Logic and Conversation

Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and Conversation. In: Cole, Peter and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics. Vol. 3: Speech Acts. New York, etc.: Academic Press, 41-58.

I wish, rather, to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that the mistake arises from an inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation. I shall, therefore, proceed at once to inquire into the general conditions that, in one way or another, apply to conversation as such, irrespective of its subject matter. (Grice 1975: 43)

Quite interesting to see what these could be, and how they'd compare to Malinowski's phatic communion.

Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet. At this point, A might well inquire what B was implying, what he was suggesting, or even what he meant by saying that C had not yet been to prison. (Grice 1975: 43)

Idle gossip, talking about third persons not present.

In the sense in which I am using the word say, I intend what someone has said to be closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has uttered. Suppose someone to have uttered the sentence he is in the grip of a vice. Given a knowledge of the English language, but no knowledge of the circumstances of the utterance, one would know something about what the speaker had said, on the assumption that he was speaking standard English, and speaking literally. (Grice 1975: 44)

But is the conventional meaning of the words "symbolically theirs"?

The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. (Grice 1975: 45)

Phatic communion is not rational, i.e. not a logical sequence of thoughts, does not build upon successively - anyone can say what comes to mind, whether connected to the foregoing or not, though it's generally best if it is (somehow connected to what has been previously said).

They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, SOME possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE. (Grice 1975: 45)

The cooperative principle, thus, hinders the exchange from turning into a collective monologue, in which each participant is soliloquizing without the least regard for what others are saying. But then again phatic communion should, ideally, be "aimless", so that the only principal purpose is to spend time agreeably.

The category of QUANTITY relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims:
  1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
  2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
[|] (The second maxim is disputable; it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time. However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of information. However this may be, there is perhaps a different reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, namely, that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which concerns relevance.) (Grice 1975: 45-46)

While Mahaffy (1892: vii-ix) employed the Kantian categories for the "form" of conversation (the situation), i.e. under quantity, whether "we speak with (a) one, (b) a few [or] (c) many", Grice is treating the "content". On the whole, this is a longer explication of the conception that casual conversations are held "not in order to inform" and "there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate".

Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim - 'Try to make your contribution one that is true' - and two more specific maxims:
  1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
  2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
(Grice 1975: 46)

In contrast, Mahaffy's quantity concerns the social hierarchy, whether "we speak with (a) equals, (b) superiors, [or] (c) inferiors". Taken in the sense of truthfulness, the quality of a conversation is a very trifling thing. This "supermaxim" appears very unpractical when considering casual conversation, in which there is no practical premium on truthfulness; in fact, the keyword "gossip" negates this necessity. Most of what we pass on in casual conversation lacks adequate evidence, and a person who only speaks of things for which he has such evidence would be a dull companion indeed. A more natural "quality" of conversation would pertain to whether or not it is interesting, captivating, or agreeable. In fact, Mahaffy employs the same categories on "the matter of conversation", and there quality pertains to whether it is "serious or trivial". Likewise, Mahaffy's "quantity" pertaining to the matter of conversation is also more natural: whether the topic is "infinite" or, by implied contrast, limited (e.g. open, as something that everyone can chime in on, or closed, as something only very few people can speak about).

Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, namely, 'Be relevant.' Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in a later work. (Grice 1975: 46)

Clearly he's thinking of logical relations, or something to that effect. Mahaffy's take echoes my previous comment, whether the matter of conversation is "personal or general", i.e. the relation between the topic and the person speaking, whereas Grice's emphasis appears to be on the relation between what one is saying and what others are talking about, i.e. harkening back to the cooperative principle.

Finally, under the category of MANNER, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said, I include the supermaxim - 'Be perspicuous' - and various maxims such as:
  1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
  2. Avoid ambiguity.
  3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
  4. Be orderly.
And one might need others. (Grice 1975: 46)

Define:perspicuous - clearly expressed and easily understood; lucid. Ironic, huh? Using an obscure word for being clearly understood. In Mahaffy's system, this point is expressed under the physical subjective conditions of the manner of conversation, "physical" pertaining to the "expression" side of speech, e.g. tone of voice, accent, and "Absence of tricks and catchwords", the last being what Grice is aiming at, i.e. don't try to impress others linguistically over and above cooperation.

There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate nonconventional implicatures. The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicatures connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with the particular purposes that talk (and so, talk exchange) is adapted to serve and is primarily employed to serve. I have stated my maxims as if this purpose were a maximally effective exchange of information; this specification is, of course, too narrow, and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others. (Grice 1975: 47)

Those other, unspecified maxims sound much more interesting (more questionable). Taking the general purpose to be "a maximally effective exchange of information", Grice is committing the central error of many later writers, that is, conflating communication and communion. Communication should, indeed, ideally be maximally effective exchange of information, whereas communion is the sharing or exchanging of intimate thoughts and feelings for intrinsic purposes, whatever information exchanged being almost completely coincidental. Conversation is closer to communion than communication. Take the example given at the beginning: when "talking about a mutual friend", there is no immediate need for exchanging information; instead, the mutual friend happens to be a suitable topic because both speakers are familiar with that person (they could just as well talk about any other mutual friend).

I must also remark that this is a very patchy employment of the classical model. Consider Dewey on this point: "The primary motive for language is to influence (through the expression of desire, emotion, and thought) the activity of others; its secondary use is to enter into more intimate sociable relations with them; its employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge is a tertiary, and relatively late, formation." (Dewey 1910: 178–179). Grice has addressed conversation "as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge" (maximally effective exchange of information), which Dewey regards as the latest development; he completely neglects conversation for the sake of conversation ("to enter into more intimate sociable relations" with others, i.e. phatic communion); and when it comes to the primary motive of language use, to influence others, he limits such influence to actions only, neglecting desires (feelings) and thoughts. Though, here it turns out that in Dewey's scheme there is a significant difference between influencing the thoughts of others and passing on knowledge (exchanging information). This sounds like something interesting that should be addressed with more refined tools (perhaps with those of Baldwin).

As one of my avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges. (Grice 1975: 47)

Malinowski's aim was the exact opposite: to show that talking is very seldom a purposive or rational behaviour, and that the exchange of information is almost a boundary case, a fairly rare variety, of talking. Grice's general assumption is that talking is like a practical activity, as the succeeding parallels make clear.

Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, for example, at a particular stage I need four screws, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six. (Grice 1975: 47)

On this point Malinowski wrote explicitly: "For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement." Unlike the ideal model of maximaly effective exchange of information, actual conversation, especially "social conversation", i.e. casual conversation undertaken for the pleasure of doing so, involves social motives that touch upon human psychology. This analogy with changing a tire, for example, wouldn't exactly work out if there was "social pleasure and self-enhancement" in doing so; the cardinal difference lies in the qualification of "requirement": in "free, aimless, social intercourse" there is no explicit requirement beyond the minimum of saying something ("to say something even when there is hardly anything to say"). Since there is no practical or expected outcome to set the standard, the quantity (in the sense given here) is not very important: if you were installing screws in a plank for an art project it wouldn't exactly matter how many screws your companion handed you at once.

Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand me salt; if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber. (Grice 1975: 47)

Noted primarily for the opposition between spurious and genuine. The problem here remains the same: conversation is very much unlike changing car tires or baking a cake. These examples rather evoke parallels with communication situations that are restricted by some frame other than mere companionship. The premium on truth-value is very germane to a logician but almost wholly unnecessary in the study of casual conversation. A: "Have you been to the theatre lately? We were at "Bitter Sweet" a few nights ago. Rather good, isn't it?" - B: "Is there adequate evidence for the goodness of that particular performance?" - A: *mumbles something and clears out*.

Relation. I expect a partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of the transaction; if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate contribution at a later stage). (Grice 1975: 47)

It feels like Grice conflates "relation" and "relevance". His whole take on Relation comes off as "iffy". I'm no logician but Kant's category of relation seems to have very little to do with what's going on here. The subcategories of Relation are "Inherence and Subsistence", "Causality and Dependence", and "Community". E.g. "Community is the Causality of a Substance, reciprocally determining, and determined by other substances" (Kant 1855: 67-68). I believe this can be translated into communication theory but it would take some mental gymnastics to do so. My gut feeling says that "Relation" here should be taken rather in the sense of "Reciprocity" ("Community" having a very obscure meaning in Kantian register). That is, whether you are "speaking to" the other person and actually cooperating in your respective turns of speak; we expect the other person to respond to something we have said, even if what s/he's saying now is only tangentially related to what we said. Malinowski's take on this subject (of turn-taking) is awfully mechanical: "the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles" (between speaking and listening); yeah, but that's on the "physical" side of things - the real crux is in whether or not what we're all talking about amounts to something, whether or not there is, to borrow once again from Dewey, some consummation.

Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch. (Grice 1975: 47)

Once again this insight feels wholly improper to the study of conversation and simultaneously to have missed the mark on Kant's category of Modality. Consult the subcategories: "Necessity is nothing but Existence, which is given through the Possibility itself" (Kant 1855: 67-68). If we're dealing with the matter of conversation then it would be reasonable to assume that this category has to do with that very truth-value which Grice ascrubibed to Quality: whether we're talking about things that could be, are, and must be. Grice would limit conversation only to the latter, whereas in everyday life a conversation partner who talks only of things that must be (more so, as s/he thinks they must be) is tedious and off-putting.

A dull but, no doubt at a certain level, adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that people DO behave in these ways; they have learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed, it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies. (Grice 1975: 48)

Empirical, you say? Does decades of research in discourse analysis back this up? Is there "adequate evidence" for this claim? Anecdotally, and from fragments of modern psychological research, one could just as well say that it is easier to invent lies if you've formed the habit of inventing lies (pathological liars do exist, and they can even become presidents). On the whole it seems very unlikely that even most people only talk as much as is necessary to make a point, always tell the truth, say only what is relevant, and do so in the clearest language available. What Grice takes to be the baseline appears to me as a boundary case, a rare occasion.

I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts, undeniable though they may be; I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. (Grice 1975: 48)

This has a pleasant fragrance of Rational Action Theory about it, and we all know that all human behaviour is reasonable and people always act in their own best interest.

For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the CP and the maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions: (Grice 1975: 48)

"This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule", wrote Malinowski. What he was indicating in the register of "national characteristics" is pretty much self-evident in modern research on intercultural communication and politeness behaviour: different culturel exhibit varied expectations for interpersonal communication, particularly in something as free-floating as conversation. Grice appears to hold a very restricted sense of conversation, perhaps overemphasized by the parallels with practical activites. I believe most people would much rather attest to being "incompetent meddlers" in small talk. To quote just one of my favourite anecdotal examples: "We have all experienced these situations and know that a great deal of anxiety is associated with them." (Alonso 2002: 1137) - In that particular anecdote, Alonso is having a conversation with an aquaintance and, due to his inattention, momentarily forgets what they were talking about, and "in the intervening seconds of the interruption the world may have changed forever, that the original context we are trying desperately to recover may be lost for good, that the "where" in "where were we?" may have become a non-place, and... "Who is this person in front of me, anyway?" (ibid, 1137). In other words, there is no limit to human incompetence, even in matters as seemingly simple as having a conversation.

The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict - each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one, namely, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other. (Grice 1975: 48)

In phatic communion, the common immediate aim should be time spent agreeably in each other's company. If there is an "ultimate aim" (ulterior aim) on any side, it is, strictly speaking, a "pseudo-phatic communion" (cf. Haverkate 1988). On the subject of identifying with "the transitory conversational interests of the other" I have no quibble - this is spot on, and I attempted to formulate it myself somewhere above. An "over-the-wall chat" is such a surprising phrase that I had to look up examples in literature:

  • "The highlight of the day will be an over-the-wall chat with Mrs. Bucket next door." (Irish Girls About Town)
  • "Be friendly and firm. Chat over the wall, chat in the street, wave and smile, occasionally have her in: but no more responsibility." (Seduction of Mrs. Pendlebury)
  • "[...] and Mary engage in over-the-wall chat about housewarming with never so much as a sniff of a pun or a dig in the ribs between the lot of them." (Advertisers Weekly)

The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. (Grice 1975: 48)

Define:dovetailed - join together by means of a dovetail; join together by means of a dovetail. Goes at the heart of "reciprocity" discussed above.

There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else. (Grice 1975: 48)

This was originally published in 1967, so after Jakobson, but I'm not sure how much an influence he could have had on Grice. With Jakobson's phatic function, the emphasis is on establishing that mutual understanding, i.e. giving the signal to terminate, "a sign of parting". This talk of tacit understanding assumes that the terminal phase of the interaction is "mutually manifest", as the later Relevance Theorists would put it.

But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably. In any case, one feels that the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let [|] down not his audience but himself. So I would like to be able to show that observance of the CP and maxims is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: that any one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the CP and the maxims. (Grice 1975: 48-49)

Kant's categories, too, have a dubious universality but at least in that case you have the benefit of doubt that they are rigorously thought through. With these maxims I am less certain, seeing as they are a rather poor application of Kant's categories on an ambiguous conflation of communication with conversation. What are "the goals that are central to conversation/communication"? Exchanging information and mutual influence are pretty darn vague - bad manner that!

