its laws, will be more at our command; <strong>men will make their situation in this world abundantly more easy and comfortable; they will probably prolong their existence in it, and will grow daily more happy, each in himself, and more able</strong> (and, I believe, more disposed) <strong>to communicate happiness to others</strong>. Thus, <em>whatever was the beginning of this world, <strong>the end will be glorious and parasidiacal</strong>, beyond what our imaginations can now conceive</em>.</blockquote>Scientific and technological utopianism in this vein has continued, mediated through H. G. Wells and much of science fiction, right up to the present. (Porter 2001: 36)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Joseph Phlogiston Priestley wrote a political treatise?</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Priestley, Joseph 1771. <em>An Essay on the First Principles of Government: And on the Nature of Political, Civil, and Religious Liberty</em>. London: J. Johnson.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/essayonfirstprin00prie_3/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p37"></a>Within a generation, however, the sanitarian receded from the utopian dream to be replaced by the eugenist. Harnessing evolutionism to eugenics, <strong>Edward Bulwer-Lytton's</strong> novel <strong>'The coming race'</strong> fantasised a society dominated by an elite possessed by 'vril-power' - the term was clearl a hybrid of 'will-power' and 'virile-power'. For his part, <strong>Francis Galton</strong> saw in eugenics the only way to head off national degradation. The state, Darwin's cousin suggested in his utopian fragment '<strong>Kantsaywhere</strong>', should issue PG ('passed for genetics') certificates to those qualified to breed, while those who failed might be shunted off into celibate labour colonies. (Porter 2001: 37)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have read of one but not the other. This "Kantsaywhere" was not finished. Excerpts can be read <a href="https://archive.org/details/palifeletterslab03pearuoft/page/414/mode/2up">here</a> (pp. 414-424).</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p38"></a>Eugenics was also high on the agenda of <strong>J. B. S. Haldane's 'Daedalus: or science and the future'</strong> (1923), which <strong>proposed controlled breeding</strong>, facilitated by ectogenetic reproduction. Without eugenics, he warned, civilisation would collapse 'owing to the greater fertility of the less desirable members of the population in almost all countries'. 'Man's world' (1926), a novel by J. B. S.'s wife, Charlotte, looked to a Wellsian future in which politicians and philosophers had been superseded by an elite of scientists and eugenists. (Porter 2001: 38)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Okay, so Haldane might not have been that cool. This makes it sound like the original author of <em>Idiocracy</em> (2006).</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p38"></a>Swift aside a long and honest tradition of thinking has cast the doctor as part of the problem not the solution, from the biblican 'physician, heal thyself', through to Shaw's dictum that <strong>the medical profession, like all others, is a conspiracy against the laity</strong>. Death and doctors have long been represented as being in partnership - or, in the jargon of the 1970s guru Ivan Illich, <strnog>much illness is 'iatrogenic', that is, actually caused by doctors</strong>. In the light of such radical doubts, rather than dream of a society in which the physician is kind, visionaries have tended to imagine perfect health reigning in a society entirely free of them. (Porter 2001: 38)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This has been proven amply in recent years. Elderly overweight patients go to the hospital with mere shortness of breath or innocent lung infection and there the evil doctors give them the coronavirus and suffocate them to death with various masks, as they are wont to do.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p40"></a>A comparable conquest of the body, albeit by other means, was mooted in the twentieth century by another rationalist, <strong>the Communist crystallographer J. D. Bernal</strong>, who looked forward to a time when 'Bodies [...] would be left far behind.' The godless <strong>Bernal's utopia was predicated upon an antipathy to the body</strong>. The limbs were essentially parasites, consuming nine-tenths of the worker's energy, and <strong>there was 'blackmail' in the maintenance and exercise the body needed to prevent disease</strong>, with the higher and nobler organs wearing themselves out meeting the physiological needs of those essentially wasteful appendages. Much as for Godwin, man's true destiny lay in loftier and ever more exacting thought, and the body was holding him back. All that must change.<br />Published in <strong>1929</strong>, Bernal's <strong>'The World, the Flesh, and the devil'</strong> confronted 'the three enemies of the Rational Soul' and showed how science would vanquish them. <strong>Biology would correct bodily defects, psychology would manage man's 'desires and fears, his imagination and stupidities', while physics would tame 'the massive, unintelligent forces of nature'</strong>, thereby conferring Promethean powers upon man. Gratefully <strong>drawing on the ideas advanced by Haldane in his 'Daedalus'</strong>, Bernal predicted for the man of the future the casting off of the redundant and obselescent body so as <strong>to ensure a secular immortality for the intellect</strong>. First, he was willing to accept, man would enjoy (Ref. 27, p. 45)<blockquote>anything from sixty to a hundred and twenty years of larval, unspecialized existence - surely enough to satisfy the advocates of the natural life. In this stage he [...] can occupy his time (without the conscience of wasting it) in dancing, poetry and love-making, and perhaps incidentally take part in the reproductive capacity. Then he will leave the body whose potentialities he should have sufficiently explored.</blockquote>Thanks to a sequence of daring surgical operations, the unreconstituted physical body would then be abandoned, to be replaced by an artificial, purely intellectual, existence, with <strong>the brain encased in a mechanical shell immersed in a constantly circulating fluid</strong> - Bernal's idea of Heaven (Ref. 27, pp. 47-48):<blockquote>Instead of the present body structure we should have the whole framework of some very rigid material, probably not metal but one of the new fibrous substnaces. In shape it might well be rather a short cylinder. Inside the cylinder, and supported very carefully to prevent shock, is the brain with its nerve connections, immersed in a liquid of the nature of cerebro-spinal fluid, kept circulating over it at a uniform temperature. <strong>The brain and nerve cells are kept supplied with fresh oxygenated blood and drained of de-oxygenated blood through their arteries and veins which connect outside the cylinder to the artificial heart-lung digestive system</strong>. [...] The brain, thus guaranteed continues awareness, is <strong>connected in the anterior of the case with</strong> its immediate sense organs, <strong>the eye and the ear</strong> - which will probably retain this connection for a long time.</blockquote>And so forth. 'The new man must appear to those who have not contemplated him before as a strange, monstrous and inhuman creature', he cheerfully admitted, 'but he is only the logical outcome of the type of humanity that exists at present. [...] Normal man is an evolutionary dead end; mechanical man, apparently a break in organic evolution, is actually more in the true tradition of a further evolution.' ('Man will become merely <strong>a detached headpiece</strong>', commented a newspaper, reporting on Bernal's book: 'No More Sex!') (Porter 2001: 40)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh wow. Brain in a vat or head in a jar. Like in <em>Futurama</em>. I had no idea someone had taken Socrates' complaints about the body (in <em>Apology</em>) to such an extent.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bernal, John Desmond 1929. <em>The World, the Flesh and the Devil: An Enquiry into the Future of the Three Enemies of the Rational Soul</em>. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.171486">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="porter01p41"></a><strong>Such a vision of brain</strong> triumphant over bodies proved popular in the utopian thinking of the scientists of the first half of the twentieth century; it <strong>also dominates the science fiction of</strong> Bernal's contemporary <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong>, whose novels were childhood favorites of John Maynard Smith. In 'Last and first men' (1930) and other futuristic fiction, Stapledon pictured <strong>great brains served by self-regulating pumps functioning in place of the heart, chemical factories serving as digestive organs, electric fans as lungs, optic nerves growing out along five foot long probosces with ears on stalks</strong>, and housed in forty foot diameter turrets, operating as the factories of mind. As any bookshop reveals, the genre continues today, notably in the concept of the cyborg. (Porter 2001: 41)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Exactly why Bernal caught me off goard. Evidently this idea was in the air. There's also H. P. Lovecraft's "The Fungi From Yuggoth" (written 1929-1930) and "The Jameson Satellite" by Neil R. Jones from 1931. The claim about Stapledon possibly originating the "cyborg" with his giant brains comes from here (p. 151 - "IV. The Long Vision of Olaf Stapledon"):</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Armytage, W. H. G. 1968. <em>Yesterday's Tomorrows: A Historical Survey of Future Societies</em>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/yesterdaystomorr0000unse/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b5630170*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b22 j.1467-9973.2009.01596.x
--><h4><a id="eliot09"></a>Eliot, Christopher 2009. Review of <em>Darwinism and Its Discontents</em> by Michael Ruse. <em>Metaphilosophy</em> 40(5): 702-710. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01596.x">10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01596.x</a> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01596.x">wiley.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="eliot09p702a"></a>Yet, Ruse's plan for this book hardly resembles a mystery. Its twelve chapters have similar structures, and each arrives at essentially the same conclusion. Each opens with several <strong>gripes raised against Darwinism in various periods</strong> from its origin to the present, usefully citing and quoting their authors and proponents. Expressions of discontent are both historically contextualized and then treated with a philosophical eye to the strength of their conceptual challenges. Then, each gripe is systematically dispatched, and each chapter closes with cheerful assurance - no problem here! (Eliot 2009: 702)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This sounds quite appealing.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="eliot09p702b"></a>Trained as a philosopher, Ruse has rich and varied experience with Darwinism beyond philosophy. He has written an authoritative historical work on the Darwinian revolution (<em>The Darwinian Revolution</em>, 1979) and <strong>a comprehensive historical analysis of the concept of progress in evolutionary biology (<em>Monad to Man</em>, 1997)</strong>, <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Eliot 2009: 702)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Ruse, Michael 1996. <em>Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology</em>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/monadtomanconcep0000ruse/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="eliot09p703"></a>What the novels and plays discussed have in common is painting Darwinism as ugly or frightening as it applies to human beings and our well-being. <strong>Samuel Butler's <em>Erewhon</em> (1872) warries that machines might evolve to take over the world</strong>; Ruse argues that this particular dystopia is predicated on a false Lamarckism. (Eliot 2009: 703)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I didn't know <em>Erewhon</em> was about <em>that</em> (haven't read it yet, but the things are heading I very well might).</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="eliot09p703ja704"></a>George Bernard Shaw's play <strong><em>Back to Methuselah</em></strong> (1921) presents <strong>a disconcerting fantasy of a perfected state of humanity</strong>, prefaced by remarks <strong>aligning Darwin with the endorsement of odious capitalism and militarism</strong>. Shaw implicitly contrasts his own utopian fantasy with what he takes to be Darwin's. Ruse replies shrewdly: "Those who reject Darwinism because it does not support their vision of the future might <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> first stop and ask themselves what kind of future they really want" (266). (Eliot 2009: 703-704)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That was argued pretty convincingly on the basis of Darwin's Malthusian influences <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2021/05/a-trans-historical-given.html">here</a>. I now notice that one of Ruse's papers is the first one we were given to read in that course.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="eliot09p704"></a><strong>Images of human progress that flirt with social Darwinism</strong> (both enthusiastically and not so) <strong>appear in</strong> H. G. Well's <em>Time Machine</em> (1895), Olaf <strong>Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930)</strong>, Frank Norris's <em>Octopus</em> (1901), and Ian McEwan's <em>Enduring Love</em> (1997). These novelists invoke the intertwined and sometimes conflicting ideas of progress, collectivity, determinism, and freedom that emerge from understanding ourselves as evolved and evolving as a group, and thus subject to alarming biological forces. Ruse's response to the various fears they advance is mainly to reject the close connection each forges between Darwinism and determinism. (Eliot 2009: 704)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, nice. Ruse mentions Stapledon briefly <a href="https://archive.org/details/darwinismitsdisc0000ruse/page/266/mode/2up?q=Stapledon">here</a>, in a chapter literally titled "Literature".</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- b5 embor.2008.68_______________________
--><h4><a id="hughes08"></a>Hughes, James J. 2008. Back to the future: Contemporary biopolitics in 1920s' British futurism. <em>Science & Society</em> 9(S1): 59-63. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fembor.2008.68">10.1038/embor.2008.68</a> [<u><a href="https://www.embopress.org/doi/full/10.1038/embor.2008.68">embopress.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p59a"></a>However, it was in the English-speaking world of the early twentieth century when more far-reaching speculations - largely the science fiction of Herbert George <strong>Wells</strong> (1866-1946), Olaf <strong>Stapledon</strong> (1886-1950) and Aldous <strong>Huxley</strong> (1894-1963) - triggered an earnest debate about <strong>the use of science to shape human evolution</strong>. These fictional works were, in turn, inspired and motivated by the essays of John Burdon Sanderson <strong>Haldane</strong> (1894-1964), John Desmond <strong>Bernal</strong> (1901-1971), and the radical, political and scientific milieu in 1920s' England. (Hughes 2008: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>By now <em>all</em> of these names are familiar to me.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p59b"></a>His military experiences left Haldane profoundly disillusioned, and he became convinced that human beings must use science and reason to improve every aspect of human life. He later commented that, "<strong>the scientific point of view must</strong> come out of the laboratory and <strong>be applied to</strong> the events of daily life. It is foolish to think that the outlook which has already revolutionized industry, agriculture, war and medicine will prove useless when applied to <strong>the family, the nation, or the human race</strong>" (Haldane, 1933). (Hughes 2008: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Using science to improve society somewhat? The 1920s were a crazy time.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p59c"></a>In 1923, Haldane gave <strong>a talk</strong> to the 'Heretics Club' at Cambridge University <strong>titled, <em>Daedalus or Science and the Future</em></strong>, which was subsequently published, and <strong>triggeled an intense debate</strong> of his ideas. The title of his speech and the essay actually hinted at the importance of biology: according to Greek mythology, <strong>Daedalus was the king of Crete who bred a bull and a woman to make the Minotaur</strong>. (Hughes 2008: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Some context.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p59d"></a>Although science and technology do increase human powers for both good and evil, Haldane remained optimistic that such powers can be turned to the good to "bring mankind more and more together, to render life more and more complex, artificial and rich in possibilities." In his essay, he projected <strong>a prosperous future world society with clean and abundant energy, which would eventually be united under one government</strong>. (Hughes 2008: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>No, let's open more coal plants and wage national wars effectively over gas fields. Yeah!</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p60a"></a>He imagined a future democracy in which candidates for office would compete over who could <strong>make the next generation taller, healthier or smarter</strong>, or even over whether children should have prehensile tails. (Hughes 2008: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The influence on Stapledon is palpable. Replace the prehensile tail with an astronomical eye and you have the Eighteenth Men.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p60b"></a>As mentioned above, the speech by Haldane triggered an intense debate on posthumanity and the role of science and technology and the role of science and technology in improving mankind. Within a year, the British philosopher <strong>Bertrand Russell</strong> (1872-1970) <strong>delivered a direct response</strong> to <em>Daedalus</em> <strong>titled, <em>Icarus, or the Future of Science</em></strong> (Russell 1924; Rubin 2005), as part of a series of speeches sponsored by the Fabian Society under the title 'Is Civilization Decaying?' The arguments made by Russell reflected the tension within the Enlightenment tradition between optimism and pessimism about technology. For techno-optimists, such as Haldane, science, reason and technological progress were complements to social equality and individual liberty. For secular, left-wing pessimists, including Russell, science and technology would always add to the power of dominant classes and military machines. (Hughes 2008: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>More context. The title of Russell's <em>Icarus</em> is not unfamiliar.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p60c"></a>Aldous Huxley was the brother of the biologist <strong>Julian Huxley</strong>, and both were friends of Haldane. Yet, where Julian enthusiastically endorsed the biofuturism of Haldane and <strong>went on to coin the term 'transhumanism'</strong> (Huxley 1957), Aldous was repelled by it. In his <strong><em>Brave New World</em> - a direct response to the ideas of <em>Daedalus</em></strong> - Aldous depicted a future of controlled reproduction, genetic engineering, neurotechnology and a world socialist state as an alienated hell (Huxley 1932). (Hughes 2008: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh. <a href="#herrick09p24a">Question</a> answered!</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p61a"></a>Haldane wrote two more essays that can be regarded as sequels to <em>Daedalus</em>. The first was published in <em>Harpers Magazine</em> in <strong>1927</strong> as, <strong><em>The Last Judgment, a Scientist's Vision of the Future of Man</em></strong> (Haldane 1927; Adams 2000). Deeply <strong>influenced by the novels of Wells</strong>, Haldane argued that <strong>the further evolution of humanity will take place over millions of years</strong>, just as our evolution to this point took millions of years. He projected the creation of a united Utopian world, reshaped to satisfy human desires, over the next couple of million years. Disease is eliminated and <strong>average life expectancy is 3,000 years</strong>. Life is focused on friendships, music, art, eating, drinking and being merry. (Hughes 2008: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps the source of Stapledon's lax casting of millions upon millions of years and increasingly extending the lifetimes of his subjects.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p61b"></a>Similarly to the lunar insectile Selenite society in the Wells' novel, <em>First Men in the Moon</em> (Wells 1901), Haldane suggested that this Utopia would become <strong>stagnant</strong>. Our 'Lotus Eater' descendents would stop pursuing scientific discovery or space exploration. After 25 million years, people would even be <strong>indifferent</strong> to the impending destruction of all life on Earth owing to human exploitation of the rotation of the moon for energy. (Hughes 2008: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See the many long languid absent-minded periods in <em>L&FM</em>.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p61ja62"></a>The Christian fantasist Clive Staples <strong>Lewis</strong> (1898-1963) commented that the "brilliant, though to my mind depraved" vision of human enhancement and defeating death in the <em>Last Judgment</em> was a threat to Christianity (Lewis 1966; Adams 2000; <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Green & Hopper 1974). Lewis responded with the <em>Perelandra Trilogy</em>, which comprises three science fiction novels set on Mars, Venus and Earth, and <strong>caricatured Haldane as the physicist Weston</strong>, who was possessed by Satan. (Hughes 2008: 61-62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, professor Weston was supposed to be Haldane, not Stapledon? (cf. <a href="#shelton95p139a">Shelton 1995: 139</a>, above)</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p62a"></a>At the other end of the spectrum was <strong>the philosopher</strong> Stapledon, who was immediately taken with the futurism in the <em>Last Judgment</em>, and wrote his own <strong>influential history</strong> of the next billions of years of human evolution: <em>Last and First Men: A Story of the Near and Far Future</em> (Stapledon 1930). His work described <strong>17 distinct posthuman species succeeding '<em>Homo sapiens</em> 1.0'</strong>, who drive themselves to near extinction in apocalyptic warfare over a 100,000-year span. Some of the posthuman varieties include winged species, dwarves, giants and brains without bodies. (Hughes 2008: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yup, yup, yup.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p62b"></a>After receiving his bachelor's degree in mathematics and science from Cambridge University in 1922, the 21-year-old <strong>Bernal</strong> began to work at the Davy-Faraday laboratory in London, UK, where he <strong>determined the structure of graphite in 1924</strong>. In the 1930s, he pioneered the use of X-rays to determine the structure of matter, thereby <strong>launching the field of microbiology</strong>. Rosalind Franklin, who first visualized the double-helix structure of DNA, studied the technique in the Bernal laboratory. When Bernal died in 1971, many Nobel laureates had been taught by him or influenced by his scientific work. (Hughes 2008: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>You crazy, brilliant bastard.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p62c"></a>The 1939 essay <strong><em>Social Function of Science</em></strong> by Bernal is considered <strong>The first text on the sociology of science</strong> (Bernal 1939). (Hughes 2008: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bernal, John Desmond 1939. <em>The Social Function of Science</em>. London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.188098">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p62d"></a>However, the essay by Bernal is best known for being the first explicit proposal of brain-computer interfaces and cyborgs. In the future, he wrote, humans would spend their first 120 years of life enjoying their organic bodies, until they reached sufficient maturity to transfer their brains to non-organic, cyborg bodies. <strong>Cyborg minds would be connected to each other through the 'ether' to form collectives capable of much more than isolated individuals</strong>. "Barriers would be down: <strong>feeling would truly communicate itself, memories would be held in common</strong>, and yet in all this, identity and continuity of individual development would not be lost." Eventually, he suggested, these <strong>cyborg 'hive' minds</strong> would evolve beyond bodies altogether. (Hughes 2008: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, a possible candidate for Stapledon's obsession with collective minds?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p62e"></a>Shortly before his death, Haldane wrote a final essay, <strong><em>Biological Possibilities for the Human Species in the Next Ten Thousand Years</em></strong>, in which he expressed deep concerns about the threat of nuclear war and whether humanity has any future (Haldane 1963). Having lived to see Stalinism and fascism, <strong>Haldane was no longer as convinced of the desirability of world government as a solution to conflict</strong>, noting that the prospect of "a tyrant world state is equally sinister". However, he noted that, "a few centuries of Stalinism or technocracy might be a cheap price to pay for the unification of mankind". (Hughes 2008: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yeah... At least he was not blindly optimistic up till the end.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p63a"></a><strong>Haldane coined the term 'clone'</strong> and suggested that people with extraordinary abilities should be cloned. He also suggested that humans could acquire desirable animal traits through transgenic engineering. (Hughes 2008: 63)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The surprises just keep on coming.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hughes08p63b"></a>Yet, as we see in this British episode of the 1920s, the <strong>biofuturists</strong> - Wells, Haldane, Stapledon and Bernal - surely recognize the dystopian possibilities; indeed, they are often the first ones to give warnings about them. Yet they also recognize the risks if humanity stays the way it is, and the unlikelihood that human evolution has halted or will stop. (Hughes 2008: 63)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I desperately needed this term. Excellent paper. J.B.S. Haldane's father, John Scott Haldane, too, deserves some looking into.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-73439064182840777482023-11-28T00:32:00.000-08:002023-11-28T00:32:55.094-08:00A Catapathic Grouping<!-- A Catapathic Grouping
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#sawyer96">Sawyer 1996. Adult Services</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#leslie93">Leslie 1993. A Spinozistic Vision of God</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#lowenthal95">Lowenthal 1995. The Forfeit of the Future</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#drake98">Drake 1998. Introduction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#linsley94">Linsley 1994. Utopia Will Not Be Televised</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#sawyer98">Sawyer 1998. "Dreaming Real"</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#fitting92">Fitting 1992. Reconsiderations of the Separatist Paradigm in Recent Feminist Science Fiction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#enders91">Enders 1991. Lars Gustafsson: Life, Landscape, and Labyrinths</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#vorda90">Vorda 1990. The Forging of Science Fiction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#fischer93">Fischer 1993. A Story of the Utopian Vision of the World</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#martin99">Martin 1999. Genes as drugs</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#mccaffery91">McCaffery 1991. An Interview with Jack Williamson</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#willis95">Willis 1995. The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 1895-1939</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
06
--><h4><a id="sawyer96"></a>Sawyer, Andy 1996. Adult Services. <em>RQ</em> 36(1): 41-45. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20863044">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer96p41"></a>Science fiction (sf) is by no means just hard science written by scientists for other boffins. True, <strong>much sf is only one step beyond the "legitimate" speculation of the scientific paper and the extrapolative article</strong>, and a considerable number of scientists - and non-scientists - have been seduced into a fascination with the way the universe works by reading authors like Athur C. Clarke. But other branches of sf explore utopias and dystopias, or take current philosophical or political ideas and explore where they may lead. Far from being a minority interest, sf has something for everyone. (Sawyer 1996: 41)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sometimes the science fiction writer pesters his scientist friends for ideas about possible futures.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer96p42a"></a>The University of Liverpool was attracted to the Science Fiction Foundation Collection because of its potential for international research, and because the Department of English was planning <strong>an M.A. in Science Fiction Studies</strong> - the first taught postgraduate course in the field in the United Kingdom - for which a world-class collection of books, magazines, critical monographs, and journals would be a clear asset. There had already been something of an sf tradition in <strong>Liverpool</strong>: the <strong>University Library held the archive of Olaf Stapledon</strong>, whose gigantic philosophical epic, <em>Last and First Men</em>, is <strong>one of the most influential books in the entire field</strong>. The arrival of the Science Fiction Foundation Collection was almost immediately followed by significant archive and manuscript deposits from the Liverpool horror writer, Ramsey Campbell, and the family of the late Eric Frank Russell (another Liverpool sf writer). (Sawyer 1996: 42)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olaf_Stapledon">Stapledon</a> was awarded a PhD degree in philosophy from the University of Liverpool in 1925</u>".</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer96p42"></a>Where the major literary bibliographies are of little use, it is vitally important to know where to find information, and full use of networks of friends, fans, and fanzines is necessary. In fact, <strong>the bibliography of sf is well-covered compared to other forms of writing</strong>, and there are a number of essential reference works. (Sawyer 1996: 42)</blockquote><!--
--><p>True. There's a website - <a href="https://www.isfdb.org/cgi-bin/ea.cgi?81">isfdb.org</a> - that meticulously documents the releases of science fiction books. Even in Estonian there is <a href="http://baas.ulme.ee/?autor=880&teos=10836">Baas</a>, a website dedicated to user reviews of science fiction works specifically.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer96p43"></a>Media inquiries form a third market. Part of the function of the Science Fiction Foundation has always been to inform the media, and newspapers, TV, and radio are always there in the background with requests for information. Sometimes these are serious: <strong>a journalist writing about current research into telepathy wants to know about attempts to describe the phenomenon in fiction</strong>; a TV praduction crew preparing a major series on how we have imagined the future wants suggestions about writers to feature; a publisher producing a glossy encyclopedia of sf wants shots of book and magazine covers. (Sawyer 1996: 43)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just this perfectly normal and serious subject - telepathy.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 11 0016-3287_2895_2900017-q
--><h4><a id="leslie93"></a>Leslie, John 1993. A Spinozistic Vision of God. <em>Religious Studies</em> 29(3): 277-285. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20019619">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="leslie93p277"></a>Now, I find nothing too stupefying here. In fact, I go so far as to say that if there were absolutely no things - no people or other existents - then there would still be ethical truths: the truth, for example, that <strong>it was a pity that nobody was having fun with a chess problem</strong>, and the truth that it was fortunate that nobody was being burned alive. Even in an absence of all existents, ethical truths would be real and important. They would carry weight despite how there would <em>ex hypothesi</em> exist nobody who judged them weighty. (Leslie 1993: 277)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Fun With Chess Problems</em> sounds like a book title.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="leslie93p277ja278"></a>Is belief in God's reality sensible? It very definitely could be, if it helped to solve three puzzles. The first is the puzzle of why the world's events fall into the orderly patterns which we call patterns of Causation. The second is that of <strong>why those patterns are of a sort leading to the existence of life and of</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>intelligence</strong>. And the third - the biggest of the three, the puzzle whose solution could answer the other two puzzles as well - is why there is any world at all: why Reality includes actual existents and not just such platonic truths as that two sets of two chess-problem-solvers would necessarily make four, or that the absence of a world of people being burned alive was fortunate. (Leslie 1993: 277-278)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is the universe <em>biased</em> to create intelligent life?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="leslie93p278"></a>Just what would God be? At least a very knowledgeable and powerful person, obviously? No, it is not at all obvious that God would be that. The neoplatonic theory that God, although real, <em>is not a being</em>, has greatly influenced many theologians: Greek Orthodox ones above all, but also such Catholics as Hans Küng and such Protestants as Paul Tillich. <strong>God</strong>, on this theory, <strong>is</strong> not a person but <strong>the world's 'power of being'</strong>, a power with an ethical aspect. (Leslie 1993: 278)</blockquote><!--
--><p>God is love (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#searby89p4">Searby 1989: 4</a>).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="leslie93p281"></a>The suggested solution is as follows. Nothing exists beyond a divided mind, or perhaps an infinite collection of divine minds. This, though, does not deny real existence to you and to me. Instead you and I are inevitable aspects of the fact that a divine mind knows everything, or at least (if that is different) everything worth knowing. <strong>You and I are parts of an immensely knowledgeable mind, it being good that it have parts of this kind</strong>. We of course are not directly aware of this. What we are directly aware of, is our considerable ignorance and confusion. But a divine mind, if knowing everything, would have to know just how it felt to be you or me, and hence how it felt to be ignorant and confused about a great many matters. We are people who can be conceived without contradiction, and a mind which did not know exactly what it felt like to be such people would <em>ipso facto</em> not know everything. What is more it would, one hopes, be missing something well worth knowing. Yet knowing it would have to involve actually feeling it (or, at the very least, having once felt it or something very much like it, although this could seem far from sufficient for divinely complete knowledge). Compare know you cannot know just how it feels to experience the colour red, without ever actually experiencing it. (Leslie 1993: 281)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The, uh, <em>God is feeling himself</em> line of thought. </p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="leslie93p285"></a>While these last ideas can seem very bizarre, they are not particularly original. You will find very much the same ones in <strong>the philosophically vigorous science fiction of Olaf Stapledon</strong> (1930: section 4 of chapter 15) and in papers by Frank Tipler (1989, for instance), and they have turned up again and again over the long history of religious thought. (Leslie 1993: 285)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Indeed the cosmology of the Last Men sounds somewhat similar.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Tipler, Frank J. 1989. The omega point as <em>Eschaton</em>: answers to Pannenberg's question for scientists. <em>Zygon</em> 24: 217-253. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1989.tb01112.x">10.1111/j.1467-9744.1989.tb01112.x</a></u> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1989.tb01112.x">wiley.com</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 11 0016-3287_2895_2900017-q
--><h4><a id="lowenthal95"></a>Lowenthal, David 1995. The Forfeit of the Future. <em>Futures</em> 27(4): 385-395. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(95)00017-Q">10.1016/0016-3287(95)00017-Q</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/001632879500017Q">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lowenthal95p185"></a>Disaffection with the future stems in part from its growing uncertainty. <strong>The more complex we see our world to be, the harder it becomes to predict outcomes of our actions</strong>. Unease stems from too much as well as too little knowledge. Enhanced powers of forecasting exacerbate doubts about our ability to cope with changes foreseen or unforeseen. Whether concerns are <strong>cosmic</strong> (comet collisions such as bombarding Jupiter in July 1994), <strong>genetic</strong> (mutant life-forms), or <strong>ecological</strong> (loss of species diversity), the future we glimpse seems more a fearsome than a Brave New World. (Lowenthal 1995: 185)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cf. Gibsonian inability to imagine the future. The categories of concerns is pretty neat (L&FM has them all). </p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="lowenthal95p386a"></a>Futurism was 'suspiciously like a period styl, a neo-gothic of the Machine Age, as revealed in the Art-Deco skyscrapers of New York in the twenties'. The archetypal future was 'a city of gleaming, tightly clustered towers, with helicopters fluttering about their heads and monorails snaking around their feet; all enclosed [...] under a vast transparent dome'. <strong>Life there, mocked the visionary Olaf Stapledon, would be 'unmitigated bliss among circumstances perfectly suited to a fixed human nature'</strong>. (Lowenthal 1995: 386)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Reference to Stapledon's critique of utopianism in the preface to L&FM.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="lowenthal95p386b"></a>In the mid-1970s Banham got posters 'from some Futures operation and they were all <em>hand-lettered!</em>'; he knew then that the future had had it. 'Pictures of windmills and families holding hands; [...] what kind of future is that? Where's your white heat of technology? Where's your computer typefaces and those backward-sloping numerals that glow at you out of pocket calculators? Where's that homely old future we all grew up with?' It had vanished with the wind of hope. <strong>Technological paradise, succumbed to World War II, Hiroshima, and postwar planning. Of the modernist future only nostalgic memories now remain</strong>. (Lowenthal 1995: 386)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wishing for a pastoral future.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lowenthal95p387"></a>The assumption of eternal sameness bolstered conclusions about the future drawn from the past. Secular prognoses were based on exemplary historical evidence framed within a constant human nature; <strong><em>sub specie aeternitatis</em>, nothing really rovel could arise</strong>. Whether the future was deduced from faith or from sober calculation, it was foreseeable because processes would continue to be what they always had been. 'He who wishes to foretell the future must look into the past', as Machiavelli put it, 'for all the things on each have at all times a similarity with those of the past'. (Lowenthal 1995: 387)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Huh? What is this interpretation of <em>sub specie aeternitatis</em>?</p><!--
8-9 --><blockquote><a id="lowenthal95p391ja392"></a>H G Wells is customarily remembered as a great champion of the future. But, when he tried to trace its lineaments, the future's thinness and sameness appalled him. <strong>Its handsome but characterless buildings, its healthy and happy people devoid of personal distinction, left Wells with 'an incurable effect of unreality'</strong>. By contrast, any past institution, however irrational or preposterous, had for Wells 'an effect of realness and rightness no untried thing may share. It has ripened, it has been <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> christened with blood, it has been stained and mellowed by handling, it has been rounded and dented to the softened contours that we associate with life'. By contrast <strong>the anticipated future, however rational, 'seems strange and inhuman'</strong>. No wonder then that Banham's Futurist future died so little mourned. (Lowenthal 1995: 391-392)</blockquote><!--
--><p>From <em>A Modern Utopia</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 12 Drake-Introduction-1998
--><h4><a id="drake98"></a>Drake, H. L. 1998. Introduction. <em>Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts</em> 9(4): 257-267. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43308365">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p257"></a>Plato's allegory of the cave illustrates that <strong>we</strong>, as a species, <strong>are yet prisoners of oru own mental poverties</strong>. As Samuel Stumpf describes Plato's allegory we "recognize as reality only the shadows formed on the wall...." (53). The theme for this <em>Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts</em> special issue on "mental abilities" in science fiction and science fantasy stories is derived from Plato's ideas as well as those of two contemporary academics: <strong>Hans Moravec's "postbiological" plans</strong> and Richard Dawkins' "memetics" (information replicators). The model that Moravec provides dares to suggest <strong>a brain macromutation</strong> in contrast to the slow and unpredictable "natural selection" process of Charles Darwin, who maintained that "the variability, which we almost universally meet with in our domestic productions, is not directly produced [...] by <strong>man</strong>; he <strong>can neither originate varieties, nor prevent their occurrence</strong>; he can preserve and accumulate such as do occur" (Bates & Humphrey, 143). (Drake 1998: 257)</blockquote><!--
--><p>In contrast with Stapledon's future, wherein man does create varieties, both intentionally and accidentally.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p257ja258"></a>In his nonfiction book, <em>Mind Children</em>, Moravec theorizes about <strong>transferring recordings of human intelligence to robots</strong>. Those machines would subsequently add to the human mind transfers which they have received, in subsequently reproducing their mechanical selves: "<strong>Our culture will then be able to evolve independently of human biology and its limitations</strong>, passing instead directly from generation to generation of ever <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> more capable intelligent machinery" (4). Moravec suggests that <strong>only by way of such a noncorporeal development can <em>homo sapens</em> exist in and move through interstellar space</strong>. For, after all, as Brian Attebery has proffered, "the only thing that is colonizable is the self." (Drake 1998: 257-258)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Become machines, conquer the galaxy. What ever could go wrong.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p258ja259"></a>Fiction authors whose stories are featured in this <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <em>JFA</em> collection of articles struggle with these Moravecian and Atteberian and Dawkins extrapolations: the perpetuity and development of human "intelligence"; non-<em>terra firma</em> environments for our "minds"; the liberation of humanity from <strong>the excruciating slowness of Darwinian gradualism</strong>; and, the construction of more appropriate "memes" (Dawkins, <em>Watchmaker</em>, 158) regarding nonmythopoeic human immortality. (Drake 1998: 258-259)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good phrase. Some changes take tens of millions of years to effect.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p259"></a>James Gunn believes that perhaps the first science fiction novel having to do with mental abilities is <strong>John Davys Beresford's <em>The Hampdenshire Wonder</em></strong>, 1911 (letter, 1996). Although the story of <em>The Hampdenshire Wonder</em> is set in early twentieth century rural England, the tale fits most, if not all, of Gunn's definition(s) of science fiction: (1) considerations of a future that holds differences from the past or present; (2) <strong><em>homo sapiens</em> thinking in terms of themselves as a species</strong>; (3) <em>homo sapiens</em> maintaining open minds about themselves and the nature of the universe (<em>Road</em> 3, xi); (4) a Darwinian approach, in that environment affects <em>homo sapiens</em> psychologically as well as physically; and, (5) the cognitive ability to behave in spite of environment ("Worldview," 95). (Drake 1998: 259)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Never heard of it. Humanity thinking about itself as a totality, though, is a salient feature. E.g. aliens can't come and say "take us to your leader" because humanity doesn't have a single representative; we are still making war with each other.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Beresford, John Davys 1911. <em>The Hampdenshire Wonder</em>. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd. </u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/hampdenshirewond00bereuoft/page/n7/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
8-9 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p263ja264"></a><strong>Susan Stratton establishes a rationale for "psience,"</strong> the partnership between psi and technology. Stratton's paper features four authors - Muriel Jaeger, <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong>, Robert Heinlein and Sally Miller Gearhart - whose works not only <strong>exemplify psience</strong> but also offer ideas regarding how <strong>psi is necessary for interpersonal communication</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>in order to keep the humaneness in humanity</strong>. By discussing her featured authors, she establishes a case for psience saving <em>homo sapiens</em> from alienation with universe(s). (Drake 1998: 263-264)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Stratton, Susan 1998. Psi and Technology in Science Fiction. <em>Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts</em> 9(4): 324-335.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43308370">JSTOR</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="drake98p264"></a>More transcendental issues arise in other essays. George Nicholas takes <strong>a spiritual look</strong> at another Stapledon work - <em>Last And First Men</em> - for the sense of <strong>how psi and other mental abilities can span the centuries between early <em>homo sapiens</em> and the last of our race</strong>. Nicholas's article points up the poignant - quasi-Christian and certainly quasi-Kantian - realization by the last of our race that <strong>there is something noncorporeal and nontechnological that in the final analysis has made humans humane</strong>, as perhaps no other sentients in universe(s) are or ever can be. Nicholas establishes a case for Stapledon's <em>Last And First Men</em> showing that <strong>our race is a unique work of art leading to an "epiphany of consciousness."</strong> (Drake 1998: 264)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Where is this?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 16 Linsley-UtopiaTelevisedRivera-1994
--><h4><a id="linsley94"></a>Linsley, Robert 1994. Utopia Will Not Be Televised: Rivera at Rockefeller Center. <em>Oxford Art Journal</em> 17(2): 48-62. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1360574">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p48"></a>These historical 'facts' are enough to account for why the mural was destroyed, but they don't begin to suggest the full historical resonance of the piece, a resonance set into vibration by its destruction. The memory of Rivera's mural today crystallizes for us <strong>a complex network of relationships in the history of science, the history of utopian thought, economic and social history, and the history of popular culture</strong>. (Linsley 1994: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>History of science in a mural?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p50a"></a>The central section of the mural is <strong>a vision of the entirety of nature</strong>, from the astronomical universe down to the atom and the cell, thoroughly penetrated and transformed by technology. In the middle of the image <strong>a large hand holding a glowing sphere</strong> emerges from some ambiguous machine. Inside this sphere are schematic renderings of atomic nuclei and of cell division. This sets out one of the major themes of the piece: <strong>the interrelationship of the organic and inorganic, of the biological world and the physical universe, and ultimately of mankind and the machine</strong>. The sphere is placed against a sectional backdrop illustrating the political and social struggles of the thirties. A benign scientific domination of nature is clearly situated in the mural as a product of the dialectic of history, as a component of a world also transformed socially. (Linsley 1994: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have to admit, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man_at_the_Crossroads#/media/File:Libro_Los_Viejos_Abuelos_Foto_68.png">the mural itself</a> (at least the extant copy) looks awesome.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p50b"></a>Having already perfected the technology of radio long before Marconi, Tesla had left his invention on the shelf, so to speak, and failed to develop its commercial potential. Instead, he tried to continue his researches into the broader area of energy transmission, and these led to the construction of the Wardenclyffe tower on Long Island (<em>Fig. 5</em>), intended as both a transatlantic radio station and a centre for the wireless broadcast of energy. <strong>The notion of broadcast energy is thoroughly utopian. Unlimited energy free to be drawn out of the air anywhere would transform the world, eliminating at a stroke all developmental and economic differences. Such an invention would permit decentralization of the economy and hence a break up of existing power structures</strong>. It was also totally impractical under the current social order, for the cost of generating the power to be broadcast could never be recoupled from the users. The energy could not be sold. (Linsley 1994: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How different the 20th century could have become.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p52"></a>The average pulp science fiction story featured an inane adventure plot with a few grandiose ideas about the cosmos tacked on to answer the conventions of the genre, or, alternatively, <strong>grandiose ideas about time, space and human destiny</strong> (some of which were also rather interesting) with <strong>an inane adventure plot</strong> tacked on to meet the demands of the market. (Linsley 1994: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another pretty decent definition of science fiction. Particularly salient for me - grandiose ideas about human destiny.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p53a"></a>As an associate of Trotsky, Rivera would naturally lay claim to <strong>an authentic Leninism, in opposition to Stalin's encouragement of the cult of Lenin as legitimation for his own power</strong>. It is significant that Stalin used the cult of Lenin in his propaganda for the build up of industrial power during the five-year plans. <strong>Rivera's Leninism remains utopian</strong> - he tries to capture the themes of centralized planning and industrialization at an earlier moment when the hope for a total transformation of the world had not yet been reduced to calls for increased output of tractors. (Linsley 1994: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not the best but also not the worst.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p53b"></a>While doing invaluable work for G.E., Steinmetz was convinced that he was really working for the greater good of humanity. He thought that the vast American industrial concerns were accumulations of social capital, and of course of socialized labour, on such a scale that they represented transitional stages toward <strong>an inevitable socialism</strong>. These ideas were similar to those held by Rivera. They were also the kind of thoughts that would be pondered by the owners of American business, at least the more open minded, and those more experienced in profiting from new technologies, such as the Rockefellers and David Sarnoff, as they wondered how to protect their own position in a world that seemed to be rapidly changing. (Linsley 1994: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah, the era of Eugene V. Debs and Upton Sinclair.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p54"></a><strong>For the inventors, radio was primarily a form of two-way communication: wireless telegraphy</strong>. It was Sarnoff who arrived independently at the idea of mass produced home radio sets receiving broadcasts of music and advertising, and he more than anyone is responsible for the institution of broadcasting as we know it today. For a utopian like Tesla, radio was a spin-off from the more important project of wireless power transmission. For a capitalist such as Sarnoff, <strong>wireless energy transmission was an impractical pipe dream</strong>, whereas radio was eminently exploitable. The difference between these two points of view is dramatized by a newspaper debate between Sarnoff and the professional utopian visionary, H. G. Wells. In 1927, commenting on the puerility of radio programming, Wells had said:<blockquote>My opinion (is) that the future of broadcasting is like the future of crossword puzzles and Oxford trousers, a very trivial future indeed.</blockquote>Sarnoff saw things somewhat differently: 'In broadcasting we have a force, an instrumentality greater than any that has yet come to mankind.' Some of Sarnoff's recorded statements give us a clearer indication of what he was thinking of:<blockquote>[T]hrough the institution of broadcasting, <strong>radio is the first universal system of <em>one-way communication</em> developed by man</strong>. No other agency can speak with a single voice at the same instant to millions of people. ... The greatest problem of mass communication that is likely to face us in the next national emergency is the problem of counteracting the deluge of enemy propaganda that might pour in on us through the air. (<em>emphasis mine</em>)</blockquote>Sarnoff shows an early awareness of the propagandistic possibilities of broadcasting, framed within an internationalism that would resonate with Rockefeller's own. (Linsley 1994: 54)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something similar is occurring in our own time. Computers are primarily <em>two-way</em> means of communication. You <em>send</em> and receive emails, peruse and <em>put out</em> your own webpages, etc. Whereas the smartphone is primarily a <em>one-way</em> means of communication: you scroll and scroll, and rarely if ever make something of your own.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p55"></a>Bourke-White's photo mystifies social domination through technology by elevating the instrument of control while revealing nothing of the social interests that use it. <strong>At least Rivera imagines an abstract, generalized humanity in control of its own destiny, in the form of the worker at the centre of the picture</strong>. This is not to deny that Rivera's work may also have a blind spot regarding power, but this is a reflection of a broader problem. However excellent its proposals for the reorganization of the economy might have been, the socialist movement could not solve the problem of power. (Linsley 1994: 55)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Imagine that: whole humanity in control of whole humanity; instead of those select few who control the means of production and circulation of capital.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p58a"></a>With the affair of the Rivera mural, the Rockefellers and their associates in the Center, including above all David Sarnoff, realized that <strong>the theme 'Man at the Crossroads' was an open invitation to contest the future of technology</strong>. Rivera's socialist vision of the future in which technical progress is inextricably bonded to social change was incompatible with the ambitions of businessmen who wanted to exploit technology within capitalism. (Linsley 1994: 58)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>The good of humanity? No, the main thing is that I make more money!</em></p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p58b"></a>But the overriding goal of the businessmen brought together in Rockefeller Centre was to maintain their social power through a period of what seemed to be epochal social change. Since 1917 the culture had been saturated with utopianism in a variety of forms; <strong>the best thinkers of the time were predicting the immanent collapse of the old order</strong>. Marx had predicted that capitalism would pass away through its own internal contradictions, and the crash of 1929 seemed to be the most dramatic proof of the inherent instability of the system. (Linsley 1994: 58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A general characterization of the interwar era.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p58c"></a>The company was founded virtually by government edict in 1919 as a co-operative venture between the corporations that owned the various radio patents. The patents necessary to assemble a radio set were so widely dispersed, among GE, Westinghouse, AT&T and United Fruit, that no one company could easily or profitably do it. The immediate stimulus was the experience of the Great War, which had demonstrated the military value of radio technology. <strong>It was clearly in the interests of the parties to disregard Tesla's original patents entirely, and therefore by extension any other agenda regarding the uses of the technology</strong>; but really it was not the technology itself that mattered so much, but the need for closer co-operation between industry, government and the military, and it was the first media conglomerate, the Radio Corporation of America, that was the nexus of this co-operation. (Linsley 1994: 58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>At the inception of the American military-industrial complex: the radio.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p59"></a>As he clarified and condensed the design, the television moved into the centre. In both wings of the mural groups of people are watching images projected inside the circular casing spanning the central section. On the right workers on their lunch break, instructed by a pantheon of Marxist heroes, watch <strong>Lenin join the hands of soldier, peasant and worker (this was the ostensibly offensive scene)</strong>. On the left, students and young people watch the life styles of the dissolute rich against the backdrop of a demonstration of the unemployed taking place on Wall Street. Rivera sees television as revelatory and educational; he seems to have a perception of its propagandistic potential that is as vivid as Sarnoff's, but very different in content. (Linsley 1994: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah, television! That's what those large lenses were meant to represent. And of course there could be nothing worse than the soldier, peasant and worker becoming like-minded.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p60a"></a>The mural is divided in two. The viewers left side - the right side for the worker in the centre - is the 'bad' side, with images of war and violence in the streets, but also with important references to science and education. In general terms the left side is the present. <strong>The right half - left for the worker - is the 'good' side, a fantasy of realized socialism; this represents the future</strong>. The right/left, negative/positive split also carries over into the two ellipses, representing the microcosmic and macrocosmic worlds delivered up by the telescope and microscope centred in the composition just behind the worker. The negative side of the macrocosmic ellipse contains the moon, a dead planet, and an eclipse of the sun. The biological ellipse on the same side contains samples of various diseases. More significantly, on the positive side of the biological ellipse of mass of dark cancer cells in visible near the centre of the crossroads. (Linsley 1994: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I can't help noticing that on the left side there is Zeus in all his might wielding a thunder strike with a background of gas-masked soldiers and on the right there is a decapitated statue (the statue is just a statue) with a background of common people. Clearly there's a juxtaposition of "keeping our God(s)" and only looking inward <em>vs</em>. overcoming our fantasy overlords and exploring the space, in peace and unity.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p60b"></a>The symbols of present defeat on the left side of the picture are balanced by the appearance at the upper end of the cosmic ellipse of a hammer and sickle floating in the stellar reaches. <strong>This grandiose prophecy of fulfilled history at a moment of defeat is paralleled in socialist utopian literature</strong> of the 20s and 30s, such as the novels of H. G. Wells, and <strong>particularly those of Olaf Stapledon</strong>, whose <em>Last and First Men</em>, published in 1930, was very widely read in the United States and discussed in the mass circulation press. (Linsley 1994: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What? It is argued if it is even "utopian" literature, much less "socialist".</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="linsley94p60c"></a><strong>This book is perhaps the most hyperbolic and even delirious of all Hegelian fantasies</strong>. It projects the struggle of humanity to take control of its own evolution over a period of 2 billion years, through 18 distinct species on three planets, moving upward toward the ultimate union of consciousness and the universe. Like Rivera's mural, <strong>Stapledon's novel is at once the testament and gravestone of the now forgotten utopianism of the pre-war period</strong>, and like Rivera's mural, its message is that in the fullness of time all present defeats will be understood as necessary moments of an eventual victory. But this hope is so abstract that it signifies more than anything else that the battle is already lost, that the invocation of Lenin is in the face of the failure of the Leninist party to fulfill its promise. (Linsley 1994: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Quotable. But what even?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 17 Sawyer-DreamingRealConquest-1998
--><h4><a id="sawyer98"></a>Sawyer, Andy 1998. "Dreaming Real": The Conquest Of Psiberspace? <em>Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts</em> 9(4): 268-283. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43308366">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p268a"></a><strong>The term "telepathy" itself was first used by</strong> the early members of the society for Psychical Research, who were (by their own lights at least) <strong>hard-headed scientific investigators</strong> exploring paranormal phenomena which may well be reduced to aspects of the scientific fields we know. (Sawyer 1998: 268)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>The term was coined by F.W. Myers in 1882</u> [in] <u>Vol 1</u> [...] <u>of the <em>Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research</em> (London, Trubner & Co 1883)</u>" (Sawyer 1998: 279, note 1)</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p268b"></a>As early as 1872 Lewis Carroll in <em>Alice Through the Looking Glass</em> was making a curious reference to <strong>people "thinking in chorus"</strong> (<em>Complete Works</em> 147: noted in Haynes 13) and the notes collected by Charles Fort in <em>Wild Talents</em> (1932) and the experiments carried out by Joseph Rhine at Duke University in the 1930s were incorporated into much science fiction of the succeeding decades. (Sawyer 1998: 268)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Kooris mõtlemine</em>. Not bad.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p269a"></a>Evidence for thought-transference is almost entirely on the anecdotal level, or a matter of <strong>how many marked cards an experimental subject can guess</strong>. You or I may claim to have telepathic powers but unless we can insert thoughts into each other's minds to the satisfaction of an impartial and expert witness, our claims are, in scientific terms, worthless. (Sawyer 1998: 269)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Calls to mind <em>The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar</em> (2023).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p269b"></a>The novels of both Robert Silverberg and <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong> mentioned below <strong>may be read as dramatization</strong>s <strong>of the dislocated individual in culturally disorienting times</strong> (although it is the richness of sf that such a reading is merely reductive: to read science fiction purely <em>as</em> simple allegory is to misread its astonishing capacity for multi-levelled metaphors). (Sawyer 1998: 269)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Can Stapledon actually be read this way?</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p269ja270"></a>In this essay I am almost entirely ignoring the "plot device" function of telepathy: its role, for example as a "universal translator." Just as faster-than-light travel exists as a science fiction "given" to enable spaceships to travel around the galaxy in defiance of what we understand as the laws of relativity, so telepathy, as Walter E. Meyers describes it in <em>Aliens and Linguistics</em> (131-145), becomes the easy shorthand for communication between different <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> races. <strong>Conveniently, the alien can communicate with us through thought transference</strong>. (Sawyer 1998: 269-270)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aliens are telepathic because science fiction writers are lazy.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p270"></a>"<strong>Future Fantastic</strong>," a popular-science series recently broadcast on BBC television in the UK, looked at a number of themes explored by science and science fiction. By the very nature of being <strong>fronted by Gillian Anderson of <em>The X-Files</em></strong>, it suggested links between science and the paranormal, but more overtly it dramatized some of the wilder speculations of scientists and social dreamers. (Sawyer 1998: 270)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Available on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzQBzMiZZqc">Youtube</a>.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p271a"></a>Traditionally, sf has treated telepathy as a power which arises through mutation or evolutionary development, although <strong>some have followed Sigmund Freud in portraying it as an atavism, a reversion to abilities which may have been present in early hominids but which have been lost as language and individual reasoning developed</strong>. Freud suggested that telepathy may be "the original archaic method by which individuals understood one another" which has been superseded by better methods of communication by means of ordinary sensory perceptions but <strong>which may still be manifest in dreams, in excited crowds, or in children</strong>. (Sawyer 1998: 271)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Haha, what? There's even a Wikipedia entry on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dream_telepathy">Dream telepathy</a>. The reference to crowds sounds like he took Durkheim's "collective effervescence" a step further. The notes specify Freud's writings: "Dreams and the Occult", "Psycho-analysis and Telepathy" and "Dreams and Telepathy".</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p271b"></a><strong>Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930) describes the ability arising several times during the evolution of humanity</strong>, first within the Fourth Men as elements of the hive-minded Martians are incorporated into their brains (214) and eventually as a part-natural, part-engineered function of the minds of the Last Men, the eighteenth distinct species of humanity (289). <strong>Stapledon also saw it arising among the mutants within our own species, foreshadowing later evolution, as in his story <em>Odd John</em></strong> (1935). (Sawyer 1998: 271)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So that's what <em>Odd John</em> is about.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p272a"></a>Although Brunner's telepaths are (sometimes too easily) tempted to retreat into imaginary mentally-devised worlds, either solo or as part of <strong>a shared "catapathic" grouping</strong>, their basic need is to repair the mental damage all around them: "<em>Nobody is nothing to one of us</em>" (171). <strong>A telepath surrendering to the lust for money would feel the agony of his victims and go mad</strong>. (Sawyer 1998: 272)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Katapaatiline</em>. Search results only give "cataphatic". The case of the power-hungry telepath reminds me of this gem: "<u>Why, you couldn't even tell a polite fib about how you enjoyed a party.</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/a-godlike-race.html#bailey76p82">Bailey 1976: 82</a>)</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p272b"></a><strong>John Wyndham's <em>The Midwich Cuckoos</em> (1957)</strong> offers a form of telepathy as an alien invasion: a power of the golden-eyed hybrids who are the result of a "visitation" to an English village which results in the simultaneous impregnation of most of its female population. While still babies, the children can exert their wills over their mothers. At a later age, it is noticed that as one child becomes aware of an item of information so do the others. But is this true telepathy, or are the children in fact separate parts of a single <em>gestalt</em> organism? "What we have <em>seemed</em> to have here is fifty-eight little individual entities. But appearances have been deceptive, and we find that what we actually have are <em>two entities only</em> - <em>a</em> boy, and <em>a</em> girl, though the boy has thirty component parts each with the physical structure and appearance of individual boys; and the girl has twenty-eight component parts" (122-23). (Sawyer 1998: 272)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh damn. This must be what <em>The League of Gentlemen</em> (1999-2002) was parodying. They made a direct television adaptation <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt14245846/">just last year</a>!</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Wyndham, John 2009[1957]. <em>The Midwich Cuckoos</em>. London: Penguin Books.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780141048376">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="sawyer98p275"></a>The People are likened to angels often enough: the analogy is implicit in many stories and is made explicit in "Angels Unawares," while in "That Boy" one of them actually appears to members of a religious community in Angelic guise, feathered wings and all. "Presence, Name and Power" are clearly enough equated to "Father, Son and Holy Ghost" to convey the impression that their powers stem from deeper spirituality rather than biological difference. As with Stapledon and Silverberg in the works cited above, the mental powers granted to the People are signs of their difference from humanity, but also <strong>signs of what Humanity might grow or aspire to</strong>. (Sawyer 1998: 275)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hmm. The way I read Stapledon, it's not exactly a "might" but a <em>will</em> (inevitably?).</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 18 Fitting-ReconsiderationsSeparatistParadigm-1992
--><h4><a id="fitting92"></a>Fitting, Peter 1992. Reconsiderations of the Separatist Paradigm in Recent Feminist Science Fiction. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 19(1): 32-48. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4240119">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p32"></a>The general reaction to Margaret Atwood's <em>The Handmaid's Tale</em> (1985) led me to the realization that the backlash of late against feminism has been paralleled by <strong>a slowing in the pace of feminist utopian writing</strong>. (Fitting 1992: 32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I've never considered that writing a book could stop other books from being written.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p33a"></a>The utopias of the 1970s presented a range of explorations for male violence, grouped roughly around an "essentialist" pole (men are <em>by nature</em> violent - here the best example would be Gearhart's <em>Wanderground</em>) - and a more materialist one, according to which male violence is socially produced (whether by capitalism, as in Marge Piercy's <em>Woman on the Edge of Time</em> [1976], or by patriarchy itself, as in Russ's <em>Female Man</em>). In any event, <strong>the novels of the 1970s often had answers to questions about the differences between men and women and the roots of violence, whereas the novels of the late 1980s are not so certain</strong>. (Fitting 1992: 33)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The 1980s got more social constructionist. I recall very tedious discourse on whether even emotions are socially constructed (this discussion came and went).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p33b"></a>In using the term "<strong>anti-utopian</stronG>," I mean <strong>a work which explicitly critiques and rejects the utopian project</strong>, as in Huxley's <em>Brave New World</em> (1932), in distinction to the <strong>dystopian</strong>, which <strong>offers a bleak view of the future without critiquing utopianism per se</strong> (e.g., <em>The Handmaid's Tale</em>). <em>The Shore of Women</em> verges on the anti-utopian insofar as it portrays what might be called a "failed utopia." (Fitting 1992: 33)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I just recently had to explain this different to someone in my own words. This was pretty much it.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p37"></a>After she is rescued, she learns the full extent of her error and the real situation of Women's Country. <strong>The warriors are not the fathers of the children; that is the role of the servitors</strong>. More importantly, the warrior cult itself was deliberately created by the women as an elaborate program to select for non-violence! (Fitting 1992: 37)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What a twist. This is Sheri Tepper's <em>The Gate to Women's Country</em></p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p40"></a>While some of the women talk about turning their "lifeshaping" skills to driving the Valans from the moon, there is a general rejection of such a strategy. When the soldiers are ordered to kill Sharers who approach their bases, the women only increase their visits. <strong>Their passive resistance in the face of intensifying violence further undermines the morale of the army</strong>. Desperate plans are made to destroy the entire population of the moon, but these are aborted - not because of any moral reservations about genocide, but because the army commander is afraid that the women may have "spread an infection which would lie dormant within us for years, only to mushroom into disease and wipe us out - unless Sharers are still around to halt it" (352). <strong>It is the Valans' own fear which prevents them from exterminating the women, a fear based not on anything the women have said or done, but on what a Valan would do if he or she had the Sharers' lifeshaping skills</strong>. The novel ends with the departure of the troops and the beginning of a return to normal. (Fitting 1992: 40)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A weird tale. It certainly sounds like Joan Slonczewski's <em>A Door into Ocean</em> (1986) could have inspired <em>Waterworld</em> (1995), but mostly got lost in translation. Uh... <em>Waterworld</em> "<u>was based on</u> [Peter] <u>Rader's original <strong>1986</strong> screenplay</u>" (Wikipedia). Coincidence?</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="fitting92p44"></a>I find the argument that to begin to kill is to lose one's soul moving, but I think that the ending makes it seem as if this will bring a victory in practice as well as in principle. If we turn to <strong>one of my favorite utopian works, Olaf Stapledon's <em>Star Maker</em></strong> (1937), we can find a similar depiction of a utopian world's decision to allow itself to be destroyed rather than to fight back. Let me quote a sentence which sounds very much like the Sharer philosophy:<blockquote>But they knew also that in reorganizing themselves for desperate warfare, in neglecting, for a whole age of struggle, all those activities which were proper to them, they would destroy the best in themselves more surely than the enemy would destroy it by oppression; and that in destroying this they would be murdering what they believed to be the most vital germ in the galaxy. (<em>Star Maker</em> §9:361)</blockquote>The difference is that <strong>Stapledon's "utopian worlds" are destroyed</strong>. Slonczewski's commitment to non-violence is a shining example of the rejection of a world of violence, but the novel's happy ending implies that it is a viable political strategy. (Fitting 1992: 44)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another writer whose favorite writer happens to be Olaf Star Maker Stapledon.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 19 ENDRES-LarsGustafssonLife-1991
--><h4><a id="enders91"></a>Enders, Clifford 1991. Lars Gustafsson: Life, Landscape, and Labyrinths. <em>Southwest Review</em> 76(1): 120-137. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/43471430">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p120a"></a>Lars Gustafsson has been living quietly in Austin, Texas since 1983. The Swedish author, who was born in 1936 in Västerås, close to <strong>Mälar Lake</strong>, has written poetry, fiction, and philosophy since his student days at Uppsala. (Enders 1991: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Ma sündisin Mällari Järve ääres. Ma ei mäleta sellest midagi.</em></p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p120b"></a>Although he occasionally has set his fiction in America and Africa - indeed, one novel unfolds in Texas (<em>The Tennis Players</em>) - Gustaffson remains an essentially European author. The characters in his novels (like their author) carry Europe with them. The poems are salted with <strong>European</strong> place-names, history, <strong>psychology</strong>; they emanate a European light. (Enders 1991: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What is a European <em>psyche</em> like?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p124"></a>ENDRES: I wonder whether you concern yourself consciously with Nature, with a capital N? Your work seems to have recurrent landscapes, and a special light, and <strong>so many dogs</strong> -<br />GUSTAFSSON: <strong>It is full of dogs! I never intended so many!</strong> (Enders 1991: 124)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What am I even reading here?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p127a"></a>GUSTAFSSON: I couldn't tell you what the poem as a whole is about, though. That's often the case with my better poems. You know, the typical high-school-literature-class question, "What does the poet intend?" is really a good test - because <strong>if the poet intends something, it's often a lousy poem</strong>. (Enders 1991: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hmm.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p127b"></a>ENDRES: In "Bombus Terrestris" I was struck by the image of the flying man:<blockquote><strong>A flying man who lives far within the wood<br />has folded up his wings and sleeps in the rain.</strong></blockquote>I wonder if that is from Olaf Stapledon and -<br />GUSTAFSSON: That is exactly where I got the idea! <strong>It's a little remainder from my reading of <em>Last and First Men</em></strong>. I read that fantastic and extremely good science-fiction novel at the same time as I wrote this poem. So there is a flying man left in this deep forest. That's the finest episode in the novel. (Enders 1991: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A poem for the Sixth Men?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p127c"></a>ENDRES: Do you relate yourself as a poet to anything that Stapledon was doing in 1930?<br />GUSTAFSSON: Well, <strong>what Stapledon is discussing in that book is mankind</strong> - not exactly what kind of future mankind has, but rather history as it relates to the unborn. And that is precisely what is discussed in "A Landscape," which is about the unborn and the rest of history, and not the realized part of history. (Enders 1991: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not exactly following.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p128"></a>GUSTAFSSON: If you take individual history, it is clear that every moment in our lives forms concentric rings and compasses the earlier moments, and <strong>what happens to me in every moment changes my view of everything that has happened before</strong>. So that's a form in which our biography is present - really, is <em>in</em> our present - and of course history, which indirectly is a part of my biography, <strong>history is changing considerably over time</strong>. So in a sense <strong>history can exist only in the moment</strong>. (Enders 1991: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The poet's philosophy of history.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="enders91p132"></a>GUSTAFSSON: Rainer Maria Rilke's <em>Worpswode</em> exists. <strong>Ovre Richter Frich (<em>The Black Buzzards</em>) is an obscure Norwegian</strong>, pre-Fascist I should say, <strong>writer</strong> of "agents' stories," which are very much <strong>about international anarchists and such things</strong>. They came in the late twenties and early thirties. (Enders 1991: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%98vre_Richter_Frich">Gjert Øvre Richter Frich</a> wrote <em>De knyttede næver</em> (1913) and over 21 more books. None appear to have been translated into English (though several have been translated into Finnish). Correction: there's <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Lucifers-Oga-Ovre-Richter-frich/dp/B000GS9XHC/ref=sr_1_30?qid=1700983946&refinements=p_27%3AOvre+Richter+Frich&s=books&sr=1-30"><em>Lucifer's Oga</em> (1958)</a>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 19 extr.1990.31.3.197
--><h4><a id="vorda90"></a>Vorda, Allan 1990. The Forging of Science Fiction: An Interview with Greg Bear. <em>Extrapolation</em> 31(3): 197-215. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.3828/extr.1990.31.3.197">10.3828/extr.1990.31.3.197</a> [<u><a href="https://www.liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/10.3828/extr.1990.31.3.197">Liverpool University Press</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p197"></a>Bear married Astrid Anderson (daughter of Poul Anderson) in 1983 and has a son named Erik who was born in 1986. They live outside Seattle, Washington, in a home that has <strong>a library of over 12,000 books</strong>. (Vorda 1990: 197)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Incestuous science fiction writers and way too many books.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p198a"></a>BEAR: Outside of the field of American pulp science fiction, <strong>Olaf Stapledon is probably one of the more influential writers</strong>. His works inspired Arthur C. Clarke. <strong>After seeing <em>2001</em>, I traced Clarke's roots back to Stapledon</strong>. The originals, such as <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Starmaker</em>, were very formative. Then, of course, the old timers, like H. G. Wells, were influential. (Vorda 1990: 198)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Would like to read something more specific about this connection.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p198"></a>BEAR: Outside of science fiction completely I enjoy reading James Joyce, Joseph Conrad and, in my college years, Nikos Kazantzakis. <strong>I found a great deal of resemblance between the philosophy of Kazantzakis and what I had found in Stapledon</strong>. Later on I found a similar vein in Bradbury's work because Bradbury was very fond of Kazantzakis's "Spiritual Exercises." (Vorda 1990: 198)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p201a"></a>VORDA: To quote from the Preface of <em>The Wind from a Burning Woman</em>: "<strong>The future will come, and it will be different, unimaginably so</strong>." And to quote a line by Kawashita from <em>Beyond Heaven's River</em>: "<strong>The future is not appetizing</strong>." Would you concur that this is an ongoing theme in your books - that <strong>the future for mankind is everchanging and not necessarily pleasant and predictable?</strong> Or, to be more precise, that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle is a scientific metaphor in your books? (Vorda 1990: 201)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>The</u> [future] <u>is a foreign country; they do things differently there.</u>"</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p201b"></a>BEAR: Hitler or Stalin probably would not have been very good at a party. Hitler got into power because Germany was twisted by World War I and its aftermath. Germany was just basically ground under and stomped on by all the European nations, whereupon it went crazy. <strong>Germany expressed its craziness in an urge to suicide which is particularly Germanic. They picked Hitler to lead them to the funeral parlor</strong>. (Vorda 1990: 201)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Germany: a Werther nation.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="vorda90p208"></a>VORDA: What about <em>The Forge of God</em> being an apocalyptic novel? Many people have the idea that if there are beings out there of higher intelligence, then they must therefore be good, but you seem to be saying that isn't necessarily the case.<br />BEAR: When I wrote the book, I convinced myself that this isn't really a bad theory about why things are so quiet out there. A long time ago David Brin and I were talking about a galactic ecology. He was trying to find some reason to explain why Von Neumann probel hadn't covered up the entire galaxy. <strong>If you had one civilization develop efficient Von Neumann probes, then in 100,000 years they would have sucked up virtually the entire galaxy</strong>. (Vorda 1990: 208)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Greg Bear's novel <em>The Forge of God</em> deals directly with the concept of "Berserker" von Neumann probes and their consequences. The idea is further explored in the novel's sequel, Anvil of Stars, which explores the reaction other civilizations have to the creation and release of Berserkers.</u>" (Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-replicating_spacecraft">Self-replicating spacecraft</a>)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 21 039219219304116302
--><h4><a id="fischer93"></a>Fischer, Roland 1993. A Story of the Utopian Vision of the World. <em>Diogenes</em> 163: 5-25. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/039219219304116302">10.1177/039219219304116302</a> [<u><a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/039219219304116302">sagepub.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p5a"></a>Being condemned (or chosen?) to be "the missing link" on its way to perfectibility (or redemption?) - <strong>half animal/half human</strong> - we always need in some way or another the transcendence of a Utopian Vision. (Fischer 1993: 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Humans only half-human.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p5b"></a>George Orwell (1970) described the Utopian Vision as "the dream of <strong>a just society</strong> which seems to haunt the human imagination ineradicably and in all ages, whether it is called the Kingdom of Heaven or <strong>the classless society</strong>, or whether it is thought of as a Golden Age, which once existed in the past and from which we have degenerated." As a structure of the imagination it has barely changed in the last twenty-four and a half centuries. <strong>Are not all utopias of the past two and a half thousand years merely footnotes to Plato's <em>Republic</em>?</strong> (Fischer 1993: 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Plato's <em>Republic</em> may be "just" in a philosophical (or geometrical?) sense, but definitely not classless.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p6"></a>It was of course through Plato's <em>Republic</em>, rediscovered along with other Greek writings in the European Renaissance, that the Hellenic ideal city most influenced western utopias. More saw his own <em>Utopia</em> as partly a continuation of the <em>Republic</em>, fulfilling <strong>Socrates' desire in the <em>Timaeus</em> to see the abstract Republic actualized</strong>. And four hundred years later H.G. Wells was still constructing his "modern utopia" according to Platonic example, and largely along Platonic lines. (Fischer 1993: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Still haven't read <em>Timaeus</em>.</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p7ja8"></a>The Utopian concept of historic continuity remained a powerful undercurrent, culminating in social utopias of lasting anticipatory illumination. The most influential among them was that of the Calabrian monk Joachim di Fiore (around 1200). Joachim, a former Cistercian who had fled to the mountains of San Giovanni in Fiore, proclaimed that the progressive self-revelation of God occurs in three great stages: the first <em>status</em> is that of the Father, the second that of the Son, and <strong>the third and final that of the Spirit, i.e., the enlightenment of all in mystical democracy (a classless society</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>without masters or Church</strong>). Joachim was not formally a millenarian, and he was never denounced as a heretic by the Church; the doctrine he preached, however, was interpreted in a millenarian manner - that of the Eternal Evangel - and was developed by a long succession of followers, such as Thomas Müntzer and <strong>Tommaso Campanella</strong>. (Fischer 1993: 7-8)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>According to Joachim, only in this third age will it be possible to truly understand the words of God in their deepest meanings, and not merely literally.</u>" (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joachim_of_Fiore">Wikipedia</a>) - Sounds like <em>I know this shi- doesn't make any sense now but trust me bro it will definitely make sense in a few hundred or thousand years or so. We just have to keep at it</em>.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p14"></a><strong>Utopias are not universal. They appear only in societies with the classical and Christian heritage, that is, only in the West</strong>. Other societies have their paradises, primitivist myths of a Golden Age of justice and equality, Land of Milk-and-Honey fantasies, even messianic beliefs, but they do not have utopias. The modern utopia was invented by a Christian martyr, Sir Thomas More, later canonized by the Catholic Church. More's Christian piety was in many respects matched by that of the two other great early utopian thinkers, Campanella and Andreae, both of whom passed their entire lives as priests and preachers. Even the "pansonic" utopias of Bacon, Comenius, and Leibniz, with their stress on science, were conceived within the framework of Christian philosophy: science was the means to both a better knowledge of God and the creation of a truly Christian society. The title of Andreae's utopia, <em>Christianopolis</em>, sums up well the evident goal of all the principal utopian thinkers to the end of the seventeenth century: the ideal Christian commonwealth, a Christian utopia. Without the hope that religion ultimately offers, without the paradisiac and millenial expectations that Christianity inspires, it may be that utopia becomes a lifeless shell. <strong>Religion is, in this sense, the "unconscious of utopia," the subterranean source of much of its emotional force and dynamism</strong>. (Fischer 1993: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lucian's "True History", Ferdawsi's "City of Brass", al-Kinani's "Book of Misers", Kautilya's "Arthashastra". None of these exist.<!-- ChatGPT hallucinated them.--> The author's thesis that utopianism is religious, and specifically Christian, is unconvincing.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p15a"></a><strong>Anti-utopias</strong> such as <em>Brave New World</em> and <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em> not only dominated their own times but have continued to attract a considerable following in our time. Huxley's and Orwell's outlook on the modern world can readily accommodate many of the social developments of the postwar decades. Nevertheless, the anti-utopia too has faltered, as our continuing reliance on Zamyatin, Huxley, and Orwell itself suggests. Vonnegut's <em>Player Piano</em>, David Karp's <em>One</em>, a totalitarian nightmare, and Burgess's <em>A Clockwork Orange</em> have continued the tradition. But no anti-utopia since <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em> has truly captured the popular imagination or become the center of public debate. (Fischer 1993: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The author does not hold to the distinction between "anti-utopia" and "dystopia".</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p15b"></a>Utopia survived among small pockets of utopian missionaries, but they preached to largely unhearing ears. No work of the utopian imagination appeared that caught the public fancy as had the utopias of Bellamy, Morris, and Wells at the turn of the century. Neither <strong>Olaf Stapledon's original utopia, <em>Last and First Men</em></strong> (1930), or its successor <em>Star Maker</em> (1937), found a large and receptive audience. C.S. Lewis paid them the compliment of attacking their rationalist outlook in some of his best science fiction, and science fiction writers such as Arthur C. Clarke and James Blish acknowledged their debt to Stapledon's ideas. But <strong>his books were largely ignored and quickly forgotten</strong>. (Fischer 1993: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Firstly, not a utopia. Secondly, you're talking about it.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p16"></a>Pre-industrial society was also a living source of ideas and institutions in the vision of Ivan Illich, the nonconformist Catholic priest who in a series of short, vivid and wide-ranging tracts - <em>Deschooling Society</em> (1971), <strong><em>Tools for Conviviality</em></strong> (1973), <em>Medical Nemesis</em> (1975) - sketched the broad outlines of a community that restores meaning and satisfaction in work to its members. (Fischer 1993: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tools_for_Conviviality">Wikipedia entry</a> for <em>Tools for Conviviality</em> makes it out as <em>r/fuckcars, the book</em>.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Illich, Ivan 1973. <em>Tools for Conviviality</em>. New York: Harper & Row.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/toolsforconvivi000illi">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="fischer93p19"></a>Fictitious and utopian storytelling creates mental images in our listeners that should be as real, in a fundamental sense, as the immediately experienced world "out there." Both are constructions of the brain and mind. <strong>In hearing or reading the words of another, we literally share the reality of another consciousness</strong> (just as hypnotist and hypnotized do). (Fischer 1993: 19)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What the thell is this article about? So incoherent.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 22 1467-9566.00171
--><h4><a id="martin99"></a>Martin, Paul A. 1999. Genes as drugs: the social shaping of gene therapy and the reconstruction of genetic disease. <em>Sociology of Health & Illness</em> 21(5): 517-538. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.00171">10.1111/1467-9566.00171</a> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9566.00171">wiley.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p519"></a>A number of different theoretical perspectives have been used to examine the creation of new technologies, including actor-network theory (ANT) (Callon 1987), <strong>the social construction of technology</strong> (SCOT) (Bijker 1995) and the analysis of large technical systems (Hughes 1987). Although each takes a distinct approach they share several common features, notably the idea that <strong>the development of a new technology involves a range of heterogeneous social, technical, economic and political processes</strong>. In addition, it is argued that new knowledge is co-produced at the same time as new technologies and new socio-technical relations, through a process of mutual shaping. (Martin 1999: 519)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The development of new technologies requires <em>synergy</em>.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p521a"></a>The idea of genetic therapy has its roots in <strong>pre-World War II futurism and eugenics</strong>. The first suggestions for the genetic alterations of people for both social and medical reasons can be found in the writings of scientists such as Haldane and Muller, and <strong>the science fiction of Stapledon</strong> (Haldane 1923, Muller 1935, Stapledon 1930). Early advocates of the technology drew on <strong>Jacques Loeb's concept of 'biological engineering' as a means of modifying man and combating the degeneration of the race</strong> (Pauly 1987). These ideas were also articulated in the policies and programmes of <strong>the Rockefeller Foundation</strong>, whose funding was fundamental in shaping the development of the new science of molecular biology during the 1930s and 40s (Kay 1993). (Martin 1999: 521)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_Loeb">Jacques Loeb</a> became one of the most famous scientists in America, widely covered in newspapers and magazines, influencing other important individuals in the scientific world such as B.F. Skinner.</u>"</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Haldane, J. B. S. 1995[1923]. <em>Daedalus</em> or science and the future. In: Dronamraju, Krishna R. (ed.), <em>Haldane's Daedalus Revisited</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</u> ["<u><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._B._S._Haldane">J. B. S. Haldane</a> was one of the founders of neo-Darwinism.</u>"]</li><!--
--><li><u>Muller, H. J. 1935. <em>Out of the Night; a Biologist's View of the Future</em>. New York: Vanguard Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/outofnightbiolog0000mull">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Pauly, P. J. 1987. <em>Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Kay, L. E. 1993. <em>The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p521b"></a>However, two competing 'visions' of how genetic therapy might be developed emerged during these first discussions of the subject during the 1960s. The first took its inspiration from eugenics and was centered on the idea of modifying future generations to make social and intellectual 'improvements' and cure genetic diseases. This vision was advocated by Hermann Muller and other supporters of what Kevles has called <strong>reform eugenics</strong> (Muller 1965). The second vision was purely medical and was only concerned with <strong>genetically altering affected patients and not their offspring</strong> (Tatum 1966). It was mainly proposed by a younger generation of clinically trained investigators who largely rejected the eugenics of the 1930s. (Martin 1999: 521)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Fix the patient or "fix" the patient's whole bloodline with new technologies not yet fully understood.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p522"></a>The Commission findings were published in 1982 in the landmark report <em>Splicing Life</em>, coinciding with increasing political pressures for an outright ban on research into gene therapy from <strong>religious groups, environmental activists</strong> and a number of prominent scientists. (Martin 1999: 522)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Religious groups I get, but environmental activists?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p525"></a>As a consequence, during 1986 Anderson worked with <strong>venture capitalists</strong> to found the world's first gene therapy firm, Genetic Therapy Inc, with the explicit aim of manufacturing vectors to support a clinical trial of ADA deficiency (Lyon and Gorner 1995). (Martin 1999: 525)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The heroes of the world, the venture capitalists. Nothing better than some public-private partnership. Isn't currently enshittifying everything in existence.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p529"></a>In each of these cases the development of novel therapeutic strategies was only possible as <strong>a result of the researchers being able to describe the pathology terms of molecular genetics</strong>. In some cases, such as haemophilia, the primary cause of the disease was clearly inherited, but as with cancer, <strong>it was also possible to construct a model of these other acquired conditions in terms of problems in the way the gene was regulated in the body</strong>. For example, Alzheimer's might be caused by the production of too little nerve growth factor (NGF) in the brain as a result of damage to the NGF gene. The role of gene therapy in these cases was therefore to resture the level of the missing protein coded by the damaged gene. This shift to a 'molecular pathology' was enabled by progress in many areas of biology, in particular, the information coming from gene sequencing and the recentyl formed Human Genome Project. <strong>By the early 1990s it was becoming possible to describe many diseases in purely molecular terms</strong>, with the prospect of all pathologies eventually being categorised in this way. (Martin 1999: 529)</blockquote><!--
--><p>In other words, we might be thinking of cancer in terms of gene mutations because there's billions in them thar gene therapy companies.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="martin99p532"></a>For pioneering investigators to apply gene therapy to research problems in specific clinical niches, they had to engage in a process of heterogeneous socio-technical engineering (Callon 1987). This included, <strong>the reconceptualisation of particular diseases as being genetic in some way</strong>; the reshaping of the technology itself; the construction of local socio-technical networks of regulators, genes, firms, clinicians and patients; and the creation of a new industry. (Martin 1999: 532)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mighty sus.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 24 McCaffery-InterviewJackWilliamson-1991
--><h4><a id="mccaffery91"></a>McCaffery, Larry 1991. An Interview with Jack Williamson. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 18(2): 230-252. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4240061">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p230"></a>Whereas <strong>European SF was already in the process of producing a number of works of formal originality and thematic significance</strong> (Zamiatin's <em>We</em> [1920], Karel Čapek's <em>The Absolute at Large</em> [1922], Aldous Huxley's <em>Brave New World</em> [1932], and <strong>Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> [1930]</strong>, for instances), the maturing of SF in the US was being delayed by its self-imposed "ghettoization" within the hardware/adventure-oriented pulp magazines that flourished in American markets until the 1950s. Although a number of thoughtful and speculative SF authors emerged from this pulp scene (Asimov, Heinlein, van Vogt, Sturgeon, and Williamson himself, for example), even the best of these works were typically being created by men (and a few women) possessing rich imaginations and backgrounds in science but lacking the literary skills to fully express their visions. (McCaffery 1991: 230)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Europeans got an earlier start (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-mystical-joining.html#derleth52p4">Derleth 1952: 4</a>). </p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p231"></a>But while following that rule to some extent, Williamson's output of the '40s is markedly different from the elegantly reasoned (but passionless) SF of someone like Isaac Asimov. Rather, as Brian Aldiss puts it in his survey of SF's history (<em>Billion Year Spree</em>), Williamson "operates powerfully at <strong>the dreaming pole</strong>" of SF. In other words, though Williamson greatly admires scientific and rational thought, he himself is very much an intuitive writer whose work also expresses powerful psychological states - and <strong>a deep ambivalence about the suitability of using reason as th ebasis of defining ourselves and our values</strong>.<br />This clash of allegiances creates a powerful tension in <strong><em>The Humanoids</em> (1948)</strong>, Williamson's best-known work, which <strong>was to have a major impact on the presentation of robots for the next two decades</strong>. Depicting the takeover of the world by benevolent robots, <em>The Humanoids</em> memorably expresses Williamson's deep ambivalence towards the value of rationality in general. (McCaffery 1991: 231)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Williamson, Jack 1950. <em>The Humanoids</em>. New York: Grossett & Dunlap.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/humanoids0000will">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p231ja232"></a>By the 1950s, Williamson began to sense that a new generation of SF authors were leaving him behind. He accordingly decided to update his scientific background and explore literature more deeply by going back to <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> college. <strong>At the age of 50, he enroled as a student of English in graduate school</strong>, where he served as a teaching assistant and was awarded his doctorate (from the University of Colorade) in 1964. Although he wrote virtually no SF during this period, Williamson would eventually make good use of his readings in <em>Beowulf</em>, Chaucer, Rabelais, and Shakespeare to broaden his literary range when he resumed writing SF during the 1970s. More importantly, he was preparing himself to make what was to be his most significant contribution to the field during the 1960s and '70s: the establishment of SF as a suitable subject for college courses and scholarly research.<br />In part this involved making criticism of SF "respectable," a project which he contributed to by publishing one of the first scholarly treatments of the genre: his dissertation, <strong><em>H.G. Wells: Critic of Progress</em></strong>. (McCaffery 1991: 231-232)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somehow the discussion always returns to Wells.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p233"></a>JW: We're stuck with technology and we'll just have to figure out how to use it. Stuart Chase's article "Two Cheers for Technology" makes interesting points about this problem. <strong>Before World War II</strong> and Hiroshima, we had been proud of technology, optimistic about our future and our stature; <strong>there was a sense we had control over our own destiny</strong>. Right now, though, there seems to be a contagious fear of the future - a fear that has brought our faith in science to a crisis. (McCaffery 1991: 233)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Alternatively: we were in control but then <em>these other guys</em> crashed near Roswell and started showing up all over the place, demonstrating with their mere visitations that we are in control of nothing.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p234"></a>LM: Didn't you invent the term "genetic engineering" in one of of <span style="color: #fa4100">[sic]</span> your stories?<br />JW: I hesitate to claim that, but I did write a novel that was published in <strong>1951</strong>, in which I referred to the new science of "<strong>genetic engineering</strong>" as a way to recreate the human race. I don't recall having seen the phrase before that point (the idea, of course, had been around for sometime). (McCaffery 1991: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>According to <a href="https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=%22genetic+engineering%22&year_start=1930&year_end=1951&corpus=en-2019&smoothing=3">Google Ngram Viewer</a> "genetic engineering" was first used in 1931 (probably the Rockefeller Foundation researchers). It lingered in the 1930s, dropped to half during WWII but immediately after the war started steadily climbing, reaching 0.0000000350% by 1951 when Williamson "invented" the term.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p236"></a>JW: I do remember that when I came across Gernsback's <em>Amazing Stories</em>, I was completely fascinated by the covers by the artist <strong>Frank R. Paul</strong>. They look pretty crude now, but back then they seemed wonderful and exotic. They conjured up these startling images of strange machines and strange creatures, spaceships taking off for other planets. <em>That</em> was what SF fiction was about! Wonderful inventions, travel in space, travel in time, <strong>future ages</strong>, other worlds. (McCaffery 1991: 236)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paul's cover art is admittedly pretty cool.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p240"></a>LM: I said earlier that I distinguished SF from other fantasy approaches by the fact that <strong>SF should always make an effort to depict something that could possibly happen, while fantasy doesn't create this kind of direct link with reality</strong>. This definition is pretty subjective because fantasy forms can also be connected to the world around us symbiotically. (McCaffery 1991: 240)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Science fiction as predictive, extrapolative literature.</p><!--
12-13 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p240ja241"></a>JW: So I based "Breakdown" <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> on Spengler and Toynbee, and I wrote a drama of the decline and fall of a future civilization. It seemed obvious that since people seem so endlessly fascinated with the eclipse of Greece and the fall of Rome, <strong>the notion of our own civilization falling into ruin would naturally have a similarly strong emotional appeal</strong>. (McCaffery 1991: 240-241)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is about one quarter of Stapledon's whole shtick in L&FM.</p><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p245"></a>LM: Did you get from Campbell the inspiration for having the robot guardians in <em>The Humanoids</em> be defeated by psi powers? It's pretty well known that he was very personally interested in these sorts of things.<br />JW: Yes, Campbell came up with the idea of that conclusion. He had gotten interested in the work that <strong>Joseph Rhine</strong> was conducting in psi-phenomena at Duke University. I had written "With Folded Hands" without consultation with Campbell at all. He likes it and accepted it for publication, but he suggested that I look into Rhine. <strong>He was intrigued with the possibility that people might develop the parapsychological powers that Rhine was interested in</strong>. I read a couple of Rhine's books, and for a few days <strong>I was halfway persuaded</strong> that parapsychological phenomena might be real and have practical applications. (McCaffery 1991: 245)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Banks_Rhine">Joseph Banks Rhine</a> "<u>was an American botanist who founded parapsychology as a branch of psychology, founding the parapsychology lab at Duke University, the <em>Journal of Parapsychology</em></u> [in 1937]"</p><!--
19-20 --><blockquote><a id="mccaffery91p247ja248"></a>LM: In <em>Bright New Universe</em> and especially in <em>The Starchild Trilogy</em>, you investigate <strong>the idea that our conception of life and intelligence in the universe is far too limited</strong> - a view expressed even in your earlier stories. was <strong>Stapledon</strong> a major influence in these later works? Your presentation of <strong>the sentient sun in <em>Starchild</em></strong>, for example, <strong>seems like something right out of <em>Star Maker</em></strong>.<br />JW: <strong>I rate Stapledon very highly</strong>, but I can't document his specific influence. I know I was interested in putting intelligence into all things in very <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> early works, long before I became acquainted with Stapledon's works. In a planned, early collaboration with Merritt, for example, I was working with the notion of a sentient mountains - it was a kind of primitive "animism" (as anthropologists would call it), attributing sentience to trees, rocks, and so on. I'm not sure I embrace this sort of mystic animism myself in a serious, conscious way, although I've been exploring variations of this idea throughout my work. That vision of the universe in <em>The Starchild Trilogy</em>, where <strong>the entire mass of the steady-state universe is gradually revealed to be, in a sense, a sentient being</strong>, is an outgrowth of this infantile animism by which the child or the primitive can impute life to sticks and stones. (McCaffery 1991: 247-248)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The whole universe sentient? Like... a Universal Mind?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!-- 32 Willis-OriginsBritishNuclear-1995.pdf
--><h4><a id="willis95"></a>Willis, Kirk 1995. The Origins of British Nuclear Culture, 1895-1939. <em>The Journal of British Studies</em> 34(1): 59-89. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1086/386067">10.1086/386067</a> [<u><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-british-studies/article/abs/origins-of-british-nuclear-culture-18951939/CC6942ACC90567553F7EEA29FF162C31">cambridge.org</a></u> | <u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/175809">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p61"></a><strong>Nuclear culture</strong> is, of course, a product of nuclear physics, and modern nuclear physics - or, more accurately, modern atomic physics - began at the very end of the nineteenth century with the discoveries, in <strong>1895 and 1896</strong>, by Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen and Antoine Henri Becquerel of X-rays and radioactivity, and, at the turn of the century, with the pioneering work of Marie Curie and Pierre Curie on radium and Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy on radioactive transmutation. Such discoveries revolutionized the study - and imagery - of physics and chemistry and sparked off their own chain reaction of research and further discovery which continues uninterruptedly. In the years from 1895 to 1939, the pace of change was positively dizzying - for participants as well as observers - as physicists and lay audiences learned <strong>a new language of X-rays, alpha particles, electrons, neutrons, half-lives, relativity, quantum mechanics, ciclotrons, positrons, plutonium, fission, fusion</strong>, and on and on and on. (Willis 1995: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The names are familiar from popular culture but I don't think I've ever read something explicitly about this "nuclear culture".</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p62"></a>These same writers, furthermore, also published avowedly popular introductions to the new physics, books such as <strong>Bertrand Russell's</strong> immensely successful <strong><em>The ABC of Atoms</em> (1923)</strong> and <em>The ABC of Relativity</em> (1925), E. N. da C. Andrade's <em>The Atom</em> (1927), J. W. N. Sullivan's <em>Atoms and Electrons</em> (1923), Oliver Lodge's <em>Atoms and Rays</em> (1924), and G. K. T. Conn's <em>The Nature of the Atom</em> (1939), books which ran through many editions and reprintings and which continued to appear in growing numbers right up to the outbreak of war in September 1939. (Willis 1995: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Bertrand Russell did everything, didn't he?</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Russell, Bertrand 1923. <em>The ABC of Atoms</em>. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/abcofatoms0000bert/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p66"></a>For years later Soddy surpassed himself, and in the peroration to his most widely read book, <em>The Interpretation of Radium</em> (1908), prophesied, "A race which could transmute matter would have little need to earn its bread by the sweat of its brow. [...] Such a race could transform a desert continent, thaw the frozen poles, and make the whole world one smiling Garden of Eden."<br />However compelling or hyperbolic such visions of prelapsarian bliss may have seemed to contemporaries, they also perplexed Soddy's audiences (as well as enraged nearly all of his more cautious scientific colleagues who well knew how far Soddy was racing before his or anyone else's evidence). Bewilderment stemmed in part from Soddy's repeated - and equally vivid - references to "storehouses stuffed with explosives" and "<strong>weapons by which to destroy the earth</strong>." (Willis 1995: 66)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It might be that Stapledon took this literally. As in, atomic weapons could make dirt disappear.</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p67ja68"></a>And to perplex lay readers still further, the respected Cambridge scientist and popular science writer W. C. Dampier <strong>Whetham</strong> paused at the end of a long and lucid essay on "Matter <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and Electricity" in the April 1904 <em>Quarterly Review</em> to repeat one of Rutherford's rare and characteristically private conjectures: "Professor Rutherford has playfully suggested to the writer the disquieting idea that, <strong>could a proper detonator be discovered, an explosive wave of atomic disintegration might be started through all matter which would transmute the whole mass of the globe into helium of similar mass, and, in very truth, leave not one stone upon another</strong>." (Willis 1995: 67-68)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That's the stuff. Stapledon's "atomic rifles" have to be shot twice in succession, the second shot inhibiting the reaction from swallowing the whole globe.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p70"></a>As early as 1895 - the very year of Röntgen's earliest discoveries - the Irish journalist and adventure novelist <strong>Robert Cromie</strong> seized on the notion of atomic decomposition implied in Röntgen's work and placed it at the heart of a new novel, <strong><em>The Crack of Doom</em></strong>. I dismally written and absurdly contrived tale which nonetheless attracted a wide readership, the novel features a group of stereotypically fiendish scientists and "rational thinkers" whose leader invents <strong>a device capable of initiating atomic disintegration and thus (through the "wreckage of its contituent atoms") earthly oblivion</strong>. The device, "encased in a hollow glass ball the size of a pea," holds within it a single drop of water. When touched by an unspecified "chemical agent," "the atoms of the water [are] resolved into the ultimate ether of which they were composed" and set off a fierce reaction culminating in the destruction of the earth. The dastardly plans of the chief villain thus to "etherise" the planet are thwarted in the end by the protagonist, who alters the formula of the agent and causes not the atomic decomposition of the globe but rather <strong>a massive earthquake which destroys the Malaysian island</strong> from which the ultimate destruction was to proceed. (Willis 1995: 70)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another candidate.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Croom, Robert 1895. <em>The Crack of Doom</em>.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/26563">Project Gutenberg</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p71"></a>This pessimism received dramatic, if in some ways unintended, new expression in the winter of 1913 when H. G. <strong>Wells</strong> began to serialize what he described as a "good old scientific romance," <strong><em>The World Set Free</em></strong>, in the <em>English Review</em>. Published in book form just weeks before the outbreak of the Great War, <em>The World Set Free</em> was dedicated to "Frederick Soddy's Interpretation of Radium" and was avowedly inspired by Soddy's popular writings as well as by his direct conversation with Wells concerning the potential implications of radioactive disintegration. Not one of Wells's finest efforts, the novel is disjointed, ill-organized, and populated with caricatures rather than characters. (Willis 1995: 71)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Of course Wells shows up.</p><!--
21 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p78"></a>British novelists and playwrights, by contrast, were neither as inhibited nor as scrupulous as their scientific contemporaries, and the 1920s saw the publication of several works in which atomic energy was indeed put to the lethal purposes Lodge deplored. <strong>J. J. Connington's <em>Nordenholt's Million</em> (1923)</strong>, for example, featured an atomic catastrophe sparked off by a physicist attempting to harness atomic energy through "induced radioactivity" but producing instead only a "high detonation" and the obliteration of his own laboratory. <strong>His successors, by contrast, were able - using his notes and after a series of "fearful explosions" - to "tap the stores" of atomic energy and create "atomic engines" which ran tirelessly, cheaply, and, reminiscent of Wells, "made the employment of human labour supererogatory."</strong> Since, however, a bacteriological infestation had wiped out nearly all the world's population, mass unemployment proved not to be a problem. Instead, the survivors - concentrated improbably in the Glaswegian hinterlands - enjoyed lives of prosperity, idleness, and boredom. (Willis 1995: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps the inspiration for Stapledon's focus on the scientific information not getting into the wrong hands.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Connington, J. J. 1923. <em>Nordenholt's Million</em>. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.69106/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
21-22 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p78ja79"></a>A similar use of the "inexhaustible source of power" within the atom appeared briefly in <strong>Olaf Stapledon's remarkable science fiction novel, <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), a sprawling and often incoherent account of "two thousand million years" of human history</strong>. First mastered by an obscure Chinese physicist in the early 1930s, atomic energy proved to be so "easily manipulated and controlled" that it soon found its way into ordnance production. At a meeting of international scientists at Plymouth, a demonstration of a small atomic device intended to set off a carefully delimited process of atomic disintegration proved at once unexpectedly destructive and eerily prescient:<blockquote>For a dazzling point of light appeared on the remote cliff. It increased in size and brilliant, till all eyes were blinded in the effort to continue watching. It lit up the under parts of the clouds and blotted out the <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> sun-cast shadows of gorse bushes besides the spectators. The whole end of the island facing the mainland was now an intolerable scorching sun. Presently, however, its fury was veiled in clouds of stream from the boiling sea. Then suddenly the whole island, three miles of solid granite, leapt asunder; so that a covey of great rocks soared heavenward, and beneath them swelled more slowly a gigantic mushroom of steam and debris. Then the sound arrived. All hands were clapped to ears, while eyes still strained to watch the bay, pocked white with the hail of rocks.</blockquote><strong>The mushroom cloud was born</strong>. (Willis 1995: 78-79)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If nothing else, Stapledon "invented" the mushroom cloud?</p><!--
