Faatiline sõnavahetus

Malinowski lisand, "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages", Ogdeni ja Richardsi teoses The Meaning of Meaning (1923) sisaldab kolme-nelja lehekülge (mis mahuvad ühele A4-le) "faatilise osaduse" teemal. Terve essee taasavaldati 1948. aastal kogumikus Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, ja need kolm-neli lehekülge 1972. aastal John Laveri ja Sandy Hutchesoni toimetatud kogumikus Communication in face to face interaction pealkirjaga "Phatic Communication".

2020. aastal ilmus Malinowski esseede kogumikust eestikeelne tõlge (Maagia, Teadus ja Religioon ning Teisi Esseid), millest võrdlesin faatilise osaduse katkendit originaalteksti ja oma isikliku tõlkega. Mulle ei sobinud "faatiline suhtlus", sest minu arvates on õige nimisõna "osadus", aga samas võib ta olla ka Ivan Ivanovitš, kuniks kõik saavad aru, millest jutt käib — mispuhul käesoleva postituse pealkirjas andsin vasteks midagi muud. Nii mõneski punktis jäi võrdluses võidutsema ametlik tõlge, millest kohandasin paremaid tulemusi nii palju kui võimalik. "Autoritatiivset" tõlget ei tasu vast lootma jääda, aga "adekvaatsuse" nimel on optimaalne koostada mitteametlik versioon, mida saab ja peab veel parendama.

Mitte-tõlkijana unistan ka võimalusest, et kui 20. sajandi alguse eestikeelse teaduskirjandusega lähemalt tutvuda siis võib proovida kunstitekstilist tõlget mis võiks jätta veenva mulje, et ta on avaldatud 1924. aastal vms. Võib-olla gooti kirjas ja kõikvõimalike ortograafiliste iseärasustega. Aga isegi selliste ürituste tarbeks on vaja korralikku eestikeelset tõlget:

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Tähenduse küsimus algelistes keeltes
Keelt tuleb oma kõige algelisemas funktsioonis vaadelda tegutsemisviisi kuiet mõtte vastumärgina. Metslaste keerulise kõneolukorra analüüs. Kõne põhilised algelised kasutused: kõne-tegutsemises, sõnade rituaalne käsitlemine, jutustus, 'faatiline osadus' (kõne ühiskondlikus lävimises).

Vabas, sihitus ühiskondlikus lävimises kasutatava keele juhtum nõuab erilist tähelepanu. Kui hulk inimesi istub pärast kõigi päevatoimetuste lõppemist ümber külatule, või kui nad ajavad tööst puhates juttu või saadavad mõnda lihtsat käsitööd lobaga, mis on sõltumatu sellest, mida nad parasjagu teevad — siis on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keele kasutamise viisiga, teistsugust tüüpi kõnefunktsiooniga. Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis tol momendil parasjagu toimub, ning sel näib isegi olevat puudu igasugususest situatsiooni kontekstist. Mitte ühegi lausungi tähendust ei saa ühendada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga.

Lihtne viisakusväljend, mis on metsikute hõimude hulgas sama palju kasutusel kui Euroopa külalistetoas, täidab funktsiooni, millega selle sõnade tähendusel pole peaaegu mitte midagi pistmist. Pärimine tervise järele, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mõne ülimalt ilmselge asjade seisukorra kinnitamine — kõike sellist vahetatakse mitte selleks, et teavitada, käesoleval juhul mitte selleks, et inimesi tegevuses ühendada, kindlasti mitte selleks, et väljendada mingit mõtet. Minu arvates oleks isegi väär öelda, et selliste sõnade eesmärk on jagada ühiseid tundmusi, kuna selline eesmärk säärastelt käibefraasidel tavaliselt puudub, ja kui see teesklebki sellist eemärki, näiteks kaastundeväljendustes, on see ühel pool varjamatult võlts. Mis on siis selliste väljendite põhimõte nagu "Kuidas läheb?", "Aa, siin sa oledki", "Kust sa tuled?" ja "Ilus ilm täna" — mis kõik toimivad erinevates ühiskondades tervitus- ja lähenemisvormelitena?

Ma arvan, et lihtsate ühiskondlikkuste kõnefuktsiooni üle arutledes jõuame inimese ühiskondliku loomuse ühe põhilise aspektini. Kõikides inimestes on teada-tuntud kalduvus ühte koguneda, koos olla, ja üksteise seltskonda nautida. Paljud instinktid ja loomuomased suundumused, nagu näiteks hirm ja riiakus, igasugused ühiskondlikud tundmused nagu näiteks auahnus, edevus, võimu- ja rikkuseiha, sõltuvad ja on seotud selle põhilise kalduvusega mis muudab pelgalt teiste inimeste kohaloleku inimese jaoks hädavajalikuks. Ma väldin sihilikult "karjainstinkti" väljendi kasutamist, sest usun, et kõne all olevat kalduvust ei saa rangelt öeldes pidada instinktiks. Pealegi on "karjainstinkti" mõistet hiljutises sotsioloogilises uurimuses väärkasutatud, aga see on saanud piisavalt populaarseks, et jagada oma seisukohti sel teemal üldise lugejaskonnaga.

