JNB Volume 2 Issue 3 Spring 1978

Patterson, Arthur H. 1978. Territorial behavior and fear of crime in the elderly. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(3): 131-144.

[...] a study by Schooler (1970) found that the elderly are more concerned with their safety than with maintaining social interaction. (Patterson 1978: 132)

Apparently when you're old you are less concerned with social interaction than you are of your personal safety. I wonder if fear of crime overrides sociability to such a degree that it can be considered as a cause for unsociability.

Another explanation of the problem is offered by Christian (Note 1). He feels that the elderly, many of whom live alone, are physically and socially vulnerable. This vulnerability leads to a decrease in social activity and an increase in victimization and fear of crime. Lebowitz (1975) has also found that those elderly who live alone fear crime more than those who do not live alone. (Patterson 1978: 132)

It does seem to be so. If you feel vulnerable then you are obviously also less outgoing.

Neugarten and associates (1964) have described this as the shift to less active mastery in later years. Similarly, this has been viewed as a shift from active to passive behavior and from aggression to cooperation (Clark, 1967) and as a movement from competitive behavior to cooperation and from aggressive behavior to passivity (Riley, 1969). (Patterson 1978: 133)

This is a known factor in aging: the loss of ability (here active mastery). It does demand a degree of agility and aggressiveness to go out and socialize.

Lawton et al. (1976) have discussed the lack of environmental control, which can partially account for the crime problem in the elderly. They note such problems among the elderly as (1) limits in their visual and auditory acuity, which results in potential threats going unrecognized; (2) physical limits to the actions that they can take, such as running to avoid assault; and (3) social isolation and economic deprivation, which lead to vulnerability. (Patterson 1978: 133)

I recall my old social studies teacher who avoided the city center because it was too dangerous for her - at least that's what she thought. I, too, was afraid of the city center when I was 16. After that not so much, but it's probably because now I'm more familiar with the city and also I don't go out that much myself, so I don't come across dangerous situations as much. My own problems are actually quite similar. Perhaps not the first one, but I do avoid going out because of my health and also the third aspect (no point going out when you don't have beer money or friends at hand to hang out with).

A 1973 Gallup poll indicated that many people over 50 years of age were afraid to leave their homes at night. (Patterson 1978: 133)

As the saying goes: nothing good ever happens after 2 am. In older times (the beginning of the previous century) the rules of civil conduct didn't actually apply after 2 am.

Newman (1972) has stated that crime deterrence results from the capacity of the designed environment to create zones of territorial influence that the inhabitants will survey and defend. The research on territoriality generally supports this concept. (Patterson 1978: 134)

Neighbourhood watch seems to be an intentional effort to create such a zone, although what they have in mind here is probably a naturalistic zone of such surveillance and defence.

Baum, Andrew; Karen Mapp and Glenn E. Davis 1978. Determinants of residential group development and social control. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(3): 145-160.

Clearly, architectural design can influence mood and behavior at a number of levels, including the development of social groupings and the evolution of norms governing the use of space. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 146)

It would be interesting to find out whether the evolution of these norms are influenced by culture and to what degree.

[...] research exploring the effects of architecturally derived group size suggests that interior designs that cluster relatively large groups of residents around common living space result in loss of regulatory control of social contact and are associated with crowding stress (e.g., Baum & Valins, 1977). (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 146)

This could be framed in terms of loss of control over the phatic function, that is, loss of control over communication channels.

Simply defined, "semiprivate space" is that space beyond an individual's primary or private territory that, due to frequent use by the individual and local others, assumes many of the characteristics of group territory. The suitability of a given public space is determined by a variety of factors specific to each community. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 147)

Recently a table and four chairs appeared in our communal kitchen. It seems to function as a semiprivate space, although I have yet to see actually use it.

One of these end-hall exits in each building was closer to campus areas than the others; as a result, for half of the residents in the long-corridor dormitories and two-thirds of those in short-corridor housing, they could exit close to campus by walking through the floor's hallway or exit nearby and walk outside. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 154)

In my dormitory, one exit on my side of the building is closer to the city center while the exit on the other side of the building is closer to the store across the street. When I go to the store with bad weather I exit from the other side of the building, while most residents on that side of the building seem reluctant to cross corridor on my side of the building to exit closer to the city center. It may be because the other corridor is longer and thus more impersonal while my corridor is shorter and thus more personal.

Follow-up interviews suggested that the different exiting patterns were associated with short-corridor residents' reluctance to walk through space that they perceived as "belonging" to another group. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 154)

This is exactly what I mean by a corridor being "personal". My short corridor has more of a feeling of "belonging" to its inhabitants than the long corridor.

Female confederates, who did not live in the dormitories being studied, waited in the hallways and initiated eye contact with residents as they emerged from bedrooms. All observations of resident response were recorded by an experimenter hidden nearby, and all sessions were conducted in early evening hours of weekdays in the first week of May. A total of 40 subjects was examined in each dormitory, half of each sex.

The results of this study confirmed our expectations. While only 10 long-corridor residents returned eye contact, 29 short-corridor residents did so, X²(1) = 18.06, p < .001. Also, whereas only 7 long-corridor subjects smiled at the confederate, 19 short-corridor subjects followed eye contact with a smile, X²(1) = 7.54, p < .01. The related unresponsiveness of long-corridor residents reflects the interpersonal consequences of a relatively anonymous local social environment in which residents do not exert active social control over shared space. When group-derived regulation of interaction does not evolve in shared spaces, as in the long-corridor hallway, these spaces remain public and residents are less likely to respond to someone in that space. Conversely, when social control and interaction loci are congruent, enabling the conversion of public hallway to semiprivate space, as in the short-corridor dormitory, residents are quite responsive to the presence of an unfamiliar other. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 157)

A similar experiment in my dorm corridor would probably prove the "unresponsiveness" of my neighbours and myself.

When social control is inhibited, as in the long-corridor environments, residents begin to assume unresponsive postures toward others. This coping strategy functions to control an otherwise aversive level of social stimulation and, as evidenced by previous laboratory research with this population, becomes a rather generalized mode of interacting with other people. (Baum, Mapp & Davis 1978: 159)

They suggest (on the basis of "previous laboratory research") that this kind of unresponsiveness in the dorm has an influence on the total communicative pattern of the resident.

Rozelle, Richard M. and James C. Baxter 1978. The interpretation of nonverbal behavior in a role-defined interaction sequence: The police-citizen encounter. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(3): 167-180.

The interpretation of nonverbal behavior during role-defined interactions has generally been limited to such settings as psychotherapy (e.g., Deutsch, 1952; Ekman & Friesen, 1968; Mahl, 1968; Scheflen, 1965) or structured laboratory procedures involving such conditions as deception (e.g., Collett, 1971; McClintock & Hunt, 1974; Mehrabian, 1971) and ingratiation (e.g., Jones, 1964; Rosenfeld, 1966). (Rozelle & Baxter 1978: 167)

This is where Ruesch's role instructions come in handy. Role-defined interactions are not considered at all in Jakobson's model. I'm not even sure if role-defined speech registers are accounted for.

Jones and Nisbett (1972) have pointed out that when people form impressions of each other, an observer has a tendency to overattribute an actor's behavior to his disposition, thus neglecting or underemphasizing situational determinants of the observed actions. This, in turn, may lead to the misinterpretation of an actor's emotions, intentions, and related distinctive characteristics. It would seem that this misinterpretation of behavior should increase to the degree that the observer (1) has minimal information regarding the actor and (2) must make decisions concerning what action to take as a result of the interpretation made. The police-citizen interaction appears to be closely related to these conditions. The police officer usually has minimal or no previous information about the citizen and must rely heavily on both verbal and nonverbal cues observed. This information must be used, in turn, to reach a decision about what action to take as a result of the interaction. (Rozelle & Baxter 1978: 168)

The analyst is in a similar position. Video clips of human behaviour sometimes lacks information about the actors and the analyst has to deduce such information from a limited reserve of behaviour.

Rozelle and Baxter (1975) interviewed 51 experineced metropolitan police officers and discovered consistencies in the interpretation of molecular and molar nonverbal behavioral sequences for inferring numerous qualities about the citizen. Of particular interest was the reliance placed upon such behaviors as gaze aversion and heightened arm, hand, and general body activity as an index of an intention to deceive, presumably out of a sense of guilt. Although this may be the basis for valid interpretation, these same behaviors have been shown to be reliably caused by situational constraints on the interaction process itself, namely, increased spatial proximity of the interactants (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Baxter & Rozelle, 1975; Goldberg, Kiesler, & Collins, 1969). (Rozelle & Baxter 1978: 168)

Molecular and molar here parallel micro and macro. Interpreting gaze aversion and heightened body activity as a sign of deception may be faulty because situational factors my have caused these behaviours. This is where the context of the situation becomes increasingly important.

The control condition was designed to contrast with the experimental condition in as complete a fashion as possible. The citizen spoke less frequently, but for longer periods, maintained more extended eye contact with the policeman and displayed no unusual eye and head activity. Fewer trunk rotations were displayed, and the hands and arms were positioned to the side of the body or "hooked in the pockets" throughout most of the interaction. (Rozelle & Baxter 1978: 170)

That is one cool control group subject.

[...] the high degree of consensus regarding the impressions formed in the present manipulations indicated that systematic interpretation of nonverbal behavior does occur and can possibly lead to inaccurate impressions formed. (Rozelle & Baxter 1978: 179)

Very generally: people do judge nonverbal behaviour ("systematically") and do so with inaccuracy.

Shotland, R. Lance and Michael P. Johnson 1978. Bystander behavior and kinesics: The interaction between the helper and victim. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(3): 181-190.

Argyle and Dean (1965) stated that eye contact serves as a signal that a communication channel is open and that it places a person under "some obligation to interact." Eye contact with the victim thus should increase the probability that a bystander will identify himself as part of an emergeny situation and feel some obligation to act. Eye contact between a victim and a bystander focuses the responsibility to help on the bystander and communicates that the victim desires aid, thereby making social responsibility norms more salient. (Shotland & Johnson 1978: 182)

In such an emergency eye contact is not only phatic but also emotive and conative.

Body orientation appears to be a key variable. The effects of eye contact and sex are only apparent in the front condition. The deindividuation literature suggests that norms, whether of the social responsibility variety or any other, may only be salient and active when a person is identifiable or individuated. The front of a person appears to be a preparatory cue for some type of interaction. In an uncrowded context it is not unusual to respond to a stranger by nodding your head when walking by him; one seems to be prepared for some type of interactio nand as a result acknowledges that the other person is present. The people in the front condition are indiiduated. When a person is not identifiable, the effectiveness of all norms, including the social responsibility norm, are going to be minimally effective (Zimardo, 1969; White, Note 1). When a bystander was facing our victim's back, he was not visible to the victim; hence, norms were not particularly salient for the bystander. (Shotland & Johnson 1978: 188)

I wonder if this is related to manners of execution - why shooting someone at the back of the head is considered inhumane, etc.

