A Factor of Cohesion

[pt. 1]

Baxtin Circle | Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832) | Benveniste, Emile (1902-1976) | Berkeley, George (1685-1753) | Body | Bogatyrev, Petr Grigor'evič (1893-1971) | Bolzano, Bernard (1781-1848) | Bréal, Michel (1832-1915) | Brentano, Franz (1838-1917) | Brik, Osip Maksimovič (1888-1945) | Brøndal, Viggo (1887-1942) | Bühler, Karl (1879-1963) | Canonic Situation | Cartography | Cassirer, Ernst (1874-1945) | Channel | Cicero (106 B.C.-43 B.C.) | Cinema | German Semiotics of Cinema | The Formalist Contribution | Code | Cognition | Cognitive Approaches | Collingwood, Robin George (1889-1943) | Communication | Comte, Auguste (1789-1857) | Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de (1715-1780) | Content Analysis | Co-text and Context | Cryptology | Culture | Moscow-Tartu School | Dance | Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) | De Iorio, Andrea (1769-1851)

Holquist, J. Michael 1986a. Baxtin Circle. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 76-77.

Several circles gathered around the Russian thinker Mixail Baxtin during his long life (1895-1975). Of great importance for the history of semiotics was the particular group that first came together in Nevel and Vitebsk in the years 1918 to 1924. In addition to Baxtin, who had just completed a degree in classical philology at St. Petersburg University, the group consisted of the philosopher M. I. Kagan (1889-1937) and the philologist L. V. Pumpjanskij (1891-1940). Two members were later to become important in the musical world: M. V. Judina (1899-1970), a leading concert pianist, and I. I. Sollertinskij (1902-1944), at his death musical director of the Leningrad Philharmonic. Two others were to play a particularly significant role in developing the body of theory we associate with the group: P. N. Medvedev (1891-1938), an activist in cultural affairs, and V. N. Vološinov (1895-1936), poet, musicologist and student of linguistics. (Holquist 1986a: 76)

I was aware only of Vološinov.

Baxtin 1929 appeared after its author was under arrest as a suspected religious activist. He was exiled to Kazakhstan for six years, during which time he wrote several pieces on the theory of the novel; these works appeared in 1975. Vološinov died of tuberculosis and Medvedev was purged during the thirties, but Baxhtin managed to keep working in the isolation of Saransk, where he was rediscovered in the early sixties. Since that time a number of works on a variety of subjects have appeared, making it clear Baxhtin was essentially a philosopher of language. He died in Moscow in 1975. (Holquist 1986a: 76)

With copious amounts of tea and tobacco, if I recall correctly.

But language, in order to mean, must also be open to the unique conditions in which any individual utterance is made. With different shades of intonation the same words can mean many different things. Baxhtin considers intonation simply one of the ways variable historical and social contexts manage to effect the invariable aspects of language system. [↩] Baxhtin, then, stresses the action of parole as opposed to the statis of langue, of history over synchrony, epistemology and semantics over linguistics. He is a post-, or better, trans-structuralist insofar as he devotes his attention to the leaks in system. His work on speech genres (1979a) makes him a pioneer of speech act theory and bears on issues later taken up in Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis (1974). (Holquist 1986a: 77)

"The leaks in the system" has a ring to it.

• Bakhtin, Mikhail 1968. Rabelais and his World. Translated by Helene Iswolsky. Cambridge: MIT Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]
• Bakhtin, Mikhail 1973. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. Ann Arbor: Ardis. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER] [JJA]
• Bakhtin, Mikhail 1981. The Dialogic Imagination. Translated by Michael J. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]

Language, understood as the sum of all actual dialogues, is the subtlest and most complete register of the dialogue between centripetal and centrifugal forces in the world. But Baxhtin studies other ways the two forces enact conflict and communication. Dialogue is present in ego-formation, in the need always to conceive my self in terms provided by others, since in the flux of becoming, an "I" always strives to fix an identity for itself (Baxtin 1981). It is present in the complex politics that determine the ratio of power between authors and their characters, the monologic instance of a Tolstoy, who seems to be the autocrat of his texts, versus the "polyphony" of Dostoevsky, in whose novels we get a democracy of voices, each of which is an "image of a complete language" peculiar to one of the opposed ideologies abroad in Dostoevsky's world. (Holquist 1986a: 77)

This definition of language has its appeal. Though the emphasis on dialogues seems to exclude autocommunication. If someone writes poems "into the drawer", so that no-one ever reads them, are they not part of "language"?

Baxtin's 1940 dissertation on Rabelais, finally published in 1965, demonstrates the kind of thinking that made him an important influence on the Moscow-Tartu group's turn from an early, cybernetic and scientific version of semiotics to a semiotics of culture. Reading the Renaissance European culture system as a text, Baxhtin finds in it the battle between centripetal and centrifugal forces worked out in historically specific terms. (Holquist 1986a: 77)

Hmm. Maybe it would be a good idea to read Rabelais and his World and then immediately after another look at the 1973 Theses.

Norris, Christopher 1986a. Bentham, Jeremy (1748-1832). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 78-80.

Bentham's so-called felicific calculus, his principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number," was meant to cut a path through the thickets of pretense and obfuscating rhetoric that made up the fabric of English law. To strip away these legal fictions and show them up for what they were - manipulative lies masquerading as necessary truths - was Bentham's unswerving concern. This placed him squarely in the line of empiricist philosophy and ethical-political thought descending from Locke, John and Hume, David. His aversion to all forms of abstract or speculative thought went along with a desire to democratize language, to reform it on a model of commonsense and clarity so that people would no longer be deceived by the obscurantist jargon of lawyers and politicians. To this end Bentham set about his relentless critique of legal metaphysics from a utilitarian and nominalist standpoint. (Norris 1986a: 78)

So that's what they mean by Bentham's Theory of fictions.

He was torn between a respect for commonsense usage and a desire to purge all language of its ambiguous or systematically misleading elements. In pursuit of this latter ambition, Bentham devised an elaborate machinery of paraphrase and verbal substitution, aimed at rendering abstract or inexplicit meaning into sentences possessing a clear-cut logic of reference. His mentor here was Locke, whose nominalist epistemology likewise rested on the belief that complex meanings could always be translated into "simple" terms based directly on sense impressions and construed in accordance with a logical syntax. (Norris 1986a: 79)

It would appear that the idea of "Newspeak" (in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four) has a long tradition in British Empiricism.

On the other hand, this work deserves attention on its own merits as a curious but striking anticipation of modern semiotic thought. In The Meaning of Meaning (1923), C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards put forward a nominalist account of language very much in the spirit of Bentham's inquiries. Their aim, like his, was to rid linguistic philosophy of the age-old bias toward speculative fictions that had so far bedeviled its progress. Looking for support to C. S. Peirce (and, with more reservations, to Saussure), Ogden and Richards argued the case for semiotics as a branch of applied psychology, empirically grounded in the "sign-situation" and shunning all forms of "metaphysical" investment. (Norris 1986a: 79)

The primary "speculative fiction" there being "meaning". It is a bit odd that they would favor C. S. Peirce without any reservations - one of young Peirce's first full-length writings was "A Treatise on Metaphysics" (cf. W 1: 58).

Ogden went on to amplify their debt in Bentham's Theory of Fictions (1932a). Here he took stock of Bentham's achievements in the light of modern philosophy, logic, and (perhaps most important) ethical theory. Ogden concluded that "verbalism," or metaphysical bewitchment by language, was still at the root of much current confusion, and that Bentham's thinking on symbols and fictions was undoubtedly the best way forward. (Norris 1986a: 79)

How does "verbalism" pair with "nonverbalism"?

Bentham came up against intractable problems in this effort to "remake" language on the pattern of a rationalized prescriptive ideal. Ogden and Richards encountered the same resistance with their program for Basic English, an explicitly "back to Bentham" [|] movement that sought to promote international understanding by means of a drastically reduced vocabulary and a set of procedures for "translating" the complex into the simple. Quite apart from its overtones of cultural imperialism, this program suffered, like Bentham's, from a combination of top-heavy method and reductionist attitude to meaning. (Norris 1986a: 79-80)

That's Newspeak alright. But say what you will, there's a Simple English article on Wikipedia on Jeremy Bentham.

Rey, Alain 1986b. Benveniste, Emile (1902-1976). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 80-81.

Finally, he reflected up on linguistic semantics, with his distinction between the "semiotic mode" and the "semantic mode" of language (1969a). According to Benveniste, the former mode is made of signs, with a signifying, but not a referring, function; the latter mode is made of sentences, where signs are functioning on a referential and communicational level, but which are not signs themselves. "Semantism" is linked to the expression of non-linguistic experience; it is translatable. "Semiotism" cannot be transferred from one language to another. (Rey 1986b: 80)

Sounds like Aristotle's "two semantic functions of a linguistic sign: to express something as its meaning, and to relate to something through its meaning" (Oehler 1986a: 53, infra) again.

However, the distinction between two semiotic levels and the theory of integration as a condition for being a sign for any linguistic unit, cannot be underestimated. The use of Peirce's concepts, mainly the interpretant, inside the Saussurean framework, is another interesting feature in Benveniste's semantics, which are based on a functional view of language, taking into account not only semantics, but pragmatics, and, through an impressive knowledge of historical and comparative data, an overall view of language. (Rey 1986b: 81)

Pure weirdness.

Armstrong, Robert 1986a. Berkeley, George (1685-1753). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 81-83.

Berkeley attacks Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke held that the primary qualities - solidity, number, motion, extension, and figure - were objective; that is, the sensory idea in the human mind is qualitatively like the external constitution of things. Berkeley argued that the primary qualities were just as subjective as the secondary qualities, sensory ideas like sound and color, which though causally related to their external causes are not qualitatively like those causes. In short, Berkeley rejected Locke's materialistic premise that there is an independently existing external physical world that is the cause of our sense ideas. Berkeley rejected the notion that anything as passive and inert as matter is supposed to be could cause anything. (Armstrong 1986a: 81)

"Berkeley was an idealist. He held that ordinary objects are only collections of ideas, which are mind-dependent. Berkeley was an immaterialist. He held that there are no material substances." (IEP)

Esse is Percipi, the the essence of what we perceive is what we perceive; there is no underlying material substance. When we perceive the tree in the garden and then later imagine the tree to be there when no one is perceiving it we commit an error of abstraction. We forget that we have removed the perceiving mind and yet imagine the tree to have all the properties it did when it was being perceived. (Armstrong 1986a: 81)

Lacking object permanence, the philosophy of. If I'm not looking at it, why should the Author of Nature even bother rendering it?

Berkeley allows that when the perceiving human mind is not [|] present, the tree existing in God's mind, but what he means is that the Author of Nature is omnipresent and that when a human mind is present at a given location God will actively cause (will) the idea of the tree to be perceived by the human mind. (Armstrong 1986a: 81-82)

Damn. God must have over 9000 hellabytes of RAM.