Kõne on nüüd selle kalduvusega omavahel seotud, sest loomuseisundis inimesele on teise inimese vaikimine mitte julgustav tegur vaid, vastupidi, midagi häirivat ja ohtlikku. Võõras, kes keelt ei oska rääkida, on kõigile metslashõimudele loomulik vaenlane. Algelisele mõttelaadile, metslaste hulgas või meie endi harimata klassides, tähendab vaikimine mitte ainult ebasõbralikkust vaid otseselt halba iseloomu. Kahtlemata see sõltub palju rahvuse iseloomust, aga kehtib üldreeglina. Vaikuse murdmine, sõnade osadus, on esimene samm seltsisidemete tekitamisel, mis päädib leivamurdmise ja toiduosadusega. Kaasaegne inglise väljend "Ilus päev täna" või melaneeslaste tervitus "Kust tuled?" on vajalikud, et saada üle sellest kummalisest ja ebamugavast pingest, mida inimesed vastamisi vaikides tunnevad.

Esimesele vormelile järgneb keele voog, eelistuste ja võõrastuste sihitu väljendamine, jutustused tähtsusetutest juhtumitest, kommentaarid asjade kohta, mis on täiesti ilmsed. Sellist loba, nagu võib leida algelistes ühiskondades, erineb vaid pisut meie endi omast. Ikka ja alati sama rõhk jaatamisel ja soostumisel, mille sekka on vahest segatud mõni juhuslik lahkarvamus, mis loob vaenusidemed. Või ülevaated kõneleja isiklikest vaadetest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja kannatab vaevaliselt ennast tagasi hoides, oodates kuniks tuleb tema kord rääkida. Kuulaja ja kõneleja vahel loodavad sidemed ei ole sellises kõnekasutuses päris sümmeetrilised, sest keeleliselt aktiivne inimene saab suurema jao ühiskondlikku naudingut ja eneseülendust. Aga kuigi sellistele lausungitele pühendatud kuulamine pole reeglina niivõrd tugev kui kõneleja enda osa, on see tema naudingu jaoks väga vajalik, ja vastastikkus kujuneb välja rolle vahetades.

Ei saa olla mingit kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega, mida terminoloogilise leiutamise deemon ahvatleb mind sellele nimeks andma faatiline osadus — kõneviis, milles luuakse ühiskondlikke sidemeid pelgalt sõnavahetuse kaudu. Heidame sellele pilgu sellest erilisest vaatenurgast, mis meid siin puudutab; lubage küsida, mis valgust see heidab keele funktsioonile või olemusele. Kas faatilises osaduses kasutatakse sõnu peaasjalikult selleks, et edastada tähendust mis sümboolselt kuulub neile sõnadele? Kindlasti mitte! Nad täidavad ühiskondlikku funktsiooni ja see on nende peamine eesmärk, aga nad ei intellektuaalse arutluse tulemus ega virguta ka kuulajas ilmtingimata arutlust. Veel kord võime öelda, et keel ei tööta siin mõtete ülekandevahendina.

Aga kas me võime seda pidada teguviisiks? Ja millises suhtes seisab ta meie põhilise mõiste, olukorra kontekstiga? On ilmselge, et väline olukord ei satu otseselt kõnetehnikasse. Aga mida saab pidada olukorraks, kui hulk inimesi ajab niisama koos juttu? See seisneb täpselt selles seltskondlikkuse õhustikus ja nende inimeste isikliku osaduse tõsiasjas. Aga seda saavutatakse tegelikult läbi kõne, ja olukord on kõigil sellistel juhtudel loodud läbi sõnavahetuse, läbi kindlate tunnete mis annavad lõbusale seltskonnale kuju, läbi selle lausungite andmise ja võtmise mida kujutab tavaline jutuajamine. Kogu olukord seisneb selles, mis toimub keeleliselt. Iga seisukohavõtt on tegu, mis täidab otsest eesmärki siduda kuulajat kõneleja külge mõne ühiskondliku tundmuse köidikuga. Veel kord ilmneb keel meile selles funktsioonis mitte arutlusvahendi vaid teguviisina.

Tahaksin koheselt lisada, et kuigi arutletud näited olid võetud metslaste elust, võime iseendi hulgast leida täpseid vasteid igat tüüpi keelekasutusele, mida seni oleme arutlenud. Sõnadest sidekude, mis ühendab laeva meeskonda halva ilmaga, kaasneb sõdurite kompanii tegevusega, jookseb tehnilises keeles kaasa mõne tarviliku töö või sportliku tegevusega — kõik need meenutavad põhimõtteliselt tegutseva inimese algelist kõnekasutust ja meie arutelu oleks võinud sama hästi läbi viia kaasaegsemal näitel. Valisin ülalolevad metslaste kogukonnast, sest tahtsin rõhutada, et täpselt selline ja mitte teistsugune on algelise kõne iseloom.

Taas kord, [üksteist tervitades] ja juttu ajades kasutame me keelt täpselt nagu metslased seda teevad ja meie jutust saab üleval analüüsitud "faatiline osadus", mille ülesandeks on kehtestada isiklikud ühendussidemed inimeste vahel, kelle on kokku toonud paljas vajadus seltskonna järele, ja mis ei täida mingit eesmärki edastada ideid. "Kogu läänemaailmas nõustutakse, et inimesed peavad kohtuma sageli ja, et vestlemine pole mitte ainult oodatud vaid on elementaarse viisakuse küsimus öelda midagi isegi kui ei ole mitte midagi öelda." [John Mahaffy, The Principles of the Art of Conversation, 1887, lk 1.] - [nagu kirjutatakse]. Tõepoolest seal pole vaja, võib-olla isegi ei tohiks olla, midagi teatada. Nii kaua kui on sõnu mida vahetada toob faatiline osadus metslase ja tsiviliseeritud ühtemoodi viisaka ühiskondliku lävimise meeldivasse õhkkonda.

