200 Years of Syntax: Marty

Graffi, Giorgio 2001. 200 Years of Syntax: A critical survey. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

An anti-Herbertian attitude is therefore what is shared by Brentano and Wundt: both reject the assumption of a substance called 'mind' and of an 'unconscious space'. (Graffi 2001: 58)

Hmm. The rejection was apparently so powerful that the study of "mind" receded to the background for a while and "unconscious space" (such as Peirce's lake of consciousness) became something like a poetic metaphor.

[...] quoting Tichener (1921[1976]:84), one would say that "Brentano's psychology is essentially a matter of argument, and that Wundt's is essentially a matter of description". In other words, Wundt is mainly interested in describing the origin and the development of our psychic pxperiences (Erlebnisse), which he conceives as process, whereas Brentano investigates their structure. (Graffi 2001: 58)

The distinction is quite similar with cultural anthropology or psychology, e.g. Tim Ingold's comparison of Bateson's processual view and Levi-Strauss's structural view.

The two fundamental features of the psychic act, according to Brentano (cf. Gilson 1955:51) are: 1) every psychic act is conscious; 2) every psychic act is directed towards an object, i.e., as Brentano says borrowing a term used within Scholasticism, it is 'intentional'. The first of these two features is ascribed to psychic acts also by Wundt (even though with totally different motivations) but the second one is peculiar to Brentano's framework. The care of defining the relationship between psychic act and its object is wholly extraneous to Wundt. (Graffi 2001: 59)

Is this difference why Brentano-inspired phenomenology is philosophy and Wundt-inspired psychology is science? I have yet to figure out what Brentano's intention consists of.

The care for 'objectuality' led Brentano to discuss also the ways in which our linguistic expressions describe the relationship between our thought and things. For Brentano, not all linguistic expressions have an autonomous meaning; that is, not all of them indicate a given object, a given 'real'. Many of them have a meaning only together with other expressions, i.e. they are 'cosignificant' (mitbedeutend). As is plain, the most typical expressions belonging to this class are conjunctions, prepositions and adverbs. According to Brentano, adjectives and nouns are also cosignificant, if they do not indicate any 'real'. (Graffi 2001: 59)

At first sight "cosignificant" sounds a lot like "context-dependent", but the issue is much more radical. That is, it's an issue of reference. Brr, objectionality.

Funke (1923:182) illustartes the problem by sketching a confrontation between Marty and Wundt. Wundt would interpret the difference between Latin amavi, French j'aimé, German ich habe geliebt (all meaning 'I loved') as instances of the opposition between synthetic vs. analytical thought. Marty, by contrast, considers them as different 'constructive inner forms'. The meaning of all such expressions is identical: what differs is their inner (and obviously their outer) linguistic form. (Graffi 2001: 62)

The examples are worth noting down in themselves. But the issue of inner form and especially "different 'constructive inner forms'" seems analogous to Jakobson's discussion of variant/invariant stuff. One could even say that they are both variants of the same invariant idea. (Damn you, Jakobson, for making these notions so applicable!)

Language is no langer treated as the most authoritative witness of thought, both individual and ethnic: rather it is thought, viewed as an autonomous and universal entity, which dictates the criteria according to which linguistic expressions are to be classified. (Graffi 2001: 62)

"Keelelised opositsioonid ise ei räägi meie arvates midagi teadvusest." (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

In this perspective, the distinction traced by Marty between 'autosemantic' and 'synsemantic' signs is a fundamental one. The signs of the first kind are those which "taken in isolation, express a psychic content which is communicable in itself"; the other signs do not have such a capacity (see Marty 1908:205). If natural languages were not syntactically constructed, there would be no synsemantic signs (p.532). Note that the terms 'autosemantic' and 'synsemantic' only partially match the Peripatetic notions of 'categorematic' and 'syncategorematic'. Thus, sitzt ('sits'), geht ('goes'), etc., since they are 'predicable', are categorematic, but they are not autosemantic. Only Gehender ('the one who goes'), Sitzer ('the one who sits'), er geht ('he goes'), er sitzt ('he sits'), etc., are autosemantic (Marty 1908:206). (Graffi 2001: 62)

It seems that the notion of "autosemantic signs" could actually be quite useful for the study of nonverbal communication. These would be forms of behaviour that don't need to be "clustered" together with other behaviours (or, alteratively, "considered contextually") in order to be reliable indicators of something. // It is worthwhile to remark that nonverbal communication can be asyntactical and synsemantic.

Autosemantic signs are divided into 'emotives' (exclamatory sentences, commands, questions), 'assertions' (declarative sentences) and 'suggestives of representations' (Vorstellungssuggestive), i.e. nouns (Marty 1908:476). This classification is based on Brentano's taxonomy of psychic phenomena: 'affective movements' (Gemütsbewegungen), 'judgments' (Urteile) and 'represen- [...] (Graffi 2001: 62)

Now one would only have to figure out how Marty's "emotives", Brentano's "affective movements" and Jakobsons "expressive function" interrelate (or, correlate). It is beginning to look as if I cannot avoid reading more about Brentano.

We saw that Marty argued against such a radically psychologistic view: he criticized the 'language/thought parallelism' assumption and the identification of 'inner linguistic form' with meaning. (Graffi 2001: 64)

Since I don't have any considerable context I'll have to take these bits of information as is and try to make sense of them as chance allows.

'Ethnopsychological' approaches, for their part, were a solution agreed on by few linguists to a problem which all felt as fundamental: to explain how language, which is a typically individual product, nevertheless accomplishes the task of communicating. The lingusts of the French school (see next section) solved this problem by maintaining that language was a social phenomenon. As a consequence, they overlooked its creative aspect both in its acquisition and in its usage. Other linguists, like Paul, instead restated the strictly individual character of every linguistic activity. (Graffi 2001: 65)

Oh god damn, yet another special field (ethnopsychology or psychological antropology) I feel I have to look into same day. Also, I'll note that Luhmann similarly neglects the creative aspect of language (I guess it would have complicated his theory of "social systems" too much).

Papers on zoosemiotics

Osborne, Catherine 2007. Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers: Humanity and the Humane in Ancient Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

In this chapter we shall take a sideways glance at these contemporary debates by way of an exploration of Aristotle's attempts to explain the continuity between animal capacities and the, supposedly distinctive, human capacity to think in conceptual terms. I shall sugest that Aristotle's attempt to trace continuity, rather than radical discontinuity, across the human-animal spectrum is a fruitful project that belongs with a humane and perceptive attitude to the non-linguistic members of our own species and other creatures. For our own achievements are surely not so very special, just because they are expressed in language. (Osborne 2007: 64)

For in the 21st century we finally acknowledge that some humans are "nonverbal".

We alse use sentences of classic subjects-predicate form when we are not writing a paper or speaking on the radio, but expressing our inner feelings and interests, our social involvement, and our concern for others. We say 'I have a headache', 'I'm worried about my son', 'I don't know what to do'. But although these take a propositional form in the expression, it is not clear that these exchanges of ordinary social intercourse necessarily need words at all, let alone sentences, in order to say what we mean. Except when the intention is to share thoughts of an intellectual or deliberative nature, most could be done equally well with wordless forms of communication (facial expressions, bodily contact, inarticulate sounds, glances, and wordless signs). (Osborne 2007: 67)

It is also quite fashionable to acknowledge nonverbal communication.

In his discussion of human and animal behaviour, Aristotle sometimes invokes a mechanism that he calls phantasia, or (in the traditional translation) 'imagination'. (Osborne 2007: 72)

Relevant for my interests.

What moves all animals, human and non-human alike, Aristotle argues in De anima, is inclination, and inclination is always purposive. There are also intellectual capacities peculiar to humans, some of which can have a bearing on purposive action; but evidently they can only affect action if they can alter how attractive a given object of desire looks, since the object of desire is what arouses inclination. That, according to Aristotle, is what initiates voluntary motion. (Osborne 2007: 73)

This sounds a lot like Berger and Luckmann's husserlian dictum that consciousness is always intentional.

If we find it useful to identify such a function, because it is an economical way to explain a range of phenomena with a related kind of phenomenology, then we do not need to wait for neuroscience to identify a physical seat (or seats) for supplying the funcionality. (Osborne 2007: 83)

Ah, someone needs to inform Kantorowicz of this!

His [Aristotle's] outlook stresses the continuity between human and animal behaviour, and then seeks the explanation, convinced that there must be, in fact, a way in which animals can act intelligently without intellect. (Osborne 2007: 84)

Something Aristotle has in common with Darwin.

Wolfe, Cary 2010. What is posthumanism?. Minnesota; London: University of Minnesota Press.

That question is what language is and how it is related to our ideas about subjectivity, consciousness, and the like. And that question, in turn, cannot be addressed without investigating our assumptions about what knowledge is and the kinds of knowledge we can have of ourselves and of others - in this case (the hardest case, perhaps) nonhuman others. (Wolfe 2010: 31)

Why can't questions about language and consciousness be addressed without "investigating out assumptions about what knowledge is"? I bet it can but you don't want to, because what you really want to do is spill words or drone over issues of epistemology.

[...] whether or not knowledge - including knowledge of our own subjectivity and that of others - is representational and, within that, how we are to construe the relationship between epistemological and ontological questions. (Wolfe 2010: 31)

Bleh.

It is exemplified, he writes, "by the theretical claim that the mind is like the sort of 'computation that takes place in electronic computers. In simpler terms, minds are software (programs) run on the hardware (neural circuits) of the brain." The "strong" version of this claim (or the weakest, depending on your point of view) is called "eliminative materialism," which holds that "notions such as mind, intention, belief, thought, representation, and so on will eventually be eliminated in discussions of cognitive processes in favor or [sic] more mechanistic synonyms that refer to chemical-electrical signaling processes of the brain. Mentalistic terms, it is suggested, are merely glosses for more complex brain processes that we at present do not understand." (Wolfe 2010: 32)

Yeah, it does seem to be heading that way.

They key finding of the study, we are told, is that Rico is apparently capableof a process called "fast mapping" - an ability to instantly assign a meaning to a new word, a strategy human toddlers use to learn language at a prodigious rate, and a skill thought to be exclusively the province of humans. (Wolfe 2010: 33)

And now I fast mapped the concept of fast mapping.

In Kinds of Minds and throughout his work, Dennett rightly rejects the idea that "some central Agent or Boss or Audience" - what he also sometimes calls a "Cartesian puppeteer" - takes in and "appreciates" the information produced by the neural networks and uses it to "steer the ship" of subjectivity. (Wolfe 2010: 34)

I on the other hand reject the other extreme that divorces mind from body in favour of the body by imputing "some central Agent or Boss or Audience" on the body. Recent speaker in Semiosalong, Veronika Valk, used constructions such as "what the body needs/wants". She viewed the body as a separate consciousness, a puppeteer of sorts.