In rejecting the notion of a material substance as a substratum which unifies the various sensory ideas of a perceived object, Berkeley supplies a substitute account of how these disparate sensory ideas are related. They mutually signify each other. The fresh cherry consists of five different kinds of ideas that mutually signify each other because of their association at the same location in space and time. Thus, the cherry looks red, feels round, and tastes sweet. There is no unperceived substance that is the red cherry; there are just the various sensations or ideas we experience. (Armstrong 1986a: 82)

What sensations or ideas are we experiencing when we're exctracting catechins, naringenin, and chrysin from cherry stems for use in the cosmetics industry? If these compounds end up in make-up and on someone's face, will they still be unperceived substance?

We may, on the one hand, describe the three relations (within categories, among categories, and between idea and its cause) as three kinds of signification. Or, on the other hand, and perhaps more cogently, we may describe them as combinations of signification with three quite different other relations: qualitative similarity, spatial and temporal association, and active willing. (Notice the correspondence to David Hume's three principles of association: resemblance, contiguity, and causality.) (Armstrong 1986a: 83)

Neat.

Magli, Patrizia 1986a. Body. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 84.

If it is possible to discern the emergence of a semiotic awareness in the history of thought, it first appears in the reading of the body: the Greek term semēion 'sign' is used in the medical tradition of Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) to designate a symptom that is taken by logico-conceptual inference as belonging to a system. Thus, the body is available as a text, in which every pathological symptom or indication of an emotional state constitutes an expressive vehicle in a system of codified equivalences. The project of a semiotics of the body has been carried down through the centuries both in terms of the interpretation of "natural" symptoms (from the medical semiotics of Hippocrates and Galen to Darwin's study of emotional expression, and up to contemporary ethology) and in terms of the study of the modalities of sign production through which the body presents itself. (Magli 1986a: 84)

Too bad no specific text is mentioned - Hippocrates has been translated into English.

So one can outline a stylistics of bodily eloquence that has been the object of the attentions of classical rhetoricians like Quintilian and Cicero, of artists of the Renaissance like Alberti, of discourses on etiquette from Castiglione to recent works by Soviet researchers, and of students of face-to-face interaction like Goffman, Scheflen, Argyle, and Kendon. (Magli 1986a: 84)

On Quintilian and Cicero I've read Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome (Aldrete 1999) a decade ago. Baldassare Castiglione "wrote Il Cortegiano or The Book of the Courtier, a courtesy book dealing with questions of the etiquette and morality of the courtier." What Leon Battista Alberti wrote about the body, nonverbal communication, or face-to-face interaction is left to guess - probably something about painting, gestures, and facial expressions.

The body as a unitary presence adds a factor of cohesion to the occurrence of each gestural sequnece, in this way constituting itself as a global utterance whose sense varies within the range of utterance contexts in which it is found. See also Angenot 1973; Bouissac 1973; Kahn 1978; Poyatos 1976a. (Magli 1986a: 84)

For 1986 this is a very poor entry about the semiotics of the body.

• Angenot, March 1973. Les traité de l'éloquence du corps. Semiotica 8: 60-82. [De Gruyter]
• Bouissac, Paul 1973. La Mesure des Gestes. The Hague: Mouton. [De Gruyter]
• Kahn, Joan Y. 1978. A diagnostic semiotic. Semiotica 22: 75-104 [De Gruyter]
• Poyatos, Fernando 1976a. Language in the context of total body communication. Linguistic 13: 168. [De Gruyter]

Oguibenine, Boris 1986a. Bogatyrev, Petr Grigor'evič (1893-1971). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 85-86.

Bogatyrev belongs to those semioticians whose activity is of pivotal significance since he worked in the field long before modern semiotics shaped its methods and approach and after it received its contemporary appearance. As one of the co-founders of the Moscow Linguistic Circle it may well be that his treatment of the facts within the field of Slavic folklore and ethnography, in which his competence was extremely broad, was determined from the very beginning by contemporary linguistic approach. F. de Saussure, N. Trubetzkoy and R. Jakobson, as well as Prague linguists like V. Mathesius, strongly influenced his early analysis of ethnographic data. (Oguibenine 1986a: 85)

Another familiar name.

• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1971. The Functions of Folk Costume in Moravian Slovakia. The Hague: Mouton. [De Gruyter]
• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1976a. Costume as a sign. In: Matejka, L; Titunik, I. R. (eds.), Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Cambridge: MIT Press, 20-32 [ESTER]
• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1976b. Folk song from a functional point of view. In: Matejka, L; Titunik, I. R. (eds.), Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Cambridge: MIT Press, 20-32 [ESTER]
• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1976c. Forms and functions of folk theatre. In: Matejka, L; Titunik, I. R. (eds.), Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Cambridge: MIT Press, 51-56 [ESTER]
• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1976d. Semiotics in the folk theatre. In: Matejka, L; Titunik, I. R. (eds.), Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Cambridge: MIT Press, 33-50 [ESTER]
• Bogatyrev, P. G. 1976e. Semiotics in the folk theatre. In: Matejka, L; Titunik, I. R. (eds.), Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions. Cambridge: MIT Press, 57-82 [ESTER]

Bogatyrev's structural-functional approach to ethnographic and folklore facts owes much not only to the linguistic principles of the Saussurean inspiration (langue vs. parole; the semiotic nature of ritual and magic performances as well as of folk customs; synchronic analysis as strongly opposed to diachronic analysis; the distinction between the productive and unproductive folklore facts analogous to that between productive and unproductive language forms), but also to the Czech variety of functional structuralism (noticeably different from the structuralism in ethnology as exemplified by B. Malinowski) which was primarily rooted in literary and general aesthetics (J. Mukařovský, who worked alongside with Bogatyrev without any apparent influence in the thirties in Prague). (Oguibenine 1986a: 85)

Haha. It would be really messed up if someone actually compared and synthesized their respective structural-functionalisms.

A pioneering work (1929b), written in collaboration with Jakobson, distinguished between folklore and literature. The former's potential existence is each time reactualized by the performer; the folklore production has its being from one performer to another and is essentially oriented towards langue, while the literary work is oriented towards parole, is objectified and has its being from its individual author to the reader/performer. (Oguibenine 1986a: 86)

Oh heck yes! There's an English translation:

• Bogatyrëv, Peter; Jakobson, Roman 1982[1929]. Folklore as a Special Form of Creativity. In: Steiner, P. (ed.), The Prague School: Selected Writings, 1929-1946. Austin: University of Texas Press, 32-46. [De Gruyter]

Analyzing folk costumes (1937, 1971a), his main concern was to present them as signs with definite structure and functions, the functions of a costume being bundled together and possessing the general function, the function fulfilled by the structure of functions itself. (Oguibenine 1986a: 86)

Interesting.

Scheffcyzyk, A.; Rehder, Wulf 1986a. Bolzano, Bernard (1781-1848). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 86-88.

Bolzano's main semiotic insights are contained in the first two volumes of his principle work, the four volumes of the Wissenschaftslehre (Bolzano 1929-31; for English translation see George 1972 and Berg 1973). On the other hand, also portions of the third and fourth volume (Bolzano 1929-31: §§334-44, §§637-98) are devoted to what Bolzano himself called semiotics. What he presents here is, however, chiefly concerned with rather straight-forward requirements of sign usage in scientific representations, and it is the practical and pedagogical aspects that are emphasized here: topics include the clarity of signs to be chosen, their uniqueness, and their form. (Scheffcyzyk & Wulf 1986a: 86)

Wow. There are English translations available! Only last year I formed the (mistaken) impression that only "Bolzano's ethical and political writings have been translated" (JJA 2021/06).

• Bolzano, Bernard 1972. Theory of Science: Attempt at a Detailed and in the Main Novel Exposition of Logic with Constant Attention to Earlier Authors. Edited and translated by Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press. [De Gruyter]
• Bolzano, Berg 1973. Theory of Science: A Selection, with an Introduction. Edited by Jan Berg, translated by B. Terrell. Dordrecht: Reidel. [Springer]

The Wissenschaftslehre is, therefore, not a theory about the relationship between linguistic signs/expressions on one side and objects/facts on the other. The specifically semiotic role of denotations as well as the difference between sense and reference which played such an important role for Frege (1962) are no topic for Bolzano. His Wissenschaftslehre is, on the contrary, a theory of [|] "propositions in themselves" (Sätze an sich), "truths in themselves" (Wahrheiten an sich), and "ideas in themselves" (Ideen an sich). All of these notions concern assertions "that something is or is not the case, regardless of whether somebody has put it into words, and regardless even of whether it has been thought" (1929-31: §19). (Scheffcyzyk & Wulf 1986a: 86-87)

Much more to my liking than, e.g. "there is no such thing as nature or truth" (Rey-Debove 1986a: 72, infra).

As shown above by the third example of a reduction (which sounds like a rather forced metalinguistic interpretation of the assertion about the existence of "some wise human beings"), they are to be interpreted as higher (second) order predicates. In this way, ideas may then be classified as (1) "non-referring" or "without reference" or "empty" (Berg 1973) (gegenstandslos), and (2) "referring" or "with reference" (gegenständlich). Ideas with reference are further divided into (a) "single ideas" (Einzelvorstellungen) and (b) "common ideas" (Gemeinvorstellungen) (1929-31: §68). In this conception of an "idea of an idea" (Vorstellungsvorstellung) or "symbolic idea," the symbolic and thus the semiotic aspects of Bolzano's theory becomes apparent. (Scheffcyzyk & Wulf 1986a: 87)

I'm not grasping any of this, but it certainly looks interesting.

With respect to semiotics, it is important that Bolzano is led to the concept of "degrees of complexity" of truths in a hierarchical texture of propositions, where the order inside the hierarchy is defined by increasing degrees of complexity (which is, in turn, defined in terms of deducibility). (Scheffcyzyk & Wulf 1986a: 88)

Same. This entry focuses on Bolzano's logic. For more explicitly semiotic aspects, see his section in "A Glance at the Development of Semiotics" (Jakobson 1985[1975g]: 202-203).

Stankiewicz, Edward 1986a. Bréal, Michel (1832-1915). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 88-91.

Michel Bréal, professor at the Collège de France and founder of the Linguistic Society of Paris, gave a new direction to French and European linguistics by emphasizing the semantic and social aspects of language and by viewing linguistics as a branch of the general theory of signs. (Stankiewicz 1986a: 88)

Another distantly familiar figure - primarily through Ogden & Richards.

• Bréal, Michel 1900. Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning. Translated by Henry Crust, with a prefare by J. P. Postgate. London: W. Heinemann. [Internet Archive]
• Bréal, Michel 1991. The Beginnings of Semantics: Essays, lectures and reviews. Edited and translated by George Wolf. Stanfard, California: Stanford University Press. [Internet Archive]

Bréal was born in Landau (Bavaria), studied Indo-European linguistics in Germany (with Bopp, Weber and Kuhn), but spent most of his life in Paris where, as professor of "comparative grammar" (at the Sorbonne and at the Collège de France), he educated a new generation of linguists who combined the study of Indo-European with a pursuit of general linguistic problems. Of particular importance was his influence (not often acknowledged) on Saussure and A. Meillet. (Stankiewicz 1986a: 89)

It figures.