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Võrdlus

1. Ipsissima verba.
2. Esimene tõlge.
3. Ametlik tõlge.
4. Teine tõlge.

1. 1. • The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration.
      • Keelekasutus vabas, sihitus ühiskondlikus läbikäimises nõuab erilist tähelepanu.
      • Vabal, sihitul sotsiaalsel lävimisel kasutatava keele juhtum nõuab eraldi vaatlust.
      • Vabas, sihitus ühiskondlikus lävimises kasutatava keele juhtum nõuab erilist tähelepanu.
   2. • When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing — it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function.
      • Kui hulk inimesi istuvad pärast kõigi päevatööde lõppemist tööst puhates ümber külatule, või kui töö kõrval ajatakse juttu, mis on sõltumatu sellest, mida nad parasjagu teevad — on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keelekasutus, teistsugust tüüpi keelefunktsiooniga.
      • Kui hulk inimesi istub külas lõkke ümber, olles kõik päevased toimetamised lõpetanud, või kui nad lobisevad, puhates tööst, või kui nad räägivad lihtsa käsitsitöö kõrval suusoojaks jutte, mis pole nende tegevusega sugugi seotud — siis on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keelekasutuse moodusega, teist tüüpi kõnefunktsiooniga.
      • Kui hulk inimesi istub pärast kõigi päevatoimetuste lõppemist ümber külatule, või kui nad ajavad tööst puhates juttu või saadavad mõnda lihtsat käsitööd lobaga, mis on sõltumatu sellest, mida nad parasjagu teevad — siis on selge, et meil on tegu teistsuguse keele kasutamise viisiga, teistsugust tüüpi kõnefunktsiooniga.
   3. • Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation.
      • Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis parasjagu toimub, see näib isegi olevat lahutatud igasugusest situatsiooni kontekstist.
      • Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis tol momendil juhtub, ning puudu näib olevat isegi situatsiooni kontekst.
      • Keel ei sõltu siin sellest, mis tol momendil parasjagu toimub, ning sel näib isegi olevat puudu igasugususest olukorra kontekstist.
   4. • The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behavior, with the purpose of what they are doing.
      • Ühegi lausungi tähendust ei saa ühendada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga.
      • Igasuguse lausungi tähendust ei saa seostada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga.
      • Mitte ühegi lausungi tähendust ei saa ühendada kõneleja või kuulaja käitumisega, nende tegevuse eesmärgiga.
2. 1. • A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant.
      • Paljas viisakusfraas, mis on metsikute hõimude seas kasutusel samavõrd kui Euroopa külalistubades, täidab funktsiooni, mille jaoks selle sõnade tähendus on pea täielikult ebaoluline.
      • Lihtne viisakusväljend, mida mestlaste hõimudes kasutatakse sama tihti kui Euroopa salongis, täidab funktsiooni, millega sõnade tähendusel pole peaaegu mitte mingisugust pistmist.
      • Lihtne viisakusväljend, mis on metsikute hõimude hulgas sama palju kasutusel kui Euroopa külalistetoas, täidab funktsiooni, millega selle sõnade tähendusel pole peaaegu mitte midagi pistmist.
   2. • Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things — all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought.
      • Tervise järele pärimine, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mõne ülimalt ilmselge asjaolu kinnitamine — kõike sellist vahetatakse mitte selleks, et informeerida, mitte isegi selleks, et inimesi tegevuses ühendada ja kindlasti mitte selleks, et väljendada mõnda mõtet.
      • Pärimine tervise järele, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mingi ülimalt ilmselge asjade seisu kinnitamine — kõike seda lausutakse ja mitte selleks, et informeerida, mitte et antud juhul inimesi tegevuses ühendada, kindlasti mitte et väljendada mingisugust mõtet.
      • Pärimine tervise järele, kommentaarid ilma kohta, mõne ülimalt ilmselge asjade seisukorra kinnitamine — kõike sellist vahetatakse mitte selleks, et teavitada, käesoleval juhul mitte selleks, et inimesi tegevuses ühendada, kindlasti mitte selleks, et väljendada mingit mõtet.
   3. • It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side.
      • Oleks isegi väär, ma arvan, öelda, et sellised sõnad teenivad ühiste tundmuste saavutamise eesmärki, sest see on tavaliselt selliste käibefraaside juurest puudu; ja kus see näibki eksisteerivat, näiteks kaastundeväljendustes, on see ühel pool varjamatult võlts.
      • Minu arvates oleks isegi ebatäpne öelda, et selliste sõnade eesmärk on luua ühist meeleolu, kuna tavaliselt see säärastest käibefraasidest puudub. Või kui seda saabki tuvastada, näiteks kaastundeavaldustes, siis on see ühelt osapoolelt varjamatult võlts.
      • Minu arvates oleks isegi väär öelda, et selliste sõnade eesmärk on jagada ühiseid tundmusi, kuna selline eesmärk säärastelt käibefraasidel tavaliselt puudub, ja kui see teesklebki sellist eemärki, näiteks kaastundeväljendustes, on see ühel pool varjamatult võlts.
   4. • What is the raison d'être, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are,' 'Where do you come from?' 'Nice day to-day' — all of which serve in one society or another as formulæ of greeting or approach?.
      • Mis on seega selliste fraaside, mis on kõik ühes või teises ühiskonnas käibel tervitus- ja lähenemisvalemitena, nagu "Kuidas sul läheb?", "Siin sa siis oledki", "Kust sa pärit oled?", "Ilus päev täna" raison d'être?