The source of our greater intelligence when compared to our mammalian relatives, he [Dennett] argues, is not the size of our brains but "our habit of off-loading as much as possible of our cognitive tasks into the environment itself - extruding our minds (that is, our mental projects and activities) into the surrounding world, where a host of peripheral devices we construct can store, process, and re-present our meanings, streamlining, enhancing, and protecting the processes of transformation that are our thinking" - a process that "releases us from the limitations of our animal brains." And "thanks to our prosthetically enhanced imaginations," he continues, "we can formulate othewise imponderable, unnoticeable metaphysical possibilites." (Wolfe 2010: 35)

Oh wow. I haven't met the concept of off-loading in a long while. When I first met it I assumed that my readings blog is one such "peripheral device". I still think it is so.

The problem is that it is not clear how such prosthetic processes and devices can be said to constitute - to "store, process, and re-present" (in Dennett's words) - "our" thinking. After all, if we pay attention to the material, social, technical, and cultural complexities of such devices, then in what sense can the internal psychic states Dennett calls "our thinking" be said to be "re-presented" by such devices? And this is obviously true not just for storage devices such as archives, encyclopedias, books, and the institutional and disciplinary contexts in which they are embedded, but also for that first and most fundamental prosthesis of all, language itself, which cannot be said to "re-present" "our" thinking for at least two reasons. First, as Niklas Luhmann has put it (with characteristic astringency), language, like all forms of communication, "operates with an unspecific reference to the participating state of mind; it is especially unspecific as to perception. It cannot capy states of mind, cannot imitate them, cannot represent them." Second, there can be no "re-presentation" of "our" thinking in language because the meaning of an utterance is always subject to differential interpretation, an interpretation that itself takes place within multiply embedded protocols, traditions, conventions, and so on. (If this weren't the case, then it would be a private language, and we couldn't use it to communicate "our" thinking at all.) (Wolfe 2010: 35)

Both of these arguments can be negated. Firstly, language does enable one to express and/or represent states of mind. These guys completely neglect the so-called "emotive" function of communication. Secondly, language is not either all-social or all-personal. As Bakhtin put forth in his work, everyone speaks his or her own language, but we understand each other because our individual languages have commonalities - we can negotiate our meanings.

Maturana and Valera offer an extremely valuable accont of the evolutionary emergence of language proper from "linguistic domains" - an account that reaches back to Gregory Bateson's important work on "meta-communicative frames" in mammalian communication (especially in forms of "play"), and forward to the latest work is these areas by Noam Chomsky, Marc Hauser, and others. (Wolfe 2010: 37)

This is interesting, but it is merely a hint. The note says: "For a more detailed discussion of Bateson that situates his work in relation to Maturana and Varela, see my chapter "In the Shadow of Wittgenstein's Lion," in Zoontologies." Perhaps I will.

If this has a familiar ring to it, it should, because it is exactly the strategy that Jacques Lacan famously uses - in his essay of 1960, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" - to juridically separate the human from the animal as that being, alone among the living, who can lie by telling the truth. The animal, in Lacan's terms, can pretend, but not pretend to pretend - only the human, as "subject of the signifier," can do that. (Wolfe 2010: 39)

Neat. I wonder if this has anything to do with Remo's ostentation.

"Don't confuse ontological questions (about what exists) with epistemological questions (about how we know about it)!" (Wolfe 2010: 40)

The simplest circumlocutions to these philosophical terms I have seen. Dennett in Kinds of Minds.

As Derrida's later work makes clear, that Cartesianism rests on two fundamental points: (1) the assertion that animals, however sophisticated they may be, can only "react" but not "respond" to what goes on around them. And this is so because (2) the capacity to respond depends on the ability to wield concepts or representations, which is in turn possible only on the basis of language - and precisely in the sense voiced by Dennett when he writes, "No matter how closely a dog's 'concept' of cat is to yours extensionally (you and the dog discriminate the same sets of entities as cats and noncats), it differs radically in one way: the dog cannot consider its concept. ... No languageless mammal can have a concept of snow in the way we can, because a languageless mammal has no way of considering snow 'in general' or 'in itself.'" (Wolfe 2010: 40)

This is quite interesting, actually, as it paints "reaction" as physical response and "response" as meaningful reaction. In humans the difference is between nodding or vocalizing "mhm" (reacting) and actually saying something relevant in turn (responding). // The argument itself doesn't seem to hold, though, unless of course a languageless mammals have told Dennett that they have no way of considering something 'in general' or 'in itself'. Everyday experience tells that animals do respond, but then again I know too little about them to be sure.

As Marc Hauser - one of Chomsky's coauthors - argues is a separate study (and again I quote Haraway), this means that "organisms possess heterogeneous sets of mental tools, complexly and dynamically put together from genetic, developmental, and learning interactions throughout their lives, not unitary interiors that one either has or does not have." (Wolfe 2010: 41)

I'm sorry to say M. and P., in their metatheory of consciousness, seem to rely on this "unitary interior" approach - you either have consciousness or you don't (or, you either are in the sphere of consciousness or you aren't).

[...] the difference between communication and metacommunication, signifying and signifying about signifying, thinking and knowing you're thinking, and so on. (Wolfe 2010: 42)

I hate that you don't know how much I hate how you don't know how beautiful I think you don't think you are. ...and so on.

Wenner, Adrian M. 1969. The Study of Animal Communication: An Overviev. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. and Alexandra Ramsay (eds.), Approaches to Animal Communication. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 232-243.

In spite of an eagerness to organize working outlines, we have yet to find a formally stated, comprehensive framework within which we can consider even the field of animal communications. Until we have such a comprehensive view of the relationship among various behavioral acts, we can hardly develop meaningful classifications within more restricted areas of communication. (Wenner 1969: 232)

How comprehensive can you be at such an early stage? A complete overview of all aspects couldn't possibly be viable in the late 1960s.

A study of animal behavior largely concerns itself with an analysis of the activities of a sender or receiver, before and after signals (stimuli) pass. A study of animal communication, on the other hand, concentrates on an analysis of those signals which produce certain types of activity and on attendant circumstances which contribute to the activity generated. (Wenner 1969: 234)

I'm not sure what this distinction contributes to the discussion. Ideally, you would be interested in the signals and their circumstances as well as their effects.

That is, it is relatively easy to see an animal do something, but it may be very difficult to intercept the signal(s) responsible. (Wenner 1969: 234)

The situation was eerily similar in the study of human nonverbal communication. But unlike animal communication, which was studied as if from a blank slate, the researchers brought a wealth of cultural symbols, pre-interpretations and bias to the study of humans.

These physical features can involve more complicated factors, as well. Can a signal contain information about past or future events or can it be used only at the time of production? (Wenner 1969: 237)

Sounds like a question not unlike one involving Mead's truncated acts.

Hediger, Heini 1968. The Psychology and Behaviour of Animals is Zoos and Circuses. Translated by Geoffrey Sircom. New York: Dover.

[...] the greatest attention must be paid above all to the animals' expressions in the zoo, as these provide an important factor in determining the animals' mental and physical well-being. Characteristic changes in facial expression, and in the body, are of frequent occurrence in most animals. (Hediger 1968: 140)

Because nonverbal communication is the only means of communication available with animals.

What astonishes and interests us was that this lady visitor to the zoo had completely failed to recognize the extraordinary state of excitement of the maned sheep. Let us consider, then, by what signs this could have been recognized. First of all, the total situation, quite apart from the disappointed keepers, panting for breath: the animal was not just running, it was dashing up and down, and along the fence as well. This had nothing to do with play, or desire for exercise; the whole external appearance of its movements was obviously caused by some strong urge or other. Direction, tempo and type of movement of the animal were expressive of extreme distress and excitement. (Hediger 1968: 141)

The lady failed to recognize the definition of the situation.

Additional signs were the violently heaving flanks and the hoarse panting - an audible form of expression. (Hediger 1968: 142)

A circumlocution for strepitation.

Although animals, particularly wild ones, are as a rule excellent observers, far superior to men, it sometimes happens that they misunderstand one another; in other words they misinterpret the expressions of other animals. In the zoo, where animals that are quite foreign to each other come into contact, this happens comparatively often. (Hediger 1968: 142)

The case is similar with humans in so called "melting pots" where numerous cultures meet. Because the behaviour patterns of remote cultures are different, they pose a lot of misunderstanding to even very casual interactions.

Anyone critically inclined can of course object that this is just assertion without proof, since I could never know what was going on in the vulture's mind. The objection is theoretically justified. On the other hand, it must be stated here and now that people who have some experience in this field, and who see hundreds or thousands of animals daily eventually, by noting the expressions, develop a kind of intuition, rather like a doctor's diagnostic sense. (Hediger 1968: 143)

Define intuition as a "feeling for relations" as Edward Sapir did.

Optical Phenomena of Expression
These may be roughly divided into facial, gesture, and colour-change phenomena. (Hediger 1968: 145)

Colour-change is a marginal aspect of expression in humans as well. E.g. the estonian word jume (colouration, complexion).

Kind of step (e.g. goose-stepping in deer). The kind of step has also proved to have important expressive value in man (G. Kietz, 1952); similar studies for animals would be most interesting. (Hediger 1968: 145)

He's referring to Gertraud Kietz's 1952. Der Ausdrucksgehalt des menschlichen Ganges.

In mammals, the whole body is like an open book, to be read by those who know how. Every item, from the way the hair lies, to the position of the tip of the tail, has its special meaning. As a rule, the closer one gets to an animal, the clearer one finds the expressions of its condition, i.e. the external symptoms of the mood. On the other hand, there is a large number of expression phenomena we can understand the first time we meet, as they are more or less non-specific or resemble those with which we are already familiar in other animals. Indeed, some human grimaces are found in much the same form in animals. (Hediger 1968: 148)

The nature-book metaphor also makes its appearance. I suspect the "internal expression phenomena" Hediger is talking about inspired Sebeok's discussion of the biosemiotic self.

Moreover, the fact that most important facial nerve in human beings, the nervus facilis, in this branch of the animal kingdom, controls a considerable region, that of the gill-covers, shows how wrong it is to regard these denizens of the water as expressionless. (Hediger 1968: 148)

This is the nerve that gets affected by Bell's palsy.

Charles Darwin pointed out the many similarities and even correspondences in his far-reaching work "Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals". One important difference between man and animals, however, lies in the fact that conscious deception through shamming, i.e. falsified expression, really occurs in man alone. The pretence of lameness, in the crane or golden plover, the famous shamming dead of the opossum, or the often doubted but really genuine shamming sleep of the fox has certainly nothing to do with deception. We look for this characteristic in vain in the animal kingdom, a fact which has earned for animals many friendships with human beings. Exceptions occur only among trained animals, whose characters, as D. Katz (1927) expresses it, have been "tainted by man's fall from grace", and occasionally among very highly developed species, such as anthropoid apes living in close contact with man. (Hediger 1968: 150)

Shamming is an odd term. I prefer dissembling or dissimulating. He may be right about man being the only creature that falsifies expressions, but only because this is not a "survival mechanism" as it is in other species who "play dead" (e.g. the shamming sleep of the fox).