As professor of comparative grammar and as translator of Bopp's works (1867-72), Bréal was the first to introduce this branch of study in France, but became increasingly critical of the direction which it assumed in the hands of Bopp's successors, beginning with Schleicher up to The Neo-grammarians. Thus he opposed their one-sided concern with linguistic reconstruction, their neglect of the semantic aspects of language, their mechanistic interpretation of linguistic change, as well as their general view of language as a phenomenon of nature, or as an "organism." Instead, he called for a historical linguistics which would examine the evolution of individual languages, for a study of the meanings of words and grammatical categories, and for the treatment of language as a system of signs. His Semantics, which touched upon all of these problems, was conceived of as a general theory of language, which would explain the relations of sound and meaning and the role of language as a communicative vehicle. (Stankiewicz 1986a: 89)

It now makes more sense why Jakobson was constantly harping on the neogrammarians' case: "Overcoming the one-track mind of the neogrammarian bias, F. de Saussure pointed out that beside the axis of successiveness, linguistics [...] must also tackle the other coordinate - the axis of simultaneity" (Jakobson 1961[1949d]: 419).

The fundamental characteristic of the verbal sign is, consequently, its polysemy (a term coined by Bréal), which makes language into a pliable and elastic instrument, capable of coping with unpredictable situations and events. Thanks to the polysemy of its terms, "language can convey an infinite number of meanings with a limited number of signs" (1879: 307). The polysemy of the sign is restricted only in the languages of science, which deal with narrow segments of reality and which stipulate in advance the frame of their reference (1877: 304). (Stankiewicz 1986a: 90)

Kudos.

The development of language was for Bréal a history of competing forms which coexist at any particular, synchronic state of a language (1897a: ch. 23). Historical change implies thus in the first place a choice (not always conscious) on the part of the speaker between older and newer forms or a switch in the functional significance of these forms (a switch which Bréal called the "law of specialization;" 1897a: ch. 1). (Stankiewicz 1986a: 90)

Permanent Dynamic Synchrony.

Bonomi, Andrea 1986a. Brentano, Franz (1838-1917). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 91.

A German psychologist and philosopher. In Brentano's psychological theory a central position is occupied by his notion of intentionality, which is an important point of reference for some contemporary theories of meaning (especially as regards the question of sentences about nonexistent entities). His position on this issue underwent a considerable evolution, as we can see from the differences between the first and the second, enlarged and revised edition (1911) of his main work, Psycholige vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874). (Bonomi 1986a: 91)

I'm still miffed about "the intentionality of emotions" (cf. Mulligan 2004: 81).

In the first exposition of his doctrine, Brentano identifies the peculiar characteristic of mental acts with their refential nature or "direction upon something." This object of reference (for example a certain centaur which I am thinking of) may not exist in reality, but it has an "intentional inexistence": it is something immanent in the mental act itself. On this ground, Brentano can treat psychic phenomena as genuine relations between thes ubject of the act and its intentional object, that sometimes can simply be an ens rationis. Later, though, he acknowledges that there can be a relation (in a genuine sense) only between existent objects. (Bonomi 1986a: 91)

That's the other thing: "Brentano notes that language suggests that certain emotions relate to objects - we say we are sad or upset about this or that" (Mulligan, ibid.). This used to annoy me so much. Revisiting it now, it's not that bad - some emotions have objects, and this is only suggested by language. The idea that every emotion has an intentional object sounds about as cogent as "the digestive process is, besides metabolism, all about French Critical Theory, actually".

Brentano divides mental activities in three general kinds: (1) representations (which are presupposed also by the other mental phenomena, since to judge or hate anything we have to "represent" it, to have it "before the mind"); (2) judgments; (3) phenomena of love and hate. (Bonomi 1986a: 91)

An all too familiar triad: (1) phenomena of love and hate; (2) judgments; (3) representations.

Scheffcyzyk, A. 1986a. Brik, Osip Maksimovič (1888-1945). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 92.

Founding member of Opojaz. Literary theorist, later playright and author of opera libretti and film scripts. Brik was a prominent figure in avant-garde literary and cultural circles in the 1920s and 1930s. He was closely involved with the early Russian Formalists (the Moscow Linguistic Circle as well as Opojaz), the Futurists and with the Left Front of Art group. He was editor of the newspaper Art of the Commune (Iskusstvo kommuny), and later of the journals Lef and Novyj Lef (Left Front of Art, 1923-1925, and New Left Front of Art, 1927-1928). (Scheffcyzyk 1986a: 92)

Yet another name I'm vaguly familiar with, and have read about (cf. Barooshian 1971). From the man himself I've only read one piece in an Estonian translation (cf. Brik 2014[1923]).

Larson, Svend Erik 1986a. Brøndal, Viggo (1887-1942). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 92-94.

Later, Brøndal came in close contact with the Prague Linguistic Circle, especially Roman Jakobson, and was active in establishing the Linguistic Circle of Copenhagen, in 1931. Together with Louis Hjelmslev, he founded Acta Linguistica Hafniensia (1939-), after abandoning plans for his own Revue Internationale de Linguistique Générale. (Larson 1986a: 92)

Familiar themes.

The grammatical doctrine of Brøndal is outlined in his major work, Ordklasserne (1928; French translation 1948a), and in "Langage et logique" (1937) and "Linguistique structurale" (1939), both reprinted in Brøndal 1943. The essence of this theory is a reinterpretation of Aristotle's philosophical categories. Together with a revival of the concepts of the logic and the linguistic philosophy of scholasticism, Port-Royal, Leibniz, and Humboldt, and together with the inspiration of Husserl's phenomenology and the relational logic of logical positivism, Brøndal's theory constitutes a synthesis of classical and modern linguistics in an ambitious attempt at comprehending human reality on the basis of language universals. (Larson 1986a: 93)

An impressive array. Port-Royal Logic was also one of Locke's major inspirations, if I'm not mistaken.

Brøndal did not develop an original theory of the sign and concerns himself very little with the concept of sign. His ultimate purpose is to find the basic features of language that will maintain it as an intentional phenomenon (according to Brentano and Husserl), will maintain the linguistic production of meaning as constitutive of human reality, and will function as the basic features for the construction of a grammar according to general structural laws. The concepts pertaining to these ambitions derive from the same philosophical contexts as the concept of sign and are primarily the Aristotelian categories: substance, quantity, quality, and relation, which is Brøndal's revision are referred to as the generic categories Relatum, Descriptum, descriptor, and relator. These categories are defined by Brøndal in necessary and sufficient interrelationship for morphological and syntactical purposes. But he also develops a set of specific relative categories, especually Symmetry, Transitivity, and Connectivity, from the logical relations of modern logical theory, mainly for semantic purposes. (Larson 1986a: 93)

I no longer wonder why Danish semioticians write incomprehensible things.

As in his concept of universal grammar and in the concept of intentionality, attached to his basic categories, Brøndal was influenced in his analyses of the structural laws of language by Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen (1900-1901), an influence increased by Brøndal's discussions with Roman Jakobson on Husserl's concept of founding (Fundierung), i.e., the hierarchical relationship between elements of a totality (see Brøndal's review of Jakobson's Kindersprache, Aphasie und allgemeine Lautgesetze, in Acta Linguistica II, 1940-1941). (Larson 1986a: 93)

Haha, "The old Husserlian model of language only contains enough relational foundation for the logical explication of the speech of a monad, the soliloquy of a Diogenes in the Barrel who was capable of the highest abstractions" (Bühler 2011[1934]: 12-13); or, in other words "Husserl saw in language only the function of representation" (Graffi 2001: 71-72). The longer story is that "Jakobson adopted the ideas of Edmund Husserl (1913) and Anton Marty (1908) on universal grammar as the only firm theoretical basis for linguistic work [and] then correlated this basis with the work on Gestalt psychology, which insisted on relations (especially part-whole relations), on their constitutive character, and on the importance of contextualization" (Waugh & Monville-Buston 2002: ix).

He [then] sets up six so-called forms of relation, which, when developing the principle of symmetry, indicate the formal possibilities of the manifestations of a given element: positive, negative, neutral, complex, positive-complex, and negative-complex, which, among others, are applied by A. J. Greimas, following the generalizing intention of Brøndal, (see also Larsen 1975) in his structural semantics. (Larson 1986a: 94)

Hmm... Six... "forms of relations", you say?

Brøndal's main contributions to semiotics are his analyses of the structural laws of language and his constant effort to synthesize linguistics and philosophy, methodology and epistemology. [↩] See the bibliography in Brøndal 1943 (141-168), a biography in Holt 1943 and Sommerfelt 1948, and expositions of Brøndal's theory in: Kurylowicz 1950; Egebak 1973: 61-90; and Larsen 1975 (French); Wrenn 1951 (English); Schmidt-Hidding 1955 and Wissemann 1958 (German); Beccaria 1967 and Vincenzi 1967 (Italian). (Larson 1986a: 94)

Certainly sounds very interesting, but apparently not (yet) available in English. The closest thing to it appears to be Robert Hallon's thesis, "Brøndal's system of grammar: A translation of, and commentary on, Morfologi og syntax (1932)" (1988, online, pdf). I added some items on Brøndal that I found through the Dimensions app:

• Larsen, Svend Erik 1987. A Semiotician in Disguise: Semiotic Aspects of the Work of Viggo Brøndal. In: Sebeok, Thomas A.; Umiker-Sebeok, Jean (eds.), The Semiotic Web 1986. Berlin, etc.: de Gruyter, 47-102. DOI: 10.1515/9783110861310-003 [Internet Archive | ESTER]
• Larsen, Svend Erik 1988. Gods, ghosts, and objectS: Brøndal and Peirce. Semiotica 70(1-2): 49-58. DOI: 10.1515/semi.1988.70.1-2.49 [De Gruyter]
• Gardiner, Alan H. 1944. De Saussure's analysis of the signe linguistique. Acta Linguistica 4(1): 107-110. DOI: 10.1080/03740463.1944.10410916 [tandfonline.com]
• Baecklund-Ehler, Astrid 1977. Roman Jakobson's Cooperation with Scandinavian Linguists. In: Armstrong, Daniel; van Schooneveld, C. H. (eds.), Roman Jakobson: Echoes of his scholarship. Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 21-28. [De Gruyter]
• Lepschy, Giulio C. 1975. European Structuralism: Post-Saussurean Schools. In: Aarsleff, Hans; Austerlitz, Robert; Hymes, Dell; Stankiewicz, Edward (eds.), History of Linguistics, Vol. 2. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 887-902. [De Gruyter]
• Bonfiglioli, Stefania 2008. Aristotle's Non-Logical Works and the Square of Oppositions in Semiotics. Logica Universalis 2(1): 107-126. DOI: 10.1007/s11787-007-0021-z
• Wrenn, C. L. 1951. Review of Brøndal Les Parties du Discours, 1948. Archivum Linguisticum 3: 70-75.
• Kuryłowicz, J. 1950. Review of Brøndal Les Parties du Discours, 1948 and Brøndal Essais de Linguistique Generale, 1943. Acta Linguistica 6: 100-109. DOI: 10.1080/03740463.1951.10410878 [French]
• Malmberg, Beril 1992. Les théories linguistiques de Brøndal. Semiotica 91(3-4): 341-358. DOI: 10.1515/semi.1992.91.3-4.341 [French]

Camhy, Daniela G. 1986a. Bühler, Karl (1879-1963). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 94-95.