      • Mis on siis seesuguste fraasidega nagu "Kuidas käsi käib?", "Aa, siin sa oledki", "Kust sa tuled?" ja "Ilus päev täna" olemasolu mõte — kui need kõik on ühes või teises ühiskonnas tervitamise või lähenemise vormelid?
      • Mis on siis selliste väljendite põhimõte nagu "Kuidas läheb?", "Aa, siin sa oledki", "Kust sa tuled?" ja "Ilus ilm täna" — mis kõik toimivad erinevates ühiskondades tervitus- ja lähenemisvormelitena?
3. 1. • I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society.
      • Ma arvan, et tühjade viisakuste kõnefunktsiooni üle arutledes jõuame me ühe põhilise aspektini inimese ühiskondlikus loomuses.
      • Ma arvan, et kui me räägime kõne funktsioonist puhtalt seltskondlikkuse kategoorias, siis oleme jõudnud inimese ühiskondliku loomuse ühe põhjapaneva aspektini.
      • Ma arvan, et lihtsate ühiskondlikkuste kõnefuktsiooni üle arutledes jõuame inimese ühiskondliku loomuse ühe põhilise aspektini.
   2. • There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company.
      • Kõigis inimestes on teada-tuntud kalduvus koguneda, olla koos, nautida üksteise seltskonda.
      • Kõigil inimestel on teada-tuntud kalduvus ühte koonduda, koos olla, üksteise seltskonda nautida.
      • Kõikides inimestes on teada-tuntud kalduvus ühte koguneda, koos olla, ja üksteise seltskonda nautida.
   3. • Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man.
      • Paljud instinktid ja kaasasündinud suundumused, nagu hirm ja riiakus, mitmesugused ühiskondlikud tundmused nagu ambitsioon, edevus, võimu ja rikkuse iha, on sõltuvad ja seotud selle põhilise kalduvusega mis teeb teiste inimeste juuresviibimise inimese jaoks hädavajalikuks.
      • Paljud instinktid ja sünnipärased suundumused, näiteks hirm ja riiakus, ning igat tüüpi sotsiaalsed tunded, nagu auahnus, edevus, võimuiha ja rikkusehimu, johtuvad ja sõltuvad fundamentaalsest kalduvusest, mis muudab ainuüksi juba teiste kohalolu inimesele hädavajalikuks.
      • Paljud instinktid ja loomuomased suundumused, nagu näiteks hirm ja riiakus, igasugused ühiskondlikud tundmused nagu näiteks auahnus, edevus, võimu- ja rikkuseiha, sõltuvad ja on seotud selle põhilise kalduvusega mis muudab pelgalt teiste inimeste kohaloleku inimese jaoks hädavajalikuks.
   4. • I avoid on purpose the use of the expression Herd-instinct, for I believe that the tendency in question cannot strictly be called an instinct. Moreover the term Herd-instinct has been misused in a recent sociological work which has, however, become sufficiently popular to establish its views on this subject with the general reader.
      • Ma väldin sihilikult väljendi "karjainstinkt" kasutamist, sest ma usun, et küsimuse all olevat kalduvust ei saa päris täpselt instinktiks nimetada. Veel enam, karjainstinkti mõistet on väärkasutatud hiljutises sotsioloogilises uurimuses, mis on sellegipoolest osutunud piisavalt populaarseks, et kinnistada oma vaateid lugejate seas.
      • Hoidun sihilikult väljendist "karjainstinkt", sest usun, et kõnealust kalduvust ei saa pidada rangelt võttes instinktiks. Pealegi on mõistet "karjainstinkt" viimasel ajal sotsioloogilistes uurimustes valesti kasutatud, kuigi need uurimused on kujunenud piisavalt populaarseks, et viia antud teemat käsitlevad seisukohad laiema lugejaskonnani.
      • Ma väldin sihilikult "karjainstinkti" väljendi kasutamist, sest usun, et kõne all olevat kalduvust ei saa rangelt öeldes pidada instinktiks. Pealegi on "karjainstinkti" mõistet hiljutises sotsioloogilises uurimuses väärkasutatud, aga see on saanud piisavalt populaarseks, et jagada oma seisukohti sel teemal üldise lugejaskonnaga.
4. 1. • Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous.
      • Kõne on selle kalduvusega lähedalt seotud, sest metsiku inimese jaoks ei ole teise inimese vaikimine rahustav tegur vaid, vastupidi, midagi ärevust tekitavat ja ohtlikku.
      • Kõne on selle kalduvuse lähedane korrelaat, sest loomulikule inimesele pole teise inimese vaikimine julgustav faktor, vaid vastupidi, midagi ärevusse ajavat ja ohtlikku.
      • Kõne on nüüd selle kalduvusega omavahel seotud, sest loomuseisundis inimesele on teise inimese vaikimine mitte julgustav tegur vaid, vastupidi, midagi häirivat ja ohtlikku.
   2. • The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy.
      • Võõras, kes ei oska kohalikku keelt rääkida, on kõigi metsikute hõimlaste jaoks loomulik vaenlane.
      • Võõras, kes ei oska keelt rääkida, on kõigi metslaste silmis loomulik vaenlane.
      • Võõras, kes keelt ei oska rääkida, on kõigile metslashõimudele loomulik vaenlane.
   3. • To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character.
      • Primitiivsele mõistusele, olgu metslaste või meie endi harimata klasside hulgas, tähendab sõnaahtrus mitte ainult ebasõbralikkust vaid otseselt halba iseloomu
      • Primitiivsele mõtlemisele tähendab vaikus nii metslaste keskel kui meie endi harimata klassides ebasõbralikkust, liiati otseselt halba iseloomu.
      • Algelisele mõttelaadile, metslaste hulgas või meie endi harimata klassides, tähendab vaikimine mitte ainult ebasõbralikkust vaid otseselt halba iseloomu.
   4. • This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule.
      • See kahtlemata erineb oluliselt rahvuste lõikes, aga jääb tõeks üldise reeglina.
      • Kahtlemata varieerub see suuresti vastavalt rahva iseloomule, kuid [..
      • Kahtlemata see sõltub palju rahvuse iseloomust, aga kehtib üldreeglina.
   5. • The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food.