It is possible to combine metaphor and irony by imposing on the hearer two stages of interpretation. I say You are the cream in my coffee, intending the hearer to reach first the metaphor interpretant 'You are my pride and joy' and then the irony interpretant 'You are my bane.' (Grice 1975: 53)

An interesting verb case of "interpretant".

Examples in which an implicature is achieved by real, as distinct from apparent, violation of the maxim of Relation are perhaps rare, but the following seems to be a good candidate. At a genteel tea party, A says Mrs. X is an old bag. There is a moment of appalled silence, and then B says The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn't it? B has blatantly refused to make what HE says relevant to A's preceding remark. He thereby implicates that A's remark should not be discussed and, perhaps more specifically, that A has committed a social gaffe. (Grice 1975: 54)

An interesting take on "talking about weather", that it is a go-to when someone says something improper.

Information, like money, is often given without the giver's knowing to just what use the recipient will want to put it. If someone to whom the transaction is mentioned gives it further consideration, he is likely to find himself wanting the answer to further questions that the speaker may not be able to identify in advance; if the appropriate specification will be likely to enable the hearer to answer a considerable variety of such questions for himself, then there is a presumption that the speaker should include it in his remark; if not, then there is no such presumption. (Grice 1975: 57)


A veritable copying-machine

Baldwin, James Mark 1907a. Thought and Language. Psychological Review 14(3): 181-204. [DOI: 10.1037/h0074382]

In the first place, it may be pointed out that logical meanings constitute a context of thoughts. The prelogical meanings of all sorts, the individuated contents established by processes earlier than explicit judgment, are taken up in the organized system of experience which is the objective thought-world of the thinker. It is first of all the thinker's experience, controlled in the inner processes of judgment and acknowledgment, whatever further reference or confirmation it may have as being true to or cognizant of 'reality.' (Baldwin 1907a: 181)

Mõtleja objektiivne mõttemaailm korrastab ka ebaloogilisi tähendusi.

Furthermore and third, this common character and meaning of the subject matter of thought was found to rest genetically or prelogically upon a process that is both social and experimental: the process described in our earlier discussions under the term 'secondary conversion.' We found that the context of knowledge, considered as a confirmed and established body of data, was in very essential ways due to the recognition and use of the contents of the minds of one's social fellows. (Baldwin 1907a: 182)

Teadmiste kontekst on hädavajalik ühiskonnakaaslaste mõistuste sisu äratundmiseks.

All but the original substantive parts of experience - the parts found directly convertible into the hard coin of persisting and recurring fact - was actually set off from the fugitive and private images of fancy, through such secondary and essentially social conversion process. It was in the further development of this motive, it will be remembered also, that the marks of knowledge as general, universal, and even singular were derived. The conclusion that knowledge - in any mode that is not subpersonal nad so subsocial - is a 'social outcome rather than a private possession,' summed up our results in the matter. (Baldwin 1907a: 182)

Reminiscent of Clay's distinction between fugitive and durable modifications of mind. The subpersonal/subsocial distinction is reminiscent of Morris's distinctions, where private/fugitive symbols are termed "post-language" symbols.

Finally we may point out, in addition to the foregoing, a character of thought which has not as yet been adverted to; one that fixes genetically both the social motive and the experimental motive as now put in evidence. It is the linguistic character of thought. Thought is a system of predications or assertions that may be embodied in a more or less explicit system of symbols for purposes of inter-personal communication. (Baldwin 1907a: 183)

The conditional "may be" is probably the most important point.

The old problem put in the question, 'Is thought possible without speech,' has no real significance except so far as it is set genetically or from the point of view of the comparative origin and development of these two great functions. (Baldwin 1907a: 183)

Nevertheless it's a question that crops up constantly, something we cannot get over.

For the purposes of linguistic theory, this may be called the 'personal' or 'dynamic' point of view. It recognizes the fact that the person is the source of new accretions of social meaning, and the dynamic movement of such meaning is made possible only as the results of personal thought find adequate and appropriate expression. It considers language as a live thing, flexible in its growth with the development of thought, divergent and varying in its comparative system of symbolism. (Baldwin 1907a: 184)

Signs grow, from one to many.

But the further question as to the conservation, the conventionalizing - in the large sense, the socializing - of meanings, whereby they show themselves more than personal, and in an important sense also less than personal, is equally urgent. This question may be put sharply thus: how can a system of symbols serving as expression of a dynamic movement of personal thought, also serve as the embodiment of established and conventionalized social meaning? (Baldwin 1907a: 184)

Also "crystallization" and "ossification".

This inquiry has direct enforcement from the side of the psychology of what is called 'intercourse.' There is no purely 'personal' intercourse; all intercourse is in its constitution inter-personal. Its intent is to be understood as well as to be expressed. It becomes necessary to enlarge the theory of expression to make its unit one of common meaning. The lowest functional term of expression is in some crude sense [|] 'intercourse' - the development of common meaning. Turning, therefore, to the theories of language reached from the social side, we find a second type. (Baldwin 1907a: 184-185)

Denying the existence of intrapersonal communication?

The Social or Static Theory. The theory of common symbolic meaning would seem not to find its problem in the first instance in personal expression. Its problem is not how personal meaning could become common in its expression, but how a conventionally common meaning could be the vehicle of genuine personal experience. Would not any system of symbolic meanings become, just by the rigidity and static character that its social fixity would impart, unavailable for personal purposes? (Baldwin 1907a: 185)

It is kinda amazing that he finds this problematic at all.

Indeed, the function of language, we are told by the static theorists, does not extend to the expression of what is personal as such. It comes to reflect personal interest only by being first of all conventional and common. The demand of intercourse is for a symbolism to express meanings already understood and accepted. It is only by social generalization that a meaning can become eligible for linguistic embodiment at all. Witness the fact that feeling and impulse, so far as they are not thrown into descriptive form as knowledge, cannot be given common linguistic rendering. Music may be cited: what does music really express? It is only so far as a meaning has taken on a form that gives it currency in society that it is made a matter of intelligible speech. (Baldwin 1907a: 185)

This is where I concur wholeheartedly. The limits of language are most palpably felt at the prescipice of feeling.

Upon this type of theory a view is based which makes language a static, stereotyped system of forms. The classics, being no longer living and growing but dead, offer the models of literary form. Any current modes of speech and language that do not fit into these models, so far fall short of the instrumental adequacy that facile social intercourse demands. (Baldwin 1907a: 185)

"But the widened conception of context of situation yields more than that. It makes clear the difference in scope and method between the linguistics of dead and of living languages. The material on which almost all our linguistic study has been done so far belongs to dead languages." (Malinowski 1923: 306)

Just as there is a sphere of personal experience that is ineligible to common and symbolic expression, so there is a sphere of common and public experience that is ineligible to strictly personal and private uses. In their range, in short, personal meanings and social meanings overlap but do not coincide. Consequently, there is the requirement all the way along that the symbols of conventional expression be so far as possible flexible in order to embody the accretions to personal experience; and on the other hand, that they be fixed enough to embody the habitual and conventionalized meanings of historical and common experience. This requirement is embodied in the view, now fast gaining ground, that language is a growing organic thing, relatively satisfactory for the epoch and the gorup; but by no means containing or requiring a system of fixed and stereotyped meanings. (Baldwin 1907a: 186)

Kinda abstract; could do with examples.

The interest at work may be of this or that sort according as this or that group of meanings ordinarily called a 'topic' is being pursued. This in turn varies with all the dispositional or other tendencies or motives coming to consciousness in the individual. The content itself, so considered as a subject-matter of thought, has relations, discovered or not discovered, in a larger whole of meaning. For example, the item 'horse' may have very different lines of import developed according as I am conversing with a horseman, a naturalist, a dealer, or a veterinary surgeon. In each case only those ramifications of meaning that are relevant to the common interest of the parties to the situation are elucidated and further advanced. (Baldwin 1907a: 192)

Relevance Theory at large.

How the more superficial sorts of comprehension of a subject are possible might be made subject of further remark; here it may suffice to say that when they are thus of the superficial sort, it is pseudo-thinking; it gives meanings that remain in large part either in a mode not yet judgmental, or so habitual as to be under mere reality-feeling, or again they are mere material for schematic use in this way or that when judgment upon their further relevancies is actually achieved. (Baldwin 1907a: 193)

I feel personally attacked. Mostly because this is my first closer acquaintance with Baldwin and his terminology is yet foreign and largely incomprehensible.

If genuinely receptive, indeed, the attitude of the hearer is one of continuoun thinking. His selective interests are not severely taxed, since the relevant information is directly supplied to him. But the meanings suggested to him are, in the first instance, merely proposed, assumptive, experimental. Each item added to the whole requires assimilation by some process complementary to that whereby, in the contrasted case, he tests in the social environment the meanings of his own suggestion. (Baldwin 1907a: 193)

In contrast to phatic communion, which is unreflective - the hearer might not be thinking, or even listening, at all.

And there must also be supposed a form of correlation between these two types of meaning, considered as being in a situation in which the speaker and hearer get the same subject-matter at the same time - as indeed they must lest intercourse lose its commonness and so be futile. (Baldwin 1907a: 194)

Dorothy Lee, once again, having hit the nail on the head.

Baldwin, James Mark 1896a. The Genesis of Social "Interests". The Monist 7(3): 340-357. [DOI: 10.5840/monist18977329]

The outcome serves to afford a point of departure for the view which we may entertain of the person as he appears to himself in society. If it be true, as all the evidence goes to show, that what the person thinks of himself is a pole or terminus at one end of an opposition in the sense of personality generally, and that the other pole or terminus is the thought he has of the other person, the alter, then it is impossible to take his thought of himself at any time and say that in thinking of himself he is not essentially thinking of the alter also. (Baldwin 1896a: 341)

The looking glass self.

The acts now possible to himself, and so used by him to describe himself in thought to himself, were formerly only possible to the other; but by imitating that other he has brought them over to the opposite pole, and found them applicable with a richer meaning, and a modified value, as true predicates of himself also. If he thinks of himself in any particular past time, he can single out what was then he, as opposed to what has since become he; and the residue, the part of him that has since become he, that was then only thought of - if it was thought of as an attribute of personality at all - as attaching to some one whom he was acquainted with. (Baldwin 1896a: 342)

Sounds like a psychological interpretation of the old saying, kes teisele nime annab, see ise seda kannab.

So the truth we now learn is this: that each and all of the particular marks which I now call mine, when I think of myself, has had just this origin; I have first found it in my social environment, and by reason of my social and imitative disposition, have transferred it to myself by trying to act as if it were true of me, and so coming to find out that it is true of me. And further, all the things I hope to learn, to acquire, to become, all - if I think of them in a way to have any clear thought of my possible future - are now, before I acquire them, simply elements of my thought of others, of the social alter, or of what considered generally we may calle the "socius." (Baldwin 1896a: 342)

The imitation theory of selfhood: I can become what I see around me.

But we should also note that what has been said of the one pole of this dialectical relation, the pole of self, is equally true of the other also - the pole represented by the other person, the later. What do I have in mind when I think of him as a person? Evidently I must construe him, a person, in terms of what I think of myself, the only person whom I know in the intimate way we call "subjective." (Baldwin 1896a: 343)

I am the measure against which I evaluate others.

So my thought of any other man - or all other men - is, to the richest degree. that which I understand of myself, together with the uncertainties of interpretation which my further knowledge of his acts enables me to conjecture. It think him rational, emotional, volitional, as I am; and the details of his more special characteristics, as far as I understand them at all, I weave out of possible actions of my own, when circumstances call me out in similar ways. But there is always the sense that there is more to understand about him; for as we have seen, he constantly, by the diversities between us which I do not yet comprehend, sets me new actions to imitate for my own growth. (Baldwin 1896a: 343)

The triad. The ending, the "growth", has a very positive ring to it.

Or we take a group of individuals together as we find them is society and ask how it is that these individuals could have come together. All this without so much as consulting the single person psychologically as to the view he has of his own social life, his opportunities, and his obligations! (Baldwin 1896a: 344)

How indeed.

To bring our development of the sense of personality, therefore, into view of these questions, let us attack one of the main points in the theory of society which recent discussion has tended to formulate. This point is that which concerns the "interests" of the individual. What are the interests of the individual, and how do they stand related to the interests of the community, state, social group, in which the individual lives? (Baldwin 1896a: 345)

The order is somewhat off. According to size, it should run: individual → social group → community → state.

But this sense of equal interest, desert, because of identical position in the evolution of selves, what is this but the sense of justice in the abstract, and in the concrete, the feeling of sympathy with the other? (Baldwin 1896a: 346)

A definition of sympathy: identification of interests.

This is true just in so far as there is a certain typical other self whose relation to me has been that of social give and take by which the whole development of a sense of self of any kind has been made possible. (Baldwin 1896a: 346)

Reminiscent of "the give and take of utterances". Stored for paraphrasis.