During his career in Vienna he also taught at Stanford, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and Chicago. After being taken into custody by the Nazis in 1938, Bühler emigrated from Vienna to the United States, but, in the words of his wife, "was not able to re-orient himself" there. He taught at the College of St. Scholastica in Duluth and at the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, both in Minnesota, and finally at the University of California in Los Angeles, where he died. (Camhy 1986a: 95)

Damn. For the timeframe, "Jakobson escaped from Prague in early March 1939 via Berlin for Denmark, where he was associated with the Copenhagen linguistic circle" (Wiki).

Although Bühler anticipated many problems of modern linguistics in his book Sprachtheorie (1934) and in his seminal paper, "Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften" (1933); his words in the psychology of thought and perception and in developmental and child psychology have received more attention than his contributions to the theory of language, and he is generally considered a psychologist. (Camhy 1986a: 95)

Cannot get around it. May have to, one day, try to read the German original:

• Bühler, Karl 2009[1933]. Die Axiomatic der Sprachwissenschaften. Kant-Studien 38(1-2): 19-90. DOI: 10.1515/kant.1933.38.1-2.19 [De Gruyter]

By 1918, Bühler had developed his concept of language, the organon model, starting from the Platonic schema according to which language is an organon, or tool, by means of which we provide information to one another about things. Language is conceived of as an instrument of communication having three dimensions, initially called the Kundgabe 'utterance,' Auslösung 'release,' and Darstellung 'representation.' These are the functions of language, involving a sender, who expresses the description of something or of someone, and a receiver. (Camhy 1986a: 95)

Here the significant highlights are "release" - letting-out (possibly katharsis), which became the emotive function in Jakobson's scheme; and "description", which became the referential functio - Darstellung is given by Wiktionary as (1) exhibition, (2) depiction, presentation, (3) description, statement, and only then (4) representation.

The linguistic sign is, "in virtue of its correspondence with objects and states of affairs, a symbol, in virtue of its dependence upon a sender, a symptom (sign or index), and, in virtue of its appellative function in relation to the hearer (whose responses it affects like other signs), a signal" (Bühler 1934: 28). (Camhy 1986a: 95)

It really reads like arriving at Peirce's triad through another path.

The work Sprachtheorie, in which he refers to Humboldt, Marty, Cassirer, Husserl, Meinong, and Saussure, is based on this same triad but uses a new terminology: Ausdruck 'expression,' Appell 'appeal,' and Darstellung 'representation.' This triad was later extended by Jakobson, who characterized Bühler's Sprachtheorie as being "for linguists probably the most inspiring among all the contributions to the psychology of language" (1971a: 671). Bühler himself considered this theory of language as a contribution to sematology 'semiotics'. (Camhy 1986a: 95)

Yeah. I've been bogged down by it for 1/3 of my life by now.

Moles, Abraham 1986a. Canonic Situation. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 96.

A canonic situation is the abstract representation made by the observer (e.g., the psychologist or the communicologist), on the basis of the analysis of actual situations encountered in direct observation, by schematizing in it the most relevant properties for a systematic study of categories of phenomena (e.g., communication processes). [↩] The basic interest of the idea of a canonic situation is the same as the one of "canonic equations" in Mathematics, "canonic formula" in chemistry, etc.; the vast diversity of natural phenomena being reduced by proper schematizing to a limited number of features, all basically important, arranged in a very general pattern, all the properties of which can be thoroughly studied. For instance, the communicologist will try to distinguish in the variety of communicative situations a basic pattern, on which he builds a model, which includes all the features of the communicative process. With this pattern, which he can properly master with a satisfactory theory, he subsequently seeks to account for the variety of actual situations by following the methods of typology, viz., by determining the quantitative or qualitative factors that reintroduce specificity into a particular actual situation which he has to consider. This twofold movement of the mind, first extracting a simple, well-known canonic situation out of the variety of cases encountered in reality, properly identifying the elements, making predictions on the basis of their structural relationship, and second, seeking again the specificity by looking at the factors of differentiation, is in itself a method used in semiotics of communicative processes. (Moles 1986a: 96)

What is this now? Not a citation in sight. "Canonic situation" itself gives 39 search results, most of which are seemingly unrelated formulations, primarily in theology. I'll have to look into this, since it has to do with "everyday life" and communication, just to see if there's any points of contact with phaticity.

• Moles, Abraham A. 1986. The Legibility of the World: A Project of Graphic Design. Design Issues 3(1): 43-53. DOI: 10.2307/1571640 [JSTOR]
• Mathien, Michel 2007. Abraham Moles: affronter scientifiquement la quotidienneté de la communication humaine. Hermès, La Revue 48(2): 101-108. [online, French]

Krampen, Martin 1986b. Cartography. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 98-99.

Secondly, whenever the information consists of one single set of data, referring to the different elements of the set (such as the verbal contact between members of discussion groups) the relationships within the set (verbal contact between A and B, A and C, B and C, etc.) can be expressed graphically. The result is defined as a graphic network. A graphic network appears to be, while still an icon, more conventional than a diagram, which in turn, by the rise and fall of its curves, appears to be more indexical in its iconicity. The signifier of graphic networks consists of graphic marks taking the form of nets or trees, the signified being numerical data. The semiotic object of cartography, the map, is a special type of graphic network with a high degree of iconicity. The signifier of the map consists of areal, linear and punctual graphic marks places into a conventionally subdivided "field" (Bühler 1934) not unlike musical notes in the framework of their staff. In contrast to diagrams and networks, the signified of maps is limited: it is confined to the universe of geographic information. (Krampen 1986b: 98)

Jotting all this down just in case I ever feel like visualizing something in relation with Jakobson's "radius of communication", e.g. the overheard train conversation about Poe's Nevermore.

Verene, Donald Phillip 1986a. Cassirer, Ernst (1874-1945). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 103-105.

The fundamental conception of Cassirer's philosophy is symbolische Form 'symbolic form', which is the theme of his three-volume major work, Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen (1923-1929). Cassirer coins the term most immediately on the basis of the essay "Das Symbol" (1887) by the hegelian aesthetician Friedrich Theodor Vischer, and on Heinrich Hertz's conception of innere Scheinbilder oder Symbole 'inner fictions or symbols' in Die Prinzipien der Mechanik (1894). Its roots go back to Cassirer's interest in Plato's connection of being an eidos, Goethe's sense of organic form, and Kant's [|] Schematismus 'schematism' in the first Critique and the reflektierende Urteilskraft 'reflective judgment' of the third Critique, and to Cassirer's whole reading of the development of the problem of knowledge and humanistic thought from the Renaissance to the present. (Verene 1986a: 103-104)

Okay... That's... A lot.

• Vischer, Friedrich Theodor 2016[1887]. The Symbol. Translated by Holly A. Yanacek. Art in Translation 7(4): 417-448. DOI: 10.1080/17561310.2015.1107314 [tandfonline.com]
• Hertz, Heinrich 1899. The Principles of Mechanics: Presented in a new form. With an introduction by H. von Hermholtz. Authorised English translation by D. E. Jones and J. T. Walley. London: Macmillan and Co. [Internet Archive]

Cassirer first defined symbolischen Form in "Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften": "Under the term symbolic form should be understood each energy of human spirit [Geist] through which an intelligible content and meaning [geister Bedeutungsgehalt] is joined with and internally adapted to a concrete sensible sign [sinnliches Zeichen]" (1961: 175). (Verene 1986a: 104)

Sounds vaguely like Aristotle's "affections in the soul" (Oehler 1986a: 52, infra) and Aquinas' "the passions of the soul (i.e., concepts)" (Eco 1986b: 42, infra).

To ground the symbol in the human organism Cassirer employs Jakob von Uexküll's biology of the Umwelt. To the Merknetz 'receptor system' and Wirknetz 'effector system' of Uexküll's description of the animal organism Cassirer adds a third link, the symbolic system, that transforms "animal reactions" into "human responses." Man is defined by Cassirer as animal symbolicum (1944: 26). The symbol is always part of a system of symbols within the circle of human culture. (Verene 1986a: 104)

Huh. I've seen abstracts like "In this paper I pursue the influence of Jakob von Uexküll's biosemiotics on the anthropology of Ernst Cassirer" (Weber 2004), and only now did it hit me that there's a direct influence there.

Cassirer distinguishes three functions of consciousness that he calls the Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis 'phenomenology of knowledge' (1964a, vol. 3). The first of these is the Ausdrucksfunktion 'expressive function'. Here the symbol and the symbolized are not differentiated. All meaning is present on a single plane of the mythic image which asserts its primacy over the thing. The second is the Darstellungsfunktion 'representational function'. Here the image grows beyond itself and begins to refer to an order of things and attributes. This results in the anschauliche Welt 'intuitive world' that is built through the linguistic symbol. The third is the Bedeutungsfunktion 'significative function'. Here the linguistic class concept is subsumed in the propositional function of mathematical-logical thought. This is a level of the scientific symbol in the sense of articulate signs and formal notations. (Verene 1986a: 105)

Well, isn't this familiar? Cassirer's take on secondness (free well, appeal, conation, etc.) follows the likes of Brentano, whose secondness is "judgment" (cf. Bonomi 1986a: 91, above).

The three functions of consciousness and their forms of mythic, linguistic, and scientific symbolism parallel Cassirer's distinction between the Mimische 'mimetic', Anologische 'analogical', and eigentlich Symbolische 'truly symbolical'. Cassirer employs these as phases of the internal development of individual symbolic forms. He does this most explicitly in relation to language as a symbolic form, in which, he says, this schema represents a "functional lawfulness of the structure of language" [funktionale Gesetzlichkeit des Aufbaus der Sprache] (1964a, vol. 1: 139). Mimetic, analogical, and symbolical represent a progression of unity, disjunction, and reunification of symbol and symbolized that is similar to that of the three functions of the general phenomenology of knowledge. In the mimetic phase the meaning of the symbol is present in its immediate expression. In the analogical, the symbol attains distance from its object such that what is meant is not totally present in the immediacy of the symbol. In the purely symbolical, the symbol attains a level of systematic self-development in which orders of meaning are articulated through the conscious extension of the power of symbolic formation itself. (Verene 1986a: 105)

So, thesis, antithesis, and synthesis? ...Dammit.

• Cassirer, Ernst 2020a. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 1: Language. Translated by Steve G. Lofts. London; New York: Routledge.
• Cassirer, Ernst 2020b. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 2: Mythical Thinking. Translated by Steve G. Lofts. London; New York: Routledge.
• Cassirer, Ernst 2020c. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Volume 3: Phenomenology of Cognition. Translated by Steve G. Lofts. London; New York: Routledge.

Moles, Abraham 1986b. Channel. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 106-107.

A communication channel is the material link established between the universe of the transmitter and the universe of the receiver prior to a communicative process. A conventional example would be the ancient acoustic pipe which, in the last century, connected the apartment of the master to the room of the servant for the sake of the former calling the latter and vice versa. (Moles 1986b: 106)

From the materiality aspect comes Jakobson's adjective "physical channel" (as opposed to "psychological connection", which is immaterial or idealistic). Odd calling the sender and receivers "universes".