      • Vaikuse murdmine, sõnade osadus (communion), on esimene samm ühiste sidemete loomises, mis päädib leivamurdmise ja toidu osadusega.
      • ..] sõnaline suhtlus on esimene tegu, et luua vendlussidemed, mis tipnevad leiva jagamise ja ühise söömisega.
      • Vaikuse murdmine, sõnade osadus, on esimene samm seltsisidemete tekitamisel, mis päädib leivamurdmise ja toiduosadusega.
   6. • The modern English expression, 'Nice day to-day' or the Melanesian phrase, "Whence comest thou?' are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence.
      • Tänapäevane inglise väljend "Ilus päev täna" või Melaneesia fraas "Kust tuled?" on vajalikud, et saada üle sellest kummalisest ja ebameeldivast pingest, mida inimesed tunnevad vastastikku vaiki olles.
      • Nüüdisaegne ingliskeelne väljend "Ilus ilm täna" või melaneeslaste fraas "Kust sa tuled?" on vajalikud selleks, et saada üle kummalisest ja ebamugavast pingest, mida inimesed tunnevad, kui nad üksteisega vaikuses kokku satuvad.
      • Kaasaegne inglise väljend "Ilus päev täna" või melaneeslaste tervitus "Kust tuled?" on vajalikud, et saada üle sellest kummalisest ja ebamugavast pingest, mida inimesed vastamisi vaikides tunnevad.
5. 1. • After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious.
      • Pärast esimest vormelit järgneb keelevool, eelistuste ja võõrastuste eesmärgitu väljendamine, aruanded ebaolulistest juhtumustest, kommentaarid täiesti ilmselgete asjade kohta.
      • Pärast esimest vormelit järgneb keelevoog, otstarbetud eelistuste või vastumeelsuste väljendused, kirjeldused asjassepuutumatutest sündmustest, kommentaarid millegi täiesti ilmse kohta.
      • Esimesele vormelile järgneb keele voog, eelistuste ja võõrastuste sihitu väljendamine, jutustused tähtsusetutest juhtumitest, kommentaarid asjade kohta, mis on täiesti ilmsed.
   2. • Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own.
      • Selline primitiivsetes ühiskondades leitav keelepeks erineb väga vähe meie endi omast.
      • Sellised suusoojaks räägitud jutud, nagu neid esineb primitiivsetes ühiskondades, erinevad meie omadest vaid pisut.
      • Sellist loba, nagu võib leida algelistes ühiskondades, erineb vaid pisut meie endi omast.
   3. • Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy.
      • Alati sama rõhk jaatamisel ja soostumisel, võib-olla segatud juhusliku lahkarvamusega, mis tekitab vaenusidemeid.
      • Ikka on rõhk samamoodi jaatusel ja nõusolekul, sekka vahest mõni üksik vastuväide, mis loob antipaatia sidemed.
      • Ikka ja alati sama rõhk jaatamisel ja soostumisel, mille sekka on vahest segatud mõni juhuslik lahkarvamus, mis loob vaenusidemed.
   4. • Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak.
      • Või isiklikud ülevaated kõneleja vaadetest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja kuulab pealt mõningase vaoshoituse ja kergelt peidetud kannatamatusega, oodates kuniks saabub tema kord kõnelda.
      • Või isiklikel ülevaadetel kõneleja seisukohtadest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja üksjagu kammitsetult ja veidi varjatud kärsitusega vastu võtab, oodates, kuni saabub tema kord rääkida.
      • Või ülevaated kõneleja isiklikest vaadetest ja eluloost, mida kuulaja kannatab vaevaliselt ennast tagasi hoides, oodates kuniks tuleb tema kord rääkida.
   5. • For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement.
      • Sellises vestluses loodud sidemed kuulaja ning kõneleja vahel ei ole päris sümmeetrilised, sest keeleliselt aktiivsem osapool võtab suurema jao ühiskondlikust naudingust ja eneseülistamisest.
      • Sest kuulaja ja kõneleja vahel sellise kõnekasutusega loodavad sidemed ei ole päris sümmeetrilised, lingvistiliselt aktiivsele inimesele saab osaks suurem sotsiaalne nauding ja eneseülendus.
      • Kuulaja ja kõneleja vahel loodavad sidemed ei ole sellises kõnekasutuses päris sümmeetrilised, sest keeleliselt aktiivne inimene saab suurema jao ühiskondlikku naudingut ja eneseülendust.
   6. • But though the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of roles.
      • Kuigi selliste lausungite puhul kuulaja roll ei ole niivõrd intensiivne kui kõneleja enda jagu, on see tema naudingu jaoks siiski üsna vajalik ja vastastikkus saavutatakse rollide vaheldamise kaudu.
      • Kuid olgugi et selliste lausungite kuulamine pole reegline nii intensiivne kui kõneleja osa, on see tema naudingu jaoks väga vajalik ning vastastikuse hüvanguni jõutakse rollide vahetusega.
      • Aga kuigi sellistele lausungitele pühendatud kuulamine pole reeglina niivõrd tugev kui kõneleja enda osa, on see tema naudingu jaoks väga vajalik, ja vastastikkus kujuneb välja rolle vahetades.
6. 1. • There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use — phatic communion I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention — a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words.
      • Ei ole mingit kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega — terminoloogilise leiutamise deemonist mõjustatuna olen ahvatletud nimetama seda faatiliseks osaduseks — kõnetüübiks, milles ühendussidemeid luuakse pelgalt sõnade vahetamise kaudu.
      • Ei saa olla kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega — mul on kiusatus nimetada seda faatiliseks suhtluseks, mida käivitab terminoloogilise leidlikkuse deemon — sedalaadi kõnega, milles ühtsussidemed luuakse pelgalt sõnu vahetades.
      • Ei saa olla mingit kahtlust, et meil on siin tegu uut tüüpi keelekasutusega, mida terminoloogilise leiutamise deemon ahvatleb mind sellele nimeks andma faatiline osadus