In the animal kingdom, and among mammals in particular, there is an extremely widespread and remarkably highly developed faculty of interpreting human expressions, usually with great accuracy. One might expect the domestic animal, which has been so intimately connected with man for centuries to be able to understand and act upon man's signs better than the wild animal. Animals, especially domestic ones perhaps, are better observers and more accurate interpreters of expression than men, if we exclude his technical aids such as films, microscopes, psycho-galvanometers, etc. (Hediger 1968: 153)

This was also Sebeok's conclusion in his exposition of "Clever Hans and Smart Simians" (1981).

Sartre, consciousness, and intentionality

Rowlands, Mark 2013. Sartre, consciousness, and intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12(30: 521-536.

All consciousness, as Husserl has shoown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness that is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 'content'.

The first, mundane, claim is that all consciousness is intentional. The claim is, of course, not utterly mundane: doubted by some, it nevertheless provides the starting point for philosophy in the Brentanian - hence philosophical - tradition, and is also widely accepted outside that tradition. Let us call this the Intentionality Thesis (IT). The second claim is far less mundane. Consciousness has no 'content'. Let us call this the No Content Thesis (NCT). This claim seems prima facie implausible. If consciousness has no content then, it seems, ther eis nothing in it. (Rowlands 2013: 521)

Oh my gawd, I hate phenomenology. There's no getting around it. How is the Intentionality Thesis mundane? Because phenomenologists keep repeating it as if saying it enough times makes it true? I have yet to see any substantial proof behind this thesis. That being said, there are certainly connections with Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski, who also wrestle with the content of consciousness.

No object of consciousness can be part of consciousness. That is:

(NCT) Necessarily, any object of consciousness is outside consciousness.

Sartre uses the term "transcendent" to refer to items that are outside consciousness. Thus, according to NCT, any object of consciousness is, necessarily, a transcendent thing. (Rowlands 2013: 522)

If you say so. Personally, I don't think consciousness can be studied through language and imagery games that pay lip service to logic. M. and P. are at least self-conscious of it.

To properly understand what NCT does and does not entail, we need, first, to observe the familiar distinction between acts and objects of consciousness. This distinction, in Sartre's work, corresponds to the distinction between two types of being: being-for-itself and being-in-itself respectively. (Rowlands 2013: 522)

St ühel pool teadvuse mõismine, töö ja võitlus teadvusega; teisel pool teadvuse sfäär, seisund ja struktuur.

Acts of consciousness include things such as seeing (and perceiving more generally), thinking, remembering, desiring, imagining, emoting, anticipating, dreading, and so on. An object of consciousness is that of which I am aware when I engage in an act of consciousness. (Rowlands 2013: 522)

Seega ei, siin on teooria, mitte metateooria, tasand. Teadvuse tegevused on ikkagi nägemine, kuulmine jne.

Given that NCT is supposed to be an implication of IT, the rejection of intentional objects as contents of consciousness must, it seems, be grounded in an argument of the following sort:

1. Consciousness is intentional
2. No object of consciousness can be intentional
3. Therefore, no object of consciousness can be part of consciousness

Claim 3 is, of course, NCT. Necessarily, any object of consciousness is outside of consciousness - a transcendent thing.
For the argument to work, a little tidying up is required. First, we should distinguish derived and non-derived or original intentionality. Derived intentionality is, roughly, intentionality that derives either from the minds or from the social conventions of intentional agents. Non-derived, or original, intentionality is intentionality that does not so derive. The Brintanian thesis, expressed as premise 1, is that consciousness is intentional in an original, or non-derived, sense. Moreover, the inclusion of derived intentionality would clearly make premise 2 false. We can, and often do, use symbols to stand in, or go proxy, for other things. (Rowlands 2013: 524)

Noneh. Kõige selle mõistmiseks tuleb vististi hakata Brentanot lugema. Tema intentsionaalsus on iseenesest müstiline - kui sellele lisada tuletatud intentsionaalsus siis muutub asi juba võimatuks ajuakrobaatikaks.

The hard work in defending premise 2 begins when the object is a mental one. Consider, for exampl, something that, prima facie, seems a very good candidate for object of consciousness with original intentionality: a mental image. Suppose I stare at a dog. Then close my eyes and picture it. I form a mental image of the dog. I am aware of this image. Therefore, it is an object of my consciousness. It is also about the dog. Therefore it certainly seems to have an original intentional status.
However, we can use an argument, generally associated with Wittgenstein rather than Sartre, to show why this is not, in fact, the case. The image, is, logically, just a symbol. In itself, it can mean many things, perhaps anything. It might mean - stand in for, be about - this particular dog or about dogs in general. It might mean 'furry thing', 'thing with four legs', 'thing with tail', 'thing with cold nose', 'mammal', and so on. In itself, the image can mean many things. To have specific meaning - to be about one thing rather than other things - it must be interpreted. And this, on the Sartrean scheme, is what consciousness - as act - does. More accurately, it is what consciousness, as act, is. Consciousness, in this context, is the interpretation of the image as being about one thing rather than others - in the mode, as Sartre would say, of not being it. The expression 'in the mode of not being it', signifies that it is not possible to assert that consciousness is interpreting activity. If the interpreting activity of my consciousness were, for example, to become an object of my consciousness, then it would no longer be part of my consciousness. The activity would be transcendent. (Rowlands 2013: 525)

Niiet teadvusel ikkagi on objektid? Teadvus on tõlgendus? Ma ei saa aru kas siin on konkreetsed vastused või mitte. Näib, et argumenteeritakse lihtsalt argumenteerimise pärast. Eriti häirib mind, et kujutluspildi (a mental image) tähendusele lähenetakse kui verbaalsele sümbolile, mis tundub lihtsalt kohatu. Kui sa vaatad koera, sulged silma ja kujutad sama koera pilti, siis see kujutis on ikkagi sama koera kujutis ja selle "tähendus", kui siin üldse saab tähendusest rääkida, on sama koer või pigem sinu suhe sellesse koera. Lühidalt, mind häirib, et siin usaldatakse keelefilosoofiat nähtuste puhul millel on vähe pistmist keelega.

The intentionality of consciousness, Sartre notes, has been understood in two ways:

All consciousness is consciousness of something. This definition of consciousness can be taken in two very distinct senses: either we nuderstand by this that consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or it means that consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a transcendent being. But the first interpretation destroys itself: to be conscious of something is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness.

The first interpretation 'destroys itself,' Sartre has argued in the preceding pages, for the reasons ultimately grounded in NCT. No object of consciousness can be part of consciousness since consciousness is intentional (in an original sense) and no object of consciousness can be intentional (in an original sense). There is nothing in consciousness, and therefore there are no resources from which the being of transcendent objects could be construed. (Rowlands 2013: 527)

Niiet välistatakse võimalus, et ollakse teadvusel sellest, et ollakse teadvusel. Aga kui ma pärast rasket trenni jalutan spordihallist ühiselamusse ja olen nii väsinud, et ei mõtle mitte millestki ja ei pane tähelegi kuidas ma kohale jõuan - kas ma ei olnud siis teadvusel?

Consciousness of consciousness would, therefore, seem to be impossible. However, this is a claim that Sartre denies. Indeed. Sartre insists that self-consciousness - consciousness of consciousness - is essentially involved in every conscious act. (Rowlands 2013: 530)

Natukenegi mõistlik, aga tõestab jällegi, et loogikaga ei ole väga mõttekas teadvusele läheneda, sest see võib muutuda tundmatuseni ja korjata üles "järelikult" vidinaid mis ei vasta tegelikkusele vähimalgi kombel.

Glossary of formalist terminology

O'Toole, Lawrence Michael and Ann Shukman (eds.), 1977. A contextual glossary of formalist terminology. In: Formalist Theory. Russian Poetics in Translation, Vol. 4. Oxford: Holdan Books.

The subject of literary science is not literature, but literariness, i.e. that which makes a given work a literary work. Up till now, however, historians of literature have mostly behaved like the police who when they want to arrest someone take in everyoen and everything found in the apartment and even chance passers-by. Historians of literature have in the same way felt the need to take in everything - everyday life, psychology, politics, philosophy. Instead of a science of literature we have fetched up wit ha conglomeration of cottage industries. (Jakobson 1921: §II in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 17)
[Noveishaya russkaya poeziya. Nabrosok Pervyi. Viktor Khlebnikov [The newest Russian poetry. First draft. Viktor Khlebnikov], Prague]

I don't know anything about the literary science of that time but today the scene seems equally intermeshed and confusing.

When we talk of ideological criticism, i.e. of criticism where the dominant criterion is not aesthetic but social or philosophical, it does not mean that we exclude all purely literary purport from such criticism. In the first place, every method of examining verbal material, whatever the degree of its literary consciousness, must of necessity be one of the historical-literary factors, the totality of which make up the literary background of the period. Secondly, even ideological criticism always has its poetics, though it is a poetics that is less practical, more summary, and more difficult to decipher. (Ginzburg 1927: 87 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 18)
['Iz literaturnoi istorii Benediktova' ['From the literary history of Benediktov'], Poetika, II, Leningrad, 83-103.]

That is, even researchers who turn to literature for sake of convenience still cannot avoid turning to historical-literary factors (the literary background of the period).

A writer draws after him a chain of other people's linguistic consciousness, a suite of narrators, who make combinations of new systems of skaz out of books, archaic elements [...] or out of conversational and dialectic elements [...] The stylistic movement is then enclosed in the narrow sphere of linguistic consciousness, in thrall to the conditions of the social life portrayed. (Vinogradov 1926: 38 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 19)
['Problema skaza v stilistike' ['The problem of skaz in stylistics'], Poetika, I, Leningrad, 24-40.]

Very simplistically: no author begins from a truly blank page.

The work is a system of correlated factors. Correlation of each factor with the others is its function in relation to the whole system. It is quite clear that every literary system is fromed not by the peaceful interaction of all the factors, but by the supremacy, the foregrounding, of one factor (or group) that functionally subjugates and colours the rest. This factor bears the name that has already become established in Russian scholarly works of the dominant. (Tynyanov 1927a: 4 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 20)
['Oda kak oratorskii zhanr' ['The ode as an oratorical genre'], Poetika, III, Leningrad, 102-128. References to reprint in Tynyanov 1929: 48-46 (Arkhaisty i novatory [Archaists and Innovators], Leningrad.).]

It is easy to see that there's a hierarchy and a predominant function in Jakobson's communication model after the foregrounded factor in the literary work.

The work of art is first and foremost a sign. A sign is an object that serves the perceiving consciousness as a substitute for some system of ideas which is its meaning. The essence of signification is the substitution of th eirrational, the fluctuating, the complex by the rational, the fixed, the simple. For this reason a sign is always a perceptible datum. Consequently, since it is a sign, the work of art must possess a perceptible substratum which in accord with the generally accepted terminology we shall term the material. In the work of art the material serves only as substratum upon which is realized a certain organization, usually termed artistic form [...] Material and form are the two basic points of view dictated by the definition of the work of art, the basic factors of artistic structure. (Bernshtein 1927: 28-29 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 21-21)
['Esteticheskie predposylki teorii deklamatsii' ['Aesthetic presuppositions for a theory of declamation'], Poetika, III, Leningrad, 25-44.]