We find that such a child shows, in the very first stages of his sense of himself as a being of rights, duties, etc., a very organic nature. He is occupied mainly with the business of learning about himself, other people, and nature. He imitates everything, being a veritable copying-machine. He spends the time not given to imitating others very largely in practicing what he has picked up by his imitations, and in the exploiting of these accomplishments. (Baldwin 1896a: 347)

Found a title.

But on the other hand, there are persons to whom his attitude has a right to be different. In the case of these the dialectic has gone farther. He has mastered all their features, he can do himself what they do, he anticipates no new developments in his intercourse with them; so he "ejects" them, as the psychological expression is; for an "eject" is a person whose consciousness has only those elements in it which the individual who thinks of that consciousness is able, out of his own store of experience, to read into it. It is ejective to him, for he makes it what he will, in a sense. (Baldwin 1896a: 348)

Not at all certain if this is Bosanquet's meaning of "eject".

Now the further advance which he makes in this general sense of social situation as a whole, is in the line of carrying this same adaptability of attitude into his relation to each of the persons whom he knows. (Baldwin 1896a: 351)

Something along the lines of "reading the room".

He learns the signs of warmth, of good humor, of sorrow, of joy, hope, love, jealousy, giving them added interpretation all the time which his own imitation of them enables him to make by realising what they mean in his own experience. (Baldwin 1896a: 351)

Semiotics of the context of situation, it looks like.

He thinks of the other, the alter, as his socius, just as he thinks of himself as the other's socius: and the only thing that remains more or less stable, in the midst of the whole growth, is [|] the fact that there is a growing sense of self which includes both terms, the ego and the alter. In short, the real self is the social self, the socius. (Baldwin 1896a: 352-353)

An alternative formulation of the looking glass self.

But in the larger social whole of adult life both elements are so complex - the solidified self of the individual's history is so fixed, and the social suggestions of the community are so varied and conflicting - that the outcome of the fusion is a thing that no man can prophesy. (Baldwin 1896a: 355)

Possibly something to connect with "social meaning". I expect him to have much more to say about "suggestion".

Maudsley, Henry 1889. The Double Brain. Mind 14(54): 161-187. [JSTOR]

In the former case the loss of one organ would mean so much subtraction of function only, a loss which might be made good by the increased action of the other that was left; in the latter case the loss of one half would not be a lessening only, but a laming function, which could not be compensated by any increased action of the remaining half. (Maudsley 1889: 162)

Noted for the odd use of "function". Similar to the oddity of "the function of language" (Baldwin 1907a: 185, above).

When we reflect upon the intimate constitution and structural connexions of the brain, it seems the natural conclusion that it is not formed of two distinct organs any more than the body is formed of two distinct bodies; that, like the body, it is a bilateral structure. Essentially it is a great aggregate of nerve-centres and nerve-tracts, part of, and administering organ in, a circle of communication between the organism and its medium, nowise a separate and paramount centre of authority, a sort of supreme organ apart, as ordinary language might seem sometimes to imply; an aggregate with which all parts of the body are in communion, mediate or immediate, in which they may be said to have direct or indirect representation, through which the whole works in each part and each part in the whole; and it is bound, therefore, by its constitution and relations, however great the separateness of its halves in respect of some functions, to be fundamentally a double organ ministering to one function, the function of one body. It represents at the same time the halves of the body and the unity of the whole whereof itself is part. (Maudsley 1889: 162)

Sounds a bit like Uexküll's "functional circle". Loving the use of "communion" here: "the halves of the double brain [...] are respectively in communion with and representative of similar organs and structures of the body" (ibid).

It is almost universally admitted now that each cerebral hemisphere contains the centre of voluntary movements and of sensory perceptions for the opposite side of the body; experiments on animals and observations of disease in man having apparently put the conclusion beyond all reasonable question. (Maudsley 1889: 163)

Once again reminiscent of Uexküll, voluntary and sensory mirroring the Wirk- and Merkwelt.

For we may note here that it does not matter whether the associated centres in such case lie close together so as apparently to form one organ or not; if they are closely united in structure by fibres of association, and habitually associated in function, they are practically one notwithstading that they lie some distance apart. (Maudsley 1889: 164)

Neat expression, could be used metaphorically for the quality, size or strength of mental associations.

But the main reason is, perhaps, that years are required to learn the exceeding nice, exact, numerous and complex movements of speech, which really go along in their acquisition and development pari passu with the acquisition and development of reason, whereas the simpler, fever and less fine movements of writings may be taught in a few months. Words being the symbols of reasoning, the definite fixing of them and of the fine shades of their meaning - the nice and exact organisation of their proper nervous substrata - need long time and work, but once they have been acquired it is not so difficult to [|] substitute other symbols for them; if a person, therefore, who has lost the use of his right hand retains his power of speech and reasoning, it ought to be little more difficult, if not easier, to teach him to write with the left hand than it was to teach him in the first instance to write with his right hand. (Maudsley 1889: 165-166)

The "question, 'Is thought possible without speech,' has no real significance" (Baldwin 1907a: 183, above), even though it keeps on cropping up.

[...] that the hemispheres act together by a sort of immediate sympathy or induction during the alternating instants that we are conscious of their respective doings, [...] (Maudsley 1889: 167)

The corpus callosum is an organ of sympathy? It does look like "sympathy" and "communion" were very common words in scientific discourse before the world wars.

What is it that unifies their action? The end or aim in view. And what is the end or aim? The conception or foresight of the act, its ideal accomplishment, which is derived from experience - either individual working experience, when it is exact, full and capable, or observation of the build-up experience of others, when it is vague and general only, incapable of unifying successfully the movements of the two bodies, capable only of supplying them with a general purpose to direct the work of gradual adaptation through repeated trials and patient practice. The purpose is complete and definite only when the effect can be completely and definitely accomplished. (Maudsley 1889: 170)

Reminiscent of Baldwin's later treatment of imitation, e.g. "But there is always the sense that there is more to understand about him; for as we have seen, he constantly, by the diversities between us which I do not yet comprehend, sets me new actions to imitate for my own growth" (Baldwin 1896a: 343, above).

Certainly perceptions are not the mere impressions on sense which they seem to be when we have acquired them, but are acts of inference or judgment grounded on experience: so easy and natural to us are they when formed that we fail to remember that we were not born with them, and to realise how slow and tedious their acquisition was actually. The first movements of the infant are notably uncertain, irregular, uncombined; they become definite, regular, and are combined by parctice; more and more so day after day by insensible degrees, until they attain an automatic ease and exactitude. (Maudsley 1889: 170)

Adjectives of automatism.

No doubt there is a certain innate predisposition or inclination of the hemispheres to enter into joint action, a sort of waiting readiness, not otherwise than as in two bodies which, without previous instruction, accomplish a sexual union that is entirely new to them; and at any rate they can do together simultaneously what one might have to do successively, and so save time. (Maudsley 1889: 171)

"But it is still less possible to admit that a man and a woman would on the first occasion, or even without any reason, part and form new unions if they were both attached so strongly to the same person - an attachment which, as in so many examples, sometimes amounted to a real passion." (Malinowski 1913)

The eye in perceiving or apprehending literally grasps, like the hand, only it grasps the image, not the object; and if the object be indistinct and uncertain, as it is when it is a long way off, the eye, like the hand, makes repeated grasps, as it were, until it hits on the fit one - searches and tries, in fact, until it succeeds in the fit motor apprehension. (Maudsley 1889: 171)

Define:apprehend - To take into custody; arrest. Understand. To become conscious of, as through the emotions or senses; perceive. Analogy between thought and eyesight. Another name for a process of consciousness, from the motive force of a stimulus or object, the spontaneous contrivance of what should be done about it, and then the "arrest" of a rational conclusion. Baldwin's theory of meaning concerns the communication of that conclusion from one person to many, and the concurrent process of imitation whereby the conclusions generally or habitually held of "common sense", is rendered unto the individual. He formulates this common sense in pleasing language: it preserves and embodies "the fruits of social and historical tradition" (Baldwin 1907a: 187).

"Kas sõnu kasutatakse faatilises suhtluses eeskätt selleks, et edasi anda tähendust, mis on sõnadel sümboolselt olemas?" (Malinowski 2020: 311) - kas hariliku või ühiskondliku läbikäimise keelelises sümbolismis on sõnadel tähendus? Kuidas on see võimalik, et me saame kohandada isiklikku kogemust, omi mõtteid, edasi anda ilma oluliste moonutusteta? Eriti kui need on väga kokkuleppelised, sattumuslikud - juhuslikult ühiseks keeleharjumuseks kujunenud väljendid ja väljendused, nö klišeed. Üks populaarne vastus on, et häälitsuste õhkamisel on emotsionaalne tähendus, mida võib olla oluliselt rohkem kui keeles sõnastiku järgi väljendatud tähistajad kirja panduna väljendavad. Selle häguse ja mõõtmatu dimensiooni eitab Malinowski seetõttu, et kui nö "kaastundeavaldustes" (expressions of sympathy) saab tuvastada "eesmärk[i] luua ühist meeleolu" (the purpose of establishing a common sentiment), "siis on see ühelt osapoolelt varjamatult võlts" (avowedly spurious on one side). Kui keegi üritab meiega klišeid vahetades ühist meeleolu tekitada, siis on see Malinowski järgi ühele osapoolele võlts. Seda saab lugeda kaheti: see, kes üritab "tundmusi" (sentiments) jagada ei ole siiras, see on ühiskondlik etteaste, võlts, feik (nt matuse leinatraditsioonidesse võib kuuluda emotsionaalne etteaste, mida ei saada siiras kaastunne - näitleja tegelikult ei tunne seda, mida ta esitab - a la Durkheim 1915: 397); teisest käest võib seda lugeda ka "tundmuste" sihtmärgi kohta - Chase (1863: 477) valgustab, et tundmus ei ole kunagi paljas tunne, vaid hinnang, mida saadab tunne. Tundmus ei ole isegi mitte hinnanguline tunne, vaid tundeline hinnang. Veel enam Chase tsiteerib Comte't, tundmus "eeldab mingisuguste ühiskondlike suhete olemasolu [ja] määrab [iseloomuliku kalduvuse või iseloomu-kalduvuse], mida [isendid] peavad üksteisele neis suhetes jätma [(impress)]" (vt samas, 477). Peale selle, et tundmused on määratluse järgi juba eos jagatud, juba nö ühiskondliku ja ajaloolise traditsiooni osa, siis peab küsimuse all seisma "tundmustaja" ja "tundmustatava" vaheline nö ühine ajalugu. Viimast omakorda võib võtta ühiskonnatasandite läbilõikes: kas nad on osa samast laiemast ühiskonnast, nt riigist või kultuurist; kas nad kuuluvad samadesse või seotud ühiskonnagruppidesse; kas neil on omavahelist suhtlusajalugu; ja viimase ning mitte-ebaolulise äärmusena mitte-suhtlustatud teadmised, nt parasotsiaalne interaktsioon. St sama ühiskond, ühiskonnaosadus, läbikäimine, ja tuntus. Siin kohtub viimane, väikseim ja väiklaseim positsioon uuesti tundmustaja ühepoolsusega: ta ei pruugi jagada tundmustatavaga samu ühiskondlikke tundmusi, aga tegutseda iseka või enesekeskse tundmuse ajendil, mispuhul saab meeldivast läbikäimisest ebameeldiv pseudoosadus, millel on, erinevalt puhtinimlikust osadusest, suhtlussituatsioonist väline eesmärk - nt Henk Haverkate (1988) on selline purist, aga seda võib välja lugeda ka faatilise osaduse "kasutusest" (futility, vt Lee 1940: 367 - does not transcend the act itself). Puhtinimlik osadus on jällegi positiivselt kasutu, meeldiv.

Presumably it is where the individual [|] is labouring to grasp some new thought, to compass a new apprehension, or where he is giving strong attention to a process of reasoning - where, in fact, new adjustments and new combinations of nerve-plexuses to new facts and relations are being made - that the process of associating the hemispheres to act together in one function is going on. (Maudsley 1889: 171-172)

"Apprehension, by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of many sensations." (Kant 1855: 127) - "Apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term." (Meiklejohn 1855: 127; footnote)

The fullest voluntary attention would seem to demand their conjoint action; perhaps the proportions and relations of things thus obtain representation in more adequate conceptions; there may be a strength and grasp of thought in the union which there could not be in the single action; and at any rate there will be a saving of time and wear by their doing together simultaneously what the one would have to do successively. (Maudsley 1889: 172)

Clay (1882: 205) would insist that "voluntary attention" is redundant, all true attention is voluntary, involuntary attention being quasi-attention. Substantially, perceiving and conceptualizing the object are modes of representation (Kant 1855: 224-225).