29-30 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p86ja87"></a>On the morning of September 1, 1939, the preeminent British popular science magazine, <em>Discovery</em>, published as its leading article a <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> provocative essay by its editor, <strong>C. P. Snow</strong>. Entitled ominously "A New Means of Destruction?" it informed its nervous readers that the "atomic age" was about to open: "Some physicists think that, within a few months, science will have produced for military use an explosive a million times more violent than dynamite." (Willis 1995: 86-87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another surprisingly familiar name.</p><!--
31-32 --><blockquote><a id="willis95p88ja89"></a>Tellingly, both Mark Oliphant and Jock Cockcroft, two of Rutherford's most <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> admired and trusted acolytes, had to leave the Cavendish in order to build the accelerators necessary to their researches. In America, by contrast, the funding for much contemporary physics came from industry, philanthropists, and foundations; it was not the University of California but utilities, pharmaceutical companies, and the <strong>Rockefeller Foundation</strong>, to offer but one prominent example, which largely financed successive versions of Lawrence's cyclotrons - to say nothing of Millikan's efforts to endow the California Institute of Technology. (Willis 1995: 88-89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So, this is it, huh? The Rockefeller Foundation is going to make an appearance in every other article?</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-60764741113649983662023-11-20T23:28:00.000-08:002023-11-22T05:26:32.109-08:00A Mystical Joining<!-- A Mystical Joining
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia,
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4QlkbW5BxoMTXK32CVSk9RS49ke4Py4W1whYFIfUwhc2Y5fsIEsMDSENYtts6LchLDQlIvwZu7XZWD9s4kwL1RabfuiRyfT39Y0218BVR7gCMmh2qbeEt0eMdlvzdREmuYjPH6kRxZtXGXYaAGCRpfxrpNZQOaHXAWiOf8nMh40EU7QvxG85DZTY_ZOuh/s4080/jja_pilt_20231117_213742.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1836" data-original-width="4080" height="144" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj4QlkbW5BxoMTXK32CVSk9RS49ke4Py4W1whYFIfUwhc2Y5fsIEsMDSENYtts6LchLDQlIvwZu7XZWD9s4kwL1RabfuiRyfT39Y0218BVR7gCMmh2qbeEt0eMdlvzdREmuYjPH6kRxZtXGXYaAGCRpfxrpNZQOaHXAWiOf8nMh40EU7QvxG85DZTY_ZOuh/s320/jja_pilt_20231117_213742.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#h37">H. 1937. Messianic Radiation: Review of <em>Star-Begotten: a Biological Fantasia</em> by H. G. Wells</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#anon39">Anonymous 1939. Latent Virus Infections: Their Bearing on the Cancer Problem</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#lerner48">Lerner 1948. An Economist Comments on "Freedom Demands Responsibility"</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#price55">Price 1955. A scientist dreams of Economic Frontiers in 2000 A.D.</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#derleth52">Derleth 1952. Contemporary Science-Fiction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#huxley51">Huxley 1951. Sui Generis</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#livingston69">Livingston 1969. Science Fiction as a Source of Forecast Material</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#pietrkiewicz62">Pietrkiewicz 1962. Krajewski's Warsaw on the Moon</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#clarke76">Clarke 1976. Science and Society: prophecies and predictions 1840-1940</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#myers78">Myers 1978. Science fiction in the classroom</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#roberts73">Roberts 1973. Science Fiction and the Adolescent</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#michaelis78">Michaelis 1978. Energy 2000</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#smith85">Smith 1985. Review of <em>Coordinates</em>; <em>The End of the World</em>; and <em>The Mechanical God</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#smith89">Smith 1989. Review of <em>Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction</em> and <em>Talking Across the World</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#huntington89">Huntington 1989. Review of <em>The Legacy of Olaf Stapledon</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#rovit83">Rovit 1983. Review of <em>Olaf Stapledon: a man divided</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hoch88">Hoch 1988. Review of <em>In the Name of Eugenics</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#alkon85">Alkon 1985. Samuel Madden's <em>Memoirs of the Twentieth Century</em></a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="h37"></a>H., J. B. S. 1937. Messianic Radiation: Review of <em>Star-Begotten: a Biological Fantasia</em> by H. G. Wells. <em>Nature</em> 140: 171. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1038/140171a0">10.1038/140171a0</a> [<u><a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/140171a0">nature.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="h37p171a"></a>It is always interesting to see what a scientific fact will look like after Mr. Wells's imagination has been let loose on it. The facts on which this book is based are that <strong>particles or photons of high energy provoke mutation</strong>, and that such particles and possibly photons are reaching our planet from outside. What if some intelligent extra-terrestial beings, perhaps on Mars, are treating us as we treat <em>Drosophila?</em> If these beings are as benevolent as they are powerful, <strong>may we not expect that our mutations will be of a desirable character, and that the mutants will reform the world?</strong> So Mr. Wells's characters argues. (H 1937: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Radiation will give you superpowers!</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="h37p171b"></a>"Star-begotten", like <strong>Stapledon's "Last and First Men" and "Odd John"</strong>, but unlike his recent "Star-Maker", <strong>despairs of existing humanity</strong>, and demands beings of innate endowments superior to our own to deal with <strong>the present crisis of civilization</strong>, which it sketches in brilliant phrases. The author is obviously sceptical of the remedies which he and others have propounded. "Haven't all civilised men nowadays the feeling of being dilletantes on a sinking ship?" asks one of his characters. So with unconquered optimism he puts forward a panacea which he knows to be fantastic. (H 1937: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What was the "present crisis"? Economic depression? The onslaught of authoritarianism?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="h37p171c"></a>Whether or not the Marxians have correctly diagnosed the cause of our present distresses, it is clear that evolutionary processes, either natural, or directed by terrestial or celestial eugenists, are most unlikely to end them. <strong>The time-scale of evolution is altogether longer than that of history</strong>: and we probably have not many years, let alone generations, to save our civilization from collapse. If this book encourages a single reader to think, even for one moment, that any natural or supernatural process will take the place of human effort and human thought, then it is a bad look. (H 1937: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It could be said that Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> is 'a future history of evolution'.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
02
--><h4><a id="anon39"></a>Anonymous 1939. Latent Virus Infections: Their Bearing on the Cancer Problem. <em>The British Medical Journal</em> 2(4114): 969-971. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20314574">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="anon39p970"></a>"<strong>Toothless</strong>" viruses need not be found only in cancers. Might not the viruses which, as some thought, must persist after infections and be responsible for keeping up a lifelong immunity be capable of being modified or made relatively "<strong>edentulous</strong>" instead of merely being masked by antibody? (Anonymous 1939: 970)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Define:edentulous - "<u>lacking teeth</u>".</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="anon39p971"></a>Dr. G. W. M. Findlay recalled a book by Dr. W. O. <strong>Stapledon</strong>, <em>Last and First Men</em>, in which he <strong>pictured the human race some millions of years hence being attacked by the Martians with masses of various particles which had the property of receiving and transmitting short- and long-wave radiations</strong>. A large part of the human population was thus killed off, and it was only when man managed to incorporate the various particles into himself, thus converting himself into a receiving and transmitting station, that he overcame the forces arrayed against him. That seemed an analogy on the physical plane for Dr. Andrewes's argument on the biological. (Anonymous 1939: 971)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Leaving out the part where artificially constructed super-brains ("Fourth Men") construct a new species of humans ("Fifth Men"), incorporating the Martian subvital units in them artificially to give them "telepathy".</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
03
--><h4><a id="lerner48"></a>Lerner, A. P. 1948. An Economist Comments on "Freedom Demands Responsibility". <em>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</em> 4(10): 306-309. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1948.11460256">10.1080/00963402.1948.11460256</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00963402.1948.11460256">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lerner48p306"></a>In Olaf Stapledon's "Last and First Men" <strong>the discoverers of atomic energy decide that the secret is too dangerous to be entrusted to the human race</strong>. They therefore destroy the formula and it is not rediscovered for hundreds of years. Some atomic scientists in America and in England seem to feel that they should do likewise. They recognize that the nature of modern science makes the burying of a secret possible only in a world controlled by the imagination of the novelist. Nevertheless, the guilt that they feel about their participation in the development of the atomic bomb, emphasized by vivid pictures of Hiroshima and by the spectre of the threatening atomic world war, makes them wonder <em>whether</em>, like Stapledon's heroes, who suffered torture rather than divulge the dread secret, they should not somehow arrange to avoid participation in the development of more powerful forces for a world seeking to destroy itself. (Lerner 1948: 306)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This was written before the USSR made theirs.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
04
--><h4><a id="price55"></a>Price, George R. 1955. A scientist dreams of Economic Frontiers in 2000 A.D. <em>Challenge</em> 4(3): 52-55. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/05775132.1955.11468188">10.1080/05775132.1955.11468188</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05775132.1955.11468188">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="price55p52"></a>The economic picture I foresee for the end of the century is that construction will be our major industry, <strong>the sun will be our major power source, and the most important raw material will be water</strong>. (Price 1955: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not wrong.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="price55p53"></a>As I mentioned, the sun will certainly become our major power source. Each day the sun supplies the earth with more energy than man has used since he appeared on earth. The technological problems involved in converting sunlight to electricity should be simple once the necessary fundamental knowledge has been gained. And distribution costs will often be extremely low, for <strong>most domestic users will be able to generate their power needs on the roofs of their homes</strong>. (Price 1955: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not <em>most</em>, yet, but yeah.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="price55p55"></a>For example, the three major <strong>prophetic novel</strong>s of the early 1930s - H. G. Wells' <em>The Shape of Things to Come</em>, Aldous Huxley's <em>Brave New World</em> and <strong>Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em></strong> - have <strong>already</strong> been <strong>outmoded in several respects</strong>. Thus the first two do not mention atomic power at all, and <strong>in the third it does not appear until about 2100 A.D.</strong> (Price 1955: 55)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Maybe it will be "atomic rifles" that appear in the 2100s.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
06
--><h4><a id="derleth52"></a>Derleth, August 1952. Contemporary Science-Fiction. <em>The English Journal</em> 41(1): 1-8. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/807153">10.2307/807153</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/807153">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p1"></a>Even for many of its most vocal proponents, science-fiction seems difficult to define with precision. For some it consists of fiction dealing solely with speculation about the future; for others it is the fiction of prophecy; for yet others it is fiction concerned only with interplanetary adventure. Actually, however, the term "science-fiction" embraces <strong>all imaginative fiction which grows out of scientific concepts</strong>, whether in mathematics or geology, nuclear fission or biology, or any scientific concept whatsoever, whether already demonstrtaed or whether projected out of the writer's imagination into future space and time. (Derleth 1952: 1)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How would one delineate scientific concepts from non-scientific concepts?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p2a"></a>An attempt to set forth <strong>a basic science-fiction library</strong> of twenty books in a poll conducted by the <em>Arkham Sampler</em> two years ago among authors, editors, and readers of science-fiction resulted in a wide disparity of selections. In first place stood <strong>H. G. Wells's <em>Seven Famous Novels</em></strong> (<em>The Time Machine, The Island of Dr. Moreau, The Invisible Man, The War of the Worlds, The First Men in the Moon, In the Days of the Comet</em>, and <em>The Food of the Gods</em>). This omnibus was <strong>followed by</strong> nine other titles - <strong><em>Last and First Men</em>, by W. Olaf Stapledon</strong>; <em>Brave New World</em>, by Aldous Huxley; <em>The Short Stories of H. G. Wells; Adventures in Time and Space</em>, edited by R. J. Healy and J. F. McComas; <em>Slan</em>, by A. E. Van Vogt; <em>The World Below</em>, by S. Fowler Wright; <em>Strange Ports of Call</em>, edited by August Derleth; <em>To Walk the Night</em>, by William Sloane; and <em>The Lost World</em>, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. (Derleth 1952: 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sir Arthur Conan Doyle?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p52b"></a>Modern science-fiction has little relation to its forebears save in theme. Out of the tales of fabulous travels, which were begun by <strong>Plato</strong> in the description of <strong>Atlantis</strong> embodied in his <em>Timaeus</em> and <em>Critias</em> and reached their height in Sir John Mandeville, grew the familiar lost-continent and last-man-on-earth themes so common to science-fiction in our time. Out of the fantastic chronicles of voyages to the moon begun by <strong>Lucian of Samosata with his <em>Icaromenippus</em>, <em>ca</em>. A.D. 165</strong>, burgeoned the tale of interplanetary exploration, and this in turn opened various secondary themes - invasion from space, the conquest of alien planets, asteroids, stars. (Derleth 1952: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I may finally have to read Lucian's "True History".</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p3"></a>Writers now show <strong>a concern for matters philosophic, sociologic, psychiatric, and ethnological</strong>; and several of them, notably Robert A. Heinlein, with his "Future History" series, Isaac Asimov with his "Foundation" series, and A. E. Van Vogt with his "Weapon Shops of Isher" stories, have set out ambitiously to portray <strong>the history of future galaxies</strong>. Above all, a sort of Fortean challenge to the imagination has resulted in fresh, new themes, as well as different approaches to the more standard themes of science-fiction. (Derleth 1952: 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And Stapledon is not included in this bunch?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p4"></a>In England, however, wellk-onwn writers like C. S. Lewis, <strong>S. Fowler Wright, H. F. Heard</strong>, and W. Olaf Stapledon had had regular publication of their science-fiction in book form, most of them, clearly, <strong>on a far more literate level than the work of their American contemporaries</strong>, and most of them, curiously, <strong>concerned with the fate of mankind in the distant future or on other planets</strong>. Many of the stories stemmed from the utopian theme, which persists in the best novels in the genre, in one form or another, either in the direct portrayal of an imaginary and much improved civilization of the future or in the form of earth's rebuilding after a holocaust leaving but few survivors. M. P. Shiel's <em>The Purple Cloud</em> and, more recently, George Stewart's <em>Earth Abides</em> are excellent examples of the latter theme. (Derleth 1952: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>English science fiction was, at least for a while, ahead of the Americans.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="derleth52p6"></a>Editor-author John W. Campbell, Jr., a nuclear scientist himself, writing under the pen name of Don A. Stuart, as well as under his own name, is best represented by his collection <em><strong>Who Goes There?</strong> and Other Stories</em>, from the title story of which (comparable to the earlier "At the Mountains of Madness," by H. P. Lovecraft) <strong>the movie <em>The Thing</em></strong> was recently produced. (Derleth 1952: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted. I've been curious about <em>The Thing</em> ever since its parody in <em>Futurama</em> but have yet to watch the movie, even.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
07
--><h4><a id="huxley51"></a>Huxley, Julian S. 1951. Sui Generis. <em>Science</em> 114(2952): 109. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.114.2952.108">10.1126/science.114.2952.10</a> [<u><a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.114.2952.108">science.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="huxley51p109"></a>I read with interest <strong>J. R. Pierce's article on "Science and Literature"</strong> in your issue of April 20, but I would like to point out one omission in it. He spoke of a book by Heinlein, tracing <strong>the imaginary future of man</strong> through many periods but omitted to mention what, in my opinion, is <strong>by far the best book on this subject</strong>, namely, Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>. This pursued the subject in <strong>a most illuminating way</strong>, on the assumption that with the vast amount of time still ahead of the <strong>human species</strong>, it <strong>might well produce a succession of totally different types</strong>. Stapledon's picture of the society in which all the thinking was done by specialized individuals whose brains were cultured out to a gigantic size on some sort of <strong>trellis</strong>, is unforgettable! (Huxley 1951: 109)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Define:trellis - "<u>a framework of light wooden or metal bars, chiefly used as a support for fruit trees or climbing plants.</u>"</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Pierce, J. R. 1951. Science and Literature. <em>Science</em> 113(2938): 431-434. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1126/science.113.2938.431">10.1126/science.113.2938.431</a></u> [<u><a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.113.2938.431">science.org</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
08
--><h4><a id="livingston69"></a>Livingston, Dennis 1969. Science Fiction as a Source of Forecast Material. <em>Focus</em> 1(3): 232-238. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(69)90026-3">10.1016/0016-3287(69)90026-3</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0016328769900263">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p232"></a>The most basic concept developed in the history of science fiction is that <strong>the future is not totally unknown</strong>. In fact, inherent in science fiction is the notion that there is not one future, but <strong>many possible futures</strong>, each arising from the infinite variations that could be applied to the extension of present-day trends. (Livingston 1969: 232)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Multiverse.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p233"></a>Voyages to outer space have traditionally been specialties of science fiction, but the first man to think of using some form of rockets as the means of propulsion was <strong>Cyrano de Bergerac</strong> in <strong>A Voyage to the Moon</strong> (1650). <strong>Edward Everett Hale</strong> was the first to think of an artificial earth satellite in <strong>The Brick Moon</strong> (1869), as an aid to navigation, and <strong>George O. Smith</strong> made use of a space station to facilitate interplanetary communication in <strong>QRM Interplanetary</strong> (1942). Finally, <strong>Hugo Gernbeck</strong>'s <strong>Ralph 124C41+: A Romance of the Year 2660</strong> (1911-1912), featured a startling array of successful predictions, such as radar, tape recorders, and microfilm. (Livingston 1969: 233)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think I was only vaguely aware of only Bergerac.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p234a"></a>Robert Heinlein in <strong>Double Star</strong> (1955) suggests a world <strong>federal</strong> government headed by a constitutional monarch descended from the Dutch House of Orange, while Paul Anderson's <strong>Satan's World</strong> (1968) features <strong>a galactic organisation of loosely cooperating governments</strong>, interlaced with a guild of large companies (the 'Polesotechnic league') <strong>composed of both human and alien intelligent beings</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>For context, Frank Herbert's <em>Dune</em> was first published in 1965 and Star Trek: The Original Series first aired in 1966.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p234b"></a>This type of prediction [The sociology of the future] is probably the most valuable contribution science fiction can make to futures research, since <strong>it is easier to describe</strong> the eventual appearance of <strong>a gadget</strong> whose technical prerequisites already exist, <strong>than it is to predict its social consequences</strong>. The informed individual of <strong>the late nineteenth century might have foreseen the automobile, but it would have taken a high degree of imagination to have predicted the traffic jam</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good analogy. Sounds familiar, too.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p234c"></a>Three <strong>masterpieces</strong> of science fiction that presents an overall picture are Wells' The Time Machine (1895), and <strong>Olaf Stapledon's Last and First Men</strong> (1930) <strong>and The Star Maker</strong> (1937). Two more recent long-range projections include Clifford Simak's City (1953) and Heinlein's stories and novels known collectively as the 'future history' series (of particular importance since the author pioneered the use of trend curves in projecting an integral future setting within which his stories are placed). (Livingston 1969: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Both, huh?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p235a"></a>Both Wells, in The Island of Dr Moreau, and <strong>Stapledon, in Sirius, discuss man's efforts to increase the intelligence of animals</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Possibly the earliest notice of <em>Sirius</em> I've found.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p235b"></a>The information explosion is extrapolated to its logical conclusion in <strong>Hal Draper</strong>'s <strong>Ms Fnd in a Lbry</strong> (1961) where a galactic human civilisation collapses upon the inability of the 'bibliotechal engineers' to locate, somewhere in the galaxy, the single drawer that contains <strong>the sum total of human knowledge impressed on 'nudged quanta'</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh wow.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p235c"></a>Robert Bloch has conveniently summarised the kind of future society presented by the average science fiction writer as consisting of some variety of totalitarian state in which psycho-chemical techniques are a favourite means of keeping the populace happy (or quiet), an underground which the larger-than-life hero can join, and scientists who gladly turn over their discoveries to those in power. Running throughout such tales are <strong>the pervasive assumptions that human nature as we know it will remain stable</strong>, that economic incentive will remain the highest motivation, and that twentieth century culture and moral values will continue to dominate the world. (Livingston 1969: 235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The average future in science fiction is a mixture of <em>Brave New World</em> and <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em>, it seems.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p236a"></a><strong>E. M. Forster</strong>, in <strong>The Machine Stops</strong> (1909), suggests that a perfectly functioning global communications network, and automatic satisfaction of food and medical needs might prevent the necessity and even the desire for personal contact. (Livingston 1969: 236)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I recall mentions of this "prescient" piece of writing during the pandemic.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p236b"></a>In Clarke's Childhood's End, the aliens come not to conquer, but to guide man toward his final destiny, <strong>a mystical joining with the cosmic mind</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 236)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Also a theme in Stapledon's work.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="livingston69p237"></a>Psychic powers of teleportation and <strong>telepathy</strong> are imaginatively explored in The Demolished Man (1952) by Alfred Bester and Slan (1940) by A. E. van Vogt. <strong>The superman/mutant type appears evocatively in Stapledon's Odd John</strong> (1935) and Heinlein's Gulf (1949), both of which remind us that <strong>such an individual may also have super-problems about coping with a society of ordinary mortals</strong>. (Livingston 1969: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A positive mention of <em>Odd John</em>?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
09
--><h4><a id="pietrkiewicz62"></a>Pietrkiewicz, Jerzy 1962. Krajewski's Warsaw on the Moon. <em>The Slavonic and East European Review</em> 40(95): 308-323. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4205363">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p308a"></a>The first Polish contribution to <strong>science fiction</strong> was printed in 1785 and <strong>happens</strong> also <strong>to be one of the earliest novels in the language</strong>. The mood of the 18th century is reflected in its title: <em>Woyciech Zdarzyński. Życie i przypadki swoie opisuiący</em> (Adalbert Zdarzyński. Describing his life and adventures). According to the fashion, <strong>fiction is here presented as a true account</strong>, and the hero performs the function of a story teller, advertising his goods by his very name. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Like Lucian's "True History".</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p308b"></a>His books are still dismissed as mere imitations; his name, if mentioned at all, means almost nothing even to the students of Polish classicism; the little that was said of him a century ago is echoed to-day, sometimes with the same disparaging remarks cursorily repeated. <strong>The first edition of 1785 remains the only edition</strong> of <em>Woychiech Zdarzyński</em>, and it does not seem probable that it will be reprinted in the near future. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very nearly the fate of <em>Odd John</em> but looking it up now, it did have an edition by Galaxy Publishing Corp, and Dover bundled it with <em>Sirius</em>. </p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p310"></a>Within the Polish <strong>ground of reference</stronG>, <em>Zdarzyński</em> seems important as a highly conscious stylistic exercise, and there are, after all, not many of them in 18th-century prose. One might go even further and say that the prose of <em>Zdarzyński</em> is as succinct as that of its model, Krasicki's <em>Doświadczyński</em>. At times it has an experimental quality. <strong><em>Nomet et omen</em></strong>, Adalbert Adventure turns out to be more adventurous than Nicolas Experience, at least in language. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 310)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I really like this author's style.</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p316ja317"></a>Chesterton is right about the people who are always 'playing the game of Cheat the Prophet'. Prophetic fantasy should remain volatile, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> even without the help of balloons and rockets, for nothing destroys the illusion more than the heavy-handed attempt to nail it down to a particular moment in time. The late <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong>, novelist and philosopher, <strong>unfortunately chose to imagine an Anglo-French war and the destruction of Paris by the British Air Force</strong> in the first chapter of his <em>Last and First Men</em>. <strong>His prediction was confounded only nine years later by Hitler and Stalin</strong>. Many novels about the future have <strong>dated beyond redemption</strong> because they gambled on dates. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 316-317)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not wrong. Putting in exact dates is silly.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p317"></a><strong>Krajewski</strong> kept his science fiction well within the bounds of his own century. He would not venture out into a distant to-morrow. Even when he <strong>complains about the menace of coach-drivers to pedestrians in the streets of big cities, he does not predict the dangerous mechanised version of to-day, but simply remarks</strong> in the footnote on p. 148 <strong>that the danger is sufficiently real in the present to speculate about what might happen in the year 2044</strong>. This attitude saves him from other temptations which would destroy the verisimilitude of his incidents. He may be far too cautious, as his critics seem to imply, but he certainly does not commit the folly of describing the 21st century in terms of the 18th. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 317)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The exact example discussed above (cf. <a href="#livingston69p234b">Livingston 1969: 234</a>).</p><!--
11-12 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p317ja318"></a>The satire against science in <em>Zdarzyński</em> has a formal validity, and it seems unfair to discuss it only in relation to Krajewski's sources. Besides, <strong>the source hunters</strong> cannot be altogether trusted. Wojciechowski exaggerates Krajewski's debt to Swift and makes a misleading statement that chapter XX in the Polish novel paraphrases chapter V in the third <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> book of <em>Gulliver's Travels</em>. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 317-318)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Allikajahtijad</em>.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="pietrkiewicz62p319"></a>In his study on 'the technique and function of the Polish novel in the times of Stanislas Augustus', Z. Skawarczyński not only repeats the reference to Peter Wilkins but also perpetuates the name of Mercier as Merces, which is an obvious printing error in Gubrynowicz's study. Sometimes one has to use <strong>the petty weapon of pedantry</strong> in order to fight pedantry of a heavier kind, for it certainly did weigh down <em>Zdarzyński</em>'s chances. (Pietrkiewicz 1962: 319)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I am seriously tempted to look into what else this Pietrkiewicz has written.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
10
--><h4><a id="clarke76"></a>Clarke, I. F. 1976. From Prophecy to Prediction: 13. Science and Society: prophecies and predictions 1840-1940. <em>Futures</em> 8(4): 350-356. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(76)90131-2">10.1016/0016-3287(76)90131-2</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0016328776901312">sciencedirect.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="clarke76p353"></a><strong>From 1920 onwards</strong> the debate about the consequences of the First World War was summed up in phrases that have since become familiar signals in any discussion of the rational use of scientific discoveries - the impact of science on society, the pace of progress, the challenge of the future, technology and social change, the need for planning. At the same time, <strong>the tale of the future went through a rapid and total transformation</strong>. The once common prophecies of the technological paradise-to-come and the many confident visions of a triumphant technology changed to admonitory accounts of a future time when human folly has destroyed all life on earth. (Clarke 1976: 353)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not the first to make a note of this in my recent readings (cf <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-philosophical-echo.html#scheick81p19b">Scheick 1981: 19</a>).</p><!--
5-6 --><blockquote><a id="clarke76p354ja355"></a>The intention of the new myth makers was to get outside the closed circle of progress and technology so that they could make radical statements about their society. <strong>Olaf Stapledon put this new imperative with uncompromising</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>clarity</strong> in the preface to his most original story of <em>Last and First Men</em>:<blockquote>To romance of the future may seem to be indulgence in ungoverned speculation for the sake of the marvellous. Yet controlled imagination in this sphere can be a very valuable exercise for minds bewildered about the present and its potentialities. Today we should welcome, and even study, every serious attempt to envisage the future of our race; not merely in order to grasp the very diverse and often tragic possibilities that confront us, but also that we may familiarise ourselves with the certainty that many of our most cherished ideals would seem puerile to more developed minds.</blockquote><strong>That proposition of 1930 was characteristic of the reactions to the immense changes thta had followed on the First World War</strong>; for all those many changes put a requirement on the prophet and the predictors to describe what lay in waiting for the world. (Clarke 1976: 354-355)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A historical-causal explanation.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
11
--><h4><a id="myers78"></a>Myers, Alan 1978. Science fiction in the classroom. <em>Children's Literature in Education</em> 9: 182-187. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01150170">10.1007/BF01150170</a> [<u><a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01150170">springer.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="myers78p183"></a><strong>Robert Heinlein's novel <em>Starship Troopers</em></strong>, with exciting military episodes of an unashamedly Earth-chauvinist nature, propounds the idea that political power in a society should be restricted to those willing to defend it in actual physical combat. (Myers 1978: 183)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh wow, didn't know that was Heinlein's.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="myers78p184"></a>Time travel is often used as a device to permit tinkering with the past, but this is usually on a personal level and is often treated light-heartedly. Altering history is normally frowned upon in the future and the Time Police are notoriously efficient. Poul Anderson, in his <em>Corridors of Time</em> takes the reader to Carthage and ancient North America to avert twists in the time-line. <strong>A popular theme with amateurs is the expedition to Calvary with a machine-gun to prevent the crucifixion</strong>. (Myers 1978: 184)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That is literally the plot of a movie titled <em>Assassin 33 A.D.</em> (2020).</p><!--
3-4 --><blockquote><a id="myers78p184ja185"></a>Wells' <em>The Time Machine</em> deals with the future evolution of the human race and can be used as discussion material on the rise and fall of civilisations (or warnings on the dangers of extrapolation in general!). A student who develops great interest in this topic can be given Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and</em> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <em>First Men</em>. <strong>I personally find this arid, but I seem to be in a minority and there is no doubt that Stapledon's staggering vision of the evolution of the race of man over the eons has been a major formative influence on several science fiction writers</strong>, including Arthur C. Clarke. (Myers 1978: 184-185)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Understandable. Stapledon is not for everyone.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
12
--><h4><a id="roberts73"></a>Roberts, Thomas J. 1973. Science Fiction and the Adolescent. <em>Children's Literature</em> 2: 87-91. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/chl.0.0169">10.1353/chl.0.0169</a> [<u><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/issue/13237">Project MUSE</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="roberts73p87"></a>But it is science fiction prose - by far the most sophisticated and demanding of all these genres - that is capturing that adolescent reader. We seriously underestimate him if we suppose we understand science fiction prose merely because we have watched <em>The Creature from the Black Lagoon</em> or read <em>Flash Gordon</em> when we were young. It would be like supposing we know <em>Moby-Dick</em> because we have seen Joh Huston's film. <strong>The science fiction film may be lovable but it is stupid. Science fiction prose is often clumsily written but it is intelligent</strong>. (Roberts 1973: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well put.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="roberts73p88a"></a>The truth is that a large part of science fiction is not about science at all; it is about the supernatural. And much of the rest of it is either covertly or quite openly doubtful about scientific values: we all think of <strong>Ray Bradbury</strong> as a writer of science fiction but he <strong>knows very little about modern science and is blatantly antagonistic to it</strong>. (Roberts 1973: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Which may be why he is not the darling that he was in the 1950s (e.g. for <a href="#derleth52">Derleth</a>).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="roberts73p88b"></a>There are some <strong>good novels which only the exceptional adolescent will find absorbing</strong>: Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em>, and Frank Herbert's <em>Dune</em>, and John Brunner's <em>Stand on Sanzibar</em>, and the oeuvre of H. G. Wells (when read as anything more than gadget-stories). (Roberts 1973: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon is not for everyone.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="roberts73p88c"></a>Adult science fiction manifests <strong>moral and philosophical and theological concerns</strong> and gives greater emphasis to the people in that strange new world, but it is the adolescent variety that interests us. (Roberts 1973: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>All present in <em>L&FM</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
13
--><h4><a id="michaelis78"></a>Michaelis, Anthony R. 1978. Energy 2000. <em>Interdisciplinary Science Reviews</em> 3(2): 87-88. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/030801878789826357">10.1179/030801878789826357</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/030801878789826357">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis78p87"></a>Man's luck appears to hold again - at least for the next two decades. The present climatic cooling cycle of the Earth is just about compensated by the 'greenhouse effect' caused by the carbon dioxide liberated from the profligate burning of fossil fuels. <strong>No dramatic changes of climate are foreseeable until the year 2000 A.D.</strong> (Michaelis 1978: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, thank god. After the year 2000 let it come what may. Who would want to live after that date anyway.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis78p87"></a>What hope remains then for the Western World to maintain its present high level of energy consumption? <strong>Will Olaf Stapledon's prediction</strong>, made in his classic book of 1930 <em>Last and First Men</em>, <strong>come true?</strong> He foretold that <strong>The squandering of fossil fuels on useless and ritual transportation ended the first of the many human civilizations of the future described in his mythology</strong>. Only fusion and solar power appear to offer new technologies of sufficient magnitude. Geothermal energy, wind and tidal power as well as the burning of artificially produced biomass, are either too local or too small to have a world-wide impact. (Michaelis 1978: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool, at least <em>some</em> dirty energy hounds took notice.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis78p88"></a>Just the opposite appears to be true to harness the power of the Sun. <strong>Only a gigantic satellite</strong> with about 100 km<sup>2</sup> of solar cells or Brayton engines in geosynchronous robit, 35 700 km above the equator, <strong>looks like the most effective way to tap solar power continuously</strong>. Solar heaters for individual houses can make a useful but only a very limited contribution. (Michaelis 1978: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Solar cells can only go on top of houses or in space. No point in placing a lot of them in an array on a field, for example.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
14
--><h4><a id="smith85"></a>Smith, Curtis C. 1985. Review of Slusser, George E.; Rabkin, Eric S.; Scholes, Robert eds., <em>Coordinates: Placing Science Fiction and Fantasy</em>; Rabkin, Eric S.; Greenberg, Martin H.; Olander, Joseph D. eds., <em>The End of the World</em>; and Dunn, Thomas P; Erlich, Richard D. eds. <em>The Mechanical God: Machines in Science Fiction</em>. <em>Modern Fiction Studies</em> 31(2): 462-464. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.0.0136">10.1353/mfs.0.0136</a> [<u><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/242216">Project MUSE</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith85p462a"></a>But the more successful essays see science fiction as reflective of broader social trends. Bruce Franklin in "America as Science Fiction" discusses, among other things, the New York World's Fair of 1930 as a kind of science fiction. Susan Gubar, in "She in <em>Herland</em>: Feminism and Fantasy," not only makes extensive comments on Haggard and Gilman but considers feminism itself as a kind of fantasy; and by fantasy she means a broader, ennobling power of the sort mentioned by Eric Rabkin, who concludes in another fine essay that "it is by well made fantasy that homo sapiens shapes the world." In his essay on Jules Verne, Mark Rose characterizes science fiction broadly as containing <strong>the tension between materialism and spiritualism</strong>. (Smith 1985: 462)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted. <em>Coordinates</em> is available on <u>lg</u>.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith85p462b"></a>Two essays should be singled out: Gary K. Wolfe's "<strong>Autoplastic and Alloplastic</strong> Adaptations in Science Fiction: 'Waldo' and "Desertion'" and Leslie Fiedler's "The Criticism of Science Fiction." The former is the best essay on science fiction fandom that I have seen. (Smith 1985: 462)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again, noted. I've been somewhat interested in the terms auto- and alloplasticity for over a year now.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="smith85p463a"></a>The slogan "let's get science fiction back in the gutter where it belongs" has made the rounds of the conventions. Now here is Fiedler to tell us that science fiction never left the gutter after all. Even the best science fiction differs from mainstream literature in its effects, he says, and must accordingly be judged by different standards: "<strong>If</strong>, therefore, <strong>Stapledon</strong> [for example] <strong>moves</strong> [...] <strong>us, it is not</strong> [...] <strong>as Joyce, Proust, Mann, Kafka</strong> [...] <strong>move us</strong>." Rather, Stapledon - like other science fiction - is "<strong>sub or para literature</strong>." Fresh from books on freaks ad on Olaf Stapledon, Fiedler would lump science fiction with the previous two. <strong>In Stapledon, though, Fiedler picks a poor example to make his point, as recognition of Stapledon's (conventional) literary quality is growing</strong>. (Smith 1985: 463)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon is indeed a poor example of the worst tendencies in science fiction. His books are still blowing minds in the early 21st century.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="smith85p463b"></a>Typically, essayists in this book assume that evaluative standards from outside can and should be imposed on science fiction, and they also take science fiction seriously as a source of ideas. Fiedler says that "the reader is not made better in any sense of the word, not <strong>wiser</strong>, not more <strong>pious</strong>, nor more <strong>sensitive</strong> by the reading of sf." The contrary assumption of <em>The End of the World</em> is that <strong>science fiction does at least attempt to make the reader all of these things</strong>. Several essays in the book discuss apocalyptic literature as a modern attempt to find in the face of threatened annihilation <strong>new images of order and meaning</strong>. (Smith 1985: 463)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Too bad that this very same Fiedler is one of the first to publish a monograph about Stapledon. Such a poor outlook.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="smith85p464"></a>Gravest of all defects is <strong>the omission of Olaf Stapledon</strong>, who is not listed even in the bibliography. The conflict in Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930) between a future species of humans, the Third Men, and their creations the "Great Brains" (or Fourth Men) may be <strong>the most profound struggle between human and human creation in science fiction</strong>. After the Great Brains win the struggle, they come to realize that - because they can experience no emotion - there is something they are missing. In effect they make a decision to relinquish control, creating their supplanters, the Fifth Men. Any extensive study of machines in science fiction should include discussion of this conflict. (Smith 1985: 464)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This Smith might be a fan. Evidently (<a href="https://sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/smith_curtis_c">sf-encyclopedia.com</a>) he edited the first and second edition of <em>Twentieth-Century Science-Fiction Writers</em> (1981; <a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3234311*est">1986</a>), which primarily delved into Olaf Stapledon and Mack Reynolds.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="smith89"></a>Smith, Curtis C. 1989. Review of <em>Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction</em> by Darko Suvin and Crossley, Robert ed. <em>Talking Across the World</em>. <em>Modern Fiction Studies</em> 35(2): 400-401. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.0.0316">10.1353/mfs.0.0316</a> [<u><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/243053">Project MUSE</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith89p400a"></a>Darko Suvin's book is a collection of essays he wrote for periodicals, particularly for <em>Science-Fiction Studies</em>. Therefore, there are some duplications, and because most of the essays were written in the 1970s, the book is somewhat dated as well. <em>Positions and Presuppositions in Science Fiction</em> is incidental work by Suvin, necessarily of less importance than his massive and major <em>Metamorphoses of Science Fiction</em>. However, Suvin is easily the most important critic of science fiction, and <em>Science-Fiction Studies</em> by far the most important journal in the field. <strong>Incidental Suvin makes for worthwhile reading</strong>. (Smith 1989: 400)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Thus far I've only read <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/a-literature-of-ideas.html#suvin72">one piece</a> by Suvin but it wasn't bad.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="smith89p400b"></a>The only link between Suvin's book and Robert Crossley's is that <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong> (1886-1950) <strong>is one of the cognitive science fiction writers Suvin most respects</strong>. (Smith 1989: 400)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Makes sense. Stapledon represents the extreme of cognitive estrangement.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="smith89p400ja401"></a>With Crossley's magnificent and important book, which is essential to understanding Stapledon, this important writer may finally be coming into his own. Author of such vast future histories as <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em>, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>Stapledon is surely the most ambitious science fiction writer who has ever lived</strong>. His aim is no less than to synthesize all human knowledge, to summarize all human history past and future, and to justify the Star Maker's ways to man. His sweep and even his style are Miltonic. Yet Stapledon has lived in the shadow of H. G. Wells the storyteller, and, especially <strong>after his death in 1950 until about 1970, his reputation was in almost complete eclipse</strong>. With now five full-length studies of Stapledon, one from Oxford University Press, and with an entire issue of <em>Science-Fiction Studies</em> devoted to Stapledon, <strong>this situation may well be changing</strong>. (Smith 1989: 400-401)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very usable quotes. The chronology is correct - Stapledon was as-if rediscovered in the late 1980s.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="smith89p401"></a>Their exchange by mail during the war years makes for an affecting love story with which we all may identify at the same time that it is a striking period piece - no one writes such letters or has such a seemingly endless engagement today. Yet the book also involves far more. Olaf and Agnes give us erudite and witty talk about everything from a rail strike in Sydney to feminism to <strong>H. G. Wells</strong> and Walt Whitman to a near-riot in Liverpool when the Abbey Players come to perform Synge's <em>Playboy of the Western World</em>. (Smith 1989: 401)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Casting some doubt on the claim that Stapledon had not read Wells's <em>Time Machine</em> before he wrote his own <em>L&FM</em>.</p><!--
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17
--><h4><a id="huntington89"></a>Huntington, John 1989. Review of McCarthy, Patrick; Elkins, Charles; Greenberg, Martin Henry eds. <em>The Legacy of Olaf Stapledon</em>. <em>Modern Fiction Studies</em> 35(4): 810-811. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1353/mfs.0.1452">10.1353/mfs.0.1452</a> [<u><a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/250290">Project MUSE</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="huntington89p810a"></a><strong>The admirers of Olaf Stapledon find his continued obscurity a puzzle</strong>. While the defenders of Shakespeare, Austen, Joyce, or Woolf develop critical angles and languages to convey what they value in these artists, <strong>the defenders of Stapledon still can only say, "Read him."</strong> Such a failure to enunciate value may be a sign of the inadequacy of our criticism, or it may be a sign of something hidden in Stapledon that enthusiasm fails to see. (Huntington 1989: 810)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just watched Media Death Cult's <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jeNGUKIWX90&t=623s">review of <em>L&FM</em></a>. "Read him" very well summarizes that review.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="huntington89p810b"></a>Robert Shelton explicates Stapledon's philosophical works. Patrick McCarthy discusses in general terms what Stapledon shares with modernism. Two essays, Charles Elkins' challenge of Stapledon's quest for totality and Cheryl Herr's posing <strong>the dichotomy of convention and spirit</strong> as the deep structure of Stapledon's thought, begin to raise questions about Stapledon's goals, although neither develops a thorough and convincing argument. (Huntington 1989: 810)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Convention and spirit?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="huntington89p810c"></a>Louis Tremaine's essay, "Ritual Experience in <em>Odd John</em> and <em>Sirius</em>," comes closest to identifying <strong>the unease that represents Stapledon's strength and prevents his recognition</strong>. Using ideas from Eliade, Van Gennep, and Turner, Tremaine reads both novels as rendering a transitional moment between a conventional social "structure" and an enlightened "communitas." He persuasively argues that the murders in the books are sacrifices in which the protagonists encounter death by substitute. The essay does justice to the transformational ideal without losing sight of <strong>the moral atrocities depicted in these works and the problems they pose for the reader</strong>. (Huntington 1989: 810)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon's works indeed do not lack moral atrocities. Whether or not this is the cause of the "unease" I'm not yet certain.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="huntington89p811"></a>The last two selections in the volume put us in touch with aspects of Stapledon's failure. <strong>Curtis Smith</strong> describes unsympathetically Stapledon's struggle in the late 1930s to defend his pacifist position in letters to newspaper editors. The sense of intellectual impotence that Smith conveys is amplified by the final selection, Stapledon's "Letter to the Future." Like late James, <strong>late Stapledon can sound like self-parody</strong>. The advice is entirely abstract; <strong>all assertions are withdrawn as soon as made</strong>; and although repeatedly disclaiming preaching, the letters are sermons. There is one fine atheistic apothegm, which has an angry energy quite unlike anything else in these letters: "I shall not forget the joy with which my slow mind first discovered that the human race and the stars are not a poultry farm for the production of moral foie gras for a gluttonous God." <strong>In his fiction Stapledon could give life to such an experience of intellectual discovery</strong>. As philosophy, however, it remains, as he himself seems at times aware, adolescent. Stapledon's "legacy" is not all of equal value, and it should be part of his admirers' task to discriminate. This book suggests some beginning points. (Huntington 1989: 811)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A nice addition to the discussion about Stapledon's use of language (e.g. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-philosophical-echo.html#branham80p16a">Branham 1980: 16</a>).</p><!--
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18
--><h4><a id="rovit83"></a>Rovit, Earl 1983. Review of <em>Olaf Stapledon: a man divided</em> by Leslie A. Fiedler. <em>Library Journal</em> 108(3): 208.</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="rovit83p208"></a>Fiedler brings <strong>belated attention</strong> to the British <strong>pioneer</strong> (1886-1950) whose work (especially, <em>Star Maker</em>) has had <strong>enormous influence</strong> on the scope and apocalyptic proclivities of the genre in America as well as in England. Although Stapledon was <strong>somewhat neglected</strong> by American readers, Fiedler demonstrates the <strong>seminal importance</strong> of novels like <em>Last and First Men, Odd John</em>, and <em>Sirius</em>. At the same time, he places Stapledon in relation to the social and intellectual milieu between 1914 and 1945. Using the scanty biographical materials available in conjunction with the fiction, Fiedler makes a sympathetic effort to reveal a portrait of what was <strong>a decidedly bizarre, conflicted, and reclusive personality</strong>. Recommended. (Rovit 1983: 208)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Recommended</em>.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
19
--><h4><a id="hoch88"></a>Hoch, Paul 1988. Review of <em>In the Name of Eugenics</em> by Daniel J. Kevles. <em>The British Journal for the History of Science</em> 21(2): 252-254. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007087400024808">10.1017/S0007087400024808</a> [<u><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-for-the-history-of-science/article/abs/daniel-j-kevles-in-the-name-of-eugenics-new-york-alfred-knopf-1985-pp-x-430-ibsn-0394507029-no-price-given/CBD9257C2A8FFA739B6EC5FDF5FA9D88">cambridge.org</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hoch88p253a"></a>The book also gives what may be a partly misleading impression, that the sterilization programmes for mental incompetents, victims of hereditary diseases, and - disproportionately - for racial minorities in various American states, had been effectively ended by the rise of the new social sciences and the recoil from Nazi eugenics in the 1930s and '40s. However, a few chapters later, it turns out that <strong>such programmes were also uncovered in various parts of the United States in the late '60s and early '70s</strong>. (Hoch 1988: 253)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Fighting the Nazis taught the Americans very little.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hoch88p253b"></a>It might also have been interesting to delve further into literary reflections of the eugenics debates - over and above the three works mentioned by J. B. S. Haldane, Hermann Muller and Aldous Huxley - to include some of <strong>the genetic utopia</strong>s (and anti-utopias) <strong>of</strong> H. G. Wells, <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong>'s <em>Last and First Men</em>, and possibly even Norman Spinrad's satirical heroic fantasy of Hitler's eugenics conquests, <em>The Iron Dream</em>. (Hoch 1988: 253)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Genetic utopia?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
20
--><h4><a id="alkon85"></a>Alkon, Paul 1985. Samuel Madden's <em>Memoirs of the Twentieth Century</em>. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 12(2): 184-201. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239683">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="alkon85p184a"></a><strong>The impossibility of writing stories about the future was so widely taken for granted until the 18th century</strong> that only two earlier anticipations are known: Frances Cheynell's six-page pamphlet of political propaganda set in a very near future, <em>Aulicus his dream of Kings sudden comming to London</em> (1644); and Jacques Guttin's heroic romance, <em>Epigone, histoire du siécle futur</em> (1659). Before their publication, <strong>the future was reserved in Western literature for prophets, astrologers, and practitioners of deliberative rhetoric</strong>. As a trope for madness, John Donne could use the proverbial castigation <em>Chronica de futuro scribet:</em> "He undertakes to write a Chronicle of things before they are done, which is an irregular, and a perverse way" (2:77). (Alkon 1985: 184)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"[...] <u>we cannot speak literally of shaping the future. The future exists only potentially.</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/11/a-philosophical-echo.html#lawler80p2">Lawler 1980: 2</a>).</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="alkon85p184b"></a>The first English book to discard this aversion to chronicling the future is <strong>Samuel Madden's <em>Memoirs of the Twentieth Century</em></strong>. Perhaps in deference to the taboo against tales of the future, it <strong>was published anonymously in 1733</strong>, and then immediately suppressed by its author, an Irish Anglican clergyman who destroyed almost all copies of his extraordinary work as soon as they came from the press. (Alkon 1985: 184)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good to know.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="alkon85p186"></a>It would be stretching our generosity to praise Madden for being the first to show a traveller arriving <em>from</em> the future, although what <strong>the narrator's guardian angel</strong> does in <strong>appearing one evening in 1728 to hand over 20th-century documents</strong> makes me think of such tales as Robert Silverberg's <em>The Masks of Time</em> (1968). <strong>Madden is, however, to my knowledge the first to write a narrative that purports to <em>be</em> a document from the future</strong>. He deserves recognition as the first to toy with <strong>the rich idea of time-travel in the form of an artifact sent backwards from the future to be discovered in the present</strong>. This too is an original variation on a familiar literary tradition: the discovery and interpretation of some ancient document (an artifact from the remote past) containing political or other prophecy. This convention has been used both seriously and satirically. (Alkon 1985: 186)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon can quite easily be placed in this literary-historical context, what with his Eighteenth Man making contact with him (telepathically) from the future.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="alkon85p196"></a>No matter how inept as a satire, Madden's book remains noteworthy as the first work of prose fiction to adopt the central technique of those S-F and related modes that are formally distinct from previous narrative traditions by virtue of <strong>inviting readers to imagine themselves looking backwards from a far future to their own present and immediate future, which are thus also to be regarded as the past</strong>. Here, for the first time in prose fiction, is the proleptic structure identified hy Hanzo as the narrative method most closely affiliated with SF. (Alkon 1985: 196)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This mode invites the reader to consider his present and future as a past, as having already occurred, somehow.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-87691187832653364312023-11-20T23:15:00.000-08:002023-11-20T23:15:42.265-08:00A Philosophical Echo<!-- A Philosophical Echo
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#branham80">Branham 1980. Ineffability, creativity, and communication competence</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#filmer85">Filmer 1985. That Hideous 1984: The Influence of C. S. Lewis' <em>That Hideous Strength</em> on Orwell's <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em></a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#hoyle1986">Hoyle 1986. Fred Hoyle on the Argument of Malthus</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#huntington82">Huntington 1982. Utopian and Anti-Utopian Logic: H.G. Wells and his Successors</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#michaelis89">Michaelis 1989. Anticipating the Future: TA + SF</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#wilt81">Wilt 1981. The Imperial Mouth: Imperialism, the Gothic and Science Fiction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#engelhardt84">Engelhardt 1984. Persons and humans: Refashioning ourselves in a better image and likeness</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#csicseryronay86">Csicsery-Ronay 1986. Twenty-Two Answers and Two Postscripts: An Interview with Stanislaw Lem</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#ketterer83">Ketterer 1983. Pantropy, Polyploidy, and Tectogenesis in the Fiction of James Blish and Norman L. Knight</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#lawler80">Lawler 1980. Certain Assistances: The Utilities of Speculative Fiction in Shaping the Future</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#scheick81">Scheick 1981. Towards the Ultra-Science-Fiction Novel: H.G. Wells's <em>Star Begotten</em></a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="branham80"></a>Branham, Robert James 1980. Ineffability, creativity, and communication competence. <em>Communication Quarterly</em> 28(3): 11-21. DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01463378009369371">10.1080/01463378009369371</a>> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01463378009369371">tandfonline</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p11"></a>Throughout history, persons of all cultures have claimed to have <strong>experiences</strong> that are unique and significant, but which they <strong>cannot accurately convey to others</strong>. Occasionally such frustration has produced organized opposition to language or expression: The mystic academies of Plato and Ficino sought to avoid the "learned ignorance" imposed by language in their search for a reality beyond appearances; the spiritual disciplines of the Chinese Quietists operated from the shared assumption that "the Tao which can be told is not the eternal Tao." (Branham 1980: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Like mystical experience, one presumes. Plato's idealist disregard for language or expression reminds me of the asyntactic type in L.'s cultural typology.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p12"></a><strong>The claim of ineffability is a communicative commonplace</strong>, a persistent theme manifested across cultures, ages, epistemological and religious beliefs, and expressive talents. At its most interesting, human communicative history may be viewed as the record of confrontation between vision and expression, and between visionaries and those with whom they have attempted communication. (Branham 1980: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The history of communication is one of overcoming the barrier of incommunicability.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p14"></a>The person struck by the ineffability of his experiences may nonetheless be moved to attempt expression or communication by a number of motivations. If sufficiently impressed by the magnificence and uniqueness of his vision, <strong>he may seek to translate or evoke its effects for others through artistry</strong>. He may seek to reach others who have shared similar experiences, or to proselytize for others to join in recreation. Less exotically and more commonly, he may simply seek to exalt and demonstrate the effects of on unusually moving and highly personal experience. (Branham 1980: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Turn your vision into a novel</em>, for example.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p15"></a>Insecure conversationalists often frame their statements with <strong>proclamations of practical ineffability</strong>, such as "I just can't tell you" (e.g., how excited I am), or "words are inadequate to convey" (e.g., my heartfelt sympathy). In private conversation, such qualifiers are commonly interpreted as demonstrations of sincerity and depth of feeling rather than proof of communicator incompetence. (Branham 1980: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nearly a phatic issue.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p16a"></a>Qualified expression has occasionally produced significant aesthetic achievements. <strong>The works of philosopher and novelist Olaf Stapledon, for example, offer a powerful chronicle of personal struggle with vision and expression</strong>. Stapledon's nonfictional works explore <strong>the qualities and limitations of language in the construction of ethical insights and principles</strong>. Calling himself an "agnostic mystic," Stapledon sought expressive forms that would preserve the delicate balance of visionary insight and recognition of cognitive and linguistic inaccuracy. It is this cultivated tension between vision and expression that pervades Stapledon's fictional works, particularly <em>Last and First Men</em> (an intellectual history of the universal search for God in which <em>Last and First Men</em> is summarized in a paragraph). <strong>His myths, though grand in scale and conception, are invariably tentative and heavily qualified</strong>. (Branham 1980: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Even Stapledon's nonfiction works may turn out to be of interest for the semiotician.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p16b"></a>Stapledon reinforced this qualifier in virtually every descriptive passage. The reader's interest is sustained through <strong>the grandeur of the image fragments nevertheless attained</strong> and through a developed intrigue with <strong>the expressive situation of the narrator</strong>. The reader may forgive the narrator's cosmic stammering because he gains a sense of <strong>the immensity of Stapledon's vision and the hopelessness of more satisfactory articulation</strong>. Stapledon used language but distrusted it; he sought to trancend the ordinary limits of expression by raising our awareness of them. (Branham 1980: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This factor is also noticeable in <em>L&FM</em>. </p><!--
7-8 --><blockquote><a id="branham80p16ja17"></a>Paul Goodman characterized poets <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> as those who "understand, more than most people, what cannot be said, what is not being said though it ought to be, what is <strong>verbalized experience</strong> and what is <strong>mere words</strong>." (Branham 1980: 16-17)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sõnastatud kogemus vs paljad sõnad.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="filmer85"></a>Filmer, Kath 1985. That Hideous 1984: The Influence of C. S. Lewis' <em>That Hideous Strength</em> on Orwell's <em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em>. <em>Extrapolation</em>. <em>Extrapolation</em> 26(2): 160-169. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.3828/extr.1985.26.2.160">10.3828/extr.1985.26.2.160</a> [<u><a href="https://liverpooluniversitypress.co.uk/doi/10.3828/extr.1985.26.2.160">Liverpool University Press</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p160"></a>Clive Staples Lewis, a contemporary of Orwell, wrote his "science fiction trilogy" between 1938 and 1945. The last novel in the trilogy, <em>That Hideous Strength</em>, anticipates Orwell on many aspects of the evils of totalitarianism. Like Orwell, <strong>Lewis sees totalitarian rule as an attack not merely on society but on the very humanness of humanity itself</strong>. This issue is relevant in today's world, since it draws attention to the fact that <strong>governments are themselves controlled by forces antipathetic to human individuality</strong>. Indeed, it might be said that both Lewis' and Orwell's books are fictional exptrapolations of Lord Acton's time-honored aphorism, "All power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." (Filmer 1985: 160)</blockquote><!--
--><p>More commonly known as <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C._S._Lewis">C. S. Lewis</a>. </p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p161"></a>Although there is some disparity between Lewis' and Orwell's choice of genre, it is nevertheless clear that their novels owe a common debt to <strong>the dystopian tradition which includes</strong> H. G. Wells's <em>The Time Machine</em>, <strong>Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em></strong>, and Aldous Huxley's <em>Brave New World</em>. Both Lewis and Orwell explore <strong>the effects of a malevolent regime upon society</strong>, and in particular the corruption by that regime of two aspects of science - psychology and biology. (Filmer 1985: 161)</blockquote><!--
--><p>On what basis can <em>L&FM</em> be said to be dystopian literature? For its prefatory dismissal of utopianism, only?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p162"></a>With Orwell's dislike of intrusive supernatural elements, it is only to be expected that he would make his villain human. <strong>Lewis, on the other hand, was firmly convinced of the existence of an evil supernatural force, the fallen angels of Christian theology</strong>. He makes them and their leader, Satan, responsible for the complete and utter dehumanization of those who have chosen to serve themselves instead of God, but he terms them "Macrobes," not "devils." (Filmer 1985: 162)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Of course. Anglican demonology.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p164a"></a>But sex is seen by Lewis not as one more human attribute to be abrogated by totalitarian power, but as part of a divine order. Mark and Jane Studdock sin by practicing birth control, while <strong>the cursed side of the moon which looks to each is inhabited by evil beings who will appease their lust not with flesh but with phantasms, and who are consequently barren</strong> (p. 337). For Lewis, sex is not the sole focus of the attack upon humanity, and the attack upon humanity is itself seen as part of a larger, cosmic struggle. (Filmer 1985: 164)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Casting sexual aspersions on the alien space station on the dark side of the moon.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p164"></a>The aim is to make "a new type of man" - <strong>a pure intelligence, a disembodied brain</strong> - for which the loathsome Head is prototype. Lewis' idea is not original, since it has been raised conjecturally by many writers, of whom the most recent is F. Estfandiary in his book <em>Up Wingers</em>. Esfandiary writes <strong>a philosophical echo of Olaf Stapledon</strong>: "We must redo the human [...] we must begin by redoing the human body. The body has been our greatest hangup. Our most serious obstacle to a higher evolution." Lewis' "Head" at Belbury represent with loathing and disgust the ultimate result of scientific manipulation of human development, and it communicates graphically the point he makes in his <em>Abolition of Man</em>: that "science" is closely related to the occult magic of the Middle Ages. (Filmer 1985: 164)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "giant brain" is a pretty common trope in sci-fi, it turns out.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="filmer85p165"></a>Lewis and Orwell are closest in their use of the motif of <strong>the corruption or perversion of logos</strong>. In this respect, their works are most applicable to the current political and sociological <em>Zietgeist</em>. In Orwell's novel, the motif is identified as "Newspeak"; In Lewis' it is presented through the continuing contrast between <strong>the meaningless jargon spoken at Belbury</strong>, especially in the final banquet scene when guests become acutely dysphasic, and the descent upon St. Anne's of Mercury, <strong>the "eldilic" Lord of Meaning</strong>. (Filmer 1985: 165)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phaticity?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="hoyle1986"></a>Hoyle, Fred 1986. Fred Hoyle on the Argument of Malthus. <em>Population and Development Review</em> 12(3): 547-562. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1973224">10.2307/1973224</a> [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/1973224">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p547"></a>Sir Fred Hoyle (b. 1915), the noted British astronomer and cosmologist (former Plumian Professor of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy at Cambridge University), and <strong>occasional science fiction novelist</strong>, is not one readily to accept consensus positions, in his own field or those of others. In this excursion into demographic speculation written in the early 1960s, Hoyle displays characteristic originality, insight, and provocativeness to suggest a different and, many might be persuaded, no less plausible long-term global <strong>future</strong>: one <strong>with recurrent population expansions and collapses</strong>. (Hoyle 1986: 547)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not out of the question.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p548a"></a>The millenial time scale, it might be noted, is modest beside Charles Galton Darwin's <em>The Next Million Years</em> (London, 1952), the work Hoyle takes as his point of departure, let alone beside Olaf Stapledon's 1931 science-fiction classic, <em>Last and First Men</em> (also <strong>an oscillatory future, though lacking</strong> the <strong>evolutionary continuity</strong> of Hoyle's). (Hoyle 1986: 548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These are still the papers that mention Stapledon very briefly. (The next batch will be explicitly about him.)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p548b"></a><strong>The prediction of the future is the main concern of science</strong>. This is a matter for scientific theories. Experiment exists in science as an aid to arriving at theories, although a casual observation of the facilities provided for experiment on the one hand and theoretical studies on the other, both in Universities and in the country at large, might sometimes suggest otherwise. (Hoyle 1986: 548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A strong opening statement.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p552"></a>This argument has had a profound effect on all biological thinking since the days of Malthus. (The original publication, <em>An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society</em>, appeared in 1798.) It is well known that Darwin's work on natural selection was in part influenced by Malthus. And his grandson makes a similar use of these ideas in <em>The Next Million Years</em>, forecasting that the human society of the future will be limited by starvation, that <strong>the men of the future will look back on the present day as the golden age of the species</strong>. (Hoyle 1986: 552)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Back in them days we could adequately feed most of the population</em>.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p554"></a>We are already beyond the normal form of biological control, the control that has directed evolution over the past thousand million years. However, I must emphasize that this is not to say we are beyond all control, rather that a new control is going to come into operation. My view is that the control will be so strong, so overwhelming, that <strong>within five thousand years a new species will have taken the place of the human species</strong>. It will still be human in shape, but its genetic make-up, its mental processes, its behaviouristic patterns will be so different from present-day norms as to justify the title of a new species. (Hoyle 1986: 554)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds a bit too optimistic.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p555"></a>While only a fool, and apparently there are plenty of these, can contemplate nuclear warfare with equanimity, I do not think the effect would approach the picture painted by <strong>Nevil Shute</strong> in his novel <strong><em>On the Beach</em></strong>, for instance. (Hoyle 1986: 555)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Added to the list.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p556"></a>Rather obviously, <strong>the new creature</strong> - or new species as I prefer to call him - <strong>will be much more socially minded than we are</strong>. Selection of course is essentially synonymous with rejection. It will be <strong>the unco-operative elements</strong> that <strong>will be rejected</strong>. Such individuals prefer to exist in chaos and will finally be submerged. A species much better adapted to the whole phenomenon of social organization will have emerged. (Hoyle 1986: 556)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Again, very optimistic. </p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="hoyle1986p557"></a>Reading in a library is to-day merely the innocent pursuit of the scholar. <strong>In the future the ability to puzzle out the knowledge of the past will be decisive</strong>. Knowledge, organization, the library, these are the environmental factors that will determine the future. It mae seem strange to the biologist to think of the library as a major environmental factor, but I think the strangeness comes from the newness of the concept rather than from any new principle. (Hoyle 1986: 557)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool idea, though we're already seeing that machine-learning might be the key to make sense of the large mass of knowledge recorded in our libraries.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="huntington82"></a>Huntington, John 1982. Utopian and Anti-Utopian Logic: H.G. Wells and his Successors. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 9(2): 122-146. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239475">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p123"></a>The major alteration in the structuce of Wells's logic that has occurred in IDC [<em>In the Days of the Comet</em>] is camouflaged by his use of what looks like the "two-world system" of <em>The Time Machine</em> or <em>The Wonderful Visit</em> (from which the phrase comes). The novel juxtaposes two worlds that share personalities and geographies but which are radically different. The old world is ours, an "insane" world of war, class hatred, and murderous jealousy; <strong>the new world is that which a rational treatment of society and of human relations might supposedly create, an organized utopia in which all humans are free to realize their whole potential</strong>. (Huntington 1982: 123)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Dreams.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p127"></a>In ridding the novel of its disturbing anti-utopianism by melodramatic gestures, Wells is being true to one important dynamic of WSW: the technological exuberance. <strong>The machine-dominated future</strong>, so the novel implies, <strong>Does not have to be a nightmare</strong>. (Huntington 1982: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It doesn't?</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p128a"></a>Either, as in the case of Zamyatin's <strong><em>We</em></strong> (1924), we commit ourselves to an infinitely dialectical anti-utopianism, or, as in the case of Orwell's <strong><em>Nineteen Eighty-Four</em></strong> (1949) or, in a different spirit, Bradbury's <strong><em>Fahrenheit 451</em></strong> (1953) or Huxley's <strong><em>Brave New World</em></strong> (1932), we quash ironic conflict and replace the puzzle with a single-valued structure, either dystopian or utopian. (Huntington 1982: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Always this same bunch.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p128b"></a>But let us also observe that Zamyatin is not the only <strong>anti-utopian developing out of the Wells tradition</strong>. Though it would lead us astray from our present purposes to explore their work in any detail, writers such as Karel Čapek, <strong>Olaf Stapledon</strong>, and Ursula Le Guin deserve mention here. (Huntington 1982: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A more interesting bunch.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p128c"></a>In <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), Stapledon transforms the more or less static oppositions of Wells into <strong>a serial process of discovery</strong>, and his <strong>relentlessly dialectical history of the future</strong> picks up that mixture of yearning and skepticism that characterizes anti-utopia. (Huntington 1982: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Dialectical" in what sense?</p><!--
21 --><blockquote><a id="huntington82p141"></a>The narrator of <em>A Modern Utopia</em>, what Wells calls "<strong>the owner of the Voice," is an ironic device that Wells uses as a way not of withholding full assent to the ideas he sets forth</strong>, but of suggesting the contradictory fullness of human hopes and, therefore, of expressing his anti-utopian awareness of the narrowness of his fervently held utopian ideas even as he declares them. (Huntington 1982: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hmm.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="michaelis89"></a>Michaelis, Anthony R. 1989. Anticipating the Future: TA + SF. <em>Interdisciplinary Science Reviews</em> 14(2): 97-102. DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/isr.1989.14.2.97">10.1179/isr.1989.14.2.97</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/isr.1989.14.2.97">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis89p97"></a>It is an attempt to compare technology assessment with a few examples from classical science fiction where the authors have described <strong>the social consequences of scientific discoveries</strong> and the resulting technologies. I do not know if this has been done before; even if it has, it may still be worthwhile to repeat it here as it may contribute to the renown of technology assessment. (Michaelis 1989: 97)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not uninteresting.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis89p98"></a>The Minisec was the hand-held personal part of the system, the Comsole the unversal <span style="color: #fa4100">[sic]</span> counterpart, looking like today's television screen and just as widespread. These two related to each other across an optical beam of ultraviolet light, exchanging personal with universal information and knowledge. 'Through the Comsole could flow everything that Man had ever learned about the universe [...] <strong>All the libraries and museums that had ever existed could be funnelled through this screen and the millions like it, scattered over the face of the Earth</strong>.' And what did Clarke suggest were the social consequences for an Earth that possessed such a utopian communication system? 'There is <strong>an unhealthy preoccupation with the past</strong>, an attempt to reconstruct and to relieve it.' The only pioneering spirit left in the solar system was on far-flung Titan, represented in the book by Duncan Mackenzie on a VIP visit to Imperial Earth. (Michaelis 1989: 98)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Computers and smartphones, and endless nostalgia.</p><!--
7-8 --><blockquote><a id="michaelis89p100ja101"></a>Again it was the brilliant imagination of <strong>H. G. Wells</strong>, together with his not inconsiderable knowledge of science, that foresaw in uncanny detail the destructive powers of atomic bombs, in <em>The World Set Free</em> of 1914. He <strong>invented the term 'atomic bomb'</strong> and called them 'the crowning revolution of human potentialities' and considered that 1956 'or for that <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> matter 2056 may be none too late' for them. Atomic weapons were also prophesied by other writers, particularly Olaf Stapledon in his <em>Last and First Men</em> published in 1930. A young Chinese scientist demonstrates the power of his <strong>atomic rifle</strong> by removing a large island from the Bristol Channel, and he destroys a fleet of American bombers about to annihilate Europe. Yet the Council of world Scientists to whom the weapon is demonstrated decide unanimously that it is premature and must be destroyed. 'No, Sir! Your very wonderful toy would be a gift fit for developed minds; but for us, who are still barbarians, no, it must not be,' are the words of the French President of the Council. (Michaelis 1989: 100-101)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Did not know about Wells coining the term.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="wilt81"></a>Wilt, Judith 1981. The Imperial Mouth: Imperialism, the Gothic and Science Fiction. <em>Popular Culture</em> 14(4): 618-628. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1981.00618.x">10.1111/j.0022-3840.1981.00618.x</a> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1981.00618.x">wiley.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p618"></a>In or around December, 1897, to paraphrase Virgina Woolf, Victorian gothic changed - into Victorian science fiction. The occasion was the publication of <strong>H.G. Wells' <em>The War of the Worlds</em>, which followed by only a few months the publication of Bram Stoker's gothic classic <em>Dracula</em></strong>. Playing fairy godfather to the transformation was Victorian imperialism, that <strong>march of mind and militia</strong> whose confident momentum concealed anxieties which the literature of the time faithfully, if often obscurely, recorded. (Wilt 1981: 618)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A literary hinge point.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p619"></a><blockquote>The bare idea of this is no doubt horribly repulsive to us, but at the same time I think that we should remember how repulsive our carnivorous habits would seem to <strong>an intelligent rabbit</strong>.</blockquote>The tone here is science fiction: the image is of carnal appropriation, not metaphysics but physics, and biology; the morality is scientific tolerance. (Wilt 1981: 619)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Quote from Wells' <em>The War of the Worlds</em>. Could Stapledon have taken this figure of "intelligent rabbits" as the basis of "man's more rabbit-like [...] descendants"?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p623"></a>Stoker wrote another novel in 1904 called <strong><em>The Jewel of Seven Stars</em></strong> which contains in a less oblique way, I think, a popular nightmare arising out of "The African Question" of the last Victorian decades.<br />In this novel the western penetration into Egyptian Tombs has both revealed and triggered the resurrection of <strong>a powerful Queen whose seven-fingered hand contains the jewel whose stars match a constellation current in the skies</strong> at the time the novel opens. (Wilt 1981: 623)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One of my favorite rappers is named Seven Star. The premise reminds me of the beginning of Ridley Scott's <em>Prometheus</em> (2012) for some reason.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p627a"></a>The alien, like Conrad's trading company, eats men, and moves by machine, and shoots heat guns. Nevertheless, to the end <strong>Wells tries to make the Martian the other, absolutely uncommunicated with, barely communicable about</strong>. (Wilt 1981: 627)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not that dissimilar from Stapledon's Martians.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p627b"></a>The crowning horror is reserved for the Martians, however; victory, alarmingly for the English consciousness, satisfyingly for the unconscious, belongs to the invaded, not the invader. Destruction from the Martians runs its allotted course; then destruction fastens upon them and they appear to the narrator the second time, when he comes out of hiding, as solitary decaying corpses, killed by <strong>the bacteria of the earth who are "our microscopic allies,"</strong> part of man's very self striking back at the invader. The Martians came on the wings of progress but what they learned on the planet Earth was regression. Specifically, the narrator remarks, "all the evidence suggests the Martians knew nothing of the putrefactive process." Now they know. The earth is the very locus of regression, reduction. <strong>"By the toll of a billion deaths man has gained his immunity and bought his birthright of the earth," Wells concludes, "and it is his against all comers"</strong> (p. 444). (Wilt 1981: 627)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That's a pretty neat idea: countless humans have had to die from infections so that we can live <em>with</em> our bacteria. We have become symbiotic with our microscoping partners, who would easily kill anyone else who hasn't paid the selective toll of living with these tiny living organisms.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="wilt81p628"></a>But I like best of all <strong>the long dramatization of the non-imperial "progress" of the species</strong> in the Englishman Olaf Stapledon's novel of 1931, <em>Last and First Men</em>. There, after a history of mutations which alter and alter humanity until it can no longer be called such, the "last man" gives up the future to chance, letting the "seeds" of the race float out into the unknown space beyond the last inhabited corner of the universe, and pronounces, in case no seed takes root, with great simplicity, the end of empire: "It was good to have been man." (Wilt 1981: 628)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Too bad this paper wasn't about that, then.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
07
--><h4><a id="engelhardt84"></a>Engelhardt, H. Tristram 1984. Persons and humans: Refashioning ourselves in a better image and likeness. <em>Zigon</em> 19(3): 281-295. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1984.tb00931.x">10.1111/j.1467-9744.1984.tb00931.x</a> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9744.1984.tb00931.x">wiley.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p281"></a>Reflections on <strong>the genetic engineering of humans</strong> tend to be encumbered by a number of difficulties, the main one being that this engineering is not currently possible in any significant degree. Hence, reflections take on a somewhat futuristic, if not science fictional, character. (Engelhardt 1984: 281)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Definitely premature in the 1980s.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p282"></a>Genetic engineering of the germ line attracts our attention because it brings into question <strong>our very character as a particular species</strong>. (Engelhardt 1984: 282)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is it fluid?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p285a"></a>To take the general issues of genetic engineering seriously in a science fictional context is also useful in conjuring certain contrasts between being a human and being a person, for <strong>the fantasy presents human nature as a changing and changeable designation</strong> for a certain range of mammalian capacities. (Engelhardt 1984: 285)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Science fiction tends to portray it as fluid.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p285b"></a>For the former arguments to succeed, a set of religious or metaphysical assumptions regarding some designer and His or Her (or Their) design would be required. Such assumptions place the debate within restricted communities accepting such special religious or metaphysical assumptions. <strong>It would appear very difficult to show why in general terms the current results of evolution are in any sense sacrosanct</strong>. (Engelhardt 1984: 285)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps God created <em>Sahelanthropus tchadensis</em> in his own image, and <em>Homo erectus</em> et al. are just the leftovers - the good Toumaï were raptured to heaven long ago, and the only <em>tchadensis</em> skull we have was the one sinner left behind, who accidentally promulgated all of us.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p286a"></a>One might cite as an example the classic science fiction novel by Olaf <strong>Stapledon</strong> (1968), <em>Last and First Men</em>, which <strong>portrays the history of the human race over approximately two billion years and recounts various radical refashionings of human nature</strong>. Stapledon's 1931 portrayals of man remaking himself envisage many of the difficulties that are likely to be encountered in genetic engineering. Even where they fail to be complete, such accounts offer <strong>a heuristic portrayal of the distance between persons as fashioners, makers, and manipulators, and human nature as an object of such manipulation</strong>. (Engelhardt 1984: 286)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah, persons as genetic engineers, humans as genetic enginees.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p286b"></a><em>Mistakes: Could genetic engineering provide the ground for tort for <strong>wrongful life</strong> suits?</em> It is becoming more accepted legally that offspring may seek a recovery for damages when they are born with a genetic defect that could have been avoided by abortion or by contraception (Holder 1981). <strong>To conceive a child or to allow a pregnancy with known genetic defects to go to term harms the future person who will be born</strong>. However one might be able to construe such a harm, it is generally to the advantage of society to have as few disabled individuals as possible. (Engelhardt 1984: 628)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Sue your parents for being born</em>. The antinatalists would love this.</p><!--
8-9 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p288ja289"></a>The polytheistic metaphor can remind us that one should attempt to articulate alternative views of human excellence. Just as a devout polytheist attempts to choose a proper constellation of special gods and goddesses for his or her worship - one might think here of <strong>Septimius Alexander, worshipping</strong> in his private chapel with particular devotion Christ, Abraham, Orpheus, and <strong>Apollonius of Tyana</strong> (Lampridius <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> [1924] 1967, 29.2) - so too a society might especially support the development of certain human types, while recognizing in the end that these constitute only a small selection from a wider possible range. (Engelhardt 1984: 288-289)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Wait, how did we get here?</p><!--
11-12 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p291ja292"></a>This point is understood by children who have seen the movies in the "Star Wars" series and have come to the judgment that Yoda is a marvelous person and Jabba the Hut is an evil person. none of those entities is human, although they are all portrayed as persons. Stories of angels and gods give classic illustrations of the same point. Not all persons need be humans.<br />Genetic engineering makes this point in a somewhat transformed fashion. <strong>Humans, since they are persons, need not remain human</strong>. One <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> can imagine humans over time so transforming their characteristics that one would wish to advance new classificatory taxa to replace Homo sapiens - perhaps Homo Fabricatus I, Homo fabricatus II, and so on. <strong>This is the point raised by the novel by Stapledon</strong>. If one is willing to entertain a sufficiently long-range fantasy regarding the human future, it is difficult to imagine that humans will not in fact refashion themselves in major ways. (Engelhardt 1984: 291-292)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not a bad argument.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="engelhardt84p293"></a>The difference and distance between us as persons, as manipulators of our nature, and us as humans, as objects to be manipulated gives us <strong>our destiny as self-refashioners, self-manipulators</strong>. Being self-conscious and rational, we can always objectify our bodies and in so objectifying them bring their shortcomings into question. In seeing ourselves as objects, we then raise for ourselves the moral problem of all creators, namely, to create prudently and responsibly. Here the issue is especially earnest, for the problem is that of our own <strong>self-creation</strong>, self-manipulation. The possibility of genetic engineering recalls to our attention the inescapable fact that <strong>in being self-reflective individuals, we are always potentially recreators of ourselves</strong>. Genetic engineering opens up in physical reality possibilities that were always available in reflection. (Engelhardt 1984: 293)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Enese-ümberkujundajad</em>. Good paper.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
08
--><h4><a id="csicseryronay86"></a>Csicsery-Ronay, Istvan 1986. Twenty-Two Answers and Two Postscripts: An Interview with Stanislaw Lem. Translated by Marek Lugowski. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 13(3): 242-260. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239764">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p244a"></a><em>Lem:</em> Literary realism, for me, is <strong>literature's way of dealing with the real problems</strong> of a dual (at least) type. The first kind is the sort of problem that already exists or is coming into existence. The second kind is the sort <strong>that appear</strong>s <strong>to be lying on the path of humanity's future</strong>. Any attempt to differentiate "possible problems" from "fictional," or "probable situations (albeit seeming outrageous today)" from "unlikely," is probably too polarizing to be successful. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 244)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Problems like genetically engineering humans.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p244b"></a>Similarly - <em>mutatis mutandis</em> - my writings over the last 30 years has been subjected to tests imposed by the changing world. I dare claim that the thrust of the main changes (such as <strong>genetic engineering or computer science</strong>) would become apparent to me, roughly at the time when some very intelligent people simply laughed at my notions as fairy stories. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 244)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yup.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p246a"></a>Of course, the mental life of the protagonist was all me - where else could I have acquired the information to render it? I do know, however, that <strong>books can be smarter than their authors</strong>, and that my geniouses such as Hogarth were half-illusions. After all, I do not quote the mathematical works which made Hogarth famous. All such things are decorations, theatrical props conjuring reality. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 246)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something something the fifth function of texts in society.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p246b"></a>I haven't read Kafka for a long time, because there is something in his works that I find repugnant. It's as if they contain more misfortune than is "proper" for a "decent" author. It's as if Kafka struggled with both some real forces and some that were but his own, personal, desperate neuroses; and I despise <strong>writer-psychopaths</strong>. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 246)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oof.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p249a"></a><em>ICR:</em> In <em>Science Fiction and Futurology</em>, you wrote that <strong>no one has developed Stapledon's method of creating cultures</strong>. Many of my students, who read your novels immediately after reading Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em>, saw your work as <strong>a dialogue with Stapledon</strong>. They read your alien encounters as intense dramatic depictions of the same subject matter that Stapledon describes with <strong>epic expansiveness</strong>. Did Stapledon's imaginary cosmogony have an effect on your "dramas of cognizance"? (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 249)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon created "cultures"?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p249b"></a><em>Lem:</em> Most likely, my reading of Stapledon provided plenty of inspiration for my imagination, especially from <strong>the sociological point of view</strong> (the variety of cultures and the magnitude of their separateness). I think I can say that to me <strong>he is in that select group of authors known as true eye-openers</strong>. Still, purely belletristically, I can point to <strong>many flaws</strong> in his writing, as I have done in my <em>Science Fiction and Futurology</em>, especially <strong>in his <em>Odd John</em></strong>. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 249)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As of yet my understanding is that <em>absolutely no-one likes "Odd John"</em>.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p250"></a><em>ICR:</em> You once wrote to me that you believe a lot of what Golem says. His speculations on the "<strong>toposophy</strong>" of Superior Artificial Intelligences can be read as <strong>a materialistic version of theosophy</strong> - a theosophy without a teleology. The development of intelligence described by Golem seems to parallel the development of "spiritual consciousness" projected by Teilhard, the Austrian mystic <strong>Rudolph Steiner</strong>, and others in the modern Western mystical tradition. Despite your stated dislike of mysticism and of Hegel, aren't you describing a dialectical progress of the Spirit of Intelligence in Golem's vision? (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 250)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Interesting. Haven't yet gotten around to Steiner but hopefully will.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p253"></a><em>Lem:</em> Love is a matter of individuals. It is the fulfillment of the human psyche's expectations. An individual is able to feel love towards only a small number of the closest persons, be it erotic love, parental, or other - for example, religiously inspired. In my private life, this emotion plays perhaps the main role. <strong>But one cannot really love humanity. It is impossible even to get to know all coexisting persons</strong>. So put, "love of humanity" is a pure abstraction, entirely impotent in the face of the world's dramatic problems. This is why making love the subject of a book is tantamount to closing one's eyes to the problems of the world, and because of this alone, it would hinge on being escapist. Of course, these are strictly my private convictions. I do not believe that love can save nations or entire societies. This may be why love has taken the backseat in my writing. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 253)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What a marvellous statement (that can be set in contrast with Stapledon's 18th men who do <em>get to know all coexisting persons</em>, all the billions of them).</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="csicseryronay86p255"></a>What may be even more surprising (if not downright paradoxical-sounding), this was the way in which I wrote my discursive prose as well: no projects, no blueprints. If <em>a priori</em> plans were needed, it often turned out they weren't kept. It was as though I was carried away by the current of my thought as I was writing the text - the sort of thing that happens to white water rafters: keeping the course and not really managing to do so. Basically, I wrote by trial and error, and since I never cross out anything, instead throwing away in its entirety what does not please me, <strong>I see myself as a high-jumper, making attempts at a height, one after another, each a contained procedure, including the initial run. It is impossible to pause in the air over the crossbar in order to make an adjustment</strong>. (Csicsery-Ronay 1986: 255)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very similar to my own views on writing. Never been able to do anything systematically, piecemeal. It's either all in one go or a bust.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
09
--><h4><a id="ketterer83"></a>Ketterer, David 1983. Pantropy, Polyploidy, and Tectogenesis in the Fiction of James Blish and Norman L. Knight. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 10(2): 199-218. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239549">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p199"></a>After remarking the comparative rareness of stories deriving their major ideas from biological areas (with the exception of stories concerned with <strong>teratology, the study of monsters</strong>), Blish points in a note to Norman L. Knight's "Crisis in Utopia" as "a real genetic story." (Ketterer 1983: 199)</blockquote><!--
--><p>In medicine and biology, "<u>the scientific study of congenital abnormalities and abnormal formations</u>." In mythology, "<u>relating to fantastic creatures and monsters</u>."</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p202"></a>Although the relationship between the Altered Men and other human beings is problematical in "Seeding Program," there is no real doubt that the Altered Men are human beings - and this in spite of <strong>the synthetic denial implicit in such references as</strong> Sweeney's to <strong>the possibility of converting "an Adapted Man back into a human being</strong>" (I:2:24) and in spite of the meaning of the word "pantropy" itself: "changing everything" (I:1:8). If everything is changed or can be changed, then in what real sense is an <em>Altered</em> Man a human being? That question in effect occupies the concluding Book, "Watershed," where <strong>the notion of pantropy as total, ceaseless change comes up against the notion that there is an essential human nature which remains the same</strong>, an essential truth. (Ketterer 1983: 202)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Some question arises with Stapledon's future humans, who are affirmed as "fully human", and us first humans not yet so.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p205"></a>However, Dr Chatvieux points out that they themselves can contribute germ cells; and from these, with the aid of "pantropes," microscopic beings might be created that could survive in the puddles about the broken ship. Echoing the reasoning which applies in "The Thing in the Attic," fresh water is chosen rather than the sea because it is safer. The Adapted colonists that result will have no memory of their previous incarnation, although to some degree "the donor's personality patterns" (II:0:107) will be transmitted. But the original seeding team, including the two lovers, the pilot la Ventura, and midshipman Joan Heath, will die before they can be reborn as something new. <strong>A record engraved on metal plates of an appropriately microscopic size is left in the hope that the aquatic colonists, after generations of evolution, will decipher and learn the facts</strong>. In spite of the objection that telling them they are microscopic "may saddle their entire early history with a gods-and-demons mythology" (an echo of "The Thing in the Attic" again), this information is included. Chatvieux points out that "These people will be of the race of men. [...] They are not toys to be protected from the truth forever in a fresh water womb" (II:0:109). (Ketterer 1983: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Microscopic metal plates? May they not corrode or be destroyed in volcanic activity? Or be buried under so much sediment as to be practically lost for ever?</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p208"></a>If <strong>sex</strong>, as it seems to be, <strong>is</strong> that essential human truth, <strong>a material counterpart to the soul</strong>, then pantropy has a long way to go before it can be said to "change everything." (Ketterer 1983: 208)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What?</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p210a"></a>On the face of it, <em>A Torrent of Faces</em> seems to have more to do with the theme of overpopulation than with that of tectogenesis. <strong>The future, well-nigh utopian world described supports a population of about one trillion "normal" human beings (nine-tenths of whom are unemployed) in one hundred thousand enclosed, pyramidical, hive-type cities</strong>. Most of the book deals with the increasing threat of this stable world's collapse posed by three major disasters, one for each of the novel's three books: the shipwreck of a sea hotel; a break in the main supply pipe of a normally empty Disaster City named Gitler in Missouri, Unistan (i.e., the US plus Canada), to which people might be evacuated; and the impact in the Hudson's Bay area of an asteroid, one mile in diameter, named Flavia, one of a cast of 24 "characters" listed after the contents page. (Ketterer 1983: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_Inside"><em>World Inside</em></a> type visions of the future, it looks like.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p210b"></a>In addition there is Dep. Blish 399/6 which consists of maps and six very detailed diagrams by Knight of a futuristic form of television, the floating-globe hotel, and aspects of a Biological Preserve where, in the interests of a controlled ecology, all the wildlife is kept apart from all that vegetation known as <strong>the World Forest</strong>, which covers most of the world's land masses including the exteriors of the cities. (Ketterer 1983: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "agricultural area" between the urbmons.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p213"></a>Like much SF, <em>A Torrent of Faces</em> hinges on the opposition between the artificial and the natural. The land world of the novel has been <strong>artificially segregated</strong> into three separate areas: a massive vegetable area, the <strong>World Forest</strong>; the various <strong>Biological Preserves</strong> where the animals are kept; and the <strong>enclosed cities</strong> where the people are kept. This apparently stable situation is then steadily undermined by a series of more or less natural disasters, culminating in the meteor. (Ketterer 1983: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vegetative, animal, and rational souls kept apart.</p><!--
17-18 --><blockquote><a id="ketterer83p214ja215"></a>It should be recognized that <strong>the notion of biological or genetic engineering</strong> predates Blish's three treatments of the theme. It <strong>crops up</strong> incidentally in Wells's <em>The First Men in the Moon</em> (1901), <strong>in Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First men</em></strong> (1930) (an <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> ancestor <strong>Blish alludes to</strong> in <em>The Seedling Stars</em> [I:3:44]), and most significantly in Aldoux Huxley's <em>Brave New World</em> (1932). (Ketterer 1983: 214-215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Alludes how?</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
10
--><h4><a id="lawler80"></a>Lawler, Donald L. 1980. Certain Assistances: The Utilities of Speculative Fiction in Shaping the Future. <em>Mosaic: An Interdisciplinary Critical Journal</em> 13(3/4): 1-13. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/24780257">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lawler80p2"></a>We all know, although sometimes we must remind ourselves, that <strong>we cannot speak literally of shaping the future. The future exists only potentially</strong>. It is true that present choices help give shape, substance and dimension to the future as it actually unfolds; but our choices, much less our hopes and fears, are themselves insufficient causes of actual futures. Chance, irrational actions and events, destiny, and what we may broadly term froces of history, all converge in helping to shape our tomorrows. (Lawler 1980: 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The underlying premise of Stapledon's work might call this into question.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lawler80p3a"></a>Hugo Gernsback thought so much of the utility of science fiction as an inspiration of new science and technology that he proposed <strong>patent searches include science-fiction literature</strong> and that science-fiction writers should be allowed legal claim to ideas that were later commercially developed. Such an arrangement would have made more than one science-fiction writer a fabulously wealthy citizen of the world. (Lawler 1980: 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Make a not-so-quick buck by writing science fiction with every possible invention you can think of.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lawler80p3b"></a>Science fiction as <strong>cautionary tale</strong> has, it seems, a necessary and important role to play in our culture. The idea is now a familiar one that in exploring imagined futures, speculative science fiction sensitizes its readers to <strong>the likely consequences of the often fast-moving developments of the present</strong>. Olaf Stapledon expressed such a view in his Foreword to the American Edition of <em>Last and First Men:</em><blockquote>Man seems to be entering one of the major crises of his career. <strong>His whole future, nay the possibility of wishing any future at all, depends on the turn events may take in the next half-century</strong>. It is a commonplace that he is coming into possession of new and dangerous instruments for controlling his environment and his own nature. Perhaps it is less obvious that he is also groping toward a new and racial purpose. Unfortunately, he may possibly take too long to learn what it is he really wants to do with himself. Before he can gain clear insight, he may lose himself in a vast desert of spiritual aridity, or even blunder into physical self-destruction. Nothing can save him but a new vision and a consequent new order of sanity or common sense.</blockquote>Science fiction serves our culture, therefore, as <strong>a sort of early warning system</strong>. An important effect of the cautionary tale is also to offer a reinterpretation or restatement of moral values in imagined future cultures different from our own. To this degree, science fiction advises us how to adjust our moral radar. (Lawler 1980: 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Damn, this quote is indeed missing from the Penguin edition I read. </p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="lawler80p7"></a>The idea of science fiction as a new mythology, however it is conceived is a profoundly suggestive one, even portentous. To my knowledge, the first persuasive, systematic account of the genre as a new mythology occurs in <strong>Eugene Zamiatin's seminal study, <em>Herbert Wells</em>, (1922)</strong>. Zamiatin calls Wells's scientific romances "urban fairy tales," arguing that the myth-making faculty of the poet has begun to take its materials from the modern city. Out of factories, automobiles, airplanes, apartment high-rises and the like, the poet now fashions a new mythology for industrial humans. (Lawler 1980: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Zamyatin, Evgenii 1927[1922]. Well's revolutionary fairy-tales. (Excerpt from <em>Herbert Wells</em>). Translated by Lesley Milne. In: Parrinder, Patrick (ed.), <em>H.G. Wells: The Critical Heritage</em>. Delhi, etc.: Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD, 258-274.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.146846/page/n267/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
11
--><h4><a id="scheick81"></a>Scheick, William J. 1981. Towards the Ultra-Science-Fiction Novel: H.G. Wells's <em>Star Begotten</em>. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 8(1): 19-25. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239378">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="scheick81p19a"></a>Despite a respectable reception at the time of its publication, <strong>H.G. Wells's <em>Star Begotten:</strong> A Biological Fantasia</em> (1937), has been no favorite among literary critics of SF aficionados. In fact, <strong>today</strong> it <strong>is hardly known at all</strong>, even by experts on Wells. But Wells wrote it during the period of his late career when he was celebrating the maturation of his thought and artistry; and he apparently viewed the work as an advance in the direction of the ultra-SF novel, an elusive ideal toward which his previous SF novels, by a kind of asymtotic evolution, had been pointing. (Scheick 1981: 19)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Seems likely. None of the papers on Wells I've read recently have even mentioned it.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="scheick81p19b"></a><strong>The early 1920s</strong>, in Wells's opinion, <strong>exhibited momentarily a keener perception of reality</strong> as a consequence of the shock of World War I. The war, Wells maintained, had shattered illusions which had been supported by the deceiving framework or façade of ideas characteristic of pre-war generations. (Scheick 1981: 19)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It was, in a cultural sense, an "explosive" era.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="scheick81p23"></a>Ideally the reader should ascertain that just as Mary and Joseph Davis, like their biblical prototypes, are the people <em>within</em> or behind the event of the remarkable birth and just as the birth itself is the product of a genetic change <em>within</em> human cells amounting to the incarnation of Martian mind <em>within</em> human flesh, so too the dimension of human reality that is <em>Homo sideralis</em> lies but veiled (6:103) <em>within</em> each reader. By demystifying the biblical account of Joseph and Mary, Wells lifts the veil of Christian mythology and reveals a greater dimension of contemporary reality in their story; and this demystification includes as well an "opening out," <strong>unveiling or broadening of audience expectations concerning a Wellsian work of SF and of prognostication</strong>. (Scheick 1981: 23)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not that far removed from what occurs in Stapledon's <em>L&FM</em> over the span of several human species.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="scheick81p25n14"></a>I have emphasized only these two features. In fact <strong>Wells's reach ranges farther and includes a revision of Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em></strong> (p. 81) and Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of the <em>Übermensch</em> (p. 87), among other works. <strong>Stapledon replied in "Mr. Wells Calls in the Martians,"</strong> <em>London Mercury</em>, 36 (July 1937): 295-296. (Scheick 1981: 25, note 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So they were in a dialogue of some sort.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-37228001889016139892023-09-30T02:05:00.000-07:002023-09-30T02:05:52.784-07:00A Function of Musement<!-- A Function of Musement
Semiotics,Source: Other,Ülikool,Papers,Lang: English,
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgy_bjlHl8BVwehDewJe0S6sKCSDEz5MpLcfGofjOTFs5urVrOgRSQC6ga14aVwb2N3_ov-_pTdzRZ5l_uFM9CxxKu3akfzeQLTSLczz748Erf8YRlPWU87lkONw7tRgpEgV_aSvPyrjTOjq-rmrff8BpgSlbEfeivAlKRIJhDlaY8EdErbq8Tp8qsZfQ_7/s3264/jja_pilt_20230925_175218.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2448" data-original-width="3264" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgy_bjlHl8BVwehDewJe0S6sKCSDEz5MpLcfGofjOTFs5urVrOgRSQC6ga14aVwb2N3_ov-_pTdzRZ5l_uFM9CxxKu3akfzeQLTSLczz748Erf8YRlPWU87lkONw7tRgpEgV_aSvPyrjTOjq-rmrff8BpgSlbEfeivAlKRIJhDlaY8EdErbq8Tp8qsZfQ_7/s320/jja_pilt_20230925_175218.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#deely91">Deely 1991. Modeling Anthroposemiosis</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kulletal15">Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015. A hundred introductions to semiotics</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#lotmanuspenski1371">Lotman; Uspenski 2013. Kultuuri semiootilisest mehhanismist</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="deely91"></a>Deely, John 1991. Modeling Anthroposemiosis. In: Anderson, Myrdene; Merrell, Floyd (eds.), <em>On Semiotic Modelling</em>. Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 525-593. [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1641294*est">ESTER</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p525a"></a>And yet, the two differ at least as much - or perhaps I should say: exactly as much - as do "Umwelt" and "Lebenswelt", or (to fall back on <strong>an older analogate</strong> within the set of attempts over the centuries to interpret the relation of our organismic type to intelligent behavior of other animal forms) as do the <em>vis aestimativa</em> and <em>ratio particularis</em> (Deely 1971) whose difference disappears when it comes to tracing them through the sensible products of evolutionary adaptation (Deely 1966). (Deely 1991: 525)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A functive analogate.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p525b"></a>Similarly, the notion of modeling system is familiar to <strong>semioticicians</strong>, being especially the creation of the Tartu group and primarily associated with language. (Deely 1991: 525)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Semitoic!</p><!-- // "Semitoiline" on minu isiklik tähis kirjavigadega avaldatud sõnadele, mida võib kokku koguda ja lõpuks kirjutada täielikult taolistest kirjavigalistest sõnadest koosneva semitooika-teooria.