In summary, we would conclude that interaction between bystander and victims is an important determinat of helping behavior. In particular nonverbal cues appear to play an important role in the shaping of bystander's reactions to a person in need. (Shotland & Johnson 1978: 189)

Another generality.

JNB Volume 2 Issue 2 Winter 1977

Ginsburg, Harvey J., Vicki A. Pollman, Mitzi S. Wauson and Marti L. Hope 1977. Variation of aggressive interaction among male elementary school children as a function of changes in spatial density. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 67-75.

First, the room in which the study was performed contained a one-way mirror used to observe the children. As noted by Gallup (1968), mirror-image stimulation has been known to affect behavior dramatically, particularly in the context of social situations. More importantly, the room in which the children were testedd was a new environment for them. It is, therefore, not possible to assume that similar results would have been obtained had the children been tested in a familiar, rather than novel, play area. (Ginsburg et al. 1977: 68)

This should make on reconsider taking contrived psychological experiments too seriously. The reference: Gallup, G. G., Jr. 1968. Mirror-image stimulation. Psychological Bulletin 70: 782-793.

This structure did not appreciably influence observable behavior (there was no clustering around it or activity focused upon it). (Ginsburg et al. 1977: 69)

These two influences are actually notable and relevant for #linnasemiootika - there are indeed areas or structures in the city environment that either cluster people around it (such as the benches and other sitting accommodations) or focus activity upon itself (such as clocks, fountains, etc.).

Aggressive behavior was defined in terms of five specific modes of attack: hitting, whece one child beats another with clenched fists; jumping upon, where the aggressor attempts to force another child to the ground by wrapping his arms around the trunk of the other after gaining momentum from a running start; pushing, where the aggressor causes child to lose balance by rapidly extending his arms and with an open palm making contact with the body of the other child; pulling, where the aggressor grasps clothing or body part of other child and forces child to move in direction of the pull; and, kicking, where the aggressor first moves his leg back and then forward sothat the foot makes contact with a body part of the child under attack. As might be expected, these behaviors usually appeared in combination with one another. (Ginsburg et al. 1977: 70)

Huh. I'm not sure what this could be useful for, but for sake of even useless typologies, I'll quote it.

The data, lending support to the hypothesis that crowding (by reducing environmental space) increases the frequency of aggression, fit nicely into a theoretical framework provided by Hediger (1950). According to Hediger, many species possess what he terms a critical "flight" distance. That is, if an aggressor is at a distance far enough away to make flight an adaptively probable response, the organism threatened by a potential aggressor exhibits escape or avoidance behavior. (Ginsburg et al. 1977: 73)

The reference: Hediger, Heini 1950. Wild animals in captivity. London: Butterworth.

Also, a small area would presumably allow more rapid involvement by a benefactor; he has to traverse less space to reach the primary combatants. If it is assumed that an element of quickness or surprise enhances the probability or success for this kind of aidi giving, an area that decreases proximity between benefactor and recipient may potentiate this form of helping behavior. Finally, Ginsburg, Wauson, Easley, and Pollman (Note 1) demonstrated that such altruism is contingent upon certain nonverbal cues emitted by the child under attack. Thus, in the small play area potential benefactors have greater visual access to the type of nonverbal interaction occurring between the aggressor and the child under attack. (Ginsburg et al. 1977: 74)

More aid is given to someone being attacked if it is visible and reachable. This is probably why criminal adults prefer to attack in places where it isn't readily visible and help isn't easily reachable (e.g. back-alleys).

Sundstrom, Eric and Mary Graehl Sundstrom 1977. Personal space invasions: What happens when the invader asks permission? Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 76-82.

The concept of personal space was introduced largely through the work of Robert Sommer (1969) to describe the closest interpersonal distance for comfortable interaction. The well-known study of personal space invasion by Felipe and Sommer (1966) suggested that extremely close proximity by a stranger in a public place produces signs of discomfort and flight from the scene. Subsequent field experiments (reviewed by Sundstrom & Altman, 1976) generally agree with the original study. However, the effects of close interpersonal proximity by a silent stranger seem quite different from the effects of close proximity during a conversation. (Sundstrom & Sundstrom 1977: 76)

Sommer's work is often conflated with Hall's without an acknowledgement. And the difference between the effects of a silent stranger and a conversation partner are also often neglected.

However, contrary to predictions, females left more quickly when they had been asked (X = 6.5 min.) (Sundstrom & Sundstrom 1977: 80)

And hy is that so? Do females expect something to follow when they are asked and leave out of disappointment? Why are they made more uncomfortable when they are asked for permission to sit down next to them?

One way to explain this unexpected result is to assume that males and females see a personal space invasion differently. For males a silent invasion might be seen as a threat or a show of dominance. A male may become uncomfortable and leave rather than confront the invader. A male invader who asks permission may be seen as showing subordination, thereby reducing his threat value and the subject's discomfort. For females an invasion of personal space may be seen as an affiliative gesture. When another female asked permission and sat down, the subject may have expected a friendly conversation. The subsequent silence of the invader may have been seen as a kind of rejection. Perhaps a silent invasion is not as uncomfortable because it does not produce as great an expectation of conversation. (Sundstrom & Sundstrom 1977: 81)

The researchers came to the same speculation as I did. Asking for permission "opens the channel" so to say and females are more prone to see it as such.

Berglund, Birgitta, Ulf Berglund, Erland Jonsson and Thomas Lindvall 1977. On the scaling of annoyance due to environmental factors. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 83-92.

In this paper data from two sociological surveys concerning malodors and noise will be discussed within the framework of scaling theory. (Berglund et al. 1977: 84)

Malodor is a very unpleasant smell.

The differences in range of the categories used may indicate different frames of reference in the populations, produced perhaps by different experiences of environmental factors, educational differences, or differences in semantic conceptions. (Berglund et al. 1977: 88)

Semantic conceptions is the most immediately semiotic, but the other two (environment and education) also fall under the rubric of semiotics, at least tangentially.

Data were collected through a questionnaire with questions about the respondent's experience of street-traffic noise (A), noise from the neighbors' radio and TV sets (B), murmuring pipes and tubes (C), noise from the stairs (D), and aircraft noise (E). (Berglund et al. 1977: 89)

(A), (B) and (E) are broadly anthropophonic, (C) concerns infrasound, and (D) is most likely related to strepitation.

Elman, Donald, Duane C. Schulte and Allen Bukoff 1977. Effects of facial expression and stare duration on walking speed: Two field experiments. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 93-99.

In a series of field experiments Ellsworth, Carlsmith, and Henson (1972) ddemonstrated that a stare from a stranger caused drivers and pedestrians to cross an intersection faster than they normally do. The authors concluded that a stranger's stare is aversive and produces an escape response, at least in a public outdoor setting. More recent evidence suggests that under certain circumstances a stare does not lead to flight; instead it may prompt approach or prosocial behavior (Ellsworth & Langer, 1976; Snyder, Grether, & Keller, 1974). (Elman, Schulte & Bukoff 1977: 93)

Stares are indeed polysemic and have very different effects in different circumstances.

One such factor is the facial expression of the starer. For example, a stare from a smiling face may produce a different response than the unsmiling gaze used by Ellsworth et al. A smile might counteract or even reverse the effect of a stare alone. (Some might feel that the term stare necessarily implies an unsmiling face. However, the operational definition of stare commonly used in this type of research - a fixed, steady gaze - is equally compabitle with a smile.) (Elman, Schulte & Bukoff 1977: 93-94)

This seems like one of the reasons why Ekman & Friesen tried to avoid "inferences" in descriptions. "a fixed, steady gaze" doesn't have connotations of a certain facial expression while "stare" does.

Overall, these studies suggest two significant limitations of the stare-escape effect for walkers in public settings. First, a stare must last for at least 10 to 15 seconds before it noticeably increases walking speed. This finding was interpreted as due to the time sequired for attributing meaning to a stare. Second, the mere fact of being looked at does not automatically lead to escape, even after a long gaze. In Experiment 2 only when the starer was not smiling did such an effect occur. When the strarer smiled, subjects did not change their pace appreciably. Although direct measurement of subjective responses was not feasible in these studies, a reasonable inference is that a smile mitigated the implied threat of a long stare. If possible, future research should attempt to incorporate a method of measuring covert as well as overt reactions to another's nonverbal behavior. (Elman, Schulte & Bukoff 1977: 98-99)

I have no idea how knowledge of how fast people would escape from you if you stare at them for too long is important at all.

Maines, David R. 1977. Tactile relationships in the subway as affected by racial, sexual, and crowded seating situations. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 100-108.

Fried and DeFazio (1974), for instance, stated that "the subway is one of the few places in a large urban center where all races and religions and most social classes are confronted with one another and with the same situation" (p. 50).
While this statement is essentially true, the assumption was that such heterogeneity had no effect upon territoriality, and, in fact, these authors expressly regarded such differentiation as "natural randomness" (p. 50). (Maines 1977: 100-101)

"Natural randomness" is a good term. Lotman's major works could be re-read with heterogeneity and randomness in mind.

Leichty (1975) sought to examine the dimensions of tactile relationships and suggested that just as there are universes of discourse and appearance so are there "universes of touch." There are norms concerning interpersonal and situational expectations regarding who may touch one another, when, in what degree of involvement, and with what kind of imputed meaning. Matters of identity are crucial in such relationships, and touching becomes an activity to be managed and negotiated insofar as it contributes to and is predicated upon the establishment of certain identities (Emerson, 1970). Just as "space speaks" (Hall, 1959), so does touch speak in that it can announce who we are and something about our intentions. But touch also listens. It can provide others with a basis for imputing identities and intentionality to us (Montagu, 1971). (Maines 1977: 101)

The "universes of touch" seems like a flimsy metaphor. I like universes of discourse, but there's a component of distanciation in it - universes of discourse are verbal and semantic universes. To imply that there are nonverbal and episodic (in a loose Tulvingian sense) universes seems weird.