The meaning of a symbol is a system of ideas and the function of signification is (or at least seems to be) to substitute "the complex, the fluctuating, the complex" system of ideas with "the rational, the fixed, the simple" perceptible material sign-vehicle. This account has a Wittgensteinian feel to it, at least when it comes to the specificity of a symbol's meaning.

Literature is a language construction which is perceptible precisely as a construction, i.e. literature is a dynamic language construction. (Tynyanov 1924: 14 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 22)
['Literaturnyi fakt' ['The literary fact']. References to reprint in Tynyanov 1929, 5-29. (Originally 'O literaturnom fakte', Lef, 2, 1924, 100-116.)]

Recall the poetic function that makes a verbal construction perceptible as poetry.

Poetry is language in its aesthetic function. (Jakobson 1921: §II in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 22)

Or that.

In emotional and poetic languages, the linguistic images (phonetic and semantic) concentrate more attention on themselves, the connection between sound and meaning is closer, more intimate, and the language by virtue of this is more revolutionary, inasmuch as habitual associations by contiguity recede into the background. (Jakobson 1921: §II in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 2)

In this way both emotional and poetic language are "ostensive" (they concentrate attention on themselves). The meaning is more closer and more intimate because it doesn't rely so much on reference as on the nature of its expression: in emotional utterances the content is secondary and the paralinguistic cues are primary; in poetry the content in similarly secondary and the aesthetic qualities of the poetry are primary.

The material of poetry is language. [...] The specific tendency of poetry [...] in the last analysis comes down to breaking up the structure of language into its elements which are then reconstructed [in such a way that] the correlations of parts are transposed, shifted, and consequently, there is laid bare and precisely calculated the actual significance, valency, linguistic value of these component parts. In other words poetic creation is work on the word not only as a sign, but as a thing possessing its own construction, the elements of which are re-evaluated and re-grouped in every new poetic utterance. [...] It must not be forgotten that in acquiring a poetic function the word does not thereby lose its other functions, including the communicative one; the latter are merely covered with a new constructive principle. (Vinokur 1923: 105, 109, 110 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 23)
['Poetika. Lingvistika. Sotsiologiya' ['Poetics. Linguistics. Sociology'], Lef, 3, 104-113.]

This is how the poetic function focuses on the message for its own sake. That is, it focuses on the message as a thing, as something other than mere message, but something with poetic/aesthetic value, its own construction or constructive principle.

In the verse-line, according to this law, all the words that make up the line are in a special correlation, in a denser interaction; hence a word does not have the same sense in poetry, but is different from practical speect of all kinds, and from prose. Moreover, all form words, all the secondary words that pass unnoticed in speaking, become in verse extraordinarily prominent and meaningful. (Tynyanov 1927b: 70 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 25)
['Ob osnovakh kino' ['On the foundations of cinema'], in Poetika kino, ed. B. Eikhenbaum, Moscow-Leningrad, 53-85.]

Similarly, our everyday practical movements have a different sense in dance. For example, Lil B performing his "cooking dance" is quite different from actual cooking.

By equivalent of a paetic text I mean all non-verbal elements which in some way replace it, first and foremost partial omissions, then partian substitution by graphic elements and so on. [...] The appearance of equivalents does not signify any lowering or weakening, but, on the contrary, the pressure and intensity of unexpected dynamic elements. They are clearly different from pauses: the pause is a homogeneous element in speech which stands for nothing but itself, while in an equivalent we are dealing with a heterogeneous element, differing in its very functions from the elements among which it is interposed. [...] an equivalent cannot be transmitted acoustically, only a pause can. (Tynyanov 1924a: 43, 47 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 27)
[Problema stikhotvornogo yazyka [The problem of verse language], Leningrad. References to 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965.]

It is actually quite unique for the notion of "non-verbal" appearing at this early date. That is, this notion was still in development in various fields. This definition here may very well be a source for Jakobson's cryptic "nonverbalized but verbalizable". The non-verbal element is here seen as replacing or substituting the verbal element. It is, indeed, nonverbalized, but only in the context of a poetic text.

How are we preconditioned to decipher polysemic lyric utterances? First of all by the traditional conventions of word-usage and of poetic style in general; next by the context (that is, by the obligatory significance of the given totality of speech elements, by the interaction of words); [...] (Larin 1927: 67 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 28)
['O lirike kak raznovidnost' khudozhestvennoi rechi (semanticheskie etyudy)' ['On the lyric as a kind of literary speech (semantic studies)'], Russkaya Rech' (novaya seriya) I, Leningrad, 42-73. Page references to the reprint in B.A. Larin, Estetika slova i yazyka pisatelya, Leningrad, 1974.]

This is what I think "verbal context" (of the speech act) means, as opposed to "nonverbal situation" (of the interaction).

In order to find in the structure of the poetic word this ontological correlation to the normal, - (and one might almost say here 'natural'), interest of the reader in the personality of the writer, it is enough to recall that, from the point of view of the biographer, a poem is not so much a particular cultural manifestation as an action by the author, the form of his behaviour - this idea was our starting point. [...] The word is not only the expression of some semantic content but also a social and psychological act on the part of one who utters it. Consequently it not only conveys to us, in its predicative forms, ideas and images, but it also suggests to us by its expressive forms, the pose, manner, and behaviour of the person who performs the act of predication. (Vinokur 1927: 78-80 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 28-29)
[Biografiya i kul'tura [Biography and culture], Moscow.]

It is quite understandable why this quote is in the category of "pragmatics". In the final analysis a poem is a speech act.

A poem does not, however, simply exist in history: it is a particular and specific cultural object. It exists in culture as a poem. Our task is therefore to seek out in the structure of the poem as a particular historical object, those features of which it could be said that, since they are what makes the poem a poem, they endow it with everything that is for it specific and typical. This specificum of the poetic structure is poetic inner form, the bearer of the special poetic significance of the word, the basis of its imagery and symbolic quality. It is here that takes place the transition from the simple-historical to the poetic as such, it is here that lies the 'forbidden one' in which the varied and random material taken from current social reality is raised by creative effort to the power of poetic existence sui generis. (Vinokur 1927: 75 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 29)

A similar ethos underlies my search for nonverbal imagery and symbols in Estonian culture.

The form of a literary work must be conceived of as dynamic. This dynamism is to be seen 1) in the notion of the constructional principle. Not all factors of a word have equal value; dynamic form is brought about not by the combination of factors, nor by their fusion (cf. the frequently used concept of 'correspondence'), but by their interaction and, consequently, by the foregrounding of one group of factors at the expense of another group. When this happens the foregrounded factor deforms the subservient ones. 2) The sense of form is, moreover, always a sense of flow (and hence of change) in the relationship between the subordinating constructional factor and the subservient factors. [...] Art lives in this interaction, in this struggle. Without a feeling of the subservience, of the deformation, of all the factors in relation to the factor that plays the constructional role, there can be no fact of art. [...] If the sensation of the interaction of factors disappears (a feeling which presupposes the presence of two principles: one subordinating and one subservient) the fact of art is lost; it becomes automatized. (Tynyanov 1924a: 28-29 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 30)

I wonder if this is the same reason why the functions of Jakobson's communication model have a hierarchy... And I kind of get why this "deformation" is necessary - it's because it's almost a literal de-formation, or as Shklovsky or Tynyanov put it somewhere in the above quotes, the replacement or substitution of one form with another. This is pretty much the nature of innovation and creativity and also involves sarcasm and parody. If there is no dominant and consequently no subservience (nothing is renewed, parodied, looked at from another angle, etc.) then there indeed is no art, just a formulaic repetition. In even a more broader scheme of things, this is why music, art, literature and other aspects of culture can never be finished and finalized, perfect for ever and ever. It is why there will always be "something new", even if it's merely another take on something old.

The organizing feature of art, by which art is distinguished from other semiological structures, is the direction of intention not towards the signified but towards the sign itself. The organizing feature of poetry is intention directed on to the verbal expression. The sign is a dominant in an artistic system and when the historian of literature takes as his principal subject not the sign, but what is signified, when he studies the ideology of a work of literature as an independent and autonomous entitiy, he destroys the hierarchy of values of the structure he is studying. (Theses, 3, c, 5. in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 31)
['Theses', Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague, 1, 1929.]

Not the poetic function but the organizing feature of poetry. Not the set (Einstellung) towards the message, but the intention towards the verbal expression. I still think we should turn to Anton Marty to make sense of not only Jakobson's emotive and poetic functions but also Tynyanov's auto- and synfunction and how they compare to Marty's auto- and synsemantics.

The existence of a fact as a fact of literature depends on its differentila quality (i.e. on its correlation with either the literary or the non-literary series). In other words its existence depends on its function. (Tynyanov 1927: 35 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 32)
['O literaturnoi evolyutsii' ['On literary evolution']. References to reprint in Tynyanov 1929, 30-37. (Originally 'Vopros o literaturnoi evolyutsii', Na literaturnom postu, 10, 42-48).]

Very much akin to his thesis co-written with Jakobson the next year.

The study of literary evolution is only possible if literature is treated as a series or system related to other series and systems and conditioned by them. An investigation must proceed from the constructional function to the literary function and from the literary function to the verbal. It must elucidate the evolutionary interaction of functions and forms. (Tynyanov 1927: 46-47 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 32-33)

This seems to spell out that literature is only one aspect of the system of systems (whatever it may be), and must be treated as such if it is to be studied. That is, literature is interconnected with all other aspects of... well... culture, society, nature, whatever.

The correlation of each element of a literary work, as a system, wit hothers, and, naturally, with the system as a whole, I term the element's constructional function. On closer inspection, such a function turns out to be a complex concept. The element simultaneously correlates: on the one hand, with the series of similar elements in other works as systems and even in other series, and, on the other, with other elements in its own system (the 'autofunction' and the 'synfunction'). For example, the lexis of a given work can be correlated simultaneously with literary lexis and general language lexis on the one hand, and with other elements of the given work on the other. (Tynyanov 1927: 33 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 33)

Intuitively one feels that these should be opposite: that the autofunction should concern elements of its own system and synfunction should concern similar elements in other systems. BUT! It makes perfect sense when we consider that auto- and synfunction are modeled after Anton Marty's semasiology. In that case it appears clearly that: Synsemantic words and phrases are meaningful only when they occur in the company of other words or, as synfunction stipulates, in relation with other elements in its own system. Autosemantic words and phrases on the other hand are meaningful in isolation, independent of context and, according to the autofunction, can be correlated with similar elements in other works, systems and series. I really must advocate turning to Anton Marty to make sense of Prague thinkers.

The dominant may be defined as the focussing component of a work of art: it rules, determines and transforms the remaining components. It is the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure. (Jakobson 1935: 82 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 34-35)
['The dominant' (unpublished Czech text of lecture). Page references to the English version in Readings in Russian Poetics, M.I.T., 1971, 82-87.]