Modern communication provides us with an enormous number of issues of communication where the basic situation remains the same; connecting two or more people by a physical link able to transfer messages in some coded or uncoded form, but widely different as to the physical nature of the channel; the telephone or telegraph connection, the sheet of paper of the letter sent by mail, the transmission of electric signals reflected by sattellites, etc., all constitute typical examples of communication channels. (Moles 1986b: 106)

The part about "the basic situation" remaining the same probably about his concept of canonic situation (cf. Moles 1986a, above).

The semiotic analysis of communication has until now oriented its basic interest towards the coding procedures and the repertoires, much more than towards the channels of communication properly, which it has more or less taken for granted. Nevertheless, the science of the way to combine signs cannot practically be considered independent of the physical nature of the channels or the constraints they put on the uses of signs. (Moles 1986b: 106)

Inching towards the concept of "affordances".

Communication theory emphasizes the fact that the act of communication relies equally on two moments of its actualization, the first being the establishment of the link of the communication, the second being the action of communication itself. These two phases have to be considered separately. (Moles 1986b: 107)

Not so in the age of constant connection and ambient presence.

Manetti, Giovanni 1986a. Cicero (106 B.C.-43 B.C.). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 107-109.

Amongst his output, a semiotic problem is posed mainly by two groups of works: those which deal with the theory of rhetoric as the science of persuasive discourse, and those which concern divination, that is, the religious practices of the interpretation of signs sent from the gods. (Manetti 1986a: 107)

The bibliography here doesn't feature anything in English but Internet Archive currently gives 466 English translations, an unmanageable amount.

The rhetorical works provide us with the best indications toward a theory of signs. These works can be divided into two groups: De Oratore, Orator, Brutus, and De optimo genere oratum, which contain on the whole a political-cultural problematic, concerned with the definition of the figure of the perfect orator and his role in Roman society and culture; and De Inventione, Partitiones oratoriae, and Topica, which, even if written at different periods and with differing degrees of originality, have the common characteristic of taking into consideration the theoretical and technical features of rhetoric (while in the first group of texts these were left as implicit) as they had become fixed in the last [|] centuries of the Greco-Roman culture. (Manetti 1986a: 107-108)

The three in the first group are an absolute mess: "On the Orator; not to be confused with Orator" (Wiki), nor "On the Best Kind of Orators"; but then De Oratore is given an English title On the Ideal Orator. A mess.

• Cicero, Marcus Tullius 1948. On The Orator, Books I-II. With an English translation by E. W. Sutton and introduction by H. Rackham. London: William Heinemann Ltd. [lg]
• Cicero, Marcus Tullius 2001. On the Ideal Orator. Translated, with Introduction, Notes, Appendixes, glossary and indexes by James M. May and Jakob Wisse. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. [lg]
• Cicero, Marcus Tullius 1968. De Inventione; De optimo genere oratorum; Topica. With an English translation by H. M. Hubbell. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. [Internet Archive]

It is in this second group that we can trace most clearly the elements of a semiotic debate, which is characterized by the following features:

1. The concept of the sign is seen in a juridical perspective: indeed, the signs concern facts that become important in a trial determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2. The fundamental semiotic unity considered is never the verbal morpheme (as occurs in the modern tradition of structuralist linguistics) but deals in certain cases with nonverbal clues (or bloody sword, the blanching of the accused, footprints, etc.) as well as logical propositions ("if he breathes he is alive").
3. The fundamental semiotic relationship established is that between an antecedent and a consequent. This conception forms part of both the Aristotelian and the Stoic traditions: the example with runs through such traditions is, "If she has milk (it is a sign that) she has given birth."
4. As a consequence of the last two points, it follows that the semiotic mechanism has relevance not for semantics but for logic in the strictest sense, even if the Ancients did not distinguish clearly enough between the two spheres.

The semiotic problem as posed by Cicero is within the theory of the Argumentatio, understood as the mechanism which permits the finding of one element which leads to another element in a way which may be necessary or only probable: "Argumentatio seems to be something discovered somewhere in some way which either reveals another thing in a probable manner or demonstrates it in a necessary way." Starting from this definition, the following classification of semiotic facts is outlined in terms of the Aristotelian tradition. This classification remains constant throughout Cicero's works, notwithstanding a certain terminological oscillation between the immature works and those of his maturity. (Manetti 1986a: 108)

Kinda marginal issues. No wonder Cicero rarely, if ever, figures in semiotic discussions.

"Signum 'sign' is that which is perceived by the senses and which means something, such as blood, the fight, dust, and other things of this kind" (1915 vol. 1: 30, 48). "There is also another type of evidence which is drawn from clues (ex vestigiis) such as a weapon, blood, screams, groans, guilty behavior, changes in color, incoherent speech, trembling, and any other phenomena perceived by the senses" (1961, 11, 39). This category (a sub-categorization of the second in the De Inventione [1915] but more autonomous in the Partitiones [1961]) seems heterogeneous in comparison with the others, since it takes into consideration not propositions but nonverbal clues. It deals in fact with the ambiguous sign, which by itself is worthless as evidence, but which must be consolidated by other concomitant elements. "It needs support and more certain proof" (1915, vol. 1: 30, 48). (Manetti 1986a: 109)

define:vestige - a trace or remnant of something that is disappearing or no longer exists.

Williams, Alan 1986a. Cinema. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 110-115.

The most prominent result of formalist critical tools applied to cinema was the anthology Poetika Kino (1927), with contributions by Sklovsky, Ejxenbaum, Tynjanov, and others. The most influential of works on cinema by radical filmmakers have been the essays of S. M. Eisenstein (collected in 1942 and 1949). With the partial exception of Eisenstein, this body of work fell into disrepute beginning in the 1930s and was only recently revived by the semiotics movement centered in Moscow and Tartu - for example, Juri Lotman (1973c). Relatively stable characteristics of the entire Soviet endeavor have been: (1) a constant effort to integrate analysis of cinema into general cultural theories; (2) attention to "avant-garde" artistic practices, with an effort to see these as part of a continuum of modes of expression, frequently most expressive of the general processes of the medium; and (3) a general emphasis of the "formative" ects of cinema - its work in "modeling" the perceived world - and on montage in particular. (Williams 1986a: 110)

• Eikhenbaum, B. M. (ed.) 1982. The Poetics of Cinema. Translated by Richard Taylor. Oxford: RPT Publications. [Monoskop, pdf, unpaginated]

American pragmatist (or pragmaticist) semiotics remains, at the date of this essay, little developed in the area of cinema. Wollen (1969; ch. 3) outlined the Peircean trichotomy of index, icon, and symbol with reference to film and called for further work in this area, but aside from scattered applications to specific problems, no sustained investigation has followed. (This is most likely due to lack of any institutional base, given the relative decline of pragmatic models in the disciplines of psychology and philosophy.) Potential advantages of such work include: (1) a flexible approach to the sign, not based solely on verbal models and not restricted to one level (for Peirce, a book or painting can be a "sign"); (2) a readily compatible tradition of philosophical psychology - which may possibly avoid the limited applicability of psychoanalytic models used to date (e.g., copy theories of perception and attendant mechanistic interpretation of spectator activity); (3) no rigid separation between questions of rhetoric and of aesthetics. (Williams 1986a: 111)

The real boon here, which is very infrequently brought to light, is the Peirce's compatibility with a lofty tradition of philosophical psychology.

• Wollen, P. 1969. Signs and Meaning in the Cinema. London: Secker & Warburg. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]

Obviously, this separation of the field into trends is to some extent artificial; writers in one "school" read and profit from other approaches. Metz's work begins (1968: ch. 3) with a critique of Eisenstein. Carroll initially (1977) defined his own project via a critique of Metz. Lotman has read Saussure. (Williams 1986a: 111)

Good catch!

In his 1971 study, Metz shifted his terms of analysis, arguing that although no langue in the sense of master code could be constructed, cinematographic communication utilizes a repertoire of loosely related, historically shifting codes and subcodes, some specific to the medium, others not. (Williams 1986a: 112)

He reached Permanent Dynamic Synchrony.

Caroll relies on intuitive judgments of "filmicity," backed up by filmmaking manuals, making the observation that, just sa many uses of natural language are "ungrammatical" and yet communicate information, so "unfilmic" construction in cinema are neither unjustifiable nor meaningless, but simply ambiguous, or elliptic, etc., as compared to "normal" usage. (Williams 1986a: 112)

Nothing to see here, just collecting *icity terms.

Bentele, Gunter 1986a. German Semiotics of Cinema. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 115-118.

The establishment of a "Stuttgart School" of Semiotics under the guidance of M. Bense and E. Walther, characterized by a somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of the writings of C.S. Peirce, has left its marks in the field of film semiotics. The "Stuttgart Trend" of film semiotics comprises mainly the dissertation by P. Beckmann (1974) and an article [|] by J. Hoensch (1976). Hoensch portrays certain entities of film as sub-signs or signs: colors and shades as well as lighting are interpreted as qualisgns or sinsigns, movement that is the basis of montage is taken as indices whereas moviemaking devices such as pan, tracking, and zoom are seen as superized indices; and editing as icon. Metasemiotic rules for the association between semiotic terms and entities of film largely remain implicit. It thus seems to be difficult to elaborate on this approach whose methods similar to that of literary criticism are restricted to classification. (Bentele 1986a: 116-117)

Aren't all interpretations of the writings of C.S. Peirce somewhat idiosyncratic?

Hansen-Love, Aage 1986a. The Formalist Contribution. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 120-121.

Formalist "poetics and film" (Poètika kino, M.-L. 1927) for the first time developed the bases for a semiotic of the art. The concept of the sign was for the first time used in the structuralist and semiotic sense and no longer simply in the sense of "indicator" or "key" to the decoding of a text. Ejxenbaum's, and above all Tynjanov's, outline for a semiotic of film concentrated on the structure of the sequences of movement within and between 'stills' (kadry) as a sign language which has "semantic signs" and its own "grammar." According to Tynjanov's semantics of film the semasiologization of lexical units in the verse line holds true also of the syntagmatics of film. (Hansen-Love 1986a: 120)

Good thing the book is available online, even if it is unpaginated.

Krampen, Martin 1986. Code. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 123-132.

The term code was first introduced into semiotics by Ferdinand de Saussure in his 3rd Course of lectures at the University of Geneva on April 28, 1911 (Godel 1969: 82) and is mentioned in all four student manuscripts (G. Dégallier, Mme. A Sechehaye, F. Joseph, E. Constantine) on which this part of the posthumous edition of the Cours de Linguistique Générale is based (Saussure 1916: 31; cf. the edition by Engler, 1968 and [|] the 1976 edition by de Mauro [note 66, p. 423]). It was used by Saussure as a synonym of langue (cf. Martinet 1960). In the more generalized meaning of repertory of signals, code is found in information theory (cf. Shannon and weaver 1949). Jakobson (1971) suggested that the term code as used in information theory expressed more operationally what had been called langue>>>or linguistic pattern in linguistics. He took it to mean a stock of signs shared by sender and receiver and opposed it to the term message, previously called parole in French, speech in the American tradition of linguistics. The basic functioning and economy of codes in semiotics has been formalized to a large extent by Prieto (1966). A semiotic "Theory of Codes" was proposed by Eco (1968, 1975c, 1976c). The term code will be used here synonymously with sign system. (Krampen 1986c: 123-124)

Surprisingly recent, then. I had to check - Peirce does indeed use the word "code" infrequently and either in an ethical or mathematical sense, not explicitly in a semiotic one.