So it is perhaps that we need the joint action of the hemispheres to apprehend best intellectually, just as we need the joint action of the two hands to apprehend or grasp best physically, and the joint action of me there is notably a part which I see with one eye only, a part of it which I see with the other eye only, a much larger, in fact the greatest, part which I see with both eyes, the fileds of their visual consciousnesses coinciding there; instead of seeing two objects, as I probably did in the first instance when I began to see, I combine the two images, blending into one perception that which my eyes see in common in the object, and uniting it to that which either eye sees. (Maudsley 1889: 172)

The object grasped is missing. I don't need the joint action of two hands to grasp a pen and write. Or to use a computer mouse. I don't think this equation between "apprehend[ing] best intellectually" and "grasp[ing] best physically" is all that solid. Some things can be grasped with one hand, some things can best apprehended with one eye closed (e.g. telescoped), why can't some things be best intellectually apprehended in a single hemisphere? (cf. Fry 1977: 130-131)

Now just as in vision, once the image has been acquired by experience, the momentary impression of the object on one eye is a sign quite sufficient to awaken it fully - (and a mere sign it is, which without the previous instruction we should no more be able to interpret into the object than we should [|] be able to understand the words of an entirely unknown language) - so may it be in thought that, once the idea has been acquired by experience, the least suitable stimulus to either hemisphere suffices to excite it fully. (Maudsley 1889: 172-173)

Inchoate semiotics. Sounds like signs of cheese - that fuzzy feeling or intuition of an object that constitutes perception.

It is obvious that he might have the ordinary feelings and thought of life, and behave like other persons in the ordinary relations of life, while many subtle defects were hidden under the show of complete soundness. (Maudsley 1889: 173)

That's a judgment... or whatever Baldwin called it - is it an assertion or assumption? Maudsley both assumes and asserts (?) that a person with one hemisphere "entirely destroyed by disease" could still function in everyday life or "ordinary relations of life":

  • "Human beings are to each other the sources of the greatest felicity which they are capable of enjoying, while the love of sex adds additional attractions to all the ordinary relations of life." (Henry M'Cormac - 1837: 337)
  • Thus God bears testimony to His Anointed through the ordinary operations of his providence in the ordinary relations of life, through the calm coulse of history and of nature, through the spiritual bent of good men and the conscience of wicked men, through the investigations of science, the dogmas of theology, and the work of Scripture." (Lange 1872: 509)
  • "No in some measure, he who is deeply conversant in the tragic phrase, in the swelling language of compassion, of generosity, and of love, finding no parallel in his common intercourse with mankind, will not so readily open his heart to the calls on his feeling, which the vulgar distresses of his fellow-creatures, or the ordinary relations of life, may occasion." (Anon 1892: 168)

It is perhaps easier to conceive that one hemisphere may do well the ordinary work of thinking, feeling and willing when the function of the other is entirely suspended or abolished than it is when its function is not abolished entirely, so leaving the sound one free play, but is deranged or discordant. (Maudsley 1889: 174)

The triad. ╙ - below, "the ordinary processes of thought, feeling and will" (ibid, 174).

The person would most likely think double, as he sees double when disorder of the action of the eyes, giving visual results contrary to his uniform experiences, causes him to see one object as two objects; in which case notably he is sometimes able after a while to learn to disregard the second object - all the more easily when the two objects are wide apart than when they are close together or overlay. (Maudsley 1889: 174)

The one man band falls apart, loses its fantasy.

When we exert will, either to think closely or to do resolutely, we draw upon the affective life or life of feeling for [|] the driving force. The intellect deals only with the clearness or dimness, the definiteness or indefiniteness of ideas, it supplies no motive energy; all the ideas in the world might pass through it without there being any feeling or desire in relation to them - without appetence or inappetence; it would never experience the least motive of indulgence towards one rather than another, would never tend to one rather than another. The desire tinging any idea, the affective tone or element of the idea, its motive power, comes from the affective life. Now as it is certain that ideas belong to the cerebral hemispheres, being elaborated and performed there, so it is certain that the sources of the passions or affections of mind are distributed through the whole body; they spring and flow from the organic life, of which the so-called sympathetic system of nerves is the ministering nervous machinery. And here let it be noted that recent inquiries go to prove the sympathetic system not to be the separate and quasi-independent nervous system which it has been customary to regard it; so far from being a different system from the cerebro-spinal, it would appear to be actually neither more nor less than the splanchnic distribution or system of the cerebro-spinal. There are not, in fact, two nervous systems, but there is one nervous system with its different distributions. (Maudsley 1889: 174-175)

There's a lot to unpack here but I think I've found a serviceable secondary definition of motivity.

  • "The method employed by myself was the similar application of the electrodes, of the secondary spiral of Du Bois-Reymond's induction coil, connected with a cell of the mean electro-motive power of 1 Daniell." (Ferrier 1886: 223)
  • "But this is not the case, for the strength of the sensation is dependent only on the strength of the motive impulse, passing outwards from the centre, which acts on the innervation of the motor nerves." (Wundt 1863: 222 in Ferrier 1886: 385)
  • "The motive to action is thus the resultant of a complex system of forces; the more complex, the wider the experience, and the more numerous the associations formed between actions and their consequences, near and remote. Actions so conditioned are regarded as mature or deliberate, in contradistinction to impulsive volitions, but the difference is not in kind but only in degree of complexity; for in the end, actions conditioned by the resultant of a complex system of associations, are of essentially the same character as those conditioned by the simple stimulus of a present feeling or desire, where no other associations have as yet been formed capable of modifying it." (Ferrier 1886: 440)

Again, it is certain that the life of feeling is fundamental to the life of thought; it goes before it in the order of development and lies deeper in the individual nature - is rooted in the organic life and constitutes really the basic unity of the Ego, all whose passions and emotions are determined in character according as their exciting causes help or hinder its self-expansion. (Maudsley 1889: 175)

Recently saw a quote to this effect pulled from M.L. in Päevade Sõnad.

The fundamental note of the organic life, as of all life, is attraction and repulsion - to ensure what is profitable, to eschew what is hurtful, to it; and the organs of animal life inspired by it are really its means and instruments to accomplish this end. Their function is to sustain and maintain the organism by procuring food, by securing what is helpful and repelling what is hurtful to it, by embracing what is agreeable and shunning what is disagreeable - in fact, to protect and defend and further life in all ways. (Maudsley 1889: 175)

An utilitarian addition to the opposition between contact (attraction) and avoidance (repulsion).

Faatiline Suhtlus

Malinowski lisand Ogdeni ja Richardsi Tähenduse Tähendusele on minu jaoks väga isiklik teema. Ma olen viimased viis-kuus aastat pühendunud neile neljale leheküljele tema lisandist sellisel määral, et sellest on kujunenud välja minu isiklik kood-tekst, st tekst, mille kaudu ma olen võimeline kodifitseerima paljutki 20. sajandi ühiskonna- ja keeleteadlikust mõtteloost, ja - üllataval kombel - isegi mingit osa 19. sajandist.

Ühest käest on mul väga hea meel, et lõpuks on eesti keeles saadaval üks Malinowski tuntuimaid kogumikke, mis muuhulgas stimuleeris kohe järgneval (1949) aastal nii antropoloogi Weston La Barre'i kui lingvisti Roman Jakobsoni mõtestama oma ideid suhtlemisest välitöö-antropoloogia "vanaisa" ühe kuulsaima terminoloogilise leitise kaudu. Malinowski faatiline osadus on tõepoolest märkimisväärne terminoloogiline leiutis, mille süvaprobleeme me asja- ja huvitundjad lahendame siiani ja võib-olla jääme veel aastakümneteks lahendama.

Teisest käest ei ole mul väga hea meel näha, et phatic communion on selle tõlkija arvates "faatiline suhtlus" kui igast küljest õigem tõlge oleks "faatiline osadus". Käesoleva postituse eesmärk on lugejasse istutada kriitiline suhtumine käesolevasse tõlkesse, et vähemalt järgnevad põlvkonnad eesti humanitaare võiksid avastada ja kasutada õiget vastet.

Nii mõnigi punkt sellest arutelust viitab minu isiklikule uurimusele faatilisest osadusest, mispuhul lingin teid artiklini Malinowski mõiste "faatiline osadus" kontekst, milles ma esitan faatilist osadust kõige enam mõjutanud autorite katkendeid ja, by and by, süüdistan Malinowskit selles küsimuses kolmekordses plagiaadis. Aga see selleks. Faatiline osadus võiks olla eestikeelset humanitaarteadust edendavaks mõisteks isegi kui asjaosalised on teadlikud, et originaalmõiste oli problemaatiline.

Käesoleva postituse sisuks on võrdlus originaalteksti ja kahe tõlke vahel. Üheks neist on käesoleva üllitise tõlge. Teiseks on minu isiklik tõlge, mis oleks pidanud ilmuma koos lingitud artikliga samas köites, oleks ma vaid olnud oma tõlkega piisavalt rahul, et toimetajatele püstist pöialt näidata. Pärast käesoleva tõlke lugemist ei ole ma endiselt kindel, kas autoritatiivne tõlge on üldse võimalik. Ehk mõni lugeja, kunagi, jõuab selleni.

Malinowski, Bronislaw 2020. Maagia, Teadus ja Religioon ning Teisi Esseid. Tõlkinud Olavi Teppan, järelsõna Toomas Gross. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus. [Ainult lk 309-312]

The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration. When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing - it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation. The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behavior, with the purpose of what they are doing. (Malinowski 1948: 247)
Vabal, sihitul sotsiaalsel lävimisel kasutatava keele juhtum nõuab eraldi vaatlust. Kui hulk inimesi istub külas lõkke ümber, olles kõik päevased toimetamised lõpetanud, või kui nad lobisevad, puhates tööst, või kui nad räägivad lihtsa käsitsitöö kõrval suusoojaks jutte, mis pole nende tegevusega sugugi seotud - siis on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keelekasutuse moodusega, teist tüüpi kõnefunktsiooniga. Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis tol momendil juhtub, ning puudu näib olevat isegi situatsiooni kontekst. Igasuguse lausungi tähendust ei saa seostada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga. (Malinowski 2020: 309)
Keelekasutus vabas, sihitus ühiskondlikus läbikäimises nõuab erilist tähelepanu. Kui hulk inimesi istuvad pärast kõigi päevatööde lõppemist tööst puhates ümber külatule, või kui töö kõrval ajatakse juttu, mis on sõltumatu sellest, mida nad parasjagu teevad — on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keelekasutuse, teistsugust tüüpi keelefunktsiooniga. Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis parasjagu toimub, see näib isegi olevat lahutatud igasugusest situatsiooni kontekstist. Ühegi lausungi tähendust ei saa ühendada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga. (minu tõlge)

Intercourse / lävimine / läbikäimine - hea. Lävimine on iseenesest parem kui läbikäimine.

Daily tasks / päevased toimetamised / päevatööd - siin olen oma variandiga rohkem rahul. Päevatöö on vb natuke laetud lääneliku konnotatsiooniga, a la daily work, millest task (ülesanne) on vabam, aga minu arvates mitte nii vaba kui "toimetus" (vt nt daily routine - igapäevased toimetused).

Chat / lobisevad / ajatakse juttu - siin olen ise kasutanud kujutlusvõimet, sest töö kõrval vs tööst puhates on tõepoolest erinevad asjad.

Another mode of using language / teistsuguse keelekasutuse moodusega / teistsuguse keelekasutuse - siin oleks vb parim lahendus olnud "teistsuguse keelekasutusmoega".

A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things - all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought. It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side. What is the raison d'être, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are,' 'Where do you come from?' 'Nice day to-day' - all of which serve in one society or another as formulæ of greeting or approach? (Malinowski 1948: 248)
Lihtne viisakusväljend, mida mestlaste hõimudes kasutatakse sama tihti kui Euroopa salongis, täidab funktsiooni, millega sõnade tähendusel pole peaaegu mitte mingisugust pistmist. Pärimine tervise järele, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mingi ülimalt ilmselge asjade seisu kinnitamine - kõike seda lausutakse ja mitte selleks, et informeerida, mitte et antud juhul inimesi tegevuses ühendada, kindlasti mitte et väljendada mingisugust mõtet. Minu arvates oleks isegi ebatäpne öelda, et selliste sõnade eesmärk on luua ühist meeleolu, kuna tavaliselt see säärastest käibefraasidest puudub. Või kui seda saabki tuvastada, näiteks kaastundeavaldustes, siis on see ühelt osapoolelt varjamatult võlts. Mis on siis seesuguste fraasidega nagu "Kuidas käsi käib?", "Aa, siin sa oledki", "Kust sa tuled?" ja "Ilus ilm täna" olemasolu mõte - kui need kõik on ühes või teises ühiskonnas tervitamise või lähenemise vormelid? (Malinowski 2020: 309)
Paljas viisakusfraas, mis on metsikute hõimude seas kasutusel samavõrd kui Euroopa külalistubades, täidab funktsiooni, mille jaoks selle sõnade tähendus on pea täielikult ebaoluline. Tervise järele pärimine, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mõne ülimalt ilmselge asjaolu kinnitamine — kõike sellist vahetatakse mitte selleks, et informeerida, mitte isegi selleks, et inimesi tegevuses ühendada ja kindlasti mitte selleks, et väljendada mõnda mõtet. Oleks isegi väär, ma arvan, öelda, et sellised sõnad teenivad ühiste tundmuste saavutamise eesmärki, sest see on tavaliselt selliste käibefraaside juurest puudu; ja kus see näibki eksisteerivat, näiteks kaastundeväljendustes, on see ühel pool varjamatult võlts. Mis on seega selliste fraaside, mis on kõik ühes või teises ühiskonnas käibel tervitus- ja lähenemisvalemitena, nagu "Kuidas sul läheb?", "Siin sa siis oledki", "Kust sa pärit oled?", "Ilus päev täna" raison d'être? (minu tõlge)

A mere phrase of politeness / lihtne viisakusväljend / paljas viisakusfraas - ametlik tõlge on parem. Läksin otsetõlkega - mere on "paljas". See sõna esineb tekstis viis korda, vahel saab tõlkida "pelgalt", aga "pelk/pelgas viisakusväljend" oleks kummaline.