Levine et al. (1973, p. 212) have observed that there is a "taboo against physical contact" in the subway. On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper, that observation must be qualified to exclude same-race and same-sex relationships where the frequency of arm and hand touching was not statistically different from nontouching. The term "taboo," in fact, is inappropriate in describing subway tactile relationships since it refers to deeply embedded value structures. (Maines 1977: 106)

By this merit there are other cases where "taboo" is used too loosely. I can only quibble that the phrase does not read "deeply embedded cultural value structures".

Russell, James A. and Albert Mehrabian 1977. Environmental Effects on Drug Use. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(2): 109-123.

Among drug researchers the environment has typically meant either drug availability or various sociocultural factors. However, currently there is increasing awareness of environmental variables, such as crowding, noise level, pollution, and urban design, as additional determinants of psychological dysfunctions, antisocial behavior, and drug use. The present paper suggests a conceptualization of these environmental effects upon drug use using emotions as the mediating link: both environments and drugs can alter emotions. Various physical settings may elicit a wide range of emotions, including anxiety, anger, depression, frustration, elation, and boredom. Further, it is possible to describe systematically effects of environmental variables (e.g., colors, lighting intensity, temperature, loudness of noise) on emotions (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974a, chap. 4). (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 109)

Is there anything that can't alter emotions? Mehrabian studies so weird things. I'm assuming that for this paper he got funding from drug research (yup, the footnote reads: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism).

"Western man uses an awesome variety of substances to manipulate his mood, affect, energy level, and sense of well-being" (Leavitt, 1974, p. 43). (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 110)

For me personally these are food supplements, e.g., vitamins. The reference: Leavitt, F. 1974. Drugs and behavior. Philadelphia: Saunders.

Other available research, however, has helped delimit relatively independent (orthogonal) dimensions of emotion. The three most consistently identified dimensions are pleasure-displeasure (also termed evaluation, hedonic tone, euphoria-dysphoria, or the positive-negative quality of emotion), level of arousal (also termed activation, energy level, or responsiveness), and dominance-submissiveness (also termed power, aggressiveness, or potency). These three have been found in numerous studies of the basic dimensions of emotion [...] (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 111)

In almost a whole decade Mehrabian couldn't move on from the three-dimensional semantic space approach.

Consistent with Bentler's evidence (1969), the three dimensions were also defined as being bipolar. Thus, pleasure is a continuum ranging from extreme pain or unhappiness at one end to extreme happiness or ecstasy at the other. Arousal ranges from sleep through intermediate states of drowsiness and then alertness to frenzied activity at the opposite extreme. Dominance ranges from extreme submissiveness or lack of control over one's environment to extreme dominance or a feeling of control over it. According to these definitions, a person is always in some emotional state - a state that can be described as some combination of these three basic dimensions or as a point in this three-dimensional emotion space. Emotion, then, does not merely refer to occasional passionate states. (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 111)

Haha, emotion space! You crack me up, Mehrabian. The definition of emotion here is basically meaningless - it is correlated with semanticity to the degree that it stops being about emotions at all and is actually about verbal self-reports about emotions, which can indeed be given at any given time without actually feeling any emotion. It's about as absurd as Bill O'Reilly's insistence that Christianity is not a religion but is in fact a philosophy.

For instance, Russell and Mehrabian (1974) showed that:

anger = displeasure, high arousal, dominance
anxiety = displeasure, high arousal, submissiveness

Thus, anger is similar to anxiety in its displeasure and high arousal component, but the two are distinguished by their dominant versus submissive qualities, respectively. Other results (Russell & Mehrabian 1977) showed that pleasure, arousal, and dominance values account for almost all of the reliable variance in measures of anger, anxiety, depression, elation, and many other emotional states. (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 112)

This goes to show that you can contrive anything if you use an effective semantic scheme and refer to yourself at every step. What I don't like about this is the two-dimensional variables of this three-dimensional scheme. There is no neutral. Because of this, dominance and submissiveness, for example, are almost violently introduced to some emotions ("relaxation = pleasure, low arousal, dominance" below - as if you can't relax and be submissive, or completely outside of measure of dominance).

LSD users have reported both heightened pleasure and extreme displeasure. Therefore, we would assume it to be neutral with respect to this dimension, that is, to have no direct relationship to pleasure. However, LSD is a central nervous system stimulant and is, therefore, arousing. It also seems to lower dominance. This last hypothesis is derived from observations that LSD produces fear and flight and lowers the incidence of violence (Siegel, 1971). (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 114)

So you can actually admit a neutrality? The reference: Siegel, R. K. 1971. Studies in hallucinogens in fish, mice and men: The behavior of "psychedelic" populations. In: O. Vinar, Z. Votava, & P. B. Bradley (Eds.), Advnaces in Neuropsychopharmacology. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing.

Alcohol in large doses lowers arousal, as measured verbally, behaviorally, and physiologically. But evidence indicates that alcohol in small doses raises pleasure, arousal, and dominance levels (Russell & Mehrabian, 1975). (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 114-115)

"It'll make you feel different than you usually do, in a good way. But the next day it'll feel like you were poisoned, which you were. So don't be surprised or complain to us about it!" (If Beer Ads Were Forced to Be Honest - Beer Commercial Parody by Cracked)

No general preference for dominance versus submissiveness is hypothesized. (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 118)

10 pages in he finally realizes how unnecessary this preference is for emotions.

Along the same lines, stressful places (those that make people feel unpleasant, overaroused, and submissive) should lead to preferences for drugs that increase pleasure, decrease arousal, and also increase dominance. (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 120)

This is actually a pretty good characterization of stressful places. But most people probably aren't as rational and semantically calculating in their drug use as this paper seems to suggest.

[...] our framework would suggest that a depressed or bored person who uses hallucinogens would only do so in pleasant and reassuring places. (Russell & Mehrabian 1977: 121)

This is surprisingly good advice.

JNB Volume 2 Issue 1 Fall 1977

Miller, Stuart and Kathleen M. Nardini 1977. Individual differences in the perception of crowding. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(1): 3-13.

Since Stokols' (1972) distinction between population density as a physical variable and crowding as a psychological state, research and theory have been directed toward a better understanding of the experiential nature of crowding. Accordingly, a number of investigators have interpreted crowding as a condition of social overload (Desor, 1972; Esser, 1972; Valins & Baum, 1973; Heft & Adams, Note 1). (Miller & Nardini 1977: 3)

Apparently several first volumes of this journal are dedicated to studies of crowding.

Individuals who are low in affiliation, arousal seeking, and extraversion and high in anxiety would tend to experience negative affects in the presence of others and may be more likely to experience "unwanted social interaction." Thus, for these individuals, relatively low levels of stimulation may produce feelings of being crowded. Put in another way, individuals who (a) prefer being alone (affiliation), (b) prefer a constant, predictable environment (arousal seeking), (c) primarily attend to internal stimuli (extraversion), and (d) are already highly anxious (anxiety) would be particularly susceptible to ovelroad from social stimulation. Conversely, individuals who are high in affiliation, arousal seeking, and extraversion and low in anxiety would tend to place positive value upon social stimulation as it would be relevant to the satisfaction of important needs - e.g., the need to be with people, the need for variety and change - and, this it would take relatively high levels of social stimulation for these people to feel crowded. (Miller & Nardini 1977: 4)

I consider myself the first type of individual, that is, particularly susceptible to overload from social stimulation. It is interesting that extraversion is marked and introversion is unmarked - that is, introversion is counted as merely low extraversion, as if introversion didn't even exist.

Subjects were instructed to "place as many people as you can here without overcrowding them. In other words, stop placing figures in the room when you feel that one more person would make the room too crowded." Differences in the number of figures placed in the room were taken as a reflection of an individual's tolerance for, or susceptibility to, crowding. (Miller & Nardini 1977: 5)

Is that a reliable measurement? What if people don't invest their figures with a sense of crowding that they themselves possess in real life? What if these differences don't reflect personality but a rather culturally learned proxemic rules?

(1) All figures were put into groups of two or more (G). (2) Most figures were grouped while other appeared to be alone, groups and singles (GS). Although most subjects clearly fell into these two categories, for other subjects (eight males and eight females), it was difficult to determine whether each figure was alone or was a member of one large group surrounding the subject. These (latter) subjects were dropped from subsequent analyses. (Miller & Nardini 1977: 7)

If it's not clear whether you belong to a group or not, you are dropped.

The strictly quantitative approach of simply adding up the number of individual figures (using experimenter-defined units) ignores the fact that people are active social beings who organize their environment according to their needs, goals, and expectations about the nature of social situations. (Miller & Nardini 1977: 10)

But how about the fact that some people are not active social beings?

Finally, the authors feel that, at this point, caution should be exercised in generalizing from the present study, where a projective measure of perceived crowding was used, to naturalistic situations in which crowding is immediately experienced as a complex system involving perceptual, cognitive, affective, physiological, and behavioral components. (Miller & Nardini 1977: 11)

Caution: does not apply to real life.

O'Neal, Edgar, Christine Caldwell and Gordon G. Gallup 1977. Territorial invasion and aggression in young children. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(1): 14-25.

A very strong relationship between territorial invasion and intraspecific aggression has been inferred from naturalistic observations of animal populations. The relationship has been extrapolated to the realm of human affairs by a number of popular writers (e.g., Ardrey, 1966; Storr, 1968). Despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that invasion leads to aggression in Homo sapiens, it has not been subjected to direct experimental test. (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 14)

These popular writers and their books are: Ardrey, R. The territorial imperitave. New York: Delta, 1966. and Storr, A. Human aggression. New York: Atheneum, 1968.

The biological survival function of territorial behavior for individual humans can be argued most strongly within the context of infrahuman analogues, and other, more cognitive, explanations of it recently have been advanced. In these accounts, human territoriality is understood as but one of a range of mechanisms available to an individual human, in regulating access by others to the self (Altman, 1975) or in insuring his freedom of choice (Proshansky, Ittelson, & Rivlin, 1970). It is also emphasized that fighting in defense of territory is not common in individual humans (Edney, 1976). (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 15)

Another aspect to add to the topic of nonverbal regulation. Here regulation concerns Jakobson's channel component and phatic function.

In the animal literature, territoriality has two hypothetical orientations: object-centered territory (defense of a specific object irrespective of its location) and space-centered territory (defense of particular geographic area with definite boundaries). (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 16)

This distinction has an analogue in proxemics: the fixed (space-centered territory) and unfixed (object-centered territory).

The clown role for the confederate was employed because in previous studies (e.g., Hanratty, O'Neal, & Sulzer, 1972) a small clown was found to be a familiar and nonthreatening figure for young children. (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 16)

What about coulrophobia?