In his communication model the predominant function seems more like a methodological curiosity (e.g. one views one function as dominant) but it is becoming abundantly clear that in some way or form Jakobson is trying to say that the dominant is a precondition of a speech act.

The purpose of art is to transmit the sense of a thing as seen not as recognizing; the device of art is that of 'making things strange' and of making form difficult, increasing the difficulty and time taken to perceive since the process of perception in art is an aim in itself and must be prolonged: art is a way of experiencing the making of a thing and what has already been made is of no importance. (Shklovsky 1927: 13 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 35)
['Iskusstvo kak priem' ['Art as device'], Sborniki po teorii proeticheskogo yazyka, II, 3-14. Reference to the reprint in Shklovsky 1929, 7-23. (O teorii prozy, Moscow. 1st ed. 1925.)]

This idea is a play on William James's observation that higher intelligence means greater delay between stimuli and reaction. While the intelligence of lower animals may appear as almost mechanical, in humans the measure of intelligence is how great a duration there is between an action and its rewards. I can't find the exact quote that reminded me of Shklovsky when I read James. In any case, Shklovsky has turned this idea around and viewed art as something that is meant for the intelligence of man, to give its most complex organ something to make sense of by making it strange.

We have the word 'set'. It breadly denotes 'the author's artistic intention'. And yet it sometimes happens that 'the intention was good, but the execution was poor'. Furthermore the author's intention can be no more than the yeast. Once equipped with some specific literary material, the author retreats from his original intention and submits to the material [...] Let us cross out the teleological connotation, the 'intention', from the word 'set'. What do we get? The 'set' of a literary work (series) turns out to be its speech function, its correlation with everyday life. (Tynyanov 1927: 42-43 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 36)

A verification - the "set" towards something is actually "setting" (Einstellung on sätestumus). The matter is made more confusing only by the fact that Einstellung also means "adjustment" and "attitude" in psychology.

The literary system correlates with the nearest non-literary series - the spoken word, with the material of adjacent verbal arts and of everyday speech. How does it correlate? In other words, where is the nearest social function of the literary series. This is where the term 'set' becomes meaningful. The set is not merely the dominant of a work (or genre) which colours functionally the subsidiary factors; it is at the same time the function of the work (or genre) in relation to the nearest non-literary series, that of speech. This is why the set to the spoken word is so enormously important in literature. (Tynyanov 1927a: 49 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 37)

Literature does "correlate" a lot with spoken word. This passage also hints that nonverbal communication can also be a "non-literary series", although it's correlation with the literary series is lesser than that with the spoken word.

The concept of 'set' or speech function applies to the literary series or the system of literature, but not to an individual work. The individual work has to be correlated with the literary series before we can speak of its set. We will not apply the law of large numbers to small ones. By trying to establish at once the subsequent causal series for individual works and individual authors, we are studying not the evolution of literature, but its modifications; not how literature changes and evolves in correlation with other series, but how adjacent series deform it - a question also worth studying, but belonging to a totally different dimension. (Tynyanov 1927: 44-45 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 37)

This suggests that in case of the "predominant function" in Jakobson's communication model, the "set" towards one of the functions is not a matter of an individual speech act, but a matter of "genre" (in the loose sense of the words), such as poetry, interjections, greetings, explicating the meaning of words, etc. In the end, this is a matter of theoretical typologies, not about the empirical analysis of communication.

The means of expression is an inseparable part of the message it contains. This heightening of attention towards the means of expression is known as a set to expression. As we perceive language of this kind we automatically sense the means of expression, that is, we notice the words which make up the expression and the way they are arranged in relation to one another. The means of expression take on a certain value of its own. Language centaining a set to expression is called literary, as distinct from practical speech which does not have this set. (Tomashevsky 1930: 9 in O'Toole & Shukman 1977: 37)
[Teoriya literatura. Poetika [Theory of literature. Poetics] Moscow-Leningrad, 1930. (First edition, 1925).]

More on the poetic function: in practical speech the means of expression (the language used) is not as important as it is in literature, where the means of expression "take on a certain value of their own". This value, one can presume, is aesthetic, poetic, or even literary value.

Jakobson-Pomorska Dialogues

Halle, Morris 1983 [1980]. Foreword. In: Jakobson, Roman & Krystyna Pomorska, Dialogues. Translated by Christian Hubert. Cambridge: The MIT Press, vii-xii.

During the Second World War, Jakobson organized in New York a project for the study of the Igor Tale, a twelfth-century Russian epic poem, which A. Mazon of the College de France had declared a seventeenth- or eighteenth-century forgery. The collective work of the Igor Tale published in 1948 not only fully established the authenticity of the poem, but also provided a completely new perspective on the history, the culture, and the literature of medieval Russia. (Halle 1983 [1980]: ix)

Jakobson's antics! I couldn't find the collective work, but I did find a paper dedicated to B. A. Uspenski in Russian Linguistics about a sexual motif in the Igor Tale.

Jakobson, Roman & Krystyna Pomorska 1983 [1980]. Dialogues. Translated by Christian Hubert. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

There is an inevitable distance between two interlocutors, which varies depending on the person addressed by the discourse. Our linguistic means must change according to whether our dialogue is limited to our family, our neighbours, or people who come from another part of town or another region of the country. Of course, social and cultural distances must be taken into account in addition to purely spatial differences. In other words, what we encounter here is a complex of questions of geographic and social dialectology. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 79)

This is also evident in non-linguistic affairs, especially in relation to behaviour patterns. This, let's call it, (socio-)semiotic distance is in my opinion at fault for countless misunderstandings and even ("intercultural") violence. The man who gets maced (pepper-sprayed) because he misinterpreted a random finger movement by another customer as a gesture to "go ahead" at the store counter is an extreme example, but not the most extreme.

Only a narrow dogmatism can artificially separate the stylistic canons from the linguistic code: in reality, these canons are an integral part of the code. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 80)

This is helpful, for I cannot (yet?) decide whether the imagery I'm studying is a stylistic canon (of impressionism, for example), or an integral part of Estonian language.

Upon tracing the history of the phonic and grammatical modifications of different languages, I became increasingly convinced of the necessity of constantly combining two opposite forces: the tendency to maintain an equilibrium and the tendency to destroy it. This is the essence of the self-motion of language. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 83)

Unsurprisingly these tendencies are viewed in Lotman's semiotics as aspects of culture.

In the Russian intelligentsia of my generation, for example, people pass easily from Russian to French and back in conversation among coevals. They sometimes include French phrases in their Russian utterances, and sometimes insert Russian words and expressions when speaking French. Gallicisms were perfectly natural in the colloquial language of Russian from the period described by Tolstoj in War and Peace until the recent past. For the characters in that historical novel, French was not a foreign language. It was just one style among many of Russian speech. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 86)

The situation is somewhat similar between English and Estonian in Estonia. But it's probably like that in countless countries all over the word.

In contradiction to these two types of signs [icons and indexes], Peirce delimited a third: the "symbol," which is based not on an actual relation between signans and signatum, but on a prescribed, conventional, and learned relation between them. In Peirce's terminology, the symbol relates the signans to the signatum by virtue of a prescribed and conventional contiguity between these two entities. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 91)

And artifice or parallelism relates signans to signatum based on a prescribed and conventional similarity.

Thus I was able once again to convince myself of the correctness of Lev Vladimirovich Shchreba's idea that philology is factually the science of slow and repeated reading. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 108)

Ain't that the truth.

Semantic comparisons applicable in a given parallelistic system furnish a key not only for understanding the semantic turn of the language in question, but also for comprehending the particularities of the linguistic thought of the community, although great caution must certainly be observed when drawing inferences about thought from the facts of language. (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 109)

Another worthwhile note to keep in mind when studying "mentality" on the basis of literature.

As without light there can be no joy -
For while the eye sees all of God's creation,
Still what is seen without light lacks beauty -
So it is with every soul lacking letters [...] (Jakobson & Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 154)

Relevant for my interests. Source: Constantine's prologue to his translation of the four gospels.

Pomorska, Krystyna 1983 [1980]. Afterword. In: Jakobson, Roman & Krystyna Pomorska, Dialogues. Translated by Christian Hubert. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 159-183.

Roman Jakobson often referred to his memories of Majakovskij, and he told me once that the poet "did not like what the English call 'small talk,' which was only gossip for him. In general, he would either gamble or write verse." This recollection enables us to understand all that Majakovskij wrote in his works, which are fundamentally "anti-quotidian." He had a morbid aversion to the banality of the everyday, to that odious cliche conveyed in the untranslatable Russian term byt. (Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 167)

I think one could even compile a list of 'serious' people who dislike small talk. I believe the list would be lengthy indeed.

Malevich's letter coincides with the very style of Jakobson's letters. These messages all have the character of a free notation of thoughts on art, which is apparent even in their graphical form: the long text is broken down into fragments separated not by paragraphs but by asterisks. Roman Jakobson said that his letters to Kruchenykh and Khlebnikov made use of ideas he had progressively jotted down after slow walks around the Polytechnic Museum of Moscow in the evenings after school. During these walks he would reflect upon poetry and poetic language, and upon returning home he would write his thoughts in little black notebooks. This sort of correspondence, which aimed at a veritable intellectual exchange, is characteristic of that period, and of the men of the Russian avant-garde in particular. (Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 173)

Come springtime I must try out this practice.

He would dramatize his poem "Vesna s dvumja priglašenijami" ("A spring with two invitations") with all sorts of sound effects: he would stamp his foot or strike rhythmic blows with the chair he was holding onto during the recitation. The back of the chair would serve him sometimes as a tribunal bannister, sometimes as an instrument for his sound effects, sometimes as protection against the public. ... The last time we heard him, in about 1967, he was reading wit ha somewhat less booming voice but still quite well, and with a particularly bizarre sound device: "the chandelier! It has fallen on the bald head of the old nobleman!" He would scream out the first word while covering his mouth with his hand in order to direct his voice toward the ceiling, toward a real chandelier that would begin to tremble and resonate. (Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 175)

Kruchenvkh's nonverbal/strepitative elements or dramatizations in poetry recital. The latter bit with the chandelier is especially clever.

Roman Jakobson, Russian by origin, was one of the most gifted Slavists and Bohemists, an unusual man both in appearance and in nature. A powerful man, with a rather large head, thick blond hair, and the face of a Raman god, he squinted in one eye. But he was not one to be bothered by such a troublesome defect. He overflowed with vitality, spoke with passion, and gestured with spirit. ...

(Vančura's widow in Pomorska 1983 [1980]: 177)

Mitte kissitav silm vaid kõõrdis silm. Mul on sel teemal üles korjatud tsitaat mida ma hetkel ei leia. Midagi sellist, et tähtis pole mitte see kas inimesel on defekt, vaid see, kas ta laseb ennast ja seeläbi teisi sellest kõigutada.