Among savage tribes / metslaste hõimudes / metsikute hõimude seas - oma tõlget pean paremaks. Argonautides taunib Malinowski ise sõna savage kasutamist, aga käesoleva essee kirjutas ta vist enne seda? Kes teab. Ma arvan et "metsik" on parem kui "metslane", sest viimane on essentsialistlikm - mitte, et nad on parasjagu metsikud, vaid, et nad olid, on ja jäävad metslasteks.

State of things / asjade seisu / asjaolu - oma vaste meeldib rohkem, kaldub "olukorra" või "asjaloo" poole paremini. Parim oleks vb "asjade seisukord".

Exchanged / lausutakse / vahetatakse - minu oma on küll otsetõlge, aga panem minu arvates õigesti rõhku sellele, et taolisi viisakusväljendeid lausutakse edasi-tagasi. Nt Trotteril (1921[1916]), kelle pealt Malinowski viksis palju maha, on selle viisakusväljendite edasi-tagasi vahetamise jaoks selline väljend nagu elaborate evolutions, mille vasteks andsin "viimistletud pöörded", st toppisin sinna kujutluses "r" tähe ette, sest muidu ei oleks oleks "evolutsioon" arusaadav, samas kui "pöördumine" on täitsa olemas.

Incorrect / ebatäpne / väär - Nastik annab "väär, ebaõige, vigane". Ma kaldun arvama, et incorrect on siin tugevamas tähenduses kui lihtsalt ebatäpne.

A common sentiment / ühist meeleolu / ühiste tundmust - siin on küsimus põhjapanev. Sentiment kohe kindlasti ei ole meeleolu (frame of mind; mood; state of mind). Meeleolu võiks siin sobituda "atmosfääriga" (melu), aga selles kohas on tegu eitusega - Malinowski ei usu, et lihtsad viisakusväljendid saavutavad ühiseid tundmusi; allpool aga ütleb ta, et sellised viisakusväljendid ühendavad kuulajat ja kõnelejat läbi ühe või teise ühiskondliku tundmuse (seda vasturääkivust puudutasin natuke oma artiklis). Võtmesõna on tundmus, mis ei ole enam tänapäeval levinud teadustermin, aga oli seda Malinowski öökapiraamatus, Alexander Shand'i The Foundations of Character: Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments (1914). Viimase "tundmusteoorias" (theory of sentiment) on tundmused kõrgema järgu tunded, millel on mingi ideeline sisu. Seda on üsna raske seletada, pole veel kogu vajalikku kirjandust läbi seedinud (Shand vaidles ajakirjas Mind sel teemal pikalt ja põhjalikult, aga tema süsteem oli ehk teps liiga keeruline, et olla eluvõimeline).

Avowedly spurious on one side / ühelt osapoolelt varjamatult võlts / ühel pool varjamatult võlts - see on see koht, millega S.S. ei olnud rahul, jäi arusaamatuks. Esimesse artiklisse ei jõudnudki see, kuidas Malinowski tõenäoliselt viitas sellega ühele matusekommete märkusele Durkheimi Usuelu Algvormides. Jätan oma tõlke siia: "Üks esialgne tõsiasi on kindel: leinamine ei ole individuaali tunnete spontaanne väljendus. Kui veresugulased nutavad, itkuvad, katkuvad juukseid, siis mitte selle pärast, et nad tunnevad ennast isiklikult hõimukaaslase surma poolt puudutatuna. Muidugi võib olla, kindlatel üksikjuhtumitel, et väljendatud meelehärmi tuntakse päriselt. Aga üldisemalt on pigem nii, et tuntavate tundmuste ja riituses osalejate žestide vahel ei ole mingit ühendust. Kui, hetkel mil nutjad näivad olevat leina poolt kõige enam üle võetud, kõnetab neid keegi mõnes maises küsimuses, juhtub sageli, et nende näoilme ja hääletoon muutuvad koheselt naeruks ja nad vestlevad kõige rõõmsamal viisil, mida saaks ette kujutada. Leinamine ei ole julma kaotuse poolt haavatud isiklike tunnete loomulik liigutus; see on grupi poolt kehtestatud kohustus." (Durkheim 1915[1912]: 397) - Siin sõltub tõlgendus sellest, et "expressions of sympathy (kaastundeavaldustes/kaastundeväljestustes) tuleb võtta sõna otseses mõttes - "kaastunnet avaldatakse" leinavatele inimestele ("Ma tunnen kaasa"). Üks mitmest võimalikust teooriast, kuidas sõna "faatiline" tekkis, on sympathy minus symmetry hüpotees: kaastundeavaldused on "varjamatult võltsid", sest kaastundeavaldaja ei saa kunagi tunda täpselt seda, mida tunneb leinav inimene. Minu jaoks meikib see senssi läbi E. R. Clay homogeense ja heterogeense sümpaatia eristuse (kaastunne/koostunne), aga Malinowski tõenäoliselt toetus McDougall'ile, kellel on sama eristus aktiivse ja passiivse sümpaatia vahel (vt. McDougall 1916: 168). Üleüldiselt on "avowedly spurious" üks neist nö unhackneyed phrase'idest, mille Malinowski korjas jumalteabkust üles ja toppis oma teksti, arusaadavuse kahjuks (to the detriment of intelligibility).

I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society. There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company. Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man. [Footnote:] I avoid on purpose the use of the expression Herd-instinct, for I believe that the tendency in question cannot strictly be called an instinct. Moreover the term Herd-instinct has been misused in a recent sociological work which has, however, become sufficiently popular to establish its views on this subject with the general reader. (Malinowski 1948: 248)
Ma arvan, et kui me räägime kõne funktsioonist puhtalt seltskondlikkuse kategoorias, siis oleme jõudnud inimese ühiskondliku loomuse ühe põhjapaneva aspektini. Kõigil inimestel on teada-tuntud kalduvus ühte koonduda, koos [|] olla, üksteise seltskonda nautida. Paljud instinktid ja sünnipärased suundumused, näiteks hirm ja riiakus, ning igat tüüpi sotsiaalsed tunded, nagu auahnus, edevus, võimuiha ja rikkusehimu, johtuvad ja sõltuvad fundamentaalsest kalduvusest, mis muudab ainuüksi juba teiste kohalolu inimesele hädavajalikuks. [Joonealune märkus:] Hoidun sihilikult väljendist "karjainstinkt", sest usun, et kõnealust kalduvust ei saa pidada rangelt võttes instinktiks. Pealegi on mõistet "karjainstinkt" viimasel ajal sotsioloogilistes uurimustes valesti kasutatud, kuigi need uurimused on kujunenud piisavalt populaarseks, et viia antud teemat käsitlevad seisukohad laiema lugejaskonnani. (Malinowski 2020: 309-310)
Ma arvan, et tühjade viisakuste kõnefunktsiooni üle arutledes jõuame me ühe põhilise aspektini inimese ühiskondlikus loomuses. Kõigis inimestes on teada-tuntud kalduvus koguneda, olla koos, nautida üksteise seltskonda. Paljud instinktid ja kaasasündinud suundumused, nagu hirm ja riiakus, mitmesugused ühiskondlikud tundmused nagu ambitsioon, edevus, võimu ja rikkuse iha, on sõltuvad ja seotud selle põhilise kalduvusega mis teeb teiste inimeste juuresviibimise inimese jaoks hädavajalikuks. [Joonealune märkus:] Ma väldin sihilikult väljendi "karjainstinkt" kasutamist, sest ma usun, et küsimuse all olevat kalduvust ei saa päris täpselt instinktiks nimetada. Veel enam, karjainstinkti mõistet on väärkasutatud hiljutises sotsioloogilises uurimuses, mis on sellegipoolest osutunud piisavalt populaarseks, et kinnistada oma vaateid lugejate seas. (minu tõlge)

Mere sociabilities / puhtalt seltskondlikkuse kategoorias / tühjade viisakuste - siin on seni kõige suuremad erinevused. Mere on jälle probleemne. Kui ma saan õigesti aru, siis tõlkija võttis sociability-t "seltskondlikkuse" tähenduses, eirates mitmust. Mina tõlgendasin seda "paljaste viisakusfraasidega" analoogselt ühiskondlike "viisakustena". Seda on tõesti raske tõlkida, aga mingit aimu annavad ehk vasted nagu "the sociabilities of club life", "the refined sociabilities of a luxurious court", "the sociabilities of human life", "the sociabilities of the French", "the amiable sociabilities of the marriage state", jne. Kõige ilmekas selline näide on järgnev: "The high court and military officials, who formed the aristocracy, were deficient in all intellectual and engaging sociabilities." Väga tõenäoliselt on sociabilities umbes nagu "seltskondlikud lõbustused". St seltskondlikkus kui selline ja "seltskondlikud lõbustused" on natuke erinevad asjad. Konkreetselt, kui me räägime Kõne funktsioonist pelgalt seltskondlikutes lõbustustes...

Tendency to congregate / kalduvus ühte koonduda / kalduvus koguneda - siin on tõlkija justkui mõelnud sõnast "agglomerate". Congregation on kogudus, mitte koondus; to congregate on kokku kogunema, mitte ühte koonduma.

Social sentiments / sotsiaalsed tunded / ühiskondlikud tundmused - ennist oli "meeleolu", nüüd "tunded". Õige sõna on "tundmused". See selleks. Asjaloo nali, millest kirjutan järgmises artiklis, seisneb selles, et kõik rivistatud tundmused on Shandi tundmusteooria järgi "enesekesksed tundmused" (self-regarding sentiments), st täpselt mitte sotsiaalsed. Kes meist arvab, et "auahnus, edevus, võimuiha ja rikkusehimu" on ühiskondlikud? Need on kõik isekad tundmused. Nad nõuavad küll ühiskonna osalemist, aga on suunatud sissepoole, enda edendamisele. Lõppkokkuvõttes võib Malinowski lausest välja lugeda, et inimene vajab teiste inimeste seltskonda, et nendega tüli norida ja ennast teiste üle kehtestada. Shandi järgi on need "enesearmastuse" (self-love) ilmingud. "Ühiskondlikud tundmused" on midagi muud, nt patriotism või armastus mõne teaduse või kunsti vastu.

A recent sociological work / viimasel ajal sotsioloogilistes uurimustes / hiljutises sotsioloogilises uurimuses - tõlkija võtab "tööd" valesti mitmuses, ebaisikuliselt (justkui see lauseosa loeks "recent sociological works"). Tegelikult viitab ta siin ühele konkreetsele sotsioloogilisele uurimusele - Wilfred Trotter'i Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.

The tendency in question / kõnealust kalduvust / küsimuse all olevat kalduvust - kalduvus, mida ta silmas peab, on Trotteri järgi seltskondlikkus (gregariousness). See sõna esineb korra ka tekstis (convivial gregariousness, lustakas seltskondlikkus).

Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a [|] general rule. The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food. The modern English expression, 'Nice day to-day' or the Melanesian phrase, "Whence comest thou?' are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence. (Malinowski 1948: 248-249)
Kõne on selle kalduvuse lähedane korrelaat, sest loomulikule inimesele pole teise inimese vaikimine julgustav faktor, vaid vastupidi, midagi ärevusse ajavat ja ohtlikku. Võõras, kes ei oska keelt rääkida, on kõigi metslaste silmis loomulik vaenlane. Primitiivsele mõtlemisele tähendab vaikus nii metslaste keskel kui meie endi harimata klassides ebasõbralikkust, liiati otseselt halba iseloomu. Kahtlemata varieerub see suuresti vastavalt rahva iseloomule, kuid sõnaline suhtlus on esimene tegu, et luua vendlussidemed, mis tipnevad leiva jagamise ja ühise söömisega. Nüüdisaegne ingliskeelne väljend "Ilus ilm täna" või melaneeslaste fraas "Kust sa tuled?" on vajalikud selleks, et saada üle kummalisest ja ebamugavast pingest, mida inimesed tunnevad, kui nad üksteisega vaikuses kokku satuvad. (Malinowski 2020: 310)
Kõne on selle kalduvusega lähedalt seotud, sest metsiku inimese jaoks ei ole teise inimese vaikimine rahustav tegur vaid, vastupidi, midagi ärevust tekitavat ja ohtlikku. Võõras, kes ei oska kohalikku keelt rääkida, on kõigi metsikute hõimlaste jaoks loomulik vaenlane. Primitiivsele mõistusele, olgu metslaste või meie endi harimata klasside hulgas, tähendab sõnaahtrus mitte ainult ebasõbralikkust vaid otseselt halba iseloomu. See kahtlemata erineb oluliselt rahvuste lõikes, aga jääb tõeks üldise reeglina. Vaikuse murdmine, sõnade osadus (communion), on esimene samm ühiste sidemete loomises, mis päädib leivamurdmise ja toidu osadusega. Tänapäevane inglise väljend "Ilus päev täna" või Melaneesia fraas "Kust tuled?" on vajalikud, et saada üle sellest kummalisest ja ebameeldivast pingest, mida inimesed tunnevad vastastikku vaiki olles. (minu tõlge)

Natural man / loomulikule inimesele / metsiku inimese - ma ei tea, kes on "loomulik inimene", aga ma arvan, et Malinowski mõtles siin inimest loomuseisundis (man in a state of nature - vs. man in a state of society; loomuseisund vs ühiskonnaseisund), st tema enda variatsioon "metslase" jaoks.