As the confederate performed each action, the experimenter remarked in a matter-of-fact tone, "Do-do is going into your place ... Dodo is playing with your toy." (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 18)

Well that is not at all contrived.

It may seem surprising that the subjects in this study responded with aggression to invasions of territory, while in a number of recent studies (e.g., Russo, 1975; Krail & Leventhal, 1976) children react with withdrawal to personal space invasion. However, the incongruity seems less acute when one considers the fact that withdrawal is instrumental to removal of personal space invasion, while withdrawal may actually ensure that the territorial invader remains in control of the disputed territory. It would not appear illogical, then, to allow the possibility that a usual response to invasion of personal space is withdrawal and of territory is aggression. (O'Neal, Caldwell & Gallup 1977: 23)

Because withdrawing from a personal space invasion restores satisfactory personal space.

Patterson, Miles L. 1977. Tape-recorded cuing for time-sampled observations of nonverbal behavior. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(1): 26-29.

Research on the nonverbal components of social interaction typically involves the observation and evaluation of a variety of subtle behaviors. The use of film or videotape recordings in studying patterns of nonverbal behavior is usually very desirable, and in some cases almost a necessity, e.g., in studying very rapid changes in facial expression. Furthermore, the relative permanence of film or videotape permits constant access to valuable data records. In addition, sophisticated techniques for linking film or videotape recordings to computer hardware can facilitate the efficient selection, identification, and scoring of recorded interactions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Trochim, 1976). (Patterson 1977: 26)

Since almost everyone now carries a smartphone with a 5 megapixel camera, the expense of "videotape" is no longer an issue. Is there something that still is?

For example, the filming of naturally occurring interactions in field settings is often difficult to do well without being obtrusive. (Patterson 1977: 26)

Edward Hall carried a little spy-camera. Today, you can be relatively unobtrusive by appearing to use your phone for texting or calling while actually recording video.

Self-manipulative behaviors (rubbing hands together, scratching, tugging at clothes, etc.) and leg movements were simply scored as either being present or absent during that 5-second period. (Patterson 1977: 28)

And what would one do with this quantitative data? I'd be more interested in a qualitative analysis of self-manipulative behaviours.

Firestone, Ira J. 1977. Reconciling verbal and nonverbal models of dyadic communication. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(1): 30-44.

The experimental literature on dyadic communication has developed along two separate lines over the past decade. One area of research has focused on nonverbal dimensions of communication, examining relationships between interactor's distance, eye contact, body orientation, posture, and movements. The second area of research has focused on the verbal aspects of communication, studying the determinants of speech fluency, latency, and breadth or depth of disclosure. (Firestone 1977: 30)

Why not nonverbal aspects and verbal dimension?

A more careful consideration of these reviews suggests a startling conclusion: The dominant models proposed to order these two aspects of communication are quite divergent and perhaps incompatible. (Firestone 1977: 30)

This is also the impression one may get from comparing the communication models of Ruesch and Jakobson.

In this section some of the relevant research literature is reviewed. Studies were included if they contained both variation in level of a verbal or nonverbal distancing behavior(s) presented to subjects and also included one of these behaviors among the dependent variables assessed. This categorization yields four types of study designs: effects of verbal disclosure on verbal behavior; effects of verbal disclosures on nonverbal behavior; effects of nonverbal distance treatments on nonverbal behavior; and effects of nonverbal distance treatments on verbal behavior. (Firestone 1977: 33-34)

This is stunningly similar to Ducasse's verbo-real etc. model.

An alternate explanation of this finding stresses the increased demands for self-reflection and cognitive activity required to deal with personal questions. Visual regard offered by speakers is known to be much lower than that offered by listeners (Exline, Gray, & Schuette, 1965; Kendon, 1967). Speaking requires more concentration than listening, and there may be the same difference in cognitive effort required to deal with personal versus impersonal questions. (Firestone 1977: 37)

What if you learn some text by heart and speak while maintaining eye contact? How creepy will that be?

Attraction, for example, does not seem to influence disclosure (Derlega, Harris, & Chaikin, 1974; Klein, Kaplan, & Firestone, Note 1) but does affect nonverbal approach. This could be because information is the main commodity being conveyed via the nonverbal modality of communication, whereas affect is central to proxemic dimensions. Foa and Foa (1972) argue that different rules of interpersonal exchange hold for commodities like affect and information. If we consider that the former is transitory, affection may be given and then withdrawn while information once provided cannot be taken away. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that the same forms of relationship hold for different commodities being exchanged during communication. (Firestone 1977: 41)

What sweeping generalizations! One could argue that affect cannot be negated: you can refute previous information, but you cannot refute previous affects. And how can you consider affect a commodity?

Stranger disclosure was markedly sensitive to interpersonal distance, while spousal disclosure was uninfluenced by distance. (Firestone 1977: 42)

People who know each other don't rely on immediate nonverbal cues as much.

Woolfolk, Robert L., Anita E. Woolfolk and Karen S. Garlinsky 1977. Nonverbal behavior of teachers: Some empirical findings. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 2(1): 45-61.

Nonverbal behaviors were chosen that had been identified in previous research to communicate evaluative attitudes toward an addressee. (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 47)

In a very mehrabian manner, we of course do not need to know what those nonverbal behaviours were.

Body orientation was excluded from the study because this behavior is decoded differently for male and female communicators (Mehrabian, 1968). (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 48)

Because Mehrabian is such a trustworthy source.

The nonverbal behaviors from the evaluative dimension that met all criteria for inclusion in the present study were facial pleasantness (smile) and affirmative head nod. Tone of voice (friendly, warm, approving, versus hostile, cold, disapproving) was included as a third nonverbal component to be systematically manipulated. (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 48)

Haha, facial pleasantness, haha. That is so exact!

Nonverbally negative females were perceived as significantly more negative than either nonverbally negative males or nonverbally positive females. In similar fastion female teachers, when they were nonverbally positive, were rated as more attractive than in conditions where they were nonverbally negative. There was a nonsignificant tendency for nonverbally negative male teachers to be viewed as more attractive than nonverbally positive males. (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 59)

If you're a female teacher, you are liked when you are positive. If you're a male teacher, it doesn't really matter much.

If greater nonverbal expressiveness by women is a trend general to our culture, as suggested by Jones (1960), then it is possible that children learn to "pay attention to the words" when men are communicating and consequently to focus less upon the nonverbal aspects of male adult communication. (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 59)

Conclusion: children are sexist!

A recent study (Redd, Morris, & Martin, 1975) found that although a positive adult was most preferred by children, a negative adult was a more potent controller of the children's behavior. Preliminary data from our own laboratory indicate that students work harder for teachers who are nonverbally negative. However, it would be premature to conclude that "nice adults are losers" when it comes to controlling child behavior. Much additional research is necessary to expand knowledge of the interrelationships among adult behavior, child affective response, and adult influence. (Woolfolk, Woolfolk & Garlinsky 1977: 60)

One aspect of being "nonverbally negative" that does seem to pay off is brow furrow. Nick Offerman told in an interview that he worked as a security guard at a night club and didn't have to punch anyone as long as he could achieve eye contact and display his mighty brow furrow.

JNB Volume 1 Issue 2 Spring 1977

Schopler, John and Janet E. Stockdale 1977. An interference analysis of crowding. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(2): 81-88.

The recent acceleration of research efforts aimed at discovering the behavioral consequences of being in crowded settings have failed to produce a coherent set of findigs. It is by now well known that the aversive consequences observed in colonies of animals living in conditions of high population density (e.g., Calhoun, 1962) are generally not detectable when humans are observed either in laboratory studies (e.g., Freedman, Klevansky, & Erlich, 1971; Ross, Layton, Erickson, & Schopler, 1973) or in demographic studies (e.g., Freedman, Heshka, & Levy, 1975). Instead, the consequences of high population density for human behavior appear to depend upon interactions with other variables, such as cultural traditions (Draper, 1973), interior architectural design (Desor, 1972; Valins & Baum, 1973), and sex of subject (Freedman, Levy, Buchanan, & Price, 1972; Ross, Layton, Erickson, & Schopler, 1973). These interactions completely undetermine the intuitive assumption, which has beet regularly verified by the animal research, that crowding stress is a monotonically increasing function of density. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 81)

Thus, Hall's omnious prediction that human overpopulation will lead to a behavioural sink hasn't been proven. It is much more likely that high population density will be overcome by cultural means - an equilibrium will be established in some way or other.

Crowding is then defined, for example, in terms of perceived inadequacy of space (Stokols, 1972), restrictions in behavioral choices (Proshansky, Ittelson, & Rivlin, 1972), excessive stimulation from social sources (Desor, 1972), excessive stimulation from familiar or inappropriate contacts (Esser, 1972), unwanted social interactions (Valins & Baum, 1973), interference and blocking (Sundstrom, 1975), or inability to attain desired levels of privacy (Altman, 1975). The present paper also attempts to subsume the interactive variables under a single variable - the "interference" created by the presence of others. An analysis of the role played by interference will redefine the stimulus conditions producing subjective crowding but, more importantly, it will outline the classes of variables capable of mediating the consequences of being in a crowded setting. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 82)

These terms are good to know. Valins & Baum's notion, especially, has become familiar due to three papers in the previous issue referring to it. This new single variable, interference, sounds like something I could get behind. [Interference = häire, vahelesegamine, interferents]

The experience of being crowded is typically connected with some aspect of population density. Density, however, is not an accurate predictor of the amount of stress experienced in a setting. It is our view that the central source of stress for individuals in dense settings is the perception that their own goal attainment will be interfered with by the presence of others. The presence of others is interfering whenever they restrict, disrupt, or block goal-oriented response sequences. The interference attributed to the presence of others determines crowding stress and is distinguished from other potential sources of frustration, such as task failure due to lacking requisite abilities. Crowding stress is created by actual or expected interference because it raises the costs of enacting behaviors. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 82)

Yup. I feel that a bar is too crowded not because of the amount of people actually there but because I can't get a comfortable seating, can't hold a decent conversation with my peers, and would have to wait too long in the line to get a drink.

Whereas both density and interference contribute to the subjective experience of being crowded, it is only the amount of interference that determines the degree of crowding stress. In the majority of circumstances interference and density will be highly correlated, but there are instances in low density settings where interference from others can be the sole determinant of crowding and crowding stress. The success of coping with interference problems, therefore, is the critical mediator between stress and behavioral consequences. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 83)

Again, I agree. A place can be "crowded" by there being a single person who causes interference and stress. In old westerns this is exemplified by two guys having a shoot-off at daybreak because "this town is too small for the two of us". Seeing an ex with whom you are not on good terms at the place you wan't to hang out will produce enough interference to consider going somewhere else.