Lugemissõbralikum teadvuse sfäär

Vabandan, kes juba asusid teksti lugema, panin kogemata üles töövariandi, nüüd on õige, loodetavasti lugemissõbralikum. (S.S.)

Mamardašvili, Merab K. ja Aleksander M. Pjatigorski [1997]. Sümbol ja teadvus. Tõlkinud Silvi Salupere.

Rangelt võttes on teadvuse filosoofias (nii nagu ma seda praegu ette näön ja sellest momendist kasutan ma väljendit "teadvuse filosoofia" ainult selles personaalses tähenduses) metateooria võtnud endale teooria koha. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Siin on nii mõndagi sarnast Ricoeuriga. Esimene sarnasus on muidugi see, et ta tegeleb meta-hermeneutikaga. M. ja P. metateoretiseerimine meikib senssi vaid nii palju, et nad ei teoretiseerivad teoretiseerimisest - metateooria tunduv olevat võtnud endale teooria koha, sest teadvuse filosoofias on juba liiga palju teooriaid, et keegi suudaks neid kõiki vallata. Selle asemel loovad M. ja P. oma metateooria, mis on kõike muud kui konkreetne teooria.

Filosofeerimine "siin" eeldab ühte, metateoreetiliselt väga olulist momenti: ta paneb paika selge piiri filosofeerija situatsiooni ja koha (või kohtade), kus see filosofeerimine aset leiab, vahel. Teisiti öeldes, selle sfääri, mis on kaetud teadvuse filosoofia pragmaatikaga ja sfääri, kus ilmnevad lõplikud tulemused ja formuleeringud, vahel. Viimast sfääri võib tinglikult ja ainult selles tähenduses nimetada "maailm", "ajalugu" või "kultuur". (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Filosoof filosofeerib siin, kindlas olukorras, aga tema filosoofia koht kus ta aset leiab ilmneb maailmas, ajaloos ja kultuuris. Sarnaselt praegu ma loen ja kirjutam märkmeid siin ja praegu, aga need märkmed leiavad endale koha interneti, kindlas blogis.

Tänapäeva normaalse filosoofi reflekseerimata mõtlemine püüdleb (alates Lukács'ist ja Marcuse'ist kuni Frankfurdi koolkonnani ja Kojève'ist kuni hilise eksistsialismini) nende tulemuste ja formuleeringute automaatsele ülekandele mitte-filosofeerimise maailma kasutuse või praktikana (Praxis). (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Meenub Marxi kuulus ütlus, et filosoofid on maailma lõputult tõlgendanud, aga pont on hakata maailma muutma. Ehk: viia filosoofia tulemusi ja formuleeringuid automaatselt üle kanda mitte-filosofeerimise - praktika - maailma.

Siis me pöörasime oma pilgud teadvusele, kui sellele ainsale millelegi, mis on mitte-asi, st nii "on" kui "on mitte asi". (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Seda viimast konstruktsiooni saab ka lihtsamini selgitada. Teadvus on olemas, aga ta ei ole asi, st ta on mitte-asi. Teadvus ei ole objekt. Teadvuse ei ole materiaalne. Aga ometi on ta olemas. Omamoodi küsimus on see, kas oma metateooriat luues nad ikkagi ei loo lihtsalt järjekordset teooriat mis kirjeldab seda kuidas teadvus "väljendab olukorda teistes asjades" (nt psüühikas, ajus, jne).

Siit teine Teema küsimus: "Sümbol - Mille?". Pärast seda sai meile selgeks, kui kaugele me olime jõudnud semiootikast. Ja see eemaldumise fakt määras ära töö üldplaani. Alguses antakse teadvuse metateooria kui sissejuhatus teadvuse sümbolismi. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Sümbol - Mille? Vastus on siin "teadvuse", sest nende metateooria seisneb eelkõige "teadvuse sümbolismis" - milleks on ilmselt teadvuse sfäär, seisund struktuur jne.

Me mõlemad oleme täiesti veendunud, et on olemas (mitte "eksisteerib", vaid "on"!) üks filosoofia, mis on erineval moel väljendatud erinevate maade, kultuuride, aegade ja isiksuste tekstides. Lihtsalt üks ja sama selles tegutsev jõud kirgastus maailma serinevate nimede all. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Noh, filosoofia iseenesest on vaid tarkusearmastus, niiet võib küll ette kujutada, et taruksearmastus on olemas olnud kaua enne kirjakeelt ja see on erinevais paigus lihtsalt erinevaks kujunenud.

Aga enne seda oleks vajalik selgitada selle vajaduse, mis sunnib pöörduma teadvuse poole ja sellega tegelema, pragmaatilist ja metateoreetilist olemust. "Teadvuse" probleemil on olemas täiesti iseseisev pragmaatiline aspekt ja just selles aspektis saab teda tinglikult eristada, eraldada psühholoogia, epistemoloogia, loogika ja lingvistika probleemidest, mis on valdavalt teoreetilise iseloomiga. Ja ka pragmaatiline ei ole ta selles mõttes, nagu meile ilmnevad teised, puhtpraktilised inimese elu probleemid. Asi on selles, et juba suhtumine fakti "mul on olemas mingi teadvus" ja töö selle suhtega kujutavad endast erilist suhtumise ja töö viisi, mis nõuab erilist mõistmist. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Teadvus on eriline nähtus. Kahjuks ei näi nad jõudvat selle vajaduse selgitamiseni vaid tegelevad eituste ritta seadmisega. Kas teadvuse fakti (fakti, et mul on teadvus) ja sellega tegelemise või töötamise olemus ongi mõistetav ainult läbi selle mida ta ei ole? Sel juhul on olukord tõepoolest väga fenomenoloogiline - vähemalt Ricoeuri vahendatud mõttes, et fenomenoloogia on õõnestav ja eitav filosoofia mille aluseks on kõige muu (teaduse, psühholoogia, jne) eitamine. Meenub üks fenomenoloogia teemal kirjutatud magistritöö semiootika osakonnas, mis võttis samasuguse eitava suhtumise semiootika suhtes. Mulle aga näib, et kui su eesmärk on pidevalt teisi õõnestada, siis võid sa ise lõpuks seest õõnsaks osutuda - ja täpselt sellisena fenomenoloogia mulle praegu tundubki.

[...] siin on meil tegemist teatud metateadvusega, sellise tunnetuse sfääriga, millesse me lülitame midagi, mis ise teadvusesse ei kuulu. Ja antud juhul ei räägi sellise tunnetussfääri olemasolu meile veel midagi selle kohta, kas see, mis temasse on lülitatud, kuulub teadvuse juurde või mitte. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Sama operatsiooni saab teostada nö käitumise sfääriga ja tulemus oleks samasugune - ükskõik milliseid sümboleid kasutada, "kätimuse programm" vms, selles ei saa kuidagi kindel olla, et see sinna üldse kuulub. Peaasi, et metateooria ise oleks huvitav ja võimaldaks käitumist eriliselt tunnetada.

Siin mängib erilist rolli teatud sisemine negatiivne võime, mis väljendub "võitluses teadvusega". Võitlus teadvusega johtub inimese püüdest saavutada, et teadvus ei oleks midagi spontaansed ja iseseisvat. Teadvusest saab tunnetus ja ta lakkab selleks ajaks ("aeg" ei ole siin füüsilises tähenduses) olemast teadvus, muutub justkui metateadvuseks; sel juhul me nimetame selle viimase termineid ja väiteid metateooriaks. Ja see, mis meid suunab teadvuse metateooria poole, on tarvidus võidelda teadvusega. Võitlus teadvusega johtub üksikindiviidi kui teadliku olendi eksisteerimisviisist ja on selle viisi ilminguks. Selles mõttes on tegemist pragmaatilise probleemiga, sest inimene põrkub sellega, ükskõik millega ta ka ei tegeleks. Inimene lahendab seda probleemi kui oma/enda olemisviisi probleemi. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Millegi pärast adun ma siin Peter Ouspensky (Pjotr Uspenski) laadset mõtlemist, ehk venelaste vahendatud idamaise müstitsismi mõju. (Ja siinkohal on tähtis eristada, et see on just venelaste vahendatud, sest ameeriklaste vahendatud idamaine müstitsism on hoopis teistsugune.) Samas ei ole ma võimeline seda edasi andma kasutamata ameeriklaste tõlgendust: teadvusega tuleb võidelda, et saavutada nirvana - mitte-olemine või misiganes. Ouspensky käsitlusega sarnaneb teadvuse muutumine tunnetuseks või metateadvuseks. Ouspensky üks seminari-harjutusi demonstreerib seda: ülesanne on minutiks lõpetada mõtlemine, tundmine, liikumine jne ning "olla hetkes" nii täielikult, et sa ise justkui kaod ära - ainult et, just selle kadumise kaudu mäletad sa iseennast, saad iseendast teadlikuks. (Minu tõlgendus võib olla väga väga vigane - peaksin teda vististi uuesti lugema hakkama ja seekord tõesti märkmeid tegema, sest käesoleva teksti mõistmiseks tundub see relevantne või vähemalt abistav.)

Teadvusele võib läheneda nii mitteteadlikult kui ka teadlikult. Mitteteadvustatud lähenemise puhul figureerib teadvus kui tunnetusprotsess. Ta lihtsalt jääb "oma kohale", temaga "ei juhtu midagi". Kuid me lähtume siin veidi hullumeelsest eeldusest, et sel momendil, praegu, sel ajal, kui me arutleme teadvuse probleemi üle, kui, nagu me ütlesime, "töötame teadvusega", me juba teatud määral välistame teadvuse kui teatud spontaanse protsessi. Selles seisnebki võitlus teadvusega. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Intralinguaalne tõlge: võitlus teadvusega seisneb teadvusega töötamises (milleks siis üldse neid toiminguid eristada?) mille kaudu välistatakse teadvust kui spontaanset protsessi. Isegi kui töötamine ja võitlemine ei ole võrdväärdsed jääb siit külge tugev fenomenoloogia maik: me ei ütle mis teadvus on, me räägime vaid sellest mida ta ei ole - ta ei ole spontaanne protsess. Aitäh, Brentano.