Reassuring / julgustav / rahustav - mõlemad variandid sobivad: reassure'imine eemaldab kahtlusi ja hirme (say or do something to remove the doubts or fears of (someone)). Isikliku suvana eelistan rahustamist.

Savage tribesmen / metslaste / metsikute hõimlaste - siin läks tõlkijal "hõimlus" kaduma. Jälle, eelistan metsikust metslastele.

The primitive mind / Primitiivsele mõtlemisele / Primitiivsele mõistusele - Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, La Mentalité Primitive (1922). Kõige täpsem oleks seega "primitiivsele mentaliteedile".

Taciturnity means / tähendab vaikus / tähendab sõnaahtrus - mitte üldse sõnu, vaid vähe sõnu; nt "Japanese tend to be taciturn, considering it a virtue to say little and rely on nonlinguistic means to convey the rest." (Cheung 1993: 8; minu rõhk).

But remains true as a general rule / - / aga jääb tõeks üldise reeglina - tõlkija justkui ei nõustu, et eelnev küll varieerub vastavalt "rahvuslikule iseloomule", aga kehtib üldreegline kõikjal. Esimene selline lauseosa, mis on täielikult välja jäänud.

The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act / kuid sõnaline suhtlus on esimene tegu / Vaikuse murdmine, sõnade osadus (communion), on esimene samm - siin pistab pea üles minu põhiline tüliküsimus selle tõlkega. Mul võttis väga kaua aega, et lõpuks komistada mingi prantsuse-eesti sõnastiku otsa ja avastada, et communion on "osadus". Tõlkija sellist sammu ei ole teinud. Seetõttu on faatilisest osadusest saanud siin faatiline "suhtlus". Siin on küsimus suisa nii probleemne, et terved lauseosad lähevad kaduma. "Vaikuse murdmine" visati täiesti välja, ja "sõnade osadusest" sai "sõnaline suhtlus". Etteruttavalt panen lauale, et Malinowski kogu point faatilise osadusega on vastandada kirjeldatud keelekasutusmoodi suhtlemisele. Ta kasutab sõna communicate suisa kaks korda, mõlemad negatiivses tähenduses (does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas ja there must not be anything to communicate). Kui ta oleks tahtnud öelda phatic communication, siis ta oleks ka vastavalt talitanud. Ta kasutas sõna communion nimme, et vastandada faatilist osadus suhtlemisele.

Selles suhtes on kogu see tõlge läinud vett vedama, osutunud nurjumiseks, vähemalt minu jaoks. Muidugi on neid, kes kasutavad väljendit phatic communication. Neid on laias laastus kolme tüüpi, mida võib populaarsuse järgi järjestada järgnevalt: 1) need, kes toetuvad Jakobsoni faatilisele funktsioonile ja arvavad, et tema funktsioonid on kommunikatsioonifunktsioonid, mitte keelefunktsioonid; 2) need, kes loevad Malinowskit ja ei saa aru, et communion ja communication on kaks erinevat sõna; ja 3) Weston La Barre, kes nimme vastandus Malinowski rassismile ja klassismile ja andis faatilisusele täiesti uue sisu, mispuhul tema phatic communication on samaväärne mõistega nonverbal communication. Meie tõlkija on vististi laagris nr. 2.

The communion of food / ühise söömisega / toidu osadusega - siin justkui riivab õiget tähendust: ühistegevus. Point on muidugi natuke kaugemal: "paljudes ühiskondades usutakse, et koos võetud eine loob tehisliku sugulusühenduse" ja "toiduosadus võib toota sama mõju, mis ühine päritolu" (Durkheim 1915: 317). Toidu ja osaduse seos ei ole arbitraarne. Kristlik armulaud (communion feast) sai alguse Vana-Kreeka orjade pidusöögist, eranos (ἔρανος) meaning a banquet to which the guests bring contributions of food, a no-host dinner. John Mahaffy, kes oma ramatus The Principles of the Art of Conversation (1887) lõi Malinowski jaoks selle seose, võrdles vestlust panuse-pidusöömaga (a contribution-feast), st vestlus, just nagu eranos, on selline üritus, kuhu igaüks peab midagi kaasa tooma, et ühiselt sellest osa võtta. Just selles tähenduses paneb ka Malinowski kokku sõnad the communion of words.

When facing each other in silence / kui nad üksteisega vaikuses kokku satuvad / vastastikku vaiki olles - siin olen ma isiklikult uhke selle üle kui hästi õnnestus kolme sõnaga asja kokku võtta. Samas on ka oluline erinevus selle vahel, kas sa satud kellegagi vaikuses kokku, või sa oled olukorras, kus sa oled kellegagi näost-näkku ja kumbki ei oska midagi öelda. St "kokku sattumisel" on mööduv maik, aga üksteisest vaikuses mööduvatel inimestel ei pruugi sellest mingit lugu olla; probleemseks muutub vaikus olukordades, mis justkui nõuavad, et keegi midagi ütleks. Põhiküsimus võibki olla liikuvuses - liftis sõitmine ei tekita seda ebamugavustunnet nii palju kui nt järjekorras seismine.

After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious. Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own. Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy. Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak. For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement. But though the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of roles. (Malinowski 1948: 249)
Pärast esimest vormelit järgneb keelevoog, otstarbetud eelistuste või vastumeelsuste väljendused, kirjeldused asjassepuutumatutest sündmustest, kommentaarid millegi täiesti ilmse kohta. Sellised suusoojaks räägitud jutud, nagu neid esineb primitiivsetes ühiskondades, erinevad meie omadest vaid pisut. Ikka on rõhk samamoodi jaatusel ja nõusolekul, sekka vahest mõni üksik vastuväide, mis loob antipaatia sidemed. Või isiklikel ülevaadetel kõneleja seisukohtadest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja üksjagu kammitsetult [|] ja veidi varjatud kärsitusega vastu võtab, oodates, kuni saabub tema kord rääkida. Sest kuulaja ja kõneleja vahel sellise kõnekasutusega loodavad sidemed ei ole päris sümmeetrilised, lingvistiliselt aktiivsele inimesele saab osaks suurem sotsiaalne nauding ja eneseülendus. Kuid olgugi et selliste lausungite kuulamine pole reegline nii intensiivne kui kõneleja osa, on see tema naudingu jaoks väga vajalik ning vastastikuse hüvanguni jõutakse rollide vahetusega. (Malinowski 2020: 310-311)
Pärast esimest vormelit järgneb keelevool, eelistuste ja võõrastuste eesmärgitu väljendamine, aruanded ebaolulistest juhtumustest, kommentaarid täiesti ilmselgete asjade kohta. Selline primitiivsetes ühiskondades leitav keelepeks erineb väga vähe meie endi omast. Alati sama rõhk jaatamisel ja soostumisel, võib-olla segatud juhusliku lahkarvamusega, mis tekitab vaenusidemeid. Või isiklikud ülevaated kõneleja vaadetest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja kuulab pealt mõningase vaoshoituse ja kergelt peidetud kannatamatusega, oodates kuniks saabub tema kord kõnelda. Sellises vestluses loodud sidemed kuulaja ning kõneleja vahel ei ole päris sümmeetrilised, sest keeleliselt aktiivsem osapool võtab suurema jao ühiskondlikust naudingust ja eneseülistamisest. Kuigi selliste lausungite puhul kuulaja roll ei ole niivõrd intensiivne kui kõneleja enda jagu, on see tema naudingu jaoks siiski üsna vajalik ja vastastikkus saavutatakse rollide vaheldamise kaudu. (minu tõlge)

Purposeless expressions / otstarbetud [...] väljendused / eesmärgitu väljendamine - natuke tühine küsimus, aga siin on sünonüümia purposeless ja varasema aimless vahel. Eesmärgi puudumine, see tähendab, ei ole minu arvates samaväärne otstarbe puudumisega. Otstarve justkui on - vestluskaaslastega lähematesse suhetesse astumine; eesmärk, st point, või midagi, millest räägitakse, aga puudub. Vb liiga peen eristus, et mingit olulist rolli mängida.

Preference or aversion / eelistuste või vastumeelsuste / eelistuste ja võõrastuste - mulle meeldib muidugi enda tõlge (enamjaolt) paremini, aga siin konkreetselt mängib rolli paronomaasia: "võõrastus" riimub "eelistusega" paremini kui "vastumeelsus".

Accounts of irrelevant happenings / kirjeldused asjassepuutumatutest sündmustest / aruanded ebaolulistest juhtumustest - ma arvan, et kui Malinowski oleks tahtnud öelda "kirjeldused" (descriptions), siis oleks see sõna. "Aruanne" (account) on mingis mõttes tugevama tähendusega - keegi hakkab millesti ebaolulisest (mitte ainult asjassepuutumatust, sest "asja" ei ole, aga just "ebaolulisest", sest midagi "olulist", midagi "asist" pole) jahvatama ja muudkui annab aru, kuigi kedagi ei huvita. St tõlkija konstruktsioonist võib jääda väär mulje, et on mingi "asi", millest räägitakse, ja keegi kõrvaline pistab midagi "asjassepuutumatut" vahele. Minu tõlge annab ehk paremini edasi, et mingit "asja" polegi. Sündmustest/juhtumustest - events/happenings tundub liiga ilmne möödatõlkimine, et selle kohta midagi enamat öelda.

Gossip / suusoojaks räägitud jutud / keelepeks - "So me think why waste time say lot word when few word do trick" (Kevin Mallone). Siin on ka sisuline vahe. Suusoojaks on "moepärast, jutujätkuks". Gossip, seevastu, on Malinowski kasutuses enam-vähem alati negatiivse konnotatsiooniga, nt Argonautides eirab Malinowski informante, kes räägivad talle kuulujutte, mida ta tüüpiliselt on varem juba mujalt kuulnud. Kuulujutud teda ei huvita, sest need kalduvad asjaolusid liialdama või fabritseerima. Üks liin, mida ma veel ei ole loogilise lõpuni jälitanud, seisnebki selles, et ehk lõi Malinowski sellise mõiste, et nuriseda ebausaldusväärsete informatide üle. Näiteks, kui üks informant kiitleb, et ta läks kuskile, kust ta sai alati lõputult süüa, analüüsib Malinowski: "It may be easily imagined how strongly these pictures would appeal to the natives' fancy, how they would enhance the personal prestige of the boaster and arouse the envy of the more ambitious. Boasting about food is the most prevalent form of native vanity or ambition." (Malinowski 1916: 364-365). Samasse jatta läheb järgmine mitmest etümoloogilisest hüpoteesist, seekord nö fama-hüpotees - et Malinowski vermis "faatilise osaduse" sellest, et inimesed kalduvad vestlema ainetel, mis tõstavad nende endi ühiskondlikku kuvandit, aitab neil saada "suurema jao ühiskondlikust naudingust ja eneseülistamisest". Võtmesõna sellesse arutellu on renown.

Affirmation and consent / jaatusel ja nõusolekul / jaatamisel ja soostumisel - veel üks ebaoluline moment kus ma tunnen, et minu variant on marginaalselt parem. Vb jälle samal põhjusel, et jaatamine ja soostumine riimuvad. Aga samas, tõlge ei ole luule.

Mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement / sekka vahest mõni üksik vastuväide / võib-olla segatud juhusliku lahkarvamusega - siin on minu tõlge kohmakam, aga üldiselt on "lahkarvamus" parem vaste kui vastuväide; selleks, et mitte nõustuda, ei pea väljendama vastuväidet; lahkarvamus on sekka segatud (ühildav kolmas variant). Natuke üldisemalt võib mainida, et see kirjakoht on jälle inspireeritud Trotterist, kes kirjutas olulisse katkendisse lauseosa, "watching intently for the first low hint of a growl, which will show one belongs to the wrong pack" (Trotter 1921: 119-120), st küsimus on natuke more subtle kui eksplitsiitne "vastuväide" - me võime märgata, et keegi ei ole meiega "samal lainel" ka sellest, et nad õigel hetkel ei nooguta, ei vasta midagi, või vaatavad murelikult kõrvale.