2 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p526a"></a>In Part 2, under the heading of Textuality, I will examine, so to say, <strong>the linguisticization of the world of experience</strong> - that is, the species-specific element of experience that makes the human modeling system, or experience anthroposemiotically considered, different from the modeling system of animals employing communication systems lacking the code constitutive of the <em>signum expertum ad placitum</em> (<strong>the sign experienced linguistically, let us say</strong>). This sign will appear as ultimately rooted as such in the relation of signification grasped and deployed in its distinction from the perceptive sign-vehicle and the content signified. (Deely 1991: 526)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps relevant for a science-fiction future wherein humans become telepathic and "languaging" is retained as a form of art.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p526b"></a>We will see in establishing this how textuality, virtual in the Umwelt, becomes actual through the indefinite decompositions and recompositions of experience linguistically construed by means of the establishment of <strong>a praeter-biological code</strong> which no longer, as in Sebeok's notion (cf. Baer 1981: 183), adequates the Uexküllian notion (1940) of 'meaning-plan' because it breaks the proportion between biological heritage and object as such experienced. (Deely 1991: 526)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have no clue what's going on here but I think I found a title.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p526c"></a>This examination of code will bring us to the third element in our modeling of anthroposemiosis, that curiously detached exercise known generically as "criticism" wherein, at one and the same time, what is most distinctive and what is most feeble in anthroposemiosis coincide to create that illusion whereby <strong>the literary aspect of semiosis is raised to the pinnacle of intellectual achievement and treated perversely as a self-contained and autonomous exercise of semiotic competence</strong>. Here we will make explicit a point that will have been established virtually in the two previous stages of the discussion - to wit, that <strong>the critical function</strong> and faculty <strong>is a subspecies of semiotic competence</strong> rather than identical with semiotic competence. Subordinate to and subtended by much broade processes of semiosis, criticism owes its validity to its connection with, rather than to its misleading appearance of autonomy within, those processes. (Deely 1991: 526)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something something literary production is not the pinnacle of what can be done with signs.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p526ja527"></a>It is a question of appreciating <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> the expanse of the framework and depth of the foundation that belongs to semiotics today by birthright as an offspring of the doctrine of signs gestated by the Iberians after 1529 (<strong>Soto's <em>Summulae</em></strong>), crystallized thematically in Painsot's <em>Treatise</em> of 1632, named by Locke in 1690, and implemented by Peirce in its wholesale possibilities with the essay on categories of 1867 and in the many essays thereafter until his dath in 1914. (Deely 1991: 526-527)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Domingo de Soto's <em>Summulae</em> has been digitized (<u><a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=gmsEVaBpGnsC">GB</a></u>) but it does not look like it has been translated; "<u>his addressing the logic of terms and propositions from within the conceptual framework of sign theory was an important step toward the development of semiotics and the logic of ideas, which subsumed logic with epistemology and dominated logical theorizing for almost the next 300 years</u>" (<a href="https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4_146">Hill 2011</a>)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p527"></a><strong>There are signs, and there are other things besides</strong>: things which are unknown to us at the moment and perhaps for all our individual life; things which existed before us and other things which will exist after us; <strong>things which exist only as a result of our social interactions</strong>, like governments and flags and things which exist within our round of interactions - like daytime and night - but without being produced exactly by those interactions. (Deely 1991: 527)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The world consists of signs and non-signs.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p531"></a>Let us recall as an example the arcane consideration of physical entities which have <em>ex hypothesi</em> no bodies: the angelic beings of Christian belief, <strong>the general idea of a "spirit world"</strong>, or of a unique divine being than which no greater can be conceived. Even more than mythical animals or legendary heroes, these entities are, from the standpoint of experience, <strong>purely objective being</strong>. (Deely 1991: 531)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The mode of being of Stapledon's universe of music.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p535"></a>The <strong>environment selectively reconstituted</strong> and organized according to the specific needs and interests of the individual organism <strong>constitutes an Umwelt</strong>. The Umwelt thus depends upon and corresponds to <strong>an Innenwelt or cognitive map developed within each individual</strong>. This may enables that individual to find its way in the environment and to exist as a base station or node within a network of communication, interest, and livelihood sharable especially with the several other individuals of its own kind. (Deely 1991: 535)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A definition of the Innenwelt. Not sure if very workable.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p536"></a>In fact, in my own opinion, being steeped in the German tongue is an impediment to the full unfolding of what is proper to this concept, because it exacerbates the entanglement with Kantian idealism (an entanglement ultimately counterproductive for the understanding of the Umwelt as it applies species-specifically to our own life form), and tends to make of the distinction between object and thing a <strong>diremption</strong> rather than a difference often able to partially coincide experimentally. (Deely 1991: 536)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Define:diremption - "<u>a sharp division into two parts; disjunction; separation</u>".</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p537"></a>As a result, the Umwelt as it is structured by linguistically mediated social interaction becomes freed from overdetermination by biological heritage, enabling the formation of what I have called (1982: 111ff., after Morris 1946) the <strong>post-linguistic</strong> (or "tertiary" modeling) system, teh semiotic equivalent of what anthropologists heretofore have termed simply <strong>culture</strong> - a semiotic system postlinguistic in nature but presupposing language in order both to come into being in the first place and in order to be understood in what is proper to it (see also Deely, Williams and Kruse 1986: xii-xv). (Deely 1991: 537)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad, though Morris' term if I recall correctly was applied to signs and not sign systems. Nevertheless, viewing culture as a post-linguistic sign system would be more-or-less in the spirit of modelling systems theory.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p538"></a>The regions of so-called "human sciences" no less clearly exhibit the modeling procedures. Thomas More's <em>Utopia</em> and Plato's <em>Republic</em> provide <strong>alternative models</strong> for consideration in further remodelling of the experienced world of human beings, the actual Umwelt. (Deely 1991: 538)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Utopias as models.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p540"></a>We see then what is required of the sign: it needs to be a means of establishing connections, and not in any bare physical sense: <strong>experience</strong> is not needed for smoke to be an effect of fire, but it <strong>is needed if smoke is to become <em>a sign</em> of fire</strong> (an extremely important point: see Painsot 1632: 137 note 4). The sign in its proper being requires <strong>an understanding of how there can be connections</strong> established in an objective sense which yet does not preclude (and it is here that the doctrine of signs departs from the dogma of Kantian criticism, and dictates in the process of appropriating semiotically the Uexküllian notion of Umwelt some remodeling of the very notion from within) incorporating whatever of the physical as such may happen to be objectified within the large totality of the species-specific lifeworld. (Deely 1991: 540)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm really beginning to like this example (cf. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-semiotic-threshold.html#eco76p17b">Eco 1976: 17</a>). // Paneb mõtlema sellest, kas Marslased ei pane 2+2 kokku, et Maal on elu kui Maa lahvatab põlema.</p><!--
18 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p542"></a>This fact further explains why the sign as such is not something that directly appears in experience - why a sign as such is never a thing on the one hand or an object simply on the other. It is never an object simply, for an object simply represents itself within awareness, while <strong>a sign simply makes something other than itself present in awareness</strong>. (Deely 1991: 542)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Now define "awareness".</p><!--
20 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p544"></a>They exist rather as objects experienced in what is proper to them as a network of relations originated in or even (something) for the purpose of controlling the objectivity experienced by an animal which, besides perceiving - say - marks on paper, or a carving in stone, grasps their relation to objects not on the paper nor in the tone physically but nonetheless signified and conveyed by those marks according to a convention or <em>code</em> which makes of them <em>signs</em> - i.e., which makes of them the foundation for <strong>a complexus of relations</strong> to a corresponding objective structure understandable but not perceptible in the marks or carvings as physical objects given in perception. (Deely 1991: 544)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Complexus" you don't see that often.</p><!--
22 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p546"></a>To create a text is to come to understandi that "the role of the object in the semiosis is", as Johansen puts it (1985: 2350), "not confined to being an element in an experiential situation interpreted to tell if a symbol applies or not"; <em>and to proceed accordingly in the use of signs to freely structure objectivity in a contour and manner accessible only to a conspecific in the precise sense of another organism able to share that understanding and to grasp signs fashioned on its basis</em> - that is to say, encoded according to patterns neither reducible to nore accessible within the perceptible dimension of the sign structure as such. Text creation is <strong>a function of musement</strong>, for the understanding of which function two terms must be clarified: code and idea. (Deely 1991: 546)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Text not necessarily communicative or significative.</p><!--
25-26 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p549ja550"></a>"In all general inquiries about signs", Peirce observes (1907: 9), "nothing is of more livey importance than maintaining a clear and sharp distinction between <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>the object, or proposed cause of the sign</strong>, and the meaning, or intended effect". (Deely 1991: 549-550)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A useful hint as to what "object" is for Peirce.</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p553a"></a>In another sense, no doubt, it is possible to speak of a "code" as defining a familiar path zoösemiotically (cf. Baer 1981: 183): <strong>there is a thirdness, an "ideal being", at work in all of nature</strong>, not, as Sebeok justly put it (1984a: 2), just in "that minuscule segment of nature some anthropologists grandly compartmentalize as culture". (Deely 1991: 553)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A teleological thirdness: human species becoming "fully human".</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p553b"></a>An interpretant in general need not be logical. It is the ground on which whatever object functions as a sign. Interpretants exist, consequently, at those points in semiosis where objects are transformed into signs or signs are transformed into other signs. Ideas are interpretants, but not all interpretants are ideas: <strong>interpretants</strong> as such are indifferently physical or even mental. They <strong>define the points of innovation in semiosis</strong>. In other words, when an interpretant is introduced to explicate a sign, this is where the original sign is amplified into another sign. And the act of amplification is where the innovation takes place. (Deely 1991: 553)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Still somewhat ambiguous, but not bad. Amplification, development.</p><!--
29-30 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p553ja554"></a><blockquote>There is an <em>Intentional</em> Interpretant, which is <strong>a determination of the mind</strong> of the utterer; the <em>Effectual</em> Interpretant, which is <strong>a determination of the mind of the interpreter</strong>; and the <em>Communicationa</em> INterpretant, or say the <em>Cominterpretant</em>, which is <strong>a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place</strong>. This mind may be called the <em>commens</em>. It consists of all that is, and <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.</blockquote>The communicational interpretant in this sense, as embodied in the objective world, is precisely what we have called <em>code</em>, of which the linguistic code (no less virtual in its universality than any other code, be it noted) is a subspecies. (Deely 1991: 553-554)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Actually extremely useful.</p><!--
30 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p554"></a>If we combine Jakobson's <strong>factorial model</strong> (1960: 353) and his subsequent "corresponding scheme" of functions, with <strong>the factorial element indicated as substructural to the superstructural element of function</strong>; redraw the separating line in this combined schema so that the asymmetry defining textual communication (now understood as the communication typical of inhabitants of a human Umwelt, or Lebenswelt, in contrast to the inhabitants of strictly perceptual Umwelts) becomes a matter of foreground; invert the central column of the model as a whole so as to place iconic emphasis on the superstructural nature of the asymmetry constitutive of the code as <strong>dimanating</strong> the textual element in the overall situation; and add brackets to indicate the objective dimension of relationality as such introduced into the Umwelt as remodeled by ideas; we then have the schema in Figure 1. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD7T6Yi06rnMF8xiEU9wcBPl61d7ksdUNutK_bzEKU3ybrGbHQ6SK2b56T-FhuEdDpYjc0A4HNNFXAe0EiLS1WE0xNsqtFYP_J5E7CRiy9qOyR22B95GoQCVc9Sg540_gSX06CEVQCI7uLstVsHgQygO09jROou7iV1EyeHU3Y3p_Ci-pWCXcCl1b44r7h/s1671/jja_pilt_deely_1991_figure1_model_of_textuality_after_jakobson.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1000" data-original-width="1671" height="192" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhD7T6Yi06rnMF8xiEU9wcBPl61d7ksdUNutK_bzEKU3ybrGbHQ6SK2b56T-FhuEdDpYjc0A4HNNFXAe0EiLS1WE0xNsqtFYP_J5E7CRiy9qOyR22B95GoQCVc9Sg540_gSX06CEVQCI7uLstVsHgQygO09jROou7iV1EyeHU3Y3p_Ci-pWCXcCl1b44r7h/s320/jja_pilt_deely_1991_figure1_model_of_textuality_after_jakobson.png" width="320" /></a></div>(Deely 1991: 554)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So many damn alterations.</p><!--
31 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p555a"></a>— where emotion provides the motivation whence the "addresser" attempts (<em>conari</em>) to reach another with a unique conception (poetic message) by means by <strong>a sensory modality (<em>phasis</em>)</strong> in a context of existence by means of establishing a code or putting now into operation (with or without perceived modification) a pre-existing code. (Deely 1991: 555)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What the hell is a <em>phasis</em>?</p><!--
31 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p555b"></a>Two attempts have been made to represent schematically the complexity of the process in its dynamic dimensions. One is the attempt by <strong>Sebeok (1972: 14), directly based on Jakobson's model, which takes the elements and embeds them in a Morley triangle</strong>, so as to bring out the essentially triadic nature of the semiosis which is not foregrounded as such in Jakobson's model. The Sebeok version nicely brings out the complexity of the dynamics, but it has a major drawback for our present concerns. Sebeok generalizes the notion of code to an abstract commonality of the species-specific biological rearticulation of environment into objective world through a relational network, in order to account precisely for the zoösemiotic component as such of communication as common to all animals, including humans. (Deely 1991: 555)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This is in his <em>Perspectives in Zoosemiotics</em>.</p><!--
32-33 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p556ja557"></a>As a result, to understand <strong>Johansen's</strong> model, which he calls "the <strong>semiotic pyramid</strong>", the reader needs to make some adjustments, distributing our above notion of code among the five "poles" of the pyramid, by actively conceptualizing at each point the respective contributions of the ten axes and planes, identified by Johansen, to the formation and operation of the metalingual or "commensurating" code proper to anthroposemiosis in the unique dimension of textuality which characterizes in a permeating fashion the totality of human experience, of anthroposemiotic objectivity as virtually including the Umwelt of zoösemiosis. Johansen's model (1982: 473; more fully discussed in 1985: 266), stripped of its exclusively Peircean technical vocabulary, relabelled at each pole so as to suppress technical presuppositions not explicable <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> terminologically within the limits of the current discussion, and enhanced by an explicit identification of the ten axez constituting the pyramid, may now be introduced into the present discussion. See Figure 2.<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgn5YdF1SF6QCoDRXVuXULCJBp6SZDTswZwZIhAX56Rq0tmeAPTMCkpu0vrd3usyRgjEY_fsilgK9Na31Dij1-cb7rzjw3FKR-uJ3o9Rsr3ChKc8H-KD3Lo9MybusYawsg86ZW2t5B2ZNTFgceDdc8oEDOhaYrhGpdm26nq24Z6FFg3_d2Zwmz5KoB6cZmR/s5273/jja_pilt_deely_1991_figure2_the_pyramid_of_semiosis.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3963" data-original-width="5273" height="241" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgn5YdF1SF6QCoDRXVuXULCJBp6SZDTswZwZIhAX56Rq0tmeAPTMCkpu0vrd3usyRgjEY_fsilgK9Na31Dij1-cb7rzjw3FKR-uJ3o9Rsr3ChKc8H-KD3Lo9MybusYawsg86ZW2t5B2ZNTFgceDdc8oEDOhaYrhGpdm26nq24Z6FFg3_d2Zwmz5KoB6cZmR/s320/jja_pilt_deely_1991_figure2_the_pyramid_of_semiosis.png" width="320" /></a></div>(Deely 1991: 556-557)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Johansen, Jørgen Dines 1987. Sign Concept, Meaning, and the Study of Literature. In: Deely, John; Evans, Jonathan (eds.), <em>Semiotics 1982</em>. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 473-482.</u></li><!--
--><li><u>Johansen, Jørgen Dines 1985. Prolegomena to a Semiotic Theory of Text Interpretation. <em>Semiotica</em> 57(3/4): 225-288. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1985.57.3-4.225">10.1515/semi.1985.57.3-4.225</a></u> [<u><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/semi.1985.57.3-4.225/html?lang=en">De Gruyter Mouton</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
38 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p562"></a>In the history of these questions, this contrast was early recognize in the philosophical tradition as defining the difference between <em>logos</em> and <em><strong>myth</strong>os</em>, i.e., between the understanding operating in the line of assigning a prospective reason for a defined state or condition of being experienced as irreducible to the experience of it, and <strong>understanding operating in the line of conjecture free of the restraints imposed by the aim of coinciding discursively in a determinate (if partial) way with structures of experience which represent accurately prejacent dimensions and elements of physical being as they stand in their independence of our experience of them</strong>. (Deely 1991: 562)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A definition of a myth. And an illustration of the kind of paragraph-spanning sentences this paper is filled with - why use 5 concise words when you can pile 50 clauses on top of each other.</p><!--
39 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p563"></a>The contingency of the linguistic sign is indefinitely exploitable, but only if we insist on its externality vis-à-vis an actual situation at hand (c.348-347 BC: Book I, Chap. 10, 76b23-27):<blockquote>All syllogism, and <em>a fortiori</em> demonstration, is addressed not to the spoken word, but to <strong>the discourse within the soul</strong>, and though we can always raise objections to the spoken world, to <strong>the inward discourse</strong> we cannot always object.</blockquote>Unlike the actual world at any given moment, the world of could-bes and could-have-beens admits of the infinite regress, synchronically as well as diachronically. (Deely 1991: 563)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Recording for the citation for where Aristotle mentions inner speech.</p><!--
40 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p564"></a>Beyond being a rhetorical play, the label is a way of referring to a strategy for encouraging a view of semiotic not as a theory in either the traditional critical sense or in the traditional scientific sense, but as a <em>doctrine</em> of signs which transcends the opposition of culture to nature by having for its unifying object <strong>the action of signs, <em>semiosis</em>, explicitly recognized as an activity or process constructive not only of human experience but of all organismic experience</strong> and of the physical environment itself as tending to give rise to and supportive of the existence of the plethora of Umwelts (including the species-specifically human one) precisely in their contrast, as objective worlds, to the physical realm of the environment which the objective worlds not only rest upon, but indirectly modify while partially including and directly restructuring objectively the surroundings. (Deely 1991: 564)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sebeok's "major tradition" encompasses both nature and culture.</p><!--
42 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p566"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> or with elements <em>de facto</em> eluding our particular biological channels of sense (too remote - the case of planets and stars on the one side; too tiny - the case of elements such as quarks and photons, molecules and atoms) or even with <strong>elements <em>de jure</em> precluded from access by any biological channel of sense as such</strong> (the pure spirits, the Gods of later monotheism in general, Allah specifically, etc.). (Deely 1991: 566)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phraseology for criticizing attempts to do exactly that (bioengineer humans that are capable of communicating with the spirit realm and God itself).</p><!--
42-43 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p566ja567"></a>Maritain observes of this larger notion, this surplus creating an admixture whereby the whole of culture is textualized (. 1964: 91):<blockquote>The term <em>language</em> does not relate only to the words which we use, it covers also all that which serves us to make ourselves understood, and therefore the whole imagery which we use and which is that of the men to whom we speak, at such and such a moment of time and in such and such a place on earth. (<strong>Supposing that through some telephone through duration we could tell a contemporary of Julius Caesar something which concerns our epoch</strong>, could we speak to him of airplanes and of electronic machines, of the British Parliament, or of the Praesidium of the Communist Party? The other person would not understand anything; it would indeed be necessary to use the imagery furnished by his own type of culture, as well as his own words and his own syntax.)</blockquote><span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Given <strong>the coextensiveness, then, of textuality with the objective world of human experience</strong>, it is all a question of how one is to construe the "linguistic admixture" demonstrable within every semiological system - i.e., within the totality of human experience, including the experience of "nature" so-called. (Deely 1991: 566-567)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Maritain, Jacques 1984[1964]. <em>Notebooks</em>, Chapter 3. Translated by Joseph W. Evans. New York: Albany, 81-89.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
43 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p567"></a>It is not just a question of new foundations for the human sciences, and a putting aside of the ill-advised or - as Culler (1981: 20) more <strong>mordantly</strong> muses - "futile attempt to distinguish the humanities from the social sciences". (Deely 1991: 567)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Define:mordant - "<u>(especially of humour) having or showing a sharp or critical quality; biting.</u>"</p><!--
46-47 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p570ja571"></a>It is not so much that "realism is in essence deeply mythic" (Con Davis 1985: 56) as that reality - the reality of human experience, wherein the line between what is dependent upon and independent <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> of interpretive <strong>acticity</strong> can never be finally drawn because that very line itself shifts with each new achievement of understanding - is in essence thoroughly semiosic. (Deely 1991: 570-571)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jesus Christ.</p><!--
47 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p571"></a>In this context, one can appreciate Culler's reasons (1981: 35) for deeming literature - if not "the" at least "a" - "most interesting case of semiosis":<blockquote>Though it is clearly a form of communication, <strong>it is cut off from the immediate pragmatic purposes which simplify other sign situations</strong>. The potentiol complexities of sigifying processes work freely in literature. Moreover, the difficulty of saying precisely what is communicated is here accompanied by the fact that signification is indubitably taking place. One cannot argue, as one might when dealing with physical objects or events of various kinds, that the phenomena in question are meaningless. Literature forces one to face the problem of the indeterminacy of meaning, which is a central if paradoxical property of semiotic systems. Finally, <strong>unlike so many other systems which are devoted to ends external to themselves and their own processes</strong>, literature is itself a continual exploration of and reflection upon signification in all its forms: an interpretation of experience; a commentary on the validity of various ways of interpreting experience; an exploration of the creative, revelatory, and deceptive powers of language; a critique of the codes and interpretive processes manifested in our languages and in previous literature. In so far as literature turns back on itself and examines, parodies, or treats ironically its own signifying procedures, it becomes the most complex account of signification we possess.</blockquote>It is difficult to see how the word "account" is used here, where some synonym of "example" or "token" seems to be demanded by the context. (Deely 1991: 571)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Relevant for discussing the opposite case: when a literary work has clear external ends.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Culler, Jonathan 1981. <em>The Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction</em>. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/pursuitofsignsse0000cull">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
60-61 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p584ja585n19"></a>No doubt the most startling example of mistaking semiotics from within its provided by the late notes of Bakhtin, who seems never to have recovered from his youthful conception of semiotics as of a piece with Russian Formalism (Bakhtin 1971: 147): "<strong>Semiotics deals primarily with the transmission of ready-made communication using a ready-made code</strong>. But in live speech, strictly speaking, communication is first created in the process of transmission, and there is, in essence" - which I interpret to say "prejacent to and independent of the anthroposemiosis itself" (unfortunately, this fragment concludes by ending in the middle of a tantalizing sentence posing "<strong>The problem of changing the code in inner speech</strong>...") - "no code." (Deely 1991: 584-585, n 19)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tantalizing stuff indeed.</p><!--
61 --><blockquote><a id="deely91p585s21"></a>Johansen, reflecting our idea that it is more a question of semiotic surplus than of linguistic admixture that ought to guide our understanding of textuality, remarks flatly (1985: 286), as the reason for "the point made in [his] article", that "without taking into consideration the role played by <strong>nonverbal semiosis</strong> in the generation and interpretation of text meaning, the vary fact that meaning is possible becomes a mystery", and he dismisses as a "fiction" the idea that "verbal knowledge" can be derived or operate independently of the knower's experience - <strong>word meaning itself being already an abduction</strong>. (Deely 1991: 585, n 21)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Most of this lengthy paper was just a clever advertisement for Johansen's work.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kulletal15"></a>Kull, Kalevi; Bogdanova, Olga; Gramigna, Remo; Heinapuu, Ott; Lepik, Eva, Lindström, Kati; Magnus, Riin; Moss, Rauno Thomas; Ojamaa, Maarja; Pern, Tanel; Põhjala, Priit; Pärn, Katre; Raudmäe, Kristi; Remm, Tiit; Salupere, Silvi; Soovik, Ene-Reet; Sõukand, Renata; Tønnessen, Morten; Väli, Katre 2015. A hundred introductions to semiotics, for a million students: Survey of semiotics textbooks and primers in the world. <em>Sign Systems Studies</em> 43(2/3): 281-346. DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2015.43.2-3.09">10.12697/SSS.2015.43.2-3.09</a> [<u><a href="https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.2-3.0">utlib.ee</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p282"></a>An increase in the number of introductory courses is especially notable in the countries where some universities provide a degree in semiotics, e.g., <strong>Italy, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Brazil</strong> (Kull 2009). What all these issues demonstrate is the need for <strong>an overview of semiotics textbooks</strong>. Indeed, at the University of Tartu as a semiotics centre, with its full-scope programme in semiotics (including majors on the bachelor's, master's, and doctoral levels), the need to address this topic is particularly acutely felt. Thus, our purpose is to give a (pluri)review of all existing introduction to semiotics. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 282)</blockquote><!-- // qc tee Kull 2009 töötavaks href=# lingiks! // The_importance_of_semiotics_to_Universit.pdf
--><p>What's going on in Brazil?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p283a"></a>This means that we have not included textbooks that deal with some particular branch of semiotics, e.g. only with sociosemiotics (e.g., Leeuwen 2005), visual semiotics (e.g., Sonesson 1988), biosemiotics (e.g., Hoffmeyer 2008), or <strong>literary semiotics</strong> (e.g. <strong>Simpkins 2001</strong>), semiotics of film, theatre, etc. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 283)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Simpkins, Scott 2001. <em>Literary Semiotics: A Critical Approach</em>. Lanham: Lexington Books.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3465506*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p283b"></a>However, introductory textbooks that attempt to give a general overview while departing from a particular field or approach in semiotics (e.g, Peircean and pragmatist perspective in <strong>Tejera 1988</strong>; or semiotics of text in Pozzato 2004; or non-verbal communication in Leeds-Hurwiz 1993) are included. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 283)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Tejera, Victorino 1988. <em>Semiotics from Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression</em>. Leiden: Brill.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b4542278*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p284"></a><em>Anthologies and readers</em> — This category comprises various anthologies and readers which assemble full key texts or extracts from significant texts in semiotics, often arranged in chronological order. Among the works of this type, the first one - and still one of the best - to be published in English was <strong>an introductory anthology by Robert E. Innis</strong> (1985) that also contains introductory comments on classic texts. <strong>Another collection titled <em>Frontiers in Semiotics</em></strong> (<strong>Deely <em>et al</em>. 1986</strong>) is supplied with an introduction by John Deely and characterized by a broad treatment of semiotics. Another early anthology was compiled by Martin <strong>Blonsky (1985)</strong>. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 284)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Innis, Robert E. (ed.) 1985. <em>Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology</em>. Bloomington: Indian University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3449249*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Deely, John; Williams, Brooke; Kruse, Felicia (eds.) 1986. <em>Frontiers in Semiotics</em>. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3455524*est">ESTER</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Blonsky, Marshall (ed.) 1985. <em>On Signs</em>. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3240809*est">ESTER</a></u> | <u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p286ja287"></a>This small book by Roland Barthes was the earliest in this group. It introduces the terminology of the French structuralist school departing from Saussure. <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> Barthes considers semiology as a part of translinguistics studying "great signifying unities of discourse" (Barthes 1995[1964]: 11), an area that is still trying to take definite <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> shape. The elements of semiology presented in the book are extracted from linguistics: language and speech, signifier and signified, syntagm and system, denotation and connotation. After a theoretical explanation of his key notions, comparing linguistic and semiological approaches, Barthes introduces the semiological prospects of these terms (for example, the garment and the food systems). <strong>Barthes</strong> also discusses the problems of these notions when describing various systems. He <strong>considers reconstituting the functioning of the systems of significations other than language to be the aim of semiological research</strong>. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 286-287)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have fastidiously managed to avoid Barthes as much as possible. Perhaps his <em>Elements of Semiology</em> could be a not-too-upsetting introduction to his thought.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p287"></a>— Bense's <em>Semiotik: Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen</em> [<em>Semiotics: General Theory of Signs</em>] (1967)!br /!This is a short but very dense and original introduction to Peircean semiotics. First, it gives an overview of Peirce's theory of signs (<strong>abstract semiotics</strong>), then moving on to the issues of ontology and epistemology of signs. Finally, Peirce's classification of ten sign types is applied to the signs of natural language as well as different types of language. The work is richly illustrated with comprehensive diagrams. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 287)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Now I finally know what to call Peircean semiotics in general.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p290"></a>— Trabant's <em>Elemente der Semiotik</em> [<em>Elements of Semiotics</em>] (1976)!br /!The textbook focuses on introding semiotics as a new discipline. Trabant begins by quoting various renowned scholars (<strong>Locke, Lambert, Hegel, Sasusure, Morris and Klaus-Buhr</strong>) on what semiotics is. <strong>Philosophy and linguistics are seen as primary sources of semiotics, complemented by influences from cybernetic theory of information</strong>.!br /!The first part of the work gives an overview of the foundations of the theory of signs (Saussure, Morris, information theory). The second part develops the notion of sign as action. <strong>Trabant is a proponent of deveoping semiotics based on the theory of action</strong>, which could also be read as a critique of the positions on semiotics cited in the first part of the work. Trabant uses speech act theory, Wittgenstein's approach and hermeneutics to formulate the basis of his theory. <strong>A semiotic approach, as he says, should not be based on information theory's concept of communication, but on communication as action</strong>. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 290)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This one comes across as the most sympathetic to my own views.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p292"></a>— Scholes' <em>Semiotics and Interpretation</em> (1982)<br />Scholes' book could rightfully have the subtitle "<strong>Introduction to literary semiotics</strong>", but we have included it in our review as an excellent example of a user-friendly textbook on applying semiotics in the humanities. The author is concerned about the pedagogical aspects of his work and stresses the importance of the students' own interpretation: "the student's productivity is the culmination of the pedagogical process" (Scholes 1982: 4-5). To achieve this purpose, the student must be exposed to <strong>models of interpretive texts</strong>. Scholes offers a useful and inspirational set of such models based on the ideas of <strong>Jakobson, Barthes, Riffaterre, Lotman, Todorov, Genette and other scholars</strong>. The addendum of this valuable book consists of a little glossary and a commented bibliography. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 292)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Scholes, Robert 1982. <em>Semiotics and Interpretation</em>. New Haven: Yale University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/semioticsinterpr00scho">Internet Archive</a></u> | <u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1483246*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p293"></a>— Silverman's <em>The Subject of Semiotics</em> (1984)<br />This book is not really an introduction but is intended as <strong>a methodological guide</strong> which claims the centrality of psychoanalysis to semiotics. The work covers the ideas of Saussure, Peirce, Barthes, Derrida and Benveniste, but the main heroes for the author are Freud and Lacan. Her point is that <strong>the human subject is the subject of central importance to semiotics</strong>. The book includes a post-structuralist (and feminist) introduction to the analysis of film and literature as studied in connection with viewers and readers. Thus, <strong>it represents an original approach for advanced-level students</strong>. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 293)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Silverman, Kaja 1983. <em>The Subject of Semiotics</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/subjectofsemioti0000silv_b2l2">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p294a"></a>— Sless' <em>In Search of Semiotics</em> (1986)<br />David Sless seems to be best known for his claim that "<strong>semiotics is far too important an enterprise to be left to semioticians</strong>" (Sless 1986: 1) which is the opening sentence of the book. Indeed, one of the stated aims of his book is <strong>to make semiotics more accessible to a general audience by discarding obscure jargon</strong>. The book is easy to read, with each chapter concentrating on one topic summarized at the end of the chapter. All in all, it is a short and clear presentation of Sless's conception of semiotics. For the author, semiotics is first and foremost <strong>the study of communication and understanding</strong>. Within communication, there are two kinds of semiosis: one within <strong>the author/text relation</strong> and the other within <strong>the reader/text relation</strong>; researchers into semiotics must occupy one of these positions. Much of his book is devoted to the analysis of the different positions that can be taken by participants in communication. In this sense, as Sless claims, semiotics is not a science, as communication cannot be studied from a neutral position (Sless 1986: 38). Another problem that Sless explores is the question of meaning, which he defines as "the end product of semiosis" (Sless 1986: 91). The last two chapters of the book are dedicated to semiotic research and the founders of semiotics. Whie some aspects of the book could be considered outdated, it is noteworthy in its goal to guide the reader away from semioticians and towards semiotics. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 294)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Sless, David 1986. <em>In Search of Semiotics</em>. London: Croom Helm.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/insearchofsemiot0000sles">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p294b"></a>— Clarke's <em>Principles of Semiotic</em> (1987)<br />This is a brief introduction to semiotics as a discipline on language and logic, written in <strong>an enjoyably lucid style</strong>. In this sense, it is <strong>a good coursebook on the Peircean school of semiotics</strong> from the point of view of a philosopher of language. Clarke starts his <strong>history of semiotics from the antiquity</strong>, concluding that semiotics was mostly applied in the field of medicine where a symptom stands for a disease. He discusses the views of <strong>Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans</strong> on linguistic semiotics, paying much attention to <strong>Sextus Empiricus</strong>. Mediaeval authorities noted include <strong>St. Augustine and William of Ockham</strong>. From the field of communication theory, a treatment of H. P. Grice and the theory of speech acts is included. In the final chapter, entitled "Language", Quine, Frege and Kripke are covered. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 294)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Clarke, David S. 1987. <em>Principles of Semiotic</em>. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/principlesofsemi0000clar/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p296"></a>Deely's conception of the sign entails that it mediates between physical reality and any experience of reality (as well as between reality as it exists in physical terms and <strong>reality as it comes into being by way of influence from the future</strong>). The fifth edition, published in 2009 by Tartu University PRess, contains five new chapters into which he incorporates his by then developed thought about the human being as a semiotic animal (rather than a rational animal <em>pace</em> Aristotle or <em>res cogitans</em>, i.e. a thinking thing <em>pace</em> Descartes). A crucial distinction is that between objects (mind-dependent being) and things (mind-independent being) - a distinction Deely claims only the semiotic animal is capable of drawing. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 296)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It might be time to re-read <em>Basics of Semiotics</em>. Reading it as a first year student might have been a mistake.</p><!--
18-19 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p299ja300"></a>— Johansen's and Larsen's <em>Signs in Use: An Introduction to Semiotics</em> (1994, English ed. 2002)<br />Two Danish professors of <strong>comparative literature</strong> have authored a balanced approach to semiotics in which the concepts of discourse and narrative occupy a prominent place. Vivid illustrations and examples from different walks of life render the subject comprehensible, yet not oversimplified. A professionally compiled glossary and biographical sketches of persons covered in the book provide a useful supplement. <span style="color: #fa4100">[.|.]</span> The main focus of the book nevertheless is on <strong>the semiotics of text</strong>. Discourse analysis and its various methods, as well as modern narratology, are discussed quite thoroughly. <strong>Text is understood as semiosis rather than as a complex structure</strong>. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 299-300)</blockquote><!--
--><p>For some reason I seem to be gravitating towards literary semiotics here.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Johansen, Jørgen D.; Larsen, Svend E. 2002[1994]. <em>Signs in Use: An Introduction to Semiotics</em>. London: Routledge.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1782658*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
24 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p304a"></a>— Lidov's <em>Elements of Semiotics</em> (1999)<br />Lidov's book is a good theoretical study on general semiotics. The text is arranged to be useful to the novice, <strong>presenting the theory of semiotics in the context of classic sources</strong> David Lidov understands semiotics as a comparative perspective of <strong>the artifacts of conscious life</strong>. This makes him also pay attention to <strong>the possibilities of the existence of unconscious signs</strong>. The authors he is using include, e.g., Hjelmslev, Martinet, Goodman. He speaks about structuralism as a supplement to pragmatism. Among othes, he says: "I meniton Greimasian theory because of its influence and suggestiveness, but I have not been able to discover any grounds for believing it" (Lidov 1999: 137). Lidov's background in the theory of music gives advantage to represent different theories and models in clear and playful manner. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 304)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Lidov, David 1999. <em>Elements of Semiotics</em>. New York: St. Martin's Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/elementsofsemiot0000lido">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
24 --><blockquote><a id="kulletal15p304b"></a>— Merrell's <em>Signs for Everybody, or, Chaos, Quandries, and Communication</em> (2000)<br />While this book purports to be about "semiotics for everybody", one could argue that <em>Signs for Everybody</em> is not really an introduction to semiotics but <strong>an introduction to Peircean semiotics</strong>. Still, Peirce's person plays a marginal role here compared to his philosophy. In fact, Merrell has chosen to avoid the history of semiotics altogether and present instead <strong>an explanation of the basic semiotic categories</strong>. Starting from a discussion of Peirce's concept of the sign, he moves on to the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness, <strong>the different types of signs, and the action of signs</strong>. After this, Merrell proceeds to the second major theme of the book: the criticism of binarism. For this purpose, he adopts terms and concepts borrowed from mathematics and quantum physics, attempting to show that life and semiosis cannot be described in purely linear and binary terms. (Kull <em>et al</em>. 2015: 304)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Merrell, Floyd 2000. <em>Signs for Everybody, or Chaos Quandries and Communication</em>. New York: Legas.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3410957*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="lotmanuspenski1371"></a>Lotman, Juri; Uspenski, Boriss 2013[1971]. Kultuuri semiootilisest mehhanismist. Tõlkinud Peet Lepik. — Uspenski, Boriss, <em>Vene kultuuri jõujooni: valik artikleid</em>. Koostanud Peet Lepik ja Boriss Uspenski; tõlkinud ja kommenteerinud Peet Lepik, Malle Salupere ja Andres Ehin; toimetanud Silvi Salupere. Tartu: Ilmamaa, 207-239. {Л·208}</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p207a"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> iga ajaloos esinev kultuur sünnitab teatud <strong>temale iseloomuliku kultuurimudeli</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p207">207</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Viimati lugesin seda teksti käesoleva aasta alguses (vt <u><a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/01/maailm-on-ratsu.html#lotmanuspenski13a">JJA 2023-01</a></u>). <em>Kaks korda ühe aasta jooksul sama maja röövida — nad ei oska seda oodatagi!</em> Faili (Uspenski raamatu PDF-i) koos allajoonimistega olen muidugi ära kaotanud — tegelikult ei viitsi lihtsalt üles otsida, sest postituses on lisaks rõhutatud kohtadele ka kommentaarid — mistõttu esimese asjana joonistasin uuesti raamid ümber katkenditele, mis on juba siin blogis olemas. Üritan nii palju kui võimalik laveerida ümber nende (siin samas kohe selle ennatliku reegli vastu eksides) ja teostada sellist mitmekordset ülelugemist, mida kunagi kavatsesin (edutult) teostada ühe Baldwini tihke tekstiga. Igal juhul ei ole ülelugemine mõttetu ja mõttetu oleks hoopis minna seminari ilma, et oleks tekstiga värskelt tuttav.</p><!--
--><p>Põhiline siin on see, et "<u>teatud</u> [kultuurile endale] <u>iseloomulik kultuurimudel</u>" vastab minu arvates <em>kultuuri enesemudelile</em>, st korraga enesekirjeldus [~tooken] ja teaduslik "mudel" sellest, misasi on kultuur [~tüüp]. </p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p207b"></a>Kogu määrangute mitmekülgsuses võib samal ajal eristada ka midagi ühist, mis nähtavasti vastab mõnedele kultuurile <strong>intuitiivselt omistatavatele tunnustele</strong> termini mis tahes tõlgendamise korral. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 207)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kultuurimääratlustel on ühisosa, mis on <em>intuitiivselt</em> (justkui <em>a priori</em>) mõistetavad.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p208"></a>Sellegipoolest läheb kultuuril niisugust vastandumist alati vaja. Just <strong>kultuurist saab seejuures opositsiooni markeeritud liige</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p208">208</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Markeeritud kultuur ja markeerimata mitte-kultuur.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p208b"></a><strong>inimkogemuse kondenseerimisvõime</strong> (erinevalt looduse algkujulisusest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p208">208</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Justkui <em>artoonika</em> põhitees: kunst (tinglikult järeletehtu) on mingis mõttes "algkujulise" (looduse) <em>modelleerimise</em> (vähendamise, kondenseerimise) tulemus.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p209"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> kusjuures <strong>ka võitlus vanade rituaalidega võib omandada eriliselt ritualiseeritud iseloomu</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p209">209</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See on iseenesest päris kõnekas ülekanne kirjanduse sfäärist: innovatiivne võitlus iganenud vormidega muutub ajapikku ise iganenud vormiks.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p209"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> siis Pauli tegevuses ilmneb <strong>märgilisuse järsk rõhutamine nendes (käitumis)vormides, mis olid juba olemas</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 209)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vt nt kuidas Putin on approprieerinud nii Tsaari ja Nõukogude (kahepäine kotkas tema luksusmõisa sissepääsu kohal, Georgi lint, jne) sümboolikat.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p210a"></a>Sapir-Whorfi hüpoteesi kannul on mitmes töös rõhutatud ja uuritud keele mõju inimkultuuri mitmesugustele ilmingutele. Viimasel ajal <strong>on</strong> Émile <strong>Benveniste toonitanud, et metakeele rolli võivad täita üksnes loomulikud keeled</strong> ja ses mõttes on neil inimese kommunikatsioonisüsteemides täiesti eriline koht. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ilmselt tema nö "metasemiootika" (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-semiotic-threshold.html#eco76p30n1">Eco 1976: 30, n 1</a>).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p210b"></a>Kuid tundub vaieldavana, kui autor selles artiklis teeb ettepaneku pidada <strong>pärissemiootilisteks süsteemideks</strong> ainult loomulikke keeli ja kõiki teisi kultuurimudeleid semantilisteks - niisugusteks süsteemideks, millel puudub oma <strong>süsteemne semioos</strong> ja mis selle laenavad loomulike keelte sfäärist. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>St Benvenistel on tõenäoliselt eristus semiootiliste ja semantiliste süsteemide vahel. Lotman ja Uspenski vaidlevad vastu, et ka muudel <em>kultuurimudelitel</em> (st eeldatavasti mitte-keelelised märgisüsteemid) on ka oma "süsteemne semioos", mis kõlab päris hästi. </p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p211a"></a><strong>Kultuur</strong> on struktuursuse generaator, ja sedaviisi loob ta inimest ümbritseva sotsiaalse sfääri, mis biosfääri kombel <strong>teeb võimalikuks</strong> elu - siiski mitte orgaanilise, vaid <strong>ühiskondliku elu</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p210ja211">211</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ühiskonna ja kultuuri suhe on leidnud siin ühe sõnastuse (paljudest võimalikest). Kultuur teeb ühiskondliku elu võimalikuks, eeldatavasti, tänu loomulikule keelele ja muudele märgisüsteemidele, mis on loomulikust keelest tuletatud.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p211b"></a><strong>Struktuursuse presumptsioonil</strong>, mis keelelise suhtlemisvilumuse resultaadina välja kujuneb, on võimas korrastav toime kommunikatsioonivahendite kompleksile tervikuna. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 211)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pani mõtlema <em>presupposition</em>'i mõistele Eco semiootikateoorias.</p><!--
5-6 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p211ja212"></a>Niisiis <strong>baseerub</strong> kogu inimkogemuse säilitamise ja vahendamise süsteem teataval <strong>kontsentrilisusel</strong>, mille keskmes asuvad enesestmõistetavamad ja püsikindlamad (n.-ö. kõige struktuursemad) struktuurid). Äärealadele lähemal paiknevad moodustised, millede struktuursus ei ole ilmne või pole <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> leidnud tõestust, kuid mis üldistesse märgilis-kommunikatsioonilistesse situatsioonidesse sisestatuna <em>funktsioneerivad struktuuridena</em>. Niisugustel kvaasistruktuuridel on inimkultuuris nähtavasti väga kaalukas koht. Veel enamgi: <strong>just teatav seesmine korrastamatus, poolik plaanipärasus tagab nii inimkultuuri suurema sisemise mahutavuse kui ka dünamismi, mida korrapärasemad süsteemid ei tunne</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 211-212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See jällegi kõlab nagu Jakobsoni kontsentriline mudel, mille keskmes on keeleteadus, natukene väljaspool semiootika, sellest väljaspool sotsiaalantropoloogia ning päris servas vist majandus vms. Mõte on sarnane: keskmes on kõige "<u>enesestmõistetavad ja püsikindlamad</u>" märgilised nähtused, aga äärealadel nähtused, millel on oma semiootiline aspekt olemas kui vähegi lähemalt vaadata. Ka katkendi lõpus rõhutatud tsentri-perifeeria dünaamika võib sellisest vaatekohast toimida: vähem-struktureeritud süsteemide "<u>seesmine korrastamatus</u>" on nagu varu, mida saab alati asuda struktureerima.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p212a"></a>Meie käsitame kultuuri kui <em>kollektiivi mittepäriliku mälu</em>, mis avaldub teatava keeldude ja <strong>ettekirjutuste süsteem</strong>ina. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Taolistest väljaütlemistest võis Eco (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-semiotic-threshold.html#eco76p12ja13">1976: 12-13</a>) jällegi järeldada, et Tartu-Moskva koolkonnas tegeletakse väärtuste, normide, reeglite ja muu mitte-otseselt-semiootilisega ("ettekirjutus" on teatud metafoorilise "grammatikana" mõistetuna arusaadavalt semiootiline, aga mitte iseenesest nii).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p212b"></a>See tees ei välista individuaalse kultuuri võimalikkust, juhul kui keegi käsitab ennast <strong>kollektiivi <em>esindajana</em></strong>, aga ka kõigil autokommunikatsiooni juhtudel, mispuhul üksik <strong>indiviid täidab</strong> - kas ajas või ruumis - <strong>kollektiivi eri liikmete funktsioone</strong> ja moodustab faktiliselt grupi. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p212">212</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui seda siin lugeda kahasse tema nö kommunikatsioonimudeliga artiklis "Kultuurisemiootika ja teksti mõiste" (vt <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/paljuhaalne-aines.html#lotman22p57kuni59">Lotman 2022: 57-59</a>), siis ilmneb, et kultuur on sotsiaalne nähtus metonüümiliselt ja metafooriliselt (just selles järjekorras): kollektiivi esindajana on üksikisik osa ühiskonnast ja siin on tegu (2) <em>auditooriumi ja kultuuritraditsiooni vahelise suhtlemisega</em>; kollektiivi eri liikmete funktsioone täites on üksikisik ühiskonnaga isomorfne või sarnanev olem ja siin on tegu (3) <em>lugeja suhtlemisel iseendaga</em>. Sellisel lugemisel on veel huvitavaid tagajärgi, mida ma hetkel veel ei suuda adekvaatselt välja joonistada. </p><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p212ja213"></a>Edasi, kultuur <strong>kultuur on</strong> <em>mälu</em> või teisisõnu <strong>mälusalvestis sellest, mida kollektiiv on juba läbi elanud</strong>, on ta vältimatult seotud <em>möödunud</em> ajalookogemusega. Järelikult sünnihetkel kultuuri kui niisuguse olemasolu ei saagi sedastada; <strong>kultuur teadvustatakse alles <em>post factum</em></strong>. Kui juttu tehakse uue kultuuri loomisest, siis toimub paratamatu etteaimamine, s.t. hakatakse tõenäoliseks pidama seda, mis (nagu eeldatakse), <em>saab</em> rekonstrueeritava tuleviku seisukohast mäluks (loomulikult võib niisuguse oletuse õigustatust demonstreerida vaid tulevik). (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 212-213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kammkultuuri esindajad ei teadnud ilmtingimata, et nad on kammkultuuri esindajad (selleks on nad osutunud tagantjärele).</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p213"></a>Seega (käitumise) programm toimib suunatud süsteemina: programmi koostaja vaatevinklist on programm suunatud tulevikku; käitumise (programmi) realiseerituse vaatevinklist on kultuur pööratud minevikku. Sellest järeldub, et <strong>erinevus käitumisprogrammi ja kultuuri vahel on funktsionaalne</strong>: üks ja sama tekst võib olla nii seda kui teist, olles antud kollektiivi üldises ajalookangas eristatav funktsiooni poolest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ütlen ausalt, ma ei tea mis siin täpselt toimub — mis käitumisprogrammist jutt käib. Järgmises lõigus räägitakse "<u>semiootilistest reeglitest, mille järgi inimkonna elukogemus kultuuriks muutub. Neid viimaseid saabki tõlgendada <em>programmina</em></u>". Üsna ebamäärane, kujundlik kraam.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p214a"></a>Teatud juhtudel võib nende kahe aspekti vahel puududa otsene kooskõla: nii näiteks <strong>võib eri liiki eelarvamusi käsitada elementidena aegunud kultuuritekstist</strong>, mille kood on kaduma läinud, s.t. niisuguse juhuna, kus tekst elab koodist kauem. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paneb mõtlema traditsionalistlikest meestest, kes meemivad, et "naise koht on köögis", aga ei taha mõeldagi selle ettepaneku presuppositsioonist, et mehe koht on järelikult tööl ja tema roll ulatada kogu oma palgatšekk naisele köögis. See loosung on jäänud püsima näitena (teisesenenud funktsiooniga) tekstist, mille kood (ühiskonnakorraldus, milles sugu määrab eluvaldkonna) on juba hääbunud.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p214b"></a>On iseloomulik, et <strong>paljud struktuurid ei võimalda</strong> üldse enda kehtestatud reeglite aktuaalsuse kuigivõrd olulist muutmist, teisisõnu <strong>väärtuste mis tahes ümberhindamist</strong>. <strong>Seega ei ole kultuur tihtipeale häälestatud hankima teadmist tulevikust</strong> - tulevik kangastub seiskunud ajana - ja tulevikuks <strong>saab piaks veninud "nüüd"</strong>. See on aga vahetult seotud orientatsiooniga minevikku, mis tagab hädavajaliku stabiilsuse; ja see on kultuuri eksisteerimise üks tingimusi. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Selle <em>pikaksveninud nüüd</em>-i tehniline nimetus on "the specious present". Üldiselt näib see katkend rõhutavat, et <em>mälusalvestise</em> või <em>käitumisprogrammina</em> ei soosi "<u>paljud struktuurid</u>" kultuuris innovatsiooni. // Minu jaoks on praegu oluline hoopis vastupidine nähtus: <em>tulevikust teadmiste hankimise</em> semiootilised mehhanismid. St ajaloo-semiootika asemel otsin futuro-semiootikat.</p><!--
8-9 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p214ja215"></a>Pikaealisuse poolest <strong>moodustavad tekstid kultuuri sees hierarhia</strong>, mis tavaliselt samastatakse väärtuste hierarhiaga. Kõige väärtuslikumaks saab pidada tekste, mis antud kultuuri kriteeriumide kohaselt on <strong>maksimaalselt püsivad ehk pankroonilised</strong> (kuigi võimalikud on ka "nihestatud" kultuurianomaaliad, mil kõrgeima hinnangu saab hetkelisus). <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> See võib kooskõlastuda <strong>teksti fikseerimiseks kasutatavate materjalidega</strong> ning tekstide säilitamise <strong>koha ja mooduste hierarhiaga</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 214-215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Koodide hierarhia ei tundu pooltki niivõrd problemaatiline kui tekstide hierarhia, kuigi teine on konkreetsem-materiaalsem (tekstid raamatukogus ja arhiivis on kõrgemalt hinnatud kui tänavatekstid, kellegi "mina olin siin" gräffiti).</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p215"></a>Koodi pikaealisuse määrab tema struktuuri põhitegurite konstantsus ja seesmine dünamism - võime muutuda, <strong>säilitades samal ajal mälestusi eelnenud seisunditest</strong> ja järelikult teadmist oma ühtsusest. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aspekt, mida saaks väga kergesti ümber lülitada (või seda sealt otsida) kultuuri enesemudeli temaatikas.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p215b"></a>Faktide jada muutumist tekstiks saadab alati selektsioon, s.o. <strong>ühtede</strong>, tekstielementideks siirdatavate <strong>sündmuste fikseerimine ja teiste</strong>, olematuteks kuulutatavate <strong>unustamine</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p215">215</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nt kui inimkond jutustab iseendale inimkonna terviklugu, siis üks maailmajuhtidega seksiv naine võib pälvida terve peatüki, aga terved paljumiljonilised rahvused minna vähimagi mainimiseta.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p215c"></a>Tekst ei ole tegelikkus; ta on aines selle rekonstrueerimiseks. Sellepärast <strong>peab dokumendi semiootiline analüüs alati eelnema ajaloolisele</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: <a href="esi#lotmanuspenski13p215ja216">215</a>)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Need kaks poolust (ajalooline ja semiootiline analüüs) vajavad eraldi käsitlemist (mu praeguses ettevõtmises).</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p216"></a>Seega kollektiivse mälu mahu teatavad <em>piirangud on eeldatavad</em> ja tingivadki säärase <strong>ühtede tekstide väljatõrjumise</strong> teiste poolt. Kuid teistsugustel juhtudel saab ühtede tekstide puudumine teiste olemasolu vältimatuks tingimuseks - <strong>nende semantilise kokkusobimatuse tõttu</strong>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 216)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Orwell tõrjub välja Burdekini jne. Kui mul saabuvad rahakamad ajad siis hakkan (RVL-i kaudu) jahtima haruldaseid raamatuid (nt Burdekini <em>Quiet Ways</em>), eriti selliseid, millest võib leida arvustusi, aga mitte raamatut ennast, justkui neid enam ei eksisteerikski, nagu nad oleksid mingid fantoomid (nt Isbyami <em>Infinity and Ego</em>).</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p216ja217"></a>Kui <strong>tõusuaegadel loovad ühiskondlikud</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>formatsioonid paindlikke ja dünaamilisi mudeleid</strong>, mis pakuvad kollektiivsele mälule avaraid võimalusi ja soosivad selle avardumist, siis sotsiaalset loojangut saadab reeglina kollektiivse mälumehhanismi tardumine ning mälu ahenemise kasvav tendent. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 216-217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jõudeaegadel on mahti pluralismiks; vaevalistel aegadel jätkub energiat vaid argiolmeks ja ellujäämiseks.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p217"></a>Esimesel juhul omandab põhimõttelise tähenduse muuhulgas küšimus "<em>kuidas</em> seda või teist nähtust <em>nimetatakse</em>?". Vastavalt sellel võidakse ebaõige nimetamisakt samastada <em>teistsuguse</em> sisuga (vt. allpool). Vrd. <strong>keskaegsete otsingutega, leidmaks nime nendele või teistele hüpostaasidele</strong>, mis vabamüürlastel on muide jäädvustatud rituaalis. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Silme ette tulevad kabalistlikud skeemid, milles arvudele antakse nimetus ja sisu. (Endiselt ei ole veel lugenud Lotmani artiklit vabamüürlastest 1992. aasta <em>Akadeemias</em>.)</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p218"></a>Vastavalt sellele <strong>võib eristada kultuure, mis keskenduvad peamiselt väljendustasandile, ja kultuure, mis keskenduvad peamiselt sisutasandile</strong>. On sege, et juba väljendustasandile keskendumise faktis endas, käitumisvormide range ritualiseerimise faktis endas peitub tavaliselt väljendusplaani ja sisuplaani vastastikku ühene (ja mittemeelevaldne) suhe, nende vastastikuse põhimõttelise lahutamatuse omaksvõtt (nagu see on iseloomulik eriti keskaegses ideoloogias) või tõendus väljendustasandi mõjust sisutasandile. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 218)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mis on <em>kultuuritüpoloogiad</em>?</p><!--
23 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p229a"></a>Mis tahes elavasse kultuuri on orgaaniliselt sisestatud vasturääkivus süsteemsuse pideva <strong>täiustamispüüde</strong> ja samas pideva võitluse vahel struktuuri <strong>automatiseerumise</strong> vastu, mis täiustamise taotlemisel tekib. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 229)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Täiustumisele püüdlev innovatsioon vs automatiseerunud arhaism.</p><!--
23 --><blockquote><a id="lotmanuspenski1371p229b"></a><strong>Inimene</strong> pole pelgalt kogu muust loodusest märgatavalt <strong>muutlikum</strong>a maailma osa, vaid ühtlasi ta suhtub muutlikkuse ideesse endasse täiesti teistmoodi. Kui kõigi orgaaniliste olendite püüdluseks on neid ümbritseva keskkonna stabiliseerimine, kogu nende muutlikkus on püüd jääda muutumatuks maailmas, mis muutub hoolimata nende vajadusest, siis inimese jaoks on keskkonna muutlikkus olemise loomulik tingimus; tema jaoks on normiks elada muutuvates oludes - <em>eluviisi muutumine</em>. (Lotman; Uspenski 2013[1971]: 229)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Epigraafiliselt relevantne inimloomuse voolavusele.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-46574159426122391082023-09-29T08:44:00.000-07:002023-09-29T08:44:00.263-07:00A Semiotic Threshold<!-- A Semiotic Threshold
Semiotics,Source: Other,Ülikool,Papers,Lang: English,
Peirce, Telepathy and Perception, puuduolevad leheküljed:
363-364
370-371
378
384-388
391
395
Tarasti (ed.) Comunication: Understanding/misunderstanding - proceedings of the 9th congress of the iass/ais - helsinki-imatra, 2007
Radica AMel - To use signs vs. to invent signs - 33-43
Josep Barcons - The existential dimension of the phatic function - 128-139
Bogdan bogdanov - communication and understanding - 197-202
dario compagno - misunderstanding or misperceiving - 364-371
trziana giudice - metaphors and imagination - 542-150
Volker Hooyberg - seeing connections - 601-608
Florian Hruby - preparing the unknown - 632-640
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#eco76">Eco 1976. <em>A Theory of Semiotics</em> [Introduction]</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kull09">Kull 2009. Vegetative, Animal, and Cultural Semiosis</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#higuerakull17">Higuera; Kull 2017. The Semiotic Threshold</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="eco76"></a>Eco, Umberto 1976. <em>A Theory of Semiotics</em>. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [<u>lg</u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p3"></a>The aim of this book is to explore the theoretical possibility and the social function of a unified approach to every phenomenon of signification and/or communication. Such an approach should take the form of <strong>a <em>general semiotic theory</em>, able to explain every case of sign-function</strong> in terms of underlying systems of elements mutually correlated by one or more codes. (Eco 1976: 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The social function of a scientific approach?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p4a"></a>Therefore a first chapter will be devoted to the analysis of the notion of 'sign' in order to distinguish signs from non-signs and <strong>to translate the notion of 'sign' into the more flexible one of <em>sign-function</em></strong> (which can be explained within the framework of a theory of codes). This discussion will allow me to posit a distinction between 'signification' and 'communication': in principle, a semiotics of signification entails a theory of codes, while <strong>a semiotics of communication entails a theory of sign production</strong>. (Eco 1976: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>How is the notion of "sign" not flexible? How does adding "function" make it more flexible?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p4b"></a>It is not by chance that the discriminating categories are the ones of signification and communication. As will be seen in chapters 1 and 2, there is <strong>a signification system</strong> (and therefore a code) when there is <strong>the socially conventionalized possibility of generating sign-functions</strong>, whether the <strong>functives</strong> of such functions are discrete units called signs or vast portions of discourse, provided that the correlation has been previously posited by a social convention. There is on the contrary <strong>a communication process</strong> when the possibilities provided by a signification system are exploited in order <strong>to physically produce expressions</strong> for many practical purposes. (Eco 1976: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And these are <em>not</em> equivalents for "language" and "speech?</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p4ja5"></a>Even if the theory of codes and the theory of sign production succeed in eliminating <strong>the naive and non-relational notion of 'sign'</strong>, this notion appears to be so suitable in ordinary language and in colloquial semiotic discussions that it should not be completely abandoned. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> It would be uselessly oversophisticated to get rid of it. (Eco 1976: 4-5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Were semioticians using the notion of "sign" in a non-relational way before this? (Peirce's <em>sign is a relation...</em> precedes this by a century.)</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p6a"></a>There are 'co-operative' limits in the sense that various disciplines have elaborated theories or descriptions that everybody recognizes as having semiotic relevance (for instance both linguistics and information theory have done important work on the notion of code; <strong>kinesics and proxemics are richly exploring non-verbal modes of communication</strong>, and so on): in this case a general semiotic approaches should only propose a unified set of categories in order to make this collaboration more and more powerful; at the same time it <strong>can eliminate the naive habit of translating</strong> (by dangerous metaphorical substitutions) <strong>the categories of linguistics into different frameworks</strong>. (Eco 1976: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kinesics and proxemics both died with their progenitors. What is rich, though, is descrying the translation of linguistic into different frameworks from the guy who applied Jakobson's scheme of linguistic functions on architecture.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p6b"></a>By <em>natural boundaries</em> I mean principally those beyond which a semiotic approach cannot go; for <strong>There is non-semiotic territory since there are phenomena that cannot be taken as sign-functions</strong>. But by the same term I also mean a vast range of phenomena prematurely assumed not to have a semiotic relevance. These are the <strong>cultural territories</strong> in which people do not recognize the underlying existence of codes or, if they do, do not recognize the semiotic nature of those codes, i.e., their <strong>ability to generate a continuous production of signs</strong>. (Eco 1976: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Like the physical world of causality?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p7a"></a>Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be <em>taken</em> as a sign. <strong>A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else</strong>. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it. Thus <em>semiotics is in principle the discipline studying everything which can be used in order to lie</em>. If something cannot be used to tell a lie, conversely it cannot be used to tell the truth: it cannot in fact be used 'to tell' at all. I think that the definition of a 'theory of the lie' should be taken as a pretty comprehensive program for a general semiotics. (Eco 1976: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Actually made me think of how O.S.'s novel is a substitution for the 18thM's history of mankind. The actual thing (might) exist(s someday) but what we have is a reduced version that got partly lost in the transmission (transtemporal telepathy not a reliable means of communication?).</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p7b"></a>Semiotics is of the limits and laws of semiotics must begin by determining whether (a) one means by the term 'semiotics' a <em>specific discipline</em> with its own method and a precise object; or whether (b) semiotics is <strong>a <em>field of studies</em> and thus a repertoire of interests that is not as yet completely unified</strong>. If semiotics is a field then the various semiotic studies would be justified by their very existence: it should be possible to define semiotics inductively by extrapolating from the field of studies a series of constant tendencies and therefore a unified model. If semiotics is a discipline, then the research ought <strong>to propose a semiotic model deductively which would serve as a parameter on which to base the inclusion or exclusion of the various studies from the field of semiotics</strong>. (Eco 1976: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The latter, it's a field. Excluding some because they don't use "a semiosic model" would be... hegemonic?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p7c"></a>One cannot do <strong>theoretical research</strong> without having <strong>the courage to put forward a theory</strong>, and, therefore, an elementary model as a guide for subsequent discourse; all theoretical research must however have the courage to specify its own contradictions, and should make them obvious where they are not apparent. (Eco 1976: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>History of semiotics now barred because it does not put forward a new theory.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p8a"></a>At first glance this survey will appear as a list of <em>communicative</em> behaviors, thus suggesting <em>one</em> of the hypotheses governing my research: <strong>semiotics studies all cultural processes as <em>processes of communication</em></strong>. Therefore each of these processes would seem to be permitted by an underlying <em>system of signification</em>. (Eco 1976: 8)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The fundamental premise of the semiotics of culture.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p8b"></a>So <strong>let us define a communicative process as the passage of a signal</strong> (not necessarily a sign) <strong>from a source</strong> (through a transmitter, along a channel) <strong>to a destination</strong>. In a machine-to-machine process the signal has no power to signify in so far as it may determine the destination <em>sub specie stimuli</em>. In this case we have no signification, but we do have the passage of some information.<br /><strong>When the destination is a human being</strong>, or 'addressee' (it is not necessary that the source or the transmitter be human, provided that they emit the signal following a system of rules by the human addressee), <strong>we are on the contrary witnessing a process of signification</strong> - provided that the signal is <strong>not merely a stimulus but arouses an interpretive response</strong> in the addressee. This process is made possible by the existence of a code. (Eco 1976: 8)</blockquote><!--
--><p>According to this, what we call a transmission of information (sharing files between devices, uploading files to a cloud, etc.) is communication, and what we usually call communication is "<u>a process of signification</u>". Got it. This must have been written before the digital age when transmission was analogic; no-one today, not even Tom's uncle Richards' buddy Harry, would say that computers run... without a code.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p8c"></a>A code is a system of signification, insofar as it couples <strong>present entities</strong> with <strong>absent units</strong>. When - on the basis of an underlying rule - <strong>something actually presented</strong> to the perception of the addressee <strong><em>stands for</em> something else</strong>, there is <em>signification</em>. In this sense the addressee's actual perception and interpretive behavior are not necessary for the definition of a significant relationship as such: it is enough that <strong>the code should foresee an established correspondence</strong> between that which '<em>stand for</em>' and its correlate, <strong>valid for every possible addressee</strong> even if no addressee exists or even will exist. (Eco 1976: 8)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Very... <em>virtual</em>. If trees fall in a forest over a lengthy period of time in a sequence spelling out "SOS" in morse code, it's a significant relationship even if there's no-one there to perceive and interpret it. The code itself foresees that the correlation is there. (A "virtual addressee", a God, would appreciate the correlation.)</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p9"></a><em>Zoosemiotics</em>: it represents the lower limit of semiotics because it concerns itself with the communicative behavior of non-human (and therefore non-cultural) communities. But <strong>through the study of animal communication we can achieve a definition of what the biological components of human communication are</strong>: or else a recognition that even on the animal level there exist patterns of signification which can, to a certain degree, be a defined as cultural and social. (Eco 1976: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, good, the lower animals have a use after all.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p10"></a><em>Musical codes</em>: <strong>the whole of musical science since the Pythagoreans</strong> has been an attempt to describe the field of musical communication as <strong>a rigorously structured system</strong>. (Eco 1976: 10)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Seemingly no book goes without a mention of them. The phraseology here is not bad. A rigorously structured system flows over and through us and we do not perceive it.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p11"></a>As a matter of fact music presents, on the one hand, the problem of <strong>a semiotic system without a semantic level (or a content plane)</strong>: on the other hand, however, there are musical 'signs' (or syntagms) with an explicit denotative value (trumpet signals in the army) and there are syntagms or entire 'texts' possessing pre-culturalized connotative value ('pastoral' or 'thrilling' music, etc.). In some historical eras <strong>music was conceived as conveying precise emotional and conceptual meanings</strong>, established by codes, or, at least, 'repertoires' (see, for the Baroque era, Stefani, 1973, and Pagnini, 1974). (Eco 1976: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As I understand it, even the most tedious techno/house music has its codes and conventions. They are perhaps merely too complicated to be verbalized.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p12"></a><em>Text theory</em>: the exigencies of <strong>a 'transphrastic' linguistic</strong> and developments in plot analysis (as well as the poetic language analysis) have led semiotics to recognize the notion of <em>text</em> as a macro-unit, ruled by particular generative rules, <strong>in which sometimes the very notion of 'sign'</strong>" - as an elementary semiotic unit - <strong>is practically annihilated</strong>" (Barthes 1971, 1973; Kristeva 1969). (Eco 1976: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Text without signs?</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p12ja13"></a><em>Cultural codes</em>: semiotic research finally shifts its attention to <strong>phenomena which it would be difficult to term sign systems in a strict sense</strong>, nor even communicative systems, but which heading the Soviets bring in myths, legends, primitive technologies which present in an organized way the world vision of a certain society</strong> (see Ivanov and Toporov 1962; Todorov 1966) and finally the typology of cultures (Lotman 1964, 1967a), which study the codes which define a given cultural model (for example the code of <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> the mentality of medieval chivalry); <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Eco 1976: 12-13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eco not really getting the gist of TMS modelling theory.</p><!--
12-13 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p14ja15"></a>Saussure's definition is rather important and has done much to increase semiotic awareness. As will be shown in chapter 1 the notion of a sign as a twofold entity (signifier and signified or <em>sign-vehicle</em> and <em>meaning</em>) has anticipated and promoted <strong>all correlational definitions of sign-function</strong>. Insofar as <strong>the relationship</strong> between signifier and signified <strong>is established on the basis of a system of rules</strong> which is '!em"la langue</em>, Saussurean semiology would seem to be <strong>a rigorous semiotics of signification</strong>. But it is not by chance that those who see semiotics as a theory of communication rely basically on Saussure's linguistics. Saussure did not define the signified any too clearly, leaving it half way between <strong>a mental image, a concept and a psychological</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>reality</strong>; but he did clearly stress the fact that the signified is something which has to do with <strong>the mental activity of anybody receiving a signifier</strong>: according to Saussure signs 'express' ideas and provided that he did not share a Platonic interpretation of the term 'idea', such <strong>ideas must be mental events that concern a human mind</strong>. Thus the sign is implicitly regarded as <strong>a communicative device</strong> taking place between two human beings intentionally aiming to communicate or to express something. (Eco 1976: 14-15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This ambiguity of the <em>signified</em> served it well - we all know what it is, and yet we do not know what it is exactly. An engram?</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p15a"></a>I shall define the 'interpretation' better later (chapter 2), but it is clear that <strong>the 'subjects' of Peirce's 'semiosis' are not human subjects but rather three abstract semiotic entities</strong>, the dialectic between which is not affected by concrete communicative behavior. (Eco 1976: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These "subjects" are "<u>a sign, its object and its interpretant</u>", or, by their real names, Signe, Olev and Indrek.</p><!--
13 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p15b"></a>It is true that the same interpretation could also fit Saussure's proposal; but <strong>Peirce's definition</strong> offers us something more. It <strong>does not demand</strong>, as part of a sign's definition, the qualities of <strong>being intentionally emitted and artificially produced</strong>. (Eco 1976: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Which is perhaps why Peirceanism is becoming increasingly hegemonic in biosemiotics.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p17a"></a>We are able to infer from smoke the presence of fire, from a wet spot the fall of a raindrop, from a track on the sand the passage of a given animal, and so on. All these are cases of <em>inference</em> and our everyday life is filled with a lot of these inferential acts. It is incorrect to say that <strong>every act of inference is a 'semiosic' act</strong> - even though Peirce did so - and it is probably too rash a statement to assert that every semiosic process implies an act of inference, but it can be maintained that <em>there exist acts of inference which must be recognized as semiosic acts</em>. <strong>It is not by chance that ancient philosophy has so frequently associated signification and inference</strong>. A sign was defined as <strong>the evident antecedent of a consequent or the consequent of an antecedent when similar consequences have been previously observed</strong> (Hobbes, <em>Leviathan</em>, 1,3); as an entity from which the present or the future or past existence of another being is inferred (Wolff, <em>Ontology</em>, 1952); as a proposition constituted by a valid and revealing connection to its consequent (Sextus Empiricus, <em>Adv. math.</em>, VIII, 245). Probably this straightforward identification of inference and signification leaves many shades of difference unexplained: it only needs to be corrected by adding the expression <strong>'when this association is culturally recognized and systematically coded'</strong>. (Eco 1976: 17)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I should really reread Hobbes' <em>Leviathan</em>. It is probable that if Spinoza has a theory of signs, per Derrida, then he should have got it from Hobbes. (A theory of signs is, in this case, like a contagious disease.)</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p17b"></a>An event can be a sign-vehicle of its cause or its effect provided that both the cause and the effect are not actually detectable. <strong>Smoke is only a sign of fire to the extent that fire is not actually perceived along with the smoke</strong>: but smoke can be a sign-vehicle standing for a non-visible fire, provided that a social rule has necessariy and usually associated smoke with fire. (Eco 1976: 17)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The murderer standing by the body with a bloody knife saying "I did it" does not require a detective.</p><!--
19 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p21"></a>One must undoubtedly exclude from semiotic consideration <strong>neurophysiological and genetic phenomena</strong>, as well as the circulation of the blood or the activity of the lungs. But what about the information theories that view sensory phenomena as the passage of signals from peripherical nerve ends to the cerebral cortex, or genetic heredity as a coded transmission of information? Probably it would be prudent to say that neurophysiological and genetic phenomena are not <strong>a matter for semioticians</strong>, but that <strong>neurophysiological and genetic informational theories</strong> are so. (Eco 1976: 21)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Semiotics deals with theories only?</p><!--
20 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p22"></a>The difference between saying culture 'should be studied as' and 'culture is', is immediately apparent. In fact it is one thing to say that an object is <strong><em>essentialiter</em></strong> something and another to say that it can be seen <strong><em>sub ratione</em></strong> of that something. (Eco 1976: 22)</blockquote><!--
--><p>First time seeing these expressions, I think.</p><!--
21-22 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p23ja24"></a>However, these conditions do not even imply that two human beings actually exist: the situation is equally possible in the case of a solitary, shipwrecked Robinson Crusoe. It is necessary, however, that whoever uses the stone for the first time should consider the possibility of passing on the information he has acquainted to himself the next day, and in order to do this should elaborate a mnemonic device, a significant relationship between object <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and function. A singe use of the stone is not culture. <strong>To establish now the function can be repeated and to transmit this information from today's solitary shipwrecked man to the same man tomorrow, is culture</strong>. The solitary man becomes both transmitter and eceiver of a communication (on the basis of a very elementary code). It is clear that a definition such as this (in its totally simple terms) can imply an identification of thought and language: it is a question of saying, as Peirce does (5.470-480) that <em>even ideas are signs</em>. But the problem appears in its extreme form only if one considers the extreme example of a shipwrecked individual communicating with itsef. (Eco 1976: 23-24)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Autocommunication and culture. </p><!--
27 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p29"></a>For my own part, I share the same skeptical opinion that all enquiry is 'motiated'. Theoretical research is a form of social practice. <strong>Everybody who wants to know something wants to know it in order to do something</strong>. If he claims that he wants to know it only in order 'to know' and not in order 'to do' it means that he wants to know it in order to do nothing, which is in fact a surreptitious way of doing something, i.e. leaving the world just as it is (or as his approach assumes that it ought to be). (Eco 1976: 29)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Knowing and even feeling are meaningless, there is only doing.</p><!--
28 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p30n1"></a>Hjelmslev (1943), for instance, proposed to divide semiotics into (1) <strong>scientific semiotic</strong> and (b) <strong>non-scientific semiotic</strong>, both studied by (c) <strong>metasemiotic</strong>. A metasemiotic studying a non-scientific semiotic is a semiology, whose terminology is studied by a metasemiology. Insofar as there also exists a connotative semiotic, there will likewise be a meta(connotative) semiotic. This division, however, does not take into account (for historical reasons) many new approaches to significant and communicative phenomena. For instance, Hjelmslev called 'connotators' such phenomena as tones, registers, gestures which, not being at that time the object of a scientific semiotics, should have been studied by a metasemiology, while today the same phenomena fall within the domain of paralinguistics, which would seem to be a 'scientific semiotic'. Hjelmslev's great credit was that of having emphasized that <strong>there is no object which is not illuminated by</strong> linguistic (and <strong>semiotic</strong>) <strong>theory</strong>. (Eco 1976: 30, n 1)</blockquote><!--
--><p>First time someone has made Hjelmslev appear interesting for me.</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p31n3"></a>Semiotics will therefore be presented as the axiomatic meting-place of all possible knowledge, including arts and sciences. This proposal is developed by <strong>Kristeva</strong> in "Pour une sémiologie des paragrammes" (1967) and in "Distance et anti-representation" (1968), where she <strong>introduces Linnart Mall</strong>, "Une approche possible du Sunyayada!, whose study of the "zero-logical subject" and the notion of 'emptiness' in ancient Buddhist texts is curiousy reminiscent of Lacan's '<em>vide</em>'. (Eco 1976: 31, n 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linnart_M%C3%A4ll">Linnart Mäll</a> keeps on popping up in my recent readings. // Mäll töötas 1983-1991 "ajaloo ja semiootika laboratooriumis", mille aadress oli Tiigi 78-100 (vb samad ruumid kus semiootika osakond asus enne 2012. aastat). Laboratooriumisse kuulus ka ajaloolane <a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Ligi">Herbert Ligi</a>, kelle artiklitest ilmub kogumik oktoobris, st järgmine kuu.</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="eco76p31n5"></a>It is sufficient to maintain that all this must apply to the first being which performed a semiotic behavior. This could mean - as Piaget (1968, p. 79) suggests - that intelligence precedes 'language'. But this does not mean that intelligence precedes semiosis. <strong>If the equation 'semiosis = verbal language' is eliminated, one can view intelligence and signification as a single process</strong>. (Eco 1976: 31, n 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Relevant for the absurd question: <em>Is telepathy semiosic?</em> (Never mind why one should even ask such a question.)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kull09"></a>Kull, Kalevi 2009. Vegetative, Animal, and Cultural Semiosis: The semiotic threshold zones. <em>Cognitive Semiotics</em> 4: 8-27. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem.2009.4.spring2009.8">10.1515/cogsem.2009.4.spring2009.8</a> [<u><a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/cogsem.2009.4.spring2009.8/html">De Gruyter Mouton</a></u>]</h4><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p8ja9"></a>The basic features which go together with semiosis include <strong>the possibility to make mistakes</strong> (or <strong>fallibility</strong>), and an intentionality in a very broad <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> sense. Thus it is worthwhile, when speaking about semiosis in organisms, to demonstrate as clearly as possible the existence of these features. (Kull 2009: 8-9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Instead of (Eco's) lying, making mistakes.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p9"></a>Before the life process or semiosis (that has lasted and functioned uninterruptedly for about <strong>two billion years</strong>) started, there could have been <strong>an intermediate series of events</strong>, which brought together the necessary components of the entire semiosic machinery. This view is close to a contemporary common understanding of the beginning of life, according to which life did not take its origin through a single unique step, but through a multitude of steps (and possibly several branches, some of which were temporal and later disappeared entirely). As such, <strong>the border between life and non-life turns quite fuzzy in principle</strong>. (Kull 2009: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Relevant for the time-scale as well as for framing O.S.'s <em>biological program</em> for seeding the galaxy with material that could evolve into life in suitable conditions.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p12"></a>With the introduction of the concept of the lower semiotic threshold, certain problems involving its correspondence to C. S. Peirce's approach appear. For Peirce, <strong>semiosis starts from the situation of lawless chaos; laws then develop as habits</strong>. Thus Peirce does not accept <strong>universal laws</strong> in the sense that modern physics does - since the latter assumes something which in principle (by definition) <strong>can never err</strong>. The universal physical laws (like the conservation of energy and the conservation of momentum) are described in contemporary physics as certain fundamental symmetries (according to Noether's theorem) that are <strong>strict and unavoidable conditions for all processes</strong>. (Kull 2009: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Habits are fallible. </p><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p12ja13"></a>A relation is anything that cannot by itself affect, neither be directly recognized by, anything except another relation. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> This is exactly what is true for a meaning - meaning exists only for another meaning, or a sign only for another sign. Or, as Jakob von Uexküll once (slightly sarcastically) remarked: "those who cannot see the meanings seemingly lack the appropriate organ [...]" Or, with another formulation: a sign is anything that requires for its detection a living device; whereas <strong>in order to recognize it <em>as a sign</em>, to recognize a relation as a relation, no less than a semiotic animal (= human) is needed</strong>. (Kull 2009: 12-13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A much more cogent approach to this metalevel issue than Eco's example of a shipwrecked man teaching himself tomorrow how to use a rock (<a href="#eco76p23ja24">above</a>).</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p15a"></a>In this case, the major types or levels of evolutionarily or ontogenetically established <em>relations</em>, i.e., of the sign relations that life can create - will be,<ol><li>Vegetative, which is capable of <strong>recognition</strong> - iconic relations;</li><li>Animal, capable for <strong>association</strong> - indexical relations;</li><li>Cultural, capable for <strong>combination</strong> - symbolic relations.</li></ol>A history of this typology ultimately goes back to the classical Aristotelian distinction between <em>anima vegetativa</em>, <em>anima sensitiva</em>, and <em>anima rationale</em>. The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, similarly, included the view that in the first stage of embryonic development, the vital principle has merely vegetative powers; then a sensitive soul comes into being, and still later this is replaced by the perfect rational soul (Kull 2000). (Kull 2009: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That's the stuff I like.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p15"></a>Stjernfelt (2003: 488-489) characterized (not without his good sense of humour) the iconic threshold (in the sense we use it here) as "<strong>the Sebeok theshold</strong>", the indexical threshold (in the sense of the current study) as "<strong>the Merleau-Ponty or Lakoff threshold</strong>", the symbolic threshold as "<strong>the Eco threshold</strong>", and the lack of the lower threshold as "<strong>the Peirce threshold</strong>". (Kull 2009: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>All of these make a lot of sense except Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff - I don't know what exactly they were about (self-perception? cognitive metaphors?).</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p20"></a>A common problem faced in the case of vegetative semiosis is that although it is often accepted that cells may have a functional cycle and an umwelt, the same seems not to be true of a multicellular vegetative organism like a plant as a whole. Indeed, it can be so that <strong>a colony-like set of cells has less rich organismic behaviour than its constituent cells</strong>, but nevertheless a plant as a whole may also have at least some of it, if, for instance, a relation between the sensing processes in leaves' cells and the behaviour of rhizome growth or root behaviour is inherited (thus memory-based). (Kull 2009: 20)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something something Martians.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p21"></a>These relations - the <strong>code relations</strong> - are not deterministic in the physical sense, because, unlike physical laws, they <strong>have exceptions</strong>, meaning that they are fallible, <em>errors</em> happen. However, in the case of vegetative semiosis it is not yet <em>deception</em> (that would require an animal sign system with its indexical relations), nor <em>lying</em> (which would require any form of language, the usage of true symbols). (Kull 2009: 21)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Another valuable addition to the lying/mistaking complex.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p22"></a>What we will see with the appearance of language is the creation of time - of a temporal umwelt with its distinctive past and future together with an ability for <strong>chronesthesia, or mental time travel</strong>. This corresponds to the emergence of new types of memory in humans that is necessary for narration, for building narratives. (Kull 2009: 22)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>In psychology, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mental_time_travel">mental time travel</a> is the capacity to mentally reconstruct personal events from the past (episodic memory) as well as to imagine possible scenarios in the future (episodic foresight / episodic future thinking).</u>"</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Tulving, Endel 2002. Chronesthesia: Conscious awareness of subjective time. In: Stuss, D. T.; Knight, R. T. (eds.), <em>Principles of Frontal Lobe Functions</em>. New York: Oxford University Press, 311-325. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.003.0020</u> [<u><a href="https://alicekim.ca/_20Chronesthesia02_311.pdf">alicekim.com</a></u>, PDF]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="kull09p23"></a>The appearance of language becomes possible due to the apparance of <strong>signs that signify a relation itself</strong>, relation as a relation. Such is, for instance, the connecting sign "<strong>and</strong>" - whose object is just a relation, a free relation-as-such, a relation that can be universally built between anything and which is independent of the objects between which this relation takes place. Such signs of relation can be called 'syntactical signs', and it is perhaps in this sense that Sebeok claimed syntax to be uniquely characteristic of human language (e.g., Sebeok 1996: 108). Syntactic aspects can be noticed in any sign systems, but the syntactic signs as such are a characteristic feature of language. Syntactic signs are absent in animal and vegetative sign systems. The capacity to use syntactic signs is evidently necessary for the creation of propositions and sentences. Thus, propositional, linguistic, and cultural semiosis are closely tied. (Kull 2009: 23)</blockquote><!--
--><p>An example of a purely syntactical sign.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="higuerakull17"></a>Higuera, Claudio Julio Rodríguez; Kull, Kalevi 2017. The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: The Semiotic Threshold. <em>Biosemiotics</em> 10: 109-126. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-017-9289-4">10.1007/s12304-017-9289-4</a> [<u><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316419811_The_Biosemiotic_Glossary_Project_The_Semiotic_Threshold">ResearchGate</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p110a"></a>The concept of 'semiotic threshold' has been both influential and productive within the biosemiotic literature. First proposed by Umberto ECo (1976) with at least two variables, <strong>an upper and lower threshold</strong>, the concept has helped delimit and shape the whole area of semiotic studies. <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> However the extension of semiotic theories can lead us to posit challenges to the threshold view, via pansemiotism on the lower end of the spectrum, or by <strong>extending the reach of the high-complexity branches of cultural semiotics at the higher end</strong>. Interestingly, the idea of a semiotic threshold is not only limited to determining <em>where</em> sign action is possible, but also <em>what</em> areas of scholarship can semiotics cover, as a general discipline. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 110)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Semiotics of culture with its wholes/totalities.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p110b"></a>That there is no consensus on the location of these possible thresholds should be taken as an advantage in discussing issues on the possibility of sign action; for the ongoing discussion on <strong>the split between the semiotic and the non-semiotic</strong> has been a productive tool in modeling and revisiting our positions on the role of meaning in biology. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 110)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Here's an absurd question: is telepathy semiotic or non-semiotic?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p112"></a>The concept of threshold does not present clear-cut synonyms that can replace it so easily within semiotic discourse. However, <strong>related terms such as <em>hierarchies</em> and <em>levels</em> present some relevant degree of similarity with the idea of a threshold</strong> that separates some aspects of what we may consider as semiotic (either by epistemological apprehension or by ontological assumption) from <strong>something <em>beyond</em> or <em>below</em> it</strong>. Hierarchical views of the semiotic are not a unified theory, and one may find different flavors to it. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 112)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I suspect that if one were to attempt to do the opposite and replace hierarchical models (such as Jakobson's scheme of linguistic functions) with a threshold-based approach, it may turn out that the phatic function, for example, is almost non-semiotic (not really but so close).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p113a"></a>The caveat here is that this idea of semiotic transition hinges on the idea of <strong><em>intersemiosis</em></strong>, a term related to Jakobson's semiotics and the related semiotics of translation as developed by Torop (2003). However, the cultural scope of the concept sets it further away from the more specific biosemiotic claims that we have seen before. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 113)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Läbisemioositud.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p113b"></a>The idea of a <strong><em>semiotic barrier</em></strong> is also related to the concept of the semiotic threshold. Lotman talks of "semiotic barriers" that must be overcome in acts of communication (Lotman 1990: 143). These barriers are to be understood as <strong>qualitative difference between communicative capacities</strong>. Lotman illustrates it with the example of a mother and her baby, which can be approached by biosemiotics through the understanding of biological organisms as textual systems (Kull 1999: 126). (Higuera; Kull 2017: 113)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps actually useful for my current topic.</p><!-- Telepathic future humans have qualitatively different communicative capacities than us first humans.