Sel juhul omandab väljend "võitlus teadvusega" konkreetsema elulise tähenduse, kuna osutub, et teatud motivatsioonide ja eesmärkide nimel, mis asetsevad teadvusest väljaspool, tuleb teadvus "lõpetada". Tuleb lõpetada, peatada, mitte ainult selleks, et mõista, vaid ka selleks, et mõista midagi muud, st lihtsalt elada. "Elu" ja "teadvus" on kaks täiesti erinevat asja: me ju tunnetame mingitel hetkedel selgelt sellise elu olemasolu, mis ei ole teadvus. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Minu naiivses tõlgenduses on elu ja teadvus siiski vaid subjekti ja objekti jätk, kuid seda väga erilisel viisil: elu on mitteteadlik - puu kasvab ilma, et ta peaks kordagi "mõtlema" kasvamise peale; teadvus seevastu on elust lahutatud - teadvuse suurimad saavutused asuvad väljaspool elu, see on tasand millele taimedel pole lootustki jõuda ja loomade kohta on kahtlane mida öelda - äkki Nublu on suurem budist kui ükski inimene. Igal juhul muutub Ouspensky harjutuses teadvuse peatamisega elu tajutavaks. Kasvõi kõige puhtilmsemas somaatilises mõttes - sa muutud teadlikuks sellest, et sa asud ruumis ja ajas (esimene selle tõttu, et sa tajud enda keha ja teine põhiliselt selle tõttu, et sa endiselt näed ja kuuled - võtad vastu - teisi kehasid, kes või mis liiguvad edasi). "Harjutus" on samas vist palju öeldud, sest inimesed teevad seda kindlasti teadmatult ja täpselt sama asja soovitatakse teha neil, kel on hüpnagoogiaga probleeme ja ei saa sõba silmale, sest teadvusekiirendi ei lakka lõputult tuhisemast.

Seega tõstatub kõigepealt ülesanne muuta mitteteadvus teadvuseks ja selle käigus viia inimene uue, teadvusliku kogemuse seisundisse. Kuid seejärel osutub, et mitteteadvus on see, mis "oli" teadvus ja ainult selles mõttes on võimalik mitteteadvusliku ja teadvusliku võrdlus või eristus. Mitteteadvusel on tähendus vaid siis, kui ta ise on (endise) teadvuse teatud eriline element. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

See ümberpööramine peaks niisiis olema funktsionaalne: mitteteadvus (teadvuse lõpetamine või peatamine) saab teadvusliku kogemuse uueks seisundiks ja muutub selle eriliseks elemendiks. Mulle näib praegu, et just nii saavutatakse see "vabanemine". Aga samas jääb paratamatult ka mulje, et siinne metateooria ei ole midagi muud kui mõtteharjutus mis õpetab mitteteadvust hindama kõrgelt ja kasutab teadvuse filosoofia mõisteid ja teooriaid vaid selleks, et lugejat "kirgastada".

Surma mõistet saab konkretiseerida kliinilise surmana, bioloogilise surmana jne, kudi surm ise kui nähtus jääb kirjeldamatuks ja seepärast on naeruväärne rääkida surma teooriast, samas kui teadvuse seisukohast on igati asjakohane rääkida surma metateooriast (ülalpool mainitud tähenduses, st kirjeldades tingimusi, milles surmast räägitakse ja mõeldakse ja selle rääkimise ja mõtlemise omadustest, aga mitte esemest endast. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Siin tegelikult ilmneb päris hästi metateooria iseloom. Kliinilise ja bioloogilise surmaga kaasnevad ka kindlasti teooriad ja rääkida saab ka surma antropoloogilistest, sotsioloogilistest ja psühholoogilistest külgedest. Millest rääkida ei saa on teooria surma fenomenist nii nagu seda fenomenoloogia seisukohalt peaks nägema - läbi kogemus. Mida saab aga teha on surmast rääkida ja mõelda - aga seda teevad inimesed kes ise ei ole surnud, sest muidu nad ei saaks seda teha. Samamoodi ei saa me, nagu olevat Briti antropoloogias tavaline ütlus, rääkida sellest mis tunne oleks olla hobune.

Tedavuse metateooria probleemi teeb veel keerulisemaks nn esmase metakeele olemasolu. St, peale teadvuse metakeele, mille me uurijatena tahame luua, on olemas ka teine, selle suhtes esmane, teadvuse enda kui mingi "loomulikult" funktsioneeriva jõu metakeel. Võtame sellise vanaindia grammatiliste ettekujutuste (samalaadseid nähtusi on ka paljudes mütoloogilistes süsteemides) hämmastava võime olla keele kirjeldus ja samaaegselt genereerida tingimusi teisese teadvustamise jaoks selle kirjelduse teoreetilise süsteemina. Lingvistid peavad neid ettekujutusi teadmisteks keele kohta, meie aga loeme neid teatud "loomulikeks moodustisteks", keele enda "töö" tingimusteks, igasuguse keele funktsioneerimise sisemiseks võimaluseks, sõltumata mingi keeleteaduse olemasolust. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Mulle jääb mulje, et siin räägitakse metalinguaalsest funktsioonist, mis samamoodi võimaldab sõltumatult keeleteadvusest kirjeldada keele enda "töö" tingimusi... Ei. See ei ole metalinguistic function, sest siin ei ole tegu nö "koodi täpsustamise" ja ekvivalentide väljapakkumisega. Lühidalt: siin ei puudutata ei tähistajaid ega tähistatavaid vaid hoopis teadmisi keele toimimise enda kohta, mis on ilma keeleteaduseta kahtlemata pelgalt ettekujutused. Ei. Ma ei tea. // Teisel pilgul on siin siiski semiosfääri iseloomu kirjeldus, nagu ma pakun välja allpool.

Me võime lihtsalt kujutleda, et mingid nähtused (aga mitte tingimata "subjekt") võivad ise välja töötada mingeid metamoodustusi, et mingi keel võib ka täna genereerida mingeid metakeerelisi moodustisi. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

See on liiga abstraktne, et sellega midagi pihta saaks hakata. Mingid nähtuseid moodustavad mingeid moodustusi mingite moodustuste kohta. Kuidas keel ja metakeel siia üldse puutuvad jääb arusaamatuks.

Teadvus ja keel võivad loomulikul moel funktsioneerida ainult teatud ettekujutuste (mida me nimetame metaesemeteks) olemasolu nendest esemetest. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Mulle jääb mulje, et nad käsitlevad siin väga abstraktselt midagi mida on palju täpsemate terminitega juba uuemas kognitiivses lingvistikas käsitletud. Sissejuhatuses ütlesid nad ise, et keelt juba mõistetakse... kellegi teise poolt. Seega peaks vist eeldama, et nad räägivad millestki muust kui keelest. Ettekujutuste (imagery?) roll on siin samuti ähmane.

Esmane metakeel ei ole tingimata seotud teisesega ajalooliselt. Me ei saa öelda, et esmane metakeel oli aluseks teisesele. Lihtsalt ilmselt miski tekitab esmase metakeele ja eksisteerib ka metakeel, mida saab suhestada esmase metakeelega tüpoloogiliselt, aga mitte geneetiliselt. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Midagi sarnast on lahti primaarsete modelleerivate süsteemidega. Need on suhestatud tüpoloogiliselt, mitte geneetiliselt nagu Sebeok tõlgendas. St Mihhail Lotman pidi oma Struktuuris ja Vabaduses meelde tuletama, et nendevaheline seos on "suhteline" mitte nt fülogeneetiline (ega ontogeneetiline).

Siin kõrvuti terminite "metakeel" ja "metateooria" kasutamist ei pea mõistma selles mõttes, et need on üks ja sama. Teadvuse metateooria on see, mida me konstrueerime oma töös teadvusega, oma võitluses temaga. Seejuures on mingid sõnad kõige lihtsamateks argiseks materjaliks selle "konstrueerimise" jaoks, sest nad on meil käepärast ja ei midagi enamat. Mis aga puutub teadvuse metakeelde, siis siin oleme sunnitud kas kasutama olemasolevaid, objektkeelest või metakeelest võetud termineid, või siis mingeid igapäevaseid sõnu ja väljendeid, mis ei omanud kuni selle hetkeni terminoloogilist tähendust, nagu näiteks: "teadvuse mõistmine", "töö teadvusega", "võitlus teadvusega". Seejuures on oluline, et nad säilitaksid samaaegselt ka oma elementaarse tähenduse. Teadvuse metateoorias tuleb püüelda terminite poole, mis säilitaksid oma läbipaistva argise tähenduse, võime kutsuda esile rikkalikke assotsiatsioone, mis korvaks teadvuse analüütilise kirjelduse raskused. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Ja mis oleksid teadvuse metateooria konstrueerimise keerulisem mitteargine materjal? Praegu ei ole ma veel üldse kindel kui palju oma elementeaarsest tähendusest "mõistmine", "töö" ja "võitlus" säilitavad.

Me ei saa öelda "kus on keel, seal on teadvus". Me kasutame oma teadvuse mõistmisel keelt, sest see mõistmine eksplitseeritakse. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Teadvus ja keel ei ole samad. Kui oleks, siis tähendaks see, et kõik keeletud olendid on teadvusetud. Enamus koeri ei räägi ega kirjuta luulet, aga kõik koerad on teadvusel.

Me ei saa öelda, et mingi keeleline tekst on markeeritud kui teadvuse akt. Ennem on meil tegemist mingite süntaktiliste ja stilistiliste konstruktsioonidega, kus teadvus ilmneb teksti astme kindlaksmääramises, teksti tekstis kindlakstegemises jne. Sellele nähtusele on korduvalt tähelepanu pööranud lingvistid ja keele stilistiliste eripärade uurijad. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Esimesel lugemisel arvasin, et kirjutamine on teaduvse akt. Siin aga öeldud, et ei ole. Küll aga näidakse käsitlevat pigem teksti lugemist kuiet kirjutamist. "Tekst tekstis" teema tuleks üle korrata.

Keelelised opositsioonid ise ei räägi meie arvates midagi teadvusest. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Küll aga räägivad nad minu arvates midagi kultuurist ja vahenditest mida kindla keele ja kurtuuri poolt mõjutatud teadvus kasutab iseenda ja maailma mõtestamiseks - st keel räägib midagi "teadvuse esemetest".

Teadvuse võiks sisse viia kui mingite teadvusesse mittepuutuvate struktuuride, nähtuste, sündmuste ülekande intellektuaalsete struktuuride (samuti ei kuulu teadvuse juurde) tegevuse plaani. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Siin näikse olevat paralleel kultuurisemiootikaga. Teadvus/intellekt omab korrastavad funktsiooni. Teadvus sellises tähenduses organiseerib struktuuridest, nähtustest ja sündmustest mingisuguse terviku. Tegevuse plaani osa haakub selles suhtes George H. Meadi käsitlusega intellektist, kus teadvus on samuti kujutatud tegevusplaanide korrastajana (olgugi, et väga keerulistes terminites, nagu consciousness of meaning ja truncated act väljendatuna).

Kuid tunduvalt suurema tõenäosusega võiks me eeldada, et mingid keelelise mõtlemise struktuurid on rohkem seotud teadvuse puudumise, kui tema kohaloluga. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Meenutab kangesti Jakobsoni artiklit alateadvusest kus ta tsiteeris E. Sapiri väiteit teadlikkuse kohta keele toimimisest. Keelt kasutatakse tegelikult suhteliselt "mõtlematult". Kui iga sõna ja konstruktsiooni üle ahistada end lõpmatult siis ei saaksi midagi öeldud. Tegelikult laseme keelel teha ära suure osa tööd ja ise jääme seejuures kõrvaltvaatajaks - jaa, keel räägib minu kaudu, vahva. Selleks, et teadvuse struktuurideni jõuda tuleb vististi keelest loobuda, st lülitada välja - nii palju kui teda välja lülitada annab - ja aktiveerida nö "kõrgem meel" mis tegeleb sümbolitega (ma kõlan juba nagu J. Grigorjeva).