Creates the bonds of antipathy / loob antipaatia sidemed / tekitab vaenusidemeid - neli sõna, kolm sõna, ja kaks. "Vaenusidemed" ei ole muidugi ideaalne, sest see ei ole aktiivselt kasutusel, tingitud "sidemetest" (bonds), aga läheneb üsna adekvaatselt kasutusesolevale sõnale "vaenusuhted".

Some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience / üksjagu kammitsetult ja veidi varjatud kärsitusega / mõningase vaoshoituse ja kergelt peidetud kannatamatusega - siin ei ole variantidel midagi viga, lihtsalt imetlen, et sama asja saab eesti keeles viimseni erinevate sõnadega edasi anda.

The man linguistically active receiving the greater share / lingvistiliselt aktiivsele inimesele saab osaks suurem / keeleliselt aktiivsem osapool võtab suurema jao - siin nägin ise kohaseks asendada "lingvistiliselt", mis on juba inglise keeles kohmakas, natuke parema variandiga, mis tähendab täpselt sama. Silma torkavad erinevad lahendused sooneutraalsusele - man'ist saab tõlkijal "inimene", minul "osapool". Huvitav on ka see, et "osa" on mul nihkunud aktiivsesse positsiooni (osapool) ja vastuvõtust (receiving) saab minul aktiivne "võtab", aga tõlkijal jääb passiivne "saab osaks". Siin on vb ideoloogiline moment, sest minu silmis on teistest ülerääkija "võtja", kui mitte isegi "võitja", selles negatiivses tähenduses milles Jeff Bezos - kes maksab oma töötajatele madalaimat võimalikku palka - ütleb oma miljardite kohta "winnings", justkui ta oleks passiivselt, justkui kogemata, lotos võitnud, mitte aktiivselt oma töötajaid viimseni kurnanud.

Social pleasure and self-enhancement / sotsiaalne nauding ja eneseülendus / ühiskondlikust naudingust ja eneseülistamisest - siin võtab tõlkija loorberid, sest "ülendus" on lühem ja parem kui "ülistamine". Kahjuks ei leia ma "ülendamisele" määratlust - inglisekeelsed vasted on elevate ja promote, mis kahtlemata peavad paika; "ülistamisel" seevastu on ÕS-is määratlus: "üles kiitma, taevani tõstma". St ülistamine on vb tähenduselt natuke konkreetsem (seos "enesekiitusega" tuleb esile), aga tõlkija võidab tähistaja lühidusega.

The reciprocity is established / vastastikuse hüvanguni jõutakse / vastastikkus saavutatakse - kust võttis tõlkija "hüvangu" ("heaolu, heakäekäik")? Jutt käib puhtast vastastikkusest: kord üks kuulab ja teine räägib, siis rollid vahetuvad ja teine räägib ning esimene kuulab. Mingit "hüvangut" siin ei ole - hüvest saaks rääkida suhtlemise puhul, kui mõlemad osapooled räägivad samast asjast; siin on asja ivaks osadus, st mõlemad osapooled räägivad midagi, aga nad räägivad üksteisest mööda (kordamööda räägitakse ja kuulatakse, aga ei suhelda; kuulav osapool etendab kuulaja rolli, aga tegelikult ei kuula vaid ootab "kuni saabub tema kord rääkida").

There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use - phatic communion I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention - a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in phatic communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought. (Malinowski 1948: 249)
Ei saa olla kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega - mul on kiusatus nimetada seda faatiliseks suhtluseks, mida käivitab terminoloogilise leidlikkuse deemon - sedalaadi kõnega, milles ühtsussidemed luuakse pelgalt sõnu vahetades. Vaatame seda erilisest aspektist, mida me siinkohal käsitleme. Küsime, millist valgust heidab see keele funktsioonile või olemusele. Kas sõnu kasutatakse faatilises suhtluses eeskätt selleks, et edasi anda tähendust, mis on sõnadel sümboolselt olemas? Kindlasti mitte! Sõnad täidavad sotsiaalset funktsiooni ja see on nende põhieesmärk, aga nad pole ei intellektuaalse mõtiskluse tulemus ega ärgita ka kuulajat tingimata järele mõtlema. Taas võime öelda, et keel ei funktsioneeri siin mõtete edastamise vahendina. (Malinowski 2020: 311)
Ei ole mingit kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega — terminoloogilise leiutamise deemonist mõjustatuna olen ahvatletud nimetama seda faatiliseks osaduseks — kõnetüübiks, milles ühendussidemeid luuakse pelgalt sõnade vahetamise kaudu. Vaatame seda nüüd meid huvitavast seisukohast ja küsime, millist valgust heidab see keele loomusele või toimimisele. Kas sõnu kasutatakse faatilises osaduses põhiliselt selleks, et edastada neile kui sümbolitele kuuluvat tähendust? Kindlasti mitte! Nad täidavad ühiskondlikku funktsiooni ja see on nende põhiline eesmärk, sest nad ei ole intellektuaalse refleksiooni tulemus ja ei kutsu ilmtingimata refleksiooni esile ka kuulajas. Jällegi võime öelda, et keel ei toimi siin mõtete edastamise vahendina. (minu tõlge)

A new type of linguistic use - phatic communion I am tempted to call it / uut tüüpi keelekasutusega - mul on kiusatus nimetada seda faatiliseks suhtluseks / uut tüüpi keelekasutusega - faatiliseks osaduseks - ülal juba virisesin kolme lõigu jagu, miks mulle kohe üldse ei sobi "faatiline suhtlus". Tegu on faatilise osadusega. Kui tõlge ongi muis küsimusis käideldav, siis selle möödalaskmise tagajärgedega tuleb minul järgnevatel aastakümnetel tegeleda. See on ühest käest väga tore ja tervitatav, et Malinowski tekstidest on nüüd eestikeelne tõlge ja ma võin loota näha uusi kodumaiseid lähenemisi sellele küsimusele; teisest käest on selle tõlke tõttu nüüd oodata põhimõtteliselt vigaseid käsitlusi, mis ei erista suhtlust ja osadust ja jäävad, nagu peaaegu kõik Jakobsoni faatilisest funktsioonist põlvnevad käsitlused, soikume selle küsimuse üle, kuidas on faatiline suhtlemine suhtlemine. Range eristus osaduse ja suhtluse vahel väldib paljusid kommunikatsiooniteoreetilisi probleeme. Üks, millest ma pean ühel hetkel pikemalt-põhjalikumalt kirjutama, on "kommunikatsionaliseerimine", st semiootilise kalduvusega mõtlejate komme vaadelda nähtusi, mis ei ole suhtlemine, suhtlemisena. Nimetades faatilist osadust "suhtluseks", avab tõlkija eesti keeles sama kõrvaltee eesti teadusmaastikus - kui ma näen tulevikus ka eesti keeles midagi sellist nagu "faatilised purskkaevud" (Robertson 2003: 57), siis saan ma ikka selle tõlkija peale natuke pahaseks.

Actuated by the demon of terminological invention / mida käivitab terminoloogilise leidlikkuse deemon / terminoloogilise leiutamise deemonist mõjustatuna - no leidlikkusel ja leiutamisel on ikka kardinaalne vahe. Kui Malinowskit oleks sel hetkel väisanud terminoloogilise leidlikkuse deemon, siis ta oleks võinud kasutada ühte neist hulgist inglisekeelsetest sõnadest, mis juba tähistasid sama nähtust (nt pother, prattle, gabble, jabber, twitter, burble, jne). Et teda külastas terminoloogilise leiutamise deemon, näitab tõik, et ka parima tahtmise juures ei ole võimalik kindlaks teha, millisele etümoloogilisele kalduvusele Malinowski toetus rohkem (pathos, phatos, phatikos või fama).

The result of intellectual reflection / intellektuaalse mõtiskluse tulemus / intellektuaalse refleksiooni tulemus - siinkohal ma isegi kindel, kas "mõtisklus" on refleksiooni/reflektsiooni täpne vaste. Selles küsimuses on mul pakkuda ainult ajaloolis-kontekstuaalset tausta: artiklis näitasin, kuidas Malinowski toetus John Dewey'le. Dewey omakorda toetus Immanuel Kantile. Viimasel aga on reflek(t)siooni jaoks konkreetne määratlus: "Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions" (Kant 1855: 190). St reflek(t)siooni eeldatav algutähendus ei olnud pelgalt "mõtisklus", vaid selline "peegeldav" sissepoole pööratud mõtisklus, mis üritas avastada mõtlemise subjektiivseid tingimusi, peaaegu nagu fenomenoloogiline "sulustamine". Kanti tähendus(t)est ei pea muidugi keegi kinni. Malinowski tähendus on ilmsem: faatilises osaduses räägitud jutt ei ole "mõtlik", see ei ole "mõttekas" jutt asjadest, millest rääkija on "rangelt öeldes" (Dewey 1910) mõelnud, ja ei pane ka kuulajat mõtlema.

But can we regard it as a mode of action? And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation? It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking. But what can be considered as situation when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action. (Malinowski 1948: 250)
Kuid kas me võime seda pidada tegevuse mooduseks? Ja millisesse suhtesse asetub see meie tähtsa situatsioonilise konteksti kontseptsiooniga? On ilmne, et väline situatsioon ei sisene otseselt kõnelemise võtetesse. Aga mida saab pidada situatsiooniks, kui hulk inimesi lihtsalt sihitult lobiseb? See seisneb ainult seltskondlikkuse atmosfäärist ja saavutatakse tegelikult kõnega ning situatsioon luuakse kõigil neil juhtudel sõnade vahetamisega, konkreetsete tunnetege, mis loovad lõbusa kambavaimu, tavalise jutuloba moodustavate lausungite andmise ja vastuvõtmisega. Kogu situatsioon seisneb selles, mis toimub lingvistiliselt. Iga lausung on tegu, mis täidab otsest eesmärki siduda kuulaja kõnelejaga ühe või teise sotsiaalsete tundmuste kütke abil. Taas [|] paistab keel meile selles funktsioonis tegevusmoodus, mitte mõtlemise instrument. (Malinowski 2020: 311-312)
Aga kas me saame seda pidada tegutsemisviisiks? Ja millises suhtes on see meie põhimõiste, situatsiooni kontekstiga? On selge, et väline situatsioon ei sisene otseselt kõnetehnikasse. Aga mida saame me pidada situatsiooniks, kui hulk inimesi ajavad koos sihitult juttu? See seisneb just selles viisakuse õhkkonnas ja nende inimeste isikliku osaduse tõsiasjas. Aga see tõsiasi saavutatakse läbi kõne, ja situatsioon on kõigil sellistel juhtudel loodud sõnavahetuse poolt, läbi kindlate tunnete, mis moodustavad lustaka seltskondlikkuse, läbi lausungite, millest jutuajamine koosneb, ütluse ja vastuvõtu. Kogu situatsioon seisneb selles, mis toimub lingvistiliselt. Iga lausung on akt, mis teenib kuulaja ja kõneleja sidumise otsest eesmärki läbi ühe või teise ühiskondliku tundmuse. Veelkord, keel ilmneb selles funktsioonis mitte kui refleksiooni instrument, vaid kui tegutsemisviis. (minu tõlge)

A mode of action / tegevuse mooduseks / tegutsemisviisiks - "teguviis" on juba olemas; "tegevuse moodus" on kohmakas.

Our crucial onception of context of situation / meie tähtsa situatsioonilise konteksti kontseptsiooniga / meie põhimõiste, situatsiooni kontekstiga - kuidas sai tõlkija situatsiooni kontekstist... situatsioonilise konteksti? Mis teeb konteksti situatiooniliseks? Mis teeb "situatsiooni" siin omadussõnaliseks? The context of situation on situatsiooni kontekst. Malinowski situatsioonikontekstiteooria üle võib vaielda, kas ikka on nii, et igal kõneaktil on oma situatsioonikontekst (vt Wolf 1989), aga igal juhul ei ole mingi abstraktne kontekst "situatsiooniline".

The fact of the personal communion of these people / saavutatakse tegelikult kõnega / nende inimeste isikliku osaduse tõsiasjas - siin on tõeline tohuvabohu, sest tõlkija jälle ei suuda händeldada osadust. Kaks võrdlemisi lühikest lauset on teleskopeeritud üheks (ning konstruktsiooniga) ja nende inimeste "isikliku osaduse" tõsiasi on täielikult välja visatud. Aga selles ongi ju kogu iva?! Faatiline osaduse ei ole lihtsalt "sõnaline suhtlus", see on "isiklik osadus" inimeste vahel, kes kasutavad sõnu ja räägivad, aga ei suhtle, vaid võtavad osa situatsioonist, mis seisneb ainult sõnade vahetamises. See võib kõrvaltvaatajale näha välja nagu suhtlussituatsioon, aga nad päriselt ei suhtle - nad räägivad, aga nad ei suhtle. See on asja point. Mida tähendab "tegelik kõne", mul ei ole aimugi. Malinowski point on selles, et sõnade vahetamise tõsiasi - tõsiasi, et nad vahetavad sõnu, moodustab või "konstitueerib" selle situatsiooni. Nad võtavad osa sõnade-vahetamisest.