6 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p113c"></a>Alternatively, de Mattos and Chaves argue that <strong>in the transition from youth to adulthood, individuals develop their own semiotic barriers to inhibit the development of new meanings</strong> (Mattos; Chaves 2013: 97). What can be surmised from these different, psycholinguistic meanings is that semiotic barriers are readily available as a concept for making a qualitative assessment of meaning generation and boundaries that appear within specific context, be those psychological or social. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 113)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>And once again it is the most paradoxical property of the habitus, the unchosen principle of all 'choices', that yelds the solution to the information needed in order to avoid information.</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2012/06/sociosemiotic-readings.html#bourdieu90p61">Bourdieu 1990: 61</a>)</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p121"></a>One of the more interesting proposals, however, comes from Stjernfelt's multiple thresholds associated to different positions in philosophy and semiotics, where instead of a 'lower' or a 'higher' threshold, there is a "whole ladder of thresholds of increasing biosemiotic complexity" (Stjernfelt 2007: 272). Among those we may find <strong>the <em>Searle threshold</em> as linguistic competence, the <em>Uexküll threshold</em> as zoological features, or the <em>Peirce threshold</em></strong>, comprising all forms of protosemiotic processes in the universe (Stjernfelt 2007). (Higuera; Kull 2017: 121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Now without Merleau-Ponty and Lakoff!</p><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="higuerakull17p124"></a>Coming up with specific gradients of sign action is also dependent on the context of semiotic theories, but generally speaking, biosemioticians are capable of distinguishing that, behind an evolving conception of semiosis, there can also be distinguishing features along the levels that can be differentiated through it, be it in specific referential capabilities or <strong>semiospheric integration of meaning-making features</strong>. These differences, in any case, are generally taken as qualitative distinctions between semiotic organisms. (Higuera; Kull 2017: 124)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Semiospheric integration?</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-3908561299272080322023-09-24T12:54:00.000-07:002023-09-24T12:54:49.102-07:00Paljuhäälne aines<!-- Paljuhäälne aines
Semiotics,Keel: Eesti,Source: Other,Ülikool,Papers,
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiLcbflu0V00gwYoq5ERPu-h72_JAs0G-j5QT18SHCrOtIP_fuwQSftVs8trMXRdNw5vcuMTWFgnTWKVf1kXpDACuBtR7XLoWCVXijdp-ZUGFmDYFGgVvv8cyrVHGicFyp_xd0jrURMY2xNyAnE4WePnAV7r9GQgjsuy3PsfiUm2emQR6aqygH_kh0owW7/s1778/jja_pilt_ksa01_20230919_171013.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1000" data-original-width="1778" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjiLcbflu0V00gwYoq5ERPu-h72_JAs0G-j5QT18SHCrOtIP_fuwQSftVs8trMXRdNw5vcuMTWFgnTWKVf1kXpDACuBtR7XLoWCVXijdp-ZUGFmDYFGgVvv8cyrVHGicFyp_xd0jrURMY2xNyAnE4WePnAV7r9GQgjsuy3PsfiUm2emQR6aqygH_kh0owW7/s320/jja_pilt_ksa01_20230919_171013.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#eco05">Eco 2005. Mudellugeja</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#lotman22">Lotman 2022. Kultuurisemiootika ja teksti mõiste</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kullsaluperejt18">Kull, Salupere jt 2018. Kultuurisemiootika</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="eco05"></a>Eco, Umberto 2005. Mudellugeja. <em>Lector in fabula</em>. Tõlkija Ülar Ploom; eessõna Peeter Torop. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 57-73. [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b2085460*est">ESTER</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p57a"></a><strong>Tekst</strong>, nii nagu see oma lingvistilises pealispinnas (või nähtavas kujus) esile tuleb, <strong>esindab tervet väljendusvõtete ahelat</strong>, mille vastuvõtja peab aktualiseerima. (Eco 2005: 57)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aktualiseerima — tegema reaalsuseks. Realiseerima? Lugeja peab tekstis esindatud väljendusvõtete ahela mingis mõttes <em>elustama</em> või ellu tooma, tegelikuks-toimivaks tegema.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p57b"></a>Mis puutub aktualisatsiooni, siis <strong>on tekst mittetäielik üksus</strong> kahel põhjusel. Esimene ei puuduta ainult neid lingvistilisi objekte, mida me oleme tavapäraselt hakanud defineerima tekstina (vt 1.1), vaid igasugust sõnumit, kaasa arvatud isoleeritud laused ja terminid. <strong>Mingi väljend jääb puhta <em>flatus vocis</em> tasemele seni, kuni see mingi antud koodi suhtes ei korreleeru oma kokkuleppelise sisuga</strong>: selles mõttes on vastuvõtja alati <strong>postuleeritud operaator</strong>ina (mitte tingimata empiirilise operaatorina), kes on nii-öelda võimeline avama sõnaraamatu mis tahes ette tuleva sõna puhul ja võtma appi teatud rea varem teada olevaid süntaktilisi reegleid, et tuvastada lause kontekstis terminite vastastikused funktsioonid. Niisiis ütleme, et <strong>iga sõnum postuleerib vastuvõtja teatud grammatilist kompetentsust</strong> ka siis, kui sõnumi edastaja keel on ainult temale teada, välja arvatud muidugi glossolaalia juhtumid, mille puhul saatja eeldab, et lingvistiline interpretatsioon ei osutu võimalikuks, nii et äärmisel juhul on tegemist emotiivse ja sugestiivse ekstralingvistilise mõjutusega. (Eco 2005: 57)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Midagi kirjutades eeldame, et on olemas lugeja, kes on võimeline sellest aru saama: kelle jaoks meie kasutatud sõnad ei ole võõrad, vaid kes juba teavad või on võimelised (sõnastiku abil) neid teadma. Vastasel juhul, kui me kirjutame näiteks Velimir Hlebnikovi stiilis häälikuluulet, jääb tekst tähendusetuks (<em>flatus vocis</em> - kuuldavale toodud tähendusetud sõnad on nagu "paljas hingeõhk"; tõlkija annab joonealuses märkuses vasteks "häälevõnge").</p><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p57ja58"></a>Avada sõnaraamat tähendab ühtlasi aktsepteerida mingi hulk <strong><em>tähenduspostulaate</em></strong>: iseenesest on mingi termin ebatäielik ka siis, kui talle antakse väikese sõnaraamatu formaadis definitsioon. Sõnaraamat <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> ütleb, et brigantiin on laev ja laseb |laev| all muid semantilisi omadusi implitsiitselt mõista. Ühelt poolt tekib selline probleem <strong>interpretatsiooni lõpmatus</strong>est (mis osutus fundamentaalseks Peirce'i interpretantide teoorias), teiselt poolt juhib see meid edasi <strong>implitseerimise</strong> (<em>entailment</em>), aga samuti vajalike, olemuslike ja juhuslike omaduste temaatika juurde. (Eco 2005: 57-58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lähed järgi vaatama, mis on "brigantiin", siis pead järgi vaatama mis on "laev", siis pead järgi vaatama mis on "meri", siis pead järgi vaatama mis on "vesi", jne. Jäädki sissekannete ringirattasse lõksu.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p58"></a>Siiski eristub tekst teistest väljendustüüpidest oma suurema hõlmavuse tõttu. Ja tema hõlmavuse põhimotiiv on just nimelt see tõsiasi, et temasse on ka <em>mitte-öeldu</em> sisse kootud (vrd Ducrot 1972).<br />"Mitte-öeldu" tähistab seda, mis pealispinnal, väljenduse pinnal esile ei tule: aga <strong>just nimelt mitte-öeldu on see, mis aktualiseeritakse sisu aktualiseerimise tasandil</strong>. Ja seetõttu nõuab tekst, rohkem kui mistahes muu sõnum, lugeja aktiivset ja teadlikku kaastööd. (Eco 2005: 58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõlab nagu sõnatähenduse ja lauseülese tähenduse vastuolu. St tekst võib oma üksikutes osades öelda nii üht kui teist, aga tervikuna ütleb ta midagi hoopis kolmandat.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p59a"></a>Kõigepealt peab lugeja aktualiseerima oma entsüklopeedia, nii et ta võiks mõista, et verb |tagasi tulema| implitseerib mingil viisil, et subjekt on eelnevalt ära olnud (selle tegevuse analüüs kaasuste grammatika terminites võrdub sellega, et substantiividele antakse tähenduspostulaadid: <strong>see, kes tuleb tagasi, on ära olnud</strong>, nii nagu vanapoiss on mitteabielus meessoost isik). (Eco 2005: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mis on <em>komponentanalüüs</em>? (vt <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/tahenduseline.html#martinelli05p1443">Martinelli 2005: 144</a>)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p59b"></a>Teiseks seetõttu, et mida enam <strong>liigutakse õpetuslikkuselt esteetilise funktsiooni poole</strong>, seda enam peab tekstis jääma ruumi lugeja tõlgendusele, ehkki tekst harilikult tahab, et teda mõistetakse küllaltki selgepiiriliselt ja ühemõtteliselt. <strong>Tekst tahab, et keegi aitaks tal funktsioneerida</strong>. (Eco 2005: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Instruktiivne funktsioon (midagi konatiiv-referentsiaalset). Tekstil on oma tahe.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p59jm4"></a>Konversatsioonireeglite kohta viitame muidugi <strong>Grice'le (1967)</strong>. Aga tuletame vähemalt meelde Grice'i konversatsioonimaksiime. <em>Kvantiteedimaksiim</em>: tee nii, et sinu panus oleks täpselt sama informatiivne nagu teabevahetussituatsioon nõuab; <em>kvaliteedimaksiim</em>: ära ütle seda, mis sinu meelest ei vasta tõele ja ära ütle seda, mille kohta sul pole piisavalt tõendeid; <em>suhtemaksiim</em>: räägi asjast; <em>viisimaksiim</em>: väldi sogast väljendust, väldi kahemõttelisust, ole napp (väldi kasutut sõnaohtrust), räägi asjadest järjekorras. (Eco 2005: 59, jm 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eesti keeles ka nüüd tallele pandud (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/05/logic-and-conversation.html">Grice 1975</a>).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p60a"></a>See ilmselge tekstide eksisteerimise tingimus näib muuseas minevat vastuollu teise samavõrd ilmselge pragmaatikaseadusega, mis on kauasest varjuolekust hoolimata tänapäevastes kommunikatsiooniteooriates üldtuntud. Ning seda teist seadust võib formuleerida lihtsa loosungina: <strong><em>vastuvõtja kompetentsus pole tingimata võrdne saatja kompetentsusega</em></strong>. (Eco 2005: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See, mida käsitlesin oma käsitluses Jakobsoni krüptanalüütilisest mudelist.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p60b"></a>Nüüd me juba teame, et vastuvõtja koodid võivad täielikult või osaliselt saatja koodidest erineda ja et <strong>kood</strong> pole oma olemuselt üldsegi mitte lihtne, vaid <strong>sageli keerukas reeglite süsteeme hõlmav süsteem</strong> ja et lingvistilisest koodist ei piisa, et lingvistilist sõnumit mõista: |Suitsetate?|Ei| on lingvistiliselt dekodeeritav kui küsimus ja vastus vastuvõtja harjumuste kohta, aga teatud saatmistingimuste juures võib vastuse konnotatsiooniks olla "kasvatamatus" sellise koodi põhjal, millel pole mingit pistmist lingvistilise koodiga, küll aga hoopis käitumisetiketiga, sest oleks pidanud vastama |tänan, ei|. (Eco 2005: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Keel on süsteemide süsteem jne.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p60c"></a>Isikutevahelises kommunikatsiooniprotsessis tulevad arvesse muidugi kõikvõimalikud <strong>keelevälised tugivormid</strong> (žestid, konkreetne osutamine jne), samuti lõputu hulk võimalusi asju üle korrata ja saada tagasisidet, mis kõik üksteist vastastikku toetavad. See aga märgib, et meil pole kunagi tegemist puhtalt keelelise kommunikatsiooniga, vaid üldises mõttes semiootilise tegevusega, milles paljud eri märgisüsteemid üksteist täiendavad. (Eco 2005: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Tugivormid" kõlavad nagu "abivahendid". Nagu kargud või ratastool.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p64"></a>Või nagu ütlevad reklaamieksperdid - <strong>Nad valivad välja sihtmärgi</strong> [<em>target</em>] (ainult et selline "sihtmärk" koopereerib vaevaliselt: <strong>see pigem ootab, et temale pihta saadaks</strong>). Nad teevad kõik selleks, <strong>et iga termin, iga väljend, iga entsüklopeediline viide oleks juba ette nii valitud, et nende lugeja seda mõistaks</strong>. Nende sihiks on tekitada kindlat mõju; et ikkagi oleks kindel, et vallanduks hirmureaktsioon, ütlevad nad juba ette ära: "vaat nüüd hakkab juhtuma midagi hirmsat". Teatud tasandil võib see isegi õnnestuda. (Eco 2005: 64)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pani mõtlema, et kõige kindlam viis mitte saada ideoloogiliste ja kommertssõnumite sihtmärgiks on nende eest kõrvale puigelda nii palju kui vähegi võimalik, niiet kui mõni näibki tabavat märki, siis mõju on nullilähedane, sest sõnuminool on lihtsalt arusaamatu võõras objekt.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p65a"></a>Valéry moto - <em>il n'y a pas de vrai sens d'un texte</em> - võimaldab kahesugust lugemist: et mingit teksti võib tarvitada nii, nagu tahetakse, aga sellesuunaline lugemine ei paku siinkohal huvi; või et <strong>ühe teksti kohta võib esitada lõputul hulgal tõlgendusi</strong>, ja nimelt just sellise lugemisviisiga me hakkamegi järgnevalt tegelema. (Eco 2005: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kas ikka päris <em>lõputul</em> hulgal - tundub natuke kaheldav.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p65b"></a>Ta ütleb |lill|, ja ehkki ta teab (ja tahab), et sõnast leviks kõikide puuduvate lillede lõhna, teab ka päris kindlasti seda, et see ei saa olla aastaid säilitatud konjaki <em>bouquet</em>, niisiis ta laiendab ja kitsendab <strong>piiramatut semiosist</strong> nii, nagu ta soovib. (Eco 2005: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ma peaksin hakkama lõputu semioosi erinevaid vasteid kollektsioneerima.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p66"></a>Ja et seesuguse teise teksti (või Teise teksti) kirjutamisel juhtub nii, et esimene tekst satub kriitika alla või et kaevatakse välja peidetud <strong>tähendusväärtused</strong> - see on muidugi loomulik, sest mitte miski pole karikatuurist ilmutuslikum, sest see näib olevat, aga pole karikeeritud objekt, teisest küljest muutuvad mõned ümber jutustatud romaanid ilusamateks, sest nendest saavad "teised" romaanid. (Eco 2005: 66)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See on mingi Saussure'i mõiste?</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p70"></a>On selline arvamus, et kui keegi viitab mõnes diskussioonis või poliitikaalases artiklis NSV Liidu võimudele või kodanikele kui |venelastele|, aga mitte |nõukogude võimudele| või |nõukogude kodanikele|, siis ta soovib käivitada mingit eksplitsiitset ideoloogilist konnotatsiooni, otsekui keeldudes tunnustamast Nõukogude riigi poliitilist eksistentsi, mis sai alguse Oktoobrirevolutsioonist, mõeldes endiselt Tsaari-Venemaale. Mõnedes situatsioonides on emmal-kummal terminil vägagi diskrimineeriv iseloom. Siiski võib juhtuda, et mõni autor, kellel pole mitte mingeid <strong>antisovjetlikke kalduvusi</strong>, kasutab ikkagi terminit |venelane|, lähtudes kas ettevaatamatusest, harjumusest, mugavusest või käepärasusest, võttes tolle väga levinud tava lihtsalt omaks. (Eco 2005: 70)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nõukogude Liit ei teostanud mitte mingit venestamist. Kõik rahvused olid Nõukogude Liidus võrdsed. Kõik väited ja tõendid vastupidisest on rahvavaenulikud agitatsioonid.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="eco05p71"></a>Pole raske märgata, et siinkohas hakatakse juba määratlema tekstide sotsioloogiliste või psühhoanalüütiliste "tõlgenduste" statuuti ja tegemist on sellega, et <strong>üritatakse avastada seda, mida tekst, arvestamata autori kavatsusi, tegelikult tema isiksuse või sotsiaalse päritolu kohta</strong> või ka lugeja enda maailma kohta <strong>ütleb</strong>. (Eco 2005: 71)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Minu jaoks on see praegu "Sokratese kui Jeesuse surma" küsimus (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#searby89p16b">Searby 1989: 16</a>), st kas O.S. pidas Sokratest ja Jeesust inimsuse ideaalide kehastusteks, sest ta käis koolis, mille juht oli natuke nupust nikastanud. (Rääkimata asjaloo sügavamast ivast: kas nad päriselt samastasid Sokratest ja Jeesust või oli see pelgalt Searby kirjaviga?)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="lotman22"></a>Lotman, Juri 2022. Kultuurisemiootika ja teksti mõiste. <em>Mida inimesed õpivad</em>. Koostajad Silvi Salupere, Peeter Torop; toimetanud Silvi Salupere, Siiri Ombler. Tartu: Ilmamaa, 54-59. [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b5514613*est">ESTER</a></u>] {<a href="https://jurilotman.ee/lotmani-teosed/bibliograafiad/tervikbibliograafia/"><u>Л·621</u></a>}</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p54a"></a>Üheks tendentsiks on lähtemõistete täpsustamine ning nende loomisprotseduuride määratlemine. Püüd täpselt modelleerida viib metasemiootika kujunemisele: <strong>uurimisobjektiks</strong> ei ole enam tekstid kui niisugused, vaid <strong>tekstide mudelid</strong>, mudelite mudelid jne. (Lotman 2022: 54)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mudelid tekstide toimimisest (või nende ülesehitus- ja korrastusprintsiipidest).</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p54b"></a>Teiseks arengutendentsiks on tähelepanu keskendamine reaalse teksti semiootilisele funktsioneerimisele. Kui esimesel juhul on <strong>vastuolulisus ja teksti struktuuriline järjekindlusetus</strong>, erineva ehitusega tekstide ühtimine mingi kindla tekstikogumi piires ning mõitelise tähenduse määramatus juhuslikud ja "mittetöötavad" tunnused, mis jäävad kõrvale teksti modelleerimise metatasandil, siis teisel juhul <strong>osutuvad</strong> nad <strong>erilise tähelepanu objektiks</strong>. (Lotman 2022: 54)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kuidas tegelik tekst väldib täielikku seaduspärasust.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p54c"></a><strong>Kultuurisemiootika</strong> on valdkond, mis <strong>uurib</strong> erineva ehitusega semiootiliste süsteemide vastastikust toimet, <strong>semiootilise ruumis sisemist ebaühtlust</strong>, kultuurilise ja semiootilise polüglotismi paratamatust. (Lotman 2022: 54)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eritüübiliste märgisüsteemide teadus.</p><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p54ja55"></a>Kui teksti varasemates määratlustes rõhutati teksti ühtset signaalset loomust, ta funktsioonide lahutamatut ühtsust mingis kultuurikontekstis või teksti teisi omadusi, siis mõeldi selle all kas eksplitsiitselt või implitsiitselt, et tekst on väljendumine mingis <em>ühes</em> keeles. Esimene mõra <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> sellesse pealtnäha enesestmõistetavasse kujutlusse löödigi teksti mõiste käsitlemisel kultuurisemiootika aspektist. Nimelt avastati, et <strong>mingi teade, selleks et teda määratleda "tekstina", peab olema vähemalt kahekordselt kodeeritud</strong>. Nii näiteks erineb "<strong>seadus</strong>ena" defineeritav teade kriminaalse juhtumi kirjeldusest sellega, et ta <strong>kuulub samaaegselt loomulikku ja juriidilisse keelde</strong>, moodustades esimeses erinevate tähendustega märkide ahela, teises aga <strong>ühtse tähendusega keerulise märgi</strong>. Sedasama võib öelda ka "palve" tüüpi tekstide kohta. (Lotman 2022: 54-55)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Seadus" on diskreetsetest loomuliku keele märkidest koosnev sõnum, aga "seaduse" kui märgilise nähtusena on tegemist kontinuaalse märgiga, ühtse tervikuna.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p55"></a>Ootuspäraselt oli loomulikus keeles väljendumine (lausung) esmane, seejärel muutus ta ritualiseeritud vormeliks, mis oli omakorda kodeeritud mingi sekundaarse keele abil, ühesõnaga - lausung, väljendumine muutus tekstiks. <strong>Järgmine etapp seisneb mingite vormelite ühinemises sekundaarseks tekstiks</strong>. Erilise struktuurse tähenduse omandasid juhtumid, kus ühinesid printsipiaalselt erinevais keeltes tekstid, näiteks sõnaline vormel ja rituaalne žest. Selle tulemusena tekkinud <strong>sekundaarne tekst lülitas endasse ühel hierarhilisel tasandil asetsevad, kuid keelelt erinevad ning üksteisest sõltumatud alatekstid</strong>. (Lotman 2022: 55)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Sekundaarne tekst" võib moodustuda semiootiliselt eritüübilistest "lausungitest". Nt jutustus ja joonistused lasteraamatus.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p56a"></a>Järgmiseks heuristiliseks sammuks oli kunstiliste tekstide ilmumine. <strong>Paljuhäälne aines omandab lisaühtsuse, väljendudes nüüd antud kunsti keeles</strong>. Nii näiteks rituaali muutumisega balletiks kaasneb kõigi eri struktuuriga alatekstide tõlkimine tantsu keelde. Tantsu keele abil antakse edasi žestid, toimingud, sõnad ja karjed, ja ka tantsud ise, mis seejuures semiootiliselt "kahekordistuvad". <strong>Säilib paljustruktuursus, ent see on otsekui peidetud antud kunsti keeles vormistatud teate monostruktuursesse pakendisse</strong>. Eriti võib märgata seda romaani žanrispetsiifikas, mille pakend - loomulikus keeles teade - kätkeb erinevate semiootiliste maailmade erakordselt keerulist ja vastuolulist poleemikat. (Lotman 2022: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Juba kolmas tasand! 1. loomulik keel, milles topeltartikleeritus on grammaatiline; 2. "seadus", "palve", "rituaal" ja "kombetalitus", milles tekivad uued ühtsused ja neist ühinevad sekundaarsed tekstid; ja 3. kunstikeeled, mis omakorda võivad - eeldatavasti - ühildada mitut sekundaarset süsteemi.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p56b"></a>Teise tähtsa tegurina tuleb esile tõsta pinget integreerumise (<strong>konteksti muutumine tekstiks</strong>; moodustuvad niisugused tekstid nagu "lüüriline tsükkel", "<strong>kõik eluajal loodu kui üks teos</strong>" jms.) ja desintegreerumise (<strong>teksti muutumine kontekstiks</strong>; romaan "laguneb" novellideks, selle <strong>osad muutuvad iseseisvaiks esteetilisteks üksusteks</strong>) vahel. Selles protsessis ei pruugi lugeja ja autori positsioonid kattuda. (Lotman 2022: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paljude tekstide tervik (korpus) vs nt katkendi muutumine eraldiseisvaks tekstiks (nt kuulsad tsitaadid).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p57"></a><strong>Kunstiteos</strong>e loomine tähistab kvalitatiivselt uut etappi teksti struktuuri komplitseerumises. Paljukihiline ja semiootiliselt heterogeenne tekst, mis <strong>on võimeline keeruliselt suhestuma nii teda ümbritseva kultuurikonteksti kui ka lugeja või auditooriumiga</strong>, lakkab olemast adressandilt adressaadile suunatud elementaarne teade. Ilmutades võimet kondenseerida informatsiooni, <em>omandab tekst mälu</em>. Samal ajal toob ta nähtavale omaduse, mida Herakleitos on määratlenud kui "isekasvav logos". Struktuuri komplitseerumise <strong>selles staadiumis ilmnevad tekstil intellektuaalse seadeldise omadused: ta mtite ainult ei anna edasi temasse väljastpoolt pandud informatsiooni, vaid ka transformeerib teateid ning töötab välja uusi</strong>. (Lotman 2022: 57)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nn Lotmani kommunikatsioonimudel e toimingud, mida teostab kunstitekst kommunikatsiooni ("laiemas semiootilises tähenduses") seisukohast.</p><!--
4-6 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p57kuni59"></a>Neis tingimustes muutub teksti sotsiaal-kommunikatiivne funktsioon märgatavalt keerulisemaks. Seda on võimalik taandada järgmistele protsessidele:<ol><!--
--><li><strong>Adressandi ja adressaadi vaheline suhtlemine</strong>. Tekst täidab informatsiooni kandjalt auditooriumile suunatud <strong>teate funktsioon</strong>i.</li><!--
--><li><strong>Auditooriumi ja kultuuritraditsiooni vaheline suhtlemine</strong>. Tekst täidab <strong>kollektiivse kultuurimälu funktsioon</strong>i. Selles rollis ilmutab tekst ühelt poolt võimet pidevalt täieneda, teiselt poolt aga temasse salvestatud informatsiooni ühtseid aspekte aktualiseerida ja teisi aspekte ajutiselt või täielikult unustada. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span></li><!--
--><li><strong>Lugeja suhtlemine iseendaga</strong>. Tekst - ja see on eriti iseloomulik traditsioonilistele, vanadele tekstidele, mis paistavad silma kõrge kanoniseeritusega - <strong>aktualiseerib adressaadi enda isiksuse teatud külgi</strong>. Sellisel informatsiooni saaja suhtlemisel iseendaga esineb tekst meediumi rollis, aidates ümber kujundada lugeja isiksust, muuta tema struktuurilist eneseorientatsiooni ja sidemeid metakultuuriliste konstruktsioonidega.</li><!--
--><li><strong>Lugeja suhtlemine tekstiga</strong>. Ilmutades intellektuaalseid omadusi, lakkab hästi organiseeritud <strong>tekst</strong> olemast lihtsalt vahendaja kommunikatsiooniaktis. Ta <strong>muutub</strong> võrdväärseks ja kõrge autonoomsusastmega <strong>vestluskaaslaseks</strong>. Nii autori (adressandi) kui ka lugeja (adressaadi) suhtes võib ta esineda iseseisva intellektuaalse moodustisena, millel on aktiivne ja sõltumatu roll dialoogis. Sellelt seisukohalt kätkeb vana kujund "raamatuga kõnelema" väga sügavat mõtet.</li><!--
--><li><strong>Teksti ja kultuurikonteksti vaheline suhtlemine</strong>. Antud juhul ei esine tekst mitte kui kommunikatsiooniakti agent, vaid kui selle täieõiguslik osaline, kui informatsiooni allikas või saaja. Teksti suhted kultuurikontekstiga võivad olla kas metafoorilised (teksti tajutakse kogu konteksti asendajana, sest tekst on mingis suhtes ekvivalentne kontekstiga) või siis metonüümilised (tekst esindab konteksti nagu teatud osa tervikust). Et seejuures on kultuurikontekst ise keeruline ja heterogeenne ilming, sisi võib üks ja sama tekst erinevalt suhestuda konteksti eri tasandite struktuuridega. Lõpuks on tekstidel kui enam-vähem stabiilsetel ja piiritletud moodustistel <strong>kalduvus siirduda ühest kontekstist teise</strong>, nii nagu see tavaliselt juhtub suhteliselt pikaealiste kunstiteostega: asudes ümber teise kultuurikonteksti, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> käituvad nad kui uude kommunikatiivsesse situatsiooni asetatud informant ja <strong>aktualiseerivad</strong> niimoodi oma kodeeriva süsteemi <strong>varem varjatud aspektid</strong>. Seesugune olukorrale vastav "iseenda ümberkodeerimine" paljastab <strong>analoogia isiksuse märgilise käitumise</strong> ja teksti vahel. Niisiis, sarnastudes ühelt poolt kultuuri makrokosmosega, muutub tekst iseendastki tähenduslikumaks ja omandab kultuurimudeli jooni, teiselt poolt aga kaldub tekst käituma iseseisvalt, <strong>sarnastudes autonoomse isiksusega</strong>.</li><!--
--></ol>(Lotman 2022: 57-59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>1. Tekst on sõnum.</p><!--
--><p>2. Tekst on kultuurimälu. Lugeja suhtleb teksti vahendusel kultuuriga. Loed <em>Tõde ja Õigust</em> ja saad kohe aru, miks eestlased armastavad kraave kaevata vms.</p><!--
--><p>3. Autokommunikatsioon. Tekst mõjutab lugeja isiksust, aitab tal iseennast "ümber mõelda". Loed <em>Tõde ja Õigust</em> ja saad aru, et tegelikult oled sa kraavikaevaja, kelle rinnus pakitseb tühimik, mida täidab ainult kraavide kaevamine.</p><!--
--><p>4. Tekst kui isiksus, kellega saab suhelda. Näiteks korduval ülelugemisel avastad, et iga kord <em>räägib</em> sama tekst tegelikult natuke erinevat juttu, võib-olla isegi väga erinevat juttu. Ühtäkki pole tekst enam paigalseisvate mustade glüüfide jada, vaid muutlik ja võib-olla isegi tujukas olem, kes avaldab ühtedele lugejatele üht, teistele teist, ja mõne aja järel üle lugedes jälle kolmandat ja neljandat.</p><!--
--><p>5. Tekst on isiksus, kes muutub sõltuvalt keskkonnast. Ühes seltskonnas käitub ühte moodi, teises teistmoodi. Ajapikku vahetab seltskondi. Muutub üldse teisenäoliseks. Alguses kandis mantlit ja kaabut, aga mõndade jaoks võtab üleriided maha ja on hoopis keegi teine, võib-olla sootuks paljas seal all (liputaja). Või siis - mis on arusaadavatel põhjustel sage - pead teda esmakordsel kohtumisel ainulaadseks, omapäraseks isiksuseks ja siis tuleb välja, et tal on vennad ja suur suguvõsa, kes on kõik sama nägu ja tegu. Või siis vastupidi, alguses arvad, et mingi tema kiiks on kogu ta sõpruskonnale ühine, aga siis tuleb näiteks välja, et ta hängis selles seltskonnas juhuslikult tol hetkel ning tegelikult on pärit või kuulub kuskile mujale.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="lotman22p59"></a>Öeldu valguses ei paista <strong>tekst</strong> meile mitte kui teate realisatsioon mingis ühes keeles, vaid <strong>kui</strong> keeruline, mitmesuguseid koode sisaldav <strong>seadeldis</strong>, mis on võimeline transformeerima laekuvaid teateid ja tekitama uusi. Teksti võib pidada niisiis informatsiooni generaatoriks, millel on palju sarnast intellektuaalse isiksusega. Seoses sellega muutub kujutlus tarbija ja teksti vahekorrast. Vormelit "tarbija dešifreerib teksti" on võimalik väljendada täpsemalt: "tarbija suhtleb tekstiga". Tarbija astub tekstiga kontakti. <strong>Teksti dešifreerimisprotsess komplitseerub ülimalt, minetab oma ainukordsuse ja lõpetatuse, lähenedes niimoodi meile tuttavatele semiootilise suhtlemise aktidele inimese ja teise autonoomse isiksuse vahel</strong>. (Lotman 2022: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>1 kord läbi loetud tekst on nagu inimene, kellega oled ühe korra juttu ajanud. Just nagu on absurdne öelda inimeste kohta "ma olen nendega juba (ära) rääkinud" peaks olema pentsik öelda "ma olen selle teksti (läbi) lugenud", justkui ühekordse lugemisega oleks tekst ennast täielikult ammendanud.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kullsaluperejt18"></a>Kull, Kalevi; Lindström, Kati; Lotman, Mihhail; Magnus, Riin; Maimets, Kaire; Maran, Time; Moss, Rauno Thomas; Pärli, Ülle; Pärn, Katre; Randviir, Anti; Remm, Tiit; Salupere, Silvi; Sarapik, Virve; Sütiste, Elin; Torop, Peeter; Ventsel, Andreas; Verenitš, Vadim; Väli, Katre 2018. Kultuurisemiootika. — Salupere, Silvi; Kull, Kalevi (toim.), <em>Semiootika</em>. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 201-229. [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b4745979*est">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p201"></a>Üks põhjus, miks ühtset kultuuriteadust ei ole, on kultuuri enda mitmekesisus. Metodoloog Paul Feyerabend on kasutanud epistemoloogilise anarhismi mõistet tahistamaks <strong>valikute suvalisus</strong>t ja <strong>mittehierarhilisus</strong>t, st kultuuri uurimisel on kõik teadused ja kõik meetodid head ning meil ei ole põhjust üht teisest paremaks pidada. Seda pole ka võimalik teha, sest isegi kõige rangem teaduslik analüüs on <strong>vaid üks võimalus kultuurile läheneda, mis pealegi kuidagi ei välista teisi lähenemisviise</strong>. Seega sünnib ühe ja sama kultuuri uurimisel palju erinevaid käsitlusi ja kuvandeid sellset kultuurist ning kultuuri analüüs muutub paradoksaalselt kultuuri enda osaks. Kultuur sisaldab ka eneseanalüüsi võimalusi. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 201)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>According to the most extreme view that has been read into Feyerabend's later writings, science has no special features that render it intrinsically superior to other kinds of knowledge such as ancient myths or voodoo</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2021/03/what-is-this-thing-called-science.html#chalmers99pxxijaxxii">Chalmers 1999: xxi</a>). Endal seostub juba mitmes loengus nähtud kooki, mida saab igatpidi tükkideks lõigata ja kõigile jätkub, st kui lingvistiline antropoloogia tõlgendab asju ühte moodi siis see ei tühista antropoloogilise lingvistika tõlgendust samadest asjadest.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p202"></a>Kuid <strong>kultuuriteadustes eksisteerib ka seisukoht, mis välistab võimaluse mõista kultuuri ainult ühe distsipliini raames</strong>. Põhjuseks tuuakse kultuuri kiire ja vahel plahvatuslik areng. Teaduse arengut peetakse aeglasemaks kultuuri arengust ja <strong>kultuuri analüüsitavuse suurendamise huvides õigustatakse kõigi võimalike uurimisvahendite ja -meetodite kasutamist</strong> nende distsiplinaarsest päritolust hoolimata. Seda nimetatakse <strong>distsiplinaarseks</strong> või segameetoditel põhinevaks <strong>uurimistööks</strong> ja selle üks esimesi juurutajaid oli kultuuriuuringute (<em>cultural studies</em>) suund. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 202)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ilma distsipliinita. Ongi anarhia.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p202"></a><em>Strukturaalne tasand</em> võimaldab kõike kultuuris toimuvat vaadelda <strong>ühiskonna struktuurist, mingi sotsiaalse klassi hegemooniast</strong> või valitsevast ideoloogiast lähtuvalt. <em>Kulturaalne tasand</em> võimaldab <strong>kõiges näha kultuurilist kordumatust</strong> ja mõtestada kõike ühiskonda puutuvat kultuurina. Sel tasandil tehakse tekstide süvaanalüüse kõige erinevamaid (semiootilisi, postkolonialistlikke, feministlikke jms) meetodeid kasutades. <em>Retseptiivne tasand</em> võimaldab aga kõike uurida tajuprotsessidena, sest <strong>kultuuri tegeliku funktsioneerimise määrab vastuvõtja</strong>. Kunstiteose olemine kultuuris sõltub ühelt poolt selle vaadatavusest-loetavusest-kuulatavusest (auditooriumianalüüsid ja küsitlused) ning teiselt poolt levimisest (tiraažid, kassaedu, esitusviis). (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 202)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Klassivõitlus, ebavõrdsus ja meediamajandus.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p204"></a>Umbes samasse aega kuulub Ernst Cassireri inimese ja kultuuri käsitlus. "Uurimuses inimesest" (1944) kirjutas ta (Cassirer 1999: 106): "Inimese kõige tähelepanuväärsem omadus, tema eristav tunnus ei ole ei metafüüsiline ega füüsiline - see omadus ja tunnus seisneb hoopis tema tegevuses. <strong>Just toimimine, inimtegevuse süsteem defineerib ja määratleb "inimeseksolemise" piirid</strong>. Keel, müüt, religioon, kunst, teadus ja ajalugu on selle <strong>inimlikkuseringi osised, erinevad sektorid</strong>." Seda lähenemist nimetas Cassirer ise inimese funktsionaalseks mõistmiseks. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 204)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Cassirer, Ernst 1999. <em>Uurimus inimesest: sissejuhatus inimkultuuri filosoofiasse</em>. Tartu: Ilmamaa.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1323004*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5-6 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p205ja206"></a>Tartu-Moskva koolkonna üks asutajaliikmeid Vjatšeslav Ivanov toimetas 1966. aastal trükki kogumiku "<strong>Keelte struktuurne tüpoloogia</strong>", mille avab tema enda ja Vladimir Toporovi ühine artikkel "Teksti rekonstrueerimise ja märgisüsteemi rekonstrueerimise ülesande <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> püstitamine", kus autorid sisuliselt formuleerivad <strong>kultuuritüpoloogia esmased põhimõtted</strong>. Nagu keeleteadlased toetuvad semantilistele universaalidele, nii peavad seda tegema ka modelleerivate süsteemide uurijad. Kuid peale keelefaktide võtavad nad arvesse ka arheoloogilisi andmeid jms. Just tüpoloogilise kõrvutamise kaudu on võimalik jõuda nii teadete kui ka sotsiaalse tausta rekonstrueerimiseni. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 205-206)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Структурная типология языков</em> (Uspenski toim. 1965) [<u><a href="https://imwerden.de/pdf/uspensky_strukturnaya_tipologiya_yazykov_1965__ocr.pdf">PDF siin</a></u>]</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p206"></a>Ja täpsustab (Barthes 2002a: 21): "Igasuguse strukturalistliku tegevuse eesmärk, olgu see tegevus refleksiivne või poeetiline, on taastada üks teatud "objekt" nii, et selle taastetöö tulemusena ilmneksid <strong>objekti funktsioneerimise reeglid ("funktsioonid")</strong>." (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 206)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Funktsioonid on funktsioneerimise reeglid. Õhk on õhuline aine.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p209"></a>Oma kogumiku "Artiklid kultuuritüpoloogiast 2" eessõnas esitab Lotman arusaama <strong>ühest võimalikust universaalist</strong>, millest saab lähtuda kultuuri tüpologiseerimine. Selleks on <strong>iga kultuuri vajadus enesekirjelduse järele</strong>: "See vajadus realiseerub metakultuurilisel tasandil enesekirjelduslike tekstide loomises, mida võib pidada grammatikateks, mida kultuur iseeenda kirjeldamiseks loob" (Lotman 1973: 5). Sellest lähtuvalt saame mõista ühelt poolt Lotmani edasist liikumist kultuuri enesemudelite kirjeldamise suunas, teiselt poolt aga tema huvi kunstiloome kultuuriliste süvamehhanismide vastu. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 209)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Iga kultuur omab ettekujutust iseendast. A la Eesti kultuur kui kraavikaevajate ja naabrite ülelaskjate kultuur.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p210a"></a>Jakobsoni (1985c: 120) arutluseb algavad lapse keelelise arengu metakeelelistest aspektidest: "Metakeel on igasuguse verbaalse arengu hädavajalik faktor. Ühe keelemärgi interpreteerimine teise, mõnes mõttes homogeense, sama keele märgi kaudu on metakeeleline operatsioon, millel on lapse keeleõppes oluline roll." Kuid <strong>lapse areng on võrreldav kogu kultuuri arenguga</strong>. Kultuuri arengule on tähtis, et selle kultuuri loomulik keel rahuldaks kõik võõraste ja uute nähtuste kirjeldamise vajadused ja tagaks sellega mitte üksnes kultuuri dialoogivõime, vaid ka selle loovuse ning ühtsuse - kultuuriidentiteedi. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Päris julge ja ma ütleksin, et isegi uudne väide. Selle tagajärjed osutaksid kultuuri funktsionaalsele arengule: ühtmatustest saavad tervitused, häälitsemisest saab laulmine, asjadele hakatakse andma nimesid, ühtäkki osatakse nimetada oma hingeseisundeid, anda teistele käske ja arutleda keele üle. (Jumal teab mitusada tuhat või miljonit aastat kokku võetud ühes lauses.)</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p210b"></a>Jakobsoni integratiivse kommunikatsiooniteaduse ideest kasvab kultuurisemiootika jaoks välja arusaam, et kultuur tervikuna ja iga tema osa on põhimõtteliselt paljukeelsed (mitmeid märgisüsteeme ühendavad). Osa inimesi valdab vaid <strong>paari keelt</strong> (näiteks suulist suhtlemiskeelt ja kehakeelt), osa on <strong>paljukeelsemad</strong> (osates kirjakeelt, kasutades meediatarbimise oskusi ajalehti või ajakirju lugedes või veebist teavet otsides) ning osa on ka tõelised <strong>kultuurilised polüglotid</strong> (mõistes maalikunsti, sümfoonilise muusika või teaduse keelt jne). (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Natuke nagu loomuliku keele, rituaali ja balleti näitlikud tasandid ülal Lotmani artiklis.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p210c"></a>Kultuurisemiootilise analüüsi ühe telje moodustab püüdlemine tervikkäsitluse loomisele kultuurist objekt- ja metatasandit integreerides ning kommunikatsiooniprotsessides ka autokommunikatiivseid aspekte tuvastades. Siia kuulub ka arusaam, et semiootiline paljukeelsus hõlmab kommunikatsiooniprotsessi kõiki etappe, sest juba <strong>inimese sisekõne eeldab ümberlülitusi visuaalselt koodilt verbaalsele ja tagasi</strong>. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mõtleme ettekujutustes (ideedes), räägime sõnades.</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p210ja211"></a>Kultuurisemiootik on teadlane, kes võib ühte konkreetset uurimisobjekti, näiteks filmi kultuuris, analüüsida kui tervikut, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> osade süsteemi ja osa suuremast tervikust. Filmina on tema piirideks esimene ja viimane kaader. Osade süsteemina ühendab film loomulikku keelt, muusikat, valgust, rakursse, plaane ja montaaži kui märgisüsteeme, mis loovad filmikeele. <strong>Osana suuremast tervikust kuulub film kultuuri läbi oma seoste teiste sama ajastu filmidega</strong> või osana enda turundusprotsessist, mis hõlmab treilereid, plakateid, DVD kujundust, filmi kodulehte jne, st kõike seda, mis moodustab filmi enesekirjelduse või eneseesitluse kultuuris. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 210-211)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kultuurisemiootik peaks näiteks romaani analüüsides olema võimeline zoomima sisse teose enda struktuuri ja võtetesse ning teisalt ka zoomima välja, et näidata teose kohta suuremas pildis ja selle seoseid talle eelnenud ning järgnenud kultuuritraditsiooniga. St hõlmama korraga kunstiteose nö molekulaartasandit kui ka teda ümbritseva galaktika dünaamikat.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p211"></a>Autokommunikatiivsusega kaasneb veel teinegi kultuuri olemuslik tunnus - <strong>samade sõnumite</strong> kordamine, nende <strong>tõlkimine ühest kultuurikeelest teise</strong> (näiteks kirjandusteoste ekraniseerimisel või retsensiooni kirjutamisel samast teosest). Kordamisel põhineb ka kultuurimälu ja igas kultuuris on näiteks rahvaluulel oluline mnemotehniline funktsioon. Tänapäeva kultuur on kirjeldatav samade sõnumite varieerumisena erinevates kirjelduskeeltes. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 211)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See vaade on juba omaks võtnud või eeldanud, et kultuur on isiksus. Tüüpiliselt räägitakse kultuurilisest autokommunikatsioonist seoses kultuuri enesekirjeldusega - kultuur suhtleb iseendaga iseenda kohta. Siin aga on midagi muud: igasugune kultuuritoodang on justkui "kultuur mõtlemas millestki", ja nt kirjandusteoste ekraniseerimise puhul on tegu "sisekõnega", mis muudab ettekujutused (visuaalse) väljaöelduks (verbaalseks) ja tagasi. St mitte, et kultuuri enesevaagimine on kultuuri autokommunikatsioon, vaid <em>kõik</em> mida kultuur teeb on mingist vaatekohast autokommunikatsioon, sest kultuuri kogu tegevus on kommunikatiivne (ja väljaspool semiosfääri pole <em>kedagi teist</em>?).</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p212"></a>Kultuurisemiootika saigi alguse arusaamast, et kultuur on semiootilises mõttes paljukeelne süsteem, milles kõrvuti loomulike keeltega eksisteerivad neil põhinevad <strong>sekundaarsed modelleerivad süsteemid (mütoloogia, ideoloogia, eetika)</strong> või <strong>süsteemid, mille mõistmisel või kirjeldamisel kasutatakse loomulikku keelt (muusika, ballett)</strong> või keeleanaloogiat (teatri keel, filmi keel). (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Siin on päris oluline see <em>või</em>: sekundaarsed modelleerivad süsteemid põhinevad loomulikul keelel <em>või</em> on loomuliku keele abil kirjeldatavad. Lotmani tekstist (ülal) jäi aga mulje, et kolmas (kunsti oma) on omaette tasand, mis põhineb omakorda teisel. St sekundaarsed modelleerivad süsteemid (SMS) = loomulik keel (LK) + heterogeensus/ümberkorrastus/topeltartikulatsioon (see, mis eristab lihtlauset seadusparagrahvist); kolmas - kunst - oleks omakorda SMS + heterogeensus/ümberkorrastus/topeltartiklatsioon (ma tõepoolest ei tea praegu kuidas seda nimetada). St ballett ei ole mitte ainult keeleliselt kirjeldatav, vaid põhineb tantsukunsti traditsioonil, mida on keele vahendusel õpetatud, näiteks. Keegi kuskil kunagi kasutas sõnu, et anda rätsepale juhised, millest sündisid balletikingad. </p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p214"></a>Keele mõiste metaforiseerumise üks näide on kultuurikeele samastamine märgisüsteemiga (ka "Kultuurisemiootika teesides" on need kasutusel sünonüümselt). Loomulik keel on märgisüsteem ja samuti erinevate kunstide keeled. Loomulik keel on meile süsteemina antud, kunstide keelte puhul on süsteem ise raskemini hoomatav kui keeles ja tuleb kõige enam esile kunstiteoste tervikanalüüsis. <strong>Kui loomulikku keelt saab õppida sõnaraamatu abiga, siis kunstide keeli pigem tekstianalüüside kaudu</strong>. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kehakeele sõnastikku ei eksisteeri (ja kui eksisteeriks, kirjutas Birdwhistell, siis ilmneks, et kõik "räägivad" seda vigaselt).</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p214"></a>Erinevate märgisüsteemide koosolu ja põimumine kultuuris ning nende toimimine vahenduskeeltena taanduvad kultuurisemiootikas kahele algkeelele, milleks Lotman nimetas loomulikku keelt ja <strong>ruumi struktuurse mudeli keelt</strong>. Viimane on kontinuaalsuse alus ja tähistab kommunikatsioonikeskkonna olulisust ruumina alates tekstiruumist, pildiruumist kuni mentaalse ehk kujutletava ruumini välja. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 214)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paneb mõtlema semiosfäärist ja selle ruumilisusest, mis ei ole abstraktne vaid tegelik (?). Praegu ei oska veel sellest ruumilisusest midagi täpselt arvata. Topoloogia, neh.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p215a"></a>Eesti kirjaniku romaani (näiteks Mati Undi "Sügisballi") võib lugeda (1) <strong>eestikeelse tekstina</strong>, millest arusaamine on jõukohane igale eesti keelt oskavale inimesele; (2) <strong>linnaromaanina</strong>, milles kajastuvad nii linnastumise ja suurlinnade uute elamurajoonide tekkimisega seotud sotsiaalsed ja psühholoogilised probleemid kui ka selle teema käsitlemised eesti kirjanduses; (3) <strong>kunstitekstina</strong>, mis sunnib lugejat vaatama endasse ja analüüsima oma armastuse, üksinduse ja sotsiaalse staatuse probleeme; 4) <strong>konkreetse kirjaniku romaanina</strong>, mille keelekasutuses, teksti ülesehituses ja jutustamise viisis väljendub autori eripära ja tema kujutatavasse tegelikkusesse suhtumine; 5) <strong>kultuuritekstina</strong>, mis pakub teavet eestlaste linnaelust nõukogude perioodil. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jääb tugev mulje, et need aspektid põhinevad mingist vinklist Lotmani kommunikatsioonimudeli (ülal) põhjal. Siin on konkreetne näitlukustamine ilma erilise dünaamikata, aga olemuselt väga kasulik illustratsioon, kuidas toda skeemi võib kasutada. Võib-olla peakski üritama oma magistritöös ühe väikese osana sellele ehitada käsitlus O.S. romaanist, millel on oluliselt rohkem kultuurilist konteksti ja dünaamikat kui "Sügisballil" (st saaks analüüsis natuke kõrgemalt lennata kui selle näite põhjal on võimalik — O.S. romaan on juba pelgalt <em>teatena</em> huvitav ja problemaatiline viisil, mida valdav enamus romaane ei ole).</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p215b"></a>Kirjandus kasutab keelt oma materjalina ja loomulik keel on aluseks kirjanduse keelele. Prantsuse keelt osates võiksime mõista kõiki selles keeles kirjutatud tekste, kuid <strong>ometi on prantsuse kirjanduses teoseid, mille mõistmine eeldab ühelt poolt stiili ja žanri, teiselt poolt autori maailmavaate ja eluloo tundmist. See tähendab, et keele mõistmisest ei piisa alati kirjandusteose mõistmiseks</strong>. Selle järgi tuleb kirjandust analüüsides eristada keele struktuuri ja teksti struktuuri. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lotman andis (ülal) robustsema näite: seadus. Loomulikus keeles teade, jah, aga pelgalt eesti keele oskamisest ei piisa, et kasvõi vabariigi põhiseadust lugeda ja täielikult mõista (selleks on vaja juriidist haridust, aga enne seda veel arusaama seadustest kui nähtusest; nt indiaanlane ei saa aru, kuidas paberi peale määritud märgid saavad tähendada, et <em>maa kuulub kellelegi</em>).</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p216"></a>Juri Lotmani arvates peaks tekstianalüüs põhinema dialoogil, ta eristas viit erinevat põhimõttelist suhtlemisvormi saatja ja vastuvõtja vahel (Lotman 1990d: 276-277):<ol><!--
--><li>adressandi ja adressaadi vaheline shutlemine: <strong>tekst = teade</strong>;</li><!--
--><li>auditooriumi ja kultuuritraditsiooni vaheline suhtlemine: <strong>tekst = kollektiivne kultuurimälu</strong>;</li><!--
--><li>lugeja suhtlemine iseendaga: <strong>tekst = meedium</strong>;</li><!--
--><li>lugeja suhtlemine tekstiga: <strong>tekst = partner</strong>;</li><!--
--><li>teksti ja kultuurikonteksti vaheline suhtlemine: <strong>tekst = infoallikas</strong>.</li><!--
--></ol>Sisuliselt tähendavad need viis suhtlemisviisi teksti ja vastuvõtja vahel mitte üksnes viit dominanti, vaid ka <strong>viiest tasandist koosnev</strong>at <strong>hierarhia</strong>t, sest vastuvõtja võib läbida kõik viis tasandit. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 216)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väga kena kokkuvõte. Siin võib jälle kobiseda ainult dünaamika puudumise üle. Näiteks tekst kui "infoallikas". Tekst seisab paigal ja peegeldab oma loomishetke kultuurimiljööd, igavesti, nagu metafoorne foto või maal seinal. Mulle aga näib, et Lotman peab silmas just seda, et see on pigem nagu (jällegi metafoorselt) auk seinas, mida me nimetame aknaks. (See metafoor ei toimi hästi, sest aken on läbipaistev, aga tekst ei ole tühi.) Sõnasõnaliselt on küll öeldud, et tekst on "<u>informatsiooni allikas</u>", aga edasi läheb arutluseks teksti ja konteksti omavahelisest seosest ning, et tekstil on "<u>kalduvus siirduda ühest kontekstist teise</u>". Jutt käib konkreetselt tõlkest, sisenemisest "<u>uude kommunikatiivsesse situatsiooni</u>". Nüüd taipan, et 5. punktiga peab ta silmas seda, et tekst elab iseseisvat elu läbi tõlgete (eriti nt Piibel või Gilgameš, mis on aastatuhandeid ringi rännanud, muutunud ja lugematuid järglasi soetanud). Millalgi tuleb läbi mõelda ja katsuda, mida teksti metafoorilised ja metonüümilised suhted kontekstiga endast täpselt kujutavad (võib aimata, et sel on midagi pistmist peeglikildudega semiosfääri artiklis).</p><!--
16-17 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p216ja217"></a>Teisalt võib tekst olla lingvistiliselt konkreetne keeletekst või kultuuriliselt konkreetne kultuuritekst: "Määratledes kultuuri teatud sekundaarse keelena, toome sisse mõiste <strong>"kultuuritekst", s.o. tekst antud sekundaarses keeles</strong>. Kuna see või teine loomulik keel sisaldub kultuuri keeles, kerkib küsimus loomuliku keele teksti ja kultuuri sõnalise teksti suhestatusest." Suhestatusel on <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kolm alaliiki (Lotman jt 2013: 113): (1) loomuliku keele tekst ei ole antud kultuuri tekstiks (näiteks suulised tekstid kirjasõnalises kultuuris); (2) <strong>sekundaarses keeles tekst ehk kultuuritekst on ühtlasi keeletekst, tekst loomulikus keeles</strong> (näiteks on luuletus korraga sekundaarselt luulekeeleline ja primaarselt luuletaja emakeelne tekst); (3) kultuuri sõnaline tekst ei ole tekst loomulikus keeles (näiteks ladinakeelne palve slaavlaste jaoks). (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 216-217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ausalt öeldes ei saa ikka veel selget sotti, mida võib ja mida mitte nimetada "kultuuritekstiks". Kas mõnes sekundaarses modelleerivas süsteemis konstrueeritud tekst on juba kultuuritekst pelgalt selle tõttu, et ta on sekundaarses modelleerivas süsteemis konstrueeritud tekst?</p><!--
18 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p218"></a>Metatekstide kui tekstilise terviku kaudu on võimalik analüüsida selle prototeksti eksisteerimist kultuuris. Samuti on selle abil võimalik rekonstrueerida puuduvaid prototekste, nagu näiteks muinasjututüüpide hüpoteetilisi algvorme (hilisemate variantide invariandina). Vanade salvestamata teatrietenduste rekonstrueerimine teatriloos on hea näide metatekstide vajalikkusest puuduva prototeksti kirjeldamisel. <strong>Samuti on metatekstide ja prototekstide vaheliste suhete kaudu on võimalik rääkida selle teksti suhtlemisvõimest kultuuriga, auditooriumiga, tema mõtestamise-mõistmise võimalikust maailmast</strong>. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 218)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lisandus viiendale. Tõlke kaudu ühest kultuurist teise sisenev tekst muutub ja toimib informatsiooniallikana oma allikkultuuri kohta, aga sihtkultuuris ootab teda vastuvõtt uute metatekstide näol.</p><!--
19 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p219"></a>Inimkultuur moodustab globaalse semiosfääri, kuid selles globaalses süsteemis on põimunud eri aegade (semiosfääri diakroonia) ja eri tasandite (semiosfääri sünkroonia) semiosfäärid. Iga semiosfääri võib analüüsida kui tervikut. <strong>Semiosfääri semiootikas</strong> järgitakse metodoloogilist põhimõtet, mille kohaselt iga kultuuris analüüsitav tervik on ühtlasi osa suuremast tervikust. Samas koosneb analüüsitav tervik osadest, millest igaüks moodustab terviku, mis omakorda koosneb osadest jne. Tegemist on lõputu osa ja terviku dialoogiga ning tervikumõõtme dünaamikaga. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 219)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Justkui eraldiseisev uurimisvaldkond.</p><!--
20 --><blockquote><a id="kullsaluperejt18p220"></a>Arvutimäng, koomiks või film sama teksti ainetel on osa selle teksti mentaalsest tervikust kultuuris ja analüütik ei saa seda asjaolu ignoreerida. Teiselt poolt on kõik kultuuris tekkinud metatekstid mingi teksti kultuuri tõlkimise ja kultuuris teadvustamise protsess. <strong>See protsess on kultuuri kui terviku seisukohalt autokommunikatiivne</strong>, sest kultuur otsib mingi nähtuse seletamiseks iseendale sobivaid kirjelduskeeli. Autokommunikatiivsena on kultuuril tendents informatsiooni hulka endas kasvatada, selle kvaliteeti tõsta ja selle abil iseennast muuta. (Kull, Salupere jt 2018: 220)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Metatasandi kirjelduskeel on ikkagi asjaga seotud. Nt virtuaalreaalsuste diskursus on kultuuri autokommunikatiivne üritus "panna sõrm peale" uuele meediale ja seda enda jaoks lahti mõtestada (mis see siis on? kuidas see seostub ülejäänud kultuuritoodanguga, jne).</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-73546244540203181012023-09-19T12:00:00.001-07:002023-09-19T12:00:27.924-07:00Kõrgelt Koodistunud<!-- Kõrgelt Koodistunud
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><li><a href="#niitra06">Niitra 2006. Tegelaste nimed laste- ja aabitsakirjanduses lapse kognitiivset arengut toetavate elementidena</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#moss06">Moss 2006. Varakristlike eremiitide praktiline semiootika (Pontose Euagriose askeetiline demonoloogia)</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#p2rn06">Pärn 2006. Semioloogilisest kinokeeleteooriast</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="niitra06"></a>Niitra, Mari 2006. Tegelaste nimed laste- ja aabitsakirjanduses lapse kognitiivset arengut toetavate elementidena. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 127-137.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p127"></a><strong>Nii sotsialiseerumist kui maailmapildi avardumist</strong> on vaadeldud läbi materjalis esinevate pärisnimede, analüüsitud on lastekirjanduses esinevate loomtegelaste nimesid. (Niitra 2006: 127)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Natuke kummaline fookus. Hoobilt küll ei oskaks öelda kuidas loomanimed lasteraamatutes peaksid <em>sotsialiserumist avardama</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p128"></a>Seega jätkub sõnade tähendusväljade kujunemine veel pikka aega peale seda, kui esimesed sõnad lapse kõnesse ilmuvad (Wertsch 1985: 99). See tähendab, et keele sümbolilisuse mõistmine kujuneb välja pikaajalise protsessi vältel ja <strong>sõnast saab lapse teadvuses mõiste alles pärast mitme olulise vaheetapi läbimist</strong>. Lastel kujunevad suhteliselt varakult välja abstraktsete mõistete funktsionaalsed vasted, kuid need erinevad oma struktuurilt ja opereerimisviisilt täiskasvanute kasutatavaist mõistetest. (Niitra 2006: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lapsekeel on täiskasvanute keelest erinev.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p129"></a>Esmalt, tinglikult määratledes 2 aasta vanuses, teeb laps avastuse, et igal asjal on nimi (Vygotsky 1973: 43). Avastus väljendub aktiivses uudishimus sõnade vastu ja sellest tulenevas sõnavara kiires kasvus. Sellega on laps avastanud sõnade tähistava funktsiooni, ent esialgu on sõna pikka aega lapse jaoks pigem mingi asja omadus, mitte selle märk. <strong>Selles faasis käituvad sõnad pärisnimedena, s.t laps ei suuda sõna ja denotaati teineteisest lahutada</strong>. Siinkohal võib tuua paralleele B. Russelli käsitlusega objektsõnadest, mille tähendus omandatakse kokkupuutel tähistatava objektiga ning mille esmaseim kasutus on osutav (Russell 1995: 23). (Niitra 2006: 129)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mütoloogiline mõtlemine - koera <em>nimi</em> on Koer.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p130"></a>Väikelaste raamatuis on tegelasteks erinevaid liike esindavad isendid, kes esinevad enamasti ühekaupa; <strong>sagedased tegelased on üks ja arhetüüpne Karu, Hunt, Rebane, Jänes jne</strong>. Iga tegelasega kaasneb hulk omadusi, näiteks karu suurus, aeglus, magusalembus; <strong>rebase kavalus ja mesikeelsus</strong> jne. Rõhutatakse kas omaduste kimpu või tuuakse välja üks neist. Väikelapsel, kes on ales õppinud sõnu kõnes kasutama, pole veel arusaama üldmõisteist tekkinud. Seega on üldnimel nagu nt "karu" sellistes tekstides eeskätt identifitseeriv funktsioon. <strong>Lotman ja Uspenski</strong>, kes <strong>on juhtinud tähelepanu lapse teadvuse mütoloogilisele olemusele</strong>, rõhutavad mütoloogilise ruumi(kogemuse) tunnusena tema piiritletavust ja loendatavust; mütoloogiline ruum pole mitte erinevate tunnuste abil kirjeldatav kontiinum, vaid pärisnimesid kandvate üksikobjektide kogum (Lotman ja Uspenski 1999: 195-196). (Niitra 2006: 130)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kus pärisnimedepõhise mõtlemise suitsu, seal Lotmani ja Uspenski kuulsa artikli tuld.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p131ja132"></a>Algriimilised nimed hõlbustavad klassifitseerimist ning nagu selgub, on algriimilised loomanimed vaadeldavais lasteraamatuis ülekaalukalt populaarseimad: nt Jänku-Juta, Hirve-Hilla, Rebase-Rein (H. Mänd, "Mõmmilood" - Mändu 1999). Siin on tegemist kombinatsiooniga üld- ja pärisnimest, mis on klassifitseerimist hõlbustavaks vaheastmeks mõistete kujunemisel. Samuti loetakse lasteraamatuid <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> sageli valjusti ette ning <strong>häälikute kokkukõla pääseb siin eriliselt mõjule</strong>. Oluline on ka märkida, et väikelapsed seletavad sõnade tähendusi sageli <strong>alliteratsioon</strong>i kaudu (Bertills 2003: 161-162). (Niitra 2006: 131-132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lasteraamatutegelaste nimede poeetiline funktsioon.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p132"></a>Iga tähte õpetatakse mingi looma läbi, kusjuures looma pärisnimi algab sama tähega (nt dogi Doora, madu Muia, ööbik Örru). Kasutatakse lastejuttudest tuntud stereotüüpe: eesel on rumalavõitu, põrsas räpakas ja kommeteta, <strong>vares valelik</strong>. (Niitra 2006: 132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vares peaks olema <em>varas</em>, sest nad armastavad läikivaid asju pihta panna. Seda, et nad sealjuures valelikku juttu ajaksid, pole ise kohanud. Eduard Vilde varesed ajasid mäletamist mööda täitsa asjalikku juttu.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p133jm2"></a>Antud nime puhul on tegemist oksüümoroniga, kuna <strong>vähelevinud sõna "rait" tähistab hiiglasuurt asja</strong> ("Eesti keele sõnaraamat", Tallinn, Eesti Keele Sihtasutus 2003), kõnealust raamatutegelast on kujutatud aga tibatillukese pöialpoisina, kes elutseb suure kuuse okstes. Oksüümoronile viitab ka raamatu pealkiri "Väike hiiglane". (Niitra 2006: 133, jm 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://www.eki.ee/dict/ekss/index.cgi?Q=rait&F=M">rait</a> <raidu 21 või raida 23> - hiiglasuur asi; suur pikk hoone. <em>*Kui kallis on aga see suur rait, tusase näoga ahi talveajal</em> .. E. Vilde. <em>*Võta kas või seesama maja, mille eluhoone, rehetuba, põhukuur ja laut – kõik üks rait.</em> H. Sergo.</u>" - Täiesti tundmatu sõna, ka liitsõnades "<u>hoone|rait, majarait</u>".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p134"></a><strong>A. Kivirähki loos "Kaelkirjak"</strong> (Kivirähk 1995) <strong>kannab tüdruku kõhus elav paeluss rõhutatult tavalist nime Tõnis</strong>. Nimi on antud juhul olukorra pentsikusega iroonilises nihkes ja nime tõlgendamine põhjustab koguni perekonnadraama: Kai vanemad peavad Tõnist nime järgi mõneks poisiks ning kahtlustavad, et too tungis salaja nende aeda marju sööma. (Niitra 2006: 134)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Tõnis aitab sul kaalust alla võtta</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p135"></a>Lastekirjanduse eripäraks on, et reeglina kirjutavad raamatuid täiskasvanud, mitte lapsed ise. Sellest tulenevalt võib lastekirjandust iseloomustada kui ambivalentseid tekste, milles on korraga esindatud nii laste kui täiskasvanute kood. Ühest küljest on tegemist autori enda kogemuste sissekirjutamisega, <strong>teisalt aga loevad täiskasvanud lastele raamatuid sageli ette ning sestap on osa tekstist (vaikimisi) neile adresseeritud</strong> (Nikolajeva 1996: 57). Sageli avaldub pöördumine täiskasvanust adressaadi poole näiteks intertekstuaalsete viitamiste kaudu teistele kirjandusteostele või kirjandusvälisele kontekstile, mida nopib tekstist sageli välja vaid täiskasvanu. (Niitra 2006: 135)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Täitsa kena näide sellest, kuidas interkommunikatsiooni seguneb autokommunikatsioon.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="niitra06p136"></a>"Ja õe nimi on Lutsille <strong>Internetta</strong> Kärolyn..." (samas: 42). Arvestades tänase Eesti nimepraktikaid, näib see lugu toimivat samuti kahel tasandil: manitsusena lapsevanemaile, et nad oma lastele veidraid nimesid pannes järeltulijaile määratut taaka ei tekitaks ning lohutusena neile lastele, kes just sääraste nimedega toime peavad tulema. (Niitra 2006: 136)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nagu 1920ndad Venemaal, kus vohas perekonnanimi "Revolutsioon" ja nt eesnimi "Lenina".</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="moss06"></a>Moss, Rauno Thomas 2006. Varakristlike eremiitide praktiline semiootika (Pontose Euagriose askeetiline demonoloogia). <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 138-165.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p139jm5"></a><strong>Maailmaparandamine ei ole kristlase ülesanne, see oleks ülbuse näitaja ning rohkendaks ebaõiglust ja kurjust</strong>; eesmärgiks on enese kasvatamine ja distsiplineerimine, mille õnnestumine toob kaasa muutusi keskkonnas (arhailine usk peegeldumise efekti). Püha Hieronymus on kirjutanud, et munga ülesandeks pole mitte õpetada, vaid nutta. (Moss 2006: 139, jm 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Selle peegeldumisefekti tõhususest annab elavat tunnistust meie nüüdne ebaõigluse- ja kurjusevaba maailm.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p139ja140"></a>Sügavamas taustaplaanis on siinse artikli aineks varakristlaste "jumalikustumise" kontseptuaalne <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kompleks, mis võis muuhulgas seonduda maailmakorra tajumisega demoonilisena. <strong>Samas ei ole küsimuseks, kuivõrd on selle näol tegemist autokommunikatiivsete mehhanismide ja realiteetidega</strong>, või milline oli kristlike ja gnostiliste rigoristide psühhofüüsilise lõhestatuse ja resignatsiooni ulatus ning kliiniline mõju (põlgust inimolu ja vaenulikkust keha vastu on nimetatud kogu käsitletava perioodi kultuuri endeemiliseks haiguseks (Dodds 2003: 35)). (Moss 2006: 139-140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kahju.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p140"></a>Kui platonismile toetuvas müstilises teoloogias nähti Jumala ja inimese vahel sarnasust, siis Athanasiose tekst osutab suurele ontoloogilisele kuristikule Jumala ja kõige muu - hing kaasa arvatud - vahel (Louth 1981: 99). <strong>Kuristikku sai ületada vaid Jumal, ja inimene sai võimaluse Jumalat taas tundma õppida alles seejärel, kui Jumal oli tulnud alla, sellesse lagunevasse surmamaailma</strong>. (Moss 2006: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ja 2000 aastat ei ole ennast näole andnud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p141a"></a>Hilisantiigis ja keskajal tajuti inimest ümbritsevat ruumi sõna otseses mõttes kubisevana mitmesugustest olenditest, kellel on kõigil oma eripärane olemine, nägu ja iseloom (Givry 1971: 21-23; Lepajõe 1998: 9). <strong>Inimene, kellel pole privileegi ega oskust neid näha, on ootsekui pimedusega löödu keset lahingutandrit võitlevate osapoolte vahel, kuid siiski on talle antud võimalus tasapisi õppida mõistma neid märke (näiteks läbi mõtete ja ideede), mille kaudu deemonid ja inglid temaga suhestuvad ja tahtelist tegutsemist võimalusel mõjutavad</strong>. Kommunikatsioon toimub nii ärkvelolekus kui unes. Selles valdkonnas asjatundja osutub deemonlikuks inimeseks (Dodds 2003: 37). Semiootika on selles kontekstis deemonite kunst ja semiootiline teadvus teadlikkus deemonite tegevusest, rollist ja märgilisest toimest. (Moss 2006: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Siin võib esitada naiivse stapledonliku küsimuse: kas ei pruugi meiega märkide abil suhtlevad "deemonid" olla hoopis nt Kaheksateistkümnendad Inimesed?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p141"></a>Euagriose ja varakristlase jaoks ei ole deemonid ja inglid niisiis metafoorsed kujundid, vaid <strong>reaalsed, teistsugusest substantsist koosnevad olendid, loodud ja omal moel piiratud võimetega, nagu ka inimene</strong>. Kreeklaste arusaam deemonitest ja demoonilisusest oli lähemal loodusrahvaste nägemusele vaimolenditest; kristluse ja püha Pauluse kaudu jõuab personifitseeritud kurjuse kontseptsioon kreekakeelsesse kultuuriruumi (Dodds 2003: 26). (Moss 2006: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Samuti võib siin esitada naiivse spinozaliku küsimuse: mitu erinevat substantsi?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p143"></a>Kahekümnes sajand, taasavastades ja korrastades Euagriose kadunukspeetud kreeka-, süüria- ja koptikeelseid teoseid, leiab askeedi mõtteavaldustes ja analüütilises lähenemises inimese emotsioonidele sarnasusi Jungi ja tänapäevase psühholoogiaga (Murphy 1981: 267). <strong>Sisuliselt kajastavad Euagriose tekstid Egiptuse ja Süüria kõrbetesse ühiskonnast eemale tõmbunud eremiitide kogemusi ja praktikaid</strong>. Lugejad, kelle vajadusi silmas pidades Euagrios kirjutas, olid ennekõike asketlikku elu elavad kirjaoskajad mungad, s.t end kristlastena määratlenud inimesed, kellele kirjutades polnud vaja kristlust õigustada ega särava ja nüansseeritud kreekakeelse filosoofiaga pöörata või kimbatusse ajada nagu paganaid. (Moss 2006: 143)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ah <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2015/03/in-speechless-ecstasy.html">need vanad</a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p143"></a>Need tekstid fikseerivad semiootilise teadvuse olemasolu. Esmalt tundub, et <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> nõnda, <strong>nagu</strong> osutab ja rõhutab John Deely viitega Poinsot'le, rääkides <strong>Aquino Thomase</strong> (u 1225-7. III 1274) <strong>traktaatides</strong> sisalduvatest märgiteooria elementidest iseseisva doktriini mõõtmes (Deely 2004: 102), <strong>ei ole ka Eiagriosel märk eraldiseisvaks küsimuseks</strong>. Tundub, et Euagrios ei kirjuta midagi, mis võiks puudutada märgiteooriat semiootilises mõttes. Ta "jälgib" ja "nimetab" deemoneid läbi deemonlike <strong>ideede, kontseptide ning kujutelmade</strong> (φαντασ□αι), mida need inimhinges äratavad või mille läbi jälje jätavad, ja <strong>vaatlevad</strong> demoonilisest <strong>seestumusest vaba hinge märke</strong>, kasutades sõna σνμβολον (Praktikos: 63-90). (Moss 2006: 143)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) kujutelmad, (2) kontseptid ja (3) ideed on platonlik eristus, ei? </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p145a"></a>Seejuures arutleb Euagrios veel <strong>emotsioonid</strong>e loomuse üle ja selle üle, millisel viisil nad <strong>"elustuvad" või käivitavad omamoodi "ahela"</strong>, mis on väga sarnane C. S. Peirce'i semioosile. (Moss 2006: 145)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Põnev.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p145jm13"></a>Apokatastasis — taastamine, tagasipöördumine (ld restitutio in pristinum statum). Doktriin <strong>kõikide vabatahtelistena loodud olendite</strong> (sealhulgas ka deemonite ja hukatusele määratud hingede) <strong>tagasipöördumine Jumalasse</strong>. (Moss 2006: 145, jm 13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>then in that time the awakened Soul of All will embrace within itself all spirits whatever throughout the whole of time's wide circuit</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/last-and-first-men.html#stapledon37p272">Stapledon 1937: 272</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p145b"></a>"Peri Logismon" on töö, milles võib leida enim paralleele Euagriose ja C. S. Peirce'i vahel. Rohkem või vähem implitsiitsed sarnasused avalduvad <strong>deemonlike mõtete äratundmise</strong> vajalikkuse kontekstis. "Kephalaia gnostika" on süntees teoloogilistest ja askeetliku praktika alustest Origenese maailmaehituslikus raamistuses. Siinkohal uurib Euagrios erilise hoolega <strong>kannatusi ja emotsioone, ihasid ja ambitsioone</strong>, s.t vaimseid ja moraalseid segajaid, mis kombineeruvad inimeses ja motiveerivad tegevust. Seda keerkat kristlikku psühhoteraapiat hoiavad koos doktrinaalsed seisukohad hingede preeksistentsist ja õpetus algse korra taastamisest ''ποκατ≤στασιφ. (Moss 2006: 145)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Loeb nagu Esmasus ja Teisesus oleksid need "vaimsed ja moraalsed segajad". Järele jääb "puhas mõte"?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p146"></a>Lähenedes materjalile läbi peirce'iliku pragmatititsmi, on võimalik heita sügavam ja tõsisem pilk Euagriose ja varakristlike rigoristlike eremiitide maailmapiltile, tajuda seda mitte kui veidrat <strong>museaali</strong>, vaid kui samavõrra elavat ja funktsioneerivat märgilist kehandit nagu mis tahes muud, meile "lähedasemat" reaalsust. (Moss 2006: 146)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Museaal">Museaal</a> on muuseumis arvele võetud kultuuriväärtusega ese.</u>"</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p148"></a>Igal neist kolmest tasandist on oma eripärane mõtlemise viis ehk kontemplatiivne tasand, mõtlemise muster (ingellik, inimlik, deemonlik). Tasandid erinevad ka kehade konsistentsi ja maailmade poolest, milles nad on kehastunud. Ingellikul tasandil on predomineeriv <strong>mõistus</strong> - νο◊φ ja tule element, inimlikul predomineerib <strong>iha</strong> - □πιθυμ□α ja maa element, deemonlikul tasandil <strong>raev</strong> - θυμ®φ ja õhu element (Kephalaia gnostika: I, 68). <strong>Need kolm olemise tasandit omavad igaüks tunnetust või mõtlemisvõimet</strong> vastavalt nende olemisele: raske ja segane on deemonite oma, sekundaarne kontemplatsioon loodu üle inimeste ja primaarne kontemplatsioon loodu üle inglite oma (Sinkewicz 2003: xxxviii). (Moss 2006: 148)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See on märgiline, et esmasuseks on siin "raev" ja mitte, nagu naispütaagorlastel, <em>armastus</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p149"></a>Deemonite kehad omavad värvi ja vormi, kuid kuna nende kehade koostis ei sarnane inimese omale, jäävad nad meile tavatingimustes nähtamatuteks. Kui deemon mingil põhjusel soovib, saab ta endale võtta inimesele nähtava kehavormi, siiski aga näitamata oma tõelist palet (Kephalaia gnostika: I, 22). <strong>Deemonite kehad on väga külmad ja sarnased jääga</strong> (Peri Logismon: 33). (Moss 2006: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Elavad detailid. Meenub karjanaine, kellele öösel väikesed hallid mehikesed järgi tulid ja keda ta hammustas — ning ütles, et nad olevat maitsenud metalliselt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p149b"></a>Kõik püüdlus saavutamaks taas-ühekssaamist Jumalaga, nägemaks Teda taas näost näkku, saab olla kantud ainult rõõmust. Kuna Jumala suhe oma looduga on soe ja intiimselt isiklik, siis <strong>ligimesearmastus on otsekui ühendavaks - jumalikuks - keeleks indiviidide vahel, ühendades ja ülendades mõistuslikke olendeid</strong>. Nii muutubki ligimesearmastus moraalsete vooruste algusprintsiibiks ning doktriiniks, arenedes levinuimaks ja populaarseimaks õpetuseks Kreeka ja Kapadookia erakute seas. (Moss 2006: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Love is God</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-socialism-of-love.html#searby89p4">Searby 1989: 4</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p150"></a><!-- Joonis 2. --><!--
--><blockquote><table style="text-align: left; width: 100%; border: 1px dashed gray;" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">a</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">b</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">c</td>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">d</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
<td style="text-align: center;" colspan="4" rowspan="1" valign="undefined">φιλαυτία (enesearmastus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="5" align="undefined" valign="undefined" style="writing-mode: sideways-lr;">gnostike</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
<td style="font-style: italic;" colspan="3" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">Intellektuaalsed
takistused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" valign="undefined">θεολογική</td>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined"><br>
8. ύπερηφανία (eneseuhkus)<br>
7. κενοδοζία (edevus)</td>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">←</td>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="1" style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" align="undefined" valign="undefined">Jumala (λογοί) vastu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: center;" valign="undefined">↑</td>
<td style="font-style: italic;" colspan="3" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">Emotsionaalsed
takistused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" valign="undefined">φυσική</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">6. ἀκηδία (<span style="font-weight: bold;">akeedia</span>)<br>
5. ὀργή (raev)<br>
4. λύπη (masendus)</td>
<td colspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">←</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" align="undefined" valign="undefined">loomulikkuse vastu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"> </td>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="2" style="border: 2px dotted black; text-align: center;" valign="undefined">ἀπάθεια</td>
<td colspan="3" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined"> </td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-top: 2px dotted black;" align="undefined" valign="undefined"> <br>
</td>
<td colspan="3" rowspan="1" style="border-top: 2px dotted black;" align="undefined" valign="undefined"> <br>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td colspan="1" rowspan="2" style="writing-mode: sideways-lr;" align="undefined" valign="undefined">praktike</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"><br>
</td>
<td style="font-style: italic;" colspan="3" rowspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">Ihadest
tulenevad takistused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" valign="undefined">πρακτική</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">3. φιλαργυρία (ahnus)<br>
2. πορνεία (hoorus)<br>
1. γαστριμαργία (aplus)</td>
<td colspan="1" align="undefined" valign="undefined">←</td>
<td style="border: 1px solid black; text-align: center;" align="undefined" valign="undefined"><span style="font-weight: bold;">käskude</span> vastu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></blockquote><!--
--><em>Joonis 2.</em> — a. kehalise ja vaimse dihhotoomiline jaotus, b. kristlase trihhotoomiline jaotus, c. kõrbeisade kaheksa kurja mõtet, d. deemonite kolmikjaotus. (Moss 2006: 150)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Järjekord (emotsioonid ja iha) on natuke paigast, aga muidu on täiesti klassikaline, eriti "käskude" seos. Akeedia on tüdimus - Marju Lepajõe on kirjutanud "<a href="https://kjt.ee/2012/09/tudimusest-ehk-akeediast-varases-munkluses/">Tüdimusest ehk akeediast varases munkluses</a>".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p152"></a>Ψυχ≈ ehk hing (ld anima) on vaba tahte asupaik - valikuvõimeline ja isiksustatud. <strong>Kui hing võtab kuulda vaimu</strong> ja selle soovitatut, siis toimub terviklik hinge sublimatsioon - voimsustumine, kuid kui ta pöördub liha poole, siis võtab madalam kõrgema üle võimu ning protsess on tagasipöördeline. (Moss 2006: 152)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Platoni hingekaarik.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p153"></a>Euagriose analüüsil inimese ψυχ≈ alateadvuslikust alast on <strong>sidusjooni</strong> Freudiga. (Moss 2006: 153)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Õpin eesti keelt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p154"></a>Oluline on, et deemonitele pole antud õigust näha inimese südamesse. Südamesse näeb vaid Isa (Euagrios osutab pühakirjas kohtadele: Ap 1, 24, 15, 8; Ps 32(33), 15). <strong>Deemonid on omandanud aga äärmise leidlikkuse inimese seisukorra</strong> (selle, mis peitub südames) <strong>mõistmises läbi väliste märkide</strong> ja vihjete, mida inimene reedab oma sõnade või kehaliigutustega (Peri Logismon: 37). (Moss 2006: 154)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Deemonid ei ole telepaatilised, aga nad oskavad lugeda kehakeelt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p156"></a>Viimane põhjus on spekulatiivne, kuid näib tõepoolest, et Euagriose jaoks pole olemas dihhotoomilist eristust loomulike ja konventsionaalsete, märkide per accidens ja per se vahel, sest kõik tähistusprotsessid teiseselt loodud maailmas on märgid per accidens - nad on, mis nad on (põhjus-tagajärg), sõltumata meie õigest või valest interpretatsioonist. <strong>See peegeldab väga olemuslikku kontrasti kahe koolkonna, stoikute ja epikuurlaste vahel, kellest esimesed vaatlesid märgilisi suhteid a priori, formaalsete ja ratsionaalsetena, samas kui viimased tõlgendasid neid a posteriori, toetudes täielikult empiirilistele suhetele</strong> (Manetti 1993: 124-125). Hoolimata oma kehvast kreeka keele oskusest, mõistis selle sümbolloogikale ülesehituva märgilise universumi mudeli teoreetilist potentsiaali Püha Augustinus, ning osava kirikupoliitiku, filosoofi ja teoloogina arendas seda omal viisil edasi, luues teooria konventsionaalsetest märkidest (signa data). (Moss 2006: 156)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Antiikne idealism vs empiritsism.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p159"></a>Peirce tegi selgeks, et kõik, mis on subjekti jaoks tunnetatav (ingl cognizable), võib olla märk (CP 8.177). Esmasus on võimalikkus, analüüsimatu, "<strong>erinev objektiivsest pertseptsioonist</strong>, tahtest ja mõttest" (CP 1.303). (Moss 2006: 159)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Esmasus on samane subjektiivne pertseptsiooniga?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p160"></a>See sarnaneb Peirce'i arusaamaga <strong>teisesus</strong>est, mille predomineerivaks karakteriks on "<strong>see, mis on tehtud</strong>" (CP 1.343) ja mis on seotud sellega, mis on toimunud meie <strong>minevikus</strong> (Baest 2000: 25). (Moss 2006: 160)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Erinevalt Jakobsoni tõlgendusest, milles esmasus on seotud mineviku, teisesus oleviku ja kolmasus tulevikuga.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p161"></a>Kui Peirce'i jaoks oli esmasus "puhas tabamata idee" ja teisesus oli "juhtumid, millistele see vastab", siis kolmasuse kategooria, haarates enesesse esimesed kaks, on "<strong>seaduspärasus</strong>, mis <strong>kannab enesega tuleviku fakte</strong>" (CP 1.23). See on tagajärjeks millelegi, mis on ühendatud kaks elementi. See on aktiivse mentaalse töö tulem. (Moss 2006: 161)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vähemalt sellega ei pannud Jakobson mööda.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p162a"></a>Trihhotoomsete jaotuste rohke rakendamine oli varakristlike eremiitide tekstides mudeline populaarne. Kolmikjaotust skeemina kohaldati nii inimliku kui sellest väljapoole jääva eksistentsi kõigile tasandeile (Crouzel 1989: 91). See on osa usust ja maailmatunnetusest - kristliku mõtlemise baasist. <strong>Ka Peirce tunnistas oma erilist kiindumist triaadsesse jaotusse</strong>. Määratledes ennast esmaklassiliseks filosoofiks ja teadlasena antimetafüüsikust eksperimentalistiks, teadvustas Peirce, et teaduslik loogika juhib realistliku metafüüsika juurde (Baest 2000: 18). (Moss 2006: 162)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Viimati kui asjasse sisse vaatasin, jäi mulle pigem mulje, et see pidi olema "ülestunnistus", sest ta neab triaadikuid (vihkab teistes seda, mis temas endas on nii tugev).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="moss06p162b"></a>Peirce'i järgi on meie mõtlemise eesmärk <strong>etableerida tähendusi</strong> ja läheneda seeläbi uuritava fenomeni tõele. See tõde, see tähenduste summa tuleneb fenomeniga seotud kujuteldavate võimalikkuste kogusummast (CP 5.402). (Moss 2006: 162)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tähenduste sisseseadmine. Märgiloome.</p><!--
----
--><h4><a id="p2rn06"></a>Pärn, Katre 2006. Semioloogilisest kinokeeleteooriast. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 166-183.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p166"></a>Määratledes semioloogia objektina kinokeele struktuuri uurimise, saavad keskseks paradigmaatika ja süntagmaatika ehk <strong>elementide inventari</strong> ja <strong>elementide ahela</strong> mõisted. Seejuures muutub keelesüsteemi vaatepunktist oluliseks selektsioon - seda nii paradigma ja süntagma ehk "võimalike valikute" ja "realiseeritud valikute" vahelise lülina kui paradigmaatilise tasandi enese korrastusprintsiibina. (Pärn 2006: 166)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väga head ümbersõnastused koodile (elementide inventar) ja sõnumile (elementide ahel).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p167"></a>Ent kuna <strong>keeletaoliste keeruliste objektide puhul ei ole objekt vaatepunktile eelnev, vaid just vaatepunkti poolt loodav</strong> (Saussure 2000: 8), muutubki vajalikuks semioloogia ja semioloogilise lähenemise piiritlemine ja määratlemine, et sellelt pinnalt liikuda kinosemioloogia objekti piiritlemisega seotud probleemide juurde. (Pärn 2006: 167)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Natuke nagu <em>a priori</em> ja <em>a posteriori</em> semioosi eristus ülal Mossi artiklis. Siin on mõeldud muidugi seda, et asi, mille kohta "keeletaoliste" süsteemide lausung käib, ei eksisteeri enne lausumist, vaid luuakse lausumise käigus. Hmm. Või, siis: Peirce'i "objekt" on eksisteeriv, aga täielikult kättesaamatu, aga Saussure'il pole "objekt" otseselt asjaga seotud (<em>rääkida</em> võib asjadest, mida ei eksisteeri). Kole lihtsustus ja tõenäoliselt väga ekslik, aga eks see keelevälise reaalsuse küsimus ongi teps keeruline.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p168a"></a>Ajastu meeleolud võttis kokku Lilian Gish <strong>1929. aasta "Encyclopedia Britannica" artiklis</strong> "Liikuvad pildid: universaalne keel", kirjutades, et kino on lõbustav, informatiivne ja esteetiline esperanto, universaalne keel, mis tänu piktoriaalsele pantomiimile on kõigile arusaadav. (Pärn 2006: 168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>14. väljaanne. Väidetavalt üks viimaseid asjalikke.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p168b"></a>Nii näitas näiteks heli tulek, et kinokeelt tajuti just visuaalse keelena ja heli kui selle terviklikkust ja universaalsust, isegi kinolikkust lõhkuvana. Tõsiasi, et heli võeti kiiremini omaks praktikas kui teoorias (Metz 1991: 51-52), viitas omakorda sellele, et ebamäärasele ja mängulisele kasutusele vaatamata oli kinokeele mõistel toonase filmiteooria metakeeles välja kujunenud stabiilne kino väljendusmaterjali puudutav tähendusväli. See oli pildikeel ja kui <strong>heli</stronG> muusikalisse poolde suhtuti leplikumalt, siis selle <strong>verbaalne pool</strong> (vaatamata sellele, et loomulik keel oli vahetiitrite näol filmide tavapärane osa) <strong>tekitas tugevat vastuseisu</strong>. (Pärn 2006: 168)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Filmid ei ole sellest ajast saadik head olnud kui inimesed neis häälega rääkima hakkasid.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p171"></a>Samuti ei saa kinosemioloogiast rääkides mööda Juri Lotmani "<strong>Filmisemiootika</strong>st" (Lotman 2004), mis ei ole küll sama mahukas, ent <strong>sisaldab oluliselt dünaamilisemat vaadet kinokeele olemusele ja funktsioneerimisele kultuuriruumis</strong>. (Pärn 2006: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>High praise.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p174"></a>Teadupoolest jaotas Saussure keelesfääri kaheks suhteliselt kattuvaks osaks: kõneks [parole], <strong>individuaalseks keelekasutuseks</strong> ja keelesüsteemiks [langue], <strong>lingvistiliste harjumuste tervikkogumiks</strong>, mis lubab indiviidil mõista ja mõistetud olla (Saussure 2000: 77). Seega on keelesüsteem keelt kasutava kollektiivi poolt jagatud kehand, mis tekib korduvuse kaudu, olles keelekasutuse sotsiaalne produkt. Korduse tähtsusele viitavad nii Lotman, öeldes, et mingi süsteem on keel, kui ta kasutab piiratud arvul korduvaid märke (Lotman 2004: 56) kui Metz, määratledes koodi mitteainulaadse süsteemina (Metz 1974: 76). (Pärn 2006: 174)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Veel üks kena paar ümbersõnastusi. Ähmaselt tuttavad, aga jällegi — pole Saussure'i (veel) lugenud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p175ja176"></a>Keelesüsteemi ja kõne/teksti suhteid mõtestab Saussure'ist lähtuv aj Hjelmslevi keeleteoorias konkreetse vormi saanud eristus paradigmaatika ja süntagmaatika ehk semiootilise süsteemi ja semiootilise <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> protsessi vahel. Paradigmaatilist tasandit saab vaadelda ühikute inventarina, kust valitakse elemendid, millest moodustatakse süntagmaatiline struktuur (filmikeel). <strong>Sellest lähtuvalt käsitles Roman Jakobson neid keele kahe korrastusviisina</strong> [mode of arrangement]: paradigmat selektsiooniteljena, mille elemendid suhestuvad omavahel samaväarsuse alusel ning süntagmat kombinatsiooniteljena, mille elemendid suhestuvad omavahel külgnevuse alusel (Jakobson 1981: 27). (Pärn 2006: 175-176)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nüüd tean, et neid nimetatakse korrastusviisideks.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p178"></a><blockquote><table style="text-align: left; width: 100%;" border="0"
cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2">
<tbody>
<tr align="center">
<td colspan="3" rowspan="1" valign="undefined">KINOKEELESÜSTEEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"><span
style="text-decoration: underline;">Pilt</span></td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"><span
style="text-decoration: underline;">Heli</span></td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"><span
style="text-decoration: underline;">Montaaž</span></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Kaamerasüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Muusikasüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Pildimontaažisüsteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Kaadrisüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Helisüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Helimontaažisüsteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Kirjaliku sõna süsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Suulise sõna süsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Vertikaalse montaaži süsteem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Värvisüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Kõnesüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">jne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Valgussüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Heliefektide süsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Eriefektidesüsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">↳
Helituse süsteem</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">jne</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined">jne</td>
<td align="undefined" valign="undefined"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</blockquote><em>Joonis 3:</em> Kinokeelesüsteemi paradigmaatiline jaotus (Pärn 2006: 178)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõiksugu süsteemide tohuvabohu. Meenutab oma põhjalikkusega kognitiivpsühholoogide ülevaateid kõikvõimalikest erinevatest mälusüsteemidest.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p2rn06p180"></a>Ühelt poolt tõlgiti juba Saussure'i mõistet langue (keele)koodina, mis on adekvaatne <strong>kõrgelt koodistunud</strong> loomuliku keele puhul, ent nn kultuurikeelte puhul, eriti peamiselt kunstilisel otstarbel kasutatavate keelte puhul on asi keerulisem. (Pärn 2006: 180)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Leidsin pealkirja.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-24324327755896864452023-09-19T11:54:00.003-07:002023-09-19T11:54:57.544-07:00A Socialism of Love<!-- A Socialism of Love
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkJlyRRWFHZh_UdYAHp-zAfR6L98Hk67699_hC6l44CVM3tjVnHGWwp4mRmtsNjbAgvqsGZDD6m7sknhSgEiPtUsxX7TafRr8RWMh2m8U_FZ5EaSzO9x8MQRLuG2LD69wh1OcGfpPxndXEj6_hvIvAQupnf5Uu6io3oDQN3OJWsyb50CK9pzltjp9s8bIP/s1024/jja_pilt_sdxl_the_new_school.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1024" data-original-width="1024" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjkJlyRRWFHZh_UdYAHp-zAfR6L98Hk67699_hC6l44CVM3tjVnHGWwp4mRmtsNjbAgvqsGZDD6m7sknhSgEiPtUsxX7TafRr8RWMh2m8U_FZ5EaSzO9x8MQRLuG2LD69wh1OcGfpPxndXEj6_hvIvAQupnf5Uu6io3oDQN3OJWsyb50CK9pzltjp9s8bIP/s320/jja_pilt_sdxl_the_new_school.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#searby89">Searby 1989. The New School and the New Life</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#midgley80">Midgley 1980. The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values. I</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#clark80">Clark 1980. The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values. II</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#mclaughlin83">McLaughlin 1983. Human Evolution in the Age of the Intelligent Machine.</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="searby89"></a>Searby, Peter 1989. The New School and the New Life: Cecil Reddie (1858-1932) and the early years of Abbotsholme School. <em>History of Education</em> 18(1): 1-21. DOI: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0046760890180101">10.1080/0046760890180101</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0046760890180101">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p1"></a>Between October 1888 and April 1889 the 30-year old socialist Cecil Reddie published his criticisms of the boys' boarding schools in which he had been educated and had taught, and detailed the school that he, with others, intended to open in October. <strong>Existing schools</strong>, Reddie declared, <strong>were microcosms of the competitive capitalist society, whose replacement by the co-operative commonwealth he looked forward to</strong>. Their classrooms were factories in miniature, where boys worked at repetitive mechanical tasks, cramming Latin and Greek without understanding them, for the sake of competitive examinations that were the keys to scholarships and success in the commercial rat-race. On the games field they were confined to a few competitive pursuits that excluded individual interests and relegated many pupils to the sidelines as spectators of 'gladiatorial shows'. And <strong>like the factory, the school ignored the emotions. Affectionate display between boys was discouraged. The price of repression was impurity, secret pleasures, and lust</strong>. Masters pried, and invited boys to tell tales on their comrades. (Searby 1989: 1)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Amazingly, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cecil_Reddie">Cecil Reddie</a> is a familiar name! I'm not sure from where but the name definitely rings a bell. The operative keyword here is "co-operative commonwealth", i.e. a socialist state. The overall gist reminds me of this: "<u>In her earlier novels Burdekin had commented on the upper-class English practice of sending boys away to school, and noted the anxiety that boys would otherwise not grow into proper <em>men</em>. She calls attention to the oddity of this beliefs: little girls were assumed to be capable of developing into women whether they are raised by women or men; but special training, involving a separation from women, is necessary in order for a boy to turn into a man. This training typically takes place in what Burdekin calls 'homosexual packs' - single-sex schools, clubs, sports, and, of course, the military. Men thus undergo a more rigid training in the masculine gender role, which, by implication, has nothing 'natural' about it.</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-reduction-of-women.html">Patai 1984</a>: 93)</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p2"></a>The emotions and aesthetic sense would be developed through poetry and music, while <strong>by making furniture for the school, pupils would help to create their own life-enhancing environment</strong>. In short, existing schools promoted the disintegration of the person and of society through competitiveness, while <strong>the New School would promote their integration through cooperativeness</strong>. (Searby 1989: 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Making their own furniture, once again, sounds oddly, vaguely familiar.</p><!-- $ A Leafy Village
3 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p2"></a>He [James Reddie] also had an unofficial career as a scientific heretic, <strong>regarding</strong> the earth as the centre of the universe and <strong>the stars as blobs of gas a few miles away, 'to serve for the adornment and use of earth alone'</strong>. Papers criticizing Newton's <em>Principia</em> were regularly refused by learned societies, without, however, denting Reddie's convection of his rightness. Cecil Reddie grew up, therefore, in a home where controversy was contemplated, and where his father offered the role model of polemicist. (Searby 1989: 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, a nutjob.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Reddie, James 1862. <em>Vis Inertiae Victa, or Fallacies Affecting Science: an Essay to increase our knowledge of some physical laws, and a Review of certain Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy</em>. London.</u></li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p2fn3"></a>Cecil Reddie, <em>was jesus born a virgin?</em> (Abbetsholme, 1925), 1. <strong>By the 1920s Reddie had abandoned the use of capital letters</strong>. (Searby 1989: 2, fn 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Quite literal anti-capitalism!</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p2fn5"></a>A devout Anglican, in 1865 Reddie took a leading part in forming the Victoria Institute, <strong>to reconcile science and religion by demonstrating the truths of scripture, and in particular to confute the new idea of evolution</strong>. (Searby 1989: 2, fn 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>No doubt very convincing stuff.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p3"></a>Reddie was restless, wishing to deploy his great energies creatively in teaching but not knowing how best to do so; unfocused talent is implied by his unpopularity at Fettes, his pupils seeing him as a little crazy and <strong>taking fright at his claim that he could tell what they were thinking about</strong>. (Searby 1989: 3)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A telepath to boot.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p4"></a>There were many pressures on a man like Reddie to transmute his sex drive into other energies, and perhaps some such alchemy explains the impression he made in 1885 on R. O. Moon, a young graduate of New College. Moon's entry in his normally austere diary gives a sense of Reddie's excitation and emotional power. The two young men talked at length, walking from the Serpentine to Holborn, Reddie advancing <strong>the 'Idea that the affections are the divine essence within us, i.e. "Love is God"</strong>; all our strongest forces from thence, energy not to be stifled but directed upwards'. (Searby 1989: 4)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad. If god be anything, let it be love.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p5"></a>In later years, after long pondering social issues, Cotterill moved on to call for the replacement of Competition with Co-operation - which would tap the boundless sources for good in human nature and lead to <strong>a Socialism of Love, Justice and Kindness</strong>. (Searby 1989: 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A <strike>religion</strike> socialism of love.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p6a"></a>Practicality would also draw upon the pupil's natural curiosity, that Geddes, following Pestalozzi and Froebel, saw as the chief motor of education: the ideal education was <strong>a flower-like unfolding of talents and interests</strong>. To use the creative value of play, and to allow the senses to enrich the growing mind, would help to form emotionalyl rounded adults, fitter to create a new world than the starved and stunted beings produced by the rote-learning classroom. (Searby 1989: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phrase so good.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p6b"></a>Until his mid-30s (until, that is, about 1880) Carpenter felt profoundly unfulfilled; he was frequently melancholy and distressed. Alike in their spiritual aridity were the upper-class society of his youth, with its emotional repression and empty ritual concern for appearances, and the Cambridge of his early manhood: its <strong>'everlasting discussions of theories which never came anywhere near actual life, this cheap philosophizing and ornamental cleverness, this endless book-learning</strong>, and the queer cynicism and boredom underlying - all impressed me with a sense of utter emptiness'. After abandoning his Cambridge fellowship and holy orders, Carpenter, through much <strong>soul-searching</strong>, at length came to free himself from his sense of oppression. (Searby 1989: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The good stuff, summarized a little down the page: "<u>Carpenter rejected bookish education</u>" (<em>ibid</em>, 6).</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p7"></a>At Millthorpe Reddie became acquainted with men in Carpenter's circle - C. R. Ashbee, G. Lowes Dickinson, Robert Muirhead, <strong>Havelock Ellis</strong>. In the many-hued socialist flowering of the 1880s, such men stressed not the political or industrial activism that William Morris or H. M. Hyndman favoured as the road to socialism, but the renewal of humankind's co-operative and helpful instincts. Their mood is well caught in the name of the high-minded discussion group Carpenter, Ashbee and Ellis belonged to - <strong>the Fellowship of the New Life</strong>. To reach the new fraternal and compassionate society they relied on the activity of small close-knit groups that, paradoxically, retreated from the urban industrialism they hoped to change, and were inward-looking because of their remoteness and the comradeship that sustained them. (Searby 1989: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A familiar name - and an unexpected one in this company.</p><!-- $ A Succession of Eruptions
13 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p12"></a>Advanced people of various sorts found Abbotsholme sympathetic. Vegetarians, unusual in the 1890s, welcomed its special diets, and <strong>it was a natural school for Emmeline Stapledon</strong>, a devotee of Ruskin, <strong>to choose for her son Olaf - later to be a maverick socialist and visionary</strong>, well known for his novel <em>Last and First Men</em>. (Searby 1989: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The only reason this paper crossed my path. "A maverick socialist", you say?</p><!-- $ A Penetrating Sensibility
14 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p13"></a>Abbotsholme had one assistant master of intellectual distinction - J. H. Badley, recruited to the staff in the early days by G. L. Dickinson and Edward Carpenter. Reddie resented his wish to marry, his liking for co-education, and his intellectual independence. After only two and a half years Badley left, acknowledging his great dept to Reddie's ideas, to found Bedales on Abbotsholme principles. Though Reddie plainly regarded his other assistants as second-raters, in fact <strong>he made it impossible for better men to stay</strong>, and Abbotsholme had a rapid staff turnover. <strong>While boys with spirit were welcomed, masters were seen as a potential threat</strong>. A less egotistical man would have been gladdened by the spread of his ideas through Bedales. But Reddie wanted loyal colonies, not a school that stressed its departure. (Searby 1989: 13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oof. Such egotism while spreading the gospel of co-operation.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p14a"></a>Intellectual isolation in his little kingdom, Reddie developed the authoritarian strain in his iedas, and moved away from the romantic socialism he had professed in the 1880s. Feeling, like so many in the 1890s and after, that Britain's imperial pre-eminence was under threat, he responded with a call - urgent and oft-repeated - for a national sense of purpose and organization that would fit Britain for commercial competition with Germany and the USA. Thus, while <strong>Reddie</strong> saw the well-ordered nation, and the individuals that composed it, as organisms in internal harmony, he <strong>saw international relations as necessarily competitive</strong>: a co-operative school was to prepare pupils for conflict - another example of the contradictions in Reddie. (Searby 1989: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This may have coloured young Olaf's vision of international relations.</p><!--
15 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p14b"></a>An imperial Ministry of Education should plan the British educational system as a whole - schools and universities - and should control all schools enjoying endowments as well as those directly financed by the State. In this way, Reddie thought, the public schools he so much resented could be brought to heel. The nation's schools would form a unity, and each would be aware of its place in it, but there would be three distinct sorts of school, catering for boys sharply different in intelligence and reflecting the separate traditions of the three classes whence they sprang. Strong links between cultural and intellectual endowment are assumed by Reddie, though he also writes of the need to make provision for movement from one sort of school to another. There would be <strong>schools for muscle-workers, for petty officers and for leaders</strong>: Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Schools. Abbotsholme, it hardly needs noting, was a Tertiary School, for the Directing Class. (Searby 1989: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So: workmen, guardians, and philosopher-kings.</p><!--
15-16 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p14ja15"></a>Only a personality in harmony was fit to lead, yet Reddie saw human beings as liable to inner conflict - not least because, as he learnt from Edward Carpenter, <strong>everybody contained male and female elements</strong> that were potentially antagonistic. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> (This was a highly unusual perceptions for the 1890s, though <strong>Reddie did not accept</strong> its corollary, <strong>the equality of the sexes</strong>; indeed, he vehemently expressed his disdain for women and for co-education.) (Searby 1989: 14-15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Bugger. I guess this is what the author meant by "<u>an inner conservatism with a radical face</u>" (<em>ibid</em>, 4).</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p15"></a>Boys were taught in groups of not more than a dozen, usually by general subject masters, sometimes by specialists. Reddie himself taught hygiene, which included much physiology and, very unusually indeed in Edwardian England, sex education. It is recalled as sensible and helpful by Old Abbotsholmians. At the time it caused some problems. Boys occasionally fainted at the alarming detail of their own anatomy. In other respects too the curriculum was unlike the usual public school's. <strong>There was no classical bias, indeed hardly any Latin at all and no Greek, English, French and German were taught, mathematics and science, and history and geography</strong>. There were no marks or prizes. Classwork was uncompetitive and 'general'. Specialist teaching for qualifications or university entrance was regarded as comparatively unimportant. (Searby 1989: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One can just about imagine a personality like Olaf Stapledon being formed by this kind of education.</p><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p16a"></a>There were lectures on Greek mythology, trades unions, bee culture and the history of music; these last occupied a term, and were illustrated with pianola pieces. <strong>Music was stressed at Abbotsholme - and is remembered by old pupils as having created a lifelong interest</strong>. Every boy learnt singing and two-thirds at least one instrument. The school song, specially composed, was a version of Walt Whitman's poem 'The Love of Comrades':<blockquote>Come! we will make the Continents inseparable,<br /><strong>We will make the most splendid Race the sun ever shone upon</strong></blockquote>Religious worship was the focus of the school's philosophy, just as it was at Rugby or Fettes. (Searby 1989: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Two points in case: see how much space Stapledon extends for oddly-pythagorean music theory, and his ever-constant emphasis on the improvement of the race.</p><!--
17 --><blockquote><a id="searby89p16b"></a>Abbotsholme, however, offered not conventional Aglicanism but a refraction through Reddie's personal lens. The calendar was dotted with special services detailed in the <em>Abbotsholme Liturgy</em>, a substantial volume sumptuously printed by pupils; on Good Friday there was a reading from <em>Sartor Resartus</em>, and as much about <strong>the death of Socrates as Jesus</strong>. At the chapel service that concluded each day (there was one on Sunday morning too) Reddie took his readings from Confucius, the <em>Bhagavad Gita</em>, the <em>Daily Mail</em>, and occasionally the Bible, while pupils ransacked Emerson, Ruskin and Carlyle for their favourite passages. (Searby 1989: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The exact two figures who show up in Stapledon's fiction as examples of what humanity should strive for. // Yes, the text reads "<u>the death of Socrates <strong>as</strong> Jesus</u>".</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="midgley80"></a>Midgley, Mary 1980. The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values. I. <em>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em>, Supplementary Volumes, 54: 207-223. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106784">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p207ja208"></a>Let us start with Moore's confusions, noticing particularly the wide scope of his claim. Moore said that he had discovered a single simple fallacy, so widespread and fundamental as to vitiate practically all earlier moral reasoning. 'It is to be met with in almost every book on ethics' (<em>Principia Ethica</em>, p. 14), <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> and that apparently not just as an aberration but as a central feature. 'In general, ethical philosophers have attempted to define good without recognizing what such an attempt must mean' (p. 15), and have therefore, if they kept to the point at all, ended by saying in effect, '<strong>Do, pray, act so, because the word "good" is generally used to denote actions of this nature</strong>' (p. 12). (Midgley 1980: 207-208)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Good" is that which people say is good, <em>naturally</em>.</p><!-- $ A Consequentialist Manifesto
4 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p4210"></a>Mill had tried to avert the disaster by minor repairs, but had only diminished scandal at the price of increasing confusion. Could anyone do better with essentially Humian methods? Yes, said Moore, but only by making a drastic choice between the two central strands of Hume's philosophy. <strong>We must abandon the belief in human nature as a universal explanatory system</strong>, so boldly proclaimed in the Introduction to the <em>Treatise</em> and so well used elsewhere. Instead we must cling only to the belief in universal contingency taught chiefly in <em>Treatise</em> Book I. Accordingly, Moore ruled that good was both the only moral predicate and 'indefinable' in the sense of primitive, conceptually isolated like a Humian simple idea. (Midgley 1980: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Concerning taking "human nature" as granted, stable and ever-lasting. That is, as having been <em>made</em> (creationism).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p212"></a>For Moore, the conceptual <em>cordon sanitaire</em> round goodness is provided by its being an ultimate simple - 'one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition' (pp. 9-10). For Hare it depends on something quite different, on our <strong>moving from the speech-act of describing to that of prescribing. But no reason is given why distinct speech-acts should take us into distinct conceptual universes</strong>. (Midgley 1980: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think I know some of these words.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p213"></a><em>Example</em>. <strong>Nietzsche tells us</strong> that war is good, or <strong>that malice is a good quality in philosophers</strong>. We might, of course, respond like contentious schoolboys by just saying 'prove it'. But we see reason to take him more seriously than that. So we say 'Explain yourself. In what way are these things good? What's good about them?' Nietzsche replies that they are good because they are <strong>stimulating</strong>, because they wake you up and <strong>increase your awareness</strong>, because they remind you of your insecurity and promote independence. (Midgley 1980: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A philosopher who has some bone to pick is less boring to read, I guess?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p215"></a>Moore, like Locke (and unlike Hume) counted them both as simple notions along with specific sense-properties like 'yellow'. But their kind of simplicity is radically different. 'Simples' like yellow are conceived as atoms of experience, irreducibly particular sensations. (<strong>This is confused, but let it pass</strong>.) (Midgley 1980: 215)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Okay.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p217"></a>I go, we will say, to an empty house, to find out whether the previous tenants have left any furniture there. This is evidently a factual question. <strong>Various objects are lying around. How do I know whether they are <em>furniture</em>?</strong> On the pattern which Moore seems to have taken as normal for every term but good, and which his successors still indicate, all I ought to need is the dictionary definition of 'furniture'. <strong>The OED, letting me down badly</strong>, says 'Movable articles in a dwelling house, place of business or public building'. This <strong>seems to cover</strong> the bricks and broken glrass on the floor, the rats running around and <strong>the corpse in the bathroom, but not the wardrobe</strong>, which I cannot shift. (Midgley 1980: 217)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Can you move the corpse? No, it's too heavy? Then it's not furniture. It's part of the house.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="midgley80p222"></a>What we mean is that their goodness, as a whole, is of countless kinds, so interrelated that the whole really is inexpressible. But this, again, would be true of general factual predicates too. <strong>No doubt there are special mysteries about goodness, touched on by Plato</strong>, which arise in certain very important moral contexts. But they do not concern its general logical status, and cannot be solved by trying to use it without specification. (Midgley 1980: 222)</blockquote><!--