In semiotics, a code is a given state in the diachronic development of collections of indices or signs that is singled out for the purpose of synchronic analysis. (Krampen 1986c: 124)

The code is an abstraction.

Exploring further the frontiers of anthroposemiotics, Lotman (1967) proposed to apply Jakobson's opposition of code vs. message to the history of literature, the arts and social thought in general by separating the structure of cultural texts from their content. This distinction would permit the study of culture as a hierarchy of codes developed during the course of history, the description of types of cultural codes and the determination of the universal traits of human culture in general. (Krampen 1986c: 124)

A familiar generalization.

• Lotman, J. M. 1977[1967]. Problems in the typology of culture. In: Lucid, D. P. (ed.), Soviet Semiotics. Baltimore; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 213-221. [Internet Archive | ESTER]

Finally, it is postulated in semiotics that every sign has, to some extent, an indexical function (Peirce 1933-1961: 2.248; Prieto 1966) even if it is only to allow inferences about its connection to the object or process it stands for (e.g., about its cause, about its source [|] or about its producer). (Krampen 1986c: 124-125)

More-or-less how Abercrombie, La Barre (cf. 1975: 217), and various other linguists use the "indexical function".

On the syntactic level, the same letter /a/ is coded as an (indefinite) article. On the semantic level it becomes a signifier correlated with "singularity" as its signified. On the pragmatic level, the aforementioned "partial" codes are combined into a pragmatic code fitting a particular communication situation. In such situation, the letter /a/ is used, for example, by a writer who wants to introduce an object to a reader as unknown or indefinite to himself. (Krampen 1986c: 125)

Relevant in connection with my odd fascination with the indefinite article (especially in band names, e.g. A Tribe Called Quest, A Perfect Circle, etc.).

Given the broad extensional definition of the term, the common principle of all codes must be expressed in a terminology which is sufficiently abstract to cover all phenomena designated as codes. Such a terminology is offered by elementary set theory. In set theory, a collection of objects under consideration is called a universe (of discourse). Any universe of discourse may be considered as a collection of at least one but generally more sets or classes of objects which in turn contain elements. The basic vocabulary used here for the intensional definition of the concept "code" contains therefore three words: universe (of discourse), set (class), and element. A few additional terms necessary for the intensional definition can be easily derived from this basic vocabulary. (Krampen 1986c: 125)

The concept of "universe of discourse" runs through both Peirce and Jakobson.

In semiotics, the term subcode has been introduced by Jakobson (1970b) to characterize codes as hierarchical structures. Subcodes play a special role in codes which are adaptable to the context of messages and to the circumstances of reception. As has been shown above, asymmetrical codes, especially languages, can provide a large number of supersigns for encoding the same message. If, from this large set of supersigns, an encoder "regularly" uses a certain subset, the use of this subset becomes an indication of the encoders style of rhetoric, and can be identified as a specific and smaller semiotic structure embedded into the general and larger one. This embedded semiotic structure is then called a subcode. Examples of subcodes are dialects, generation-related differences in speech or, for that matter, in dress, etc. Bernstein's (1971) opposition of elaborated vs. restricted codes exemplifies the origin and maintenance of subcodes by sociological mechanisms due to the subdivision of society in upper and lower classes. (Krampen 1986c: 130)

Permanent Dynamic Synchrony is the co-existence of subcodes.

As has been stated at the beginning, codes are only states of dynamic equilibrium in developing semiotic structures singled out for synchronic analysis. But since the equilibrium of codes is "dynamic," the diachronic mechanism of code change must also be investigated. In this change, subcodes play an important role. (Krampen 1986c: 130)

That's the stuff.

Changes in the universe of the signified of a code occur very frequently under the pressure of communicating during rapidly changing circumstances and - more important - under the influence of code violation which is the particular concern of encoders focussing on the aesthetic function of codes, i.e., on the innovation of semiotic structures with the purpose of constant adaptation of codes to new contexts and circumstances to prevent human communication from freezing into formulae (Jakobson 1973), from becoming "automatic." (Krampen 1986c: 130)

The dynamics of innovation vs archaism naturally involves the aesthetic function. Freezing into formulae an example of Šklovsky's standing influence on Jakobsonian semiotics for half a century after the fact.

De Mey, Marx 1986a. Cognition. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 132-133.

As such, the cognitive view is not new. Already in Plato's Meno, one finds an intriguing dramatization of the issue of complementarity between new information received by the knower and the information embodied in the knowledge the knower already has. Obviously, the cognitive view is also reminiscent of some Kantian and neo-Kantian epistemologies. It is also in line with the paradigm approach to the study of scientific knowledge promoted by Kuhn (1962). (De Mey 1986a: 133)

That guy.

Dunbar, Kevin 1986a. Cognitive Approaches. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 133-135.

One-word utterances are no longer considered as unformed sentences, but as vehicles to express communicative intentions (Dore 1975). The particular intention that the child is using is given by the context and prosody of the child's utterance. The child at first produces "primitive speech acts" and with the development of reference and predication two-word utterances occur that are essentially equivalent to adult speech acts (Dore, 1975). (Dunbar 1986a: 134)

Holophrases not actual phrases.

Bruner (1975) states that the child's ability to refer to an object arises out of the development of joint attention between the mother and the child. Joint attention between speaker and listener is essential for communication to occur. When joint attention is established the mother and child engage in play. "Play has the effect of drawing the child's attention to communication itself, and to the structure of the acts in which communication is taking place" (Bruner: 10). (Dunbar 1986a: 134)

Bateson's metacommunication is palpable in this.

• Bruner, J. S. 1975. The ontogenesis of speech acts. Journal of Child Language 2: 1-20. DOI: 10.1017/S0305000900000866 [Cambridge Core]

While it can be said that recent research has focused on language as communication, there is, however, a small but growing interest in the development of the noncommunicative aspects of language (Rees 1973; Halliday 1975; Blank, Gressner and Esposito 1979). Halliday (1975) has proposed a theory of linguistic development that allows language to develop both communicative and noncommunicative functions. The noncommunicative functions of language are those that aid the child in categorizing and building a model of the world. Language has a "mathetic function" (language as learning) as well as a pragmatic function (language as doing) (Halliday 1975). (Dunbar 1986a: 135)

Now I know what to call my own tendency to quote some passages only because they contain a word I didn't know or a phrase that strikes me as well formed.

• Halliday, M. A. K. 1975. Learning How to Mean: Explorations in the Development of Language. London: Arnold. [Internet Archive | ESTER]

Russell, Anthony F. 1986a. Collingwood, Robin George (1889-1943). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 135-136.

As an Oxford professor, historian, philosopher, and archeologist of Roman Britain, Collingwood elaborated a theory of history that called for the development of a new logic, a logic of question and answer that would be adequate to the needs of historical inquiry and, as Collingwood explained its character, would be essentially semiotic methodology. Since Collingwood considers questioning to be a mental process that transforms bare data into evidence and significant information, it is a sign-making function, and what he has to say about it as such is of direct interest to the semiotician. (Russell 1986a: 135)

Never heard of him.

• Collingwood, R. G. 1924. Speculum Mentis: or, The Map of Knowledge. London: Oxford University Press. [Internet Archive | lg]
• Collingwood, R. G. 1939. An Autobiography. London: Oxford University Press. [lg | ESTER]
• Collingwood, R. G. 1940. An Essay on Metaphysics. London: Oxford University Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]
• Collingwood, R. G. 1946. The Idea of History. London: Oxford University Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]

In this logic of interrogation, the significance or meaning of a proposition is known only in its function of answering a relevantly arising question of a historically situated enquirer. Knowledge is not the mere registering of facts already significant in their own right, independently of the mind's consideration, but includes also the questions to which statements of facts are answered. It is this questioning activity which is the activity proper to the mind in knowing, and is responsible for the meaning that statements will have. The significance or meaning of statements therefore consists precisely in their function of answering questions. (Russell 1986a: 135)

Sounds once again like Plato, that thinking consists of the mind proposing questions to itself.

Stanosz, Barbara 1986b. Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 137-141.

Apart from its nonsemiotic contexts, the term communication is used in ordinary language as interchangeable with "imparting information," "intercourse," "exchange of thoughts, attitudes, feelings, or moods" etc. (Stanosz 1986b: 138)

Still baffled by how "communication" used to be, and "intercourse" has become, synonymous with sex acts.

The most general definition seems to be the one given by a psychologist (Stevens 1950) but embracing more than psychological phenomena: "Communication is the discriminatory response of an organism to a stimulus." In accordance with this definition, Pavlovian conditioning, for example, is a process that results in an act of communication. On the other hand, many linguists doubt if acts of verbal communication and especially processes of language acquisition can be accounted for in the stimulus-response terminology (see, e.g., Chomsky 1959); they prefer the input-output terminology, which is also very general but which is capable of integration with the specific terminology of the linguistic theory of language. (Stanosz 1986b: 138)

Behaviorism was still in full swing in 1950.

• Stevens, S. S. 1950. Introduction: A definition of communication. Journal of the Acoustic Society of America 22(6): 689-690. DOI: 10.1121/1.1906670

From the philosophical point of view, which seems to be the most suitable for semiotics, the crucial point of the problem is the correct delimitation of phenomena that are to be embraced by the concept of an act of communication. The delimitation must be as sharp as possible and must result in distinguishing a class of phenomena that have all their essential features in common, being diversified with respect to their remaining properties. In the case under discussion, the best criterion for determining essential properties seems to be the functional criterion. If two kinds of human behavior fulfill the same function in social life and one of them is taken to be a communicational behavior, the other one must also be covered by this term - independently of the physical, biological, or psychological differences between them. (Stanosz 1986b: 138)

Not bad. This poses a question for phatic communion, and whether it can be distinguished from communication.

The function of acts of communication depends on the intentional transmission of information. Thus, behavior of a given kind is communicational if it serves as a means of intentionally transmitting information. To play this role the behavior must be controllable. If, for example, someone faints, his (her) companions get the information that he (she) is not all right, but this is not an act of communication, for the faint cannot be intentional, since it is not controllable. Furthermore, intentionality implies the existence of a set of rules according to which the behavior is to be interpreted: a behavior of one person results in an act of communication only if it is intended to be interpreted by some other person according to a certain set of rules, more or less conventionally adopted in the community to which both persons belong, and if the latter person actually interprets the behavior according to this set of rules. (Stanosz 1986b: 138)

What distinguishes communication from "giving off" information is controllability.

Following Chomsky (e.g., 1966b), one can find creativity to be a definitional property of a language. The creativity of a language depends on the native speaker's ability to understand sentences that he has never heard before. In principle, there are an infinite number of sentences (signals) that can be produced and interpreted by a spaker of any given language. (Stanosz 1986b: 140)

I would have imagined that this would have been included already in Charles Morris's definition of language. In any case, "set phrases" (phatic utterances by another name) are the exact opposite - sentences that have been heard before.

By contrast, signals occurring in nonverbal communication of any kind are finite in number and each nonverbal signal has a rule of interpretation of its own. For this reason nonverbal communication is rather limited in content and in the scope of information it can serve to transmit. (Stanosz 1986b: 140)

Highly dubious. Is there a finite number of facial expressions, hand gestures, and body movements?