Consider someone wishing to study the effects of crowding in university dormitory rooms designed for two-person occupancy. Density could be doubled either by holding room size constant and assigning four students to each room or by holding group size constant and halving the room size. Compared to the two roommates in the standard room, the dyad in the small room faces comparable circumstances, except that the average interpersonal distance between them will be smaller, and it will be of paramount importance to solve coordination problems. In contrast, the four-person group must cope with additional sources of strain. Theiraverage interpresonal distance is also small, but there are more of them and coordination is inherently more difficult and less amenable to satisfactory solution. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 83)

Again, spot on. Living in a two-person dormitory room is a challenge in itself. Even two can be too many. I lived with a calm old man for three years without significant confrontations but after he left and trying out a couple of odd new roommates I decided to go solo. Now I have significantly less stress in my life - no one will wake me up with their daily activities and I don't bother anyone by staying up too late. Living together with someone in a small room does pose "coordination problems". [My grandmother didn't get her university education because she couldn't handle living in one room with eleven other people.]

Furthermore, increasing numbers also produces increasing scarcity of "fixed" resources. Such scarcity, of course, is intended with respect to the resources of space, but it typically affects other resources as well. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 83)

Aside from the resource of space, the resource of time immediately comes to mind. This is related not only to sleeping schedules but also with "private time" - I consider solitude an invaluable resource - and time/space for receiving visitors. Another such odd resource is soundscape. This involves not only strepitation (e.g. not waking your roommate up by clanging with dishes) but also music - when and what to listen how loud, etc.

It is unlikely, however, that the number of doors, windows, sinks, or toilets would be doubled, and the interference stemming from access to these resources would be magnified. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 84)

At this juncture I would consider light a resource as well. Since I moved in first I could take up the window side of the room. My roommate lived in the "dark" side of the room, which made reading books during daytime uncomfortable. He also didn't have a view outside the window - and he sometimes enjoyed standing in front of the window and peering out, just as much as I do. I on the other hand didn't like the way he collected stools (that is, broken chairs without backs that he as a Russian also used as miniature tables when receiving visitors - in Russian language there is no differentiation between tables and chairs, both are stul) which didn't leave much room for maneuvering on his side of the room.

These dimensions are, of course, not independent, and the way that they combine to produce subjective crowding will depend upon particular setting characteristics. The contribution made by interference, for example, is determined by factors increasing the difficulties of coordinating and predicting the responses of others. These include the spatial arrangements in the setting, the availability of resources, and the structure of social relationships as well as such factors as the nature of the task to be performed. Tasks requiring complex behavioral responses or coordinated multistage solutions, compared to simple, single-stage tasks, should induce more interference from others. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 84)

Part of the stress caused by crowding certainly has to do with the relationships with those who cause interference.

The addition of pratitions to a fixed space lowers the perception of crowding when a miniature room test is used (Desor, 1972). Partitions serve to regulate a spatial behavior, but evidently they must appear functional to the actual users of the space to reduce crowding (Stokols, Smith, & Prostor, 1975). (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 84)

With the last roommate I tried to live together I took this tactic. I partitioned the room into two distinct spaces with a large shelf. It did create personal spaces in which we could live independently but it also made the room feel much smaller than it actually is and the roommate felt negatively about it. He subsequently had the stroke of luck to acquire a room of his own down the corridor. We're still buddies because he's a nice guy, but living together in a cramped space was difficult.

The distanging of others, either by a change in spatial locations with respect to the members of a group or by decreasing facial regard (Ross, Layton, Erickson, & Schopler, 1973), may be seen as attempts on the part of the individual to reduce the impact of visual and interpersonal stimulation from others and in particular to minimize the major potential source of interference. The use of such startegies reflects the fact that participants in crowded settings do not merely passively react to stimuli but whenever possible are active in shaping their physical and social environments. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 84-85)

Partitioning the room with a shelf was such an attempt. I didn't get along with the next to last roommate, because the room was organized as an open space but it left him behind his laptop always facing in my direction. Not only was I constantly being monitored but he was constantly aware that I had taken the privileged window-side of the room and had the upper hand, so to say. The partition with the next roommate made us both feel equally cramped and the times that we did bridge our own little personal spaces were seen by both as special occasions, as unforced conversations. There was also more symmetry because both of us had our computers facing the wall.

According to the current view, interference will be experienced to the extent that the individual feels that the behavioral setting jeopardizes fulfillment of his expectations and goal attainment. One alternative open to the individual confronted by such perceived limitations is to lower his aspiration level for what is to be gained in a particular setting. This might take the form of lowering the level of expected achievement or of expanding the time frame for completion of required tasks or attainment of personal goals. The amount and severity of interference from others can also be mitigated by anything that structures and regulates the interaction of praticipants. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 85)

I decided to go solo so as to save myself from the stress of getting used to another person. I had grown accustomed to my first longtime roommate because we didn't bother each other much. There was a language barrier between us that made physical barriers unnecessary. As a nonverbalist I was quite okay living with someone who didn't speak my language well, neither I his. We took over some of each other's nonverbal habits, but there wasn't pressure for daily conversations. With co-national roommates I felt the pressure to reduce tension with conversations and being a lousy conversationalist, this caused more stress. It began "jeopardizing fulfillment of my expectations" to read and write in peace, with music playing constantly and without verbal chatter.

In contrast to the corridor design, the suite design may insulate its occupants from interference by fostering cohesive subgroups, characterized by high personal liking and a high sense of normative control. The specific hypotheses to be tested were that suite residents, compared to corridor residents, would feel more intimate with their roommates, have disclosed more personal information to their roommates, and would perceive having more normative control over interpersonal events in their part of the dormitory. (Schopler & Stockdale 1977: 85-86)

Yup. I have experienced this while living in a suite dormitory when I was younger. Our six-person complex with two rooms and three people per room was comfortable. We knew each other well enough to consider ourselves a group. We shared a bathroom and a toilet and there was indeed normative control of what was allowed and what wasn't. I get Valins and Baum's point, but it could be argued that a similar phenomenon occurs in a corridor but in a lesser degree. We may not all know each other by name, but seeing people in the corridor or in the kitchen time and again does produce a faint feeling of acquaintance - if not of each other's personalities then of each other's living habits. A "stranger" from the corridor on the same floor but on the other side of the building is immediately identified. That is, I wouldn't say that there is a complete lack of normative control, but just a lower sense of it.

Mehrabian, Albert 1977. A questionnaire measure of individual differences in stimulus screening and associated differences in arousability. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(2): 89-103.

The rationale for the scale is presented in some detail because of the novelty of the concept of stimulus screening and because of the complex set of interrelated concepts and measures it represents. (Mehrabian 1977: 89)

Novelty? Didn't David Elkind write about "sensory gating" in 1971 in Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 19, where Mehrabian also published a paper?

The orienting reflex is said to be set off by novel, intense, unusual, complex, or unpredictable stimuli. Behrabian and Rusell (2974a) [sic] used information theory to show that all these qualities define a single dimension of "information rate" that subsumes the following aspects of stimulation: varied-redundant; complex-simple; novel-familiar; dense-sparse; surprising-usual; random-patterned; and moving-static - with the first adjective in each pair corresponding to higher information rate. (Mehrabian 1977: 90)

I do like the concept of orienting reflex, because I've experienced it first-hand. But I'm disappointed that Mehrabian was working with it. For me, he is the anti-hero of the study of nonverbal communication. He could churn out so many papers that said so much specific stuff but not anything in specific, if that makes sense.

"Arousability," then, may be defined as an individual difference dimension that subsumes the following intercorrelated qualities: the initial amplitude of the orienting reflek; number of trials for GSR habituation; various indexes of arousal response to increases in information rate of stimulation; and "weakness" of the nervous system. (Mehrabian 1977: 91)

I think I dislike Mehrabian because his texts are "inhuman". There are no people, just experimental subjects. His discourse is set in a psychometric echo chamber where various measures, means and matters float freely in seeming importance. There is little you can learn from him; you can only admire that this man is a Professor Emeritus of Psychology.

The lack of success with measures of characteristic (or average) arousal level led to the present emphasis on stimulus screening and its associated levels of arousability as the alternative and more relevant personality dimension in this area of study. (Mehrabian 1977: 92)

The reader obtained only weak, and not the expected moderately positive, relationship between the informational contents of current text and the arousability characteristics of the relevant stimuli in the given reading situation.

Schizophrenics exemplified a most extreme variety of low stimulus screening, as inferred from tehir response hierarchies. Although similar qualitatively to those of normals, their response hierarchies are flatter; that is, their responses to a situation are more equiprobable. Thus, their responses to a task or in a setting involve a mix of normal responses and sporadic intrusions of competing responses (Broen, 1968; Chapman & Chapman, 1973). In other words, irrelevant or less relevant cues are not as effectively screened by schizophrenics and are thus more likely to elicit (maladaptive) responses from such subjects than from normals. (Mehrabian 1977: 93)

Something similar could probably said about intoxicated people (as compared to "normals").

Furthermore, observable data on how subjects process most irrelevant cues would be lacking and could be inferred only indirectly from other verbal reports or tangentially related performance measures (e.g.: How would we assess a subject's wareness of, and response to, the textures of his clothing while he is in a conversation with another? Scoring nonverbal cues here would be extremely time consuming). (Mehrabian 1977: 95)

Then why on earth are you publishing this paper, written largely about your other paper, in a journal dedicated to the study of nonverbal behaviour? Whyyy? At this point I ragequit. I thought I could read every paper in this journal but obviously I'm not up to the task. DNF.

Kaplan, Kalman J. 1977. Structure and process in interpersonal "distancing". Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(2): 104-121.

What is important is that Hall's conception of psychoproxemics provides an integrating principle for proxemic (spatial), kinesic (nonverbal), paralinguistic, and linguistic (verbal) variables. Specifically, interpersonal "closeness" or approach is indicated by close physical proximity, direct body orientation, forwardness of body lean, and high amounts of touching, detectable body heat and odor, looking, and talking (especially in a loud voice and about intimate topics0. Interpersonal "remoteness," or avoidance, of course, is indicated by the opposite values on these modalities. It should be noted that, in his original paper, Hall (1963) seems to view soft speaking as the "close" end of the continuum. However, in a personal communication to Watson and Graves (1966), he suggested that the scoring be reversed as given - that is, loud speaking denoting closeness. (Kaplan 1977: 105)

In this sense intimacy is not signified by speaking softly but by feeling secure enough to talk loudly about personal topics.