--><p>No doubt, no doubt.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="clark80"></a>Clark, Stephen R. L. 1980. The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values. II. <em>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</em>, Supplementary Volumes, 54: 225-240. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4106784">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
20 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p226a"></a>Moral debate is possible, and people are sometimes persuaded, rationally, that they were wrong. Factual enquiry is often uncertain, inconclusive and defeasible, while moral argument is often conclusive as to be doubted only by philosophers and the insane. "Some theses about what is good are not mere sentiments, but are rationality itself' (C. S. Lewis <em>The Abolition of Man</em> p. 25). I share Midgley's antipathy to the thinkers who have left a generation with no defence against <strong>the twin demon of indifferentism and psychotic libertinism</strong>. (Clark 1980: 226)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indifferentism">Indifferentism</a> is the belief held by some that no one religion or philosophy is superior to another.</u>" | <a href="https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/libertinism">Libertinism</a> is "<u>A lifestyle or pattern of behavior characterized by self-indulgence and lack of restraint, especially one involving sexual promiscuity and rejection of religious or other moral authority.</u>" - Demons, you say?</p><!--
20 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p226b"></a>The only proof that something is risible is that people laugh at it, but what a cruel or psychotic person laughs at is not risible. It would make no sense to say that my jokes are very risible although no-one, not even me, ever laughs at them (or rather, it would be a joke to say this). The sane, or sensible, or normal person is our criterion here, as it was Aristotle's. <strong>That a thing could be desirable though no one at all desired it, nor any concomitant of it, is as "idle and vacuous" a suggestion as Midgley could wish</strong>. (Clark 1980: 226)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One of those neat coincidences just occurred to me. I'm downloading music parallel to my reading this, and the very next band I entered from a list I have prepared beforehand is <a href="https://open.spotify.com/artist/0gQkrpBBPlzrXL8VuTkW34">A Wish For A Maniac</a>. I still don't know what to call these coincidences, when, for example, you are reading something and people are having a conversation within hearing distance, and you meet something they just said on the very page you're reading. It's a common enough experience, I think, to merit a name. (I'm not weird, I'm sure this is fairly common.)</p><!--
21 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p227"></a>In this dispute Moore took a middle way. That being true should be equated with "being accepted upon adequate evidence" (J. Dewey <em>Essays in Experimental Logic</em> p. 63), or with the facts that "the rules of confirmation embedded in the conversations of our current conceptual framework fully authorize our asserting (what is then called "true")" (R. Almeder "Fallibilism and the Ultimate Irreversible Opinion": N. rescher (ed). <em>Studpies in Epistemology</em> pp. 33f. (<strong>after Peirce</strong>)), seemed to him quite wrong. (Clark 1980: 227)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Peirce and fallibilism, of course.</p><!--
27-28 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p233ja234"></a><strong>The first response of the anti-naturalist may be to doubt that</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>such a thing as human nature exists at all</strong>. Are we not indefinitely <strong>fluid creatures</strong>, born without preconceived ideas and ready to take whatever colour may be poured on us by parents and society, "liberated" (in the pretentious phrase) "from our biological straitjacket"? To this the answer is quite simply and obviously, no. <strong>We are not indefinitely fluid, though we can put on a great many forms</strong>. We are, as Aristotle said, creatures born to society and to choice, abut not just any imaginable choices, any imaginable society would do as well to satisfy our ingrained needs and assumptions. (Clark 1980: 233-234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We are not very fluid creatures <em>synchronically</em>. Seen diachronically, perhaps there is more fluidity than meets our limited eyes.</p><!--
28 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p234"></a>The reply must come that it is an illusion to suppose that human agency here is something beyond "nature": beavers build as we do - that's their nature. It's ours to make the best we can of the material - the <em>best</em> in terms of our wants and needs. Such making and mending is not unnatural nor anti-natural: <strong>what is unnatural is to disrupt the possibility of achieving a balanced, integrated system of soul and society and biosphere</strong>. Such actions are pathological manifestations because they work against our nature and the world's. (Clark 1980: 234)</blockquote><!--
--><p>My soul, our society, this biosphere.</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p235a"></a>If we conclude with Claude Bernard that natural entelechies are essentially sefish and that this runs against the law of charity, might we not conclude that we ought to act unnaturally? If "<strong>Christianity is a rebellio nagainst natural law</strong>" (A. Hitler, <em>Hitler's Table-Talk</em> (ed. H. Trevor-Roper) p. 51; see also J. L. Mackie "The Ethics of the Jungle", <em>Philosophy</em> 53, 1978), why not rebel? Bernard's position here, so to interpret it, is essentially Gnostic. (Clark 1980: 235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And that is why Christians are the "untouchables" in Burdekin's <em>Swastika Night</em> (cf. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-reduction-of-women.html">Patai 1984</a>).</p><!--
29 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p235b"></a><strong>A species is</strong> indeed more than an arbitrary set of vaguely similar individuals: it is <strong>a real and relatively stable pattern</strong>. But not for over a century have many of us believed that species were <em>absolutely</em> stable. If we suppose that they sprang full-formed from the mind of God we might believe them ordained for ever. But <strong>most of us</strong>, including Midgley, <strong>suppose that species evolve</strong>. Our ancestors of fifty million years ago did not have thes ame natures as ourselves, or not exactly - though we share some features. <strong>We cannot know that</strong> we will have <strong>descendants in a million</strong> or ten thousand or a hundred <strong>years</strong>, and if we have we cannot know that they <strong>will have our natures, that they will be of one same species with us</strong>. (Clark 1980: 235)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Approaching Stapledon.</p><!--
29-30 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p235ja236"></a>Consider <strong>Stapledon's postulate</strong> (in <em>Last and First Men</em>) <strong>that a future species of hominids will serve as ancestors for the animal kingdom of a whole world, and our descendants occupy every ecological niche from sea-squirts to supermen</strong>. Even if we grant that <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> our present needs and wants are what they are and cannot be too roughly over-ridden without a disaster that will lose us any chance even of those goods in whose name we have distorted our natures - even so there is enough variation within our kind to permit further evolution. <strong>Which way should we wish evolution to go?</strong> "t some time in the future it will be necessary to decide how human we wish to remain" (E. O. Wilson: A. Caplan (ed) <em>The Sociobiology Debate</em> p. 301). <strong>Stapledon's devil-worshipping supermen are a possibility</strong>; so are other would-be master-races; so, to be sure, are courteous folk, "the meek". (Clark 1980: 235-236)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first ~500 million years "humanity" spends on Neptune it degenerates and variegates into subhuman predatators and prey. A human-descended-creature will be a wolf to a human-descended-creature.</p><!--
30 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p236"></a>Their natures will be other than ours, their ethical assumptions other. Perhaps they will not share even our <strong>unreasoned love of life</strong>, our optimism about what will be, and find it their full satisfaction to destroy all life they can. (Clark 1980: 236)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Conatus</em>.</p><!--
31 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p237"></a>If this approach is right, then the best that purely naturalistic ethics can manage is a new form of Protagorean relativism. <strong>Morality is a matter of <em>nomoi</em>, agreement, within a group whose nature it is to seek to live together for the satisfaction of their needs and wants</strong>. With groups whose <em>nomoi</em> are quite otherwise we may choose to fight, but we have no moral quarrel with them. There are no <em>thesmoi</em>, things decreed to al of us and binding on us all, by which we may assess their/our agreements. <strong>To be right in ethics is simply to be going along with the agreed conventions of our local group</strong>. (Clark 1980: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A summary of moral relativism.</p><!--
34 --><blockquote><a id="clark80p240"></a>Morality can indeed be naturalistic, and stem from the impulses and needs of our mammalian heritage: that what has growth from these roots is true, objectively, is credible only if our evoliton has been directed to its discovery. If it has not, we cannot count on what we thought we knew, and must make what agreement then seems bearable.<br /><strong>Some of our descendants may yet be sea-squirts</strong>. (Clark 1980: 240)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ending this philosophical paper about ethics with a psalm from the gospel of Stapledon.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="mclaughlin83"></a>McLaughlin, William I. 1983. Human Evolution in the Age of the Intelligent Machine. <em>Interdisciplinary Science Reviews</em> 8(4): 307-319. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1179/isr.1983.8.4.307">10.1179/isr.1983.8.4.307</a> [<u><a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/isr.1983.8.4.307">tandfonline.com</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p307a"></a>In general, evolutionary analyses have remained remarkably free from contact with other disciplines; in his recent synoptic work, <em>The Growth of Biological Thought</em>, the eminent Darwinian Ernst Mayr devotes only three pages to the origin of life. <strong>The Darwinian machine receives a dab of biological material from somewhere and working over aeons of time spews out a million species of animals and plants</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 307)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Panspermia?</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p307b"></a>It is not necessary to leave the Earth in order to find <strong>a potential evolutionary competitor: the modern digital computer</strong> is rapidly closing the gap between uninspired computation and adaptive response, as anyone who has lost a game of chess to a machine can attest. The speed with which electronic developments are taking place argues that a new and potent specise may soon be born and enter the evolutionary race. (McLaughlin 1983: 307)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The first personal computers enter the home and some are already thinking, "yeah, this will be our ruin."</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p308a"></a><strong>Any analysis of the future is perforce an inexact endeavor, and the most that can be hoped for is a broad outline of trends</strong>. Also, such studies cannot aspire to proof, so that plausibility becomes the goal, and, under these circumstances, analogy, metaphor, and informed opinion are tools which are not to be neglected. (McLaughlin 1983: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Add to this the influence of cultural context: trends are extrapolated from existing conditions. Stapledon's milieu lacked intelligent machines, thus he pays very little mind to the role of artificial intelligence in his imagination of the distant future.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p308b"></a>There is no lack of theories of human nature, from the earliest speculations of the Greeks through modern systems of psychology. For the purposes of the present review it is useful to employ a model of human behavior that relates functions to evolutionary variables. Such a model is <strong>the triune brain developed by Paul D. MacLean</strong>.<br />In its simplest form the triune model resolves the human brain into there sub-brains, <strong>each sub-brain being relatively autonomous and possessed of its own memory, subjectivity, and set of goals</strong>. The origin of these sub-brains is derived from evolutionary history. The most primitive of these, the reptilian sub-brain, located immediately around the brain stem, is a remnant of our reptilian ancestors and retains many of their traits in its interest in <strong>ritual and violence</strong>. The second sub-brain, the limbic system, is inherited from early mammals and is one source of our <strong>emotional capacities</strong>. The neocortex, achieving its greatest development in humans, is the foremost <strong>reasoner</strong> of the three neural masses and has almost completely enveloped the brain in its rapid growth over the last million years. (McLaughlin 1983: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Since the 1970s, the concept of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triune_brain">the triune brain</a> has been subject to criticism in evolutionary and developmental neuroscience[1] and is regarded as a myth.</u>" - Parts of the soul extrapolated unto the anatomy of the brain, with first (love/emotion) and second (power/competition) rearranged.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p308c"></a><stronG>The neocortex is largely directed toward the external world</strong>. Taken together, the two older brains are more inward-directed and mediate much of our visceral awareness. The ancient antithesis between the reason of the mind and the reason of the heart is rooted in this distinction. (McLaughlin 1983: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The neocortex is, according to this model, our referential equipment.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p308d"></a>Negative behavioral consequences of the triune brain arises from incomplete integration of the three components. <strong>'With its imagination that travels in excess of the speed of light</strong>, man's new brain may be able to keep up with the present accelerated tempo of life through speedreading, the help of computers, and other contrivances, but <strong>his two animal brains, which forever tag along</strong>, must be presumed to move at their own slow pace. They seem to have their own biological clocks and their own sequential, ritualistic way of doing things which cannot be hurried. (McLaughlin 1983: 308)</blockquote><!--
--><p>You are jet-lagged because your body makes it to your destination in an unnatural speed and your soul is lagging behind the plane's trail at a more natural pace. (From Gibson's <em>Pattern Recognition</em>, via <a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b5545891*est">Tomberg 2023</a>.)</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p309a"></a><strong>Man <em>per se</em> may be an evolutionary dead end with his incompletely integrated brain</strong>. In his words of Arthur Koestler, 'the disastrous history of our species indicates the futility of all attempts at a diagnosis which do not take into account the possibility that <strong><em>Homo sapiens</em> is a victim of one of evolution's countless mistakes</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Going for that existential blunt force trauma, I see.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p309b"></a>The line leading to man has evolved by adding new brain structures to older ones, rather than extensively changing the older ones. On the principle that the future is likely to resemble the past, <strong>this mode of evolution provides a clue to how subsequent evolution may proceed</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon's Tenth Men, the rabbit-like ones, develop "<u>a new organ, which overlaid and swallowed up</u>" the older layers of brain (cf. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/last-and-first-men.html#stapledon37p243ja244">Stapledon 1937: 243</a>).</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p309"></a>The ferment of art, philosophy, science and mathematics in classical Greece powered the Roman consciousness and through it also shaped the Middle Ages, with an infusion of religious ideas from the Middle East and Arabia. <strong>The stasis of the Middle Ages yielded in the 14th century to new modes of thought forged by the Italian Renaissance</strong>. Our modern world is largely an intellectual product of the Renaissance and a physical product of the Industrial Revolution. (McLaughlin 1983: 309)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If I'm not too much mistaken, the Renaissance occurred because of the sack of Constantinople c. 1453, which forced many Byzantine intellectuals (along with their travel chests containing Plato's extant dialogues) to flee to Italy, where Marsilio Ficino was taught Greek for the express purpose of translating them into Latin (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/02/plotinos-ja-uusplatonism.html#halfwassen23p224ja225">Halfwassen 2023: 224-225</a>). To oversimplify, the Renaissance was, from this very limited viewpoint, "the Greeks, again".</p><!--
4-5 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p309ja310"></a>However, Jaynes' most surprising conclusion is that <strong>man only became conscious in the last few thousand years when effective integration of the two hemispheres took place</strong>! He has analyzed the language of the <em>Iliad</em> and concluded that the heroes of Homeric Greece were not conscious; rather, their right hemispheres directed their left hemispheres in a way that was interpreted, by them, as the voices of the gods commanding them. As Jaynes states: 'It is one God <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> who makes Achilles promise not to go into battle, another who urges him to, and another who then clothes him in a golden fire reaching up to heaven and screams through his throat across the bloodied trench at the Trojans, rousing in them ungovernable panic. In fact, the gods take the place of consciousness.' (McLaughlin 1983: 309-310)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So that's where this piece of trivia comes from! I legitimately thought it was some psychology-minded classicist from the early 1900s. The theory is obviously weak because it is based on literary evidence.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Jaynes, J. 1976. <em>The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind</em>. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/he361629">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p310"></a>Perhaps machines will achieve a purely electrical solution to the problem of intelligence, in the sense of being able to pass a Turing test by winning the imitation game, but there is another possible route to machine intelligence that is suggested by the triune model of the human brain: <strong>addition of new machine structures to older human ones</strong>. The older human structures would then provide motivational and integrating functions for the man-machine organism, as the old animal brains inside the human head do now. The historical development and the structure of this hybrid intelligence will be examined in some detail below in the section 'The Passing of Man'. It will henceforth be referred to as the <strong><em>hyborg</em></strong>, for hybrid organism. The term obviously derives from <em>cyborg</em>, the cybernetic organism. (McLaughlin 1983: 310)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just shove a motherboard inside the cranium. No biggie.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p311a"></a>In the imitation game, since, <strong>in the author's opinion the average man can write only doggerel</strong>, the machine should not have much difficulty in competing by the use of elementary rules of syntax. (McLaughlin 1983: 311)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A brutal takedown of the average man.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p311b"></a>So far, machines have not operated in autonomous modes to any substantial degree. Hence their analytical powers have been concentrated on the solution of problems already formulated by man. <strong>The true gulf between man and intelligent machines will become apparent when autonomous machines apply their powers to the formulation of problems</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 311)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If every human second indeed amounts to something like 3 years for the intelligent machine, it may very well strive towards a final solution to its predicament via nuclear armaments. <em>Problem — existence</em>.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p311c"></a>The idea of alien intelligence, machine or extraterrestial, has <strong>a long history in literature, which affects present attitudes towards it</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 311)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A very valid point. Exactly what I was aiming at somewhere above with "cultural context".</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p312"></a>The natural tendency of <strong>most individuals</strong> is to assume a principle of uniformitarianism and so to <strong>believe, at least at an informal level, that extraterrestial intelligence exists</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 312)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Also a bunch of people who have been abducted or have seen unexplainable aerial phenomena, and now the U.S. government with its videos and testimonials.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p313a"></a>Nothing in the above considerations shows, however, that life will in fact arise in many places in the Universe. Perhaps it is indeed a very difficult process to get started. If true, would this condition make the existence of extraterrestial life improbable? No. <strong>One of the primary characteristics of life is its tendency to reproduce, to send out seeds</strong>. Clearly, life began somewhere in the Universe (we exist), and it is very natural to assume that seeds, in a genaral sense, would be sent out from centers of origin to other places in the universe. Francis Click, co-discoverer of the molecular structure of DNA, has argued that life originated on Earth as a result of primitive materials being sent here from other worlds by intelligent beingS: 'directed <strong>panspermia</strong>', as the theory is termed. (McLaughlin 1983: 313)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Panspermia? Panspermia!</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p313b"></a>The answer frequently given is that we don't see extraterrestials because they don't exist: we are alone in the galaxy. An ingenious alternative answer is the so-called '<strong>zoo hypothesis</strong>', which postulates that <strong>the solar system has been set aside as a zoo or game preserve by the galactic civilization at large in order to preserve our culture</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 313)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Ball, J. A. 1973. The Zoo Hypothesis. <em>Icarus</em> 19: 347-349. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0019-1035(73)90111-5">10.1016/0019-1035(73)90111-5</a></u> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0019103573901115?via%3Dihub">ScienceDirect</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p314"></a>If one views the content of <strong>dreams</strong> as largely, or at least significantly, originating from the old animal brains in our head, then the transmission of this content to the neocortex <strong>can be viewed as a form of interspecies communication</strong>. The mode of transmission is by means of symbolism. (McLaughlin 1983: 314)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Maybe if the triune brain theory wasn't hokum.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p315"></a>Whether or not a vertically unintegrated brain, of the triune variety or otherwise, is common amongst hominids in the galaxy cannot be determined. However, the evolutionary mismatch between the primitive neural circuitry of hominids and <strong>the speed-of-light transactions of machines should ensure the triumph of machines on all planets</stronG>. (McLaughlin 1983: 315)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Speed is key for survival?</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p316"></a>However, <strong>if man is left to make mischief</strong> for 100 000 years or more, it seems likely that he will destray himself - conceivably, genetic or chemical alterations to the triune brain could change this conclusion. (McLaughlin 1983: 316)</blockquote><!--
--><p>What's the alternative? Machine or extraterrestial overlords?</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p317a"></a>For an imaginative look at the future history of man and <strong>the problems that arise when great intelligence interacts with lesser intelligence</strong>, the works of W. Olaf Stapledon are unsurpassed. (McLaughlin 1983: 317)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Earthlings destroy both martians and venusians. Unsurpassable.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p317b"></a>The analysis is complete. Is it a work of pessimism or optimism? Of course, <strong>any work which purports to show the end of man as a species cannot be located in the traditional vein of optimism</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 317)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The Moon will not fall next thursday. It'll be a while. There's that.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p317c"></a><!-- img Figure 3 --><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicjsNs2izdMG10cpumwtQ2bnnkRuTUVuMOIQTtH3hUc1IbtT6bcyxF6MgpUdbJhzBhmmsdeVTpmdn4hVdxlnMeubQF-kGptbLCAR2rbkcq-tOH6ejfGzp2ATzbQ4EFejARQn3dT9RiKOT8bx4Qr4Ymxd5ZvHJwNFGfCJLJWDZvJx_tP4Xy3P-_yrr6d5Gw/s1150/jja_pilt_mclaughlin_1983_figure_3_the_borg.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1150" data-original-width="934" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEicjsNs2izdMG10cpumwtQ2bnnkRuTUVuMOIQTtH3hUc1IbtT6bcyxF6MgpUdbJhzBhmmsdeVTpmdn4hVdxlnMeubQF-kGptbLCAR2rbkcq-tOH6ejfGzp2ATzbQ4EFejARQn3dT9RiKOT8bx4Qr4Ymxd5ZvHJwNFGfCJLJWDZvJx_tP4Xy3P-_yrr6d5Gw/s320/jja_pilt_mclaughlin_1983_figure_3_the_borg.jpg" width="260" /></a></div><!-- -->(McLaughlin 1983: 317)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sind das die Borg?</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="mclaughlin83p319n36"></a>W. O. Stapledon (1886-1950), the British philosopher and novelist, wrote pioneering novels in the domain of science fiction. <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>Star Maker</em> are future histories while <em>Odd John</em> and <em>Sirius</em> focus upon superior intellects. <strong><em>Star Maker</em> is a wonderful elixir to administer to a flagging imagination</strong>. (McLaughlin 1983: 319, n 36)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good endnote.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-36430236536135009032023-09-11T12:25:00.006-07:002023-09-19T12:01:31.304-07:00Tähenduslikustamine<!-- Tähenduslikustamine
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMopSPyqO0WAJQhvrfgfnXCTBmym0b5fZSin9nx2al30fS35eybDR9XVQaFjJ0VSJgqOLAzF-VKuAnC3GCJjjR9zSw4bu0M44QeK-F7UkRr8jAnHWBX0hygkC1K_dEn8JQvFZmE0_2HB0ANrBdlgyDEXjisNIdM66cP7mP9IA5j1J2DA5qi3hbtGyYNhpT/s2080/jja_pilt_a014_IMG_20230815_175557.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1560" data-original-width="2080" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMopSPyqO0WAJQhvrfgfnXCTBmym0b5fZSin9nx2al30fS35eybDR9XVQaFjJ0VSJgqOLAzF-VKuAnC3GCJjjR9zSw4bu0M44QeK-F7UkRr8jAnHWBX0hygkC1K_dEn8JQvFZmE0_2HB0ANrBdlgyDEXjisNIdM66cP7mP9IA5j1J2DA5qi3hbtGyYNhpT/s320/jja_pilt_a014_IMG_20230815_175557.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#p6ldv6su06">Põld; Võsu 2006. Rituaalid organisatsioonikultuuris väärtuste edastajate ja identiteedi kujundajatena Hansapanga näitel</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#ventsel06">Ventsel 2006. "Stalin — see on Lenin täna"</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#j6emets06">Jõemets 2006. Lühike sissevaade hääle problemaatikasse</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="p6ldv6su06"></a>Põld, Maarja; Võsu, Ester 2006. Rituaalid organisatsioonikultuuris väärtuste edastajate ja identiteedi kujundajatena Hansapanga näitel. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 77-103.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p77ja78"></a><strong>Me kõik kuulume mingitesse organisatsioonidesse, teatud korrastusprintsiipidel toimivatesse inimkooslustesse</strong>, ja küllap oleme täheldanud, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> et <strong>organisatsioon on justkui kultuuri ja ühiskonna kokkusurutud mudel</strong> - selle liikmetel on sageli kindlad <strong>väärtused</strong>, olulised <strong>sümbolid</strong> ja tähenduslikud <strong>toimingud</strong>, mida etendatakse. (Põld; Võsu 2006: 77-78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Organisatsioonis on korrastusprintsiip. Kõlab kummastavalt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p78jm2"></a><strong>Ratsionalistlik, funktsionalistlik ja sümboliline</strong> on kolm peamist suunda organisatsioonikultuuri uurimisel. Ratsionalistlik käsitlus lähtub sellest, et organisatsioonil on teatud kindlad <strong>eesmärgid ja vahendid</strong> nende saavutamiseks ning kultuur on üks neist vahenditest. Funktsionalistlikku käsitlust huvitab kultuur kui teatud <strong>väärtuste ja baasarusaamade kogum</strong>, mille ülesandeks on tagada tegevuskeskkonna tingimustega kohanemine ja organisatsioonisisene ühtsus. Ehkki organisatsioonikultuuri sidusus on oluline, võib see organisatsiooni piires erineda, seetõttu on võimalikud ka n-ö organisatsioonisisesed subkultuurid. Sümboliline käsitlus rõhutab <strong>sümbolililste tegevuste</strong> osatähtsust organisatsioonis, oluline on uurida, mida organisatsioon selle liikmete jaoks tähendab. Viimasest vaatepunktist on organisatsioonikultuur oma olmeuselt mitmekesine, organisatsiooni liige võib mingit situatsiooni tõlgendada nii ühise kultuuri kui ka isiklikust seisukohast (Schultz 1994: 13-16). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 78, jm 2)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eelnevaga kooskõlastatud järjekorras: 1) toimingud; 2) väärtused; 3) sümbolid.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p78"></a>Meie lähtume üldisest eeldusest, et organisatsioon on vaadeldav kultuurina ja toetume oma artiklis eeskätt neile autoritele, kelle organisatsioonikultuuri käsitlustes on <strong>kokkupuutepunkte sotsiaalantropoloogia ja kultuurisemiootikaga</strong> (Schein 1992; Trice, Beyer 1984). Selline arusaam võimaldab <strong>käsitleda organisatsiooni iseseisva kultuuritüübina</strong>, milles avalduvad sellele eriomasel moel mitmed kultuurile laiemalt omased komponendid (nt väärtused, rituaalid, identiteet). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
Schein 1992 --><li><u>Schein, Edgar H. 1992[1985]. <em>Organizational Culture and Leadership</em>. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/organizationalc000sche">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
Trice, Beyer 1984 --><li><u>Trice, Harrison M.; Beyer, Janice M. 1993[1992]. <em>The Cultures of Work Organizations</em>. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/culturesofworkor0000tric">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p79ja80"></a>Rituaalidele kui kultuurietendustele, mis aitavad kujundada sotsiaalseid gruppe, on iseloomulik terve rida eritunnuseid, millest olulisemad on nende koordineeritus ja struktureeritus (suhteliselt kindel tegutsemiskava või stsenaarium; "lavastajaks" võib olla nii kultuuritraditsioon kui ka konkreetsed teostajad), korduvus ja korratavus (teatud variatsioonidega), ajalis-ruumiline <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> piiritletus (sageli ruumiline eraldatus ja ruumi sümboolne markeeritus), kollektiivne (osa võtab mitu inimest, võidakse jaguneda etendajateks ja publikuks), esteetiline ja sümboliline väärtus (<strong>kõrgendatud meeleolu, pidulikkus, esteetiliste kvaliteetide nautimine</strong>) (Singer 1980; Turner 1985; Stoeltje, Bauman 1988). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 79-80)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Osad neist tunnustest oleksid isegi "faatilised".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p81"></a>Sageli võib sümbolilisuse kasvuga seostada ka esteetilisuse suurenemist - rituaalid võivad pakkuda mitmesuguseid sensoorseid naudinguid, "mängu ilu", lahutada osalejate meelt jne. <strong>Rituaalidega kaasneva kõrgendatud meeleolu, emotsionaalse ekspressiivsuse tõttu jäävad need sündmused inimestele paremini meelde</strong>, tugevdades omakorda kogukonna ühtsustunnet (McAuley; Lawson 2002). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 81)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nad on maakeeli "sündmused" kõigi selle sõna konnotatsioonidega (harukordsus, erilisus, jne). Tundub ainult loomulik, et <em>mäletatavus</em> on osa sellest.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p81ja82"></a>Kokkuvõtvalt võib öelda, et <strong>rituaalidel on oluline osa</strong> kultuurilises kommunikatsioonis (sh <strong>autokommunikatsioonis</strong>) - nad täidavad selles mitmeid tähtsaid funktsioone, mida niisugusel moel ei saa asendada üksnes teine käitumispraktika. <strong>Rituaalid toimivad sotsialiseerimise vahendina</strong>, olgu siis kogukonna ühendajana ja ühtsustunde loojana (<strong>ühine sööming ja pidutsemine</strong>), kogukonda uute liikmete <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> integreerijana (initsiatsiooniriitus) või inimeste ideoloogilise mõjutajana ja võimu legitimiseerijana (paraad). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 81-82)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Rituaalne autokommunikatsioon?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p82"></a>Organisatsioonikultuuris, nagu kultuuris laiemaltki, on võimalik eristada selle abstraktsemat sisu, <strong>mentaalsesse sfääri kuuluvat</strong> (ideoloogiad, normid, väärtused) ja <strong>nähtavaid avaldusi või praktikaid</strong> (lood, kangelased, rituaalid, materiaalsed sümbolid jne), mille kaudu sisutasandile kuuluvat edastatakse. (Põld; Võsu 2006: 82)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vaim on nähtamatu.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p83ja84"></a>Tegemist on <strong>grupisisese minapildiga, mis ei pruugi</strong> tavasituatsioonis <strong>ollagi</strong> aktiivselt <strong>teadvustatud</strong>, vajadus organisatsiooni kollektiivset identiteeti määratleda või selle üle reflekteerida tekib sageil muutuste olukorras (organisatsiooni reorganiseerimine, kahe organisatsiooni ühinemine). Organisatsiooni <strong>deklareeritud</strong> ehk korporatiivne identiteet seevastu on eeskätt <strong>väljapoole suunatud enesekirjeldus</strong>, teatav ideaalnägemus sellest, milline see organisatsioon on või võiks olla väljastpoolt vaadatuna, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kuidas see organisatsioon soovib teiste poolt ära tuntud saada (deklareeritud väärtused; tunnuslaused, logo jm). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 83-84)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ähmaselt teadvustatud tegelikkus vs valjult deklareeritud ideaal.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p87"></a>Kokkuvõtteks võib öelda, et rituaalid ei ole organisatsioonikultuuris pelgalt praktilis-instrumentaalseid funktsioone täitvad toimingud, vaid nagu kõigi kultuurietenduste puhul, on ka siin olulised sümbolilised, esteetilised ja emotsionaalsed aspektid. <strong>Ka "rituaal rituaali pärast" võib olla "meie"-tunde tugevdajaks</strong> ja oluliseks komponendiks organisatsiooni elatud identiteedis. (Põld; Võsu 2006: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jälle on tunne nagu autorid tahaksid rääkida faatikast, aga ei tea sellist mõistet.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p87ja88"></a><strong>Organisatsioon kultuurina pole midagi oma liikmetest eraldiseisvat</strong> - kõik organisatsiooni liikmed on mingil määral organisatsioonikultuuri loojad oma tegevuste ja nende käigus omandatud kogemuste tähenduslikustamise, tõlgendamise ja tähtsustamisega <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> (Schultz 1994: 8). (Põld; Võsu 2006: 87-88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Organisatsiooni kultuur asub oma liikmetes (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/spinoza-very-short-introduction.html#scruton02p40">Scruton 2002: 40</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p91"></a><blockquote>Mingi värk on, et <strong>helistad ükskõik kuhu ja sulle öeldakse "tšau" ja sind sinatatakse</strong>, kuigi sa räägid ilmselt endast 30 aastat vanema inimesega, keda sa iialgi pole näinud ja iial ei näe ka. Mingi omamoodi värk on. (Kristi, teller, HPs töötanud 6 kuud)</blockquote>(Põld; Võsu 2006: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Klassikaline faatika.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p93a"></a><blockquote>Pank tahab sellega öelda igale töötajale, et iga töötaja on oluline panga jaoks. Et <strong>kuna neid töötajaid ei oleks, ei oleks ka selliseid tulemusi ja seda panka ennast</strong>. Töötajate väärtustamine ikkagi. (Helle, juht, HPs töötanud 6 kuud)</blockquote>(Põld; Võsu 2006: 93)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Praegu elame alles internetipanganduse algusaegadel. Saabub ka päev mil tellereid ei ole ja kogu pank ongi vaid IT-inimesed ja juhid, kes neid piitsutavad.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="p6ldv6su06p93ja94"></a><blockquote>Minu jaoks ütlevad nad seda, et <strong>inimesed ei ole sellised mittesuhtlejad ja külmad, et nad käiksid siin ainult tööl</strong>. Et kui kell kuus kukub, siis pannakse uks kinni ja minnakse oma sõprade ja oma tuttavate juurde, vaid tahetakse koos tööd teha ka töövälisel ajal, selles mõttes et <strong>joogatrenn on ikka töö ka</strong>. Et koos aega veeta, üksteist paremini <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> tundma õppida. See tugevdab meeskonda ka. (Miia, teller, HPs töötanud 4 kuud)</blockquote>(Põld; Võsu 2006: 93-94)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lipsas läbi, et töötaja näeb töökaaslastega ühist joogatrenni osana töökohustustest.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="ventsel06"></a>Ventsel, Andreas 2006. "Stalin — see on Lenin täna". Juhikultuse deiktiline analüüs. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 104-112.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p105"></a>Kangelaslikkuse printsiip - olgu siis stahhaanovlaste, sõjakangelaste, parteitegelaste jne näol - oli üks peamistest teksti ülesehitavatest struktuurielementidest nii poliitilises retoorikas kui ka sotsrealistlikus kunstikaanonis. Kuid n-ö ülemkangelase ehk Juhi roll oli nõukogude ideoloogias eriliselt markeeritud. Juhi positsioon oli see "püha koht", mis pidi alati täidetud ja esindatud olema: <strong>Juht kujutas endast nõukogude kultuuri üht olulisemat tunnust</strong> - rangelt hierarhilise ja püramiidikujulise süsteemi tippu. (Ventsel 2006: 105)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Palja ülakehaga poni otsas sõitev ja esimesel üritamisel meresügavustest antiikseid vaase leidev Putin annab mõista, et see tunnus on Vene kultuurile iseloomulik ka pärast 20. sajandi suurimat katastroofi.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p106"></a><strong>Poliitilises diskursuses omasid</strong> Lenini teosed "Mis teha?" (1902), "Üks samm edasi, kaks sammu tagasi" (1904), "Sotsiaaldemokraatia kaks taktikat demokraatlikus revolutsioonis" (1905) jpt ning <strong>Stalini kirjutatud</strong> "ÜK(b) Partei lühikursus" (1938) ja <strong>"Leninismi küsimusi" (1945) samasugust sakraalset tähendust kui õigeusklikus diskursuses omas piibel</strong>. (Ventsel 2006: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Samasugune ühendus oli Hiinas: "Punane raamat" oli sajandeid enne Mao Zedongi üks taolistlik teos, mis jõudis keisrini nii, et ühel päeval olevat inimesed näinud kuidas see kukkunus taevast. Keiser kutsuti seda kaema enne kui keegi teine oleks julgenud seda puutuda ja bingo-bango, järgnevatel aastakümnetel valitses teokraatia. Religioosne võim keisri üle <em>nagu maast leitud</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p107"></a>Juhikultust võib iseloomustada järgnevate karakteristikute kaudu:<ul><li>Juhi üleinimlikkus - "peale suuruse, läbitungivuse, mõistuse, tohutu tahte, [...] <strong>on temas midagi üleinimlikku</strong>". Ja teiselt poolt, Juhi "lihtsus, inimlikkus" - Lenin on, vaatamata oma üleinimlikkusele, seltsimees teiste parteilaste hulgas (Dobrenko 1993: 76).</li><li>Rahvalikkus - <strong>oma lhitsuses on ta ühtlasi rahvale-massile mõistetav</strong>. Juht on tõeline oraator ja rahvamees. Partei ja rahva südametunnistus ja Juhis koondub omakorda partei südametunnistus (vt Vladimir Lenini "Mis teha?" (1945a), "Üks samm edasi, kaks sammu tagasi" (1945b)).</li><li>Ettenägelikkus - Juht on see, kes <strong>suudab ette näha sündmusi tulevikus</strong>.</li><li>Läbinägelikkus - Juhi üleloomulikkust ilmestab võime <strong>mitte ainult ette näha, vaid ka läbi näha</strong>. Stalin suutis tänu jumalikule läbinägelikkusele jõuda trotskismi olemuseni, "poliitiliste tegelasteni", "kes varjasid omi vaateid mitte üksnes töölisklassi, mitte üksnes trotskistide masside, vaid ka juhtivate trotskiskide eneste eest" (Vaiskopf 2002: 355). Siin oleks Stalin justkui Trotski ise, teades vaenlaste (trotskistide) plaane ja mõtteid paremini kui vaenlased ise teavad.</li></ul>Kirjeldatud iseloomustust võiks jätkata, kuid juba nimetatud omadustest on näha, et siin on tegemist täiesti eriliste ja vastuoluliste võimetega inimestega, kes on üheaegselt nii lihtne partei seltsimees kui ülivõimetega demiurg. (Ventsel 2006: 107)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõiki neid aspekte ilmestab juba Pythagorase müüt: 1) niivõrd üleinimlik, et isegi tuul käitub viisakalt kui Pythagoras reisib, jõed kõnetavad teda jne; 2) ta peab meestele, naistele ja lastele iselaadseid, neile suunatud ja neile arusaadavaid, kõnesid; 3) ta teab ette, mitu kala on kalamehe võrgus ja ülelugemisel ongi nii nagu ta ütleb; kui tema vastu sepitsetakse vandenõud, on ta saatuslikul hetkel varmalt juba teises linnas; 4) ta kuuleb "sfääride muusikat", mida teised surelikud ei kuule; tunneb pekstud koera häälitsustes ära oma ammuse sõbra hinge jne.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p108"></a>Lenini surmale järgnenud aastatel, kui toimus terav parteisisene võimuvõitlus, oli just Stalin see, kes kasutas ära kujunevat Leninikultust. <strong>Osutades oma kirjutistes Lenini kirjalikele tekstidele, nendest samaaegselt tsitaate välja rebides ja endale sobivasse konteksti paigutades, mängis Stalin osavalt sümboolse Lenini-kultusega</strong>. Stalin lõi endast pildi kui Lenini ustavast õpilasest, kes hoiab puhtana leninismi vaimset pärandit (Vaiskopf 2002: 278). Omaenda individuaalsus ei omanud võrdluses õpetajga mingit väärtust. Nagu ka Lenini tekste enda vajadusele vastavalt interpreteerides ei olnud Stalini eesmärgiks Lenini kui autori individuaalsuse säilitamine. Siinkohal tuleb eristada kahte tekstilist diskursust. Üks on minapilt, mille Stalin ise oma teostes iseendast lõi. Stalin esineb siin tõesti üksnes Leninismi "vahendajana", kelle ainsaks eeliseks on Lenini õpetusest adekvaatne arusaamine (mitte tõlgendamine) ja selle õige(aegne) elluviimine. (Ventsel 2006: 108)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ei tea kas sellest saabki alguse see Nõukogude traditsioon, et kõigis kirjutistes ükskõik mis valdkonnas tuleb kõigepealt ära märkida, mida seltsimees Lenin asjast arvas.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p109ja110"></a>Benveniste'i järgi on "meie" teatav ühendus, mis koosneb "minast" ja "mitteminast" (mis selel mittemina koostis ka poleks). See on hoopis erilist laadi ühisus, mis tugineb liikmete mitteekvivalentsusel: <strong>asesõnas</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>"meie" on alati domineeriv "mina" (lausumise subjekti tõttu) ja see "mina" allutab endale "mittemina" oma transtsendentsusest lähtuvalt</strong> (enesest välja astudes ta alles loob konkreetse "meie" ja määratleb ühtlasi ka "mittemina") (Benveniste 2002: 268-269). Olles ainuke subjekt, allutab Stalin "meie" enda "mina" transtsendentsusest lähtuvalt ja <strong>kogu dialoog transformeerub tsirkulaarsesse minakommunikatsiooni</strong>. Enesest välja astudes Stalin alles loob konkreetse "meie". Dialoog kommunikatsiooniruumis väljaspool Stalinit ei loo lausungite subjektiivset "objektiivset aega", sest see "aeg" on varem Stalini poolt kehtestatud. (Ventsel 2006: 109-110)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Mina ütlen, mida meie asjast arvame</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="ventsel06p111"></a>Ka enda varasemaid seisukohti hindas Stalin pidevalt ümber (Vaiskopf 2002). <strong>Tekstid, mis uue lausumisega kokku ei sobinud, muutusid ideoloogilise eneseesitluse seisukohast mitte-tekstiks</strong> (s.t nad kõrvaldati avalikust diskursiivsest ringlusest) või mõningal juhul antitekstiks. Selle kõige taga oli muidugi lihtne reaalpoliitika - monopol "õige Lenini" kujutamise üle võimaldas võimuvõitluses kõrvaldada neid, kes polnud nõus Stalini poliitikaga. Stalinistlik üleskutse "parteilisele enesekriitikale" oli tegelikult selle võimuvõitluse üks ideoloogilistest varjamise viisidest. (Ventsel 2006: 111)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ühe-mehe-tõeministeerium. See motiiv Orwelli teoses võis saada <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/09/a-reduction-of-women.html">Burdekin</a>ilt inspiratsiooni, aga sai täidetud just Stalini ajaloo-ümberkirjutamise sisuga.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="j6emets06"></a>Jõemets, Viivian 2006. Lühike sissevaade hääle problemaatikasse. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 113-126.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p114"></a>Hääle <strong>amorfne</strong> materjal paelub oma ebamäärasuse ja tabamatusega. Tema olemus on olemuse puudumine. Hääl iseeneses ei väljenda midagi, ta on vormitu, sisutu. Varjunud kõne ja muusika taha, esineb hääl nähtusena, mis ei ole subjekt ega objekt, vaid <strong>fluidum</strong>. Siin võib näha teatud paralleeli valgusega, mis saab tajutavaks läbi esemete, millel ta peegeldub. <strong>Meie jaoks ei ole olemas valgust ega häält kui asja nullastmes, iseendas oma algses olemises</strong>. Võimatu oleks määratleda "normaalset" häält, tal puudub standard või mudel, millesse subjekt püüab oma häält sobitada. Arusaam meeldivast, tervest ja kaunist häälest kujuneb kultuuri ja individuaalsete kogemuste koostoimel. <strong>Hääle olemuseks on kaduda, olla efemeerne ja fikseerimatu. Hetkel, mil hääl tuleb üle huulte, on ta juba minevik</strong>. (Jõemets 2006: 114)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Suukaudsed õhuvibratsioonid.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p115a"></a>Hääl võib esineda mitmes vormis: kõne, laul ning kõik astmed kõne ja laulu vahelisel skaalal nagu psalmoodia, Sprechstimme ja muud emotsioone väljendavad häälitsused (ohked, nuuksed) ning <strong>keha hääled (korinad, röhitsused, köhatused)</strong>, mida kaasaegne looming on hakanud kunstilistel eesmärkidel muusikasse tooma. (Jõemets 2006: 115)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2013/10/introducing-coenetics.html">Wescott</a>i strepitaalne kommunikatsioon - keha poolt tekitatud helid, mis ei ole ilmtingimata "hääl" (peeretus, susside sahin, jne).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p115b"></a>Öeldakse, et sõnad võivad valetada, aga hääl mitte. Hääle edastatud sõnum võib olla emiteerija poolt teadvustamata või tahtmatu, sest <strong>hääle kasutamine ja valitsemine on ühiskonnas tähelepanu alt välja jäänud</strong>, vastupidiselt kõnele, mida ohjavad erinevad perekonnast, haridusest, kultuurist ja muudest faktoritest tingitud keelud ja piirangud. Selliseid mehhanisme võib seada teatud hierarhiatesse, kus sõnal on suurim teadvustatud emiteerija-poolne kontroll ning vastuvõtja tähelepanu, järgneb žest kui visuaalne tähenduse kandja ning viimaks kõige vähem olulisemana hääl ja selle omadused. (Jõemets 2006: 115)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jääb mulje justkui olukordades, kus on keelatud kõneleda (klassiruum, ametlik vastuvõtt, tseremoonia jne) on häälitsemine siiski lubatud. <em>Jah, ta seal taga räuskab - aga vähemalt ei kõnele</em>. Kumma kõrvale lennukis istud: lõputult vadistava täiskasvanu või lakkamatult nutva imiku kõrvale.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p117ja118"></a>Kõne tähenduse edastamise kahest moodusest - segmentaalsest ja suprasegmentaalsest - edastab kiri teatud täpsusega vaid esimest, s.t tähendust, mida edastavad täis- ja kaashäälikute kombinatsioonidest tekkinud sõnad ning nendest moodustatavad laused. <strong>Kõik supragmentaalse ja prosoodilise aspekti alla kuuluvad näitajad ning afektiivsus jäävad täielikult suulise suhtlemisakti valda</strong>, mille juures <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> saame eristada prosoodilise ja afektiivse aspekti semantilisest, <strong>hääl ja sõnad võivad tähenduslikult ühtida ja vastanduda</strong> - vastavalt siis paralleelne või ristuv seos - mode parallèle või mode perpendiculaire (Sapir 1990: 10). (Jõemets 2006: 117-118)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üks lähenemisviis küsimusele, kas emotiivsus on lingvistiline.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p119"></a>Hääl kui kehaline ekspressioon tõlgendab ja iseloomustab subjekti. <strong>Inimene mõtestab iseend läbi oma hääle ja kõne, luues nn autointerpretatsiooni</strong>. Väljendus, "heliline tunnistus iseendast" (Fugain 1990: 100), jääb siin enese ümber suletuks ega eelda publikut. Kuuldes tühjuses enese häält, mis kandub ruumis kajana subjektile tagasi, esitab subjekti küsimuse või kutse näiliselt teisele, väljapoole iseend, kuid tegelikkuses seab end ise vastaja rolli tõdedes, et hüüdele "On siin keegi?", millele ei tule vastust teiselt, peab vastama "Jah, mina olen". Vaikusesse paisatud häälest saab peegel kõneluses iseendaga. (Jõemets 2006: 119)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Autokommunikatsioon. Väite endaga on raske nõustuda; inimene isegi ei kuule omaenda häält nii nagu teised inimesed seda kuulevad. Pigem mõtestatakse iseennast tunnetuse, väljanägemise või mõttemaailma järgi.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p120a"></a>Lähemal vaatlusel osutub hääl organismi rudimendiks, sest tal puudub elu püsimajäämiseks vajalik ülesanne. <strong>Vaikimine ei tekita inimese organismis vähimatki orgaanilist või funktsionaalset häiret</strong>. (Jõemets 2006: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Öelge ausalt, doktor, kas ma võin vaikida?</em> - Jah, see on kõrvalnähtudeta.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p120b"></a>Hääle suur <strong>seduktiivsus</strong> seletub ehk muu hulgas tõigaga, et hääl on otseselt seotud inimese seksuaalsusega: suudame vaevata eristada mees- ja naishäält - hääl on sekundaarne sootunnus. (Jõemets 2006: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Blameeritav. Mis on "veetlevus"?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6emets06p121"></a>Kaasaegse tsivilisatsiooni aegruum oma istuva eluviisiga, kus visuaalsel infol on tohutu tähtsus, on jätnud inimese keha ilma tema olulisest rollist: <strong>keha kui väljenduse ja tunnetuse vahend</strong>. Kehast on saanud "kest" füsioloogiliste vajaduste äitmiseks ja ülioluliseks on muutunud selle kesta esteetiline normatiivne kujundamine. Keha kui eneseväljenduse vahend on minetanud oma otstarbe. Seda võiks võrrelda <strong>instrumendiga, mida küll maalitakse, lihvitakse ja poleeritakse, kuid mis tegelikult ei tee häält</strong> ega suuda ületada ilusaks asjakeseks olemise staatust. (Jõemets 2006: 121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Seda kujundit saab isegi laiendada. Me oleme loomuliku liikumise suuresti asendanud jõusaaliga. Selleks, et instrumenti ilusana hoida, tuleb seda kolm korda nädalas samade masinate peal korduvalt näpitsate vahel pöörata. Nagu viiul, millel ei mängita poognaga, vaid millele koputatakse trummipulkadega (aga hästi tugevalt, niiet teeb heli küll!).</p><!-- pooleli 127 -->Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-6571156177354260872023-09-11T12:20:00.002-07:002023-09-11T12:20:18.903-07:00A Reduction of Women<!-- A Reduction of Women
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6qJ7DQMUXB72yRtX_snIuB0DoCbwUZzcGmTj335mK_Na_7JCWVngZR5aiqzK6YDMR8mfGFSjBk1SXykHJ5In_yHrE52P9uZe_4b1YMJ75JffGSajjhHYS57Fd8psE8fLhIb4xQHKndCnbEZ7ppTjHBPdAj64nBPD_dW4y2VfcubjLPPZPApT7lV7MsQv4/s1024/jja_pilt_sdjl_patai_1984_orwells_despair_burdekins_hope.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1024" data-original-width="1024" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj6qJ7DQMUXB72yRtX_snIuB0DoCbwUZzcGmTj335mK_Na_7JCWVngZR5aiqzK6YDMR8mfGFSjBk1SXykHJ5In_yHrE52P9uZe_4b1YMJ75JffGSajjhHYS57Fd8psE8fLhIb4xQHKndCnbEZ7ppTjHBPdAj64nBPD_dW4y2VfcubjLPPZPApT7lV7MsQv4/s320/jja_pilt_sdjl_patai_1984_orwells_despair_burdekins_hope.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Patai, Daphne 1984. Orwell's despair, Burdekin's hope: Gender and power in dystopia. <em>Women's Studies International Forum</em> 7(2): 85-95. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(84)90062-1">10.1016/0277-5395(84)90062-1</a> [<u><a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0277539584900621">ScienceDirect</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p85a"></a><strong>In</strong> June <strong>1937</strong>, twelve years before the publication of <em>1984</em>, <strong>a novel appeared in London with the timely title <em>Swastika Night</em> which strikingly foreshadows Orwell's most famous work</strong>. <em>Swastika Night</em> was published under the male pseudonym 'Murray Constantine', but in fact its author was Katharine Burdekin, a feminist novelist who had produced eight previous books, mostly of fantasy and science fiction - six under her own name in the years between 1922 and 1930, and two in 1934 as 'Murray Constantine'. (Patai 1984: 85)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Constantine, Murray [Burdekin, Katharine] 2016[1937]. <em>Swastika Night</em>. London: Gollancz.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/swastikanight0000cons/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p85b"></a><em>Swastika Night</em> was reissued in July 1940 as a Left Book Club selection and became one of the very few works of fiction the Club ever distributed to its members. <strong>Victor Gollancz</strong>, founder of the Club and of the publishing house that to this day bears his name, <strong>was also the first publisher of George Orwell</strong>, and Orwell's <em>The Road to Wigan Pier</em> was itself a Left Book Club selection for March 1937. There is no direct evidence that Orwell was acquainted with Burdekin's novel; only the internal similarities between <em>1984</em> and <em>Swastika Night</em> suggest a connection. (Patai 1984: 85)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like a whole interesting world that I know nothing about, yet.</p><!--
1-2 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p85ja86"></a>Burdekin envisions Germany and England in the seventh century of the Hitlerian millennium. <strong>The world has been divided into the Nazi Empire (Europe and Africa) and the Japanese Empire (Asia and the Americas)</strong>. In the Nazi Empire Hitler is venerated as a god and <strong>a 'Reduction of Women'</strong> has occurred by which women have been driven to an animal-like state of ignorance and are kept purely for breeding purposes. <strong>All books, records, and even</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>monuments from the past have been destroyed in an effort to make the official Nazi 'reality' the only one</strong>. The Reduction of Women and the exaltation of men has led to homosexual attachments among men, though for German men procreation is a civic duty. A type of feudal society is in force, with German Knights as the local authorities. <strong>Christians</strong>, having wiped out all the Jews at the beginning of the Nazi era, <strong>are now themselves the lowest of the low and are considered untouchable</strong>. (Patai 1984: 85-86)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Found a title on the very first page. The summary comes across as an apt extrapolation from Nazi aspirations.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p86a"></a>The plot centers on a skeptical English engineer, Alfred, on a pilgrimage to Germany. Through his young German friend Hermann, Alfred comes into contact with a Knight named von Hess. Von Hess's family has for generations guarded <strong>a secret manuscript</strong> - probably the only non-technical book in the German Empire other than the Hitler Bible - <strong>which is an attempted reconstruction of the true history of the world before Naziism</strong>. Von Hess also possesses a photograph depicting the real <strong>Hitler</strong> - not <strong>the blond giant of a god into which he has been transformed</strong> - in the presence of a proud and strong-looking German girl. The photograph at one stroke undoes the two central tenets of Hitlerism: that <strong>Hitler was never in the defiling presence of a woman</strong>, and that women have always been the loathsome creatures that they are in this seventh century of Hitlerism. (Patai 1984: 86)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perhaps this manuscript ordeal is what Orwell's Winston is looking for when he questions an old man in the pub. Perhaps Goldsmith's book is an echo or vestige of Burdekin's manuscript. And of course Hitler would have become a blond and blue-eyed Nordic giant in seven centuries.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p86b"></a>Extrapolating from his own society, Orwelli in <em>1984</em> arrives at an urban society that is as shabby as post-war London, and onto this he grafts Nazi and Stalinist elements. Burdekin, however, extrapolates from the Romantic and medieval longing of such Nazi ideologues as Alfred Rosenberg and hence imagines <strong>a totalitarian society in which a spurious Germanic mythology with its cult of masculinity governs life</strong>, and sheer ignorance is combined with brutality to form the main instruments of control. (Patai 1984: 86)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Damn, "a spurious Germanic mythology" is even better (a title) but I've already committed. What I imagine is if the Proud Boys governed an empire on two continents. It would be extremely dumb.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p87a"></a><em>Swastika Night</em> and <em>1984</em> are both about the interactions of <em>men</em>. Burdekin addresses this issue in her exposé of the cult of masculinity, but <strong>Orwell</strong>, taking the worst male type as the model for the human species, <strong>seems to believe that the pursuit of power is an innate characteristic of human beings</strong>. Thus Orwell's despair and Burdekin's hope are linked to the degree of awareness that each has of gender roles and sexual polarization. (Patai 1984: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>(1) love, (2) power, and (3) curiosity.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p87b"></a>Although Orwell gives names (such as <strong><em>Newspeak</em> and <em>doublethink</em></strong>) to phenomena that <strong>also appear in <em>Swastika Night</em></strong>, he cannot and does not provide a name for the key concept that explains the Party's preoccupation with domination, power, and violence: these are all part of what Burdekin calls <strong>the cult of masculinity</strong>. Because she is able to name this ideology, Burdekin's depiction of a totalitarian regime has a dimension totally lacking in Orwell's novel. (Patai 1984: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ooh, now I'm really really interested.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p88a"></a>Although in his earlier writings he occasionally argued against <strong>mistaking power hunger for a biological fact</strong>, in the world of <em>1984</em> he disassociates this hunger from the context that alone can hope to explain it. While his novel makes it clear that life for women in Oceania is in many respects similar to their life in Orwell's own society, this is not part of his critique. (Patai 1984: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nietzsche comes to mind.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p88b"></a><em>Swastika Night</em> begins with a religious ceremony in the Holy Hitler chaptel of a swastika-shaped church. The creed is sung: Hitler is venerated as a son of God the Thunderer, exploded from the head of his father, an interesting adaptation of the myth of Zeus and Athena, itself an example of male usurpation of female procreative powers. Thus <strong>Hitler is 'untainted', that is, not begotten or born of woman</strong>. By contrast, mortal men are all 'defiled at birth'. (Patai 1984: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hot damn. This is a vaguely familiar trope but I cannot put my finger on where I've met it before. Maybe this: "<u>A Greek Orthodox monk on Mount Athos, the center of Orthodox monasticism, died at the age of 82 without ever seeing a woman.</u>"</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p89a"></a>According to this Nazi ideology, <strong>women have no souls</strong> and are not human, but German men must have intercourse with German woman in order to perpetuate the race - something many of the men find impossible to do. The Knight, as he preaches to the women about their duties, knows, however, that fewer and female female babies are being born and that in this way the entire society is, ironically, endangered. He also knows - because he possesses the secret manuscript - that women were once loved. Now, however, they have been turned into ugly creatures with minds hardly more intelligent than that of a dog. (Patai 1984: 89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Well, strictly speaking, no-one does. The soul is a metaphysical construct. It doesn't actually exist.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p89b"></a>In the figure of Alfred, Burdekin creates a hero destined, like his historical namesake, to contribute to his country's freedom - but Alfred is emphatically not a warrior. Burdekin had published a pacifist novel, <strong><em>Quiet Ways</em></strong>, in 1930, in which she <strong>attacks the very idea of manliness as dependent upon violence and prowess</strong>. In <em>Swastika Night</em> she continues this attack through Alfred, who realizes that the Hitlerian notions of <strong>violence, brutality, and physical courage can never make a 'man', but only ageless boys</strong>. To be a man, in his view, requires a soul; liberation from Hitlerism, in <em>Swastika Night</em>, cannot come through violence and brutality, the 'soldierly virtues'. (In her 1934 novel <em>Proud Man</em>, Burdekin had defined a soldier as '<strong>a killing male</strong>'.) <em>Swastika Night</em> reveals the gradual extension of Alfred's understanding; from the rejection of Nazi views of what it means to be a man, he eventually comes to reject also the Nazi views of women. (Patai 1984: 89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This appears to be a rare book, possibly not reissued. Yup: "<u>Rare - only this edition ever appeared and is in only five libraries.</u>"</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Burdekin, Katharine 1930. <em>Quiet Ways</em>. London: T. Butterworth.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.abebooks.com/servlet/BookDetailsPL?bi=30856966836">AbeBooks</a></u> — US$ 363.02]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p90"></a>Although women had a high place, in theory, in the old Christian theology, von Hess explains, the Christian men acquiesced in the Reduction of Women 'probably because <strong>there always had been in the heart of the religion a hatred of the beauty of women and a horror of the sexual power beautiful women with the right of choice and rejection have over men</strong>. And when the women were reduced to the condition of speaking animals, they probably found it impossible to go on believing they had souls.' (Patai 1984: 90)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Apt.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p91a"></a>Thus Burdekin has <strong>each of her character grasp bits of the puzzle and contribute to the reader's understanding</strong>, which is a composite of these elements, <strong>rather than creating one fully knowledgeable 'informant'</strong> who would speak didactically to the reader. (Patai 1984: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhat familiar: "<u>The novel is the story of Paul's revenge for the death of his father as well as an ecological puzzle in which the reader gradually pieces together the reality of Dune.</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/a-yearning-for-totality.html#fitting79p67ja68">Fitting 1979: 67</a>)</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p91b"></a><em>Proud Man</em>, published in 1934 under the Murray Constantine pseudonym, is a novel that utilizes a science fiction framework to make a profound criticism of the sex-gender system. <strong>Like</strong> Olaf <strong>Stapledon</strong>'s <em>Last and First Men</em>, published in 1931, <strong>Burdekin utilizes a superior narrator who looks back on an earlier time</strong>. Stapledon, however, situates this narrator in the remote future and has his gaze fall schematically on a two-billion year long process of evolution that includes eighteen species of men. Burdekin, by contrast, has her narrator dream of a two-year stay in a twentieth-century England still perfectly recognizable to us nearly fifty years later. (Patai 1984: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The only reason I came across this interesting paper. A mere mention of Stapledon is a mark of quality in my eyes.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p92"></a>Burdekin locates the root cause of patriarchy in <strong>the male need to redress the natural balance that gives women greater biological importance than men</strong>. Like Karen Horney, whose essays on feminine psychology were available in English in the 1920s, Burdekin sees the male imposition on women of an inferiorized social identity as the result of a fundamental fear and jealousy of women's procreative powers. <strong>It is this that explains men's insistence on women's inferior artistic (and other) abilities</strong>, as Burdekin's narrator explains to a discouraged women writer in <em>Proud Man</em>. (Patai 1984: 92)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"[<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_Horney">Karen Horney</a>] <u>disagreed with Freud about inherent differences in the psychology of men and women, and she traced such differences to society and culture rather than biology.</u>" - Smart lady.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="patai84p93"></a>In <em>Proud Man</em> Burdekin concludes that men and women must be transformed: '<strong>They must stop being masculine and feminine, and become male and female. Masculinity and femininity are the artificial differences between men and women</strong>. Maleness and femaleness are the real differences...'. (Patai 1984: 93)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sex vs gender. Good paper, this.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-86408417767685111632023-09-05T10:04:00.003-07:002023-09-11T12:29:06.439-07:00Koodilõhkuv<!-- Koodilõhkuv
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#vaher06">Vaher 2006. Tunne oma võõrast</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#rynk06">Rünk 2006. Subjekti taandumine ironistlikus praktikas</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kuusk06">Kuusk 2006. Foto tähendusmehhanismid:</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="vaher06"></a>Vaher, Berk 2006. Tunne oma võõrast: Artaud' paradoks "oma" ja "võõra" semiootika vaatepunktist. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 38-47.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p38"></a><strong>"Oma" ja "võõras" ilmnevad reaalses kultuuridünaamikas harva selges polarisatsioonis</strong>. Ometi ei pruugi tunduda enesestmõistetavana ka niivõrd kompleksne "oma" ja "võõra" suhe, nagu võib kohata sürrealismist välja kasvanud radikaalse prantsuse teatraali Antonin Artaud' (1896-1984) mõningates esseedes. (Vaher 2006: 38)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vaatasin, et terve esimene <em>Hortus Semioticus</em> number on pühendatud omale ja võõrale. ~2006 oli nähtavasti oma/võõra ajastu.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p39a"></a>Ojamaa (1975: 9) väidab: "Artaud' paradoks on minu arvates selles, et ta <strong>keele ja kirjanduse vastu suunatud teosed on vormistatud sõnakunsti vahenditega</strong>, ja tänu sellele on tema pärand tänini elav." Grotowski aga kinnitab: "Artaud' paradoks seisneb selles, et tema [teatrialaseid] ettepanekuid on võimatu teostada [...] Artaud ei pärandanud meile mingit konkreetset tehnikat, ei juhatanud ühegi meetodi juurde. Temast jäid järele ainult nägemused, metafoorid." (Grotowski 1975: 10-11). (Vaher 2006: 39)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Sa oled keele ja kirjanduse vastu, ometi sa kasutad keelt ja kirjutad kirjandust. Huvitav küll!</em> (Nagu <a href="https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/we-should-improve-society-somewhat">meemis</a>.)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p39b"></a>Samas ajavahemikus formuleeris Artaud ka oma <strong>julmuse teatri</strong> põhimõtted, milles Ida-Lääne vastandus pole enam esiplaanil; ometi tugineb ka julmuse teater kui Artaud' loomepärandi tuntuim, uurituim, jäljendatuim ja vääritimõistetuim osa suurel määral äratundmisele, mis on väljendatud kõnealuses tekstikogumikus (mida kinnitab ka antud koguteose tekstijärjestus). (Vaher 2006: 39)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Misasi nüüd?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p39ja40"></a>Ida ja Lääne teatri vastandus neis kolmes essees põhineb väiteil, et <strong>Lääne teater on tekstkeskne</strong> (nõnda tegelikult pseudoteater, lavale <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> pandud kirjandus), <strong>Ida teater aga ruumipoeetiline</strong>; Lääne teater on psühholoogiline (<strong>liialt kinni argielulistes inimsuhetes</strong>), ida teater aga <strong>metafüüsiline</strong>; Lääne teatris valitseb sõna, Ida teatris aga märk. Samuti rõhutab Artaud kõikjal sõnateatri keelepoeesia ühekeelsust, vastandades sellele ruumipoeetika mitmekeelsuse ja voolavuse. (Vaher 2006: 39-40)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib-olla pädev. Ei tea, pole kummaski teatris käinud (nad on teine-teisel pool tänavat, eks?).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p40"></a>Ülaltoodud Artaud' paradoks põhineb tõigal, et <strong>Artaud esitab oma sõnavaba teatri nägemuse kummatigi verbaalses keeles</strong> - antud juhul õigupoolest esmalt loenguvormis (sealt ilmsesti ka "ma ütlen..."); <strong>meieni kandunult aga juba kirjandusliku tekstina</strong>. (Vaher 2006: 40)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>Kuigi ma ei olnud kaassõitja suulise sõnumi adressaat, võtsin ma selle sellegipoolest vastu ja hiljem kandsin selle ütluse kõigepealt käekirja ning seejärel trükitähtedesse; nüüd on see saanud osaks uuest raamistikust – minu sõnumist nende lehekülgede tulevasele lugejale.</u>" (<a href="https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110802122.7/html">Jakobson 1981b[1964]</a>: 7)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p45"></a>Murasov võrdleb Artaud' esseid Bahtini tõlgendusega Rabelais' loomingust kui kirjanduslikust lavast: "Nagu Bahtin, nii ka Artaud üritab ületada eristust <strong>semantika ja somaatika</strong> vahel, mis on aluseks traditsioonilisele teatrile." Seejuures jääb see eristus paratamatult ületamata ning Artaud' teatri "julmus" võibki Murasovi arvates olla "sügav šokk, mis tekib somaatika ja semantika, <strong>keha ja vaimu eristus</strong>e pöördumatusest - teisisõnu, kirjanduslike psühhosotsiaalsete mõjude pöördumatusest". (Vaher 2006: 45)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Metalingvistiline poeetika.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="vaher06p47"></a>Viitab ju Mikita oma kreatiivsuskäsitluse kokkuvõttes Bradd Shore'ile, kelle järgi<blockquote>on kujunenud mõnevõrra veider situatsioon, kus paralleelselt eksisteerib <strong>kaks erinevat tähendusgeneesi ja loomingu käsitlemise traditsiooni - semiootiline ja psühholoogiline - mis omavahel praktiliselt ei haaku</strong>. Shore prognoosib, et juhul, kui tähendust püütakse mõista kui protsessi (vastandina staatilisemale struktuurimetafoorile), on lähitulevikus oodata mõlema traditsiooni sulandumist. (Mikita 2000: 101)</blockquote>See dialoog kestab praegugi, ka Eesti kultuuris - ja sulandumine ei sünni kuigi kergelt. (Vaher 2006: 47)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vahetu ja vahendatu?</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="rynk06"></a>Rünk, Martin 2006. Subjekti taandumine ironistlikus praktikas: eneserepresentatsiooni muutumine kunstis (eesti kunsti näitel). <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 48-60.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p48"></a>Eneserepresentatiivne kunst on möödunud sajandi jooksul näidanud üles ootamatut paindlikkust. Kuigi kitsaste žanripiiridega portreede ajastu on pöördumatult möödas, toimib <strong>eneserepresentatiivsus</strong> endiselt kunstiilma ühe keskse printsiibina ja isegi tugevamalt kui enne. <strong>tõde nagu teisedki (meta)tähistajad on tunnistatud tähenduselt triivivaks ning välismaailm häguseks ja ebamääraseks nähtuseks</strong>. Nii osutub iseenda ja maailma vaheliste suhete uurimine kõige vähem korruptsioonialtiks uurimisvallaks, kuid nüüd juba uues transgressiivsemas - elu ja kunsti piire järjest enam ületavas võtmes. (Rünk 2006: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Tõde" kui tähistajate kohta tähistaja? Ei saa aru, misasi täpselt on eneserepresentatiivne kunst. See ei ole "eneseesitus", sest see on 2006, aga misasi on eneseesituskunst?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p49a"></a><strong>Kehakunst</strong> on 1960.-1970. aastail peamiselt euroameerika kultuuriruumis levinud ja tegevuskunstist võrsunud kunstinähtus, mis oma eriliseks vaatlusobjektiks on võtnud kunstniku tema kehalisuses, et selle kaudu edasi anda oma sotsiaalselt angažeeritud programmi. (Rünk 2006: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Okei. Sain vastuse.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p49b"></a>Ühtviisi sobivaiks väljundeiks võivad olla nii performance kui ka foto, film, video ja/või tekst, mis dokumenteerivad privaatselt aset leidnud <strong>aktsiooni</strong>. (Rünk 2006: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Terribiilselt blameeritav.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p49c"></a>Filosoofias oli inimese eksistentsi kehalisuse rõhutajaks <strong>Maurice Merleau-Ponty</strong>, kes raamatus "Phenomenology of perception" <strong>seadis endale ülesandeks ületada kartesiaanlik keha ja vaimu lahusus ning näitas, et keha toimib filtrina maailma ja inimese vahel</strong>. Keha ei saa seega käsitleda kõigest ühe välismaailma objektina teiste seas, vaid ta kujutab endast vahelüli objekti ja subjekti vahel (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 198-199). (Rünk 2006: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Inimene... <em>ei ole</em> keha? (Üks mu lemmikküsimusi: Kas sul <em>on</em> keha või sa <em>oled</em> keha? Merleau-Ponty'l, tundub, <em>on</em>. Ta ise on midagi muud, aga ta sõidab oma selgrooga maailmas ringi - <em><u>Boy, go find your spine and ride it out of here</u></em>.)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p49d"></a>Kehakunsti tihti rõvedustesse eskaleeruvates aktides uurivad kunstnikud "iga kehaosa iga funktsiooni iga võimalikku aspekti" (Vergine 2000: 8) ning toovad selle halastamatu aususega vaataja ette, sundides neid suhestuma nähtuga. Esmakordselt 1974. aastal ilmunud mõjukas essees "<strong>Body language</strong>. Body art and like stories" räägib itaalia kriitik ja kuraator Lea Vergine, et kehakunsti üheks eesmärgiks on <strong>ületada kultuuri ja tsivilisatsiooni piir, et näidata inimeste tabude taha peidetud olemust</strong>. See on ihade, keeldude, enesenäitamise, sadistlike mõnude ja surmaimpulsside labürint, mis kunstivälises maailmas võiks liigituda psühhopatoloogiliste ilmingute alla, kuid kunstiruumis saab teatava ebaisikliku ja rituaalse iseloomu (Vergine 2000: 9). (Rünk 2006: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Animalism. Rääkiv ahv leiab naudingut meeldetuletusest, et ta on ahv. Eriti kui see hõlmab rääkimist.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p49e"></a>Tekkinud dünaamilist <strong>intiimse, privaatse ja avaliku triaadi</strong> nimetab Richard Martel performatiivi koeks, mis esmakordselt avaldus juba futuristide tegevuslikus kunstis. (Rünk 2006: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üsna kehv "triaad". Privaatse ja avaliku sfääri vahelt on puudu "sotsiaalne" - see Edward Halli prokseemiline tsoon, milles öeldakse tuttavale inimesele "Tere" (temast siiski edasise jutuajamiseta edasi liikudes). Reaalselt on see kogu krempel topeltbinaarne: isiklik (intiimne/privaatne) ja mitte-isiklik (seltskondlik/avalik). Puudub seos keha, hinge ja vaimuga - mis teeks selle "triaadiliseks" nii nagu mina seda mõistan.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p50a"></a>Amelia Jones kirjutab kehakunstist kui nähtusest, mis ilmekalt kirjeldab eelmisel sajandil toimunud muutusi <strong>subjektimajandus</strong>es. Võttes aluseks modernismi ja postmodernismi vastanduse, konstrueerib ta ka vastavad subjektid. <strong>Modernistlik subjekt</strong> kujutab endast juba valgustusajast alates aktuaalset kartesiaanlikku subjekti, kes kehatu ja transtsendentaalsena on fokuseeritud ja igal hetkel enesest teadlik. Sellele vastab kunstiilmas kangelaslik kunstnik-geeniuse figuur, kellele on iseloomulik kehatu ja <strong>osavõtmatu [disinterested]</strong> positsioon (Jones 1998: 37). Feministlik mõte on sageli pööranud tähelepanu asjaolule, et modernistlikel autoportreedel kujutavad kunstnikud (tollal peamiselt valged mehed) ennast <strong>loomulikustatud</strong> normatiivsuse näitena, mistõttu nad näivad oma töödes olevat korraga nii kohal kui ka eemal. (Rünk 2006: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väga tihke tekst. Mis on subjektimajandus, ei tea. Kõlab nagu modernistlikust subjektist võiks eristada ka postmodernistlikku subjekti, aga enne seda veel keskaegset ja antiikset, võib-olla isegi eelajaloolist. Dno. <em>Disinterestedness</em> on üks minu isiklikke tõlkimatuseid - "osavõtmatu" tundub nagu hea kandidaat, aga mitte päris lõpuni pädev. Minu proovikivi selles küsimuses on <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2019/02/the-foundations-of-character.html">Alexander Shand</a>, kes kasutab seda mõistet sageli. Ei tundu väga hea teda tõlkida nt nii, et "<u>Armastus on <em>osavõtmatuse</em> põhimõte; ja selle <em>osavõtmatuse</em> allikaks peetakse kaastunnet või õrna tunnet</u>" (1914: 44). "Osavõtmatus" siia ei sobi. "Ebahuvitatus" veel kaugeltki mitte. Mine võta kinni.<!-- Erapooletus? No ei tea.--> Igatahes, <em>naturalization</em> on siin hästi tõlgitud. Harjumatu, aga õige.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p50b"></a>Postmodernistlikku subjekti iseloomustab seevastu <strong>intersubjektiivsus (teistest sõltuvus)</strong> ja selle kaudu ka <strong>killustatus</strong>. Eelnevale normatiivsusele hakkab vastanduma mittenormatiivsus: keha kujutamine sooliste, soorolliliste, rassiliste, klassikuuluvuslike jt teadlike või mitteteadlike tunnuste varal. (Rünk 2006: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kust siseneb küsimusse "sõltuvus", ma nüüd ei tea. Miks just sõltuvus? Samuti "killustatus". Miks mitte vastupidi just "sidusus"? — Kõrbeliivaga ei saa midagi ehitada, sest terad on ühetaoliselt ümaraks kulunud ja ei hoia üksteisest kinni. Ehitada saab liivast, mille terad on kõik erikujulised ja seetõttu haakuvad üksteisega. Erisustest ja vastupanust on kasu.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p50c"></a>Nende kahe subjektikäsitluse ristumiskohta paigutab Jones Jackson Pollocki, kelle <strong>action paintingus</strong> saavad kokku modernistlik kunstnikufunktsioon ja intersubjktiivne vajadus publiku järele. (Rünk 2006: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mul ei ole sõnu. Autoril ka mitte.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p51a"></a>Kaasaegse kunsti sisemine sundus tegeleda sotsiaalsusega, mis on <strong>puhtesteetilised kvaliteedid dekoratiivsetena kunstiilma äärealale tõrjunud</strong>, lubab kunstnikke vaadelda subjektidena ideoloogilise diskursuse raames. (Rünk 2006: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tahan juba lüüa käega.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p51b"></a>Taolist kahetist olukorda kirjeldab Louis Althusseri tähelepanek, et <strong>"subjekt"</strong> on mitmetähenduslik mõiste - ta <strong>tähistab üheaegselt nii iseseisvat, algatusvõimelist kui ka mingile tegevusele allutatud olendit</strong> (Althusser 1993: 56). (Rünk 2006: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ja <em>substants</em> on see, mis "seisab all". Diip.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p51c"></a>Kuigi subjekt üritab ideoloogilist struktuuri paljastada, jääb ta sellega ikkagi seotuks. Nii leiab Umberto Eco, et <strong>ideoloogia on semiootikaväline jääk, mis määrab semiootiliste sündmuste kulgu</strong>. See on igasugune kommunikatsioonile eelnev eelteadmine, mis on haaratud semantilise välja, kultuuriliste üksuste ja seega väärtussüsteemide struktuuri (Eco 1994: 168). (Rünk 2006: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib-olla allika-kandidaat väitele, et kõik märgisüsteemid on ideoloogilised.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Eco, Umberto 1994. <em>Einführung in die Semiotik</em>. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b3240707*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p51"></a>Uuspragmaatik Richard Rorty vaatleb oma subjekti ainult keelelise maailma piires, nagu Althussergi, kelle jaoks ideoloogia on "representatsioon", mis tähistab indiviidide imaginaarset suhet oma olemise tegelike tingimustega (Althusser 1993: 36). Ideoloogiline väli koosneb Rorty jaoks erinevatest sõnavaradest, kus iga loovinimese ülesandeks on kehtestada oma piirsõnavara, et seeläbi rakendada enda kui subjekti aktiivset alget (Rorty 1999: 80). Looja on edukas, kui ta suudab oma <strong>piirsõnavara</strong>ga (s.o <strong>enda ja ümbritseva maailma kirjeldamiseks ja mõistmiseks kasutatava sõnavaraga</strong>) mõjutada teiste inimeste sõnavarasid. (Rünk 2006: 51)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Meenub sotsiobioloogi Wilsoni kommunikatsioonimääratlus, mille järgi edukas suhtlus väljendub selles, et mõjutatakse teis(t)e isendi(te) käitumist. Siin on justkui laiendus sarnasele mõtlemisele: eduka (verbaalse) loovkäitumise tunnuseks on see, et mõjutatakse teiste isikute sõnavara. St mõjutatakse mitte käitumist, vaid märgikäitumist. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p51ja52"></a>Historitsistlik pööre, millest alates hakkas ironist metafüüsikut tunnetustüübina välja <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> tõrjuma, toimus 18. sajandi lõpus uute poliitiliste ja filosoofiliste <strong>ideede tulekuga</strong>. (Rünk 2006: 51-52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ideed tulevad. Kuskilt. Lihtsalt. Nad on kõigepealt seal eemal ja siis nad liiguvad siia ja nüüd siin nad on.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p52"></a>Historitsistliku pöörde käivitajaiks olid teiste hulgas ka vararomantikud, nn Jena ring, mille üheks loomisprintsiibiks kujunes <strong>romantiline iroonia</strong>, mis <strong>Tähistab koodilõhkuvat tegevust</strong> ja seeläbi väldib ühest tõlgendust. <strong>Iroonia on akuutne maailmast eraldatuse tajumine</strong>. Selle pöörde tulemusena hakatakse tajuma subjekti võõrandumist oma eneserepresentatsioonist ning tagajärjena kaasneb täpse deiksise ähmastumine (Finlay 1988: 239). (Rünk 2006: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Koodilõhkuv" on hea. Tavatähenduses ongi iroonia mingis mõttes just see - selles on mingi ümberpööratus, mingi <em>dissembling</em>. Mulle isiklikult imponeerib rohkem aga antiikne tähendus, <em>simulated ignorance</em>. St eraldatuse sissetoomine tundub just sellena - sissetoomisena, uue lisandusena.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p52a"></a>Romantilise iroonia tunnused säilivad ka Rorty visandatud ironistlikus praktikas, mida teostav liberaalne ironist tajub iseenda ja oma piirsõnavara sattumuslikkust ja tingitust välisest maailmast. Keele sattumuslikkus väljendab "tõsiasja, et <strong>pole võimalik astuda välja kõigist käibivatest sõnavaradest ja leida mingi metasõnavara, milles kuidagi kirjeldada kõiki võimalikke sõnavarasid, kõiki võimalikke otsustus- ja tundeviise</strong>" (Rorty 1999: 18). Ironisti eristab metafüüsikust teadmine, et puudub absoluutne keeleväline tõde. Tulemusena pürib ta teadvustatult kujundama oma individuaalset sõnavara. (Rünk 2006: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Midagi</em> sellist tegelikult eksisteerib. Vähemalt üks taoline näide, tähendab. <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2019/11/intellectual-symbolism.html">Pliny Earle Chase</a>, Charles Peirce'i isa õpilane, kelle (lingitud) raamatut noor Charles luges, üritas luua triaadilist süsteemi, milles on kõik vaimuseisundid ära nimetatud (vt <a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjRpdP33_GmQaZkEKZQxBQ93aV9LrytD23uWakqmW50NhgMmy89ol1Acdt8pf6p3EsEHa-m-82m1FLqr-2k51m7W97axkZr7gRW4Iof2MGR0cBC-dHSd2pT_sIU_kSjjGldqykvIXlbVp0C/s1600/jja_pilt_chase_1863_the_rabbit_hole_is_too_damn_deep_colored_light.jpg">tabel</a>). Häda on selles - miks ma ise sellega midagi enamat ei oska pihta hakata - on selles, et kogu see sõnavara pärineb füsiognoomiast, tollest 18. ja 19. sajandi pseudoteadusest, mille me oleme tahtlikult ära unustanud. Chase'i vaimuseisundite nimetused pärinevad mahukast füsiognoomiaõpikute kirjandusest, kus neil on üsna täpsed määratlused ja keerulised omavahelised semantilised seosed. Aga oh häda kui palju neid on ja kuivõrd segane see rägastik on! Mul ei ole varnast võtta neid aastakümneid, mis oleks vajalikud, et kõik see läbi närida ja mäletseda.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p52b"></a>Eneserepresentatiivses kunstis on metafüüsiliselt positsioonilt ironistlikule üleminek toimunud järk-järgult realistliku kujutamislaadi ületamisega. Muutused inimese ja maailma suhete struktuuris pole tulenenud mitte füsioloogilistest tajumuutustest, vaid maailmanägemisviiside ümbermõtestamisest. <strong>Nüüdseks on realism (laiemas tähenduses) osutunud sama tinglikuks kui teised laadid</strong>; mäletatavasti leidis Lyotard, et realismi ainsaks definitsiooniks on soov vältida küsimust, kuidas kunst hõlmab reaalsust (Lyotard 2000: 1426). (Rünk 2006: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Enam-vähem sellest räägibki Jaak Tombergi <em>Kuidas Täita Soovi</em> (<a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b5545891*est">2023</a>). Konkreetselt sellest kuidas Gibson, kes eelmisel sajandil kirjutas küberpunki, hakkas 2000ndatel kirjutama <em>justkui</em> realistlikke teoseid, mis kummastavad ulmeliselt juba olemasolevaid tehnoloogiaid vms. St Tombergil on pikk ja põhjalik arutelu just realismi ja ulme omavahelisest kattuvusest vms.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p53"></a><strong>Uuenduslikule kunstile on tähtis, et ta oleks piisavalt piire ületav</strong>. see, kui kaugele piirid ulatuvad, oleneb juba kultuurist ja ühiskonnast. <strong>Kui läänes pidi kunstnik ületama iseenda valuläve, siis Nõukogude Liidus oli selleks riigi valulävi</strong>. Seega oli eesti kunst sel ajal vähem isiklik - tulipunktis polnud mitte kunstniku isiksuse probleemid, vaid lääne kunsti vormikeele taha peitudes riikliku totaalsuse eest põgenemine. (Rünk 2006: 53)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tundub pädev. "Valulävendi" kujund on siin hea.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p54"></a>Keha ja kehakunsti tähtsust 1990ndate kunsti mõtestamisel on rõhutanud <strong>Hanno Soans</strong> artiklis "<strong>Peegel ja piits. Mina köidikud uuemas eesti kunstis</strong>", kus ta käsitleb kunstnike autoagressiivset käitumist kui üht kehakunsti valdkonda kuuluvat nähtust ja visandab selle tekke- ja arenguloo vahemikus 1987-1998. "Diskursust, mis peab keha kunstniku eheda eneseväljenduse või isegi enesetunnetuse viimseks kantsiks, on meie kunstiruumis teadlikult rakendatud rohkem kui kümme aastat" (Soans 2000: 318). (Rünk 2006: 54)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Soans, Hanno 2000. Peegel ja piits. Mina köidikud uuemas eesti kunstis. <em>Kunstiteaduslikke uurimusi</em> 10: 309-353.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1227310*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p55"></a><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> natuurpoeetiline - Anders Härmi poolt <strong>lansseeritud mõiste</strong> (Härm 2001b), mis tähistab eksistentsi üldisi aluseid kompavat šamanistlike joontega meditatiivset kunsti (Härmil eelkõige videokunst), nt Jaak Toomik, varasematest Siim-Tanel Annus, Jaak Arro, osaliselt Rühm T; <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> (Rünk 2006: 55)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Anders Härm lõi natuurpoeetilisuse mõistest piigi läbi.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="rynk06p56"></a>Ikooni ja ikoonilisusega seotud teemadering on lai, kuid praeguses kontekstis pakub huvi peamiselt eelmainitud ikooni ja objekti suhe. Peirce'i klassikalise definitsiooni järgi on ikoon "märk, mis viitab objektile ainuüksi oma omaduste abil" (Peirce 1974: 2.247). Ikoon paikneb tal teises märkide trihhotoomias, mis jaguneb ikooniks (sarnasusel põhinev märk), <strong>indeksiks (ühisosal põhinev)</strong> ja sümboliks (konventsionaalsusel põhinev), kusjuures ikooni ainsaks aluseks pole mitte visuaalne sarnasus, vaid ikooniliseks võib nimetada ka erinevate objektide struktuuride sarnasust, mis avaldub osade omavaheliste suhete vastavuses. (Rünk 2006: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vististi esimest korda näen "ühisosa" indeksi määratluses. Tavaliselt on selleks põhjuslikkus, lähestikkus või järjestikkus. Aga mingi "ühisosa" on tõesti nende alternatiivide ühisosa.</p><!--
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--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kuusk06"></a>Kuusk, Laura 2006. Foto tähendusmehhanismid: "Mullatoidu restorani" juhtum. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 61-76.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p61"></a>Peeter Lauritsa/Ain Mäeotsa "Mullatoidu restoran" - see on seeria lavastatud fotosid, mis <strong>kujutavad apokalüptilisi stseene inimkonna hukule järgnevatest hetkedest</strong> (vt joonised 1-6). Fotodega kaasnev sünopsis annab legendi, mille kohaselt on tegemist ökokatastroofi tagajärjel inimkonna väljasuremise võimalike süžeede läbimängimisega. Teiselt poolt on lugude taga surma fenomeni filosoofiline käsitlus. (Kuusk 2006: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üllataval kombel haakub mu praeguse uurimisteemaga.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p65a"></a>Näeme ojasse uppunud kehasid, end surnuks söönud Jeesust ja jüngreid, osoonimürgituse saanud sõdureid, kirikutorni otsa kukkunud stjuardessi. Fotod on lavastatud Setumaa ja Võrumaa metsades, piltide tonaalsust (valdavaiks on rohelised ja pruunid toonid) on digitaalselt modereeritud. Rekvisiitideks on oksad, vesi, risu, suled ja lilleõied, aga ka mootorsaag. <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> Metsa <strong>kujundiretoorika</strong> räägib harmooniast, mitme(te organismide, maailmavaadete) kooseksisteerimisest, terviklikkusest, pidevast jätkuvast eluslooduse ahelast. (Kuusk 2006: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Kujundiretoorika" annab 8 vastust. "<u>Kujundid saab kujundiretoorika alusel jagada foneetilisteks ja süntaktilisteks kujunditeks ehk kõlakujundid, piltkujundid ja lausekujundid, kõnekujundid, mis on kujunditele ka põhilised avaldumisvormid.</u>" (<a href="https://quizlet.com/255353948/kirjandusteadus-flash-cards/">Quizlet: Kirjandusteadus</a>)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p65b"></a><strong>Defineeriv tehnoloogia</strong> (ehk ajastu domineeriv kujutamise tehnoloogia) määrab piirid, mida ja kuidas saab kujutada, mis omakorda määrab meie valdavalt <strong>okulaartsentristliku</strong> (s.t nägemist teadmisega võrdsustava) maailmapildi menüü piirid, liiatigi tulenevad ka poeetilised moodustised (stiilid, žanrid, esteetikad) tihti tehnoloogilistest piiridest. (Kuusk 2006: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oijummel, missugused mõisted.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p70"></a>Pöördugem nüüd "Mullatoidu restoranis" nähtava semiootilise konstruktsiooni juurde. Selleks on <strong>teatri ja fotomeediumi läbipõimunud suhted ning nende paigutumine teineteisesse</strong> - sellist mudelit nimetab Juri Lotman "tekstiks tekstis" (1990b). See on spetsiifiline retooriline konstruktsioon, mille puhul <strong>teksti osade kodeerituse erinevus muudetakse teksti loomise ja vastuvõtu oluliseks faktoriks</strong>. Tähenduse genereerimise aluseks saab sel juhul <strong>ümberlülitumine</strong> teksti ühest semiootilise teadvustamise süsteemist teise. (Kuusk 2006: 70)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kas seda tähendab "tekst tekstis"? Oleksin arvanud, et see on pigem nagu Goldsteini <em>Oligarhilise kollektivismi teooria ja praktika</em> Orwelli <em>1984</em>-s.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p72"></a>Fotograafiat on seostatud ajalooga (19. saj sündisid nii historitsism kui fotograafia), käsitledes ajalugu sündmuste loomise ja narratiivsuse kaudu. Jan-Erik Lundströmi sõnul (toetudes siin Lyotardi ning Habermasi töödele, vt ka Krull 1996) iseloomustab 20. saj ajalootaju suurte narratiivide puudumine, usu kaotus ajaloolisse progressi, katkendlikku, ebaühtlus, fragmentaarsus. Terviku asemel on osad ning <strong>ajalugu käsitletakse oleviku seisukohast teisele ajahetkele projitseeritud tekstina</strong> (Lundström 1995: 48). "Fotograafia leiutamine aitas kaasa meie ajaloomõistmisele kui tsiteeringulisele, viitavale, kirjutavale, tekstuaalsele" (Lundström 1995: 50). (Kuusk 2006: 72)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kas sama võib öelda tuleviku kohta?</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Lundström, Jan-Erik 1995. Fotograaf kui ajaloolane. — Linnap, Eve; Linnap, Peeter (koost.) <em>Fabrique d'histoire. Konverentsi tekstikogumik</em>. Saaremaa: Kaasaegse Foto Keskus, 45-52.</u> [<u><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b1058886*est">ESTER</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kuusk06p74"></a>Kui enne digitaalset fotot peeti fotol muuhulgas mineviku (re)konstrueerimise vahediks, siis digitaalfoto ajastul konstrueeritakse selle meediumi abil tulevikku/imaginaarseid stsenaariume, mida esitab ka "Mullatoidu restoran", visandades groteskses, teatraalses võtmes inimkonna huku, s.t ajaloo ja kultuuri lõpu. See on protsesside retrospektiivne <strong>vältimatustamine</strong>, mida fotomeedium võimaldab sellega kaasnevate tajuharjumuste ja konnotatsiooniliste tähenduste (foto müütilise staatuse) tõttu eriti mõjuvalt realiseerida. (Kuusk 2006: 74)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Selline uhke sõna, mida ise ei oskaks inglise keelde pannagi.</p><!-- pooleli 77 -->Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-34312913091675285622023-09-05T10:02:00.001-07:002023-09-05T10:02:07.791-07:00A Certain Dematerialization<!-- A Certain Dematerialization
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
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--><h4>Hassan, Ihab 1973. The New Gnosticism: Speculations on an Aspect of the Postmodern Mind. <em>boundary 2</em> 1(3): 546-570. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/302297">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="anoninhassan73p547a"></a><blockquote><strong>Thine own consciousness</strong>, shining, void, and <strong>inseparable from the Great Body of Radiance</strong>, hath no birth, nor death, and is the Immutable light. [<em>The Tibetan Book of the Dead</em>]</blockquote>(Hassan 1973: 547)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhat Spinozist.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="anoninhassan73p547b"></a><blockquote>Today computers hold out the promise of a means of instant translation of any code or language into any other code or language. The computer, in short, promises by technology a Pentecostal condition of universal understanding and unity. <strong>The next logical step would seem to be, not to translate, but to by-pass languages in favor of a general cosmic consciousness</strong>. [Marshall McLuhan, <em>Understanding Media</em>]</blockquote>(Hassan 1973: 547)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somewhat Stapledonian.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p548a"></a>But what do epigraphs prove?<br />Surely they do not answer an appeal to authority since few of us now accept the same authorities.<br />Do they evoke a mood, declare a theme, insinuate a conclusion? Possibly. Yet, coming at the start, they do nothing that the text itself will not confirm or deny. Thus <strong>epigraphs become a kind of preparation for failure</strong>. (Hassan 1973: 548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I already like this author.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p548b"></a>Or is the function of epigraphs to release metaphors and ideas from the bounds of a single time, place, and mind? <strong>Can quotation marks hold back a thought from seeking a larger identity in Thought?</strong> And what are the walls within Language made of? (Hassan 1973: 548)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Blowing. My. Mind.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p549a"></a>Certainly, <strong>Consciousness</strong> has become one of our key terms, replacing Honor, Faith, Reason, or Sensibility <strong>as the token of intellectual passion, the instrument of our cultural will</strong>. Cold-eyed behaviorists may eschew the term; yet its nimbus still hangs over our rhetoric as we discourse of politics and pornography, language and literature, morality and metaphysics. Thus we "raise," "expand," "alter," "criticize," and "bracket," consciousness, among so many other things we do to it nowadays. (Hassan 1973: 549)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Downsizing "consciousness" from Thirdness to Firstness, or Secondness at best.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p549b"></a>This cultural chatter may not be wholly idle. <strong>A certain dematerialization of our world is taking place</strong>, from the "ephemeralization" of substance (Buckminster Fuller) to the "de-definition" of art (harold Rosenberg). How many forms, disciplines, institutions, have we seen dissolve, in the last few decades, into amorphous new shapes? <strong>How many objects, solidly mattered, have we seen dissolve into a process, an image, a mental frame?</strong> (Hassan 1973: 549)</blockquote><!--
--><p>If this author only knew how dematerialized our world can really get (with computers and smartphones - basically the only materials one necessarily needs to survive). I think I've also already found "a title" - I usually eschew "a certain this or than" type phrases but this is solid.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p549c"></a>The New York Times, <em>October 22, 1972:</em><blockquote>The impact of the computer is felt in virtually every corner of American life, from the ghetto to the moon. And data-processing is the world's fastest growing major business; <strong>sometime during the next decade, it is expected to become the world's largest industry</strong>.</blockquote>From hardware to software, from software to pure mind? (Hassan 1973: 549)</blockquote><!--
--><p>One of the things that surprised me about Calhoun's (1972) schema (cf. <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/a-threat-of-uniformity.html#schwitzgebel70p495b">Schwitzgebel 1970: 495</a>) is the historical coincidence that 1984 was indeed approximately the time when Personal Computers broke through. <em>Somehow</em> these authors <em>guessed</em> that ~1984 there will be a turning point, and in a way there indeed was.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p549d"></a>This process may be one of convergence far more than of dissolution. <strong>The "synoptic" force of consciousness is remarking our world in every way</strong>. As Teilhard de Chardin put it: "Everything that rises must converge." That is a hypothesis that we need, at least, to entertain. (Hassan 1973: 549)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The mind reworking its world? E.g. "<u>recognizing man as the master of his own fate</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/a-threat-of-uniformity.html#kagarfreli73p66">Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 66</a>).</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p550"></a>Eden and Utopia, the first and last perfection, are homologous imaginative constructs, mirror images of the same primal desire. Furthermore, the laws of myth and of science have this in common: both are partial codifications of reality, <strong>ways in which the mind imitates itself</strong>. Their structures, their functions, their predictive logic may not be identical; yet neither myth nor science escapes the influence of the imagination. (Hassan 1973: 550)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The mind imitates the Mind?</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p551"></a>I think it more likely that "mystics" and "mechanists," as William Irwin Thompson calls them, will move toward a new issue:<blockquote>Western civilization is drawing to a close in an age of <em>apocalyptic turmoil</em> in which <strong>the old species, collectivizing mankind with machines</strong>, and <strong>the new species, unifying it in consciousness, are in collusion with one another to end what we know as human nature</strong>. (<em>At the Edge of History</em>)</blockquote>But the convergence which I speak manifests itself not only in broad cultural contexts; it finds a voice in private lives when least we expect it. (Hassan 1973: 551)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hot damn are these passages <em>loaded</em>. Material collectivization vs mental unification.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p552"></a>Admittedly, two instances do not prove a trend. Yet the instances are scattered throughout our lives, as if each of us were compelling to discover his own Beulah, his own "place where Contrarieties are equally True." We have seen computer art aspire to Pythagorean mysteries</strong>. And even the dark avatars have disengaged themselves from our dreams to become, as in "2001: A Space Odyssey," technological prophecies. (Hassan 1973: 522)</blockquote><!--
--><p>As in... 2,500 years later we're trying to figure it out? Or, what?</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p554ja555"></a>Mary Shelley divines <strong>the point at which scientism and idealism, reason and revelation, meet</strong>. It is a point shrouded in terror. Frankenstein, the modern Prometheus, surrenders to Albertus <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Magnus and Paracelsus before he masters the exact sciences. "I was required," he says, "to exchange chimeras of boundless grandeur for realities of little worth." But his great error lies elsewhere. Self-absorbed and self-obsessed, <strong>he blights the powers of sympathy in himself</strong>. His solitary "fiend" returns to haunt him and haunt us, a ghastly embodiment of Prometheanism without responsibility or love. "Hateful day when I received life!" the fiend cries. <strong>Is that the curse of life born of pure mind?</strong> Frankenstein and his fiend are neither twain nor really one; but in this they are compacted: both together adumbrate the perils of consciousness in its (heroic-demonic) labors of self-creation. This Promethean adventure ends in a world not of fire but of ice. (Hassan 1973: 554-555)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Somehow, Frankenstein keeps on cropping up. This passage makes me think of the cursed Fourth Men, the giant brains without sympathy. Pure mind without love or feelings of any kind. It is a horror that recognizes its own horrid nature, in a way (scientific and objective), and recreates its predecessors upon an improved plan.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p555"></a>[Gerald] Feinberg [in <em>The Prometheus Project</em>] has fewer qualms about Prometheanism, about the increase of self-consciousness without bound. That increase is his project, and his Prometheus is ourselves. His premise is this: "My own feeling is that the despair of the conscious mind at the recognition of its own finitude is such that man cannot achieve an abiding contentment in his present form or anything like it. Therefore, I believe that a transformation of man into something very different from what he is now is called for." Calmly, lucidly, simplistically, Feinberg argues that <strong>mankind needs to set long-range ends for itself, and to devise corresponding means</strong>. The goal he proposes as the most likely human destiny is Promethean indeed: <strong>man will become a total consciousness</strong>. "Because of the inner logic of the conflict between the unity of one consciousness and the diversity of phenomena in the external world, there is probably no level of consciousness in which the conscious being will rest content until the sway of consciousness is extended indefinitely." <strong>We do not require</strong> the theology of Teilhard de Chardin to achieve this extension nor <strong>the science fiction of Olaf Stapledon</strong>. "I firmly believe," Feinberg notes, "that in trying to predict the future of technology, reality is likely to outstrip one's most extreme vision." <strong>The postmodern Prometheus reaches for the fire in distant stars</strong>. (Hassan 1973: 555)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"We don't need Stapledon", he says, while quoting someone who sounds exactly like Stapledon. Moreover, this is pretty much the outlook of the Third Men, the creators of the giant brains. And what is "total consciousness" after all? Is it endless self-supporting (axiomatic) thought, or is it thinking until no more thought is necessary? Consciousness? To <em>reason</em> oneself into the totality, into unification with oneness, as the pythagoreans had it, or... to achieve calm? Are we after Gordelphian maximalism or zen?</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p556a"></a>Hence Prometheanism remains the arch human endeavor for that "visionary company" of <strong>poets about whom Harold Bloom has so vividly written</strong>. Yes, there are acute dangers: solipsism, willfulness, self-corruption. (Hassan 1973: 556)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ugh. Harold Bloom - he wrote... vividly. What did he write? Something about the classics? Sure. About them. <em>Vividly</em>. We don't know what, or if any of it is even relevant for this discussion, just that he did.</p><!-- (Harold only-straight-white-man-literature-is-even-worth-studying Bloom.)