      — kõneviis, milles luuakse ühiskondlikke sidemeid pelgalt sõnavahetuse kaudu.
   2. • Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language.
      • Vaatame seda nüüd meid huvitavast seisukohast ja küsime, millist valgust heidab see keele loomusele või toimimisele.
      • Vaatame seda erilisest aspektist, mida me siinkohal käsitleme. Küsime, millist valgust heidab see keele funktsioonile või olemusele.
      • Heidame sellele pilgu sellest erilisest vaatenurgast, mis meid siin puudutab; lubage küsida, mis valgust see heidab keele funktsioonile või olemusele.
   3. • Are words in phatic communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not!
      • Kas sõnu kasutatakse faatilises osaduses põhiliselt selleks, et edastada neile kui sümbolitele kuuluvat tähendust? Kindlasti mitte!
      • Kas sõnu kasutatakse faatilises suhtluses eeskätt selleks, et edasi anda tähendust, mis on sõnadel sümboolselt olemas? Kindlasti mitte!
      • Kas faatilises osaduses kasutatakse sõnu peaasjalikult selleks, et edastada tähendust mis sümboolselt kuulub neile sõnadele? Kindlasti mitte!
   4. • They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener.
      • Nad täidavad ühiskondlikku funktsiooni ja see on nende põhiline eesmärk, sest nad ei ole intellektuaalse refleksiooni tulemus ja ei kutsu ilmtingimata refleksiooni esile ka kuulajas.
      • Sõnad täidavad sotsiaalset funktsiooni ja see on nende põhieesmärk, aga nad pole ei intellektuaalse mõtiskluse tulemus ega ärgita ka kuulajat tingimata järele mõtlema.
      • Nad täidavad ühiskondlikku funktsiooni ja see on nende peamine eesmärk, aga nad ei intellektuaalse arutluse tulemus ega virguta ka kuulajas ilmtingimata arutlust.
   5. • Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought.
      • Jällegi võime öelda, et keel ei toimi siin mõtete edastamise vahendina.
      • Taas võime öelda, et keel ei funktsioneeri siin mõtete edastamise vahendina.
      • Veel kord võime öelda, et keel ei tööta siin mõtete ülekandevahendina.
7. 1. • But can we regard it as a mode of action?
      • Aga kas me saame seda pidada tegutsemisviisiks?
      • Kuid kas me võime seda pidada tegevuse mooduseks?
      • Aga kas me võime seda pidada teguviisiks?
   2. • And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation?
      • Ja millises suhtes on see meie põhimõiste, situatsiooni kontekstiga?
      • Ja millisesse suhtesse asetub see meie tähtsa situatsioonilise konteksti kontseptsiooniga?
      • Ja millises suhtes seisab ta meie põhilise mõiste, olukorra kontekstiga?
   3. • It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking.
      • On selge, et väline situatsioon ei sisene otseselt kõnetehnikasse.
      • On ilmne, et väline situatsioon ei sisene otseselt kõnelemise võtetesse.
      • On ilmselge, et väline olukord ei satu otseselt kõnetehnikasse.
   4. • But what can be considered as situation when a number of people aimlessly gossip together?
      • Aga mida saame me pidada situatsiooniks, kui hulk inimesi ajavad koos sihitult juttu?
      • Aga mida saab pidada situatsiooniks, kui hulk inimesi lihtsalt sihitult lobiseb?
      • Aga mida saab pidada olukorraks, kui hulk inimesi ajab niisama koos juttu?
   5. • It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people.
      • See seisneb just selles viisakuse õhkkonnas ja nende inimeste isikliku osaduse tõsiasjas.
      • See seisneb ainult seltskondlikkuse atmosfäärist [..
      • See seisneb täpselt selles seltskondlikkuse õhustikus ja nende inimeste isikliku osaduse tõsiasjas.
   6. • But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip.
      • Aga see tõsiasi saavutatakse läbi kõne, ja situatsioon on kõigil sellistel juhtudel loodud sõnavahetuse poolt, läbi kindlate tunnete, mis moodustavad lustaka seltskondlikkuse, läbi lausungite, millest jutuajamine koosneb, ütluse ja vastuvõtu.
      • ..] ja saavutatakse tegelikult kõnega ning situatsioon luuakse kõigil neil juhtudel sõnade vahetamisega, konkreetsete tunnetege, mis loovad lõbusa kambavaimu, tavalise jutuloba moodustavate lausungite andmise ja vastuvõtmisega.
      • Aga seda saavutatakse tegelikult läbi kõne, ja olukord on kõigil sellistel juhtudel loodud läbi sõnavahetuse, läbi kindlate tunnete mis annavad lõbusale seltskonnale kuju, läbi selle lausungite andmise ja võtmise mida kujutab tavaline jutuajamine.
   7. • The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically.
      • Kogu situatsioon seisneb selles, mis toimub lingvistiliselt.
      • Kogu situatsioon seisneb selles, mis toimub lingvistiliselt.
      • Kogu olukord seisneb selles, mis toimub keeleliselt.
   8. • Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other.
      • Iga lausung on akt, mis teenib kuulaja ja kõneleja sidumise otsest eesmärki läbi ühe või teise ühiskondliku tundmuse.
      • Iga lausung on tegu, mis täidab otsest eesmärki siduda kuulaja kõnelejaga ühe või teise sotsiaalsete tundmuste kütke abil.
      • Iga seisukohavõtt on tegu, mis täidab otsest eesmärki siduda kuulajat kõneleja külge mõne ühiskondliku tundmuse köidikuga.
   9. • Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action.
      • Veelkord, keel ilmneb selles funktsioonis mitte kui refleksiooni instrument, vaid kui tegutsemisviis.
      • Taas paistab keel meile selles funktsioonis tegevusmoodus, mitte mõtlemise instrument.
      • Veel kord ilmneb keel meile selles funktsioonis mitte arutlusvahendi vaid teguviisina.