The point of departure for a structural framework for interpersonal "distancing" derives from the traditional Smith, Lasswell, and Casey (1946) formula describing the communication and persuasion paradim: "Who (source) says what (message) to whom (recipients) through which medium (channel) with what effect (attitude change). (Kaplan 1977: 106)

I'm guessing that effect has to do with attitude change here because the title of Smith, Lasswell and Casey's book is Propaganda, communication and public opinion.

As stated, the above formula is unidirectional; one person (who) is the source of the message, the other (whom) the recipient. The interpersonal "distancing" paradigm, in contrast, is dyadic; the who and whom cycle over an interactive sequence. Furthermore, who may choose different whoms in different interactions. (Kaplan 1977: 106)

Similar consideration is necessary for reimagining Jakobson's unidirectional schema.

A sixth limitation of the communication and persuasion paradigm is that it has not satisfactorily examined the technological aspects of the medium or channel factor; studies often manipulate psychological aspects within a given channel. For interpersonal "distancing," the technological how is of germane theoretical importance, influencing what sensory modalities are operative in a given interaction and thus what enters into the circulation of the obtaining "distance" aggregate for each party. (Kaplan 1977: 111)

And I have my basis for conflating Jakobson's channel and Ruesch's medium.

Such an extension of equilibrium theory may be very valuable in clarifying concepts such as "social refractoriness" (cf. Calhoun, 1962a,b) and "information overload" (cf. Milgram, 1970). The concept of social refractoriness derives from research in comparative ethology. It is employed by Calhoun to explain certain aspects of behavior pathology emergent under moderate population density among a domesticated albino strain of Norway rats. A concise statement of this principle is offered by Stettner (Note 9):

Essentially, since there are so many animals in the same area, animals are usually interacting with an animal that has just had an interaction and is therefore socially refractory; interacting with a refractory animal is unsatisfactory and at the same time produces a refractory state so that a period of time must pass before the animal will be fully responsive and able to have a satisfactory interaction. However, since his social need is unsatisfied, this is a "false" refractory state and the animal keeps on interacting more and enjoying it less. ... As frequency of social interaction goes up past a certain point in animal populations, probability of encountering an animal in the refractory state goes up; therefore, probability of getting into a false refractory state increases. At extreme levels, animals are continuously interacting and continually remaining unsatisfied. (pp. 3, 4)

This phenomenon is quite amenable to an "intimacy-overload" explanation. An organism has tolerance for only so much interaction intimacy across partners; if one such interaction increases in intimacy, even unsatisfactorily, the others must decrease to maintain the equilibrium. (Kaplan 1977: 117)

Add this to the discussion of "getting peopled out".

Aiello, John R. 1977. A further look at equilibrium theory: Visual interaction as a function of interpersonal distance. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(2): 122-140.

Argyle and Dean (1965) report that, for women as well as for men, the greater the distance between interactants, the greater the resulting looking behavior. These results are at variance with data reported by Aiello (1972). In contrast to the results reported by Argyle and Dean, Aiello finds that women look most at intermediate distances. Increasing the distance beyond this point decreases the amount of looking. Our previous results can be explained by a modified equilibrium model. We propose that eye contact functions to regulate the comfort of an interaction and is itself also a response to the degree of interaction comfort. This model posits that for women comfortable interaction distances promote eye contact, whereas uncomfortable distances diminish it. (Aiello 1977: 123)

This does make sense.

Close distances would be more negatively reacted to by men and far distances would be more negatively reacted to by women. (Aiello 1977: 124)

Okay.

The expectation that subjects would look more when they listened than when they spoke is strongly supported in this study. This difference appears at all distances for both males and females. Exline and his associates (1965) consider the greater looking by listeners "a marked behavioral convention." We propose, however, that the "convention" has its roots in man's cognitive functioning and consequently in his regulation of interaction. Our hypothesis is that the more demanding cognitive task of creating a message, as opposed to listening to one, forces a speaker to reduce potentially distracting incoming stimuli so that he can produce an organized delivery. The speaker's reduced looking occurs in spite of the innately satisfying reward value of the looking behavior, the feedback available from the listener, or the affect-conveying potential of the speaker's direct gaze. As Cattell (1963) observes, the use of too many channels for input (as in the talkative individual) reduces the number of channels available for scanning (searching for new ideas). (Aiello 1977: 136-137)

At a conference of late, while posing questions in the audience, I deliberately diminished distractions by looking down and scanning for ideas while talking into the microphone.

JNB Volume 1 Issue 1 Fall 1976

Lee, Randolph M. 1976. Editorial. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 3-5.

During the past few years, scientific interest in and attention to the nonverbal components of human behavior and the relationship of human being to their physical environment and literally mushroomed. Empirical recognition of the potency of environmental and nonverbal influences on human social behavior, combined with highly sophisticated methodological and technological developments, has facilitated and tremendously encouraged this research. While still nascent in many ways, our understanding of these influences is increasing rapidly, and the both of scientific literature addressed to these concerns is substantial. (Lee 1976: 3)

Notice that it's not "nonverbal behavior" but "nonverbal components of human behavior". The "environmental" influences are what pushes me to read (at least) the first issue during the semester - it can help me overcome the semiotics of the city.

This diversity has created a proliferation of substantial work which has been published in scattered and piecemeal form in a variety of professional journals, making inter- and often intra-professional communication difficult, and therefore minimizing the utility and recognition of important efforts. It is our hope that the journal will help facilitate such communication. (Lee 1976: 3)

Yup. Before a special journal for it, studies of nonverbal behaviour were published all over the place - and to a degree still are.

With the exception and proxemics - originally Edward T. Hall's term for the human use of space - many researchers have intuitively separated the purview of environmental from nonverbal influences on human behavior while recognizing the interdisciplinary quality of both. It was our view that this is in many ways a misleading and unfortunately dichotomization. Certainly a difference can be articulated, in that nonverbal research more directly concerns person-to-person relations and environmental research concerns person-environment relations, but beyond this, it is often along nonverbal dimensions that the physical environment influences behavior, and it is frequently contextual and environmental influences which significantly mediate nonverbal behavior patterns. There is much to be gained by considering environmental and nonverbal influences in human behavior as conceptually closer than has often been the case. (Lee 1976: 3-4)

Kinesics and physical environment? These are certainly important considerations. The environmental influence is certainly not insignificant - the organization of space has its effects upon the organization of human behaviour in that space.

[...] the journal seeks contributions to our scientific understanding of such areas as proxemics, kinesics, facial behavior, paralanguage, crowding, environmental perception, behavioral ecology, design impact, and the building environment. (Lee 1976: 4)

I suspect that "behavioral ecology" is a cousing of "environmental psychology".

Argyle, Michael and Jean Ann Graham 1976. The central Europe experiment: Looking at persons and looking at objects. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 6-16.

In our thinking about the processes underlying social interaction we have come to believe that gaze at other persons (P-gaze) is of central importance. In the social skill model, gaze is one of the main ways of collecting feedback on another person's nonverbal responses (Argyle & Kendon, 1967). We have found that gaze also acts as a signal, for example emphasizing parts of an utterance, and is one of the signals controlling teh synchronization of speech (Argyle, Ingham, Alkema, & McCollin, 1973). (Argyle & Graham 1976: 6)

If gaze at other people is P-gaze, is gaze at objects O-gaze and at background B-gaze? [The answer: yes.] The feedback aspect is self-evident: you can't hear the feedback just as well (except in cases of strepitation). Emphasis and synchronization are also important, I imagine.

However, in an observational study of interactions between sales staff and customers in a department store, we found that a large proportion of gaze was directed towards the objects under discussion (Argyle, Lalljee, & Lydall, Note 1). (Argyle & Graham 1976: 7)

It may be because the sales staff doesn't constitute a completely valid conversation partner. The staff plays a role - they are there to help you make the purchase. So it would indeed stand to reason that in that situation you looked more at the objects.

There are at least two reasons for looking at the background: because it is interesting and attracts attention, and because there is avoidance of too much P-gaze. Studies of eye-movements, by Yarbus (1967) and others, have shown how a rapid cycle of fixations develops, and how the eye is drawn towards interesting and striking stimuli. If the eye is drawn to one set of stimuli, e.g., the background, if follows that gaze at other stimuli, e.g., the other person, will be correspondingly reduced. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 7)

We look at something interesting in the background, but we also look at something in the background so as to not look at the other person too much.

The selling study referred to above showed that objects under discussion, or otherwise relevant to the interaction, can attract much visual attention. In many social situations, such as working with others, it is necessary to monitor both persons and objects (Argyle, 1972). In such situations people are performing a double skill, in which they have to monitor and respond to feedback from both sources. Their gaze is therefore divided beween persons and objects, and P-gaze would be expected to be correspondingly reduced. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 7)

A broader view is necessary - one that would consider communication not as a pure act of communication, but as a side-factor to other practical activities. That is, one should consider communication systems wherein communication itself is not the dominant function in the hierarchy.

When a relevant object is complex, it would be expected to attract more O-gaze, since there is more information to be processed and more possible fixation points. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 7)

Perfectly reasonable. At a conference of late, an older man sat in front of the audience, next to the speaker, and was made extremely uncomfortable by the amount of P-gaze he attracted. When the presenter-speaker introduced slideshows with complex graphics, the amount of P-gaze he gained was reduced, but he also had to move slightly out of the way.

There is avoidance of looking too much at the other person, but not at objects.
Similar considerations apply to length of P-glances. Research on individual differences in gaze has found that glances are shorter in schizophrenics (Rutter & Stephenson, 1972); this is presumably due to strong avoidance forces, perhaps due to higher levels of arousal, in these groups. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 8)

I'd say that there are significant differences in avoidance forces under the influence of various subjects. For example, alcohol may relax avoidance forces (referred to as the "courage" aspect of alcohol consumption) while psilocybin increases avoidance forces, exactly because of the high levels of arousal.

There is evidence of forces to avoid too much P-gaze: the highest level reached by P-gaze, when there was very little else to look at, was 76.6%; the highest level reached by O-gaze was 91.9%, where there was competition from both the other person and the background. Similarly, the longest P-glance found were 8.0 seconds while the longest O-glances were 24.3 seconds. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 15)

8.0 seconds debunks the 9gag image that states that anyone who looks at you more than 6 seconds either wants to bone you or murder you.