12 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p556b"></a>As in the beginning, so in the end; as above, so below. Such are the principles of mythical thought. Yet <strong>myth appears mainly retrograde, its focus on some event in the immemorial past, <em>in illo tempore</em></strong> (Eliade). Into that far, dim, and sacred time, a privileged state of existence is usually projected. Is that state one of universal consciousness? (Hassan 1973: 556)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I recall the bare-bones lotmanian definition of myth: a story that could or could not be true. This is something else. But if it is projected into the immemorial past then what would we make of Stapledon's conscious myth-making, which is expressly oriented towards the future? <em>In illo tempore</em> - <em>sub specie aeternitatis</em>?</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p557a"></a><blockquote>And the Lord said, Behold, <em>the people is one, and they have all one language;</em> and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have <em>imagined</em> to do.<br />Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. (all italics mine)</blockquote>Just what was that unitary language of mankind before God struck it into <strong>a babel of tongues</strong>? Music? Mathematics? Telepathy? Chomsky's deep structures of the mind or linguistic universals ringing each to each? (Hassan 1973: 557)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I've already got a title. This one is good but... probably to be met with elsewhere.</p><!--
12 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p557b"></a>According to Erich Neumann, the ancient <strong>plorematic</strong> or uroboric condition of existence is <strong>less conscious than unconscious</strong>, a state ruled by the Great Mother, a state, therefore, of <em>participation mystique</em>. Gnosticism, however, insists on spiritualizing this condition. "Consequently, in Gnosticism," Neumann says, "the way of salvation lies in heightening consciousness and returning to the transcendent spirit, with loss of the unconscious side; whereas uroboric salvation through the Great Mother demands the abandonment of the conscious principle and a homecoming to the unconscious" (<em>The Origins and History of Consciousness</em>). (Hassan 1973: 557)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hopefully I'm not going to step into this one. I still recall what a (w)hole it was - after meeting the word used by a sequence of semioticians - discovering <em>pleroma</em>. This "pleromatic" sounds akin - a totalic totalism. (Which is another way of saying: I'm not even going to google this just for the sake of my mental health.)</p><!-- totalistlik totaalsus
13 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p557c"></a>Yet if Beginnings and Ends are cognate, they must express, on some concealed level at least, a point of contact, perhaps even of identity. <strong>In the Jewish <em>Midrash</em>, for instance, the unborn babe in its womb carries a prophetic light around its head in which it sees the end of the world</strong>. (Recall, again, the eschatological image of the luminous intergalactic foetus at the end of "2001.") Furthermore, the mystic trance and shamanistic journey are both ways of recovering the First and Last moment into the present. (Hassan 1973: 557)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eschatology on par with that of <me>Infinite Jest</em> with its mothers-as-previous-killers.</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p558a"></a><em>Mircea Eliade</em>, Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries:<blockquote>In India a whole literature has been devoted to explanations of this paradoxical relationship between <strong>what is pre-eminently unconscious - Matter</strong> - and pure "consciousness," the Spirit, which by its own mode of being <strong>is atemporal, free, uninvolved in the becoming</strong>. And one of the most unexpected results of this philosophic labor has been its conclusion that the Unconscious (i.e. <em>pakriti</em>), moving by a kind of 'teleological instinct,' imitates the behaviour of the Spirit; that the Unconscious behaves in such a way that its activity seems to <em>prefigure</em> the mode of being of the Spirit.</blockquote>I doubt that such questions can be answered at this time in any terms that would satisfy those who insist on an answer; yet they are the very questions that myth raises repeatedly before the skeptical mind. <strong>Behind these questions lurks a desire, an intuition, perhaps even a gnosis, of a universal consciousness that transcends time, and transcends the organization of our most complex language</strong>. (Hassan 1973: 558)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Spinoza's Substance, again? What I take issue with is that <em>desire</em>, <em>intuition</em>, and <em>gnosis</em> follow no system that I'm aware of. This is not triadic! It could be, at a stretch, if intuition was placed first - but then I'm not sure any more that it should go first. (Do we experience the world "intuitively"? How so? Do we grasp it <em>logically</em> based on self-evident and self-sufficient axioms, etc.? | Damn I hate the concept of intuition. Why won't it stay still not even for a moment?)</p><!--
14 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p558b"></a>We all acknowledge that science and its extension in technology are the major agents of transformation in our world. Sometmies we acknowledge it fearfully, and like Jacques Ellul in <eM>The Technological Society</em>, we see only dark portends of our future. "<stronG>Enclosed within his artificial creation," Ellul writes, "man finds that there is 'no exit;' that he cannot pierce the shell of technology to find again the ancient milieu to which he was adapted for hundreds of thousands of years."</strong> (Hassan 1973: 558)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I absolutely hate this. I've been reading Tomberg's <em>Kuidas täita soovi</em> and it deals with exactly this issue in the first chapter: this mythical "outside nature" (what biosemioticians would call 0-nature) no longer exists. Man cannot get away from the city - he goes to the forest with a smartphone in his pocket. He does not forget the clock. He can tell the time, and consequently does not see the forest for the trees, whose time-span is decades instead of his mere minutes.</p><!--
14-15 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p558ja559"></a>Consider that familiar rubric, "the communication explosion." Quite precisely, <strong>a layer of sentience</strong> or awareness now envelops the earth, much like Teilhard's "noösphere," moving ever<blockquote>The communication explosion is a product not only of technology but also of the population explosion. There are, literally, more brains on earth, working all at the same time. How does this fact affect the degree of sentience on earth?</blockquote>(Hassan 1973: 558-59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm all out of "a titles" for now. (I guess?) The major takeaway here is that Lotman's <em>Culture and Explosion</em> could have derived the latter from Teilhard just the same.</p><!-- (Yes I'm using an Orwellian idiom, "he did it just the same". You go figure it out.)
15 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p559"></a>Furthermore, <strong>communication itself is becoming increasingly immediate, requiring less and less mediation</strong>. It is a far cry from a stone hieroglyph weighing five tons, to <strong>a wireless set weighing less than a pound</strong>. Even now we casually use "slow motion telepathy," as Barry Schwartz puts it, devices that require only microseconds to elapse between coded communication, decoded message, and feedback [<em>Arts in Society</em> (Summer-Fall, 1972)]. The process can be extended by radio or laser far into the universe. There are also other means. (Hassan 1973: 559)</blockquote><!--
--><p>We've long ago achieved instantineity and it was no biggie. The heaviest smartphone (that I have held in my human hands) weighs 5.93 oz so 1/3 of a pound (burger measures are weird).</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p560a"></a>The process is itself part of what Buckminster Fuller calls "ephemeralization:" <strong>doing constantly more with constantly less</strong>. As a result, matter intervenes less and less in the transactions of mankind. And mind is free to pursue its destiny: to become the <strong>antientropic</strong>, or synoptic, force in the universe, gathering knowledge, expanding consciousness, regenerating <em>metaphysically</em> a <em>physically</em> decaying universe. (Hassan 1973: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Define:antientropic: <u>showing a tendency towards order</u>.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p560b"></a>Fuller says in <em>Utopia or Oblivion;</em> to which he adds his great, optimistic principle: "Energy cannot decrease. Knowhow can only increase." In this ambience of sentience, telepathy becomes a new possibility. Thus Fuller again: "I think that possibly within ten years we'll discover scientifically that <stronG>what has been telepathy</strong> and has been thought of as very mysterious <strong>is, in fact, ultra, ultra, high frequency electromagnetic wave propagation</strong>" (<em>House and Garden</em>, May, 1972). (Hassan 1973: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>100% Stapledonian.</p><!--
16 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p560c"></a>In 1964 Marshall McLuhan stated in his book, <em>Understanding Media:</em><blockquote>Electric technology does not need words <strong>any more than the digital computer needs numbers</strong>. Electricity points the way to an extension of the process of consciosuness itself, on a world scale, and without any verbalization whatever.</blockquote>(Hassan 1973: 560)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yeah, pretty much confirmed that McLuhan didn't understand computers at all. </p><!--
22 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p566a"></a>And here is the point: some of the finest science fiction concerns itself, like its two parents, Myth and Technology, with the question of a universal consciousness. Sometimes the assumption appears to be that wherever life obtains in heightened forms, intelligence also functions in im-mediate ways. At other times, the assumption is simply that <strong>human minds are good enough to imagine better minds with, but good for little more</strong>. (Hassan 1973: 566)</blockquote><!--
--><p>So well put. I would relate it to Stapledon's tendency not only to develop new human species but the never-ending (though factually ending) attempt to create increasingly more developed minds; the last of the last men are intentionally more developed than their parents.</p><!--
22 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p566b"></a>British science fiction has richly rendered its own version of this theme (see <strong>Fred Hoyle's <em>The Black Cloud</em></strong> or Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>). (Hassan 1973: 566)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Black_Cloud"><em>The Black Cloud</em></a> is a 1957 science fiction novel by British astrophysicist Fred Hoyle. It details the arrival of an enormous cloud of gas that enters the Solar System and appears about to destroy most of the life on Earth by blocking the Sun's radiation.</u>"</p><!--
23 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p567"></a>These three science fictions are by no means unique in presaging the transformation of man into <strong>a vast noetic reality</strong>, a universal consciousness capable of im-mediate exchanges of knowledge. Can such anticipatory myths become slow, self-fulfilling prophecies? Or is the future simply our most widely shared, treasured, and revised fantasy? (Hassan 1973: 567)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cut it out. Stop it.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="hassan73p550b"></a>The New Gnosticism is the result of various synergies. Myth and Technology, for instance, now easily blend in the mind. <strong>A great part of our culture, however, still abets opposition, division</strong>. Consider, for instance, the current distinction between Arcadians and Technophiles:<!--
--><table border="0" width="100%"><!--
--><tr><!--
--><td>The Arcadians look for the unspoiled life in nature. They tend to be mythically minded <em>and edenic. Hostile to technology, they like communes</em>, ecology, health foods, folk music, occult and visionary literature. They are <em>children of the Earth</em>, mother-oriented, ruled by the great archetypes. See Charles Reich's <em>The Greening of America</em>, Theodore Roszak's <em>Where the Wasteland Ends</em>, or George B. Leonard's <em>The Transformation</em>.</td><!--
--><td>The Technophiles favor the active life of cities. They tend to be <em>technically</em> minded and <em>utopian</em>. They like gadgets, science fiction, electronic music, <em>space programs, futuristic</em> designs of their environment. They are children of the Sky, father-oriented, struggling to create neotypes. See Zbigniew Brzezinsky's <em>Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era</em>, F. M. Esfandiary's <em>Optimism One: The Emerging Radicalism</em>, or Victor Ferkiss' <em>Technological Man</em>.</td><!--
--></tr><!--
--></table><!--
-->These, to be sure, are stereotypes. Yet their tensions inform such serious works as Leo Marx's <em>The Machine in the Garden</em>, Arthur Koestler's <em>The Ghost in the Machine</em>, and Lewis Mumford's <em>The Myth of the Machine</em> - note the titles - works that prefigure some of our postmodern perplexities. (Hassan 1973: 550)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Reich, Charles A. 1972. <em>The Greening of America</em>. New York; Toronto: Bantam Books.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/greeningofamer00reic">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Roszak, Theodore 1972. <em>Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society</em>. New York: Doubleday.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/wherewastelanden00rosz">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Leonard, George B. 1981[1972]. <em>The Transformation: A Guide to the Inevitable Changes in Humankind</em>. Los Angeles: J. P. Tarcher.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/transformationgu00leon">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. 1970. <em>Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era</em>. New York: Viking Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/betweentwoagesam00brze_0/page/n3/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Esfandiary, F. M. 1970. <em>Optimism One: The Emerging Radicalism</em>. New York: Norton.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/optimismoneemerg0000esfa">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Ferkiss, Victor C. 1969. <em>Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality</em>. New York: George Braziller.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/technologicalman00ferk/page/n5/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Marx, Leo 1964. <em>The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/machineingardent0000marx">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Koestler, Arthur 1982[1967]. <em>The Ghost in the Machine</em>. New York: Random House.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/ghostinmachine0000koes_w6k4">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Mumford, Lewis 1967. <em>The Myth of the Machine: Technics and Human Development</em>. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/mythofmachine00lewi">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-73396248997043110852023-08-29T10:46:00.002-07:002023-09-05T10:05:28.499-07:00Kujundmõiste<!-- Kujundmõiste
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#sytistesalupere06">Sütiste; Salupere 2006. Eessõna</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#epner06">Epner 2006. Rahvuslik identitet ja klassikamängud millenniumivahetuse Eesti teatris</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#saro06">Saro 2006. Kultuurilise identiteedi järelekatsumine Eesti teatris</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="sytistesalupere06"></a>Sütiste, Elin; Salupere, Silvi 2006. Eessõna. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 7-10.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p7a"></a>Eesti Semiootika Seltsi väljaanne Acta Semiotica Estica on jõudnud oma kolmanda numbrini ja seega on juba põhjust rääkida perioodiliselt ilmuvast väljaandest. Kogumiku esitusviis ja ülesehitus on üldjoontes jäänud samasuguseks kui eelmises numbris, kuid siiski on Acta Semiotica Estica puhul toimunud ka oluline muutus: <strong>lisandunud on toimetuskolleegium, samuti on nüüdsest kõik artiklid eelretsenseeritud</strong>. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nagu elaks lapse kasvamisele kaasa.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p7b"></a>Kindlasti aitab toimetuskolleegiumi tegevus ja artiklite eelretsenseerimine ühtlustada ning tagada tööde taset. Peale selle <strong>suurendab see ka akadeemilise sfääri sotsiaalset sidusust</strong>: eelretsenseerimine ärgitab tihedamat suhtlust mitmete erialade esindajate vahel <strong>ega võimalda seega semiootikaalastel kirjutistel jääda semiootikute siseringi asjaks</strong>. Kõige rohkem sisulist kasu on eelretsenseerimisest ehk just noorematele kirjutajatele, kes saavad sel moel vastukaja, kas nende öeldu on mõistetav ja <strong>dialoogivõimeline</strong>, ning vajadusel nõuandeid, mis suunas artikliga edasi töötada ja kuidas seda paremaks muuta. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eelretsenseerimise käigus saad teada, kas su käkk on üldse loetav või mitte.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p7c"></a>Noorus, <strong>julgus oma mõtteid avaldada</strong> ja <strong>mäng traditsioonidega</strong> ongi mõned märksõnad, mis sobivad iseloomustama käesolevat Acta Semiotica Estica numbrit. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Innovatsioon vs. arhaism.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p8"></a>Sama teemat jätkab Anneli Saro, väites, et <strong>Eesti Vabariigi taasiseseisvumisega tekkis uus sotsiaalne situatsioon</strong>, mis tõu kaasa ka kultuurilise identiteedi ümberdefineerimise vajaduse. Ebaoluliseks muutus varem valitsev olnud dihhotoomia rahvusliku ja sovetliku kultuuri vahel, <strong>uued enesekirjeldused on kantud euroopalikust postmodernismi vaimust</strong>. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 8)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Sotsiaalne situatsioon" väga laias ja abstraktses tähenduse - <em>olukord riigis</em>. Euroopalikku postmodernistlikku vaimsust ei oska ise ette kujutada. Kala ei taju vett?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p9a"></a>Rauno Thomas Mossi uurimus tutvustab meile varakristlike <strong>eremiitide</strong> elu ja vaimutööd <strong>võitlus</strong>es <strong>deemonite ja nende saadetud kiusatustega</strong>. Põhjalikele allikauuringutele tuginedes tõestab autor, et Pontose Euagriose praktilises demonoloogias leidub hämmastavaid sarnasusi Charles Sanders Peirce'i hilisemate ideedega semiootika vallas. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Põnev!</p><!-- Et mitte öelda, "tekitab valusat intellektuaalset erektsiooni".
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p9b"></a>Artiklite rubriigi lõpetab <strong>soome eksperimentaalkirjaniku ja küberkirjanduse uurija Markku Eskelise ülevaade kübertekstiteooriast ja nn laiendatud narratoloogiast</strong>. Eskelinen toob esile trükitud kirjanduse uurimisel kasutatava "traditsioonilise" narratoloogia puudusi küberkirjanduse uurimisel ja ühendab klassikalise narratoloogia Espen Aarsethi kübertekstide tüpoloogia, tekstonoomia jt lähenemistega, et sobitada kirjelduskeelt uute meediaobjektide narratiivsete võimaluste ja praktikatega. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sama. See oli just see aeg, mil semiootika tegeles korraks ka veebilehtedega, mis on meie sotsiaalmeedia suletud aedade ajastul praktiliselt ära kadunud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="sytistesalupere06p9"></a>Nagu eespool vihjatud, on rubriigis Märkamisi seekord põhirõhk klassikutel. Avaartikkel - Kaie Kotovi sissevaade Gregory Batesoni ökoloogilisse epistemoloogiasse - on positiivne <strong>näide, kuidas on võimalik tõsiteaduslik sisu valada kütkestavasse vormi</strong>. See haarav käsitlus on ühtlasi sissejuhatavaks kommentaariks kahele Batesoni "Metaloogile" Silver Rattasepa tõlkes. (Sütiste; Salupere 2006: 9)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Batesoniga on siinmail oluliselt rohkem tegeletud kui ma arvasin.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="epner06"></a>Epner, Luule 2006. Rahvuslik identitet ja klassikamängud millenniumivahetuse Eesti teatris. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 11-25.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p11"></a>Viimase 10-15 aasta identiteediteemalisi kirjutisi läbib soov leida väljapääs eestlaseks olemise ebakindlusest (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/teatav-sumbolese.html#kotov05p189ja190">Kotov 2005: 190</a>). Rahvuslikku identiteeti on ühiskonnauurijad pidanud postkommunistlike riikide võtmeprobleemiks - <strong>kõigi idaeurooplaste põhiküsimus üleminekuajal on "kes me oleme?"</strong> (Lauristin 1997: 28). (Epner 2006: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ukrainlased mõtlesid välja, et nad on ukrainlased. Valgevenelased mõtlesid välja, et nad on ikkagi venelased.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p12a"></a>Globaliseerumise mõjude arutelu seostub tihedalt viimastel kümnenditel peetud diskussiooniga postmodernismi üle. Robert G. Dunn peab <strong>identiteet</strong>i <strong>postmodernse ajastu peateema</strong>ks ning tõstab identiteedi problematiseerumise põhjustena esile <strong>kultuurikogemuse killustumise ja pluraliseerumise</strong> (Dunn 1998: 223). Niisiis, kas me vaatleme viimaseid kümnendeid globaliseerumise, postmodernsuse või postkommunistlike arengute perspektiivis, tõuseb tulipunkti identiteedi küsimus. <strong>Traditsiooniline, monoliitne rahvuslik identiteet on tugevalt survestatud</strong> ning on tekkinud tarvidus seda kriitiliselt mõtestada, uuesti või ümber konstrueerida. (Epner 2006: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>On selle pärast siis "identiteet" selline asi, mida lõputult nämmutatakse? Uute tehnoloogiate toodud valikuvabadus kultuuritoodete tarbimise osas?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p12"></a>On ilmne, et nende osatähtsus identiteedi moodustamises võib ajastuti ja/või rahvuseti varieeruda. <strong>Jagatud müüdid, ajaloolised jutustused, traditsioonid, väärtused, uskumused jms</strong> moodustavad rahvusliku identiteedi sümboolse aspekti, mida <strong>on</strong> peetud identiteedi püsivuse seisukohast otsustavaks, sest sellel rajaneb <strong>indiviidi emotsionaalne side rahvuse kui üle-individuaalse üksusega</strong> (samas: 162). (Epner 2006: 12)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mis mõttes "emotsionaalne"? Jagatud sümboolne pagas ongi side abstraktse kogukonnaga nagu "rahvus". Jääb mulje, et kasutati sõna "emotsionaalne", et rõhutada, et see side on mingis mõttes irratsionaalne, teadvustamata, läbimõtlemata, ebamäärane, jne. Allikas:</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Smith, Anthony D. 1993[1991]. <em>National Identity</em>. Reno; Las Vegas; London: University of Nevada Press.</u> [<u>lg</u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p12ja13"></a>Mõne identiteedikomponendi nõrkus kompenseeritakse kultuurilise (sümboolse) "moodustaja" (üle)produtseerimisega, kusjuures selles osalevad, sageli määravalt tähtsana, jagatud müütide ja jutustuste (taas)kujutised kunstides. Müüdiloome kunstivahenditega on olnud eriti tähtis nende rahvaste puhul, kes pole saavutanud poliitilist iseseisvust (Sevänen 2004: 38). Ka Eesti on suure osa oma ajaloost kuulunud niisuguste rahvaste kilda: meie ärkamisaeg langeb 19. sajandi teise poolde, ent suveräänne riik rajati alles 1918. aastal - et see juba 1940. aastal Nõukogude okupatsiooni tagajärjel kaotada. Pole imestada, et eesti rahvusliku identiteedi nurgakiviks on tavaliselt peetud eesti keelt ja kultuuri, eriti kirjandust (vt Veidemann 2004: 110). <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Mida vähem poliitilist ja majanduslikku iseseisvust, seda suurem on <strong>tarvidus kogukonda ühteliitvate kultuurisündmuste järele</strong> - väide, mida kinnitab <strong>kunsti ebaharilikult kõrge prestiiž eesti ühiskonnas</strong> ja kunstiteoste toimimine rahvustunde kandjana nii saksa mõisnike ülemvalitsuse all kui ka nõukogude võimu aastatel. (Epner 2006: 12-13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Veenev argument. Läheb sellesse rubriiki, miks Eesti kultuur on muudkui kultuurist jahuv kultuur. See "ühteliitvate kultuurisündmuste" küsimus on iseenesest kaudselt, laiendatud mõttes, faatiline (ühiste teadmiste või teemade küsimus).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p13a"></a>Nagu osutatud, on kirjandust peetud eesti identiteedi ehitamise seisukohast tsentraalseks; eesti kirjanduse esmaseks ülesandeks on omakorda öeldud olevat "eesti rahvusliku ja kultuurilise identsuse tootmine ja taastootmine" (Undusk 1999: 249). Kirjandust tõstab teiste kunstide seast esile kõigepealt keelepõhisus - <strong>eesti kirjanduse ruumiks on esmajoones eesti keel, mitte geograafiline Eestimaa</strong> (samas: 250) -, kuna rahvuskeel on väikerahva identiteedi olulisemaid ja kindlamaid alustalasid. Teiseks kindlustavad rahvuslikku identiteeti ajaloolised ja ka fiktsionaalsed narratiivid, viimaste keskmeks on aga <strong>kirjanduskaanonisse ehk klassikasse kuuluvad teosed</strong>, mis <strong>(taas)loovad kollektiivsel enesepildil baseeruvat rahvuslikku karakterit ning väljendavad rahvuse ideaale ja väärtusi</strong> (vt sel teemal ka Annus 2000). Eesti kirjanduskriitikas on käibele läinud <strong>tüvitekst</strong>i kujundmõiste: sellised tekstid toovad esile rahvuse kollektiivseid <strong>omadusi, ihasid ja hirme</strong> ning on rahvustunde "energeetiliseks väljaks" (Veidemann 2003: 891). (Epner 2006: 13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just ülal mõtlesin, et "kunst" küll ei ole <em>see</em>. Pigem tõepoolest kirjandus. Ja just siin nimetatud põhjusel - Eesti kultuur on pigem keelepõhine kultuur. (P.S. omadused, ihad ja hirmud ei ole triaadiline; on täiesti arusaamatu miks just need kolm asja.)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p13b"></a>Taolised müüdistunud kirjandusteosed, millele toetub eestlaste eneseteadvus, on näiteks Fr. R. Kreutzwaldi eepos "<strong>Kalevipoeg</strong>" (1853-1862), Eduard Bornhõhe jutustus "<strong>Tasuja</stronG>" (1880), August Kitzbergi tragöödia "<strong>Libahunt</strong>" (1911), Oskar Lutsu "<strong>Kevade</strong>" (1912-1913) ja selle jäljed, Anton Hansen Tammsaare romaan "<strong>Tõde ja õigus</strong>" I-V (1926-1933), Lydia Koidula ja Juhan Liivi luule jne. (Epner 2006: 13)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Olen ise täisealisena lugenud neist vaid kahte ("Libahunt" ja "Tõde ja õigus"). Võib-olla peaks ülejäänutest alustama uuesti eesti kirjandusega taastutvumist.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p14a"></a>Rahvusliku eneseteadvuse tootmise ülesannet täitis teater omakirjandusel põhinevate lavastuste toel ning töötades kirjandustekstide kultuurilise võimendajana. Tänu teatrietenduste vastuvõtu kollektiivsele, teinekord lausa koguduslikule iseloomule on neil (potentsiaalselt) tugev emotsionaalne mõjuväli. <strong>Teater kui kollektiivne meedium on suuteline tugevdama vastuvõtu poolest "üksildaste" kirjandustekstide sotsiaalset kõlajõudu</strong>. Teatrisündmuses osalemist on võimalik vaadelda sotsiaalse rituaalina, milles kinnitatakse usku teatud eetilis-moraalsesse maailmakorraldusse ja korratakse teatud ühiseid müüte (Paavolainen 1992: 15). (Epner 2006: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Maakeeli: raamatut loetakse üksinda, teatris käiakse teiste inimestega koos.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p14b"></a>Teatri ja kirjanduse suhestumist kultuuriväljal saab kirjeldada ka mälu terminites. Juri Lotmani järgi on kultuur kollektiivne intellekt ja kollektiivne mälu, tekstide säilitamise ja vahendamise ning uute tekstide loomise üleisikuline mehhanism. <strong>Kultuuriruumi võib piiritleda just ühismälu alusel</strong>. Kunstimälus, mis on tüübilt kreatiivne, leiab aset juba loodud tekstide pulseerivas rütmis "unustamine" ja "meenutamine", tekstid kord aktualiseeruvad, kord tuhmuvad (Lotman 1992: 200-201). (Epner 2006: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kindlasti nii. Mind pani praegu aga mõtlema Stapledoni Kaheksateistkümnendatele Inimestele, kelle "kultuurimälu" hõlmab kogu inimkonda. Totaalselt totaalne semiosfäär?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p14ja15"></a>Mõistagi ei toimu see iseenesest. Teater, mis toob minevikuteoseid rambivalgusesse - uute põlvkondade kultuuriteadvusse -, on üks kirjandustekstide "meenutamise" ning väärtustamise ja ümberväärtustamise mehhanisme. <strong>Lavastamine kui kirjandusteksti intersemiootiline tõlge on ühtlasi minevikutekstide aktiivne suhestamine lavastuse loojatele ja vastuvõtjatele ühiste ning ajas muutuvate sotsiaalsete ja ideoloogiliste kontekstidega</strong>. Teater (re)kontekstualiseerib kirjandustekste, kusjuures klassika puhul kuulub konteksti koosseisu teose ja autori tõlgendustraditsioon, millega uus lavastus nii või teisiti dialoogi astub. Klassikat aktualiseerides ning uusi tähenduskihte <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> aktiviseerides teater ühtaegu säilitab ja uuendab kogukonna vaimset sidet minevikupärandiga. (Epner 2006: 14-15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Täpselt see küsimus mida <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/06/sipsik-erinevates-meediumides.html">Jaanika Palm (2013)</a> käsitles oma lõputöös Sipsiku raamatu, näidendi ja animafilmi põhjal. Sealjuures just tõlgendustraditsioonide omavahelise dialoogi analüüs (kuidas nt midagi jääb välja või lisatakse näiteks selle tõttu, et animafilmi režissöör on välismaalane ja film on suunatud välisturule).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p15a"></a>Teatrist rääkides tavatsetakse rõhutada tema efemeersust ja kaduvust (<strong>öeldakse, et teater on "liivale kirjutatud"</strong>), ent teiselt poolt on talle pärisomane korduvus (alates lavastuse korduvast etendamisest õhtust õhtusse), nagu ka kalduvus taaskasutada lugusid, tegelastüüpe, misanstseene, kujunduselemente jm. (Epner 2006: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vaatasin just üle filmi <em>Mank</em> (2020) [sealjuures kohe otse <em>Citizen Kane</em>'ile otsa] ja seal ütles Louis B. Mayeri tegelane midagi samasse kilda: "<u>This is a business where the buyer gets nothing for his money but a memory. What he bought still belongs to the man who sold it.</u>" Siin on muidugi rõhk mitte ärilisel vinklil vaid sellel, et teatrietendus on ajaline ning seetõttu kaduv. Veel üldisem iva siin on muidugi tüüp (näidend) ja tooken (lavastus).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p15b"></a>Teatri suhe kirjandusklassikaga ei taandu ometi võimendamisele ja/või mäluoperatsioonidele, mis <strong>sugereerivad</strong> säilitava funktsiooni primaarsust. (Epner 2006: 15)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aitäh, mul oli seda sõna vaja.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p16"></a>"Tali" on juba pealkirja järgi Lutsu tsükli jätk ja lõpetus - see, mis tuleb pärast "Sügist". <stronG>Kõiv kirjutab Lutsu arhetüüpsed eestlased sisse nõukogude okupatsiooni ja stalinistlike representatsioonide "talvesse" 1940-ndatel</strong>. Lavastuse lumme ja tuisku mattuv maailm on ühtaegu "sula"-eelse ajaloojärgu võrdpilt ning aastaaegade-tsükli surmafaas. Kevad ja suvi metaforiseerivad seevastu rahvusliku mineviku kuldaega ning visualiseeruvad lavastuses meenutuslike või nägemuslike stseenidena Lutsu samanimelistest jutustustest. Ajaloo surve all teeb eestlaste põhiomane "kuldse mineviku" müüt ("vanapõlve jutt" Kõivu sõnutsi) läbi veidraid metamorfoos. Eri ajakihid voolavad kokku, tekitades groteskseid kombinatsioone. Näiteks <strong>esitati krestomaatiline stseen Kiire kadunud saapanööridest KGB-liku ülekuulamise kontekstis, kusjuures süüdlasi ähvardati Siberiga, Tootsi ahjuroop osutus vintpüssiks, saapanööpide asemel ilmusid välja padrunid, tegelaseks tehtud Oskar Luts käsutati aga toimuvat protokollima</strong>.<br />"Kevade" südamliku huumoriga kujutatud koolipere lõheneb "Talis" eestlaskonna ajaloolise saatuse jõujooni pidi. Kõiv ei kujuta eesti rahvast ajaloolise vägivalla kollektiivse ohvrina, vaid tuletab "kuldses minevikus", s.o "Kevades" varjuvatest vastandustest lahknemise vaenulikesse leeridesse: <strong>Tootsist saab metsavend, isatust ja narritud Visakust nõukogude miilitsavolinik, jõuka peremehe pojast Imelikust hästihoolitsetud pagulane</strong> jne. "Tali" Arno varjab end põranda all, valutab südant ning tahab enda peale võtta igavese klassivõitluse süü, et lunastada oma rahvas. (Kõivule on üldse omane "tõlkida" ajaloolised ja ajalised protsessid eetilistesse, süü ja karistuse kategooriatesse.) (Epner 2006: 16)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See kõlab küll palju ägedamalt kui <em>Talve</em> (2020), mida ma vist? olen näinud, aga ei oskaks püss kuklas välja võluda, millest see rääkis.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p17"></a>Erinevalt "Tali" katkestuste poeetikast toob Unt ilmsiks ajaloo korduvuse: 20. sajandi ajaloosündmusi esitatakse kui variatsioone eesti elu põhisituatsioonidele, mis olemuslikult jäävad nendekssamadeks. Kui mehed lähevad sõtta, siis saab sõda tõlgendada mõlema maailmasõja ja Vabadussõjana; korduvas <strong>fraasis "vana vene aeg" virvendavad nii tsaari- kui nõukogude aeg</strong>; esimese Eesti Vabariigi olud ja reaalid ilmutavad hämmastavat sarnasust praegusaja Eestiga jne. Nii võtab kuju pilt Eesti ajaloost kui alalõpmatust iseseisvusvõitlusest, sõdadest ja elu ülesehitamisest nende järel. Kõik ajakihid - poliitiline (ajalugu), psühholoogiline (tegelassuhted), teatraalne (lavategevus) - käituvad ühtmoodi, tuues esile kordumisi ja variatsioone juba olnule. (Epner 2006: 17)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui praegused sündmused Ida-Euroopas üldse midagi ütlevad, siis seda, et ajalugu ei ole veel lõppenud ja võib juhtuda, et väikerahvaste iseseisvusvõitlus siinkandis jätkub ka 21. sajandil ja ikka veel sama v(a)en(e)lasega.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p18"></a>Identiteedi teema seisukohast on kõige intrigeerivamaks täienduseks arvukate Lutsu tegelaste baasil konstrueeritud märgiline muulaste paar - <strong>venelane</strong> Bolotov <strong>ja sakslane</strong> Sumpfentropf -, kes kehastavad Eestit mõjutanud poliitilisi ja kultuurilisi jõude. Narratiivis täidavad nad sookollide rolli Lutsu jutustusest "Soo", ideoloogiliselt <strong>nähtuvad eestlaste kollektiivsesse alateadvusesse ("sohu") vermitud arhetüüpsete võõrastena, kellega küll lõputult sõditakse, ent kellest mingil viisil lahti ei saa. Rahvuse mentaalsesse ruumi sisse-ehitatud Teine tehakse sel kombel teatrivahenditega nähtavaks</strong>. (Epner 2006: 18)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aga sood saab ju kuivendada... Saksamaale viivad maanteed ja kunagi ehk Rail Baltic. Venemaale peame panema traataedu ette, võib-olla varsti isegi miine. Tähendab, ühe kunagise sookolliga saame nüüd läbi, teine on nüüd veel kollim koll kui ta kunagi on olnud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p19"></a>Teist korda pöördus Jalakas Kitzbergi draama poole 1998. aastal. Täpsemalt oli seekordne "Libahunt" lavastus Kitzbergi ainetel, dramaturgideks Peeter Jalakas ning Margus Kasterpalu. Lavastus määratleti eksperimendina, mille eesmärk on uurida teatrivahenditega Kitzbergi draama keskse konflikti ja väärtuste kehtivust tänapäeva ühiskonnas. Peamiseks lavastusstrateegiaks oli <strong>"Libahundi" loo esitus "teater teatris" tehnika abil: näitlejad teevad näidendiga proove ning üksiti kommenteerivad seda. Niisiis näidati laval proove</strong>, kus näitlejad rakendasid erinevaid tõlgendusmudeleid, nagu psühholoogilis-realistlik, rahvusromantiline, ritualistlik, kuid heitsid kõik need kõrvale kui kaasaja maailmapildiga sobimatud. "Teater teatris" tehnikat täiendas lava ja lavategevuse fragmenteerimine eri võtetega, mille abil "Libahunt" kui müüt lõhestati, selle elemendid paigutati uutesse kontekstidesse ning seoti nii visuaalse kui verbaalse kommentaariga. (Epner 2006: 19)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ma ei ole teatriinimene (võib-olla isegi selle täielik vastand), aga iga kord kui mõni semiootik kirjeldab mõnd näidendit siis tundub meeletult äge ja tekib kibe tahtmine ise ka näha. Võib-olla on asi selles, et semiootikud kirjutavad ainult ägedaimatest näidenditest.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p22"></a>Õieti sooritati kaks erimärgilist demütologiseerivat operatsiooni. Ühelt poolt naeruvääristati rahvalikku elutarkust, mida väljendavad ütlused "<strong>ela lihtsalt ja tasakesi</strong>" ning "meie oleme väikesed inimesed", ja näidati eestlaste üsna skeptilisest vaatenurgast. Teiselt poolt viidi müütiline Kalevipoeg inimlikesse mõõtmetesse, vabastades ta nii heroilisest oreoolist kui ka juhmivõitu jõumehe mainest. (Epner 2006: 22)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõlab nagu mõni vanakreeklaste õpetuslause.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="epner06p24"></a>Klaus Schwindi sõnul on teatrimäng ambivalentne, dünaamiline ja <strong>genuiinselt</strong> dialoogiline protsess, milles vaataja on positsioneeritud aktiivse kaasamängijana; mäng pigem komplitseerib kui lihtsustab struktuure ja elemente, mida ta kasutab (Schwind 1997: 425). (Epner 2006: 24)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Seda regardiseerin aga blameeritava appropriatsioonina, sest käepärane vaste ("tõeliselt") on olemas.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="saro06"></a>Saro, Anneli 2006. Kultuurilise identiteedi järelekatsumine Eesti teatris. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> III: 26-37.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p26ja27"></a><strong>Nõukogude Liidu lagunemisele järgnenud ideoloogilises vaakumis</strong> pööras Eesti kui ida ja lääne vaheline <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kultuurisaar näo Euroopasse, et leida oma uus või "tõeline", seni varjatud rahvuslik ning riiklik identiteet (post)modernses ja globaliseeruvas maailmas. (Saro 2006: 26-27)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Selle vaakumi täitis loetavasti (ja tajutavasti) "ultraliberalism" (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/erialakeelne.html#joosepsonjt05p247">Joosepson jt 2005: 247</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p28a"></a>Kuid siin tekib möödapääsmatu küsimus - <strong>mil määral sõltuvad identifitseerumine ja identiteedi konstrueerimine inimese vabast või teadlikust tahtest</strong> ning mil määral sõltub see protsess ideoloogiatest ja diskursiivsetest praktikatest. On ajastuid ning piirkondi, kus üks diskursiivne praktika domineerib selgelt teiste omasuguste ning subjekti vaba tahte üle - näiteks kommunistlik ideoloogia Nõukogude Liidus. <strong>Tänapäeval ollakse üldiselt seisukohal, et indiviid moodustub identiteetide paljususest, millest</strong> mõned kehtestab ümbritsev sotsiaalne ja kultuuriline süsteem ning <strong>mõned on omaks võetud vabatahtlikult</strong>. (Saro 2006: 28)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vaba tahte küsimus kohtub identiteediloome küsimusega.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p28b"></a>Kuna eestlased on olnud vallutatud rahvas suurema osa oma teadlikust ajaloost, kujunes nende identiteet vastanduses mitte niivõrd naabrite, kuivõrd vallutajate ja valitsejatega. Rahvusliku identiteedi kõige tähtsamaks tunnuseks on Eestis peetud inimese emakeelt, kuid 20. sajandi alguseni märkis eesti keel ka kõneleja sotsiaalset staatust ning <strong>tõusuga sotsiaalses hierarhias kaasnes tihti keele vahetus</strong>. (Saro 2006: 28)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mingis mõttes on see tänini nii: enamus kõrgharidusega inimesi tänapäeval on praktiliselt võsajänkid. Mõnes tehnilisemas valdkonnas kuuleb tööl alatasa niivõrd palju inglisekeelseid mõisteid, et kohe kahju hakkab väikesest eesti keelest ja selle kõnelejatest.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p29"></a>Kuid performatiivsus ei ole vältimatult seotud ainult kehtivate normide ja traditsioonidega, isegi vastupidi - igas etenduses on ontoloogiliselt peidus teatud annus juhuslikkust ning (teadlikku või teadvustamatut) originaalsust, rääkimata siis normide teadlikust eiramisest. Näiteks 1980. aastate lõpus muutus Eestis suurmoeks oma rahvusliku identiteedi või sümpaatiate demonstreerimine. <strong>Rahvusvärvide</strong> (sini-must-valge) ning rahvariideelementide <strong>kasutamine riietuses kui üks kõige ilmsemaid performatiivsuse märke jättis</strong> samas piisavalt ruumi improvisatsioonidele ning individuaalsetele erinevustele. Sellised väikesed individuaalsed manifestatsioonid viitavad küll oma seostele mingi hõlmavama kontseptsiooniga, kuid ei suuda kunagi väljendada kõiki identiteediteemaga seotud tähendusi, jättes nii identiteedi tuuma ometi piisavalt hämaraks ning kaitsvalt varjule. (Saro 2006: 29)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kuidagi iseenesest on juhtunud nii, et minu viisakaimad riided on tumesinised püksid, must pusa, sinised jalavarjud ja sinine särk, mille käised ja alumine veeris on valged. Ükskord vaatasin ennast peeglist ja nagu üüratu hilinemisega taipasin, et ma kannan ainult lipuvärve.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p33"></a>Rahvatraditsioone on ikka kasutatud rahvuste representeerimisel nii teatri- kui laiemas kultuuridiskursuses. 18. ja 19. sajandi vahetusel, kui uurijad hakkasid sotsiokultuurilist reaalsust jagama rahvuskultuurideks, tekkis neil <strong>huvi erinevate rahvuste</strong> iseärasuste ning <strong>"vaimsete" karakteristikute vastu</strong>. (Saro 2006: 33)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võtmemõiste on Herderist põlvnenud ja veel 20. sajandi alguseni ka ingliskeelses teaduskirjanduses ilutsenud <em>national character</em> (vt <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/12/herderi-iseloom.html#piirim2e19p972">Piirimäe 2019: 972</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p34"></a>Pidu kogub hoogu ning lavategevus muutub dionüüsiaks: videoekraanile ilmub <strong>"Viru valge" viinapudelilt tuttav</strong> ja mehaaniliselt tantsiv <strong>torupillimängija</strong> kui jaanikustseenis joobe ja mentaalse joobumuse märk (<strong>Mihkel muti arvates võikski see embleem saada Eesti märgiks</strong> (Mutt 1998)), Tiina ja Margus hullavad jaanituld kujutava teleri ees nagu hundikutsikad, tuues nii esile oma libahundipotentsiaali jne. (Saro 2006: 34)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mihkel Mutt pidi küll purjus olema kui ta sellist asja kirjutas. Võib-olla oli päevaülesanne otsida "Eesti märki" ja ta leidis selle otse enda eest laua pealt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p36"></a>Ka Margus protestib esivanemate poolt ettekirjutatud käitumismustrite ja väärtushinnangute vastu, ta tahab abielluda Tiinaga armastusest, mitte ratsionaalsetest kalkulatsioonidest ja traditsioonist lähtudes. Margus deklareerib Kitzbergile ja Vanaemale:<blockquote>Mind ei huvita sinu sugu ja võsa. Mind ei huvita, et Euroopa piirid on kokku keritud. Meie joonistame sinna uued piirid, mina ja Tiina, Tiina ja mina, oma armastuse verega. Rammstein!</blockquote>(Keelemängu korras võiks Margust veel parandada ning väljenduda nii: "<strong>Mis on minul sinu suguvõsast, soost ja võsast!</strong>" Sellega öeldakse end lahti nii suguvõsast kui Eesti isamaast, mis ongi muutumas soo ja võsa sünonüümiks.) (Saro 2006: 36)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tänapäeval võiks öelda, et <em>sugu ongi võsa</em> (a la sooesituste tihnikud - <em>the thickets of gender performance</em>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="saro06p36"></a>Eesti rahvusliku identiteedi etendamise analüüsi võib viia universaalide tasandile William Butler Yeatsi sada aastat tagasi lausutud sõnadega - meie maailm on lõhestatud kahe igavikulise nähtuse vahel: <strong>veri meenutab suguvõsa minevikku ning hing aimab ette kosmopoliitset tulevikku</strong> (Segers 2004: 80). Nii jäävad ka seda artiklit lõpetama mõned komplitseeritud küsimused: kas eestlastel õnnestub säilitada oma kultuuriline mälu ning rahvuskehand geograafiliselt, keeleliselt ja geneetiliselt või tahab nende hing endale igavikku teistes vormides otsida ning eestlus taandub "Libahundi"-sarnaseks etnograafiliseks väljapanekuks mõnes muuseumis. (Saro 2006: 36)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Relevantne mu vaese Stapledoni jaoks, kes kogu aeg jahub midagi kosmopolitanismist.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-79558684315079366432023-08-27T13:01:00.004-07:002023-08-27T13:03:20.341-07:00A Literature of Ideas<!-- A Literature of Ideas
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_rYAsrhNt7hae7xR0DH-knd4TmPSnjTH_uV-DNZ6XY9rcGZRalLW3uruNqoUFWRTy7hrDQMr1ZlYsRo0m8hys_y1xlvZPvXVbzOaQ7yzGu9MnhCyy6GMTodsaOy5QULmWPvSS_qLNzH9cxf2Qjxqd7e7UongQtl-Wl2DGL1x22YugtWkXwz7Mfejx0iqj/s1024/jja_pilt_sdxl_a_literature_of_ideas.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1024" data-original-width="1024" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg_rYAsrhNt7hae7xR0DH-knd4TmPSnjTH_uV-DNZ6XY9rcGZRalLW3uruNqoUFWRTy7hrDQMr1ZlYsRo0m8hys_y1xlvZPvXVbzOaQ7yzGu9MnhCyy6GMTodsaOy5QULmWPvSS_qLNzH9cxf2Qjxqd7e7UongQtl-Wl2DGL1x22YugtWkXwz7Mfejx0iqj/s320/jja_pilt_sdxl_a_literature_of_ideas.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#pohl76">Pohl 1976. The Innovators</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#rabkin77">Rabkin 1977. Conflation of Genres and Myths in David Lindsay's "A Voyage to Arcturus"</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#suvin72">Suvin 1972. On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="pohl76"></a>Pohl, Frederik 1976. The Innovators. <em>The Journal of General Education</em> 28(1): 43-49. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27796551">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p43"></a>Now, this could have been a pleasant half hour for me. I like science fiction. I've spent my life reading it, editing it and writing it, and it pleases me to find people who find merit in it. But the pleasure was spoiled, because I didn't know quite what to say to my Texan friend; every one of those exciting ideas he mentioned were, to be sure, exciting and challenging enough, but not one of them was new. <strong>I could remember this from the works of W. Olaf Stapledon and that from Arthur C. Clarke</strong>, this bit was Lester del Rey's, and that one came from William Tenn. (Pohl 1976: 43)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It feels like acquaintance with early science fiction acquaints one with spoilers.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p44"></a>Of all the writers who have contributed original thought to science fiction - and there are scores, perhaps even hundreds, whose contributions have been substantial - <strong>Wells</strong> is clearly the one to whom we all owe the largest debt. He did not invent the story of space travel, but he gave it its modern form. He did not invent the utopia, but he <strong>may have invented the dystopia - in <em>When the Sleeper Wakes</em></strong> - and he certainly contributed largely to utopian literature. (Pohl 1976: 44)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That's the book that sounds, at least in summary, like the main inspiration for the <em>Matrix</em>.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p45"></a>But we must writers remember that Burroughs wrote long before Mariner was launched. <strong>The planet he described was the planet the best prevailing astronomical opinion spelled out for him</strong>. These were the years of Percival Lowell, when astronomers still saw canals in their telescopes, when the Martian ice caps were taken to be glaciers, when the color changes were deemed to represent the growth of vegetation - perhaps even of crops; when some of the best minds in science were preoccupied not with the question of whether intelligence existed on Mars - they took that as given - but with the question of how best to light huge fires in geometrical designs on the Sahara desert so that they might inform that Martian intelligent life that Earth had similar life of its own. (Pohl 1976: 45)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Can this be said of Stapledon's Mars?</p><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p47ja48"></a>I am not unaware, by the way, that other <strong>writers were thinking cosmologically large thoughts</strong> independent of Doc <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Smith at about that same time - <strong>Stapledon comes quickly to mind</strong>, with <em>Last and First Men</em> and <em>The Star Maker</em>. But I think Smith is entitled to pride of place, partly because of the calendar - he wrote <em>Skylark</em>, after all, around 1919 - and partly because his influence was direct, immediate and large-scale, taking place in what was then the mainstream of science fiction, the American pulps. (Pohl 1976: 47-48)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Last and First Men</em> has a literal chapter on cosmology.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p48a"></a><em>A Martian Odyssey</em> is written in <em>Liberty</em> magazine prose; it contains four or five human characters, an American, a Frenchman, a German and <strong>I have forgotten who all else; every one of them is a total bore, and I owe them no apologies for forgetting them because they deserve no better</strong>. (Pohl 1976: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Jesus Christ, Pohl, put the gasoline can and matches down.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p48b"></a>To see what a feat of invention this is we need only remind ourselves that even Wells did not succeed in accomplishing it; <strong>his Martians</strong> in <em>The War of the Worlds</em> <strong>are as impersonal as tiger sharks</strong>; his Selenites are ants ruled by witch doctors. Tweel is something else. Nothing like Tweel has ever existed. His language is less cognate with human tongues than English is with crow calls. And yet we know him well enough to like him; we may not understand him, but we can value him as a friend. Other writers put into their stories beings which they called Martians or Sirians or Plutonians, but it was always clear that they were either plain people in funny suits, or <strong>impersonal menaces</strong>, or symbolic figures like Voltaire's Micromegas and his associates, no more real than plaster saints. Tweel had the dimension of personality, and it was not near-human or insane-human, it was <em>alien</em>. (Pohl 1976: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I said put them down! / Similar (lack of) personality issue with Stapledon's Martians and Venusians, but then again they are given as much detail as the various humans (that is, very little, if any at all).</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p48c"></a>Weinbaum went on to invent other kinds of creatures in a dozen other stories in his tragically short writing life - it was only a matter of a year or two after <em>A Martian Odyssey</em> appeared that he died; but he didn't have to invent more, he had shown how the trick was done and all of us began doing it instantly and in great volume. <strong>Tweel's descendants appear in every science-fiction story written in the past forty years that has to do with aliens</strong>. (Pohl 1976: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I wonder if he's anything like Alf, Roger, or Paul.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="pohl76p49"></a>Science fiction is <strong>a literature of ideas</strong>. (Not always, to be sure. <strong>Nothing is always anything</strong>.) Some of the ideas are funneled into science fiction from external sources - from other kinds of literature, from science itself, from the world around us. No writer deserves any special credit for being the first to happen to use that sort of idea. (Pohl 1976: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ending on a profound note.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="rabkin77"></a>Rabkin, Eric S. 1977. Conflation of Genres and Myths in David Lindsay's "A Voyage to Arcturus". <em>The Journal of Narrative Technique</em> 7(2): 149-155. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/30225613">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2--><blockquote><a id="rabkin77p149a"></a>David Lindsay's <em>A Voyage to Arcturus</em> (1920), a powerful and confusing work set largely on a distant planet, obviously springs from the world of science fiction. One purist's definition of that genre calls for the exercise of utterly logical - scientific, if you will - extrapolation. Yet even in <strong>a paradigmatic science fiction novel</strong> like Well's <em>The Time Machine</em> (1895), the future setting is justified, made <em>science</em> fiction, by the fantastic device of the time machine itself. All science fiction is to some extent fantastic. (Rabkin 1977: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not sure if it's the correct use of the word "paradigmatic" but it seems to work. (Read somethig recently about Thomas Kuhn himself was not sure how to define "paradigmatic".)</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="rabkin77p149b"></a>Yet the extent to which science fiction can use the startling and assumption-reversing devices of the fantastic is much greater than Wells made clear. In <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930), for example, <strong>Stapledon gives us plenty of logical extrapolation</strong>, especially in the early chapters predicting developments in world politics, but he also has the thing called Man undergo seventeen discontinuous and fantastic metamorphoses so that he discusses fully eighteen so-called "Men." (Rabkin 1977: 149)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Does he?</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="rabkin77p150"></a>There Maskull finds a tower which he hasn't the strength to climb, for as he goes up, its gravity increases geometrically: gravity as inverse electromagnetic phenomenon. Of course, there is no extraliterary justification for this kind of gravity, but once introduced, it functions "scientifically," extrapolatively, with mathematical precision - until Krag arrives. He administers a ritual arm wound to Maskull and this magic suddenly allows Maskull to walk up the stairs with ease. <strong>The narrative attitude toward science here is ambiguous</strong>. What after all should we make of our science if it functions in the same realm as magic? By writing science fiction as fantasy, Lindsay makes science fiction a tool for questioning the ostensible precision of science itself. (Rabkin 1977: 150)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A familiar problematic: is it science fiction if there's zero science involved in it?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="rabkin77p153a"></a>The echoes of Christian mysticism are amplified by descriptions of a god like Pascal's infinite sphere with its center everywhere and by overly trinitarian concepts:<blockquote><span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <strong>Length is existence, breath is relation, depth is feeling</strong>. (213) <span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span></blockquote>However, one is not allowed to follow a simply Christian interpretation far. One problem is that the composite god goes not by three names but by at least six, again depending on locale. (Rabkin 1977: 153)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Yo what is this?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="rabkin77p163b"></a>A second problem is that the central figure in Christianity, <strong>the dying god</strong>, is most closely approximated in this book by none of the gods but by Maskull. <strong>Sir James Frazer has shown us the relationship among Jesus, Osiris and Prometheus</strong>. (Rabkin 1977: 153)</blockquote><!--
--><p>It's weird being this familiar with a name and not knowing what the person was really about.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="suvin72"></a>Suvin, Darko 1972. On the Poetics of the Science Fiction Genre. <em>College English</em> 34(3): 372-382. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/375141">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p372"></a>Second, if one takes as differentiae of SF either <em>radically different figures</em> (dramatis personae) or <strong>a <em>radically different context</em> of the story</strong>, it will be found to have an interesting and close kinship with other literary sub-genres, which flourished at different times and places of literary history: the Greek and Hellenistic "blessed island" stories, the "fabulous voyage" from Antiquity on, the Renaissance and Baroque "utopia" and "planetary novel," the Enlightenment "state (political) novel," the modern "anticipation," "anti-utopia," etc. (Suvin 1972: 372)</blockquote><!--
--><p>This question of radical difference appears to be open ended in Stapledon.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p371ja373"></a>In the following paper I shall argue for a definition of SF as <strong>the <em>literature of cognitive estrangement</em></strong>. This definition seems <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> to possess the unique advantage of rendering justice to a literary tradition which is coherent through the ages and within itself, and yet <strong>distinct from non-fictional utopianism</strong>, from naturalistic literature, and from other non-naturalistic fiction. It thus permits us to lay the basis of <strong>a coherent poetics of SF</strong>. (Suvin 1972: 372-373)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Cognitive" seems redundant here - estrangement is cognitive by default.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p374a"></a>Thus, it is not only the basic human and humanizing curiosity that gives birth to SF. Beside an undirected inquisitiveness, <strong>a semantic game without clear referent</strong>, this genre has always been wedded to a hope of finding in the unknown the ideal environment, tribe, state, intelligence or other aspect of the Supreme Good (or to a fear of and revulsion from its contrary). At all events, the <em>possibility</em> of other strange, co-variant coordinate systems and semantic fields is assumed. (Suvin 1972: 374)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Abstract reference?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p374b"></a>Thus <strong>SF takes off from a fictional ("literary") hypothesis and develops it with extrapolating and totalizing ("scientific") rigor</strong> - in genre, Columbus and Swift are more alike than different. The effect of such factual reporting of fictions is one of confroting a set normative system - a Ptolemaic-type closed world picture - with a point of view or glace implying a new set of norms; in literary theory, this is known as the attitude of <em>estrangement</em>. This concept was first developed on non-natural (<em>ostranenie</em>, Viktor Shklovsky, 1917), and most successfully underpinned by an anthropological and historical approach in the opus of Bertolt Brecht, who wanted to write "plays for a scientific age." While working on a play about the prototype scientist Galileo, he defined this attitude (<em>Verfremdungseffekt</em>) in his <em>Short Organon for the Theatre</em> (1948): "A representation which estranges is one which allows us to <strong>recognize</strong> its subject, but at the same time makes it seem <strong>unfamiliar</strong>." (Suvin 1972: 374)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Isn't this the opposite of estrangement? Beginning with an unfamiliar (a fictional hypothesis) an turning it into the familiar?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p376"></a>The <em>pastoral</em> is essentially closer to SF. Its imaginary framework of a world without money economy, state apparatus, and depersonalizing urbanization allows it to isolate, as in the laboratory, two human motivations - <strong>erotics and power-hunger</strong>. (Suvin 1972: 376)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The two dominant leitmotifs of poetry, again.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p378a"></a>The natural sciences caught up and surpassed the literary imagination in the 19th century, the sciences dealing with human relationships might be argued to have caught up with it in their highest theoretical achievements but have certainly not done so in their alienated social practice. <strong>In the 20th century, SF has moved into the sphere of anthropological and cosmological thought</strong>, becoming a diagnosis, a warming, a call to understanding and action, and - most important - a mapping of possible alternatives. (Suvin 1972: 378)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I'm somewhat suspicious about science fiction reaching anthropological and cosmological thought in the 20th century but then again I haven't read any of it.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p378b"></a>This <em>extrapolative</em> model - e.g., of London's <em>Iron Heel</em>, Wells' <em>The Sleeper Wakes</em> and <em>Men Like Gods</em>, Zamiatin's <em>We</em>, <strong>Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em></strong>, Pohl and Kornbluth's <em>Space Merchants</em>, or Yefremov's <em>Andromeda</em> - <strong>is based on direct, temporal extrapolation and centered on sociological</strong> (i.e., utopian and anti-utopian) <strong>modelling</strong>. (Suvin 1972: 378)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Good company.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="suvin72p379"></a>Yet already in Wells' <em>Time Machine</em> and <strong>in Stapledon' this extrapolation transcended the sociological spectrum</strong> (from everyday practice through economics to erotics) <strong>and spilled into biology and cosmology</strong>. Nonetheless, whatever its ostensible location (future, "fourth dimension", other planets, alternate universes), "extrapolative modelling" is oriented futurologically. Its values and standards are to be found in the cognitive import of the fable's premises and the consistency with which such premises (usually one or very few in number) are narratively developed to its logical end, to <strong>a cognitively significant conclusion</strong>. (Suvin 1972: 379)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I think with this claim that only in the 20th century did SF spill over into biology Suvin is completely ignoring Frankenstein.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-10766548072991895322023-08-27T10:30:00.002-07:002023-08-29T10:46:52.114-07:00Erialakeelne<!-- Erialakeelne
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><h4>Kroonika 2004</h4><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#maran05">Maran 2005. Seminarisari kultuuriteooriast ja semiootikast</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#joosepsontago05">Joosepson; Tago 2005. Tartu ja Lüneburgi kultuuriuurijate koostöö</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#keskpaik05a">Keskpaik 2005a. Cassirer, Lotman, Uexküll</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#tago05">Tago 2005. Noorsooprojekt "Ühendavad piirid"</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#keskpaik05b">Keskpaik 2005b. Mälestusi kaugest tulevikust</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#tyyr05">Tüür 2005. Kultuur, loodus, semiootika</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#joosepsonjt05">Joosepson jt 2005. VI semiootika sügiskool "Ideoloogilised märgiprotsessid kultuuris"</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="maran05"></a>Maran, Timo 2005. Seminarisari kultuuriteooriast ja semiootikast. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 237.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p237a"></a>2003. aasta sügisel ja 2004. aasta kevadel korraldas Eesti Semiootika Selts koostöös Eesti Kirjandusmuuseumi kultuuri- ja kirjandusteooria töörühmaga <em>seminarisarja kultuuriteooriast ja semiootikast</em> (peakorraldaja T. Maran). Seminarisarja eesmärgiks oli edendada semiootikaalast tegevust Tallinnas ning pakkuda kraadiõppuritele ja noortele teadlastele esinemisvõimalusi.<br />Seminarid toimusid esmaspäeviti Eesti Keele Instituudis ja TPÜ Akadeemilises Raamatukogus sagedusega kaks korda kuus. Sarja raames pidasid ettekande Urve Eslas, <strong>Jan Kaus</strong>, Kaie Kotov, Andres Kõnno, <strong>Karin Laansoo</strong>, Andres Luure, Kaire Maimets, <strong>Eva Näripea</strong>, <strong>Andrus Org</strong>, Anti Randviir, Kadri Tüür ja Berk Vaher. Lisaks 12 kodumaisele esinejale võõrustati kahte külalislektorit Soomest - Dario Martinellit Helsingi Ülikoolist ja <strong>Markku Eskelinen</strong>i. (Maran 2005: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mõned nimed on võõramad kui teised. Märkisi üles need, kelle kirjutisi seni ei ole kohanud ja keda seetõttu võiks järgi vaadata (kui aega tekib).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p237b"></a>Seminarisarja lõpetamiseks ja kokkuvõtete tegemiseks korraldati 21. mail seminar "Koha vaim" Paides. Sellel rohkem kultuuriteooriale keskendunud seminaril esinesid lühiettekannetega 8 uurijat: Riin Magnus, Timo Maran, Arne Merilai, <strong>Anneli Mihkelev</strong>, <stronG>Triin Pehk</strong>, Aare Pilv, Ene-Reet Soovik, <strong>Tiiu Speek</strong> ja Kadri Tüür. Ettekannete lühitutvustustest koostati teesivihik. (Maran 2005: 237)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Need teesid asuvad <a href="http://eki.ee/km/konv/paide.htm">siin</a>. (Füüsilisel kujul oleks ka äge kunagi ära näha.)</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="joosepsontago05"></a>Joosepson, Alo; Tago, Kaidi 2005. Tartu ja Lüneburgi kultuuriuurijate koostöö. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 237-238.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsontago05p237ja238"></a>2004. aasta 3.-10. maini külastas TÜ semiootika osakonna delegatsioon Lüneburgi ülikooli Saksamaa Alam-Saksimaa liidumaal. Tegu oli 2003. aasta 19.-21. novembrini Tartus toimunud üliõpilaskonverentsi "<strong>Euroopa semiosfääride dialoog</strong>: Tartu ja Lüneburg" ("The Dialogue of European Semiospheres: Tartu ja Lüneburg") jätkuüritusega. Lüneburgi konverentsil oli 29 osavõtjat, kellest 17 olid Saksamaalt ja 12 Eestist. Tartu esindust juhtisid dotsent Ülle Pärli ja vanemteadur Mihhail <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Lotman, üliõpilastest osalesid <strong>Ellu Maar</strong>, <strong>Laura Kuusk</strong>, Katre Pärn, <strong>Maarja Põld</strong>, Alo Joosepson, <strong>Merle Visak</strong>, Kaidi Tago, <strong>Maris Saar</strong>, Auli Kütt ja Tiit Remm. Lüneburgi ülikooli poolt koordineeris kohtumist dr. <strong>Elize Bisanz</strong>. (Joosepson; Tago 2005: 237-238)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sama teema: mõni tuttav nimi ja nägu linna pealt, keda muidu ei seostakski semiootikaga, on seda kunagi ammu õppinud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsontago05p238"></a>Algselt identiteedile kui millelegi ühendavale keskendatud kohtumise mõistete keeles said korduvateks terminiteks hoopis <strong>piir, erinevus, paljusus, dialoog</strong>. Osalejates kujunenud ja süvenenud arusaamine Eesti, Saksa või Euroopa <strong>identiteedi suhtelisusest ning dünaamilisusest</strong> oli ehk kogu kohtumise kõige väärtuslikum tulemus. Koos töötades said mõlemad osapooled teadlikumaks oma akadeemilise traditsiooni teadmiste, õpetamis- ning õppimisviiside eripäradest, nii oma tugevustest kui nõrkadest külgedest. (Joosepson; Tago 2005: 238)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üldmulje põhjal ka üsna päevakajalised teemad tol ajal. ("<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2010/11/semiootika-piirid.html">Semiootika piirid</a>" tuleks ka üle kaeda.)</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="keskpaik05a"></a>Keskpaik, Riste 2005a. Cassirer, Lotman, Uexküll. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 239.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05ap239a"></a>Senini on <strong>Cassireri</strong> bioloogiahuvi tõsisema tähelepanuta jäänud. Kuid tema <strong>viimastes kirjutistes on katseid arendada kultuuriteooriat kooskõlas Uexkülli biosemiootilise lähenemisega</strong>. Paljud Cassireri ideed on tänapäeva semiootika seisukohast huvipakkuvad, ning <strong>tema arvamist biosemiootika klassikute hulka on takistanud ehk vaid tema hiliste kirjutiste vähene levik</strong>. Ka seob Cassireri hiline programm omavahel mõlemad uurimissuunad, millega tegeldakse Tartu Ülikooli semiootika osakonnas. <strong>Biosemiootiliste mõjude kõrval on Cassireri kultuurisemiootilise teooria programmis paljugi sarnast Lotmani lähenemisega, kuid ka neid kahte käsitlust pole siiani omavahel lähemalt võrreldud</strong>. (Keskpaik 2005a: 239)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Intrigeeriv teema, millest olen ähmaselt-ümberkaudselt teadlik. Cassireri jaoks ma vist ei ole veel valmis (aga loodetavasti ta ka ei pääse).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05ap239b"></a>Sümpoosionil esinesid teiste hulgas tuntud Cassireri-uurija <strong>John Krois</strong> Berliinist (<em>Cassirer's philosophy of biology</em>) ning bioloogiafilosoof <strong>Manfred Laubichler</strong> USAst Arizonast (<em>Ernst Cassirer: Theoretical biology, philosophical anthropology, and the search for an integrated theory of life and culture</em>). Frederik Stjernfelt võrdles omavahel Uexkülli ja Cassireri filosoofiat, Andreas Weber käsitles tähenduse kehastumise probleemi Cassireri kultuurisemiootikas, Dario Martinelli rääkis omailma teooria rakendamisest zoomusikoloogias. Eesti-poolsed kõnelejad olid Peeter Torop, Kalevi Kull ja Aleksei Turovski. <strong>Sümpoosioni materjalid on ilmumas ajakirjas <em>Sign Systems Studies</em></strong>. (Keskpaik 2005a: 239)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/issue/view/32.1-2">Vol. 32 No. 1/2 (2004)</a></p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="tago05"></a>Tago, Kaidi 2005. Noorsooprojekt "Ühendavad piirid". <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 239-241.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tago05p239"></a>Projekti kontseptsiooni algatajateks olid semiootikatudengid Laura Kuusk, Ellu Maar, Maris Saar ja Kaidi Tago, keda huvitas erinevatest kultuuridest pärit, kuid sarnase hariduse ja vanusega inimeste erinev võime ümbritsevat <strong>tajuda, mõista ja vahendada</strong>. Koos semiootikutega ühendasid piire prantsuse filoloog Kristel Ambre ja meditsiinitudeng Teele Kuusk. (Tago 2005: 239)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Miski alternatiivne semiootiline triaad.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tago05p239ja240"></a>Projekt keskendus <strong>ajalistele, ruumilistele ja kultuurilistele piiridele</strong> inimeste ümber ja sees. Kümne päeva jooksul külastatud paigad kujutasid <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> endast kultuurilis-poliitiliselt või ajalooliselt märkimisväarsete perioodide jälgi Eesti maastikul. <strong>Meie pakutud nägemus Eestist koosnes üldistatult neljast kultuurikihistusest</strong>. Kihistusi ja nende omavahelisi suhteid, samuti seda, kuidas võõrast kultuurist pärit külalised seda vastu võtsid ja enda jaoks tõlgendasid, võib analüüsida <strong>tuum-perifeeria mudel</strong>i alusel. (Tago 2005: 239-240)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aeg, ruum ja kultuur. Mis need neli kihistust siis täpselt on? Tsenter/tuum.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tago05p240"></a>Tammealuse hiiepaigas tutvustas Auli Kütt maausuliste kombeid ja uskumusi, ekskursioon pakkus palju üllatavat ka eestlastele, rääkimata katoliiklikust keskkonnast pärit külalistest. Retk Tudu sohu pani ladinlased proovile - siin avaldus huvitav kultuuriline erinevus, mis seotud puhkamiskommete erinevustega. Kui pealinn oma korrastatud vanalinna ja eluküllase aguliga mõjus külalistele tuttavlikult, siis mõis ja orjaaeg jäid mõnevõrra arusaamatuks, <strong>eestlaste soov looduses rännata</strong> (sooretk) ja eriti maausk (mis seostus satanismiga) <strong>tekitasid aga võõristust ja kohati koguni hirmu</strong>. Edasi liikusime mööda Peipsi kallast Tartusse, kus kogetut kolme päeva jooksul mõtestasime, analüüsisime ja sünteesisime. (Tago 2005: 240)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Välismaalased said täitsa ära kohutatud... loodusega.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="keskpaik05b"></a>Keskpaik, Riste 2005b. Mälestusi kaugest tulevikust — ökosemiootika IV suveseminar Puhtus. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 241-244.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05bp241a"></a>Neljanda ökosemiootika suveseminari toimumispaigaks 6.-8. augustini 2004 sai Puhtu bioloogiajaam - biosemiootik Jakob von Uexkülli kunagine suvemaja. Timo Marani, <strong>Ivar Puura</strong>, Riin Magnuse, <strong>Renata Sõukandi</strong> ja Kaie Kotovi kõrval astusid ettekannetega üles ka Dario Martinelli Helsingist ja Andreas Weber Hamburgist. (Keskpaik 2005b: 241)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Veel mõned vähemtuntud nimed.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05bp241b"></a>Mõttevahetuse juhatas sisse Timo Maran, käsitledes eetilisi järeldusi, mida on võimalik teha semiootika klassikute Peirce'i ja Uexkülli töödest lähtudes. <strong>Semiootilises lähenemises ei ole eetilise suhtumise objektiks mitte niivõrd üksikud organismid ega ka liigid, kuivõrd tähenduste võrgustikud, mida erinevad organismid loovad oma elutegevuse käigus, suhetes oma keskkonna ja teiste organismidega</strong>. Iga looduslik objekt on osa paljudest erinevatest omailmadest, millest igaühes on tal oma spetsiifiline tähendus. Väärtustatud on eeskätt võimalikud tähendused, mis erinevatest kokkupuudetest sünnivad. <strong>Seega omandab semiootilisest seisukohast erilise tähtsuse mitmekesisus</strong>. (Keskpaik 2005b: 241)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mõttekäik, mida võib proovida ühildada Stapledoni mentaalsuse (ja selle mitmekesisuse) teemaga.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05bp241ja242"></a>Ivar Puura tutvustas oma ettekandes võimalikku uut uurimissuunda, mida võiks nimetada <strong>paleosemiootika</strong>ks ning mis <strong>tegeleks tähenduste ja kommunikatsiooni uurimisega kauges tulevikus</strong>. Valdavalt tegelevad paleontoloogid eelajalooliste organismide jäetud jälgede uurimisega, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> püüdes teada saada, millised need organismid olid. Semiootiliselt huvitavaks muutub paleontoloogia siis, kui hakatakse küsima, <strong>millise muutuse organismidevahelistes suhetes tõi kaasa</strong> näiteks kambriumi ajastu alguses tekkinud <strong>hulkraksete loomade meeleelundite areng</strong> ja sellega seotud võime töödelda, vahetada ja talletada infot hoopis uuel tasandil. <strong>Millise eelise annavad organismidele arenenud meeleelundid ning suurenenud tähelepanu- ja kommunikatsioonivõime?</strong> Mille poolest erines olukord pärast loomade tekkimist varasemast olukorrast? Kuidas on muutused semiosfääris seotud muutustega biosfääris? <strong>Need küsimused on osaliselt seotud ka küsimusega meie endi tajuaparaadi päritolust ja ülesehitusest: millised võimalused ja piirangud oleme pärinud oma eellastelt, nii maailma tunnetamise kui kommunikatsioonivahendite osas?</strong> Mille poolest erineb meie eellaste ja teiste loomade meeleelundite toimimine inimeste omast? Selleks et mõista teiste organismide ökoloogiat ja käitumist, on kasulik püüda aimata nende meelte võimalusi ja piiranguid, kujutada ette tähendusi nende omailmades. (Keskpaik 2005b: 241-242)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Huvitavad küsimused kõik. Uexküllilik rõhk tajuvõimetel on aimatav.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="keskpaik05bp243"></a>Teoreetilise ja praktilise ökosemiootika kokkupuutepunkti asetub küsimus valikust, millest sai seekord ise teoreetilise arutelu objekt. Kaie Kotov kõneles sellest, et <strong>semiootilisest seisukohast</strong> pole <strong>valik</strong> seletatav mitte niivõrd eelnenud sündmuste kaudu, vaid <strong>muutub tähenduslikuks tänu tulevikku suunatud ootustele ja eel-arvamustele selles osas, mida teatavat sorti käitumine võiks endaga kaasa tuua</strong>. Kuigi valikut võiks nimetada semiootiliseks aktiks <em>per se</em>, saab valiku toimumist nentida vaid tagantjärele, ning siis kiputakse seda seletama kausaalselt. <strong>Valiku toimumise hetkele omasest määramatusest, mida iseloomustab mitmete võrdsete valikuvõimaluste olemasolu, saab tagasivaates osa põhjuslikust ahelast</strong>. Seetõttu on semiootika üheks ülesandeks pöörata tähelepanu põhjuslike seoste kõrval võimaluste ja valikute paljususele ning valiku tegemise tingimustele. <strong>Kujutelm tulevikumälestustest iseloomustab hästi semioosiprotsessi, mille käigus olevik omandab tähenduse eelkõige tulevikku silmas pidades, ent tulevikuootused kujundatakse omakorda minevikukogemuste põhjal</strong>. (Keskpaik 2005b: 243)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hea kraam. <em>Anticipation</em>. Kultuur & Plahvatus, jne. Umbes analoogne aratluskäik tuleb mul läbida seoses selle keerulise küsimusega, kuidas Stapledoni "Viimased Inimesed" <em>tegelikult</em> siis meile "Esimestele Inimestele" oma tuleviku-kroonika edastasid.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="tyyr05"></a>Tüür, Kadri 2005. Kultuur, loodus, semiootika: kohad IV. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 244-245.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p244"></a>Programm oli jaotatud temaatilisteks sektsioonideks, millest peamiselt keskkonnaesteetika ja kirjandusteaduse valda kuuluvaid ettekandeid koondav "Koht ja paik" ning ruumi semiootilisele mõtestamisele keskendunud "Kohad ja protsessid" toimusid nii konverentsi Tallinna- kui Tartu-osas. Tartus olid kavas veel peamiselt linnaruumi mõtestavaid ettekandeid sisaldanud sektsioon "Linnad ja protsessid" ja eri regioonide tähendusloo(me)le pühendatud "Kohad ja maastikud". Tallinnas toimus erisektsioonina kunstiajalooalane "Muutuvad monumendid", <strong>Tartus nõukogude aja pärandit eritlev "Sotsialistlik visuaalkultuur, autentne ja tõlgendatud"</strong>. (Tüür 2005: 244)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kahju, et pole nimetatud autoreid ega ettekannete sisusid lähemalt kajastatud. Esinejate järgi võiks see olla <a href="https://nyydiskultuur.artun.ee/raamatud/koht-ja-paik/koht-ja-paik-v/"><em>Koht ja paik V</em></a>.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="joosepsonjt05"></a>Joosepson, Alo; Epner, Tõnu; Magnus, Riin; Ventsel, Andreas; Vabar, Sven; Väli, Katre 2005. VI semiootika sügiskool "Ideoloogilised märgiprotsessid kultuuris". <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 245-248.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsonjt05p245"></a>Lisaks said ettekandjad täiendada põgusa ettekandeaja tõttu lõpetamata jäänud mõttekäike. Õhtu hakul astus üles <strong>üllatuskülaline Sven Kivisildnik</strong>, kes vahetas Berk Vaheriga mõtteid teemal "Meediaterroristi argipäev". (Joosepson jt 2005: 245)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See tont.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsonjt05p246a"></a>Sektsiooni arutelu modereeris kirjandusteadlane Marina Grišakova. Loodusteadused püüavad anda kirjelduse sellest maailmast, mille keskel inimesed elavad ja tegutsevad. Sedavõrd, kuivõrd nad lähevad oma uurimistega tavakogemuse piiridest välja, peavad nad kasutusele võtma tavakeelest erineva erialakeele. <strong>Populaarteaduslik tekst on erialakeelse teksti tõlge tavakeelde</strong>. Arutelu keskendus küsimusele, millised ideoloogilised moonutused kaasnevad sellise tõlkeprotsessiga ning kuidas need võivad tekitada väärarusaamu lugejas, kes ei oska populaarteaduslikku teksti võrrelda erialakeelse algtekstiga. (Joosepson jt 2005: 246)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pole paha. "Loomulik keel" vastandub teadus-tehnilisele (meta-)keelele, <em>after all</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsonjt05p246b"></a>Eriti tugevat poleemikat põhjustas P. Kuuse väide, et reaalteadlased räägivad ümbritsevast reaalsest maailmast, samas kui <strong>humanitaarteadleste jutu "objektiks" on kellegi teise jutt</strong> ning seetõttu nad ümbritseva maailma probleeme ei puuduta. (Joosepson jt 2005: 246)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib ainult loota, et füüsikateoreetiku Piret Kuuse kallal sedapuhku füüsilist vägivalda ei tarvitatud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="joosepsonjt05p247"></a>Peamiste põhjustena tervikliku tähenduse kadumisel võis välja tuua järgmised katkestuslikud meedia struktuurimuutused Eestis: 1) tehnoloogiline - uute tehnoloogiate kasutuselevõtt, millega kaasnes töötajaskonna vahetus, 2) esteetiline - visuaalse keele osatähtsuse suurenemine trükimeedias, 3) žanriline - reklaamitekstide ja lühiuudiste osakaalu suurenemine arutlevate artiklite arvelt, 4) ühiskonna tähendussüsteemide struktuuri muutus - nõukogude ideoloogia asendumine <strong>ultraliberalistliku ideoloogia</strong>ga, 5) omanike muutus - välismaiste suurkontsernide <strong>orienteeritus üksnes kasumile</strong> ja 6) ruumimuutus - Eesti ümberorienteerumine liitumisega EL-ga, millega kaasnes teemade vahetus. (Joosepson jt 2005: 247)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Siin me oleme.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Kaitstud magistri- ja doktoritööd 2004</h4><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li>Eslas, Urve 2004. The Eye of the I and the Face of the Other in dialogue without communication through the rupture of il y a: Other in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Totality of the Same and Resistance of the Other. Magistritöö. Juhendaja: Eero Tarasti.</li><!--
--><li>Keskpaik, Riste 2004. Semiotics of trash: towards an ecosemiotic paradigm. Magistritöö. Juhendaja: Kalevi Kull.</li><!--
--><li>Randlane, Marju 2004. Sotsioloogiliste küsimustike staatus: konversatsioonianalüütiline lähenemine. Magistritöö. Juhendaja: Mihhail Lotman.</li><!--
--><li>Randviir, Anti 2004. Mapping the World: Towards a sociosemiotic approach to Culture. Doktoritöö. Juhendaja: Peeter Torop.</li><!--
--></ul>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-1541640829025868032023-08-27T10:21:00.000-07:002023-08-27T10:21:25.343-07:00A Threat of Uniformity<!-- A Threat of Uniformity
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQlL7YVuz1D5NMtf1GLzx3YnFOKcvfpFo76fwpvzThpE0tG2Q1UKQHAp567sbJjs0_ZqDConPjpZBOUbFgbsJT_AYqfm4v68_yq3C7yClp1u8j7r0vDWW8Ei66mSKRrixITEHXJQwi9SZwRLtmU2tBs7e4qxy0T17MKv1J7rJCb5l5DQDfrSzQ7Na4_6Dz/s1024/jja_pilt_a_threat_of_uniformity.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1024" data-original-width="1024" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhQlL7YVuz1D5NMtf1GLzx3YnFOKcvfpFo76fwpvzThpE0tG2Q1UKQHAp567sbJjs0_ZqDConPjpZBOUbFgbsJT_AYqfm4v68_yq3C7yClp1u8j7r0vDWW8Ei66mSKRrixITEHXJQwi9SZwRLtmU2tBs7e4qxy0T17MKv1J7rJCb5l5DQDfrSzQ7Na4_6Dz/s320/jja_pilt_a_threat_of_uniformity.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#schwitzgebel70">Schwitzgebel 1970. Behavior instrumentation and social technology</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#taylor72">Taylor 1972. Science Fiction: The Evolutionary Context</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kagarfreli73">Kagarlitski 1973. Bernard SHaw and Science Fiction</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Schwitzgebel, Robert L. 1970. Behavior instrumentation and social technology. <em>American Psychologist</em> 25(6): 491-499. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1037/h0029447">10.1037/h0029447</a> [<u><a href="https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1970-17672-001">APA PsycNet</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p491a"></a>Psychologis seldom ask such questions seriously - not because a possible Orson Welles' "War-of-the-worlds" answer is so unpredictable or insignificant, but because, as behavioral scientists, we have greater <strong>professional regard for rigorous irrelevancy than relevant vagary</strong>. The historical origins of this preference (e.g., philosophical operationalism, prestige of physical science models, etc.) are neither obscure nor without merit. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 491)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Profound.</p><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p491b"></a>It is a rather common assumption, indeed complaint, that technical innovations force alterations in the established social order of a culture. For example, <strong>the style of government, as well as the physical configuration of towns, was substantially altered when systems for transporting water were mechanized so that people no longer visit the communal well</strong>. Today, transportation devices and mass media are recognized as major influences in our social life. In this "indirect" way, the engineer and the technician are revolutinaries: they rearrange materials in a manner that necessarily elicits changes in social structure. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 491)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Enam ei käida kaevul.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p492"></a>Yet the simple procedure of setting our clocks forward by one hour keeps the discriminative stimulus intact - that is, the alarm still rings at "7:30 A.M." - but the behavior is effectively changed. It might be worth considering whether we could bring other <strong>cooperative or gregarious behavior</strong> under stimulus control of the clock (we do so now on New Year's Eve!) which might be activated in times of crisis. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 492)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I have to admit, I don't think I've met the term "gregarious behavior" before.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p493"></a>Selected sapling might be based on variables, such as exchange or withdrawal of diplomats, which have already been established as political indicators (cf. Feierabend & Feierabend 1966; Tanter 1966) and processed by <strong>an on-line computer</strong>. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 493)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Is your computer on the line?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p494a"></a>The pioneering work of <strong>Francis Galton</strong> and of Alexander Graham Bell might serve as models for smaller initial efforts on an <em>individual</em> basis. Galton's <strong>tireless ingenuity</strong> and empiricism led him, among many other things, to become interested in designing apparatus that would physically measure a person's emotion or attitude. He took as an illustration <strong>the "inclination of one person toward another"</strong> and suggested that this might be <strong>quantified</strong> for two people sitting next to each other at a dinner table <strong>by attaching strain gauges to the legs of the chairs</strong> and then measuring shifts in weight (Galton 1884). The telephone was a direct outgrowth of Bell's work as a speech therapist and his interest in reducing the social isolation of handicapped persons. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 494)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The same guy who quantified something or other by walking around town and judging if women in that part of town are hot or not?</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p494b"></a>Recently a number of devices have been designed by psychologists to correct functional deficits or to otherwise alter individual behavior. The "<strong>Mowrer</strong> sheet" (Mowrer & Mowrer 1938) for the treatment of enuresis is probably the most widely known device of this type. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 494)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The very same <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2015/01/talking-birds.html">Mowrer</a>.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p494c"></a>The "compassionate revolution" designates a general systems theory problem-solving approach in which <strong>personal diversity will be positively valued</strong>. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 494)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds a bit like the diersity of personalities in Stapledon's imagination of the future.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p494d"></a>The nineteenth-century <strong>amateur sociologist, Charles Fourier</strong>, inspired by experiments in telegraphy, fantasied that in the course of time, <strong>man would become equipped with a prehensile tail and sensory receptors capable of communicating with inhabitants of this and other planets</strong>. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 494)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Fourier sure has a habit of turning up in unexpected places.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p495"></a>His [Fourier's] rather incredible prophecy was, however, hardly more speculative than that of the physicist J. D. Bernal (1929), who predicted that <strong>limitations of the human body could be overcome by mechanical attachments to such an extent that eventually our only remaining organic part would be the brain</strong>. This fantasy is elaborated in Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>, where "giant brains" living in beehive-shaped cells, sustained by pumps and chemical plants, could be consciously wherever they wished by detachable sense organs. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 495)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Cool hint.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Bernal, J. D. 1929. <em>The world, the flesh and the devil</em>. [No publisher]. [Cited in A. C. Clarke (Ed.), 1958. <em>Profiles of the future</em>. New York: Harper & Row.]</u> [<u><a href="https://www.marxists.org/archive/bernal/works/1920s/soul/">Marxists Internet Archives</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p495b"></a><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSo3W2519haXgqojQ9ai2zvpnUMyVxQMyJsGLC664ntJzj8dnV70xJgO9fM1bg87rNBYzCg9Y8vTiahPWZB4VTRUhB32jmuMLSf9EBKp8Rccklxy0gcPUJktC3GG_jYIW9WFJch1duB4fI3AyosrtiTYYqBE8m4bvE95Tu9kqsW2wrIaBuq0HTBVMloF0I/s1412/jja_pilt_calhoun_1970_progressive_conceptual_transformations_of_biological_man.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1412" data-original-width="980" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgSo3W2519haXgqojQ9ai2zvpnUMyVxQMyJsGLC664ntJzj8dnV70xJgO9fM1bg87rNBYzCg9Y8vTiahPWZB4VTRUhB32jmuMLSf9EBKp8Rccklxy0gcPUJktC3GG_jYIW9WFJch1duB4fI3AyosrtiTYYqBE8m4bvE95Tu9kqsW2wrIaBuq0HTBVMloF0I/s320/jja_pilt_calhoun_1970_progressive_conceptual_transformations_of_biological_man.jpg" width="222" /></a></div>(Schwitzgebel 1970: 495)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oh, good, we'll become compassionate it 4 years.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p496a"></a>Of course he uses words and theoretical constructs, but these are not his product any more than <strong>nonverbal tools such as a pencil and paper</strong> define the product of the verbal scholar. In this respect, the psychoanalyst, novelist, or lawyer have modes of dealing with human behavior clearly distinguishable from those of the physician, architect, or jailer. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 496)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Weird.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p496b"></a>The most frequently voiced fears regarding technology include potentially excessive or malicious control of individual behavior, <strong>a threat of uniformity</strong>, and (if nothing worse) just plain boredom. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 496)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Phraseology. Stapledon had a phrase negating this threat in the Eighteenth Men.</p><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p496ja497"></a>On the basis of a fairly thorough survey by our laboratory engineer (Bird 1969), it was estimated that a computer-based radio system capable of locating individuals in a city approximately 24 × 24 kilometers would require two hundred and twenty-five 100-watt base station transceivers at 5-kilometer <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> intervals at a total system cost of about $9 million, including <strong>10,000 personally attached transponder units at $500 each. Systems of this magnitude are barely feasible and could hardly be installed without public knowledge</strong>. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 496-497)</blockquote><!--
--><p>And now we buy the transponders ourselves and are happy to carry them around with us at all times.</p><!--
7 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p497"></a><strong>A practical metatechnology</strong> must concern itself with relatively nonaversive means of regulating "spontaneous" innovations and of encouraging others. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 497)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A practical what?</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="schwitzgebel70p498"></a><strong>Our inventiveness should be able to capture, in tangible form, something of ancient dream and myth</strong>. By making our physical environment and our physical selves increasingly responsive to human intention, <strong>the distinction between matter and fantasy will gradually diminish</strong>. Thus, if we can meet our short-term social crises, the human odyssey will inevitably move toward new dimensions of being. In this, it seems to me, psychologists should find a certain measure of challenge and excitement. (Schwitzgebel 1970: 498)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Beautiful.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="taylor72"></a>Taylor, Angus M. 1972. Science Fiction: The Evolutionary Context. <em>Journal of Popular Culture</em> 5(4): 858-866. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1972.0504_858.x">10.1111/j.0022-3840.1972.0504_858.x</a> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1972.0504_858.x">Wiley Online Library</a></u>]</h4><!--
1 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p858"></a><strong>Science fiction's particular orientation tends toward the sociological</strong>. As long ago as 1906 H. G. Wells said, "I think, in fact, that the creation of Utopias - and their exhaustive criticism - is the proper and distinctive method of sociology." Wells denied the possibility of an exact science of sociology. Sociology, he said, "must be neither art simply, nor science in the narrow meaning of the word at all, but <strong>knowledge rendered imaginatively</strong>, and with an element of personality; that is to say, in the highest sense of the term, literature." (Taylor 1972: 858)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Not bad, though probably doesn't really hold: science fiction should ideally be about... science.</p><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p859"></a>Contrary to the widely-held notion that science fiction is a peculiarly twentieth-century phenomenon, this type of literature was widespread in the nineteenth, both in Europe and North America. Says H. Bruce Franklin: "<strong>There was no major nineteenth-century American writer</strong> of fiction, and indeed few in the second rank, <strong>who did not write</strong> some science fiction or <strong>at least one utopian romance</strong>." (Taylor 1972: 859)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Neat.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p860"></a>It was H. G. Wells, writing at the turn of the century, who at last articulated this dilemma in clear terms. Wells saw progress for mankind as possible but far from certain. His first novel, <em>The Time Machine</em> (1895), and also <em>The War of the Worlds</em> (1898) atacked complacent Victorian notions of inevitable progress. Wells saw man's chances of progressing with the help of his intellect limited by the fact of <strong>a universe blind to ethical considerations</strong>. Science divorced from humanity was likely to lead only to disaster. The utopian fiction that followed from his pen was in line with his sociological prescription for planning a better world, and not born of any false sense of optimism. Says Jack Williamson, "[...] Wells preached progress not out of confident hope, but out of cold desperation." (Taylor 1972: 860)</blockquote><!--
--><p>O woe is me, there is no God to judge my actions and tally my tithes.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p861a"></a>The fears of American intellectuals and writers, on the other hand, have reflected a somewhat different experience. "They have been haunted, in other words, by the possibility of totalitarian societies whose social origins are likely to be rooted in <strong>a monstrous efflorescence of capitalism</strong>. The root has not lain in the party or amongst the ideologues, but in <strong>the corporation - a domestic phenomenon</strong>. The whole tone, also, of the American anti-utopian novels had lacked the peculiar bitterness born of proximity that has infected its twin." [Madisson, Michael 1965. The Case Against Tomorrow. p 220] (Taylor 1972: 861)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Spot on.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p861b"></a>The failure of much of science fiction <strong>to postulate fundamental change in man's nature</strong>, rather than simply in his environment, has been raised, among others, by Robert Bloch, and such criticism is part of the continuing debate over the nature of the field. C. S. Lewis defined one sub-species of science fiction as <strong>"Eschatological" - speculation on the ultimate destiny of humanity</strong> - citing such examples as Wells' <em>The Time Machine</em>, Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>, and Arthur C. Clarke's <em>Childhood's End</em>. (Taylor 1972: 861)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Perfect! That is exactly what Stapledon's book is - eschatological science fiction.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p862"></a>After 1918, politics, art, and life generally, reflected disillusionment with the old ways. Between 1900 and 1927 quantum physics and relativity laid the basis for a new interpretation of the universe. They pointed the way toward <strong>a more unified concept of the structure of the universe in which matter, energy, space, and time may come to be seen as different manifestations of a single universal field</strong>. (Taylor 1972: 862)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Spinoza's substance?</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="taylor72p863"></a>Science fiction, to this way of thinking, assumes a special relevance in today's world. According to Gerald Heard: "In its aim it is bound, by its extrapolation of science and its use of dramatic plot, <strong>to view man and his machines and his environment as a threefold whole, the machine being the hyphen</strong>. It also views man's psyche, man's physique and the entire life process as also a threefold interacting unit. Science fiction is the prophetic (or to use a more exact special term) the apocalyptic literature of our particular and culminating epoch of crisis." (Taylor 1972: 863)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Man — machine — environment.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kagarfreli73"></a>Kagarlitski, Julius; Freling, Roger 1973. Bernard SHaw and Science Fiction: Why Raise the Question? <em>The Shaw Review</em> 16(2): 59-66. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40682295">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p59"></a>The topic "Bernard Shaw and Science Fiction" conceals a certain timeless contradiction. The theme is about <em>science</em> fiction. <strong>Bernard Shaw</strong>, however, <strong>repeatedly declared himself to be an enemy of science</strong>. It is scarcely necessary to cite his utterances on the subject; they are collected in abundance in the basic work of Archibald Henderson (a professor of mathematics, I want to remind you: Bernard Shaw possessed just such a talent for creating paradoxes around himself!). (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Uh-oh.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p61"></a>Contemporaneously with Capek (<em>R. U. R.</em> was published and translated into English in the same year that <em>Back to Methuselah</em> appeared), Shaw turned to the Frankenstein theme - the man-made individual who rebelled against his creator - long before Olaf Stapledon in <em>Last and First Men</em> speaks of <strong>the amazing form of future art: the creation of living creatures with laboratory-designed characteristics and appearance</strong>. (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vital Art.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p62"></a>Shaw in this respect is not entirely original. This becomes clear as one turns to the work of Swift, a writer profoundly respected by him and perfectly familiar to him. <strong>Shaw enters into polemics with the third book of <em>Gulliver's Travels</em></strong> (Swift's Struldburgs are a burden to humanity, <strong>Shaw's old people its most valuable segment</strong>) and at the same time is influenced by it as he formulates for himself his attitude toward science and science fiction. An interest in science and a familiarity with it were characteristic traits of Swift (just as they were of another of Shaw's favorites, Voltaire). (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Interesting. I should really get into Swift.</p><!--
7-8 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p64ja65"></a>In fact, <strong>science fiction is often defined as the mythology of the twentieth century</strong>. And there is reason for this. Science fiction, as the Irkutsk scholar Tatyana Chernyshova demonstrated in her recently published work, depends upon the imperfection of human knowledge; it freely "completes" a picture and in this sense fulfills the traditional role of mythology. Since nature is inexhaustible, our knowledge about it will never be absolutely complete, and science fiction, theoretically speaking, will forever preserve its role as "the new mythology." This, however, touches only one side of the <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> question. A function not conventionally mythological but rather, on the contrary, anti-mythological continues to exist for science fiction. (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 64-65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hooks up nicely with Stapledon's preface, in which he sets up his venture as an experiment in myth-making.</p><!--
8 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p65fn6"></a>Joseph Aramsky was <strong>a Russian madman who claimed to have travelled with aliens</strong>. (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 65, fn 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Isn't "Russian madman" a bit redundant?</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="kagarfreli73p66"></a>Shaw's principal objection to <strong>Darwin's theory</strong> is that it <strong>subjects man to impersonal, statistical laws, operates apart from his will</strong>, and thereby deprives him of responsibility and a sense of conscious purpose. <strong>Neo-Lamarckism</strong>, on the other hand, is accepted and advocated by him as a doctrine <strong>recognizing man as the master of his own fate</strong>. (Kagalitski; Freling 1973: 66)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Loss of (collective wil-)power?</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-45837150926170441762023-08-27T05:26:00.002-07:002023-08-27T10:34:36.913-07:00Märgiloomevõime<!-- Märgiloomevõime
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#grigorjeva05">Grigorjeva 2005. Sovietijärgne propaganda</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#tyyr05">Tüür 2005. Semiootika õpetamisest</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kull05">Kull 2005. Kuidas kirjutada neist, kes ei räägi</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="grigorjeva05"></a>Grigorjeva, Jelena 2005. Sovietijärgne propaganda: Reklaami aastakümme. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 204-2018.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p205"></a>Reklaamiuurimises rakendatuna eelistan seda teisest tähendust mäaratleda veenmisargumendina. Selles mõttes, nagu <strong>kauba pakkimine ilusasse paberisse ja selle pakendi ehtimine lehvikestega on argument pakitud eseme meeldivuse kohta</strong>. Analoogia on täielik, sest pakend, nagu ka reklaamtekst (tekst laias, semiootilises tähenduses), varjab, asendab kauba representatsiooniprotsessis, kutsudes kavatsuslikult esile uudishimu ja huvi pakendi sisu vastu. (Grigorjeva 2005: 205)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sama puuga lüües on riietus "argument" selle poolt varjatud palja keha meeldivuse kohta.