The specific feelings / konkreetsete tunnetege / kindlate tunnete - Ei. Spetsiifiliste? Maybe Eriomaste? Probably not. Konkreetsete? Kindlasti faking mitte. Need on "kindlad" tunded, st tegelikult ei oska keegi täpselt öelda, mis tunded need peaksid olema, on lihtsalt teada, et on mingid "kindlad" tunded. See on küll nõukaaegne arusaam kantseliitsõnast "kindel", aga siin on see pädev, sest Malinowski ei täpsusta, mis tunnetest ta räägib. Kui need oleksid "konkreetsed" tunded... Jessas. Kui need on konkreetsed tunded siis mis kuradi päralt on abstraktsed tunded?

Convivial gregariousness / lõbusa kambavaimu / lustaka seltskondlikkuse - Ei. Ei, ei, ei! Kambavaim oleks faking mob mentality. Kuidas ei oska tõlkija Nastiku sõnastikku kasutada? keeleveeb.ee - kuradi kurat! See ei ole ainult sõnastiku küsimus. Gregariousness on Trotteri kogu teose põhimõiste ja ta kõnetab sama mõiste kaudu lammaste, huntide ja mesilaste sotsiaalsust - kas ühegi nende liikide puhul saaksime me rääkida "kambavaimust"? Seltskondlikkusest (gregariousness), jah, kambavaimust, kindlasti mitte. Annan tõlkijale punkti ainult selle eest, et "lõbus" on parem vaste kui germanismuslik "lustakas". Gregariousness -ikka saadaks tõlkija googeldama "define:gregarious" - leiaks vaste "fond of company; sociable" - see, et inimene armastab inimestega läbi käia ja on "seltsiv" ei tähenda, et tal on "kambavaim" ja järgmise asjana hakkab tõstma mässu, võitlema politseiga, viskama poodide aknaid sisse ja karjuma "все наши".

Gossip / jutuloba / jutuajamine - siin saab ka tõlkija punkti, sest "loba" on tõesti üks neist sõnadest, mis annavad sõnastikus palju vasteid faatilisele osadusele; siin konkreetselt [sic] bavardage; blarney; blather; blether; flummery; gab; gibberish; hogwash; idle talk; prate; stultiloquence; talkee-talkee; twaddle - osadest neist ma ei ole kuulnudki - nt stultiloquence on otseselt ladina keelest "loll jutt".

A tie of some social sentiment or other / ühe või teise sotsiaalsete tundmuste kütke / läbi ühe või teise ühiskondliku tundmuse - kuidas kurat õppis tõlkija nüüdseks "tundmuse" sõna selgeks? Jääb tõsine mulje, et tõlkija töötab nagu mina ja viskab sõnu erinevatesse otsingumootoritesse nagu juhtub kuniks sobiv vaste kerkib esile. Küll oli "meeleolu", küll oli "tunne" nüüd kolmandal katsel pani täppi. Noh, third time's a charm. Kangesti meenutab ühte filosoofiaprofessorit, kes rääkis kuidas ta noorena luges mingit nõmedat tõlget Platonist, milles oli palju sünonüüme, mis pärast osutusid kreeka keeles samaks sõnaks. Siin on meil justkui sama olukord: meeleolu, tunne ja tundmus, mis inglise keeles on üks ja sama sentiment. Also, kust kurat tuleb ühiskondliku tunde "kütk"? Tõlkija tahaks justkui öelda, captivated by some social sentiment or other. Originaali tie osutab minu arvates küll pigem mingile "sidumisele" kuiet "kütkestamisele". Võtmesõna on "ühendussidemed": vt "ties of union" ja "bonds of personal union" - ilmselgelt on seosed ja sidemed (ties & bonds) Malinowski jaoks sünonüümsed.

I should like to add at once that though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we could find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed. The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit - all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example. I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of primitive speech. (Malinowski 1948: 250)
Tahaks otsekohe lisada, et kuigi vaadeldud näited olid võetud metslaste elust, leiaksime ka meilt endilt täpseid paralleele igat tüüpi keelekasutusele, mida seni oleme käsitlenud. Sõnade sidekude, mis ühendab laevameeskonda halva ilmaga, lahingut pidava roodu verbaalsed kaasosad, mingi praktilise töö või sportliku tegevusega paralleelselt kulgev tehniline keel - kõik need sarnanevad olemuselt inimese primitiivse kõnekasutusega tegevuses ja meie arutelu oleks võinud sama edukalt lähtuda ka mõnest moodsast näitest. Valisin näite metslaste kogukonnast, kuna tahtsin rõhutada, et just selline on primitiivse kõne loomus ja mitte teistsugune. (Malinowski 2020: 312)
Ma tahaks koheselt lisada, et kuigi arutluse all olnud näited on võetud metslaste elust, leiaksime me endi hulgast täpseid paralleele igale seni mainitud keelekasutusele. Sõnade siduv kude, mis ühendab laeva meeskonda halva ilmaga, sõdurite kompanii tegevust saatvad sõnad, tehniline keel, mis jookseb paralleelselt mõne praktilise töö või spordiharjutusega — kõik need sarnanevad oma põhiolemuselt tegutsevate inimeste primitiivse keelekasutusega ja meie arutlust oleks võinud samahästi läbi viia tänapäevase näite põhjal. Ma valisin näited metsikust kogukonnast, sest ma tahtsin rõhutada, et selline ja mitte mingi muu on primitiivse kõne iseloom. (minu tõlge)

The binding tissue of words / Sõnade sidekude / Sõnade siduv kude - oijah, siin oleme iseenesest samal lainel, aga... Mina ei oleks sellist julget hüpet "sidekoeni" teinud, sest meditsiinilise terminina sarnleb see armkoega. Lahusus, "siduv kude", jätab sellele väljendile mingigi metafoorilisuse. Lõpuks, jah, peab tõlkija saama punkti, ilma tühikuta on parem - ilmekam.

Conducted on a modern example / lähtuda ka mõnest moodsast näitest / läbi viia tänapäevase näite põhjal - "Homseni, jääme moodsaks." (Ain Mäeots, Jan Uuspõld Läheb Tartusse).

Such and no other is the nature of primitive speech / just selline on primitiivse kõne loomus ja mitte teistsugune / selline ja mitte mingi muu on primitiivse kõne iseloom - sõnajärjekord ja puhtalt sõnajärjekord. Selle lause tähendus on tõenäoliselt kõigile inimestele vastuvõetamatu. Nii palju kui ma olen näinud faatilise osaduse käekäigust, ei ole mitte keegi pärast kolmekümnendaid nõustunid Malinowskiga selles osas, et "primitiivsete inimeste" kõne on ainult faatiline. Mitte keegi. On neid, kes lõõbivad, et "primitiivsed inimesed" ei ole suured metafüüsikud jne. aga üldpildis ei kirjuta mitte keegi sellele väitele alla. Mitte keegi. Isegi Malinowski enda teostes ilmneb, et tema informandid olid sageli... informatiivsed. Oleks Malinowski saanud teada, mis on nanola (Malinowski 1922: 408-409) kui kõik tema primitiivsed uuritavad oleksid olnud puhtalt faatilised? See oleks olnud suur teene maailmale kui ta oleks oma analüüsi läbi viinud tänepäevasemate näidete põhjal ja käsitlenud kasvõi Suurbritannia ja Ameerika Ühendriikide kõrgklasse, kui tema Melaneesia subjektid olid nii häirivalt primitiivsed. As it stands näitas ta näpuga mustanahaliste pärismaalaste suunas, kellest ta arvas juba enne välitöid, et neil ei ole "täpset tähendust" (Malinowski 1913: 213), ja kuulutas kogu maailma jaoks, et need inimesed on võimelised ainult kuulujutte rääkima. 👎 See on üks neist momentidest, mille tõttu Malinowski faatilist osadust ei ole väga pikalt tõsiselt võetud. Isegi kui see on hea ja mugav teoreetiline seadeldis, hakkab paljudele vastu see rassistlik ja klassistlik alamtoon (undertone), mis ütleb mõtlevale, mõtisklevale, reflekteerivale inimesele This sum ol' bullshit.

Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analyzed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas. "Throughout the Western world it is agreed that people must meet frequently, and that it is not only agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something even when [|] there is hardly anything to say" [Chapter I. of the present work, p. 11] - as the Authors remark. Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate. As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into the pleasante atmosphere of polite, social intercoures. (Malinowski 1948: 250-251)
Puhtaid seltskondlikkusi vahetades ja suusoojaks vesteldes kasutame keelt jällegi täpselt samamoodi nagu metslased ja meie kõne muutub "faatiliseks suhtluseks", mida on eelpool analüüsitud ja kasutatakse isiklike sidemete loomiseks pelgalt seltskonnavajadusest kokku tulnud inimeste vahel, ning see ei täida mingit ideede edasiandmise eesmärki. "Läänemaailmas on kokku lepitud, et inimesed peavad sagedasti kohtuma, et rääkimine pole üksnes sobilik, vaid lausa üldine viisakus näeb ette, et öeldakse midagi, isegi kui midagi õieti öelda ei ole" [Käesolev töö I peatükk, lk 11.] - märgivad autorid. Tõepoolest alati ei pea olema või vahest ei tohigi olla midagi edasi anda. Kui on olemas sõnad, mida vahetada, toob faatiline suhtlus metslasi ja tsiviliseeritud inimesi ühtemoodi viisaka sotsiaalse vahekorra atmosfääri. (Malinowski 2020: 312)
Jällegi, viisakusavaldustes ja keelepeksus kasutame me keelt täpselt nagu metslased seda teevad ja meie rääkimine saab ülal analüüsitud "faatiliseks osaduseks", mis teenib pelgalt seltskonnavajadusest kokku kogunenud inimeste isiklike ühendussidemete loomise eesmärki ja ei teeni mitte mingit ideede kommunikeerimise eesmärki. Nagu kaasautorid märgivad: "Terves Läänemaailmas nõustutakse, et inimesed peavad sageli kohtuma ja et ei ole mitte ainult meeldiv rääkida, vaid on harilik viisakus öelda midagi, isegi kui on vaevalt midagi öelda" (Ogden ja Richards, 1. peatükk). Tõepoolest ei ole vaja, või võib-olla isegi ei tohiks olla vajadust midagi kommunikeerida. Kuniks on sõnu, mida vahetada, toob faatiline osadus metslase ja tsiviliseeritud inimese ühtemoodi viisaka ühiskondliku läbikäimise meeldivasse õhkkonda. (minu tõlge)

Again in pure sociabilities / Puhtaid seltskondlikkusi vahetades / Jällegi, viisakusavaldustes - toon üles ainult selle tõttu, et sociabilities annaks siin tõlkida mitut moodi - "seltskondlikkused" oleks tõesti päris hea, "viisakusavaldustega" viitan ise varasemale vb ekslikule samastusele sociabilities ja phrase[s] of politeness vahel.

To establish bonds of personal union / kasutatakse isiklike sidemete loomiseks / isiklike ühendussidemete loomise eesmärki - siin ei ole "isiklikud ühendussidemed" problemaatilised, kuigi ennist "isiklik osadus" oli.

Chapter I. of the present work, p. 11 / Käesolev töö I peatükk, lk 11 / Ogden ja Richards, 1. peatükk - oma artiklis tõin välja, et Malinowski viskab siin jälle (nagu Trotteriga) lugejale valeviite. Avame Tähenduse Tähenduse (Ogden & Richards 1923) esimese peatüki: ""Iga tsiviliseeritud inimene," jätkab lahkunud professor Mahaffy, kelle raamatule Vestluskunsti Põhimõtted võlgneme selle tähelepaneku, "tunneb või peaks tundma seda kohustust; see on universaalne saavutus, mida kõik peavad harjutama"; neid, kes selles läbi kukuvad, karistab ühiskond sallimatuse või hooliatusega" (Ogden & Richards 1923: 8). Malinowski viitas Ogdenile ja Richardsile, kuigi ta tegelikult oleks pidanud viitama Mahaffy'le (tema raamatu esimesele leheküljele). Koos Trotteriga (konkreetselt temale "osutava" joonealuse märkusega, ülal) on need kaks momenti, mil Malinowski viitas selles tekstis kellelegi valesti, st kui keegi üritaks teda tänapäeval emuleerida ja teeks sama, siis oleks tegu tõendatava plagiaadiga ja asjal oleksid tõsised tagajärjed. ... Ära ole nagu Malinowski, ära viita oma allikatele stiilis "hiljutine psühholoogiline uurimus", ega "tolle populaarteadusliku raamatu esimene peatükk". Please don't do that.

As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into the pleasante atmosphere of polite, social intercoures. / Kui on olemas sõnad, mida vahetada, toob faatiline suhtlus metslasi ja tsiviliseeritud inimesi ühtemoodi viisaka sotsiaalse vahekorra atmosfääri. / Kuniks on sõnu, mida vahetada, toob faatiline osadus metslase ja tsiviliseeritud inimese ühtemoodi viisaka ühiskondliku läbikäimise meeldivasse õhkkonda.