Why is visual attention so easily drawn away from the other person to the object, in view of the important functions found to be played by P-gaze? One explanation could be that the object contained more information than the other person. However, this was certainly not the case with our simple object, which contained almost no information at all, and what it did contain was very familiar information. Another possibility is that the simple map helped the thinking and planning process even though it contained little information. This would entail postulating some new function of gaze in addition to information-seeking. Anether explanation can be offered in terms of the approach-avoidance model of gaze (Argyle & Dean, 1965). If the level of P-gaze depends on a balance of approach and avoidance forces, a small increase in avoidance forces (including counter-attractions) could produce a large drop in amount of gaze. (Argyle & Graham 1976: 15)

This new function of gaze is not actually that new. It could be tied with the discourse on "cognitive offloading". Objects do help cognitive processes. In this case planning a holiday in central Europe is greatly helped by the mere contours of the countries. There is little information in the contoured map, but enough to support planning, recalling various aspects of different countries, etc.

Kaplan, Kalman J. and Carl I. Greenberg 1976. Regulation of interaction through architecture, travel, and telecommunication: A distance-equilibrium approach to environmental planning. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 17-29.

Central to the seemingly disparate fields of environmental planning involving architecture, travel, and telecommunication is the concept of interpersonal distance, or specifically, the way in which the intensity of interaction between people is regulated. Environmental psychology has traditionally focused on aspects of this phenomenon (e.g., the research on crowding, personal space, and privacy). However, all these models have dealt exclusively with physical distance in face-to-face interaction. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 17)

The intensity of interaction is exactly the reason why I don't voluntarily partake of MSN, FB-chat or any online instant chat. I don't very much enjoy the fact that one has to be completely invested in this procedure while engaging with it. In reading finished texts (such as e-mail), one can pause and resume, while instant chat demands constant monitoring and takes up too much attention (or cognitive resources).

A delineation of interpersonal distancing behaviors can be seen in the now classic work of Edward Hall (1963). According to Hall, physical interaction proximity, amount of touching, amount of detectable body heat, amount of detectable body odor, amount of visual contact, directness of body orientation, and loudness of speaking each serve to demarcate interaction intimacy. Specifically, moves toward greater interpersonal intimacy or immediacy (i.e., approach behavior) would be indicated by close physical proximity, more direct body orientation, greater forwardness of body lean, higher amounts of touching, detectable body heat and odor, looking and talking, especially in a loud voice, and conversations about intimate topics. Moves toward interpersonal remoteness or avoidance (i.e., withdrawal behavior) would be indicated by the opposite values on these modalities. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 18)

It could even be said that these factors regulate interaction intimacy. This is yet another aspect that should be included in a more thorough model of communication than the existing ones. I think it is very much related to the "channel" and "phatic function" of Jakobson's model. In other words, it is related to the "tension" between the sender and receiver.

A more integrative approach to these various "distancing" variables is provided by Argyle and Dean's (1965) distance equilibrium theory. In essence the theory states: (1) there exist approach and avoidance forces underlying interpersonal distancing responses; (2) the approach-avoidance crossover point signals the distance or intimacy equilibrium point for a given individual with another; (3) distance is multidetermined, represented by the modalities discussed previously; (4) a disruption in the equilibrium point by one modality (e.g., interaction proximity) requires compensating adjustments in another (e.g., eye contact) to restore equilibrium. In short, the total pressure in the system, while remaining constant, can be differentially distributed (Patterson, 1973) across modalities. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 18)

This too, is related with the "channel". Instead of "tension" here there is "pressure" or "force".

A common therad among architecture, travel, and telecommunication is that each can be employed as a regulator of one or more components of interaction distance. First, let us look at the way architecture can be used to regulate interaction distance. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 19)

I cannot help but notice that they are using Ekman and Friesen's concept, but in a weird and unexpected manner. This concerns regulation of the channel component, or "medium" in Ruesch's questions.

Architectural designs of living quarters also appear to have differential effects of crodwing perceptions and inetraction behaviors. As demonstrated by Baum and his associates (e.g., Baum, Harpin, & Valins, 1975; Valins & Baum, 1973), students who reside in corridor-design dormitories had lower tresholds to perceived crowding, avoided interactions with friends and strangers to a great extent, and in general showed more behaviors designed to reduce unwanted social interaction than did students who resided in suite-design dormitories. Even the modification of exterior design factors (e.g., height of residential dwelling) can alter residents' perception of their territorial responsibilities (Newman, 1972) and overall satisfaction with their living environment (Greenberg & Greenberg, Note 4). (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 21)

This concerns me personally, as I happen to live in a corridor-design dormitory.

Table 1 summarizes this issue by viewing any telecommunication channel as a filter on the transmission of sensory modalities. Face-to-face interaction can be viewed as the most communication-rich (i.e., highest bandwidth) channel for communication. No artificial telechannel mediates the interaction between the interactants. As such, all cues are transmitted between people whether they are proxemic, kinesic, paralinguistic, or linguistic. This, of course, assumes sensory wholeness on the part of all of the interactants, which itself provides a useful metaphor. Compared to face-to-face interactions, all remaining communication channels fail to transmit some or all of the nonverbal modalities. The amount transmitted decreases with decreasing communication richness (i.e., bandwidth). (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 23)

So much channel reliance! "Sensory wholeness" on the other hand is indeed a useful metaphor.

The value of this approach for our present purposes is that it enables us to conceptualize crowding in broader terms than proxemic oversaturations. One can be "crowded" on kinesic, paralinguistic, and linguistic modalities as well. The channels presented in Table 1 form a Guttman scale. That is, a communication channel that allows proxemic cues will also allow kinesic, paralinguistic, and linguistic cues. In other words, high bandwidth channels, by their very nature, must transmit proxemic or kinesic cues. Lower bandwidth channels will transmit only linguistic and perhaps paralinguistic cues. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 26)

This could benefit the "getting peopled out" aspect.

What such an extension means is that a person may feel as crowded by one other person as by many. The issue again is one of distribution. One has only so much intimacy to give, and if he spends it all on one partner he will have nothing left for others. Alternatively, he might manage a large number of superficial simultaneous interactions with others. (Kaplan & Greenberg 1976: 27)

Reminds me of the "spoons" theory as well as Phoebe Caldwell's "getting peopled out".

Karlin, Robert A., Dianne McFarland, John R. Aiello and Yakov M. Epstein 1976. Normative mediation of reactions to crowding. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 30-40.

In studies of short-term crowding involving spatial restriction, males generally react more negatively when crowded while females react more positivel. Epstein and Karlin (1975) propose a two-factor model to explain the differential reactions of males and females to crowding. They suggest that crowding produces arousal. In response to this arousal, individuals will either leave the situation or engage in behaviors that can be interpreted as responses to stress. In stressful situations there are societal norms that allow women to interact with each other and to some degree to share their distress but prohibit men from deing so (cf. Kagan, 1964). (Karlin et al. 1976: 30-31)

This is generally well known, but the aspect of societal norms is often left out. This is a score for masculinism, e.g. how men, too, are oppressed by society.

Epstein and Karlin (1975) suggested that sex specific responses to crowding were the product of the differential group processes that occur in male and female groups Males do not interact with each other in stressful situations, and this results in an individualistic orientation in male crowded groups. Females, on the other hand, do interact and share their distress with each other, and thus a cooperative orientation emerges among them. (Karlin et al. 1976: 31)

At the core of the matter is the notion that it is not "manly" to express your distress. Boys don't cry and men don't talk to each other about things that make them feel uncomfortable.

Marshall and Heslin (1975) found a reversal of the usual sex differences in response to crowding. In the high density condition, men liked each other more and women liked each other less than did their noncrowded counterparts. However, Marshall and Heslin noted that successful task performance in this experiment depended upon the formation of an achievement-oriented team among the subjects in each group. They suggested that the task

both drew the dense condition males together by restructuring the close proximity to mean "team" and drove the females apart by depriving them of a warm intimate setting and substituting a structure that required a focus on leadership and achievement, making the close proximity uncomfortable for them. (p. 958)

While Marshall and Heslin's results seem, at first, at variance with those of other studies, they are in fact quite consistent with the position suggested above. (Karlin et al. 1976: 32)

That is, the situation is reverse when there is a task at hand. Then men can view themselves as a "team" and cooperate as such.

While no differences emerged from the behavioral measures, the self-report data are consistent with the hypotheses. There was a clear increase in attraction to the group in the high interaction condition, while subjects in the low interaction condition were less attracted to their group. The effects of the change in interaction level in terms of evaluation of the crowded environment were also clear. Subjects in the high interaction condition were more positive about the environment. Here one item is of specific interest. Despite the fact that room size and group size were constant, manipulation of interaction levels significantly altered the perception of crowding. Finally, a similar pattern characterized the way subjects felt in the small room. Subjects experiencing high levels of interaction felt more positive, while subjects experiencing low levels of interaction were most negative. (Karlin et al. 1976: 38)

Interaction is a stress-reliever. In a recent performance art act, Shia Lebeouf sat in a room by himself, with earbuds in and not talking. People were freaked out. Phatic communication is a necessary component in social interaction.

In the Baum and Valins situation the problem is different. Restricted space is not the issue. Rather, there is congestion (a shortage of resources resulting in the encountering of others when one desires to avoid them) and an insufficient degree of privacy. Both these situations are affected by the norms governing interaction in the crowded environment. (Karlin et al. 1976: 39)

Yup. Lack of privacy is a problem in corridor-type dormitories. Communal bathroom is the main problem here, as you have to share your business with others. E.g. there is not only a common bathroom but it acts as a sort of echo-chamber and doing business results in strepitative communication.

McCauley, Clark and James Taylor 1976. Is there overload of acquaintances in the city?. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 41-55.

City people, compared to small-town people, are thought to be impolite, untrusting, unhelpful, impersonal, and uncaring in their relations with others (Foa, 1971). In a paper entitled "The Experience of Living in Cities," Milgram (1970) suggested that the quality of social interaction in the city can be understood as adaption to an overload of interpersonal contacts in the city. According to the overload hypothesis, social interaction in the city is impoverished because city dwellers need to reduce the number, duration, and intensity of interpersonal contacts. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 41)

#linnasemiootika. This impression of city people can be found in fiction as well, e.g. Oskar Luts, Õpilane Valter (1927): "Sammus puiesteel, siis istus pingile; ning huvitas teda linlaste viimnegi eluavaldus ja hämmastas see ükskõiksus, millega toimisid linlased ise. Nad justkui ei märganudki, et liikusid ja askeldasid ohal, kus oli nii võrratult palju vaatamisväärivat." (1927: 30; emphasis added).