</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p206"></a>Tegelikult aga osutub väga problemaatiliseks määratleda, milline objekti kirjeldamise staadium on esmane, loomuliku keele staadium, missugune aga täiendavalt, sekundaarselt kodeeritud. <strong>Nähtused nagu loomuliku keele "poeetiline funktsioon"</strong>, millest edaspidi veel juttu tuleb, või <em>happening</em>id <strong>uhuvad kunstikeelest välja range tasandite hierarhia</strong>. Reklaam ei täidaks oma ülesannet (tuleb nentida, et küllalt sageli ta seda ei saavutagi), kui unustaks esmase tähendustasandi. (Grigorjeva 2005: 206)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõlab samavõrd intrigeerivalt kui arusaamatult - loomuliku keele poeetiline funktsioon kaotab kunstikeele sisemise hierarhilisuse? Mida see tähendab?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p209"></a>Üldiselt kasutatakse reklaamis tihtilugu kõige vastuolulisemaid argumente, kuid kui reklaam sealjuures apelleerib üldkehtivatele püsiväärtustele (näiteks innovatsiooniväärtustele ja traditsiooniväärtustele), on kõik korras. Sellise pragmaatilise ja üldistava väärtustele lähenemise tagajärjeks on küllaltki redutseeritud argumentide hulk, mida reklaam kasutada saab. Siit tuleneb <strong>oletus, et üldjoontes vastab reklaamiargumentide kogum selle sootsiumi aktuaalsete kommunikatiivsete väärtuste kogumile, kellele tarbimisele kutsuv agitatsioon on suunatud</strong>. (Grigorjeva 2005: 209)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Umbes nagu luule võiks oma lugejaskonda ikka natukene ka kõnetada.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p210"></a>Vahetus ise on tihedalt seotud <strong>iha (soovi) mõiste ja fenomen</strong>iga; võiks isegi öelda, et iha rahuldamise, tema rahulduseks transformeerimise protsessiga. <strong>Reklaami eesmärgiks on kutsuda esile iha kauba suhtes</strong>. See eesmärk täidetakse, võrdsustades tekstist saadava naudingu rahulduselubadusega. Ainuke rahuldus, mis pärast oma teostumist võib veel jääda ihaldatavaks, on nauding tekstist, kuivõrd tekst ei realiseeru täielikult, ta ei muutu reaalsuseks. Seetõttu võib reklaamtekstide uuendamine, taastootmine ja kordamine toimida ka pärast seda, kui kaup on soetatud. <strong>Iha ei kao täitumise läbi, sest lubadused asetsesid teksti ja mitte kauba sfääris</strong>. (Grigorjeva 2005: 210)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Süües kasvab isu, jne. Iha objekt ei ole ise piisav iha rahuldamiseks; iha ei saagi vist rahuldada? A la raha ei ole kunagi küllalt. Seksuaalvahekordi (või -partnereid) ei ole kunagi "täpselt piisavalt-parajalt". Mõlemad (isu ja iha) on olemuslikult täitumatud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p212"></a>Mnemoonilise kinnistamise üks eesmärke on ka mõjuda ühele inimteadvusele sügavalt omasele kvaliteedile: <strong>eelistada argielus tuntut tundmatule, sest viimane on instinktiivselt konnotatiivses seoses ohuga</strong>. Tuntu ja tundmatu eristamine on bioloogiliste organismide enesesälitusinstinkti olulisemaid instrumente. Loomulikult kuulub valikusituatsioonis esimene eelistus tuntule. Ettevaatus ja uudishimu on kaks venda, kes tagavad liigi ellujäämise ja arengu. Kuid ettevaatus ennekõike. (Grigorjeva 2005: 212)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Loeb nagu eelmise sajandi alguse sotsiaalpsühhaloogia: võõrast tuleb karta, sest ta võib-olla ohtlik. Nii lihtne ongi.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="grigorjeva05p213"></a>Kommunikatiivses plaanis kutsub nimi esile harjumuspärase, tuttava äratundmise, mis on armas igale väikekodanlasele. <strong>Reklaamimaailm on mütoloogilise ja lapseliku maailm, pärisnimede maailm</strong>. Mõõk nimega Durandal. Pesupulber nimega Müüt. Ning taas, reklaam on valmis kasutama mänguskeemi omaenese taustal. Pean silmas populaarsust koguvat võtet, millega justkui demonstratiivselt keeldutakse nime või brändiga hullutamisest. Nii ilmuvad lettidele "Nimeta viinerid" või <strong>juust nimetusega "Juust"</strong>. See muudab müüdi veel autentsemaks, sest just müüdis eeldatakse, et iga objekt on ainus ja unikaalne Objekt. Nimetades toote üldnimega pärisnime funktsioonis, kinnitab reklaam selle toote eksklusiivset õigust identiteedile. <strong>Ainult see on Juust, kõik ülejäänud on võltsing</strong>. Venemaal müüakse edukalt pesupulbrit nimega "Tavaline pesupulber". (Grigorjeva 2005: 213)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See peab ilmselgelt olema kõige juustum juust mis on üldse juustunud. Huvitav rakendus Lotmani ja Uspenski käsitlusele nimest ja müüdist (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/01/maailm-on-ratsu.html#lotmanuspenski22a">Lotman; Uspenski 2022[1973]</a>).</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="tyyr05"></a>Tüür, Kadri 2005. Semiootika õpetamisest: Myrdene Andersoniga Imatrasse sõitvas rongis 7. juunil 2003 peetud jutuajamise põhjal üles kirjuta[t]ud. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 221-228.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p221"></a>Iga kursuse alguses, selle sisust sõltumata, on seetõttu mõttekas üritada luua üliõpilastele teoreetiline raamistus või laiem pilt asjast, millesse oleks hiljem võimalik omandatavaid teadmisi paigutada. <strong>Samuti on hea anda teemast ajalooline ülevaade</strong>, kuid seda ei peaks tegema tänapäevaste teooriate käsitlemise arvelt. (Tüür 2005: 221)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Hea on ta kindlasti, jah, see ajalugu.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p222"></a>Lugemise juures tuleks eristada <strong>teksti läbivaatamist (<em>skimming</em>)</strong> ja läbitöötamist kui erinevaid lugemisstrateegiaid, ning <strong>esimesele peaks senisest enam rõhku panema</strong>. Teoreetilisi tekste tuleks lugeda avatud meelega, et sealt kinni püüda just neid mõtteid, mis muudavad asja oluliseks selle konkreetse lugeja jaoks sellel konkreetsel ajahetkel. <strong>Parem on lugeda paljusid asju pealiskaudselt kui olla kinni ainult ühes asjas</strong>. "Ühte punkti keskendatust on maailmas niigi palju ja spontaansust on hädasti juurde vaja," ütleb Myrdene Anderson. See ei tähenda, et teksti süvitsi analüüsivaid kursusi ei tuleks sugugi pidada, kuid kindlasti on ses osas olemas <strong>vajadus suurema mitmekesisuse järele</strong>. (Tüür 2005: 222)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oma kogemusest võin öelda, et paljude erinevate tekstide kärme läbilugemine on ka selle poolest huvitav, et tekib huvitavaid "üleseid" mõtteid: hakkad tabama mustreid, mis muidu võivad jääda märkamatuks. Näiteks kui ma 2018. aastal korraga kiiresti erinevaid semiootikaajakirju õgisin, siis muudkui kohtasin nö tüümilist dihhotoomiat siin ja seal. Praegu ainult Actat hooga lugedes tikuvad nö universaalsete poeetiliste leitmotiivide dihhotoomiad (seks ja surm, armastus ja võim, isu ja iha, erootika ja ökonoomika) muudkui üles tulema. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p223a"></a>Myrdene Andersoni kursused ei lõpe tavaliselt eksamiga, kuna tema meelest <strong>on mõttetu kirjutada midagi ilma allikmaterjale kasutamata</strong> - kokkuvõttes raiskab see ainult mõlema osapoole aega, mida võiks pigem pühendada hoopis avatud ja sünergeetilistele tegevustele. Selle asemel on kursuse ajakava koostatud nii, et semestri lõpus jääks peale viimase kirjaliku töö kohta tagasiside andmist aega veel üheks üldisele tagasisidele pühendatud lisakokkusaamiseks. (Tüür 2005: 223)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ei mingit originaalitsemist! Selle viimase tagasiside-kohtumise tava on küll osakonnas omandatud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p223b"></a>Õppejõud omalt poolt peaks andma tudengitele mõningaid juhtnööre selle kohta, kuidas teksti üles ehitada või näpunäiteid, kuidas kirjutada; näiteks on praktiline <strong>soovitada tudengitel oma tekst kellelgi teisel endale valjusti ette lugeda lasta, et avastada selles stilistilisi puudujääke ja möödalaskmisi</strong>. (Tüür 2005: 223)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Siin on küll hea mõte, mis tuleks endal kuidagi käiku panna - eriti kui kirjutan oma järgmise töö otsast peale eesti keeles.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p224"></a>Semiootikat ei peaks pidama eraldiseisvaks distsipliiniks, nagu seda on näiteks lingvistika. <strong>Semiootika on pigem meta- või transdistsipliin</strong>. <strong>Semiootiku puhul</strong>, hoolimata ainest, mida ta õpetab, <strong>on teatud spetsiifiline semiootiline lähenemine alati tuntav</strong>. Iga järgmine semiootiku poolt õpetatav kursus on vältimatult eelmistest mõnevõrra erinev; teemad peaksidki varieeruda, jäädes samas semiootilise lähenemise raamesse. (Tüür 2005: 224)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Semiootikut jälitab märgimeelsuse oreool.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p225"></a>Ühe semiootikakoolkonna õpetamise või mitmete erinevate koolkondade tutvustamise eelistamise osas teeb Myrdene Anderson vahet <strong>"uudishimulikul loomusel" ja "fundamentalistlikul suhtumisel"</strong>. Viimane kasutab ühte koolkonda uskumuste süsteemina, millesse on põhimõtteliselt võimalik suruda mis tahes materjali (oma äärmustes võib see toimida Prokrustese sängina). See omakorda võib viia ühe teoreetilise vaate hegemooniani ühe osakonna või ülikooli raames ning taoline olukord toodab nimesi, kes pole võimelised suhtlema mitte ainult teistsuguste ideedega inimestega, vaid ka omavahel. See on kahtlemata kahetsusväärne olukord, kuna vahetamist väärivaid mõtteid on ju nii palju. (Tüür 2005: 225)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mesilaste risttolmendamine vs mutimullahunnik.</p><!-- Mul on just tunne, et fundamentalistlikumat suhtumist võiks natuke rohkem olla. St nt Tartus võidaks teha rohkem Tartu asja. Mitte, et uudishimul ja laiapõhjalisusel ei oleks oma võlu ja kasu, aga mõnikord on tunne, et
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p225ja226"></a><strong>Ülikooli ei tohiks käsitleda kohana, kus õpetatakse selgeks mingi konkreetne amet</strong>. Seetõttu ei peaks ka vanemad oma täiskasvanud lapsi ülikoolidiplomi taotlemisel ülemäära toetama. Seda tehes vihjavad nad, et eeldavad oma lapsi ülikoolis "õppivat midagi kasulikku", mis aitaks neil <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> hiljem tööturul edukalt võistelda. Teisalt tunnevad siis üliõpilased ise kohustust õppida mingit kitsamat eriala selle asemel, et omandada laiemaid teadmisi ning <strong>arendada oma võimet abstraktselt mõelda, mis võiks ideaalis olla ülikoolis käimise motivatsiooniks</strong>. (Tüür 2005: 225-226)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Mikrokraadid" vs kuidas klassikalises hariduses kõigepealt õpiti neli aastat ladinakeelset luulet vms.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p226a"></a>Rakendussemiootikat võib pidada eeskätt püüdeks hoida semiootikat kui eriala avalikkusele nähtaval, et õigustada selle riiklikku finantseerimist. <strong>Reklaami-</strong> või õigus<strong>semiootika</strong>, kui tuua paar näidet, on enamasti üsna hõredalt uuritud, mis tähendab, et neil aladel on kerge mingi omapoolse uue panusega välja tulla. See <strong>on käepärane, ent oportunistlik</strong> viis praktikute tähelepanu semiootikale tõmbamiseks. Lisarahastamise tingimustes, kus peale riikliku toetuse saadakse materiaalset toetust erafirmadelt või suurkorporatsioonidelt, väheneb akadeemiliste struktuuride iseseisvus. Tulemused, mis sellistes tingimustes sünnivad, ei kuulu enam teaduse valda, vaid on rakenduslikud tööd. (Tüür 2005: 226)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Njaa.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p226b"></a><strong>Reklaamisemiootikast kirjutades kerkib muuhulgas ka eetiline küsimus: kas me tahame aidata reklaamitootjail arendada efektiivsemaid reklaamistrateegiaid</strong>, või aidata tarbijail nende võtteid läbi näha? (Tüür 2005: 226)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui töö on NDA all siis ei ole midagi läbi näha.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="tyyr05p227"></a>Seoses survega efektiivselt toota tulevasi töötajaid riigi ja erafirmade tarbeks, püüavad ülikoolid saavutada seda, et üliõpilased viibiksid ülikoolis pidevalt ja seda pikema perioodi vältel, s.t ilma katkestusteta. Seda võiks nimetada eksitavaks teguviisiks. Et hoida süsteemi paindlikuna, <strong>peaks tudengeile võimaldama, kui mitte isegi soodustama, vabadust mõneks ajaks akadeemilisest keskkonnast lahkuda ning hiljem sinna naasta</strong>. (Tüür 2005: 227)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Isiklikult tunnen, et "kolmekordse nominaalajaga esimesest sisseastumisest" mind 'karistati' õppimist pärssivate terviseprobleemide eest kuiet 'võimaldati' raisata mõned parimad aastad oma noorusest tehastes madalapalgalise lihttöö tegemisega.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kull05"></a>Kull, Kalevi 2005. Kuidas kirjutada neist, kes ei räägi — aga märgi(sta)vad ometi: biosemiootikaraamatuid 2002-2004. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 229-233.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kull05p229"></a>Et päriselt mõista, mis see <strong>sõnastamisvõime - väga veider oskus (maailma lihtsustada) ja ilming (aru saada)</strong> - õigupoolest on, on hea teda vaadata-võrrelda teiste märgiloomisoskuste (ehk märgiloomevõimete) taustal ja seas. (Kull 2005: 229)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Märgiloomevõime" kõlab liitsõnalembeliselt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kull05p229ja230"></a>Näiteks Ferrara ülikooli (Itaalia) arengubioloogi <strong>Marcello Barbieri (2003) raamat orgaanilistest koodidest</strong>. Semiootika seisukohalt on selles väärtuslik alumise semiootilise läve detailne kirjeldamine, koodi mõiste täpne määratlemine ja orgaaniliste koodide liikide iseloomustamine. Kuna <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> M. Barbieri kokkupuuted teoreetilise semiootika ja biosemiootika teiste esindajatega on suures osas alles selle raamatu esimese variandi järgsed, siis on ka ta mõistekasutus mõnes osas originaalne. Kuigi pealkirjaski kasutab ta terminit 'semantika', pole tekstis peaaegu üldse viiteid semiootika (ega ka semantika) klassikale. Paljudele võib huvi pakkuda raamatu lisas toodud 63 tsitaadist koosnev elu definitsioonide kollektsioon (Barbieri 2003: 255-263). (Kull 2005: 229-230)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib-olla tuleks kasuks Stapledoni "subvitaalsete ühikute" mõtestamiseks. <u><em>The Organic Codes: An Introduction to Semantic Biology</em></u>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kull05p231a"></a>Signaali transduktsiooni koodidest kirjutab ka M. Barbieri (2003: 105-110), näidates, et just transduktsioon, erinevalt transmissioonist, teeb eluslooduses signaalidest semiootilised fenomenid ehk tõelised märgid. <strong>Raku signaalidekogumi märkimiseks võtab E. Bruni kasutusele termini <em>signaloom</em></strong> (ingl. k. <em>signalome</em>; genoomi, proteoomi jmt eeskujul). (Kull 2005: 231)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Põnev. Lähim võimalik rakendus enda praegustest teemaderingist on jällegi Stapledoni Marslaste radioaktiivsus.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kull05p231b"></a>J. Schultiga seoses märgiksin ka kiireid arenguid ühes huvitavas biosemiootika harus - <em>neurosemiootikas</em>. J. Schulti toimetatud on nimelt temaatiline erinumber elektroentsefalogrammist kui märgisüsteemist (<em>Das EEG als Zeichensystem</em>) ajakirjas <em>European Journal for Semiotic Studies</em>, kd 16(1), 2004. <strong>Neurosemiootika on praeguseks juba võrdlemisi ulatuslik valdkond, ulatudes servapidi psühhosemiootikasse</strong>. Peale T. Deaconi laialt tuntud raamatu (Deacon 1997) ja D. Favareau, A. Roepstorffi, F. nuesseli jt tööde on oluline H. A. Smithi (2001) monograafia, mis muuseas toetub paljus J. v. Uexkülli mudelite rakendamisele. (Kull 2005: 231)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Talletan viite nimel, et kunagi neurosemiootikasse lähemalt sisse vaadata.</p><!-- pooleli 237 -->Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-49003983112844343482023-08-27T03:45:00.000-07:002023-08-27T03:45:10.811-07:00A Yearning For Totality<!-- A Yearning For Totality
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia,
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--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Fitting, Peter 1979. The Modern Anglo-American SF Novel: Utopian Longing and Capitalist Cooptation. <em>Science Fiction Studies</em> 6(1): 59-76. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/4239224">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p59"></a>The aim of this paper is to explore the interplay between ideology and utopian longing in the modern SF novel. <strong>Western SF is</strong>, on the one hand, <strong>a form of ideological production</strong>, one of the ways in which capitalism speaks itself and <strong>determines our ways of perceiving reality</strong>, one of the ways through which the real problems and conflicts present in society are transformed into false problems and imaginary resolutions. On the other hand, SF is also an important contemporary manifestation of what Ernst Bloch, for instance, has referred to as "utopian longing", <strong>humanity's continued striving for an "adequate future"</strong> - a tradition which took on new force and direction in the bourgeois world following the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which were attended by <strong>the belief in the possibility of cognitive progress</strong>. (Fitting 1979: 59)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The present is markedly inadequate.</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p59ja60"></a>SF has, of course, been defined in a variety of ways. When it si situated within certain literary traditions for thematic fields, without taking into account its social and historical context, its contemporary significance is obscured. SF has been defined as well as <strong>the literature of "cognitive estrangement"</strong>; but this definition, despite its merits, limits SF to a form of knowledge, to an understanding of the present. SF is, certainly, a continuation of various literary traditions; it does use many traditional themes; and, <strong>at its best, it is the educational,</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>cognitive literature Darko Suvin defines it to be</strong>. (Fitting 1979: 59-60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Suvin's paper also mentions Stapledon, is already in the pile waiting to be read, so the context for these claims will become clear soon enough.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p60"></a>In the traditional novel, the utopian impulse is manifest in what the Hegelian Lukács described as <strong>a yearning for totality</strong>, for some lost sense of wholeness which the novelist attempts to restore to a fragmented reality - a longnig which is familiar to us in the fictional evocations of a nostalgia for some earlier, lost age. <strong>In SF this longing is often associated with the future</strong>. But the emancipatory thrust of SF, its ability to imagine alternatives, is often blunted and deformed. (Fitting 1979: 60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Spinozist connotations.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p61"></a><strong>Asimov's psychohistory is designed not to bring about a different, better world, but to preserve the already existing society for external threats</strong>. The possibility of real change and the reality of history are denied through the Spenglerian cyclical model of history and through the return to a future in which the ethics and economics of capitalism have been maintained. And this colonization of our future is not simply Asimov's response to the threat of Fascism, but also to the threat of alternative social structures - the "Communist menace" - insofar as psychohistory can be understood as Asimov's answer to dialectical materialism. (Fitting 1979: 61)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Makes sense. The Americans wouldn't have made a TV show out of it if it had taken issue with neoliberal capitalism.</p><!-- pooleli 4
5 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p62"></a>But if <strong>Simak's work can be read as</strong> the continuation of the utopian impulse, <strong>akin to the utopian visions of the English philosopher W. Olaf Stapledon</strong>, the rejection of technology will become, in the SF on the 1950s, a rejection of the utopian possibility itself. (Fitting 1979: 62)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The intelligent dog thing is indeed a bit Stapledonian.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p63"></a>The 1950s witness the appearance, then, of a third phase where this implicit negation of capitalism is recaptured and defused through a rechanneling of the utopian impulse into another kind of imaginary resolution. For insofar as "human nature" was the illusory obstacle to utopia in the second phase (whether through innate aggressivity or Original Sin), the SF of the late 1950s takes as its certain theme the concept of <strong>a <em>changed</em> human nature</strong>. This is effected by <strong>depicting various parapsychological possibilities, particularly telepathy</strong>. (Fitting 1979: 63)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledon was ahead of his time?</p><!--
10-11 --><blockquote><a id="fitting79p67ja68"></a>A first example is Frank Herbert's best-selling <em>Dune</em> (1965) which is dedicated to "dry land ecologists." In his portrayal of Paul Atreides and the desert world of Arrakis, Herbert balances a description of the ecology of Dune with an account of the "historical" forces which have led to a galactic crisis. The novel is the story of Paul's revenge for the death of his father as well as an ecological puzzle in which the reader gradually pieces together the reality of Dune. But <strong>behind the events lie neither historical forces nor individual will. There is, rather, biological determinism, "the need of their race to renew its scattered inheritance, to cross and mingle and infuse their bloodlines in a great new pooling of genes</strong>," which has brought Paul and the Fremen together to bring about that mixing of genes in the only possible way, "the ancient way, the tried and certain way that rolls over everything in its path: jihad." (ch. 1:22) <strong>History and the possibility of human endeavor and change are again reduced to "natural" forces</strong>; while ecology is, in this novel, an illusory scientific justification for a kind fo wish-fulfillment analogous to that offered by the machines which gave Van Vogt's Gosseyn (in the <em>Non-A</em> novels of the 1940s) the ability to transcend <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> time and space and his own death, or by the Martian language which gave Michael Valentine Smith and his followers unlimited powers in <em>Stranger in a Strange Land</em>. (Fitting 1979: 67-68)</blockquote><!--
--><p>I would call this a "Macedonian" reading of <em>Dune</em>.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-42524227126082041332023-08-22T12:21:00.001-07:002023-08-22T12:21:49.761-07:00Lood filosoofia ajaloost 2<!-- Lood filosoofia ajaloost 1
Keel: Eesti, Philosophy, Spinozism, Source: WEB
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--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Durant, Will 1937. <em>Lood filosoofia ajaloost. II, Filosoofia uuestisünd: Bacon ja Spinoza</em>. Tõlkinud Leo Anvelt; redigeerinud Alfred Koort. Tartu: Eesti Kirjanduse Selts. [<u><a href="https://dspace.ut.ee/handle/10062/87408">DSpace</a></u>]</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p6"></a>Sellele Aasia hinge vaevalt märgatavale sissetungile valitsevas kreeklaste tülpinud kehha järgnes ruttu <strong>idamaiste kultuste ja usundite valgumine Kreekamaale just samu teid pidi, mis oli avanud noor võitja</strong>. Müstilised ja ebausulised usundid, mis olid juurdunud Hellase vaesema rahva hulgas, said jälle jõudu ja levisid. Ja Oriendi apaatia ja resignatsiooni vaim leidis valmi pinna dekadentses ning julguse kaotanud Kreekas. <strong>Stoilise filosoofia sissetoomine Ateena föniikia kaupmehe Zenon'i (umb. 310 e. Kr) poolt oli ainult üks paljudest idamaistest immutustest</strong>. (Durant 1937: 6)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stoitsism oli orientaalne?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p7"></a><em>Zenon</em> ehitas oma <em>apatheia</em>-filosoofia determinismile, mille hilisem stoik Chrysippos leidis vaevu eraldatavaks idamaisest fatalismist. Kui Zenon, kes ei pooldanud orjust, peksis kord oma orja mingi eksimuse pärast ja ori tõi ette pehmendava seigana, et oma isand filosoofia järgi ta on määratud juba igavesest ajast sellele eksimusele, siis Zenon vastas targa rahuga, et tema, Zenon, on sama filosoofia põhjal määratud teda peksma selle eest. Nagu Schopenhaueri arvates oli asjatu individuaalsel tahtel võidelda universaalse tahtega, nii ka stoik väitis, et <strong>filosoofiline ükskõiksus</strong> on ainus mõistlik hoiak elu suhtes, kus võitlus olemasolu eest on nii alatult mõistetud vältimatule kaotusele. Kui võit on täiesti võimatu, teda tuleb põlata. Rahu saladuseks pole teha meie saavutused võrdseks soovidega, vaid langetada soovid saavutuste tasapinnale. (Durant 1937: 7)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mõtlesin, et äkki on <em>disinterestedness</em>, aga originaalis on siiski <em>indifference</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p11"></a>Selliseil lehekülgedel tunneme kristluse ja ta kohkumatute märtrite lähedust. Tõepoolest, <strong>kas ei olnud kristlik</strong> enesesalgamise <strong>eetika</strong>, kristlik <strong>poliitiline ideaal</strong> preaaegu kommunistlikust inimeste vendusest ja kristlik eshatoloogia) maailmalõpu suurest tulikahjust <strong>ainult fragmendid stoa õpetusest</strong>, mis ujusid selleaegse mõttevoolu pinnal? Epiktetoses on kreeka-rooma hing kaotanud oma paganluse ja on küps uue usundi jaoks. Tema raamatule langes osaks au olla vastu võetud religioosse käsiraamatuna varakristliku kiriku poolt. (Durant 1937: 11)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib-olla.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="anvelt37p14"></a>Canterbury peapiiskop <em>Anselm</em> (1003-1109) seletas näiteks oma kuulsas ontoloogilises jumalatõestuses Jumala eksistentsi (olemasolu) paratamatust Jumala-mõistest lähtudes. <strong>Jumala kui kõige täiuslikuma olevuse mõistesse peaks kuuluma mõiste tunnusena ka olemine, sest vastasel korral oleks mõeldav mingi veel täiuslikum olevus, mis muude omaduste kõrval omab ka eksistentsi</strong>. Kuid kõige täiuslikumast olevusest ei või olla täiuslikumat, järelikult peab omistama Jumalale eksistentsi. (Anvelt 1937: 14)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui jumala mõiste juurde ei kuuluks olemine, siis teda ei oleks.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p17"></a>See oli kangelastegude, lootuse ja jõu ajajärk, uute algatuste ja üritustega igal alal; ajajärk, mis ootas üht häält, mingit sünteetilist hinge, kes pidi võtma kokku ja lahendama ta vaimu olemuse. <strong><em>Francis Bacon</em></strong> oli see "moodsete aegade kõige jõulisem mõistus, kes helistas kella, mis kutsus targad kokku", ja <strong>kuulutas, et Euroopa on saanud täisealiseks</strong>. (Durant 1937: 17)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Väljumine omasüülisest alaealisusest</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p27"></a>Ta [Bacon] mõtleb, et sellest hoolimata noorus ja lapseiga võiksid saada liiga palju vabadust ja niiviisi inimesed kasvada korratuks ja lõdvaks. "Laske vanemaid aegsasti valida kutsed ja teed, mida nende arvates lapsed peaksid minema, sest siis on nad kõige painduvamad; ja ärge laske neid liialt arvestada oma laste dispositsiooni, nagu mõeldes, et nad teeksid kõige paremini seda, mille jaoks neil on kõige rohkem kalduvusi. On tõsi, et kui laste kiindumused ja erianded on erakordsed, siis pole hea neile risti vastu teha, kuid üldiselt on hea <strong>"pütaagorlaste" eeskiri</strong> - <strong>"vali parim, harjumus teeb selle lõbuks ja kergeks"</strong>. Sest "harjumus on inimese elu peavalitseja". (Durant 1937: 27)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kummalisel kombel ei tule tuttav ette.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p28"></a>Parem retsept revolutsioonide vältimiseks on rikkuse ühetasane jaotus: "Raha on nagu sõnnik, kasutu seni, kuni ta laotatakse laiali." Aga see ei tähenda sotsialismi ega isegi demokraatiat. Bacon ei usalda rahvast, kes tema päevil oli täiesti juurdepääsuta haridusele. "Madalaim kõigist meelitustest on rahva meelitus; ja <strong>Phokion suhtus õieti, küsides, kui mass talle plaksutas, mis ta on teinud vääriti</strong>." (Durant 1937: 28)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kaval.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p31ja32"></a>Psühholoogias on ta peaaegu "behaviorist"; ta nõuab ranget põhjuse ja tagajärje uurimist inimese tegevuses ja tahab luuta (välja jätta) sõna <em>juhus</em> teaduse sõnastikust. "<strong><em>Juhus</em> on olematu asja nimi</strong>," <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Ja "<strong>mida juhus on kõiksuses, seda on tahe inimeses</strong>." Skolastiline õpetus vabast tahtest lükatakse kõrvale kui allpool arutlemist seisev ja ära heidetakse ka üldlevinud oletus "tahtest" kui millestki "intellektist" erinevast. Need on juhised, mida Bacon lõpuni ei järgi. See pole ainus kord, kus ta paneb terve raamatu ühte lausesse ja läheb siis lustlikult edasi. (Durant 1937: 31-32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mitte just väga harv tahtevaenulikkus (vt nt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/kosmiline-kood.html#randviirsebeok01p28">Randviir; Sebeok 2001: 28</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p32a"></a>Jällegi väheste sõnadega Bacon leiutab uue teaduse - <em>sotsiaalpsühholoogia</em>. "Filosoofid peaksid usinasti uurima kombe, harjutuse, harjumuse, kasvatuse, eeskuju, jäljendamise, võistluse, <strong>seltsimise, sõpruse, kiituse, laituse, manitsuse, lugupeetuse</strong>, seaduste, raamatute, õpingute jne. mõjusid ja jõudu; sest need on asjad, mis valitsevad inimeste kombeid; nende tegurite kaudu vormitakse ja muudetakse taltsaks vaim." Moodne teadus on nii täpselt jälginud seda skeemi, et see kõlab peaaegu nagu mõni Tarde'i, Le Bon'i, <strong>Ross</strong>'i, Wallas'i või Durkheim'i teose sisukord. (Durant 1937: 32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üks väheseid kohti, mida olen kohanud, kus <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/10/principles-of-sociology.html">Edward Alsworth Ross</a> saab mainitud. Ainus tõeliselt tundmatu nimi siin minu jaoks on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Wallas">Graham Wallas</a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p32"></a>Miski pole teaduse jaoks liiga madal ega liiga kõrge. Nõidused, unenäod, ennustused, <strong>telepaatilised ühendused</strong>, "psüühilised fenomenid" üldiselt peavad alluma teaduslikule uurimisele; "sest ei või teada, missuguseil juhtudel ja mil määral ebausule [s. o. ebausulistele põhjustele] omistatud tagajärjed sõltuvad loomulikest põhjustest". (Durant 1937: 32)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Telepaatia on ikka jõle kahtlane.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p33"></a>Bacon jätkab tsiteerides Bias't, üht muistse Kreekamaa seitsmest targast: "<strong>Armasta oma sõpra, nagu peaks ta saama su vaenlaseks, ja oma vaenlast, nagu peaks ta saama su sõbraks</strong>." (Durant 1937: 33)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Biaselt ei olegi vist varem ühtegi tsitaati kohanud. Sellest siin on teine pool (<em>kohtle vaenlasi nagu neist peaksid saama su sõbrad</em>) tuttav pütaagorlaste korpusest. Esimene pool oleks nende vaimsusega vastuolus, ma arvan.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p40"></a><em>Kolmandaks</em> on <strong><em>idola fori</em> (turuplatsi-ebajumalapildid), mis tekivad "inimeste üksteisega läbikäimisest ja seltsimisest</strong>. Sest inimesed keskustlevad keele kaudu, kuid <strong>sõnad on seatud vastavalt massi arusaamisele</strong>; ja halvast ja mittekohasest sõnade moodustamisest tekib imeline pärsing vaimule." Filosoofid jagavad välja infiniitumeid (lõpmatusi) sellise hooletu kindlustundega, millega grammatikud käsitlevad infinitiive; ja ometi ei tea keegi, mis on "lõpmatus" või kas ta üldse heaks on arvanud vaeva näha eksisteerimisega. (Durant 1937: 40)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nende iidolite teemal vt <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-polyadic-relation.html#deelyrussell86a">Baconi sissekannet</a> semiootika-entsüklopeedias. "Massi arusaamine" on kokkuleplaslik. <!--Üldpilt meenutab Sage Francise laulusõnu: "<u>So welcome to the Terrordome</u> / <u>A bedroom full of pheromones</u> / <u>Where nothing that we say is set in stone</u> / <strong><u>If I thought it was for posterity I'd already be writing better poems</u></strong> / <strong><u>But I'm talking in extremes</u></strong> / <strong><u>Best this and best that</u></strong> / <u>Best not regret anything that ever gets said to this hell cat</u>" (<a href="https://youtu.be/qITsVa1YaVE?t=88">Got Up This Morning</a>).--></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p46ja47"></a>Kuigi see kujutus on lühike, me näeme tas siiski jälle iga filosoofi utoopiavisandit - rahus ja mõõdukas külluses elav rahvas, juhitud oma targemate meeste poolt. <strong><em>Iga mõtleja unistuseks on asendada poliitik teadlasega</em></strong>; miskipärast jääb see ainult unistuseks pärast nii paljusid kehastumisi? Kas seepärast, et mõtleja on liiaks unistavalt <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> intellektuaalne, et välja minna võitlusareenile ja oma kava teostada? Kas seepärast, et kitsalt püüdleva hinge kange auahnus alati võidab filosoofide ja pühakute õrnad ning piinlikult täpsed taotlused? Või on põhjuseks see, et teadus pole ikka veel kasvanud täisealiseks ja teadlikuks jõuks? - et alles meie päevil füüsikud ja keemikud ja tehnikud hakkavad nägema, kuidas teaduse tõusev osatähtsus tööstuses ja sõjas annab talle pöördelise tähtsusega seisukoha ühiskondlikus strateegias ja laseb aimata aega, mil teadlaste organiseeritud jõud veenab maailma neid juhtivale kohale kutsuma? Võib-olla pole teadus veel pälvinud maailma valitsemist; ja võib-olla varsti ta on seda. (Durant 1937: 46-47)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ideaalses maailmas poleks poliitikuid vaja.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p49ja50"></a>Isegi Baconi vaimu armastaja peab möönma, et suurel kantsleril rajades teaduste seadust ei õnnestunud püsida oma aja teaduse kõrgusel. Ta hülgas Kopernikuse ja ignoreeris Koplerit ja Tycho Brachet; ta alahindas Gilbert'it ja näib mitte tundnud Harvey't. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Tõtt öelda ta armastas enam arutlemist kui uurimist; või võib-olla tal polnud aega vaevalisteks uurimisteks. <strong>Töö, mis ta tegi filosoofias ja teaduses, jäi maha kildudena ja segipaisatuna ta surres, täis kordumusi, vasturääkimusi, õhutusi ja sissejuhatusi</strong>. <em>Ars longa, vita brevis</em> - kunst on pikk ja elu põgus: see on iga suure hinge traagika. (Durant 1937: 49-50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Njaa.<!-- Mind ootab ilmselt sama saatus. Pole süsteemi. --></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p51ja52"></a>Ja kui prantsuse valgustuse-suurvaimud võtsid käsile oma intellektuaalse meistriürituse, entsüklopeedia, nad pühendasid selle Francis Baconile. "Kui", ütles diderot eessõnas, "me oleme ta edukalt lõpule viinud, me võlgneme kõige rohkem tänu kantsler Baconile, kes visandas kunstide ja teaduste üldsõnastiku plaani sel ajal, mil nii öelda polnud ei kunste ega teadust." D'Alembert nimetas Baconit "suurimaks, kõige universaalsemaks ja kõige kõneosavamaks filosoofidest". Rahvuskonvent avaldas Baconi tööd riigi kulul. Kogu briti mõtlemise areng ja käik on <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> järginud Baconi filosoofiat. Tema püüd maailma mõista Demokritose mehaaniliste tingimuste kaudu andis ta sekretärile <em>Hobbes</em>'ile lähtepunkti põhjalikuks materjalismiks. <strong>Tema induktiivne meetod andis <em>Locke</em>'ile idee empiiriliseks psühholoogiaks</strong>, mis on olenev vaatlusest ja vabastatud teoloogiast ja metafüüsikast. Tema "kasu" ja "vilja" rõhutamine leidis väljenduse <em>Betham</em>'i kasuliku ja hea samastamises. (Durant 1937: 51-52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mõju oli kahtlemata suur.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p52"></a>"Poleks ilmaaegne," kirjutab Bacon ühes oma toredamaist kohtadest, "eristada astmeina inimeste kolme liiki püüdlust. Esimene on omane neile, kes ihkavad laiendada oma võimu kodumaal; see liik on vulgaarne ja mandunud. Teine on niisuguste [püüdlus], kes taotlevad oma maa ja selle valitsuse võimu inimeste üle; selles on kindlasti rohkem väärikust, kuid mitte vähem ahnust. Aga <strong>kui inimene püüab luua ja laiendada inimsoo enda võimu ja valitsust üle universumi, tema püüdlus on kahtlemata tervem ja õilsam kui kaks teist</strong>." (Durant 1937: 52)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pythagorase kolm eluviisi (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/07/life-of-pythagoras.html#iamblichus18p28">Iamblichus 1818: 28</a>), aga kõrgemal - kollektiivne. St 1) majandus; 2) poliitika; ja 3) filosoofia - praktilise inimvõimu suurendamisena, nagu Bacon seda mõistis.</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4>Spinoza</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p56ja57"></a>Kesk-Euroopas juudid paistsid silma kaupmeestena ja pankuritena; Pürenee poolsaarel omastasid nad rõõmsalt araablaste matemaatilise, meditsiinilise ja filosoofilise <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> teaduse ja arendasid oma kultuuri Córdoba, Barcelona ja Sevilla ülikoolis. Siin mängisid juudid XII-l ja XIII-l sajandil väljapaistvat osa, vahendades Lääne-Euroopale antiikset ja orientaalset kultuuri. Córdobas kirjutas <strong><em>Moses Maimonides</em></strong> (1135-1204), selle aja suurim arst, oma kuulsa piiblikommentaari <strong><em>Hämmeldatu juht</em></strong>; Barcelonas asetas <em>Hasdai Crescas</em> (1370-1430) ketserlikke küsimusi, mis vapustasid kogu juutkonda. (Durant 1937: 56-57)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Guide_for_the_Perplexed">The Guide for the Perplexed</a></em> (~1190).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p57ja58"></a>Hispaania juudid kosusid ja õitsesid Granada vallutamiseni Ferdinandi poolt 1492. a. ja mauride lõpliku väljaajamiseni. Nüüd kaotasid poolsaare juudid oma vabaduse, mida nad olid maitsnud pikkamisi leviva islami all. Inkvisitsioon langes nende peale, seades nad valiku ette: ristimine ja kristlikud kombed või maapagu ja varanduste konfiskeerimine. Ei saa öelda, et kirik oleks vihaselt vaenustanud juute, - paavstid protestisid korduvalt inkvisitsiooni barbaarsuste vastu, kuid Hispaania kuningas mõtles, et saab pungi ajada oma kukru selle võõra rassi kannatlikult kogutud varandusega. <strong>Peaaegu samal aastal, mil Kolumbus avastas Ameerika, Ferdinand avastas juudid</strong>. (Durant 1937: 57-58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui Ferdinand juba surnud ei oleks, sureks ta siit saadud põletushaavadesse.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p58"></a>Suur arv neist asus aga selleaegseile nõrkadele laevadele ja purjetas üles mööda Atlandi ookeani vaenulise Inglismaa ja vaenulise Prantsusmaa vahel, kuni lõpuks leidis teatud määral külalislahkust väikeses suuremeelses Hollandis. Nende hulgas oli üks portugali juutide perekond nimega Espinoza.<br /><strong>Sellest ajast peale Hispaania närbus ja Holland kosus</strong>. Juudid ehitasid oma esimese sünagoogi Amsterdami 1598. a.; ja kui nad seitsekümmend viis aastat hiljem ehitasid teise, toredaima Euroopas, nende kristlastest-naabrid aitasid finantseerida seda ettevõtet. (Durant 1937: 58)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ja Hispaania on tänini üks vaesemaid ja suurima töötusega piirkondi Euroopas.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p59ja60"></a>Ta oli hiilgav õpilane ja kogudusvanemad vaatasid talle kui koguduse ja usu tõusvale valgusele. Õige varsti siirdus ta piibli uurimisest talmudi <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> nõudlikele teravmeelseile kommentaaridele ja sealt Maimonidese, Levi ben Gerson'i, Ibn Ezra ja Hasdai Crescase kirjutistele. Ta mittevaliv aplus ulatus isegi Ibn Gebirol'i müstilise filosoofiani ja Córdoba Moosese kabalistlike keerdsõlmedeni.<br />Viimase juures hämmastas teda <strong>Jumala ja universumi samastamine</strong>. Innukalt jälgis ta sama mõtet Ben Gersonil, kes õpetas <strong>maailma igavest kestust</strong>, ja Hasdai Crescase juures, kes <strong>pidas ainelist kõiksust Jumala kehaks</strong>. Ta luges Maimonidese poolenisti tunnustavast arutlusest Averroës'e õpetuse kohta, et <strong>surematus on impersonaalne (mitteisikuline)</strong>; kuid leidis <em>Hämmeldatu juhist</em> enam hämmeldamist (segadusse viimist) kui juhtimist. Sest suur rabi tõstatas rohkem küsimusi kui vastas. (Durant 1937: 59-60)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kahjuks vist mulle ligipääsetamatu kirjandusvara.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p61ja62"></a>Ta paistab uurinud <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/02/lood-filosoofia-ajaloost-1.html">Sokratest, Platonit ja Aristotelest</a>; kuid ta eelistas neile suuri atomiste Demokritost, Epikurost ja Lucretiust. Ka stoikud jätsid tasse kustumatu jälje. Ta luges skolastilisi filosoofe ja võttis neilt üle mitte ainult terminoloogia, vaid ka nende geomeetrilise esitamismeetodi: aksioomi, definitsiooni, propositsiooni, demonstratsiooni, skolioni ja korollaariga. Ta uuris <strong><em>G. Bruno</em></strong>'t (1548-1600), seda suurejoonelist mässajat, kelle tuld "kogu Kaukasuse lumed kustutada ei jõua", <strong>kes rändas maalt maale ja ikka "tuli välja samast uksest, kust oli läinud sisse", otsides ja imestades</strong>; ja kes lõpuks mõisteti inkvisitsiooni poolt surma "nii halastavalt kui võimalik, ilma verevalamiseta" - s. t. elusalt põletamise teel. Missugune mõtete rikkus oli ses romantilises itaallases! Kõigepealt mõte ühtsusest: <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>kõik realiteet on üks substantsilt, <em>üks põhjuselt ja üks tekkimiselt</em>; ja <em>Jumal ja see realiteet on üks</em></strong>. Või jällegi vaim ja mateeria on üks Bruno meelest, <em>realiteedi iga osake koosneb lahutamatult psüühilisest ja füüsilisest</em>. <strong>Filosoofia ülesandeks on</strong> seepärast <strong>näha ühtsust mitmekesisues, vaimu aines ja ainet vaimus</strong>, leida sünteesi, kus vastandid ja vastuolud kohtavad ja ühte sulavad, tõusta sellele kõige kõrgemale teadmisele universaalsest ühtsusest, mis on jumalaarmastuse intellektuaalne vaste, ekvivalent. Igaüks neist mõtteist kujunes mõneks lüliks Spinoza filosoofia ülesehituses. (Durant 1937: 61-62)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giordano_Bruno">Giordano Bruno</a> on siit vaid kaks korda varem läbi käinud: Campanella mõjutajana (vt <a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/08/a-reflection-of-reality.html#iovan11p67a">Iovan 2011: 67</a>) ja, et "<u>Bruno mõistis termini <em>monaad</em> all ühekorraga nii füüsilisi kui psüühilisi tegelikkuse elemente, ühikuid</u>" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2021/11/pythagoras-akadeemia.html#kiho90p1191">Kiho 1990: 1191</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p62ja63"></a>Lõpuks ja kõige enam mõjutas teda prantslane <em>René Descartes</em> (1596-1650), kes on moodses filosoofias subjektivistliku ning idealistliku traditsiooni isa (nagu Bacon on objektivistliku ning realistliku). Nii ta prantslastest-jüngrite kui inglastest-vaenlaste meelest on Descartes'i keskseks ideeks <strong><em>teadvuse primaat</em></strong> - tema näilikult endastmõistetav põhiväide on, et <strong><em>vaim tunnetab iseennast</em></strong> vahetumalt ning otsesemalt kui ta iial võiks tunnetada midagi muud; et ta tunnetab "välismaailma" ainult selle maailma muljete kaudu vaimule aistingus ja tajus. Seepärast peaks igasugune filosoofia (kuigi ta kahtleks kõiges muus) algama individuaalse vaimu ja iseendaga ja moodustama oma esimese argumendi kolme sõnaga: "<strong>mõtlen, järelikult olen</strong>" (<em>cogito, ergo sum</em>). Võib-olla on selles lahtumispunktis jälgi renessansi individualismist; kindlasti oli selles aga terve nõiakübaratäis järeldusi hilisema spekulatsiooni tarvis. Nüüd algas suur mäng tunnetusteooriaga, mis Leibniz'i, Locke'i, Berkeley, Hume'i ja Kant'i tõttu ksavas <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kolmesaja-aastaseks sõjaks, mis osalt ergutas, osalt laastas uusaegset filosoofiat. (Durant 1937: 62-63)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Tunneta ennast, vaim!</em></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p64"></a>Jumal andis esimese tõuke, ütles Descartes (just peaaegu nagu Anaxagoras oli öelnud kaks tuhat aastat varem), ja kõiki ülejäänud astronoomilisi, geoloogilisi ja muid mittevaimseid protsesse ja arenguid võib seletada ühe homogeense substantsi kaudu, mis eksisteeris algul desintegreeritud olekus (vrd. Kant-Laplace'i nebulaarteooria); ja iga looma liigutus ja isegi inimese keha omad on mehaaniline liikumine, - nagu seda näiteks on vereringvool ja refleksliigutused. <strong>Kogu maailm ja iga keha on masin; kuid väljaspool maailma on Jumal ja kehas on vaimne hing</strong>. (Durant 1937: 64)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vaimne hing? (Teisesus ja Kolmasus sulavad ühte.)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p65"></a>Van Vloten on ära toonud ekskommunikatsiooniks tarvitatava valemi:<blockquote>Inglise kohtuotsusega ja pühakute otsusega me paneme põlu alla, vannume ära, neame ja tõukame välja Baruch de Espinoza, kogu püha koguduse nõusolekul, pühade raamatute ja nendes oleva kuuesaja kolmeteistkümne käsu palge ees, ja neame teda needusega, miska Eliisa lapsi needis, ja kõigi sajatustega, mis on kirjutatud Seaduse raamatusse. <strong>Olgu ta neetud päeval ja olgu ta neetud öösel; olgu ta neetud maha heites ja olgu ta neetud üles tõustes; olgu neetud ta väljaminemine ja sissetulemine</strong>. Ärgu Issand iialgi andku talle andeks ega tundku teda. Põlegu Issanda viha ja meelepaha sellest ajast selle mehe vastu, koormaku teda kõigi needustega, mis on kirjutatud Seaduse raamatusse, ja <strong>kustutagu ta nimi taeva alt</strong>; hoidku Issand teda nagu õnnetust eemal kõigist iisraeli suguharudest, pangu ta peale kõik taevalaotuse needused, mis on Seaduse raamatus; ja pääsegu sel päeval teie kõik, kes kuulete Issanda oma Jumala sõna.</blockquote>(Durant 1937: 65)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Päeval ja öösel on ta neetud. Õhutul ja hommikul mitte.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p68"></a>Nende viie Rhynsburgis viibitud aasta jooksul Spinoza kirjutas väikese fragmendi <em>De intellectus emendatione</em> (Aru selgitamisest) ja <strong><em>Ethica more geometrico demonstrata</em></strong> (<strong>Geomeetriliselt tõestatud eetika</strong>). Viimase lõpetas Spinoza 1665. a.; aga kümme asatat ta ei teinud mingit katset teost trükis avaldada. (Durant 1937: 68)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://www.ester.ee/record=b4534764*est"><em>Eetika: geomeetrilise korra järgi tõestatud ja viide ossa jagatud</em></a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p69"></a>Ainsad teosed, mis Spinoza ise avaldas oma eluajal, on <em>Descartes'i filosoofia printsiibid ja Teoloogilis-poliitiline traktaat</em>, mis ilmus anonüümselt 1670. aastal. Viimasel oli au kohta leida <em>Index expurgatoriusel</em> (kiriklikul keelulehel) ja ta müük keelati ära ilmlike võimude poolt. Nende asjaolude toetusel tõusis raamatu läbimüük küllalt suureks, <strong>nimelt tiitellehe varjul, mis ütles ta kord olevat arstiteadusliku arutluse, kord ajaloolise jutustuse</strong>. Raamatu vääramiseks kirjutati loendamatuid köiteid. Ühe arvates on Spinoza "kõige jumalavallatum ateist, kes iial on elanud maakera pinnal". Colerus räägib ühest teisest vastukirjutisest kui "lõpmatu väartusega aardest, mis kunagi ei hävi" - ainult see märkus on tast säilinud! Lisaks seesugusele avalikule karistamisele Spinoza sai palju kirju, mis püüdsid teda parandada. (Durant 1937: 69)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vatikan oleks pidanud <em>Streisand effect</em>-iga arvestama.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p72"></a>Vaadelgem Spinoza nelja teost nende saamise järjekorras. <em>Tractatus theologico-politicus</em> huvitab neist meid tänapäev vahest kõige vähem, sest <strong>terav krititsismiliikumine, mille Spinoza algatas, on teinud endastmõistetavaks need väited, mille eest Spinoza riskis eluga</strong>. Autor ei tee targasti, kui ta liiga põhjalikult tõestab oma väiteid; tema järeldused muutuvad kõigi haritud vaimude vahetusrahaks ja ta tööd kaotavad meid ikka uuesti paeluva saladuse võlu. Nii juhtus see Voltaire'iga ja niisamuti Spinoza traktaadiga religioonist ja riigist. (Durant 1937: 72)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Meenub arutlus sellest kuidas mõned klassikalised tööd kubisevad "klišeedest" ja ei kannata enam lugeda vms, sest omal ajal olid nad niivõrd mõjukad, et kõik hilisem on nende värvi, nende orbiidil.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p75ja76"></a>Asudes Spinoza järgmise teose juurde, satume kohe alguses ühele suurimale vääriskivile filosoofilises kirjanduses. Spinoza jutustab, miks ta on kõigest loobunud filosoofia kasuks.<blockquote>Pärast seda kui kogemus mulle õpetas, et kõik, mis tavaliselt juhtub harilikus elus, on tühine ja asjatu, [...] ma otsustasin lõpuks välja uurida, kas on olemas midagi, mis on tõeline hüve, [...] kas on olemas midagi, mille leidmise ja saavutamisega ma omandaksin igavesti kestva ning ülima rõõmu. [...] <strong>Ma mõistsin, et pean loobuma mitmesugusest kasust, mida saadakse aust ja rikkusest, kui tahan tõsiselt taotella muid ja uusi asju. [...] Sest mida enam kellelgi neid mõlemaid on, seda suuremaks kasvab [omamise] rõõm ja see õhutab enam ja enam neid mõlemaid suurenema</strong>. Kui aga kord pettume oma lootustes, siis tekib suurim kurbus. Au juures on aga suureks koormaks see, et teda taotelles peame oma elu paratamatult seadma inimeste arvamise järgi, vältides seda, mida inimesed üldiselt väldivad, ja otsides seda, mida inimesed üldiselt otsivad. [...] Kuid <strong>ainult armastus igavese ning lõpmatu asja vastu täidab vaimu rõõmuga, mil pole</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>mingit osasaamist kurbusest</strong>. [...] <strong>Suurim hüve on teadmine ühtsusest, nimelt vaimu ühtsusest kogu loodusega</strong>. [...] Mida enam vaim tunnetab, seda paremini mõistab ta oma jõudusid või võimu, seda suutelisem on ta juhtima iseennast ja mäarama enda jaoks reegleid; ja mida enam ta mõistab looduse korda, seda kergemini võib ta end vabastada kasutuist asjust.</blockquote>Seepärast tähendab ainult tunnetus võimu ja vabadust; ja <strong>ainsaks püsivaks õnneks on tarkuse taotlemine ja mõistmisrõõm</strong>. (Durant 1937: 75-76)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"Süües kasvab isu" tüüpi häda: 1) rikkise-isu ja 2) kuulsuse-iha on piiritud. Ainult 3) "<u>tarkuse taotlemine ja mõistmisrõõm</u>" on tõeliselt rahuldavad.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p76ja77"></a>Kõigepealt on olemas <strong>tunnetus kuuldu järgi</strong>, miskaudu ma näiteks tean oma sündimispäeva. Teiseks <strong>ebamäärane kogemus</strong>, "empiiriline" teadmine sõna <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> halvas tähenduses, nagu see on näiteks arstil, kes ei tunne ravimenetlust mitte katselisteuurimiste teadlikult formuleeritud tulemuste kaudu, vaid <strong>"üldise mulje" põhjal</strong>, et see "harilikult" nii on mõjunud. Kolmandaks <strong>otsene deduktsioon</strong> ehk mõistuse abil saavutatud tunnetus, nagu näiteks siis, kui järeldan sellest päikese määratut suurust, et teiste asjade puhul kaugus vähendab nende näilikku ulatust. See tunnetusliik ületab küll kaht esimest, on aga siiski küllalt kindlusetu, et olla ümberlükatav otsese kogemusega. Seepärast <strong>on kõrgeimaks tunnetuseks tunnetus neljandal kujul, mida saadakse otsese deduktsiooni ning vahetu kaemuse abil</strong>, kui me näiteks näeme, et proportsioonis 2 : 4 = 3 : × puuduv arv on 6, või kui me taipame, et tervik on suurem kui osa. Spinoza usub, et kogenud matemaatikud haaravad peaaegu kogu Eukleidese õpetust niisugusel <strong>intuitiivsel viisil</strong>, möönab aga kahetsedes, et "siiani on olnud ainult vähe asju, mida ma olen suutnud tunnetada selle tunnetusviisiga". (Durant 1937: 76-77)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Vahetu kaemus, neh. Selle "intuitsiooni" küsimuse kallal tuleb ikka järada (palju liha sellel kondil ei ole).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p77"></a><em>Eetikas</em> Spinoza taandab kaks esimest tunnetusliiki üheks ja viimast, <strong>intuitiivset tunnetust nimetab asjade tajumiseks <em>sub specie aeternitatis</em> - nende igaveses ilmumisviisis ja suhteis</strong> -, andes selle lühikese lausega filosoofia definitsiooni. <em>Scientia intuitiva</em> (intuitiivne teadmine) <strong>otsib seega asjade ja sündmuste taga nende seadusi ja igavesi suhteid</strong>. Siin ilmneb selgesti Spinoza põhiline eristamine (vahetegemine) asjade ja sündmuste "maailma" - "ajaliku korra" - ja teiselt poolt seaduste ja korrastiste maailma - "igavese korra" - vahel. (Durant 1937: 77)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oijah, intuitiivne igavikkulisuse tunnetamine.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p78"></a>Kui me seda kohta meeles peame Spinoza peateose uurimisel, siis viimane selgeneb iseendast ja mõnigi <strong>arastav</strong> ning sassis koht <em>Eetikas</em> muutub lihtseks ja arusaadavaks. (Durant 1937: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Araks-tegev. Originaalis: "<span style="color: #fa4100">[...]</span> <u>and much in the <em>Ethics</em> that is <strong>discouragingly</strong> complex will unravel itself into simplicity and understanding</u>".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p78ja79"></a>Selle <strong>tulemus näib</strong> meie lõdvemalt kootud peadele <strong>nii sisu kui ka vormi poolest ületamatu kontsentratsioonina ja meil tekib kiusatus lohutada end, põlastades seda filosoofilist geomeetriat kui mõtete kunstlikku malemängu</strong>, milles aksioome, definitsioone, teoreeme ja tõestusi käsitellakse nagu kuningaid ja odamehi, ettureid ja vankreid. <strong>Kord on meie vaimule vastumeelt</strong>; me eelistame <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> fantaasia lookleva voolu jälgimist ja oma unenägudest ebamäärase filosoofia kudumist. Spinoza aga tundis ainult üht sundivat iha - taandada maailma mittetalutav kaos ühtsuseks ja korraks. Spinoza omas pigemini põhjamaist tõejanu kui lõunamaist rõõmu ilu üle; kunstnik temas oli üksnes arhitekt, kes ehitas mõttesüsteemi, täiusliku sümmeetrialt ja kujult.<br />Ka Spinoza terminoloogia paneb moodse uurija komistama ja nurisema. Et ta kirjutas ladina keeles, pidi ta sõnastama oma täiesti moodseid mõtteid keskaegseis skolastilisis termineis. Need on jooksutõkked, mis hirmutavad ära nõrga, kuid õhutavad tugevat.<br />Lühidalt, <strong>Spinozat ei saa lugeda, teda peab uurima</strong>; talle peab kallale asuma nagu Eukleidese geomeetriale, mööndes, et sel lühikesel kahesajal leheküljel üks inimene on sõnastatud terve oma elu mõtted, stoiliselt maha raiudes kõik üleliigse. Ärge püüdkegi selle tuuma tabada kiire lehitsemisega; <strong>ükski teine filosoofiline teos ei sisalda nii vähe seda, mida ilma kaotuseta võib vahele jätta</strong>. Iga osa oleneb eelnevast ja mõned endastmõistetavad ning näilikult ülearused teoreemid osutuvad hiljem imposantse loogilise ehitise nurgakivideks. Te ei saa põhjalikult aru ühestki tähtsast osast, kuni te pole lugenud ja läbi mõelnud tervikut. <strong>Ärgu loetagu seda teost korraga, vaid väikeste osade kaupa ja lugemist paljudele kordadele jaotades</strong>. Ja kui sellega valmis ollakse, siis mõeldagu, et on alles alatud tast arusaamisega. Seejärel loetagu mõnd kommentaari, nagu Pollock'i <em>Spinoza</em> või Martineau <em>Study of Spinoza</em> või veel parem - mõlemaid. Lõpuks lugege jälle <em>Eetikat;</em> te leiate eest uue raamatu. <strong>Kui te olete teist korda lõpule jõudnud, te ei lakka iial armastamast filosoofiat</strong>. (Durant 1937: 78-79)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lihtsalt kohutav.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Pollock, Frederick 1912. <em>Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy</em>. London: Duckworth and Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.188890/page/n1/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--><li><u>Martineau, James 1882. <em>A Study of Spinoza</em>. London: MacMillan and Co.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/astudyspinoza05martgoog/page/n10/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p80a"></a>Juba esimene lehekülg kisub meid metafüüsika keerisesse. Moodne kõvapäine (või pehmepäine?) jälestus metafüüsika vastu haarab meid, ja <strong>hetkeks sooviksime kõike muud, ainult mitte tegelda Spinozaga</strong>. (Durant 1937: 80)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Mis on "julgustava" vastand?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p80b"></a>Metafüüsika aga pole midagi muud, nagu ütleb W. James, kui katse selgesti mõeldes tabada asjade sügavaimat tähendust ehk (Spinoza sõnadega) nende olemuslikku substantsi ja sealjuures ühendades kogu tõde saavutada "kõrgeimat kõigist üldistustest", milles isegi praktilise inglase (Herbert Spenceri) arvates seisneb filosoofia olemus. <strong>Loodusteadus ise, mis nii upsakalt põlgab metafüüsikat, sisaldab teda igas oma mõttes. Ja see metafüüsika ongi tegelikult just Spinoza metafüüsika</strong>. (Durant 1937: 80)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Samasse kilda julgete väidetega, et Spinoza oli <em>esimene psühholoog</em> ja, et tänapäev on rohkem Spinoza nägu kui me võiksime asjatundmatutena üldse äragi tunda.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p80c"></a>Spinoza süsteemis on kolm keskset mõistet: <strong><em>substants</em>, <em>atribuut</em> ja <em>moodus</em></strong>. Lihtsuse pärast jätame esialgu kõrvale atribuudi. <strong>Iga individuaalne asi või sündmus</strong>, iga eri vorm või kuju, mida realiteet möödaminevalt omaks võtab, <strong>on moodus. Sina, sinu keha, sinu mõtted, sinu seltskond, sinu liik ja sinu planeet, kõik on moodused</strong>; kõik nad on vormid, moodused, peaaegu sõna-sõnalt võttes <strong>"tegumoed"</strong>, milles esineb mingi igavene ning muutumatu realiteet, mis seisab nende taga ja all. (Durant 1937: 80)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tahtsin seda raamatut lugeda osaliselt just selle jaoks, et saada teada, kuidas <em>mode</em> eesti keelde on pandud. Sain siit lõpuks vastuse.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p80ja81"></a>Mis on selleks kõige aluseks olevaks <strong>realiteediks</strong>? Spinoza nimetab seda <strong>substantsiks</strong>, mis sõna-sõnalt tähendab <strong>allseisvat</strong>. Kaheksa põlve on selle mõiste tähenduse pärast võidelnud suuri lahinguid, me ei tarvitse seepärast julgust kaotada, kui meie seletus ei õnnestu kohe esimeses alapeatükis. Ühest eksimusest tuleb igal puhul hoiduda: substants ei tähenda teatud asja ainelist materjali, nagu me näiteks räägime puust <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> kui tooli substantsist. Kui tagasi minna skolastiliste filosoofide juurde, kellelt Spinoza võttis üle selle mõiste, siis selgub, et nad tarvitasid teda kreeka sõna <em><strong>ousia</strong></em> vastena. <em>Ousia</em> on oleviku partitsiip sõnast <em>einai</em> - "olema" ja vihjab sisimale olemisele või olemusele. Substants on seega <strong><em>olev</em></strong> (Spinoza pole unustanud piibli mõjukat "ma olen, kes ma olen"), <strong>see, mis on igavene ja muutumatu ja mille mööduv kuju või moodus on kõik muu</strong>. Spinoza mõistab substantsi all <em>Eetikas</em> umbes sama, mida ta <em>Aru selgitamises</em> mõtles "<strong>igavese korra</strong>" all. Me võime niisiis esialgu osa substantsi-mõiste sisust niiviisi mõista, et substants tähendab <strong>olemise õiget struktuuri, mis on kõigi sündmuste ja asjade aluseks ja moodustab maailma olemuse</strong>. (Durant 1937: 80-81)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Olev.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p81"></a>Edasi aga samastab Spinoza substantsi looduse ja Jumalaga. Nagu skolastikud, nii mõistab temagi loodust kahest vaatekohast, esmalt kui <strong>tegevat ning elulist protsessi</strong>, mida Spinoza nimetab <strong><em>natura naturans</em></strong>'iks "loovaks looduseks" (mis sarnleb H. Bergson'i <em>élan vital</em>'i ja "loova arenguga"), ja teiseks kui <strong>selle protsessi passiivset saadust, <em>natura naturata</em></strong>'t - "loodud loodust", kuhu kuulub looduse materjal ja sisu, ta metsad, tuuled ja põllud ja loendamatud muud väliskujud. Viimases mõttes ta eitab, esimeses mõttes aga jaatab looduse, substantsi ja Jumala samasust. <strong>Substants ja moodused, igavene kord ja ajalik kord, aktiivne loodus ja passiivne loodus, Jumal ja maailm</strong> - kõik need on ühtelangevad ning samatähendavad dihhotoomiad (kaksikjaotused): igaüks neist jagab universumi <strong>olemuseks ja juhuseks</strong>. (Durant 1937: 81)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Substance and accident</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p85"></a>Kuid mis on vaim ja mis on aine? Kas vaim on materiaalne, nagu arvavad mõned fantaasiavaesed inimesed, või on keha ainult kujutlus, nagu oletavad mõned fantaasiarikkad? Kas vaimne protsess on ajuprotsesside põhjus või toime? Või on nad, nagu õpetas Malebranche, omavahel suhteta ja rippumatud üksteist, ainult jumaliku ettenägemise tõttu paralleelsed?<br />Vaim ei ole materiaalne ega mateeria vaimne, vastab Spinoza; ajuprotsessid pole mõtlemisprotsesside põhjus ega toime, ega ole ka mõlemad protsessid rippumatud üksteisest ja paralleelsed. <strong>Sest polegi olemas kaht protsessi ega kaht entiteeti, vaid ainult üks protsess, mis seestpoolt <em>paistab</em> olevat mõtlemine, väljastpoolt liikumine; on ainult üks olemine, mis kord seestpoolt nähtuna on vaim ja väljastpoolt nähtuna on vaim ja väljastpoolt nähtuna mateeria, kuid tõeliselt on mõlema lahutamatu segu ja ühtsus</strong>. Vaim ja keha ei <em>mõju</em> teineteisesse, sest pole mingit "teist"; <em>nad on üks ning sama</em>. "Keha ei saa vaimu mõjutada mõtlema ega vaim keha liikumisse, rahhu või mõnesse muusse olekusse jääma", sel lihtsel põhjusel, "et vaimu otsustus ja keha iha ja determineeritus on üks ning sama asi". <strong>Kogu maailm on niisugune kahepoolne ühtsus; kus iganes on mingi väline "materiaalne" sündmus, seal on see ainult üks külg või aspekt tõelisest sündmusest, mis täielikult nähtuna paistaks sisaldavat niisama hästi sisemist korrelatiivset sündmust, mis mõnesugusel määral on suguluses nende vaimsete protsessidega, mida me näeme iseendas</strong>. Sisemised, "vaimsed" protsessid vastavad igal astmel välistele, "materiaalseile" protsessidele. (Durant 1937: 85)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Muhelesin omaette kui kuulasin mingit veebiloengut ja kõneleja ütles sel teemal, et ka tema ees asuval laual on Spinoza järgi oma "vaim".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p87"></a>Sageli peaks tahteks nimetatud impulsiivset jõudu, mis määrab mingi idee teadvuses püsimise kestuse, nimetame õigemini <em>ihaks</em>, - mis "on inimese olemus ise". Iha on himu või instinkt, millest me oleme teadlikud, kuid instinkt ei pruugi alati toimida teadliku iha kujul. Instinktide taga seisab ebamäärane ning mitmepalgeline <strong><em>enesealalhoiupüüe</em> (<em>conatus sese preservandi</em>)</strong>. Spinoza näeb viimast igal inimlikus ja ka allpool inimlikku seisvas tegevuses, nii nagu hiljem Schopenhauer ja Nietzsche nägid kõiges elutahet või võimutahet. Filosoofide arvamused erinevad harva. (Durant 1937: 87)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Conatus</em> on seega see täitsa rahvapsühholoogiline "enesealalhoiuinstinkt".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p88"></a>Spinoza võrdleb tahtevabadustunnet <strong>kivi</strong> mõttega, et ta <strong>lennates läbi ruumi määrab ise oma tee ja valib kukkumiskoha ja -aja</strong>. (Durant 1937: 88)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Mis mõttes "kes mind viskas"?</em></p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p89"></a>Põhiliselt <strong>on olemas ainult kolm eetika-süsteemi</strong>, kolm käsitust ideaalsest iseloomust ja kõlbelisest elust. Üks neist, <strong>Buddha ja Jeesuse oma, rõhutab naiselikke voorusi</strong>, peab kõiki inimesi samaväarseks, kurjale paneb vastu ainult heaga, samastab voorust armastusega ja poliitikas kaldub piiramatu demokraatia poole. Teine on <strong>Macchiavelli ja Nietzsche eetika, mis rõhutab mehelikke voorusi</strong>, möönab inimeste eriväärsust, kiidab võitluse, vallutamise ja valitsemise ohtusid, identifitseerib voorust võimuga ja ülistab pärilikku aristokraatiat. Kolmas, <strong>Sokratese, Platoni ja Aristotelese eetika</strong>, eitab niihästi naiselike kui ka mehelike vooruste universaalset ning ühekülgset rakendamist; <strong>arvab, et ainult haritud ning küps vaim võib otsustada vastavalt <em>erinevaile</em> olukorrile, millal peab valitsema armastus, millal võim; seega ta samastab voorust mõistusega</strong> ja pooldab valitsuskujuna aristokraatia ja demokraatia muudetavat segu. Spinoza teeneks on, et tema eetika koob mitteteadlikult need näilikult vaenulised filosoofiad harmooniliseks tervikuks ja selle tulemusena annab meile eetilise süsteemi, mis on uusaegse mõtlemise ülimaks saavutiseks. (Durant 1937: 89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See on natuke hirmutav, et loogika on siin triaadiline: 1) armastus; 2) võim; 3) erapooletu mõistus.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p89ja90"></a>"Lõbu on inimese üleminek vähemast täiuslikkusest (täielisusest, täidetud-olemisest) suuremale." "Rõõm seisneb selles, et inimese võim tõuseb." "Norg on inimese üleminek suuremast täiuslikkusest vähemasse. Ma ütlen üleminek; sest rõõm pole täiuslikkus ise: kui näiteks <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> inimene sünniks niisuguse täiuslikkusega, millele ta üle läheb, siis ta oleks [...] ilma rõõmu-afektita. Ja selle vastandi puhul paistab see veel ilmsemalt." Kõik kired on üleminekud, <strong>kõik emotsioonid on "motsioonid" (liikumised) täielisuse ja võimu poole või sellest kaugemale</strong>. (Durant 1937: 89-90)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Lõpuks! Kui palju oleme J-ga selle üle arutlenud... Lõpuks mingi konkreetne kontekst.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p90"></a>"Afektide all mõistan ma keha <strong>modifikatsioone (moendusi)</strong>, mille läbi keha tegutsemisvõime kas suureneb või väheneb, on edendatud või takistatud, ja ühtlasi nende muudatuste ideesid." (Seda afektideteooriat peetakse harilikult James'i või Lange omaks; kuid ta on siin täpsemalt sõnastatud kui kummagi psühholoogi juures ja üllatavalt kooskõlas prof. Cannon'i avastustega.) <strong>Kirg või emotsioon pole iseendast ei hea ega halb, vaid on seda ainult niikaugelt, kui ta suurendab või vähendab meie jõudu</strong>. "Mida enam keegi suudab alal hoida oma olemist ja otsida endale kasulikku, seda suurem on ta voorus." (Durant 1937: 90)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kas <em>mode</em> (moodus) ja <em>modification</em> (moendus) on kaks erinevat asja? "Jõu" vaste on <em>power</em>, st võib lugeda kui "võim".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p91a"></a>Nagu Nietzsche, nii ei oska ka Spinoza palju peale hakata alandlikkusega. Alandlikkus on kas püüdleja variserlus või orja argus; ta tähendab jõu puudumist, aga Spinozale on kõik voorused võimise ja jõu kujud. Seega on kahetsus pigemini pahe kui voorus: "<strong>see, kes kahetseb tegu, on kahekordselt õnnetu ja võimetu</strong>". (Durant 1937: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Millegi pärast meenub üks Fourier'i <em>type of cucoldry</em> - see, kes läbi oma kaasa truuduse üle muretsemise teeb ennast vaimselt kukeks enne kui see tegelikult juhtub.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p91b"></a><strong>Kõrkus teeb inimesed üksteisele piinaks: "kõrk ei kõnele millestki muust kui enda suurtest tegudest ja teiste vigadest"</strong>; talle meeldib viibida endast alamal seisvate inimeste seltskonnas, kes imestavad tema täiuslikke omadusi ja vägitegusid, ja lõpuks langeb ta nende ohvriks, kes teda kõige enam kiidavad, - sest "keegi ei lase end meelitamisega rohkem võita kui kõrk". (Durant 1937: 91)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Psühhofaatiline.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p92"></a>Ta usub, et lihtne on näidata, et viha, võib-olla seepärast, et ta on nii lähedal armastusele, on kergem võita armastusega kui vastuvihkamisega. Sest viha toitub tundest, et talle vastatakse samaga. Teisalt aga keegi, kes vihkab teist ja usub, et see teine teda armastab, langeb armastuse ja viha vahel kõikuvate tundmuste ohvriks, sest armastus sünnitab armastust (nagu Spinoza võib-olla liiga optimistlikult arvab). Sel viisil viha laostub ja kaotab oma jõu. Kes vihkab, tunnustab oma alaväärsust ja hirmu; me ei vihka vaenlast, keda usume kindlasti võita suutvat. "Kes ülekohut tahab kätte tasuda vihaga, elab viletsuses. Kes aga seevastu püüab viha võita armastusega, võitleb rõomsalt ja eneseusaldusega; ta paneb vastu niisama hästi ühele kui mitmele inimesele ja vaevalt vajab üldse õnne abi. Need, keda ta võidab, alistuvad rõõmsalt." <strong>"Vaime ei võideta relvade, vaid hingelise suuruse abil."</strong> Niisuguseis kohtades Spinoza paistab nägevat midagi sellest valgusest, mis säras Galilea künkail. (Durant 1937: 92)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sellest võib-olla ka Stapledoni pateetiline, võiks isegi öelda <em>cringy</em> seik, kus inglased eelistaksid ise hävineda kuiet prantslastele vastu astuda: "<u>It would be better even that a great people should be destroyed than that the whole race should be thrown into turmoil</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/last-and-first-men.html#stapledon37p20ja21">Stapledon 1937: 20-21</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p96"></a>Võib-olla õpetab determinism meile isegi "intellektuaalset jumalaarmastust", milles me rõõmsalt lepime loodusseadustega ja leiame oma soovide täidumist nende piires. Kes kõiki asju näeb determineerituna, see ei või kurta, kuigi ta võib avaldada vastupanu sündmustele, sest <strong>ta tajub asju "teatud igaviku-aspekti all"</strong>. (Durant 1937: 96)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sain nüüd teada kuidas ka seda eesti keelde tõlgitakse.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p97"></a>Meie individuaalne eraldumine on ju ka tõepoolest teatud mõttes illusoorne, sest me oleme osakesed suures seaduste ja põhjuste voolus, Jumala osakesed; me oleme mingi olemise mööduvad kujud, mis on suurem kui meie ja lõpmatu, kuna meie sureme. <strong>Meie keha on rakuke rassi kehas, meie rass on väike üksikjuhtum elu draamas</strong>; meie vaim on igavese valguse heitlik loit. (Durant 1937: 97)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Nagu Stapledoni loeks.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p98"></a>Niisuguse terviku niisuguste osadena me oleme surematud. "<strong>Inimese hing ei saa täiesti hävida koos kehaga, vaid midagi säilib temast, mis on igavene</strong>." See on see osa meis, mis taipab asju <em>sub specie aeternitatis;</em> ja mida enam me asju tunnetame sel teel, seda "igavesem" on meie mõtlemine. Spinoza väljendub siin veel hämaramalt kui muidu ja ta keel kõneleb, kommentaatorite lõpmatuist seletustest hoolimata, erinevaile vaimele erinevat. Mõnikord tahaks uskuda, et ta arvab <strong>George Eliot's "surematust hea kuulsuse kaudu"</strong>, mille järgi meie mõtlemisest ja elust ratsionaalseim ning ilusaim elab edasi ja mõjub peaaegu igavesti. (Durant 1937: 98)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Surematud on need, kellede nimesid me teame.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p99"></a>Selle pühaliku ning lootusrikka heliga lõpeb <em>Eetika</em>. Harva on sisaldanud mingi raamat nii palju mõtteid ja sigitanud nii palju kommentaare, jäädes seejuures edasi vastukäivate seletuste võitlusväljaks. Ta metafüüsika võib olla vigane, psühholoogia puudulik, teoloogia mitterahuldav ja tume - aga raamatu <strong>hingest, vaimust ja olemusest</strong> ei saa keegi, kes teda on lugenud, rääkida teisiti kui austavalt. (Durant 1937: 99)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kehast sai olemus.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p100"></a>Inimeste keskel muutub aga loomulik võimukord õiguste moraalseks korraks, sest ühised hädad kutsuvad välja <strong>vastastikuse abi</strong>. "Ja et kõigil inimestel on hirm üksilduse ees, sest et keegi pole üksikuna küllalt tugev enese kaitsmiseks ja elu paratamatute nõuete rahuldamiseks, siis kalduvad inimesed loomu poolest ühiskondliku organisatsiooni poole." Inimesed pole aga loomu poolest ette valmistatud vastastikuseks üksteise arvestamiseks, mida nõuab ühiskondlik kord; <strong>alles hädaoht sünnitab ühenduse, mis järk-järgult toidab ja kõvendab sotsiaalseid instinkte</strong>: "Inimesed aga ei sünni kodanikena, vaid saavad nendeks." (Durant 1937: 100)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Mutual aid</em>. Järjekordne asi mida korratakse kajastustes nii sageli, et tekib kahtlus kas algtekstis võib olla rohkem nüansse, mis neisse kajastustesse ei jõua.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p101"></a>Vabadus on riigi eesmärgiks, sest riigi ülesandeks on soodustada kasvamist ja kasvamine oleneb vabast <strong>laialdumisruumist</strong>. (Durant 1937: 101)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Lebensraum</em>?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p102ja103"></a>"Vabas vabariigis haritakse kunste ja teadusi kõige paremini, kui igale soovijale lubatakse õpetada avalikult, omal kulul ja riisikol." <strong>Spinoza ideaaliks oli nähtavasti</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>niisugune kõrgem kasvatus, mis kord õitses Kreekamaal, haridus, mis poleks saadud mingist asutisest, vaid vabadelt indiviididelt - "sofistidelt"</strong> -, kes rändasid linnast linna ja õpetasid olenemata avalikust kui ka eraviisilisest järelevalvest. (Durant 1937: 102-103)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Midagi taolist on loomulikul viisil taastekkinud meie tehnoloogilisel ajastul - vt Youtube'i loengud ja ettekanded, mida vaatavad-kuulavad palju rohkemad kui inimesi mahuks klassiruumi või staadionile.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p103"></a>Selle demokraatia sõjaliseks aluseks on üldine väeteenistus. <strong>Kodanikel peaksid olema relvad ka rahuajal</strong>. (Durant 1937: 103)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Millega peaksid kaasnema väljaõpe ja registreerimine, mitte, et igaüks võib paarisaja dollariga jalutada supermarketisse ja sealt välja automaatpüssiga.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p104a"></a>"Spinoza ei tahtnud rajada koolkonda ega rajanudki"; kuid <strong>kogu filosoofia pärast teda on läbi imbunud tema mõtteist</strong>. Selle inimpõlve juures, kes elas pärast ta surma, oli Spinoza nimi põlguses; isegi Hume kõneles ta "jõledaist" hüpoteesidest. "Spinozast kõneldi kui surnud koerast," ütles Lessing. (Durant 1937: 104)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kelle "puhast mõtet" Kanti kritiseeris?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p104b"></a>Mõni aasta hiljem juhtisid <strong>Herder'i <em>Einige Gespräche über Spinozas System</em> (Mõned kõnelused Spinoza süsteemi üle)</strong> liberaalsete teoloogide tähelepanu Spinoza <em>Eetikale</em>. Selle koolkonna juht <em>Schleiermacher</em> kirjutas "pühast, ekskommunitseeritud Spinozast", katoliiklik luuletaja <em>Novalis</em> nimetas teda "jumalast joobunud meheks". (Durant 1937: 104)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Huvitavamaist huvitavaim. Vt ka artikleid nagu "Kant's critique of Herder's Spinozism".</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p105"></a>Spinozat <em>Kant</em>'i tunnetusteooriaga ühendades jõudsid <strong><em>Fichte, Schelling</em> ja <em>Hegel</em></strong> oma mitmesuguseile panteistlikele õpetustele. <em>Conatus sese preservandi</em>'st, enesealalhoiu-tungist kasvas välja <strong>Fichte "mina", <em>Schopenhaueri</em> "elutahe", Nietzsche "võimutahe" ja <em>Bergsoni</em> <em>élan vital</em></strong>. Hegel laitis Spinoza süsteemi kui liiga elutut ja kivinenut. Ta unustas sealjuures selle dünaamilise elemendi ja mõtles ainult suurepärast kontseptsiooni Jumalast kui seadusest, mille ta võttis oma süsteemi "absoluutse mõistusena". Kuid ta oli küllalt aus, kui ta ütles: "Et olla filosoof, peab kõigepealt olema spinozist." (Durant 1937: 105)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kogu Saksa Valgustuse kupatus.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="durant37p106"></a>Võib oletada, et ka filosoof Spenceri "tundmatu"-mõiste on pärit Spinozalt. "<strong>Pole puudust silmapaistvaist kaasaeglastest</strong>", ütleb Belfort Bax, "<strong>kes arvavad, et Spinozas sisaldub kogu moodse teaduse küllus</strong>." (Durant 1937: 106)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väited, väited.</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-25359954332298044632023-08-17T13:40:00.002-07:002023-08-27T05:26:44.808-07:00Teatav sümbolese<!-- Teatav sümbolese
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#j6este05">Jõeste, Kristi 2005. Kihnu kört semiootika objektina. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 169-183.</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kotov05">Kotov, Kaie 2005. Kultuur, identiteet ja enesekirjeldus. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 184-192.</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#remm05">Remm, Tiit 2005. Linna representeerimisest piltpostkaartidel. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 193-203.</a></li><!--s[