For a review of the state of studies on communication in various disciplines and bibliography see Miller 1974. (Stanosz 1986b: 140)

The bibliography gives a title that does not appear to exist.

• Miller, George Armitage 1974. Psychology and Communication. Forum Series. Voice of America. [? - appears to be his article in this collection:]
• Miller, George Armitage 1967. The Psychology of Communication: Seven Essays. New York; London: Basic Books, Inc. [Internet Archive]
• Miller, George Armitage (ed.) 1973. Communication, Language, and Meaning: Psychological Perspectives. New York: Basic Books, Inc. [Internet Archive]

The source sends some information (message) to the destination. The distinction between the source and the transmitter is important in some techniques of communication (e.g., in telecommunications), where the original message is encoded into a signal by a distinct mechanism. In the case of normal, person-to-person communication the distinction can be neglected, for the same organism is here the source and the transmitter. The same applies to the receiver/destination distinction. Thus, in a typical communicative situation one can speak simply of the sender and the receiver of a signal. (Stanosz 1986b: 141)

The communication model is meant for technologically mediated communication only.

The signal is sent over the channel, the nature of which is determined by the nature of the encoding and decoding mechanisms (electric channel for telephone signals, air channel for vocal signals, etc.). (Stanosz 1986b: 141)

The air is at best metaphorically a "channel".

Rey, Alain 1986a. Comte, Auguste (1789-1857). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 142-144.

Beside the fact that the four big volumes of the Système give a powerful, extremely original set of hypotheses on society, history and politics, and even if the two last volumes give way to prophecy rather than to a foundation for the social sciences, Comte's work, mainly in the second volume of the Système, dealing with the general, "static" theory of Man, embodies a remarkable, but almost unknown, approach to such concepts as sign and language. Comte tried to organize any understanding of the problem in terms of the relationships between biological data (species, specific behaviors, biological modifications termed as "tendencies" or "instincts" - in French penchants) and sociological facts ("inner impressions," i.e., phsychisms, and social behaviors - called mouvements). Every sign function is explained by Comte as (1) a link between biological, species-defined systems and operations and social facts, including psychological facts, which the author does not consider as scientific data; and (2) a link between inner facts and reactions and outer, behavioral facts, as much in the biological context as in the sociological and - where Man as species is concerned - historical context. (Rey 1986c: 143)

I was vaguely interested in Comte before, but this might be where to start. I also knew vaguely that he was a bit of a triadist, too, but now I see that he has headings such as "1. As to Thought. [...] 2. As to action. [...] 3. Emotional influence [...]", and - what looks especially appealing - "Social Functions of Language, pp. 212-218", which is very much my jam.

• Comte, Auguste 1875b. System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity. Second volume, containing Social Statics or the Abstract Theory of Human Order. Translated by Frederic Harrison. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. [Internet Archive]

If Comte's theories are poor as far as linguistic semantics are concerned, his overall approach gives way to several premonitions of the main problems raised by Peirce and by twentieth century semiotics: semiosis, sign systems, communication, expression in living organisms. His views are often derived from the Port-Royal tradition on the general theory of language sign; sometimes they are original and drawn from his personal experience as a philosopher of mathematics and other sciences. They are often controversial reactions against the official trends in French philosophy of the time (e.g., eclecticism), more often self developing reflections, where pragmatics and ethics are deciding factors. (Rey 1986c: 143)

Cool. I noticed indeed that his main operative categories are "intellectual" and "moral".

Evidently, the philosophical tradition of Rousseau and Vico has many points in common with Comte's, as Benedetto Croce later also had some, but the founder of positivism is original in many other respects. For example, he always gives his simple and sometimes strange historical patterns - governed by the famous "law of the three stages" - a logical and semiotical counterpart. Thus, after the primitive "Logic of Emotion" ("logique des sentiments"), the "Logic of Images" fits with the polytheistic stage of mankind. It is only with the "Logic of Signs", synthesizing emotions and images, that man is able to link artificial, social (arbitrary) signs with abstractions and concepts. Perice's symbols are, for Comte, the conditions for the monotheistic stage of man, along with many other social characteristics. (Rey 1986c: 143)

Oh heck yeah. Aside from the parallels with religion, which I don't care for much in general, this looks exactly like something I would be very much into.

Marsciani, Francesco 1986a. Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de (1715-1780). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 145-146.

Condillac devoted a great part of his philosophical work to language and signs. It is possible to reconstruct how language gradually attained its full importance in Condillac's thought, beginning with his criticism of Locke's empiricism. Though he had made himself a disseminator of Locke's ideas in France, he nevertheless criticized what he believed to be a trace of Innatism: in particular the fact that in Locke's reconstruction of the mental processes a kind of break occurred between the primary moment of sensation, which acted as the basis for all knowledge, and that specifically human faculty of reflection, from which, in Locke's opinion, developed the possibility of true human knowledge. Condillac endeavoured to reduce all mental activity to one fundamental principle - thus eliminating any risk of Innatism - and at the same time he used explanatory hypotheses to account for the spiritual life in its entirety without having to resort to external and unverifiable postulations. (Marsciani 1986a: 145)

Oh, cool. Internet Archive has only two English translations, and the book quoted here, his response to Locke, is one of them, and was added less than 6 months ago.

• Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de 2001. Essay on the origin of human knowledge. Edited by Hans Aarsleff. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]

And so, bearing in mind his close attention to the development of thought from its origins, it is not surprising that he took up the discussion on the problem of the origin of language. But clearly the problem was understood not as historical but as functional, and for Condillac hypotheses on the origins of language were of no value as historical proofs but served instead as explanatory hypotheses on the logical and genetic level.

1. Accidental signs, or objects which particular circumstances have connected to some of our ideas, with the result that they can effectively arouse them;
2. Natural signs, or cries which nature has established for feeling of joy, hate, pain, etc.;
3. Institutional signs, or those which we ourselves have chosen and which have only an arbitrary connection with our ideas. (Essai, p. 19).

Condillac places the birth of language proper in the second category of signs. With the natural cries tied to the expression of feelings and emotions, both language and sociability develop simultaneously; in a word, we have here the origin of intersubjective communication. (Marsciani 1986a: 145)

Shuffle it around a bit and you get: (1) [iconic] natural signs, (2) [indexical] accidental signs, and (3) [symbolic] institutional signs.

However, this function of language, which we may call cognitive, is not the only one which Condillac attributes to signs. From the same language of cation there also starts the development of another of language's important functions, which we may define as the expressive function: it concerns the role played in any spoken language by all those elements such as intonation, intensity and style which are connected to that natural and emotional foundation which the gestures and cries of the language of action brought into play in primitive communication. In Condillac's opinion, even these aspects of language contribute as determining factors to the specific forms with which, throughout history, the particular character, genius, and individuality of each people have developed. (Marsciani 1986a: 146)

It was a given that the cognitive/expressive distinction between linguistic functions was the earliest (Jakobson found it in Yeats, for example - cf. Jakobson & Rudy 1981[1977b]: 619), but it is a given that such a thing most definitely precedes even Condillac, if not goes back to the ancients.

Stone, Philip J. 1986a. Content Analysis. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 147-151.

Similarly, an emphasis on "objective" producers for making inferences has led to a preoccupation with defining coding rules so that the resulting content analyses can be reliably replicated by other researchers. This of course results in the use of fixed categories that do not anticipate all the special circumstances that merit scholarly attention. [|] While it may represent a blessing for some, this "coding reliability" (considered essential for a "scientific" study) is a curse of insensitive inflexibility to others. (Stone 1986a: 148-149)

Related to my issue with "phatic markers" on modern pragmatics, which are very variable/flexible. Too much so, imo.

Segre, Cesare 1986a. Co-text and Context. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 151-152.

The two terms, co-text and context refer, respectively, to verbal environment and situational environment. Adoption of the term co-text (by Petöfi 1971b) stresses the distinction between those elements which are intrinsically textual (or intratextual) and extratextual elements: the latter being proper to extensional semantics (possible worlds, etc.) and to pragmatics (production, reception, interpretation of the text). (Segre 1986a: 151)

I wish "co-text" had entered my active vocabulary much earlier.

A second phase brings to the fore the implicit reference which the text, using to this end extensional semantic values, makes no cultural notions (the so-called "encyclopaedia", to logically organized collective experiences (presuppositions and implications) and, in general, to the overall expectations of the interlocutors; implicit reference of this kind has the added advantage of keeping text length within reasonable limits. It shall be added that the environment is not completely involved in the context, since "the context [...] is a theoretical context, in the postulation of which the linguist abstracts from the actual situation and establishes as contextual all the factors which, by virtue of their influence upon the participants in the language-event, systematically determine the form, the appropriateness or the meaning of the utterance" (Lyons 1977: 572). (Segre 1986a: 151)

Huh, "context" still... textual - the "situational environment" is meant in a cultural/epistemic sense, it appears.

Kahn, David 1986a. Cryptology. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 154-157.

Cryptology is the science of secret communications. As a social creature, man communicates. As a private on, he does not, fearing rightly that others' knowledge of his intentions may enable them to frustrate those intentions. This noncommunication is secrecy, and secrecy is the element that distinguishes cryptography from other aspects of semiotics. (Kahn 1986a: 154)

Profound.

The various means used by them to keep their communications secret from others or free from tampering are called signal security. The means used by others to gain information from these communications are called signal intelligence. Together they constitute cryptology. (Kahn 1986a: 155)

This distinction came up with the Ukraine war: turns out that Russia has capable cyber intelligence (breaking into other countries' computer systems) but not so capable of cyber security, leading to constant hacks.

Electronic forms of concealment are called transmission security. An example is spurt or burst transmission, in which a message is compressed (as by a tape recorder) and radioed at high speed. (Kahn 1986a: 155)

Oh yeah, this was the era when e.g. video games could be "downloaded" from the radio onto a magnetic tape.

Preventing others from gaining information from the actual texts of messages. If the messages are written, either in ordinary languages or in those of computers, the methods are those of cryptography; if the messages are spoken, the methods are those of cryptophony; if pictorial or gestural, those of cryptoeidography. (Kahn 1986a: 155)

Wasn't aware of the latter two.

A cipher transforms plaintext elements of uniform length and is nonphonetic (a cipher will divide a t from an h in a th, for example). Cryptologists differentiate a cipher from a code, which is a special form of substitution. A code consists generally of a book-length list of plaintext elements of varying length, usually words and phrases, and their corresponding substitutes, normally four- or five-element code groups, such as 3964 or PEDIV. Thus "await further instructions" might be represented by 21563. Substitution ciphers with long lists of equivalents merge into short codes, and no sharp dividing line may be drawn. Cryptology uses the term code as do linguistics and semiology, the only difference being that cryptologic codes are secret because their distribution is restricted. (Kahn 1986a: 155)

Hence "code-books".

The terminology used in communication security includes the following: putting a plaintext into secret form with the use of a cipher is "enciphering," with a code is "encoding," with any cryptosystem is "encrypting." Restoring a ciphertext, codetext or cryptogram to plaintext legitimately (that is, with the authorization of the users) is "deciphering," "decoding," or "decrypting." (Kahn 1986a: 156)

Makes me wonder if Lotman's use of the term "code-text" was cryptological or merely a fancy translation.