The overload hypothesis originated with sociologist Georg Simmel (1903/1950). Simmel argued that urban populations suffer from too much stimulation, especially stimulation from other people, and that city dwellers must maintain more superficial relations with others in order to conserve psychic energy. Milgram (1970) amplified Simmel's idea by reference to Miller's (1961) general theory of information overload. According to this theory, any system threatened with overload must employ some strategy to reduce the number, duration, or intensity of its inputs. Thus the superficial social interaction in the city may be seen as successful adaption, rather than as pathological reaction to urban stress (Glass & Singer, 1972; Griffin & Veitch, 1971) or as deindividuation (Zimbardo, 1969). The overload hypothesis is particularly interesting in that crowding is defined as interaction density - a psychological variable - rather than as simple physical density. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 41-42)

Good to know where this notion originates from. The bit about system overload is basically that of cognitive gaiting or selection/filtering.

Three limitations became immediately apparent. First, people have great difficulty in recalling contacts any further in the past than their yesterdays. Second, people do not recall contacts with individuals not known by name: busdrivers, cashiers, doormen, secretaries, and so on. Such contacts are very seldom recalled spontaneously, and appear to be so routinized that they might better be described as interfunctional contacts, rather than as interpersonal contacts. Third, people cannot recall conversations with members of their own households. People do remember spending a certain amount of time in the same houseor apartment with parents, wife, or children, and they remember that they talked with these family members. But they do not recall discrete conversations [...] (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 42)

"Interfunctional contact" is a good term. I justify my not saying "Hello" to some people on the basis that I don't welcome people whose name I don't know or who are not interfunctional contacts like the dorm front desk people or caretakers when they enter my room.

Table 9 shows a weak trend for city respondents to feel, more often than town residents, too busy to talk to people encountered. There is no statistically significant difference in results for Montreal and SMdeB, however, and it is safe to conclude at least that city people are not greatly overloaded in finding time to speak to those encountered by chance. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 51)

Thus, the overload issue is not as one-sided as it could be. It may be that in cities, people are indeed just more buzy, but do find time to be intimate with their friends and acquaintances in chance encounters.

Contacts with acquaintances were fewer but longer in the city, and did not differ from town contacts in intimacy of topic or intimacy of relation with contact. Nor did city people feel overloaded, compared with town people. Feelings of having too many friends, or friends not intimate enough, or no time to talk to acquaintances encountered by chance, or a long time since last important personal conversation - these feelings were not recognized by city respondents any more than by town respondents. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 52)

As a city-dweller, I find this encouraging.

The more frequent but shorter acquaintance contacts in the small town might seem to indicate that it is small-town people who are overloaded with interpersonal contacts. Militating against this conclusion, however, is the fact that no difference in the intimacy of contacts was found for city and town. If overload were operating in the small town, less intimacy of topic or less intimacy of relation with contact should have been found in the town. A more likely interpretation of the storter but more frequent acquaintance contacts in the town is simply that the geographic proximity of acquaintances in the small town makes contact with acquaintances easier and more probable. Then there is less to say to contacts seen more frequently, so the duration of town contacts is less. In contrast to the town, contacts in the city are apt to be less easy and spontaneous, more planned and less frequent, and with more to say when they occur. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 52)

I find this reasonable. But the study did not address my concerns, which have to do with the overload of acquaintances in a medium-sized city (of 100 - 300 thousand inhabitants).

The overload hypothesis is more directly supported by a study indicating that city people avoid eye contact with strangers. McCauley and Newman (in press) began with the observation that to meet a person's eye is to open a channel of communication with that person (Argyle & Dean, 1965; Goffman, 1963; Rubin, 1973). If city people are attempting to reduce the number and intensity of contacts with strangers, then city people should be less likely to make eye contact with a stranger. This overload prediction was supported by the dataof the McCauley and Newman study: City people were much less likely than small-town people to meet a stranger's eye. City people were also less likely to speak to a stranger. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 53)

Yeap, eye contact does carry the "phatic" or channel-opening function in the nonverbal realm.

Milgram's (1970) overload hypothesis of the experience of living in cities must now be reconceptualized. IN suggesting a condition of interpersonal overload in the city, Milgram did not differentiate among different types of interpersonal contact. Recent studies indicate that differentiation is required. It is too simple to say that city people are overloaded; city people are overloaded in some kinds of contact and not in others. The present study indicates that city people are not overloaded with contacts with friends and acquaintances, but the studies by McCauley and Newman (in press) and by Valins and Baum (1973) together indicate that city people are overloaded with contacts with strangers. (McCauley & Taylor 1976: 54)

This much we actually know: there are more strangers in the city.

Ekman, Paul and Wallace V. Friesen 1976. Measuring facial movement. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 1(1): 56-75.

This article reports a new method of describing facial movement based on an anatomical analysis of facial action. Most research on facial behavior has not measured the face itself, but instead has measured the information that observers were able to infer from the face. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 56)

That is, it is a continuation of Duchenne's paradigm.

Are certain facial actions inhibited in certain social settings? Which facial movements punctuate conversation, etc.? (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 57)

These are the questions involving regulations or regulative function, social control, metacommunication and the mu-function.

Our primary goal in developing the Facial Action Code (FAC) was to develop a comprehensive system which could distinguish all possible visually distinguishable facial movements. Most other investigators developed their method just to desribe the particular sample of behavior they were studying. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 58)

Thus, the dystopian TACS (Total Action Coding System) should be comprehensive in distinguishing all possible visually distinguishable body movements. The dystopian aspect comes from it not being a mere research tool but a tool of social control - linked with CCTV, it would mean that all people in every public space were constantly monitored by a computerized system.

With comprehensiveness as our goal it was necessary to built the system free of any theoretical bias about the possible meaning of facial behaviors. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 58)

That is, paradoxically, the Facial Action Code is not semiotic in itself, or at least not in the conventional sense.

We chose to derive FAC from an analysis of the anatomical basis of facial movement. Since every facial movement is the result of muscular action, a comprehensive system could be obtained by discovering how ecah muscle of the face acts to change visible appearance. With that knowledge it would be possible to analyze any facial movement into anatomically based minimal action units. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 58-59)

Thus, theoretically there is nothing in the way of establishing a Total Action Code. Every muscle, joint, bone and tendon of the human body should be accounted for, but that is not impossible.

And, of course, there might be some investigators who, like us, would want to measure not just some facial behavior, but all possible movement they could observe. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 59)

Comprehensiveness gives way to totalness.

In part, the constraint of dealing only with the visible was based on our interest in a method which could be applied to any record of behavior - photographic, film or video - taken by anyone. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 59)

Even CCTV.

Another limitation was that FAC would deal with movements, not with other visible facial phenomena. These other facial signs would be important to a full understanding of the psychology of facial behavior, but their study requires a different methodology. (Elsewhere [Ekman, Note 4] we have distinguished a variety of static and slow facial signs contrasting the type of information they may contain with rapid facial movement.) (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 60)

Movement is also easier to systematize or computerize, as movement implies an influx of data that can be scrutinized.

Changes in skin coloration are not usually visibleon black and white records. Facial sweating, tears, rashes, pimples, and permanent facial characteristics, were all excluded from FAC. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 60)

Aren't most security cameras black and white and low quality?

We are interested in determining which facial behavior is playful, or puzzled, or sad, but such inferences about underlying state, antecedent, or consequent actions should rest upon evidence. The measurement must be made in noninferential terms that describe the facial behavior, so that the inferences can be tested by evidence. Almost all of the previous descriptive systems have combined inference-free descriptions with descriptions confounded with inference: e.g., "aggressive frown" (Grant, 1969); "lower lip pout" (Blurton-Jones, 1971); "smile tight - loose o" (Birdwhistell, 1970). Each of these actions should be described without inferential terms. Since humans make the measurement the possibility of inferences cannot be eliminated, but the need not be encouraged or required. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 61)

In terms of concourse, e.g. "Tom frowned his displeasure," the "displeasure" is an inference about underlying state. Concomitantly, in concourse, one could probably differentiate high and low inference. E.g. "frowned" is low inference, for it specifies a label for the behaviour, but "displeasure" is high inference, for it goes beyond the label and associates it with an underlying state.

Blurton-Jones (1971) noted that facial activity could be described in three ways: the location of shadows and lines; the muscles responsible; or the main positions of landmarks, such as mouth corners or brow location. He opted for the last basis, although he said he used the other two as well. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 61-62)

The literary concourse I'm studying relies mostly on shadows and lines. It may have something to do with how intuitively the can be felt and made into metaphors.

Hjorstjö (1970) provided the most help. An anatomist interested in describing the visible appearance changes for each muscle, Hjorstjö learned to fire his own facial muscles voluntarily. He photographed his own face and described in drawings and words the appearance changes for each muscle. His aim was not to provide a measurement system, and so he did not consider many of the combinations of facial muscles, nor did he provide a set of rules necessary for distinguishing between appearance changes which are in any way similar.
Following Hjorstjö's lead, we spent the better part of a year with a mirror, anatomy texts, and cameras. We learned to fire separately the muscles in our own faces. When we were confident we were firing intended muscles we photographed our faces. Usually there was little doubt as to whether we were firing the intended muscle. The problem istead was how to learn to do it at all. By feeling the surface of our faces we could usually determine whether the intended muscle was contracting. By checking Hjorstjö's account we could see whether the appearance on our faces was what he had described and showed in his drawings. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 63)

Hjortsjö, Carl-Herman, Man's face and mimic language. Lund: Student-litteratur, 1970.

One limitation of this method of deriving facial units must be noted. If there are muscles which cannot be fired voluntarily, we cannot study them. This seems to be the case only with the Tarsalis muscle, and, as best as we can determine, its action and effect on appearance are not different from those of one of the voluntarily controlled muscles, Levator Palpebrae. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 64)

Is this the same muscle that was found to voluntarily movable in a small majority of people? (in 2012)

Note that we call the measurements action, not muscle units. As just explained, this is because a few times we have combined more than one muscle in our unitization of appearance changes. The other reason for using the term action unit is because we also have separated more than one action from what most anatomist describe as one muscle. For example, following Hjorstjö's lead, the Frontalis muscle which raises the brow was separated into two action units, depending upon whether the inner or outer portion of this muscle lifts the inner or outer portions of the eyebrow. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 64)

For my purposes it is invaluable knowledge that the inner and outer portions of the eyebrow can be raised independently.

It is important not to be misled by this example into thinking FAC is designed for scoring still photographs. FAC emphasizes movement, and its chief purpose is to score facial action seen on motion records, although it can be used with stills if there is also a picture of a "neutral" face. (Ekman & Friesen 1976: 73ff)

This is something that should be reminded to Sachchidanand next time he posts a picture on facebook and asks what it shows.