Tekst saab olla genereeritud, samas kui teadvust ei saa genereerida mingi lingvistilise seadeldisega, eelkõige seetöttu, et teadvus ilmneb tekstis mitte tänu mingitele keelelistele seaduspäradele, see tähendab keele seest, vaid ainult tänu teadvuse enda mingile seaduspärale. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

See tundub tõene. Nt eestlase teadvus ei ilmne tekstis mitte selle tõttu, et tekst koosneb eestikeelsetest sõnadest vaid selle tõttu, et sellest kumab eestlase teadvus läbi. Väga lihtsustatult võib öelda, et siin on tegu keele ja meele vahekorraga: teks võib olla võõrkeelne, mis on väga tuttav juhtum, aga ka võõrmeelne. Viimased pole mitte ainult tõlketekstid vaid ka eestlaste kirjutatud tekstid mis on tegelikult mõeldud teises keeles. Näiteks Noor-Eesti kirjandust süüdistati selles, et see on "paberlik kirjandus, mis on küll eesti keeles kirjutatud, kuid mitte eesti keeles mõeldud" (Uhstal 1908; vt Luukas 2000: 119). Selline lihtsameelne oma/võõra vastandus on vaid näitlik - teadvuse/teksti vahekorraga saab muidugi palju enamat ette võtta.

Sündmuse toimumise fakt, meeldejäämise fakt ja meenutamise fakt kuuluvad kõik mälu psüühilise mehhanismi juurde. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Selles aspektis tasub taaskülastada Jacob R. Kantori 1922. artiklit mälumehhanismidest mis täpsustab meenutamist, meelde tuletamist, tahtlikku ja tahtmatut mäletamist jne detailse tüpoloogiana.

[...] teadvuse kirjeldamise katsetes on hädavajalik eelnevalt konstrueerida teatud "sünteetiline objekt" (st objekt, mis oleks objektiks "meie jaoks", oleks konstruktsioon meie kaemuses, aga mitte objekt selle sõna reaalses tähenduses). (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Teadvuse sfääri on seega sünteetiline objekt.

See sünteetiline objekt peab lubama meil vabalt liikuda risti ja põiki psühholoogiliste, sotsioloogiliste, eetiliste jne kirjelduste erinevuste piirides ja võimaldada meil esitada algset lähtepunkti, mis ei sõltuks esemelistest eristustest psühholoogiliseks, sotsioloogiliseks, eetiliseks jne, lähenemisel teadvusele. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

See on küll kaval. Ja semiosfääril on samasugune affordance, mis teeb temast kasuliku vahendi erinevate vaatepunktide kohal hõljuda "metateoreetiliselt".

Seega figureerib teadvuse sfäär ka kui mingi pseudotopoloogiline mõiste. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Ka semiosfääri pseudo- või kvaasitopoloogilisusest on kirjutatud.

Teadvuse sfäär ei ole klassifitseeritav tänu meie lähenemise spetsiifikale, mille aluseks on üleüldise ja järjekindla mitteklassifitseeritavuse põhimõte. St kui toimub üleminek mõistelt "teadvuse sfäär" mõistele "teadvuse seisund" või mõistele "teadvuse struktuur", siis see ei ole üleminek üldiselt mõistelt üksikule, vaid lihtsalt järgmine aste meie arutluses, meie mõistmise/arusaama konkretisatsioon. Uued mõisted esituvad kui meie arusaama, aga mitte selle objekti, uued konkretisatsioonid. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Siit jääb mulje, et teadvuse sfäär, seisund ja struktuur on ühe ja sama idee erinevad teostused milles esineb "konkretiseerimine" selles mõttes, et me tahame jõuda väga üldiselt mõistest "sfäär" väga spetsiifilisele mõistele "struktuur". Selles mõttes on siinne metateooria tegelikult semiosfäärilise lähenemise realisatsioon - meenutagem kuidas Peirce alustab märgist, Saussure alustab keelesüsteemist ja meie alustame semiootilisest sfäärist ja märkide võimalikkusest. Siin samamoodi alustatakse kõigepealt teadvuse sfäärist ja võimalikkusest ja edasi liigume ilmselt konkreetsemate asjade juurde.

Võtame sellise näite: "üleujutus" kui jõe või mere üle kallaste tulek on "sündmus". Kuid "üleujutus" kui sümbol, mis on teadvuse poolt "väljastatud", on "maailma sündmus". Sedalaadi objekt ja subjekt, mis eksisteerivad väljaspool aega (ja millel justkui oleks mingi reaalne analoog, kuid tegelikult ei ole sellega seotud vaid on midagi muud), analüüsitakse põhimõtteliselt teistmoodi. Reaalse sündmuse vaatluse, vastuvõtu fakti ennast inimeste poolt tuleb analüüsida täiesti erinevalt, kui sedasama fakti "maailma sündmusena" ja seega peab teda suhestama juba teadvuse eluga. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Ma pole kindel kas see oli Boas, Sapir või Whorf, aga keegi neist märkis midagi sarnast, et "laine" on väljamõeldis, sest tegelikkuses on vaid "lained". Üksik laine kui selline eksisteerib samuti "ajaväliselt", st on teadvuse sümbol.

Mõiste "teadvuse sfäär" ise on aga selle asjaolu "sümboliks", et antud uurimuses ei ole ei tähistajat, ei tähistatavat ega seda, kes tähistab. Meil on ainult intuitiivne semiotiseerimise kogemus, milles need kolm momenti on olemas, kuid neid ei ole võimalik tabada kui eristatuid ajas ja ruumis. Võib eeldada, et on olemas pidev side tähistaja ja tähistatu vahel, kui neid ei ole võimalik üksteisest lahutada. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Jällegi kokkulangevus semiosfääriga, mis eelneb ühtse eraldiseisvale keele tekkimise tingimus ja on ühtlasi selle tekkimise eelduseks.

Me alustame meie mõistmise eksplikatsiooni teadvuse sfäärist, kuna see tähistab meie arutluses teatud piiri: "just siin" me alustame meie arusaamise terminite ja vastavalt teadvuse metateooria terminite seletamist, ja kuna me alustame seda mingist "miskist", siis nimetame me seda "miskit", seda piiri, teadvuse sfääriks. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Ja veel üks paralleel semiosfääriga, mis on semiootika piir - väljaspool mida on märgitegevus võimatu (vähemalt esimeses iteratsioonis semiootiline/ekstra-semiootiline, mitte nt semiootiline/teistmoodi-semiootiline). Tähendab, teadvuse sfäär on teadvuse toimimise (piiri)tingimus.

Viies sisse "teadvuse sfääri" mõiste, ehitame me sellega teadvuse struktuuri ja seisundi kirjeldamise aparaadi sümbolilist osa, millele me ei omista mingit lokalisatsiooni ja mida me mingil moel ei konkretiseeri seetõttu, et edaspidi hakkame teadvuse struktuure ja seisundeid vaatlema kui teadvuse sfääris fikseeritu lokalisatsiooni ja konkretisatsiooni. Sellega me faktiliselt tunnistame mõiste "teadvuse sfäär" sümbolilist iseloomu. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Nüüd tahaks ette arvata, kas: (a) tegu on matrjoška tüüpi järjestusega sfäär > seisund > struktuur; või (b) seisund ja struktuur on samaväärsed/võrreldavad ning kujutavad endast sisuliselt diskreetse ja kontinuaalse vastandust (pidades meeles, et tekiksid paarid "diskreetne struktuur" ja "kontinuaalne seisund"). Mõlemad variandid on võimalikud, aga (b) võimaldaks vestlusse lülitada Greimasi, kes mõistab kontinuaalsust seisundina nagu seda topoloogias vististi tehakse. Eks näeme.

Rääkides teadvuse sfäärist pidasime me silmas, et kõik ülejäänut hakkame me tooma sisse kui selle konkretiseeringut meie sümbolilise operaatorina. Aga "teadvuse seisundi" määratluses ütleme, et teadvuse seisundis asub igaüks, kes asub teadvuse sfääris. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Niiet ei (a) ega (b) vaid (c) - midagi hoopis muud.

Me arvame, et faktile, et me püüame mõista teadvust, vastab rida individuaalseid teadvuse seisundeid, antud juhul - meie omi. Kuid me võime kahlemata välja tuua ka konkreetsema vastavuse: võime endale ette kujutada, et iga mõeldav sisu (näiteks selline: "kõik, mis on olemas, on mõttekas" või "kõik, mis on olemas, on mõttetu", või mistahes teine tekstuaalselt eristatav sisu) saab suhestuda teadvuse teatud seisundi või seisunditega. Jutt ei ole siin mingitest ühetähenduslikest vastavustest (ühele ja samale sisule võib vastata mitu teadvuse seisundit või siis reale sisudele võib vastata üks teadvuse seisund), vaid sellise suhestatuse põhimõttelisest võimalikkusest. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Tundub nagu "nii palju kui on inimesi, on ka erinevaid keeli ja kultuure" või "nii palju kui on inimesi kes sind ära tunnevad, on sul sotsiaalseid mina-sid" tüüpi lahendus, milles iga teadvuse "tooken" kujutab endast erinevat teadvuse "tüüpi". Ma pole kindel mida "iga kogemus on kordumatu" meile annab.

Kuid me võime endale ette kujutada ühte teadvuse seisundit, milles on kõik sisud, või ühe teadvuse, milles on kõik sisud, või paljude teadvust, milles on üks ja sama sisu, kuigi viimane on võimalik vaid siis, kui me lähtume oma arutluses mitte teadvuse seisundist, vaid sisust, st kui jutt on juba teadvuse struktuurist. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Struktuur on seega teadvuse sisu. Ongi enam-vähem "sfäär > seisund > struktuur" ehk variant (a). Mida selle (c)-ga ette võtta, ma veel ei tea.

Meie jaoks on hädavajalik mõista teadvuse seisundit kui formaalset mõistet mitte vastandina sisule, vaid sõltumatuna igas võimalikust mõeldavast sisust. teadvuse omadus "on sisul olemas" kui sisu "asub" teadvuse seisundis. Ja sellega me juba viime teadvuse seisundi formaalselt sisse: "teadvustada" tähendab "olla teadvuse vorm" või, õigemini, "teadvustada" tähendab "olla vorm". Lähtudes sellelt, võime nüüd viia sisse mõiste "teadvuse tekst", kartmata lingvistilisi ja psühholoogilisi analoogiaid ja assotsiatsioone. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])

Siin on väga peene värk mida tuleb kindlasti üle kaaluda, aga oluline on seos formalismiga. Vormi ja sisu, seisundi ja struktuuri, omaduse ja tegevuse, teadvuse ja teadvustamise jne suhted tunduvad omavad kindlat loogikat mida on ehk isegi võimalik lahti muukida. // Lugemissõbralikum variant on tõepoolest lugejasõbralikum.