To restore a cryptogram to its plaintext without the authorization of the communicators, often reconstructing the cryptosystem in doing so, is to "cryptanalyze," or "solve," "break," "crack," or "read" it. Specialists avoid the confusing practice of using "decipher," "decode," or "decrypt" to mean unauthorized reductions to plaintext. (Kahn 1986a: 156)

Pairs well with Jakobson's musings on cryptanalysis.

Rebuses, riddles, and crossword and other languages puzzled and games involve a secrecy that is intended to be penetrated. The "decipherment" of lost languages likewise is not cryptologic because no secrecy was intended (though cryptanalytic techniques may help in the decipherment). (Kahn 1986a: 156)

Jakobson's comparison is metaphorical.

Schwimmer, Eric 1986a. Culture. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 163-166.

The first formal theory for the semiotic study of culture was that presented by Ivanov, Lotman, Uspenskij, Piatigorsky and Toporov at the Slavic congress of 1973. They coined the phrase semiotics of culture for a science where culture was defined as a domain of organization (information) in human society, in opposition to disorganization (entropy), i.e., an integrated hierarchical arrangement of sign systems. The basic unit of culture, in this sense, would be the "text," vehicle of function and meaning. A "culture" would be the sum of its texts. To each culture, there would correspond a type of chaos (non-culture) which, from the viewpoint of an observer immersed in that culture, appears as non-organized, though to an outsider would rather appear as differently organized. To this category belong: alien cultures, childishness, exoticism, the subconscious, the pathological, etc. (Schwimmer 1986a: 163)

Not a bad overview.

The term text is applied not only to messages in natural languages but to any substratum of a significant whole such as a rite, a work of art, a musical production or a public performance of any sort. On the other hand, not all messages in natural languages are texts from the viewpoint of "culture," but only those pertaining to a definable verbal genre (such as prayer, law, novel) i.e., possessing a certain meaning and a common function. The authors of the theory recognize that no isolated semiotic system could be called a "culture," as this term implies a hierarchy of linked systems of meaning. They suggest that linkage could be mediated in large measure by the system of the natural language. (Schwimmer 1986a: 163)

The definition of a "cultural text".

Let us note, however, that the authors set up their theory to apply specifically "to Slavic texts." They do not claim that it applies elsewhere, but implicitly recommend semioticists working in other cultures to investigate principles of hierarchical ordering and "linkages" between texts and semiotic systems elsewhere. This challenge has so far been taken up to only a very limited extent. (Schwimmer 1986a: 163)

E.K. might be interested in this quote.

Boas moved the study of culture much closer to a semiotic perspective, for he saw cultural phenomena in terms of the imposition of conventional meaning on the flux of experience, and as determinants of our very perceptions of the external world (Stocking 1968). (Schwimmer 1986a: 164)

This understanding of culture seems to have become the common-sense one.

• Stocking, George Ward 1968. Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology. New York: Free Press. [Internet Archive | ESTER]

In order to study these phenomena, Boas compiled innumerable texts which make up almost the whole of his written work. He insisted that each culture was distinctive in the way it assigned meanings to phenomena (Boas 1896) but did not admit the possibility to integrating these specific semiotic systems into an ordered whole. Culture was, he argued, a matter of shreds and patches (Boas 1966). The American configurationist school of the 1930's did admit such a possibility but had much difficulty in finding a valid ordering principle for cultural systems. Benedict (1934) believed that the ordering principle in a culture is its "dominant principle" as established by an external analyst, on the basis of data obtained in that culture. Several others (e.g., Kardiner [1939]; Mead [1963]; Kluckhohn [1945, 1956]) used the psychological concept of "basic personality" as ordering principle, but this was only one of several methods all aiming at discovering the "dominant principle" of cultures. (Schwimmer 1986a: 164)

Yup, "the odds are strongly against his experiencing the cultural tradition as any sort of patterned whole" (sidebar).

• Boas, Franz 1896. The limits of the comparative method of anthropology. Science 4(103): 901-908. [Internet Archive]
• Boas, Franz 1966. Race, Language, and Culture. New York: Free Press. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]
• Benedict, Ruth 1934. Patterns of Culture. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]
• Kardiner, Abram 1939. The Individual and his Society: The Psychodynamics of Primitive Social Organization. New York: Columbia University Press. [Internet Archive]

Is it possible to integrate these well-analyzed semiotic domains into a "semiotic of culture" by ordering these domains hierarchically without too many intuitive leaps? A number of suggestions to this effect have been made, including two rather impressive ones by Bateson (1972c) and Dumont (1966), but it is too early to say whether these will find wide acceptance. (Schwimmer 1986a: 164)

Bateson is indeed impressive. Who's the other one?

• Dumont, Louis 1966. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Paris: Gallimard. [Internet Archive | lg | ESTER]

Scheffcyzyk, A. 1986b. Moscow-Tartu School. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 166-168.

According to the theory of culture elaborated by semioticians working in the Soviet Union, culture is the totality of the signifying systems by means of which mankind, or a particular human group, maintains its cohesiveness (its values and identity and its interaction with the world). These signifying systems, usually referred to as secondary modelling systems (or the "languages" of culture) comprise not only all the arts (literature, cinema, theater, painting, music, etc.), the various social activities and behavior patterns prevalent in the given community (including gesture, dress, manners, ritual, etc.), but also the established methods by which the community preserves its memory and its sense of identity (myths, history, legal system, religious beliefs, etc.). Each particular work of cultural activity is regarded as a text generated by one or more systems. (Scheffcyzyk 1986b: 166)

Arts, material substructures, and ideological superstructures.

It is an assumption of the semiotic approach to culture that culture is a mechanism for processing and communicating information. Secondary modeling systems operate with conventions (or codes) that are shared among members of the social group. Unlike natural language, however, where broadly speaking an identity of code may be assumed among speakers of one language community, the codes of secondary modeling systems are variables acquired to varying degrees (or even not at all) by the individual in the course of his maturation and education. Noise (in the sense of any of a number of impeding linguistic, psychological, or social factors) may block or hinder the communications channel. So universal, indeed, is the fact of imperfect communication that it [|] can be seen as part of the very nature of culture. All cultural exchange involves therefore some act of translation as the addressee interprets the message of the addresser through his only partially shared code(s). The fact of partial communication, even at times noncommunication, within a culture stimulates the formation of an ever-increasing number of new codes to compensate for the inadequacies of the existing ones. This "proliferation" factor is the impetus to the dynamism of cultures. (Scheffcyzyk 1986b: 167-168)

Not something I would have thought about secondary modelling systems myself, but I like this aspect. It may mesh with the configurationist school mentioned above.

Hanna, Judith Lynne 1986a. Dance. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 170-172.

Although nonhumans may be trained to perform human-like dances, there is no evidence that they can create meaning and transmit to other animals dance sequences that are physically, affectively, or symbolically complex. (Hanna 1986a: 170)

A neat little triad: (1) affective, (2) physical, (3) symbolical.

Corti, Maria 1986a. Dante Alighieri (1265-1321). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 172-174.

Dante was familiar with the theorizations of Modistae logicians concerning the theory of speculative grammar. It is along these lines, as has been recently shown (Corti 1981), that he formulates his sign theory in spite of his Augustinian background. In Dante we need to distinguish between theorization, which almost exclusively concerns the verbal sign, and the use that the artist makes of the processes of polysemy and symbolization. His theories are presented in De Vulgari Eloquentia, where the sign is defined as being rationale signum et sensuale ("sensual" in so far as being a significans, and "rational" because it is a significatum); it is ad placitum, that is, conventional, arbitrary. The verbal sign is solely human as neither animals nor angers dispose of it, the former lack rationality and the later are devoid of materiality. (Corti 1986a: 172)

What is this now? There are even papers like "Dante's Theory of Language" (Ewert 1940) mentioned on Wikipedia. Amazing.

• Dante 1996. De vulgari eloquentia. Edited and translated by Steven Botterill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [lg]

The question is not merely linguistic in nature but is also sociocultural as the "very simple signs" of poetic language or high vernacular constitute the unifying element within the diversity of spoken Italian; they form the consciousness of national linguistic unity. These very simple signs are also nobilissima signa; such a situation fits into a culture with a very high level of semioticity in which we have identification between the initial stages of any one thing and the sign. In such a civilization, things have value at an existential level while only signs count at a cultural level. The relationship between these two elements is not unidirectional, as there is sometimes transition from things to semiotic structures (modi essendi et significandi through the modi intelligendi) and from structures back to things. The two-directionality of the process also emerges in Dante's thoughts on poetic language. (Corti 1986a: 173)

The exact stuff Lotman treated in his typology of cultures as the paradigmatic type of cultural code in Medieval Europe.

This "necessity" is also due to the fact that the poetic sign is always polysemic. In Epistola XIII to Can Grande della Scala, Dante defined the sensus of the Commedia as non simplex, but polisemos, a word very rarely used in that time and which Dante takes not only from Uguccione da Pisa, author of Magnae Derivationes, but also from Servio's Comment in the first verse of Canto I, Eneide. The polysemy that Dante attributes to his poetic work is the "pluri-stratified semnatics" that Lotman and modern semiotics, particularly the Russian and Italian schools, identify as the dominant structure in most literary texts. According to Dante, the verbal signs of poetic texts in general and of the Commedia in particular are encoded several times with meanings organized at different levels - literal, allegorical, ethical, anagogic; the text is therefore a hypersign carrying maximum information. (Corti 1986a: 173)

What the hell?! "[...] polysemy (a term coined by Bréal)" - Stankiewicz (1986a: 90, above), you liar!

Magli, Patrizia 1986b. De Iorio, Andrea (1769-1851). In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Encyclopedic dictionary of semiotics. Tome 1, A-M. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton de Gruyter, 177-179.

La Mimica degli Antichi Investigata nel Gestire Napoletano (The Mimic Art of the Ancients Investigated in Neopolitan Gesture), written in 1832 by Canon Andrea De Iorio, is perhaps the most complex and systematic treatise of kinesics to have appeared before Darwin (1872). The work aims to present a vast phenomenology of gesture through an investigation not only of the internal correlation in the sign between a gesture (an expressive configuration) and an idea (the content) but of the complex process of interpretation to which the correlation belongs in its totality, in so far as it is a trail one may follow by way of inferences, hypotheses, and reconstructions to the gestural language of the Ancients. At question is a process in the sign in which one thing stands for another (aliquid stat pro aliquo) according to the modes of an inference (p ⊃ p) whereby p is a class of perceptible events on the basis of which one infers the absent, the imperceptible. Hence "modern mimic art must consider itself [...] an extremely exact guide to the comprehension of the ancient one, for the passage from the known to the unknown" (De Iorio 1832: 4). (Magli 1986b: 177)

Never heard of it. It doesn't look like it's been translated into English.

De Iorio maintains that "The gift of speech would indeed be a poor thing were it limited to the mere manifestation of ideas. And mimic discourse would be equally lacking if it were to fail to move the will of others and to incite the affects" (1832: 204). (Magli 1986b: 178)

Would you look at that! Referential, conative, and emotive functions are all present.