8. 1. • I should like to add at once that though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we could find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed.
      • Ma tahaks koheselt lisada, et kuigi arutluse all olnud näited on võetud metslaste elust, leiaksime me endi hulgast täpseid paralleele igale seni mainitud keelekasutusele.
      • Tahaks otsekohe lisada, et kuigi vaadeldud näited olid võetud metslaste elust, leiaksime ka meilt endilt täpseid paralleele igat tüüpi keelekasutusele, mida seni oleme käsitlenud.
      • Tahaksin koheselt lisada, et kuigi arutletud näited olid võetud metslaste elust, võime iseendi hulgast leida täpseid vasteid igat tüüpi keelekasutusele, mida seni oleme arutlenud.
   2. • The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit — all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example.
      • Sõnade siduv kude, mis ühendab laeva meeskonda halva ilmaga, sõdurite kompanii tegevust saatvad sõnad, tehniline keel, mis jookseb paralleelselt mõne praktilise töö või spordiharjutusega — kõik need sarnanevad oma põhiolemuselt tegutsevate inimeste primitiivse keelekasutusega ja meie arutlust oleks võinud samahästi läbi viia tänapäevase näite põhjal.
      • Sõnade sidekude, mis ühendab laevameeskonda halva ilmaga, lahingut pidava roodu verbaalsed kaasosad, mingi praktilise töö või sportliku tegevusega paralleelselt kulgev tehniline keel — kõik need sarnanevad olemuselt inimese primitiivse kõnekasutusega tegevuses ja meie arutelu oleks võinud sama edukalt lähtuda ka mõnest moodsast näitest.
      • Sõnadest sidekude, mis ühendab laeva meeskonda halva ilmaga, kaasneb sõdurite kompanii tegevusega, jookseb tehnilises keeles kaasa mõne tarviliku töö või sportliku tegevusega — kõik need meenutavad põhimõtteliselt tegutseva inimese algelist kõnekasutust ja meie arutelu oleks võinud sama hästi läbi viia kaasaegsemal näitel.
   3. • I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of primitive speech.
      • Ma valisin näited metsikust kogukonnast, sest ma tahtsin rõhutada, et selline ja mitte mingi muu on primitiivse kõne iseloom.
      • Valisin näite metslaste kogukonnast, kuna tahtsin rõhutada, et just selline on primitiivse kõne loomus ja mitte teistsugune.
      • Valisin ülalolevad metslaste kogukonnast, sest tahtsin rõhutada, et täpselt selline ja mitte teistsugune on algelise kõne iseloom.
9. 1. • Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analyzed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas.
      • Jällegi, viisakusavaldustes ja keelepeksus kasutame me keelt täpselt nagu metslased seda teevad ja meie rääkimine saab ülal analüüsitud "faatiliseks osaduseks", mis teenib pelgalt seltskonnavajadusest kokku kogunenud inimeste isiklike ühendussidemete loomise eesmärki ja ei teeni mitte mingit ideede kommunikeerimise eesmärki.
      • Puhtaid seltskondlikkusi vahetades ja suusoojaks vesteldes kasutame keelt jällegi täpselt samamoodi nagu metslased ja meie kõne muutub "faatiliseks suhtluseks", mida on eelpool analüüsitud ja kasutatakse isiklike sidemete loomiseks pelgalt seltskonnavajadusest kokku tulnud inimeste vahel, ning see ei täida mingit ideede edasiandmise eesmärki.
      • Taas kord, [üksteist tervitades] ja juttu ajades kasutame me keelt täpselt nagu metslased seda teevad ja meie jutust saab üleval analüüsitud "faatiline osadus", mille ülesandeks on kehtestada isiklikud ühendussidemed inimeste vahel, kelle on kokku toonud paljas vajadus seltskonna järele, ja mis ei täida mingit eesmärki edastada ideid.
   2. • "Throughout the Western world it is agreed that people must meet frequently, and that it is not only agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something even when there is hardly anything to say" [Chapter I. of the present work, p. 11] — as the Authors remark.
      • Nagu kaasautorid märgivad: "Terves Läänemaailmas nõustutakse, et inimesed peavad sageli kohtuma ja et ei ole mitte ainult meeldiv rääkida, vaid on harilik viisakus öelda midagi, isegi kui on vaevalt midagi öelda" (Ogden ja Richards, 1. peatükk).
      • "Läänemaailmas on kokku lepitud, et inimesed peavad sagedasti kohtuma, et rääkimine pole üksnes sobilik, vaid lausa üldine viisakus näeb ette, et öeldakse midagi, isegi kui midagi õieti öelda ei ole" [Käesolev töö I peatükk, lk 11.] — märgivad autorid.
      • "Kogu läänemaailmas nõustutakse, et inimesed peavad kohtuma sageli ja, et vestlemine pole mitte ainult oodatud vaid on elementaarse viisakuse küsimus öelda midagi isegi kui ei ole mitte midagi öelda." [John Mahaffy, The Principles of the Art of Conversation, 1887, lk 1.] - [nagu kirjutatakse].
   3. • Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate.
      • Tõepoolest ei ole vaja, või võib-olla isegi ei tohiks olla vajadust midagi kommunikeerida.
      • Tõepoolest alati ei pea olema või vahest ei tohigi olla midagi edasi anda.
      • Tõepoolest seal pole vaja, võib-olla isegi ei tohiks olla, midagi teatada.
   4. • As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into the pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercoures.
      • Kuniks on sõnu, mida vahetada, toob faatiline osadus metslase ja tsiviliseeritud inimese ühtemoodi viisaka ühiskondliku läbikäimise meeldivasse õhkkonda.
      • Kui on olemas sõnad, mida vahetada, toob faatiline suhtlus metslasi ja tsiviliseeritud inimesi ühtemoodi viisaka sotsiaalse vahekorra atmosfääri.
      • Nii kaua kui on sõnu mida vahetada toob faatiline osadus metslase ja tsiviliseeritud ühtemoodi viisaka ühiskondliku lävimise meeldivasse õhkkonda.