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--><h4><a id="j6este05"></a>Jõeste, Kristi 2005. Kihnu kört semiootika objektina. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 169-183.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p170"></a><strong>Etnosemiootika on</strong> kõige lühemalt öeldes <strong>edasivaatamine etnograafiast kui distsipliinist</strong>. Milles aga seisneb etnograafia piiratus, et selle raames ei saa otsida küsimustele ammendavaid vastuseid? Eesti etnograafia on pikka aega tegelenud põhiliselt artefaktide uurimisega läbi vormi ja konstruktsiooni (Manninen 1927; Kurrik 1938; Moora 1957; Voolmaa 1971; Kaarma, Voolmaa 1981). <strong>Alles viimase deakaadi vältel on hakatud rõhutama esemete sotsiaalse mõõtme - inimese ja eseme vahelise interaktsiooni - uurimise vajadust</strong> ning seda ellu viima. On jõutud arusaamisele, et eseme väliseed omadused ei pruugi otseselt viidata funktsioonidele ja tähendustele. Eseme ja selle kasutaja käitumine on üksteisega tihedalt seotud, <strong>esemed on lõimitud meie tegevusse ning see suhe loob vastastikuse sõltuvusvahekorra eseme ja kasutaja vahel</strong>, esemed võimaldavad meie tegevusele tähendust anda või end identifitseerida. Etnograafiast on saanud etnoloogia, mis astub vormikirjeldusest sammu edasi - lisaks sellele tegeldakse ka samade esemete ideelisuse uurimise ja veelgi kaugemale minnes võrdlemisega teistest kultuuridest pärinevaga. (Jõeste 2005: 170)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Esemesemiootika.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p171a"></a>Etnosemiootika "isadeks" on tagantjärele tituleeritud Charles Saunders Peirce ja Charles Morris, kuid väidetavalt on mõjutusi saadud ka prantsuse strukturalismist (Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Greimas) ning inglise sümboolsest antropoloogiast (Firth, Newall, leach, Sperber) (Hoppál 1983: 76). <strong>Vähem tähtsaks ei peeta ka Tartu koolkonna, eeskätt selle rajaja Juri Lotmani vaateid, kuivõrd neid on võimalik rakendada peaaegu ükskõik millise kultuurisfääri kontekstis</strong>. (Jõeste 2005: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Kuivõrd</em>...</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p171b"></a>Hoppál rõhutab, et kui sotsiaalantropoloogia määratleb kommunikatsioonis adressandi/adressaadi, sotsiaalpsühholoogia aga keskendub kodeerimisele/dekodeerimisele, siis <strong>rahvuslik või rahvalik traditsioon</strong>, mida uurivad folkloristika ja etnograafia/etnoloogia, <strong>on peamiselt manifesteeritud sõnumis</strong> (Voigt 1994: 236). Sõnumi tähendus leitakse, kui määratletakse selles sisalduva koodi elemendid ehk märgid, seejärel nendevahelised suhted (süntaktika), nende semantiline dimensioon, ning lõpuks koodi pragmaatika, kasutus, mis avaldub inimeste käitumises uskumuste ja kommetena (samas). (Jõeste 2005: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Me ei uuri siin kodeerimist ega dekodeerimist. Me uurime koodis sisalduvaid elemente ja kuidas neid kasutatakse. — Me siin ei kõnni. Me hoopis kasutame oma jalgu, et liigutada oma keha.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p171c"></a>Pragmaatilise etnosemiootika (etnosemiootika on Vilmos Voigti [1994: 236] järgi ja Morrisest lähtudes jaotatakse omakorda semantiliseks, süntaktiliseks ja pragmaatiliseks osaks) näitena on nimetatud Pjotr Bogatõrjovi <strong><em>Moraavia-Slovakkia rahvariiete funktsioone</em></strong> (ingl. k 1971, originaalkeeles 1937), mis käsitleb spetsiifilise märgisüsteemi, s.o antud regiooni rahvariiete funktsioone ja kasutusi (Voigt 1994: 236). See rahvariideanalüüsi meetodi klassikaline näide on oma tunnuste järgi strukturalistlik ning inspireeritud paljusid hilisemaid uurijaid, kes on tegelenud riietuse käsitlustega (nt Enninger 1992; kaudselt Yoder 1972). (Jõeste 2005: 171)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Märgin eestikeelse pealkirja üles, sest Bogatõrjov on juba varem ja ilmselt ka edaspidi käib siit regulaarselt läbi (vt nt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/kosmiline-kood.html#randviirsebeok01p21ja22">Randviir; Sebeok 2001: 21-22</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p172"></a>"Protsessi, kus miski esineb märgina, võib nimetada semioosiks" (Morris 1971: 9) ja "märk on miski, mis viitab millelegi muule" (samas). Kui riietust peetakse märgiks, siis ei tähista ta lihtsalt praktilist asemiootilist eset, vaid <strong>viitab lisaks</strong> utilitaarsele ja <strong>kuuluvust tähistavale funktsioonile</strong> - kihnu kört on riietusese, mida kannavad kihnu naised - <strong>veel mingile muule tähendusele</strong>. Tavaliselt seostubki eestlastele Kihnu saarega kihnu naiste erisugune riietus (öeldakse 'rahvariie'), mis väljendub üle saja aasta muutumatu kujuga säilinud seeliku ehk kördi kandmises (vt foto 1). Veelgi tavalisem on, et muid riietuseosi ei teata nimetada. <strong>Punane pikitriibuline seelik on mandrieestlastele esmaseid sotsiokultuurilisi märke kihnlusest</strong>. Mida see märk täiendavalt tähendab (ese kui märk, mis tähistab kandja sotsiaalset staatust ning seoseid kombestikuga), seda teavad vaid asjasse pühendatud huvilised ja kihnlased ise. Seepärast võib öelda, et kihnu kördil võib olla ka sümboli staatus. <strong>Minu eesmärk ongi siinkohal tutvustada teadaolevaid kõrvaltähendusi, <em>mis viitavad</em> kihnu kördi puhul <em>millelegi muule</em> kui ainult praktilisele funktsioonile või kohaidentiteediga seonduvale</strong>. (Jõeste 2005: 172)</blockquote><!--
--><p>1) utilitaarne; 2) sotsiokultuurilist kuuluvust tähistav; 3) sümboolne?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p177"></a><em>Kipsuga kört</em>. (Nimetus 'kipsuga kört' paistab olevat viimase dekaadi leiutis, sest <strong>üks 78-aastane kihnu memm ei olnud sellisest nimetusest midagi kuulnud</strong>. Tema kasutas nimetust <em>natukõ punanõ</em>. Siinkirjutajale ei ole teada, mida tähendab sõna 'kips', vahest on see tuletatud sõnast 'kriips'? Need kihnu naised, keda küsitlesin, ei osanud samuti seletada.) Punaseid ja roosasid triipe on sellises kördis vähe ja need on reeglina kitsad, kördi põhitoon on tumesinine. Riipsusid eraldavad endiselt must ja tumesinine laiem triip, mille vahel on valged <em>ambad</em>. (Jõeste 2005: 177)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Riipsud, ambad, naaritsemine, kullitu, värgel, jne. Siin peaks selgelt juba Õige Eesti Keele Selts sekkuma.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p178"></a><strong>Kui märki luuakse ja kasutatakse interpreteerijate poolt selleks, et enda kohta mingit informatsiooni edastada</strong>, s.t märgil on nii individuaalne kui sotsiaalne väärtus, <strong>siis on tegemist semioosi pragmaatilise dimensiooniga</strong> (Morris 1971: 50-51). Sealjuures peab aga märgi kasutaja teadma, kuidas märki kodeerida mingi eluperioodi või konkreetse olukorra tähistamiseks. Seega reaalses elus on üsna keerukas teha vahet süntaktikal, semantikal ja pragmaatikal, sest need on omavahel alati suhestatud. (Jõeste 2005: 178)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Tundub esmapilgul üsna ebastandardne pragmaatikamääratlus - just see "enda kohta". Kas keelevälisele reaalsusele, mis kõnelejasse ega kuulajasse ei puutu, ei ole pragmaatiline?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p179a"></a>Nii inimese eluiga, tema sotsiaalne staatus (abielus-vallaline, rikas-vaene), kui ka erilised sundmused, nagu pulm, matus, kirikupühad jne, leiavad kajastamist vastavas riietuses. <strong>Kui kandmisreeglite vastu eksitakse, panevad eriti vanemad naised seda pahaks ega hoia sel juhul hurjutavaid sõnu kokku</strong>. Nõnda peavad kõik kihnu naised oskama kihnu körtide keelt kasutada, et 600-liikmelises kogukonnas rahumeelselt ja edukalt toime tulla. Näiteks on tragimatel naistel aidas riidekirstus 20-30 körti igaks elujuhtumiks varuks (see arv võib mõnel juhul ulatuda isegi 50-ni), lisaks veel tütardele kootud kördid (riideait oli kuni viimase ajani Kihnus ainus taluhoone, mida lukus hoiti, kaasajal lukustatakse turist-varaste kartuses enamasti siiski kõik hooned, kui elatakse käidavate teede läheduses). (Jõeste 2005: 179)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kui kannad valesid riipsusid siis saad memmedelt verbaalselt üle küüru.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p179b"></a><em>Punast körti</em> hakatakse Kihnus kandma tüdrukueast peale ja kantakse umbes 55-60-aastaseni juhul, kui enne leseks ei jääda. <stronG>Sealjuures tohivad noored vallalised tüdrukud kasutada körte, milles on rohkem roosasid triipe kui täiskasvanud abielunaistel</strong> (kes peavad lisaks kandma põlle oma staatuse märgina). Kihnus viibides torkas mulle ka silma, et noored kördid on üldiselt erksamad ja kirjumad, tundub, et nende kördi <em>riipsud</em> on kitsamad ja triiburohkemad. (Jõeste 2005: 179)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Võib-olla mingi universaal. Meenub ähmaselt, et Jaapani kultuuris tähistab roosa värv vallalisust.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="j6este05p179c"></a>Kui aga punane kört ilmutab kulumise märke või hakkab selle mood aeguma, siis tarvitatakse seda argipäevasena (tänapäeval küll peamiselt külmadel aastaaegadel ja kodunt välja minnes, ainult vanainimesed kannavad oma noorusaegadele truuks jäädes aasta läbi villaseid körte). Kördi eluiga lõpeb aga kartulipõllul <em>roomates</em> või mõne muu musta töö juures. Sellisel juhul pole midagi imelikku, kui körti kantakse koos dressipükstega või kantakse kartuleid korjates mitut körti korraga (peal töökörti, all tavalist körti - <strong>juhul kui keegi möödujatest tuleb juttu ajama, siis lastakse töökört alla</strong>). (Jõeste 2005: 179)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väga praktiline värk.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kotov05"></a>Kotov, Kaie 2005. Kultuur, identiteet ja enesekirjeldus. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 184-192.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p184"></a>Igasuguse semiootilise süsteemi dünaamika kirjeldamisel muutub keskseks küsimus: "Kuidas saab süsteem areneda, säilitades samas oma identiteedi?" (Lotman 2001: 9). <strong>Enesekirjeldustes sõnastatud identiteet on loomuldasa normatiivne, vastandudes alati teatud määral kultuuris esilekerkivatele uuendustele</strong>. Ometi on sellisel viisil sõnastatud identiteet kultuuri jaoks ontoloogiliselt tähtis: see piiritleb ja korrastab kogu kultuurisfääri, määratledes samal ajal kultuuri asendi teiste kultuuride suhtes. Kultuurilise identiteedi ja kultuuri identiteedi uurija jaoks muutub aga oluliseks teinegi poolus: <strong>protsessid kultuuris, mis jäävad enesekirjeldustest välja või on marginaliseeritud</strong>. Üks võimalus neid kahte poolust ühildada on käsitleda identiteediloomet mudeliloomena ning <strong>eristada</strong> seejuures <strong>identiteediprotsessi ja enesekirjeldusi</strong> kui identiteediloome kahte vastandlikku, kuid teineteisega vältimatult seotud poolust. (Kotov 2005: 184)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Protsess ja struktuur. Enesekirjeldusel on kalduvus konservatiivsusele, läägib natuke tagalikest arengutest ja hetkeolukorrast maas.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p185"></a>Kaasaegne identiteediteooria on peaaegu täielikult loobunud modernistlikust arusaamast, mis käsitleb identiteeti stabiilse, kindlapiirilise, korrastatu ja eneseküllasena. Selle asemel <strong>Rõhutatakse identiteedi dünaamilisust, dialoogilisust ning, sageli, efemeersust</strong>. Tähelepanu fookusesse on nihkunud <strong>identiteetide paljusus, identiteedi pihustumine, "tühi identiteet"</strong>, võimalike identiteetide konstrueerimine sarnaselt võimalike maailmade loomisega ning identiteet kui identiteediloome, kui protsess, teisisõnu: <strong>identiteedi dünaamika</strong>. Kõrvuti nihkega identiteediteoorias hakkas 1980. aastate teisel poolel antropoloogias üha laiemalt levima seisukoht, et kultuuri mõiste pärsib komplekssete ühiskondade dünaamika uurimist (vt Barth 1988, Hannerz 1992, Friedman 1994, Appadurai 1996): <strong>kultuur mõistena eeldab teatud ühtsust ja homogeensust, kultuur nähtusena ei vasta sellele ootusele peaaegu mitte kunagi</strong>. Mis ühel tasandil moodustab ühtse kultuuri, see avaneb teisel tasandil kultuuride kooslusena, mille nimetamiseks ja mõistmiseks <strong>on vaja hoopis liigendusterikkamat kirjelduskeelt</strong>. Nii ühendab identiteedi mõiste ja kultuuri mõistega seotud arutelusid üks küsimus: kuidas kirjeldada staatika ja dünaamika ning heterogeensuse ja homogeensuse vahekorda. Seesuguse kirjelduse ühe võimaliku lähtekoha pakub Juri Lotmani käsitlus semiosfäärist (Lotman 1990, 1999a, 2001). (Kotov 2005: 185)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ühtses tervikus on ikkagi palju erinevaid osi. Permanentne dünaamiline sünkroonia? Lõhume kultuuri monoliitsuse hüpoteesi jne.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p185"></a>Raamatus <em>Kultuur ja plahvatus</em> kirjeldab Lotman kultuurisüsteemi arengudünaamikat plahvatuse ja stabiilse arengu perioodide vaheldumisena ajalooprotsessis: ühed tagavad uuenduslikkuse, teised järjepidevuse (Lotman 2001: 24). <strong>Nii indiviidi kui kultuuri tegelik identiteet kujuneb kommunikatsiooni ja mälu, reaalse kultuuriprotsessi ja enesekirjelduse vahelises pingeväljas</strong>. (Kotov 2005: 185)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Isiksuse ja kultuuri isomorfism: mõlema enesekuvand pendeldab ideaali ja reaalsuse vahel.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p185ja186"></a>Analüüsides kultuurilise identiteedi kujunemist ja selle manifestatsioone kultuuritekstides, <strong>peame</strong> seetõttu <strong>tegema vahet</strong> (1) individuaalse ja kollektiivse ning (2) <strong>tegeliku ja deklareeritud identiteedi vahel</strong>. Seejuures on enesekirjeldustes väljendatud (ehk deklareeritud) <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>kollektiivne identiteet</strong> käsitletav <strong>kultuuritegelikkuse</strong> diakroonilist ja sünkroonilist mõõdet <strong>korrastava ja liigendava instrumendina</strong>. Just kultuuri enesekirjeldustes, deklareeritud identiteedis, avaldub eriti selgelt "<strong>enesenimetamise agressioon</strong>": kultuuriruum on ni sünkroonselt kui ajalooliselt "mitmetahuline", heterogeenne ja teatud määral amorfne, selged piirid ja teatava uhtlustusastme saab kultuur alles enesekirjeldustes (Lotman 2001: 195). (Kotov 2005: 185-186)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See eristus, mille tõttu sellele artiklile võrdlemisi sageli viidatakse.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p186"></a>Identiteediloome on semiootiline protsess, mille käigus individuaalses ja kultuurimälus sisalduvad (sageli üksteisele vastanduvad) samastumisvõimalused ühendatakse arusaamaks iseendast suhtes ümbritsevaga. Identiteet sünnib dialoogis teisega, ning olles seotud piiride ülitamise ja piiride tõmbamisega, ei ole identiteet kunagi ühemõõtmeline, vaid kujutab endast pigem samastumisvõimaluste võrgustikku, kelle suhtes ja kelle jaoks end määratletakse. <strong>Identiteet on seega piirinähtus, olles seotud piiride tõmbamise ja ületatamisega dialoogisituatsioonis</strong>. Veelgi enam, piirinähtusena on identiteet ise dialoogi ruum. Nii on identiteet, eriti kultuuriline identiteet, dünaamiline, polüvalentne, seesmiselt mitmekesine ning asümmeetriline - <strong>samastumisvõimaluste võrgustikud, milles identiteet moodustub, ei ole omavahel üksüheses vastavuses</strong>. Mida komplekssem on avatum on kultuurisüsteem, seda keerukam on samastumisvõimaluste võrgustik, mille sees ja mille suhtes identiteet kujuneb ning sageli pole meil põhjust kõneleda mitte identiteedist, vaid identiteetidest. (Kotov 2005: 186)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Piirisemiootika. "Samastumisvõimaluste võrgustik" kõlab jube hästi.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p188ja189"></a>Enamasti tekib vajadus "uue" või uuesti sõnastatud identiteedi järele siis, kui kultuuri asend kultuurisuhete võrgustikus kas kultuurisiseste või -väliste tegurite mõjul muutub. Selle ajendiks võivad olla lokaalsed <strong>murrutused</strong> (varem terviksüsteemi osana tajutud kultuurisfäär nõuab endale <strong>isemääratlemisõigus</strong>t - olgu selleks kultuuriline, <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> poliitiline või semiootiline autonoomia); enamasti on aga identiteediloome ja enesekirjelduste intensiivistumine seotud väliste mõjutustega: (1) teatud poliitiline ja majanduslik surve, surve kultuurile, rääkimata otsesest sõjalisest ohust; (2) dialoogi hoogustumine, uute kultuurikontaktide tekkimine, kehtivate kultuuri- ja võimusuhete muutumine globaalses kultuurisüsteemis toimuvate muutuste tagajärjel; (3) <strong>kommunikatsioonivõrgu muutumine uute meediumide najal</strong>. Ajal, mil me räägime võrgustuvast ühiskonnast, muutub just viimane aspekt eriti oluliseks, kuna <strong>uued meediatehnoloogiad on muutunud kommunikatsiooni kiireks ja odavaks</strong>. Infovahetuse kiirenemine eri kogukondade vahel suurendab sotsiaalset paindlikkust, kuid <strong>vähendab kogukonna-sisest sidusust</strong> (Benedikt 1995: 42). (Kotov 2005: 188-189)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ajalehti ei loeta, televiisorit ei vaadata; igaühe sotsiaalmeediasööt on individuaalne ja ühised kultuuritekstilised pidepunktid muutuvad üha harvemaks.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kotov05p189ja190"></a>1919. aasta maareform lõi aluse territoriaalsusele ja <strong>kultuurilisele identiteedile, mis on seotud väikepõllumajanduse, külaühiskonna ja talupojakujuga</strong>, mida pühitseb ka Tammsaare <em>Tõde ja õigus</em>. <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> Rahvuslik suurtööstus ei jõudnudki aga enne 1940. aastat lõplikult välja kujuneda ning selle tõttu <strong>puudub nostalgilises omamüüdis töölise kuju</strong>. See on aga vaid üks fragment komplekssest probleemist, mis on seotud siia sisserännanud, peamiselt suurtööstises tööd leidnud ning kauaks ajaks võõra keele ja võõra kultuuri kandjaks jäänud elanikkonnaga. <strong>Tööliskultuur ongi eestlaste jaoks seotud ennekõike "võõra"</strong> (ehkki Eestis elava) <strong>elanikkonnaga, keda aga ei soovita omaks võtta. Keda ei olegi võimalik omaks võtta, kuna eesti sümbolsüsteemis puudub vastav kategooria</strong>. Ida-Virumaa oma (juba Eesti eelmise iseseisvusperioodi ajal rajatud) kaevanduste, suurtööstuse ning stalinistliku linnasüdametega ei ole jäänud seega mitte ainult keelelisse ja territoriaalsesse isolatsiooni - need eristused võimenduvad lisaks majanduslike ja sotsiaalpoliitiliste tegurite survel, rääkimata käitumuslikest erinevustest ja kultuuritaustast, mis varieerub märgatavalt juba ka kohaliku venekeelse elanikkonna sees. (Kotov 2005: 189-190)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Eestlane ei ole oma enesekuvandis kunagi olnud "tööline" (proletariaat). Me tulime otse põllult arvuti taha.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="remm05"></a>Remm, Tiit 2005. Linna representeerimisest piltpostkaartidel. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 193-203.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p193"></a>Järgnevalt püüan selgitada, <strong>kuidas linna representeerimisega postkaartidel luuakse <em>kujutelma</em></strong> (omalaadset visuaalset, tähenduslikku ning orientatiivset kujutluspilti) <strong>Linnast</strong>. Linnateemalised postkaardid on ühelt poolt olemasoleva kujutelma väljenduseks, teisalt aga uute kujutelmade loojaks ja kujundajaks. (Remm 2005: 193)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Oleks olnud kasulik ühele <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/06/linnade-visuaalne-identiteet.html">linnade visuaalse identiteedi</a> uurijale.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p194"></a>Postkaardid, mis osalevad linnakujutelma loomises, on ka ise kellegi poolt loodud; nii loomist kui hilisemat kasutamist saab paigutada teatavasse järjestusse, mis moodustab postkaardi elutsükli. Postkaardi elutsükli kirjeldamine <strong>lähtub Jurgen Rueschi</stronG> (Ruesch 1972) <strong>käsitlusest <em>sümbolsüsteemide loomise</em> kohta</strong>. Sümbolsüsteemide loomine on Rueschi käsitluses teadvustatum ja eesmärgipärasem kui Bergeri ja Luckmanni käsitluse <em>reaalsuse konstrueerimine</em>, ent neis on ka palju sarnasusi. Ruesch kirjeldab selgepiiriliste <em>sümbolsüsteemide</em> loomist ja arengut. Postkaartide abil loodav linnakujutelm on otsesemalt seostatav <em>reaalsuse</em> ja selle konstrueerimisega Bergeri ja Luckmanni käsitluses, ent postkaart ise kui representeerimise vahend on kirjeldatav just Rueschi <em>sümbolsüsteemina</em>. (Remm 2005: 194)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ootamatu Ruesch. Viidatud on artiklile "The Social Control of Symbolic Systems" (<a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2014/09/semiotic-approaches-to-human-relations.html#ruesch67c">1971[1967]</a>)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p195"></a>Kolmandas staadiumis kasutatakse postkaarti saadud kirjana - seda saab <strong>lugeda/vaadata, säilitada ja hävitada</strong>. Säilitamine või balgatada uue tsükli, kus postkaarti kasutatakse kollektsioneeritava esemena. (Remm 2005: 195)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ühes semiootiaartiklis arhivaarindusest (mille märkmed siia kahjuks ei jõudnud) olen juba kohanud seda vastet kontakti saavutamisele, ülalhoidmisele ja lõpetamisele, mida säilikute kogumine, talletamine ja eemaldamine endast kujutab.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p197"></a>Kompositsiooni osaks võib olla ka mitme väikese vaatepildi koosesinemine postkaardil - nii tekib omalaadne <strong>koostähistamine</strong>, milles terviklikust üksikvaatest suurem roll on objektide kooskujutamisel tekkivatel omavahelistel suhetel. Sellises kompositsioonis väheneb üksikute vaadete fotolik kontinuaalsus ning vaated toimivad pigem üksiku objekti tähistajate kui pidev ruumi kujutajatena. (Remm 2005: 197)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="http://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/08/liigendusloogika.html#veidemann01p258">Terviktähendus</a>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p198"></a><strong>Denotatiivne on üks peamisi märgilisi funktsioone, millesse vaatepostkaartidel olevad objektid ennekõik seatud on</strong>. Teine, samuti levinud, on ruumis ja ajas määratlemine (indeksiaalne) - objekt viitab ruumilisele ja ajalisele asukohale linnaruumis, kuhu asetada kujutatud vaade; kuid samuti viitab ta vaate laiemale kultuurilisele asetusele, seostades kaarti kultuuri erinevate valdkondade ja väärtustega. (Remm 2005: 198)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sõnajärjekord nagu mõnes sajaaastavanuses saksa tõlketekstis.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p198"></a>Piktograafiline kujutamisviis on seotud vaatekaartidega, kuivõrd sarnaselt nendega on siin välja valitud teatav <strong>sümbolese</strong>, ent selle representeerimine toimub suurema tinglikkusega, esitades üksnes objekti väheseid valitud omadusi. (Remm 2005: 198)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Leidsin postitusele pealkirja.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p200"></a>Vaadeldes postkaardile trükitud tekste (ja jättes kõrvale postiteenusest tulenevad), leiame linnateemalistelt postkaartidelt peamiselt <em>identifitseerivas, <strong>kontakti loovas</strong>, õnne soovivas, autorsusele viitavas</em> ja <em>kommenteerivas</em> <strong>funktsioonis</strong> tekste. Lisaks neile võib välja tuua teksti ornamentaalse kasutamise (kompositsioonielemendina). Kõik need tekstitüübid mõjutavad ka linna representeerimist, määratledes pildiliselt kujutatut (ja sellele tähendusi lisades) ning samuti linna kui postkaardi tähistatavat. (Remm 2005: 200)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Huvitav, kelle vahel piltpostkaardi sisu kontakti loob. Lugeja ja kultuuritraditsiooni?</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p201a"></a>Identifitseerivad tekstid viitavad kohale ruumis (linnale) ja pildil kujutatud objektile. Eelkõige just lakoonilise identifitseeriva funktsiooniga kaasneb sageli kujutatu täpsem kultuurilis-hinnanguline paigutamine, nagu näiteks Tartut <em>Muusadelinnaks</em> ja Ülikooli tänavat <em>Rahatänavaks</em> nimetades. <strong>Kontaktiloovad kirjad on enamasti "tervitusi Tartust" tüüpi</strong>; kui on mainitud ka kohanimi, sisaldab selline lausung ka identifitseeritavat funktsiooni. <strong>Tervitamine ise on teatud määral lähedane õnne soovimisele</strong>, kuid on siiski kitsamalt kontakti loov. Õnne soovivad kirjad esinevad sageli kujul "Häid pühi!". (Remm 2005: 201)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kontakti loovad tervitused <em>kui žanr</em>.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="remm05p201b"></a>Samuti on võimalik üht objekti nimetada erinevalt ja seega esitada eri objektidena (vrd <em>Universitäts Bibliothek</em>, <em>Domruine</em> ja Tartu Toomkirik). Erisus on siin eelkõige objektide <strong>tähenduslikus väljas - kultuuris</strong> (ja kitsamalt kujutelmas) olemises, mitte niivõrd ühe materiaalse linnaobjekti mitmena esitlemises; kuigi ka see tegevus teatud määral toimub. (Remm 2005: 201)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kultuur kui tähenduslik väli. Nagu põld, millel võib oodata suurt tähendusesaaki.</p><!-- pooleli 204 -->Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-9919031621645463592023-08-17T13:29:00.000-07:002023-08-17T13:29:18.881-07:00A Godlike Race<!-- A Godlike Race
Papers,Lang: English,Source: WEB,Literature,Stapledonia
--><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhR9Z3PCQxrm4OCoSAoV31ndmGjEezZFeIkDAfdkc0-3UnnMEKH61dVko-0FBEh1ytF5q_R7rWO6S2Q4RrpLRknkIEqWpFqUimMdENQv6Vy5aFaI18yCUFTCSKMzGQP4z9XBl0dvOMnNN3r3ob8ary8pE0tqJarvuTjPwmuxrVBkC38fIW7AO_pQicTaEQc/s1024/jja_pilt_sdxl_stapledonia_009.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1024" data-original-width="1024" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhR9Z3PCQxrm4OCoSAoV31ndmGjEezZFeIkDAfdkc0-3UnnMEKH61dVko-0FBEh1ytF5q_R7rWO6S2Q4RrpLRknkIEqWpFqUimMdENQv6Vy5aFaI18yCUFTCSKMzGQP4z9XBl0dvOMnNN3r3ob8ary8pE0tqJarvuTjPwmuxrVBkC38fIW7AO_pQicTaEQc/s320/jja_pilt_sdxl_stapledonia_009.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><!--
--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#bailey76">Bailey, 1976. Some comments on science fiction</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#cole73">Cole 1973. The Evolutionary Fantasy</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#bailey73">Bailey 1973. Shaw's Life Force and Science Fiction</a></li><!--
--></ul><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="bailey73"></a>Bailey, J. O. 1973. Shaw's Life Force and Science Fiction. <em>The Shaw Review</em> 16(2): 48-58. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40682294">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p48"></a>Shaw developed his concept of the Life Force and creative evolution by pondering theories set forth by <strong>Buffon (1707-1788), Lamarck (1744-1829), and Samuel Butler</strong>, as opposed to those of Darwin and Huxley, illustrated in the fiction of Wells. Butler argued for his concept of purposive evolution in <em>Life and Habit</em> (1877) and <em>Luck, or Cunning?</em> (1887). Before writing these book-length essays, however, he had published the science fiction called <em>Erewhon</em> (1872), which derides Darwinism and sets forth a theory that anticipates Shaw's Life Force. (Bailey 1973: 48)</blockquote><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Butler, Samuel 1910. <em>Life and Habit</em>. London: A. C. Fifield.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/lifehabit00butluoft/page/n1/mode/2up">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p49a"></a>Whether or not "coherent and consistent," Shaw attacked two Victorian othodoxies, (1) the Darwinian conception of evolution as chance mutation and survival of the fittest, and (2) the creeds of the churches that <strong>a personal God observes, rewards, and punishes human behavior</strong>. He opposed to these othodoxies his religion of a Life Force that strives <em>within</em> man to evolve <strong>a godlike race</strong>. (Bailey 1973: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Familiar themes from both Spinoza and Stapledon.</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p49b"></a>The Life Force, defined in <em>Man and Superman</em> and <em>Methuselah</em>, is suggested in other plays and prefaces. Agnostic toward othodox creeds, Shaw conceived <strong>an evolving deity immanent throughout a developing universe</strong>. Unlike the unconscious Immanent Will of Schopenhauer and Hardy, <strong>the Life Force intends</strong> in its experiments <strong>to develop contemplative intelligence in mankind</strong>. (Bailey 1973: 49)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Organic life developing towards greater mentality.</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p50"></a>Shaw called <em>Methuselah</em> "a second legend of Creative Evolution." Part II presents Franklyn Barnabas, a "Clerical Gentleman," and his brother Conrad, a Professor of Biology, thus uniting religion and science in the dream of lengthening human life to three hundred years. Part V, "As Far as Thought Can Reach," dramatizes the product of this evolution in the Ancients, who have nearly reached godhead: they are immortal except as they may have a fatal accident. Their lives, to travellers from the land of the shortlivers, seem dull, but the Ancients find in meditation a passionate happiness. Then beyond the life of the body is a "vortex." A She-Ancient says, "<strong>The day will come when there will be no people, only thought</strong>." (Bailey 1973: 50)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The "Ancients" from <em>Stargate</em> come to mind. </p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p5"></a><strong><em>Methuselah</em> seems the first serious utopia to postulate the possibility of eternal life on Earth</strong>. But nearly every utopian fiction pictures a life-span beyond threescore and ten and extends youthful vitality far beyond the present draft age. The Vril-ya of <em>The Coming Race</em> live normally a hundred to a hundred and fifty years, during which "the vigour of middle life was preserved even after the term of a century was passed" (Ch. XXVI). In Bellamy's <em>Looking Backward</em> (1887), men "usually live to be eighty-five or ninety, and at forty-five [...] are physically and mentally younger [...] than you were at thirty-five" (Ch. XVIII). Smith, the traveller in Hudson's <em>A Crystal Age</em> (1887), supposes Yoletta is sixteen or eighteen, but finds that she is in her thirties; her father is a hundred and ninety-eight and hale. The narrator of Morris's <em>News from Nowhere</em> (1891) guesses that a woman is twenty, but finds she is forty-two (Ch. III). A man of ninety "looked dry and sturdy like a piece of old oak" (Ch. VIII). (Bailey 1973: 5)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like the Victorian equivalent of the "She only looks 12, she's actually 700 years old" trope in anime.</p><!--
9-10 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p55ja56"></a>Olaf Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930) treats features of <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> both <em>The Time Machine</em> and <em>Methuselah</em>, plus more recent concepts of space-time, biology, and astronomy. (Bailey 1973: 55-56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Noted. <em>Back to Methuselah</em> is a theatre play, tho<!-- (I've never read one // The Republic, oops.)-->.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p56a"></a>The novel records the history of man through eighteen species, to the "End of Man," two thousand million years in the future, thus outdistancing both Wells and Shaw. This history is "an authentic message from one fo the Last Men" (Preface), transmitted by telepathy across time-space. <strong>It is partly Darwinian, picturing ages of struggle, disasters, and adjustments to changes in nature, Earth, and the solar system, but it seems to owe much to Shaw also</strong>. In <em>Methuselah</em>, the Ancients make steady progress toward a utopia in which men meditate the purpose of the Life Force and almost fulfill it. <strong>Stapledon's history ends with a similar upward thrust in the godlike wisdom of the Eighteenth Men</strong>. (Bailey 1973: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>That they do. The Eighteenth Men's cosmology is a wonderful read.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p56b"></a>Men of the present species, after four centuries of atomic wars, achieve a World Financial Directorate. Man's religion of <strong>Gordelpus ("God help us"?)</strong>, a worship of the "Divine Energy" (the Life Force?), combines science and mysticism. After four thousand years, comfort undermines energy, and the world plunges into a Dark Age for a hundred thousand years, with a brief renaissance that lasts for fifteen thousand before a collapse into a second Dark Age of ten million years, followed by a World War that leaves only thirty-five human beings alive. (Bailey 1973: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Taara avita</em>.</p><!--
10 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p56c"></a>Ten million years later accumulated biological variations result in a new species, <strong>the Second Men, longlivers</strong>. Mothers carry the foetus for three years and suckle the child for five; puberty begins at twenty, maturity at fifty, and senility at about a hundred and fifty. <strong>The Second Men</strong>, devoted to philosophy and religion, <strong>suggest Shaw's Ancients</strong>. They "were determined to produce a race endowed with much greater longevity. [...] They even conceived that the ideal community should be knit into one mind by each unique individual's direct telepathic apprehension of the experience of all his fellows" (pp. 149-150). (Bailey 1973: 56)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Could be, idk.</p><!--
11 --><blockquote><a id="bailey73p57"></a>Any Eighteenth Man can communicate with any other by telepathy. In this way, an individual can share the life of all men in all times. He "savours in a single intuition all bodily contacts" and "comprehends in a single vision all visual fields" (p. 323).<br />The Eighteenth Men thus approach <strong>the "vortex" of Shaw's Life Force</strong>: "For, if ever the cosmic ideal should be realized [...] then in that time <strong>The awakened Soul of All</strong> will embrace within itself all spirits whatever throughout the whole of time's wide circuit" (pp. 334-335). (Bailey 1973: 57)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Something approaching God - all souls throughout time and space united in a totality, "<u>knowing all things and rejoicing in all things</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/last-and-first-men.html#stapledon37p272">Stapledon 1937: 272</a>).</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="bailey76"></a>Bailey, J. O. 1976. Some comments on science fiction. <em>The Journal of General Education</em> 28(1): 75-82. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27796555">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p76a"></a>The formula stories that developed in the 1930s had the general plot of interplanetary travel, discovery of a gold-and-jewelled society of human beings, towered cities, a beautiful queen with whom the traveller had a love affair, an antagonistic high priest, warfare with death-rays, victory, and the hero's marriage to the queen. <strong>Everything in this formula is absurd</strong>. (Bailey 1976: 76)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sounds like the Futurama episode "My Three Suns" (S01E07).</p><!--
3 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p76b"></a>So many stories display patterns of repetition that I should point out one such pattern. Fitz-James o'Brien published "The Diamond Lens" in 1858. The hero invented a microscope to look inside the atom. In an atom of water, he saw a beautiful girl and fell in love with her. The author did not know what to do about that, and so ended the romance by having the water evaporate. The hero ended up in a madhouse. <strong>I thought that reasonable</strong>. (Bailey 1976: 76)</blockquote><!--
--><p>lol</p><!--
4 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p77"></a>Some such purpose has been a feature of science fiction from the beginning. Much of it has been serious speculation about scientific facts surmised but not known at the time of the writing. <strong>Johann Kepler's <em>Somnium</em> of 1634 took Duracotus and his mother to the moon</strong> by witchcraft, but when they got there, the story described the moon in terms of the latest speculations, given in detail. They found some water and air on the moon, enough to keep them alive. <strong>Kepler argued seriously that some water and air exist there</strong>; he presented pictures of the moon, its geology, climatology, and biology, in accordance with the observations and the natural laws then known. (Bailey 1976: 77)</blockquote><!--
--><p>May explain why some very seriously people have entertained this notion. E.g. "<u>That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2019/12/critique-of-pure-reason-meiklejohn.html#kant55p308">Kant 1855: 308</a>).</p><!--
4-5 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p77ja78"></a>Such mingled ancestry, books ranging from tales of terror to practicable utopias, helped lay the foundation for <strong>the earnest, thrilling science fiction of Olaf Stapledon</strong>, whose <em>Last and First Men</em> (1930) told the story of mankind from the present to the eighteenth and last human species, two thousand million years in the future. (Bailey 1976: 77-78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Earnest?</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p78"></a>Stapledon wrote that he undertook to invent "a story which may seem a possible, or at least not wholly impossible, account of the future of man." It was a book with a purpose far beyond that of entertainment - yet not without kicks that were to me more exciting than the contrived manipulations of other stories. Stapledon stated a belief with which I agree, that "controlled imagination in this sphere [that is, science fiction as prophecy] can be a very valuable exercise for minds bewildered about the present and its potentialities." He attempted, he said, "to see the human race in its cosmic setting, and to mould our hearts to entertain new values." This book did more than tinker with machines and present a future made up of grotesque scraps. What Stapledon meant by "controlled imagination" was clear in the story he told, of evolution projected (unless you think the word "extrapolated" more "operative") into the distant future. There are marvels, yes. Toward the end of time, men live for a quarter of a million terrestial years, spending an adolescence of a thousand years in the Lond of the Young, going through all the experiences of the race. All men are easily brought into telepathic unity to think as a single mind, each to share all the memory, temperament, and past experience of every other. That is, <strong>Stapledon wrote fiction to present a well-informed <em>philosophic</em> picture of a possible human future</strong>. (Bailey 1976: 78)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Heavy emphasis on the <em>philosophic</em>.</p><!--
6 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p79"></a><em>The Dynasts</em> is not science fiction, but the concept has appeared over and over in this fiction. While Hardy was still alive, in 1921, George Bernard Shaw wrote <em>Back to methuselah</em>, in which a series of biological mutations took place, lengthening human life by stages, first to 300 years and finally to immortality until some accident might destroy life. The Ancients, as the final mutants were called, after a few years of romancing, recapitulating the human experience, retired into philosophic meditation that provided the loftiest happiness. A few years later, in <em>Last and First Men</em>, Stapledon told the history of humanity through eighteen species, the last of which had so mastered the mysteries of space-time and universal telepathy that <strong>the human race was in essence God, feeling universal compassion</strong>. (Bailey 1976: 79)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Putting it somewhat bluntly.</p><!--
9 --><blockquote><a id="bailey76p82"></a>Such societies have been pictured, but the subject is not exhausted. Telepathy is a commonplace in science fiction. What would really happen, utopia or chaos, if it became a fact? <strong>Why, you couldn't even tell a polite fib about how you enjoyed a party</strong>. (Bailey 1976: 82)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Telepaths would probably not throw boring parties. (Phatic telepathy?)</p><!--
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="cole73"></a>Cole, Susan Ablon 1973. The Evolutionary Fantasy: Shaw and Utopian Fiction. <em>The Shaw Review</em> 16(2): 89-97. [<u><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40682298">JSTOR</a></u>]</h4><!--
2 --><blockquote><a id="cole73p89"></a>The autonomous, industrialized societies of the late nineteenth century had to be ordered and restructured into a coherent and unified world state and anarchy, disruption and injustice eliminated by a complex and controlled system of government. The very word, "system," is particularly expressive of this period; the utopias sought systems to create just and efficient societies. <strong>Well's <em>A Modern Utopia</em> (1905) and Bellamy's <em>Looking Backward</em> (1888)</strong> are excellent examples of this category of utopian vision, the principal virtue of which is that it has <strong>eliminated the chaos, uncertainties and dangers of the old world</strong>. Such utopias are predicated on the idea that the basic needs of man do not extend far beyond economic security and material comfort and on the belief that man requires a considerable amount of organization and regulation in order to live comfortably and peaceably in a society. (Cole 1973: 89)</blockquote><!--
--><p>These, as Stapledon pointed out, presume "<u>a fixed human nature</u>" (<a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/07/last-and-first-men.html#stapledon37p11ja12">Stapledon 1937: 12</a>).</p><!--
2-3 --><blockquote><a id="cole73p89ja90"></a>The second direction pursued by authors of utopias stresses <strong>the spiritual or mental development of man</strong>, and these may be called <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> "evolutionary utopias." In these utopias, the ideal societies began to be proposed within a new sense of time as dynamic. They were to be merely stages in a continuing process of human and social growth, an ideal expressed, but not yet realized in the technological utopia. The evolutionary utopias tend to extend into the distant future and to envision society as somehow going through and coming out the other side of the technological revolution. Their concern is not with the restructuring of society, but with <strong>the evolution of man himself into a state of being that no longer requires formal social structure</strong>. Man's body undergoes sufficient improvement to make it no longer an object for his concern. He either no longer requires complex technological processes to sustain his life and therefore reverts to a simpler, more primitive life-style, or he has gained sufficient technological knowledge to run the machinery necessary to his survival with little or no effort. Consequently, man's energies are freed to enable him to develop in directions relatively unexplored in the history of mankind. In many of these utopias, although the bodi is improved in many ways through evolution, usually become more powerful, handsomer and longer-lived, it is also frequently viewed almost as a vestigal organ, and one finds that its functions become progressively fewer, while <strong>man lives more in his creative and intellectual faculties</strong>. (Cole 1973: 89-90)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A noticeable bias towards the intellectual.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="cole73p92a"></a>There is a connection then between Shaw's attempt to create myth and the unique vertical structure of his work. Interestingly, one finds the same association of intention and structure in the later twentieth-century fictional attempt at <strong>a vertical utopia</strong>, Stapledon's <em>Last and First Men</em>. (Cole 1973: 92)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A what now.</p><!--
5 --><blockquote><a id="cole73p92b"></a><em>Back to Methuselah</em> then is unlike earlier utopias in that it has not been structured upon the personal drama of a single protagonist, nor does it reveal a detailed vision of a specific possibility of human society. Rather <strong>it is a dramatic portrayal of an idea</strong>, and it is, therefore, the clarification of this idea, rather than the characters and their adventures, that regulates the dramatic structure of the work. (Cole 1973: 92)</blockquote><!--
--><p>The central idea in Stapledon being, I guess, <em>the end of humanity</em>.</p><!--
6-7 --><blockquote><a id="cole73p93ja94"></a>In refusing to exclude mind from the evolutionary process, Butler is arguing for the principle of "design" as against "descent." Clearly however, Butler would not accept the idea of external design, of a force outside the organism shaping its evolutionary development. But he found in Lamarck the concept of organism designing itself, and it is from this idea that Creative Evolution derives. For above all else, Creative Evolution means that living organisms must and do possess "<strong>an innate tendency to perfectibility</strong>," the "x" factor, as Eric Bentley describes it, not to be discovered in a laboratory, that <strong>will</strong>s <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>to live and hence to change</strong>, to grow and to become. It is this "x" factor that Shaw refers to when he speaks of the Life Force and of the will. (Cole 1973: 93-94)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Conatus</em>?</p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3162887439265402520.post-29625352800080182922023-08-15T12:17:00.002-07:002023-08-17T13:41:17.310-07:00Tähenduseline<!-- Tähenduseline
Keel: Eesti,Papers,Semiotics,Source: TÜ,
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--><ul><!--
--><li><a href="#maran05">Maran 2005. Mimikrist liikidevahelise kommunikatsiooni kontekstis</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#martinelli05">Martinelli 2005. Sissejuhatus antropoloogilisse zoosemiootikasse</a></li><!--
--><li><a href="#kytt05">Kütt 2005. Maarahva pühade puude ja puistutega seotud käitumisnormid</a></li><!--
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--><h4><a id="maran05"></a>Maran, Timo 2005. Mimikrist liikidevahelise kommunikatsiooni kontekstis. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 117-134.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p118"></a><strong>Kommunikatsioon kui kahe osalsie kokkupuutel toimuv informatsioonivahetus tõusis teaduse huvisfääri 1940. aastatel</strong>. Mõningaid uuringuid oli selles vallas tehtud ka varem, näiteks Harold D. Lasswelli tööd 1920. aastatel, mis keskendusid kommunikatsiooni rollile propagandas ja ajakirjanduses. Tema 1927. aastal ilminud raamatut <strong><em>Propaganda Technique in the World War</em> peavad mitmed autorid kaasaegse kommunikatsiooniteooria alguseks</strong>. Samuti püsib Lasswelli formuleeritud küsimus kommunikatsiooni olemuse kohta: "Kes ütleb kellele mida millises kanalis ja mis tulemusega?" täneseni rohkesti tsiteerituna (Mattelart, Mattelart 1998: 25-29). (Maran 2005: 118)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Minu kogemuses võib kommunikatsiooniteooria-laadseid käsitlusi ja märkusi leida juba vähemalt 19. sajandi lõpust, aga sellise konkreetse vormi, millisena ta 1950ndatel konkretiseerus, võttis ta tõesti alles 20. sajandi teisel kolmandikul. <a href="https://archive.org/details/PropagandaTechniqueInTheWorldWar/page/n7/mode/2up">Lasswelli</a> võiks siiski kunagi ka lugeda.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p118ja119"></a>Uuringute säärane lähtekoht <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> mõjutas paratamatult autorite arusaama kommunikatsioonist, näiteks oli Shannoni järgi kommunikatsiooni põhiküsimuseks "ühes punktis valitud teate <strong>kas täpne või ligikaudne taasloomine</strong> teises punktis" (Shannon, Weaver 1963: 31). (Maran 2005: 118-119)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Üsna... krüptoanalüütiline.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p120a"></a>Shannon-Weaveri kommunikatsioonimudeli illustreerimiseks sobivad hästi ka eluslooduses toimuvad kommunikatsiooniaktid, näiteks teadete edastamine spetsiaalsete lõhnaainete - feromoonide - abil liblikate vahel. Nii <strong>kodeeritakse</strong> emase ööliblika tammekedriku (<em>informatsiooni allikas</em>) <strong>valmisolek</strong> paaritumiseks (<em>teade</em>) spetsiaalsete lõhnanäärmete poolt (<em>edastaja</em>) liigispetsiifilisteks <strong>lõhnaaineteks</strong> - feromoonideks (<em>signaal</em>), <strong>mis läbi õhu kandudes</strong> (<em>kanal</em>) on avatud temperatuuri kõikumistele, sademetele ja teistele lõhnadele (<em>müra</em>). Kui feromoonimolekulid <strong>puutuvad isase liblika harjaselisi tundlaid</strong> (<em>vastuvõtja</em>), dekodeeritakse see putuka närvisüsteemis teateks, millest lähtudes saab isane tammekedrik (<em>sihtpunkt</em>) teha käitumusliku otsuse edasise lennusuuna kohta. (Maran 2005: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Väga kena näide.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p120b"></a>Tulenevalt praktilisest vajadustest erinevates teadusharudest, eelnkõige sotsiaalteadustes, <strong>heideti</strong> Shannon-Weaveri käsitlusele <strong>ette</strong> kommunikatsioonimudeli <strong>ühesuunalis</strong>us<strong>t</strong> ja ranget jagunemist saatjaks ja vastuvõtjaks ning sellega kaasnevat <strong>saatjapoolset kontrolli vastuvõtja üle</strong>. Kommunikatsiooni lineaarsust ja ühesuunalisust osutus võimalikuks vältida, kui <strong>mudelisse lisati vastuvõtjalt saatjale suunduv tagasiside</strong> (<em>feedback</em>). Selle mõiste ilmumine kommunikatsioonikäsitlustesse oli küberneetika otsene panus ja mõjutus (Wiener 1948). Küberneetilistes süsteemides <strong>või</strong>malda<strong>b</strong> tagasiside <strong>reguleerida süsteemi olekut süsteemis eneses</strong> või väliskeskkonnas <strong>toimuvate muutuste põhjal</strong> ja tagada seeläbi homöostaasi, kommunikatsiooni puhul aga <strong>lubab saatjal kohandada edastatavaid teateid</strong> ja kommunikatiivset aktiivsust <strong>vastavalt vastuvõtja reageeringule</strong>. Metatasandil lubab tagasiside aga ka kommunikatsioonisüsteemis kasutatavate teadete kohandamist ja valikut nende vahel, <strong>mis</strong> pikemas perspektiivis <strong>toob kaasa märgisüsteemide arengu</strong>. Erinevalt küberneetilistes süsteemides toimuvast kausaalsusest tagasisidest interpreteerib vastuvõtja kommunikatsiooni käigus edastatavat teadet aktiivselt ja toimib oma interpretatsioonist lähtuvalt, mistõttu on tagasiside puhul kommunikatsioonil igal juhul tegemist semiootilise nähtusega. (Maran 2005: 120)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Just see <em>teadete kohandamine</em> esineb ka Rueschi ja Batesoni metakommunikatsiooniteoorias: nt kui vastuvõtja annab kinnitava signaali (tagasisidestab "ma sain aru"), siis võib lõpetada sama teate edastamise - võib olla kindel, et see jõudis kohale. Väga üldine, aga ikkagi oluline innovatsioon teoreetilisel tasandil.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p120ja121"></a>Tagasiside intensiivne ja mõlemasuunaline kaasamine kommunikatsioonimudelitesse võib uurija viia ka küsimuseni, et mil määral <strong>on üldse põhjendatud kommunikatsioonis osalejate jaotamine signaali</strong> <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> <strong>saatjaks ja vastuvõtjaks</strong>. Sellele on tähelepanu pööratud näiteks inimestevahelise verbaalse kommunikatsiooni uurimisel (nt Steward 1978). Dialoogivormis toimuva kommunikatsiooni puhul liiguvad <strong>teate</strong>d mõlemas suunas, kusjuures nende <strong>seotus eelnevate teadetega varieerub teatest teatesse</strong>. Säärasel juhul täidavad kommunikatsioonis osalejad <strong>vaheldumisi</strong> nii saatja kui ka vastuvõtja rolle. Seda tüüpi kommunikatsiooniliste olukordade kirjeldamiseks on välja pakutud mitmesuguseid tsüklilisi kommunikatsioonikäsitlusi (nt Schramm 1954: 8). (Maran 2005: 120-121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paneb mõtlema nendele kultuurile, milles vestlusnorm on <em>samaaegne</em> rääkimine. Mu hiljutiste lemmiklugude hulgas on üks kurioosne näide sellisest kunstilisest võttest: Onry Ozzborni ja Heddie Leonne <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1L8m1ftnOxg">"Voicemail"</a>-is räpivad nad kohati samaaegselt.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p121"></a>Esimeseks põhjuseks, mis tingib semiootilise lähenemise kaasamise kommunikatsiooni kirjeldamisse, võib olla arusaam, et kommunikatsiooni toimumise eelduseks üleüldse on <strong>tähenduslikult organiseeritud ja säärasena kategoriseeritud subjektiivsete reaalsuste olemasolu saatjal ja vastuvõtjal</strong>. Nii tähenduslike teadete formuleerimiseks kui ka nende vastuvõtmiseks ja interpreteerimiseks <strong>peavad</strong> kommunikatsioonis osalejad <strong>olema võimelised ümbritsevat keskkonda tajuma diskreetsetes kategooriates</strong>. (Maran 2005: 121)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Inimestel ei ole Stapledoni Marslastega võimalik suhelda, sest nende radioaktiivne kommunikatsioon ei ole diskreetne.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p122"></a>Üheks võimaluseks, mis lubab saatjal ja vastuvõtjal omada ja jagada adekvaatset teadmist teadete ja nende tähenduste seoste kohta, on ühine kogemus kas varasematest kommunikatsiooniaktidest või objektidest ja olukordadest, millega edastavad teated seonduvad. Nii kasutab Wilbur Schramm (1954: 6) kommunikatsiooni kirjeldamiseks kogemusvälja (<em>Field of experience</em>) mõistet. Tema väite kohaselt peab <strong>selleks, et kommunikatsioon oleks tulemuslik, saatja kogemusväli osaliselt kattuma signaali vastuvõtja kogemusväljaga</strong>. (Maran 2005: 122)</blockquote><!--
--><p>See, millele ma ise ei ole olnud võimeline lähenema, sest mul on selleks väga kohmakas vahend: Morrise ja Rueschi "kommunisatsioon". </p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Schramm, Wilbur 1954. How communication works. — Schramm, Wilbur (ed.), <em>The Process and Effects of Mass Communication</em>. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 3-26.</u> [<u><a href="https://archive.org/details/processeffectsof00schr">Internet Archive</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p123a"></a>Semiootikutest toetab ühise arusaama esinemist ja kujunemist kommunikatsioonis näiteks Charles Morrise määratlus:<blockquote>Mõiste 'kommunikatsioon' [...] katab igat juhtu, millega tekitatakse ühisosa, s.t kus teatud omadus tehakse ühiseks paljudele asjadele. [...] <strong>Kommunikatsioon</strong> [...] <strong>on märgikasutus, mis õhutab vastuvõtja</strong> [<em>communicatee</em>] <strong>märgikäitumist muutuma sarnaseks saatja</strong> [<em>communicator</em>] <strong>omale</strong>. (Morris 1971: 195-196)</blockquote>Mõistagi leidub veel mitmeid teisi viise kommunikatsiooni määratlemiseks, mis lähtuvad suuresti erinevate teadusharude ja paradigmade eelistustest ning uurimisobjektide poolt tingitud erivajadustest. (Maran 2005: 123)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sarnasele järeldusele tuleb Roman Jakobson oma koodivahetuse (<em>code switching</em>) käsitlusega: selleks, et võõrast inimesest, kelle keel on natuke erinev, aru saada, tuleb leida tema sõnadele omad vasted ja talle tema sõnadega vastu tulla.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p123b"></a>Nii kirjeldab kommunikatsiooniteoreetik Frank E. X. Dance kommunikatsiooni mõistet, eristades eri valdkondade kirjanduse analüüsi põhjal selles 15 kontseptuaalset komponenti: 1. sümbolid, verbaalsus, kõne; 2. mõistmine; 3. <strong>interaktsioon, vahekord, sotsiaalne protsess</strong>; 4. määramatuse väljendamine; 5. protsessuaalsus; 6. ülekanne, edastamine, vahetus; 7. <strong>seotus, kokkuköitmine</strong>; 8. ühisosa loomine; 9. kanal, kandja, vahend; 10. <strong>mälestuste dubleerimine</strong>; 11. selektiivne vastus, muutus käitumises, reageering; 12. stiimul, ajend; 13. intentsionaalsus; 14. aeg, koht, olukord; 15. mõju (Dance 1970: 204-208). (Maran 2005: 123)</blockquote><!--
--><p>3. on näha, et originaalis oli "<em>interaction, intercourse</em>" ja viimasele ei ole head vastet (neist mõistetest vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2021/02/a-collapsed-act.html#carr23">Carr 1923</a>); 7. kõlab nagu Malinowski ja teiste vanaaegsete "bonds of union"; 10. on peaaegu juba nagu Rueschi tõlgendus kommunisatsioonist.</p><!--
--><ul><small><!--
--><li><u>Dance, Frank E. X. 1970. The "concept" of communication. <em>The Journal of Communication</em> 20: 201-210. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1970.tb00877.x</u> [<u><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1970.tb00877.x">Wiley</a></u>]</li><!--
--></small></ul><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p125"></a>Näiteks kasutavad samasse liiki kuuluvad väikelinnud sama struktuuriga hoiatushäälitsusi (süntaktiline aspekt), et tähistada ohtliku elusolendi (semantiline aspekt) <strong>ilmumist lähikonda (pragmaatiline aspekt)</strong>. (Maran 2005: 125)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Näide, mille üle mul tuleks vaagida kui ma lõpuks jõuan Morrisega lähemalt tegelemiseni.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p128"></a>Kommunikatsiooniakti mõistmine mitte saatja ja vastuvõtja ühekordse kokkupuutena, vaid olukorrana, mille piirid ja mõju ulatuvad tänu ajalistele kordustele konkreetsest kommunikatsiooniaktist kaugele väljapoole, pakub avaramaid võimalusi kirjeldada eluslooduses toimuvat lävimist. See lubab vastata kriitikale, mida on kommunikatsiooniteooria raames tehtud biokommunikatsiooni ja eriti liikidevaheliste suhete kirjeldamise aadressil nende eripärade tõttu. Nii on väidetud, et pole alust kirjeldada kommunikatsioonina olukordi, milles saatja on passiivne ega näita üles mingit omapoolset intentsiooni teate edastamiseks (Mackay 1975: 5), nagu see on näiteks kehakattes kinnistunud hoiatusvärvuse puhul. <strong>Nähes aga kommunikatsiooniakti osana ka evolutsiooni käigus kujunenud elusolendite omadusi, võib saatja passiivsust iseenesest mõista kui kommunikatiivset strateegiat</strong>, mis tihtilugu kaasneb vastuvõtja suurema aktiivsusega (näiteks toitu otsivad kiskjad). (Maran 2005: 128)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kummalisel kombel ei tunne mingit vajadust siin kobiseda "kommunikatsionaliseerimise" üle; seda teen siis, kui antropomorfeeritakse midagi elutut, agentsusetut, et selle peal Jakobsoni funktsioone rakendada (a la mitte-töötava ja üldse koleda purskkaevu faatiline funktsioon linnaruumis).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="maran05p131ja132"></a>Küberneetika algusaegadest saadik on olnud kasutusel <strong>eristus positiivse ja negatiivse tagasiside vahel</strong>. Neist esimene on protsesse lubav või soodustav - näiteks annab vastuvõtja saatjale teada, et kommunikatsioon on õnnestunud või et teadet on mõistetud. Teine on aga protsesse pidurdav või keelav - vastuvõtja teavitab (tahtlikult või <span style="color: #fa4100">[|]</span> tahtmatult) saatjat kommunikatsiooniakti ebaõnnestumisest. Mõlemal, nii positiivsel kui negatiivsel tagasisidel, on mõju edasiste kommunikatsiooniaktide kujunemisele ning kommunikatsioonis kasutatavate märgisüsteemide arengule. Lihtne näide: inimestevahelise verbaalse kommunikatsiooni puhul toob vastuvõtja tagasiside, nagu "Arusaadav!" või "Hea mõte!", suure tõenäosusega kaasa saatja otsuse samasugust teadet edaspidigi kasutada, samas kui vastuvõtja reaktsioon "<strong>Mis jama sa ajad!</strong>" paneb ilmselt saatja otsima teistsuguseid ja täpsemaid viise enda arusaadavaks tegemiseks. (Maran 2005: 131-132)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kasulik eristus faatika jaoks.</p><!--
---
--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="martinelli05"></a>Martinelli, Dario 2005. Sissejuhatus antropoloogilisse zoosemiootikasse. Inimeste ja teiste loomade vahelise suhte semiootiline käsitlus. Inglise keelest tõlkinud Elin Sütiste. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 135-152.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p136a"></a>Minu arvates tuleks zoosemiootika raames eristada vähemasti kaht peamist haru, ning mõlemad tuleks omakorda jagada kaheks allharuks. Ühelt poolt viidatakse siin zoosemiootikale traditsioonilises tähenduses, s.t kui <strong>distsipliin</strong>ile, <strong>mis tegeleb käitumusliku "kommunikatsiooniga"</strong> ning kasutab selleks semiootika kõige levinumaid teoreetilisi vahendeid. Seda haru <strong>nimatan ma <em>etoloogiliseks zoosemiootikaks</em></strong>. Etoloogilise zoosemiootika sees saab omakorda eristada <em>traditsioonilist</em> ja <em>kognitiivset</em> voolu. Esimesse kuuluvad varajase Sebeoki ja Lindaueri ning samuti teiste lorenziaanlikku või biheivioristlikku traditsiooni kuuluvate teadlaste tööd. Kognitiivse zoosemiootika suuna esindajatest mainin siin vähemalt hilist Sebeoki, Cimattit ja Bekoffi (rääkimata tugevatest aimdustest, mille tõi kaasa Darwin).<br />Rääkides zoosemiootika <strong>teis</strong>es<strong>t</strong> <strong>haru</strong>st, mida <strong>ma nimetan siin <em>antropoloogiliseks</em></strong>, viitan uurimustele, <strong>mis keskenduvad semiootilisele interaktsioonile inimeste ja teiste loomade vahel, sealhulgas kultuurilist ja/või sotsioloogilist laadi uurimustele</strong>. Üheks näiteks on eksperimendid liikidevahelise kommunikatsiooni vallas (hoolimata oma skeptilisest hoiakust selliste eksperimentide suhtes, pööras Sebeok neile üsna sagedast tähelepanu, samuti nagu Petrilli, Deely, Cimatti, Bekoff jt). Sellist tüüpi uurimused kuuluvad antropoloogilise zoosemiootika allharusse, mida ma nimetan <em>kommunikatsiooniliseks</em>. See mõiste <strong>viitab kontekstidele, kus inimese-looma interaktsioon on kommunikatiivset laadi, s.t interaktiivne, vastastikune ja kavatsuslik</strong>. Peale selle kuuluvad siia rühma ka rakendusliku zoosemiootika uurimused, näiteks inimeste ja lemmikloomade või inimeste ja karjaloomade interaktsioonist. (Martinelli 2005: 136)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ehk siis zoosemiootika <em>sui generis</em>, mis uurib loomade käitumist iseenesest, ja antropoloogiline zoosemiootika, mis uurib loomi seoses inimestega.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p136b"></a>Lähtuvalt eelmisest, nimetatakse antropoloogilise zoosemiootika teist allharu siin <strong><em>tähenduseliseks</em></strong> (<em>significational</em>): <strong>loom on siin</strong> puhas tähenduse allikas, <strong>pigem tähendustamise objekt kui subjekt</strong>. Antud mudel on seega <strong>ökosemiootilist laadi</strong>: kui ökosemiootika uurib, kuidas inimene kujutab loodust, siis kõnealune zoosemiootika haru tegeleb sellega, kuidas inimene kujutab teisi loomi. Siia sfääri kuuluvad müüdid, jutud, allegooriad, samuti aga süstemaatilised klassifikatsioonid, nagu taksonoomia. (Martinelli 2005: 136)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A la "Rebase (<em>vulpes vulpes</em>) representatsioon Sara Pennypackeri jutustuses <em>Pax</em>" (<a href="https://www.hortussemioticus.ut.ee/7-2020-palm/">Palm 2020</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p139"></a>Tüüpide määratlemise aluseks on sisuliselt toitumisviisid. Sellise kriteeriumi alusel saab eristada kolme komplementaarset makroskoopilist sfääri, mida nimetatakse riikideks:<ol><li><strong><em>Taimed</em>, s.t tekitajad</strong>. Fotosünteesi kaudu omandavad nad toitaineid mitte-orgaanilistest allikatest;</li><li><strong><em>Loomad</em>, s.t omastajad</strong> [ingl. k. <em>ingestors</em>] (nimetuse saanud sellest, et nad võtavad toitu [ingl. k. <em>ingest</em>] oma kehasse, kus see seeditakse). Nad söövad teisi organisme ning jagunevad <em>herbivoorideks</em> (taimesööjad), <em>karnivoorideks</em> (loomasööjad) ning <em>omnivoorideks</em> (nii taimedele kui loomade sööjad);</li><li><strong><em>Seened</em>, s.t lagundajad</strong>. Seened ei omasta toitu seespidiselt, vaid lagundavad seda sobivate ensüümide abil endaväliselt ning seejärel omastavad selle protsessi käigus tekkivaid malekule.</li></ol>(Martinelli 2005: 139)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pani fantaseerima mikitalikust võimalusest nende tüüpide kaudu liigitada mõtlejaid-uurijaid: tekitajad (originaalsed mõtlejad, algatajad), omastajad (edasiarendajad, rakendajad), ja lagundajad (arvustajad, metaanalüüsijad).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p140a"></a>Ehkki see pole küll mingi uudis, on siiski kasulik rõhutada, et <strong>ei ole olemas sellist teaduslikult tunnustatud taksonoomilist klassifikatsiooni, kus esineks autonoomne kategooria nimetusega "inimesed"</strong>; kõigis klassifikatsioonides paigutuvad inimesed loomariigi alla. Seega vaadatuna teaduslikust ja bioloogilisest vaatevinklist, inimene <em>on</em> loom. Alates Darwinist (kui välja arvata vähesed fundamentalistlikud ja/või ultrakonservatiivsed rühmitused) pole ühelgi teadusliku kogukonna liikmel olnud julgust eitada, et inimolendid on loomad. (Martinelli 2005: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Aristoteles ei ole (enam) teaduslikult tunnustatud.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p140b"></a>Olenemata sellest, milline on kontekst, sealhulgas ka sellised spetsiifilised valdkonnad nagu bioloogia või zooloogia, <strong>viitavad inimesed sageli mõistele "loom" kui semantilisele tervikule, mis ilmselgelt välistab inimesed</strong>. Enamikul juhtudel kasutatakse mõistet nimelt võrdluste loomiseks: "inimese-looma suhe" või "me oleme inimesed, mitte loomad". (Martinelli 2005: 140)</blockquote><!--
--><p>A la kui kasutatakse sõimusõnana "inimeseloom" vms siis tahetakse rõhutada, et inimese käitumine ei küüni <em>inimliku käitumise</em> tasandile ja inimnahas varitseb loom.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p141a"></a><strong><em>Loom kui eriti tsiviliseerimatu inimene</em></strong>. - Tüüpiliseks pöördumiseks halva käitumisega ja/või kultuuritu inimese poole on just nimelt "sa oled loom" või "sa oled elajas". (Martinelli 2005: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Pidasin hoopis seda silmas. Semantiline välistamine iseenesest on hinnanguvaba.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p141b"></a><em>Looma mõiste viidetes loomulikele ja/või instinktiivsetele hoiakutele</em>. - Väljendeid nagu "loomalik instinkt" või "loomalik jõud" kasutatakse sageli <strong>kirjeldamaks käitumist, mis</strong> näib olevat päritud kaugeilt esivanemailt või <strong>näib</strong> igal juhul <strong>eelkultuuriline</strong>. Iiri rockbändi <em>Cranberries</em> laul "The Animal Instinct" (e. k. "loomalik instinkt") viitab näiteks põgenemis- ja vabadussoovile. Fraasi <em>animal instinct</em> kasutatakse sageli ka viitamisel ema-lapse suhetele. (Martinelli 2005: 141)</blockquote><!--
--><p>"<u>I can claim that I'm seeking love</u> / <u>And you would call it rubbish.</u> / <u>These narcissistic monster macho traits that have been passed down for generations into my stomach.</u> / <u>Animal... instincts</u> / <u>Animal... instincts.</u> / <u>You could only make this monkey into something beautiful if you believe in metamorphosis.</u>" (Ceschi - <a href="https://youtu.be/_Zp8KBvHzmA?t=48">My Bad</a>)</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p1443"></a>Koos nendega saavutas suure usaldusväärsuse teine sarnane kategoriseerimise tüüp, nimelt <strong>komponentanalüüs</strong>. Komponentanalüüsi pooldajad postuleerisid, et sõna tähendust saab määratleda lähtudes hulgast tähenduskomponentidest, mis ei kuulu ainult ühe sõna juurde, vaid on ühised paljudele sõnadele.<br />Näiteks lekseemi "ema" tähendust saab jagada järgmisteks tähenduskomponentideks: INIMENE, NAISSOOST, TÄISKASVANU, ELUS. Omadus INIMENE eristab sõna "ema" tähendust sõna "elevant" tähendusest, NAISSOOST omakorda eristab lekseemi "ema" tähendust lekseemist "mees" jne. Komponentanalüüsi abil jagatakse sõnad binaarseteks, vastandlikeks komponentideks, rõhutades maailma komplementaarseid omadusi. (Martinelli 2005: 144)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõlab nagu John Locke'i arutlus ideedest. A la "isa" = inimene, meessoost, lapsevanem (vt <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2020/09/an-essay-concerning-human-understanding.html#locke41ap334">Locke 1741a: 334</a>).</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p149jm10"></a>Roger Fouts jutustab šimpans Washoe'st, kes mängides piltidega, jaotas need kahte rühma: ühe rühma moodustasid inimeste pildid, teise loomade pildid. <strong>Teda ennast kujutava pildi pani Washoe seejärel inimeste piltide juurde</strong>. (Martinelli 2005: 149, jm 10)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõnekas.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p150"></a>Inimene võib olla ka teiste loomade suhtes <em>manipulaator</em>. Tõenäoliselt pidas Sebeok seda võimalust enesestmõistetavalt esimese ja kolmanda punkti juurde kuuluvaks, kuid minu arvates on "manipulatsioon" siiski mõiste, mis - eriti viimaste tehnoloogiliste arengute valguses - väärib omaette lõiku. <em>Lammas Dolly</em> ja teised sarnased juhtumid näitavad, et inimesed on tänaseks saavutanud üsna hea kontrolli teiste liikide geneetilise pärandi üle (ning õigupoolest ka inimliigi geneetilise pärandi üle). Kuid ka kõige viimaseid aegu silmas pidamata on selge, et paljude liikide kodustamine toimus ja toimub endiselt pideva manipulatsiooni/valiku teel. Ning viimaks: <strong>manipuleeritakse isegi üksikute osadega teistele loomadele iseloomulikest</strong> (eriti füüsilistest ja somaatilistest) <strong>tunnustest, suures osas esteetilistel eesmärkidel</strong> (kõrvade ja saba lõikamine, jne). (Martinelli 2005: 150)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Stapledoni Kolmandad Inimesed lähevad sellega täitsa lolliks (vt "vital arts"), loovad hirve, kelle saba on pea, kõige karuma karu, kõige kiiremini lendava linnu, kes ei ole ise võimeline ennast toitma, jne.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="martinelli05p151"></a>Inimene võib olla teiste liikide <em>kaitsja</em> ja <em>edendaja</em>, ja vastupidi. - Näitena võib siin mainida loomade õiguste eest seisvad seltse, looduskaitset jms, aga samuti <strong>inimeste individuaalseid hoiakuid</strong>. (Martinelli 2005: 151)</blockquote><!--
--><p><a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2023/06/spetsiesistlik-keel-ajakirjanduses.html">Spetsiesism</a>.</p><!--
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--><hr style="border: 1px dashed #fa4100;"><!--
--><h4><a id="kytt05"></a>Kütt, Auli 2005. Maarahva pühade puude ja puistutega seotud käitumisnormid. <em>Acta Semiotica Estica</em> II: 153-168.</h4><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p154"></a>Kaua aega on pärimus toiminud hiiepaikade kaitsjana, hiljem on sarnaseks otstarbeks loodud muinsus- ja looduskaitse. Ent <strong>tänapäeval on paljud pühapaigad hävimas seetõttu, et nende olemasolu enam ei mäletata</strong>. Peale selle on rahva aktiivsest mälust kadumas mõiste <em>hiis</em> ja selle tähendusväli. Ometi on pühapaigad oluline osa meie kultuurist ja identiteedist, nagu ka hiiepärimus, mis kannab paikkondlikke mälestusi võib-olla isegi tuhandete aastate tagant. Vastava diskursuse kujunemine Eesti meedias ja ühiskonnas tuleks kindlasti suureks abiks ka paikade kaitse valdkonnas. (Kütt 2005: 154)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ka "Hiiele!" meem.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p155"></a>Folkloristikas on teada, et jutustamise situatsioon ja selles osalejad mõjutavad jutustavat; seetõttu on täiesti võimalik, et olenevalt koguja meelestatusest informandid "unustasid ära" pühapaikadega seotud traditsioonilised normid ning püüdsid esitada neutraalset seisukohta või koguni võtta omaks koguja vaated. Sellist meelsust kannavad ka <strong>mitmed 1940.-1970. aastatel kirjapandud tekstid, kus kõigest väest püütakse hoiduda tunnistamast, nagu võiks "ebausklikel kartustel" ka mingit alust olla</strong>. Nõukogudeaegsed raiumise-teemalised kirjapanekud on mõnikord lihtsalt fakti nentimised, et teatav püha puu on alles või nüüdseks maha võetud - kuid selline stiil ei ole reegel. (Kütt 2005: 155)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Midagi sellist kohtasin ka <a href="https://jeesusjalutasallveelaeval.blogspot.com/2022/09/sonajalaois.html#hiiem2e87">sõnajalaõiega</a> seoses.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p156"></a>Pärimusteadetes valitseva pühade puude raiumise keeluga on kooskõlas ka kroonikate vahendatud teave. Näiteks kirjutab Russow 1578. aastal:<blockquote>Ka pidasid nad mõningaid salusid pühadeks, kust ühtki puud ei tohtinud raiuda. Ning selles pettekujutluses uskusid nad, et <strong>see, kes arvatud pühamikus ühe puu ehk põõsa maha raiub, jalamaid sureb</strong>. Säärane ebausk ja tühi pettekujutlus on veel tänapäevalgi mõningates paikades püsima jäänud, kus Jumala sõna ei õpetata. (Russow 1993: 20)</blockquote>1802. aastal kirjutab koduõpetaja ja publitsist Johann Christoph Petri: "Varem on talupoegi küll tahetud sundida mõnd puud seesugusel pühal kõrgendikul maha raiuma, aga neid ei ole suudetud panna seda tegema ei manitsuste ega ähvardustega" (Viires 1975: 49). (Kütt 2005: 156)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Milleks narrida saatust.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p157"></a>Tavaliselt esineb teates lihtsalt keeld või on see esitatud hoiatusena järgneva karistuse eest. Mõned hoiatused esitavad tagantjärele tarkust - räägitakse, mis on juhtunud inimestega, kes korra vastu eksinud. <em>Selis Killuma põllal on üks suur niin. See pidi olema seoke, et <strong>keegi tal koort lõikas või oksa lõikas, lõikas oma käe ära</strong></em>. (Kütt 2005: 157)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Ebameeldiv üllatus sellele, kes lõikab puult oksa kohas, mille kohta ta ei tea, et see on püha.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p158a"></a>Puude, põõsaste ja okste vigastamise keeld lubab järeldada, et pühas paigas kasvavaid puid või puistusid lasti areneda vabalt ning neid ei kujundatud metsanduslikest või pargikujunduslikest eesmärkidest lähtuvalt. Sellised puistud olid tõenäoliselt <strong>ürgmetsailmelised</strong> ning nad allusid suuresti metsa loomulikule arengu e suktsessiooni seaduspärasustele. Seda aspekti oleks soovitav arvestada ka tänapäeval hiite ja teiste pärimusmaastike kaitset planeerides. Traditsiooniliselt on hiisi kaitstud kui isekujunevat protsessi, mitte kui muutumatut valmisseisundit. (Kütt 2005: 158)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Kõige metsikum mets.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p158"></a>Kroonikates ja vanemates kirjanduses leiduvad teated lubavad vaid oletada, et mahalangenud puid ja oksi ei toodud pühapaigast ära. Informatiivsem on F. J. Wiedemanni 1876. aastast pärinev teade: "Hiiumaal olid veel poole sajandi eest <strong>hiie-metsad</strong> (pühad metsatukad), <strong>kust keegi ei julgenud võtta isegi mitte ühtainust oksa, kuna see inimestele ja loomadele oleks õnnetust toonud</strong>; hoolimata seal valitsevast puupuudusest lasti mahalangenud hagudel tihedais kihtides mädaneda" (Viires 1975: 50). (Kütt 2005: 158)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Paneb mõtlema, et selline juhis oleks väga asjalik nt radioaktiivsete jäätmetega küllastunud keskkondade suhtes. Nt kui mõni hall suuresilmne paneb oma taldriku maha ja juhendab kohalikke, et nad maandumispaigast radioaktiivset materjali jumala eest paja all tule tegemiseks ei kasutaks. </p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p160"></a>Hallistest pärit lugu räägib sulaspoisist, kes peremehe teadmata ohvriaia üles künnab. <strong>Poisil lähevad seepeale jalad kõvasti paiste ning peremehel jäävad loomad haigeks</strong>. Tähelepanuväärne on, et karistada saab mitte ainult otsene süüdlane (sulane), vaid ka see, kes ohvriaia heaolu eest vastutab (peremees). (Kütt 2005: 160)</blockquote><!--
--><p><em>Lymphoedema</em> on tõepoolest üks radiatsiooni tagajärgedest.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p163"></a>Iilas asuva kalmuvarega on seotud järgmine mälestus:<blockquote>Minu isa rääkis surmani, kuidas tema lila küla lambakarjas käies sinna kükitama läks ja <strong>äkki vagase lapse hääl tema jalge all nuttis</strong>. Isa sõnad: "Aga <strong>minu viedi sealt, püksid kintul, ei jäänd enne seisu, kui toispool rugipelda</strong> Kuulbergi linnulebikus." (Elstrok 1994: 198)</blockquote>Kõik need teated viitavad arusaamale, et pühapaiga läheduses peaks oma vajaduste rahuldamise kohta hoolega valima. (Kütt 2005: 163)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Loeb nagu mõne Jaapani õudusfilmi stsenaarium.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p164"></a>Võib arvata, et ka kevadine ja sügisene toidukraami ohverdamine toimus pigem kollektiivselt. Samuti räägitakse palju sellest, et hiiesi <em>käidi</em> või <em>käidi koos</em>. <strong>Kogukondlikul pühapaigal oli ka küla kultuurikeskuse funktsioon, kuhu koguneti pühade tähistamiseks ja nõupidamiseks, tuldi lihtsalt käima või kiikuma</strong>. Virumaa hiiemägedel võib kirjelduste põhjal sageli eristada kaht-kolme erifunktsioonilist paika - hiis ise, kalmed ning kiige-, peo- ja jaanituleplats. On ilmne, et erinevateks otstarveteks kasutati hiie erinevaid piirkondi. (Kütt 2005: 164)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Sellest ka <em>hiiele kogunemine</em> mõneks tähtsaks ühiseks arupidamiseks.</p><!--
--><blockquote><a id="kytt05p166"></a>Samma küla hiietammele <em>oli tugev aed ümber tehtud, nii et püha puud ei pääsetud rüustama ega laastama</em>. 1913. aastal on hiiepuu veel alles, 1939. aasta teate järgi aga juba maha võetud. Praegu on asemele kasvanud uus tamm, mida peetakse pühaks, ning <strong>Tammealusest on kujunenud üks enimtuntud hiisi Eestis</strong>. Alates 1991. aastast on seal järk-järgult taastatud vana kiviaeda, mis ümbritseb, tõsi küll, mitte puud, vaid tervet hiit. (Kütt 2005: 166)</blockquote><!--
--><p>Piltidel tõepoolest suur ohvrikivi ja riideribad, kogu krempel.</p><!-- pooleli 168 -->Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0