A Minimum of Meaning

In the previous post I reviewed, once again, Malinowski's text (the ~four pages pertaining to phatic communion), and came away with 30 questions that I should ideally be able to answer in my BA thesis in spring 2021. The first question reads, "What makes social intercourse free and aimless?" - This with an implicit understanding that the adjective "social" is, ideally, what makes intercourse free and aimless. In any case, the projected method was to look up terms like "social intercourse" in the many thousands of books from that era I have downloaded over the years from The Internet Archive - an invaluable online resource for this purpose, seeing as The Meaning and Meaning, which contains Malinowski's supplement, as well as innumerable other books from that era have lost their copyright and are thus fully legal to download.

I didn't get far in my search. Namely because the very first result Recoll threw up was the exact one I was so sorely missing these past years. So I had to take two weeks to read through Edward Alsworth Ross's Principles of Sociology (1920). I found answers to so many questions that I'm basically all set to write the next article. But focusing on Ross alone would not be sufficient. I've already read McDougall and Shand, who are known influences for Malinowski (Ross being, in this sense, an unknown). So in this one I'm going to revisit McDougall and see if there is still anything I could use. Unlike the previous post, this will be unstructured, stream-of-consciousness type of ordeal.

---

The nature of instinct. "Professor William James, Lloyd Morgan, and G. F. Stout as the writers from whose works I have acquired my notions as to the nature of instinct and conation and their role in mental life" (McDougall 1916: x). I'll have to read each of them in due time if I wish to get at the core of this "instinct psychology" that was so popular in the early 20th century. I know it went out of fashion very soon after Malinowski's supplement and he himself took to behaviourism like a moth to a flame.

Vagueness. Sociologists recognize the value of psychology but theirs is mostly "the vague and extremely misleading psychology embodied in common speech" (McDougall 1916: 2). This is pretty much the case with Malinowski, who is no psychologist but whose text is chalk full of contemporary psychologisms - instinct, sentiment, and sympathy - which have gone out of fashion with such force that a 21st century person reading texts with these terms will have a very dim understanding of what is going on. It doesn't help that they are used interchangeably and interconnectedly, e.g. sympathy is sometimes an instinct, sometimes a sentiment.

Psychological hedonism. This is "the doctrine that the motives of all human activity are the desire of pleasure and the aversion to pain" (McDougall 1916: 8). This is presumably operative in Malinowski's "social pleasure and self-enhancement" (PC 5.5). In the same instance McDougall noted that happiness and pleasure are not synonymous terms, to which I commented that Shand likewise distinguished joy and pleasure. It may be possible, at some date, to distinguish pleasure, joy, and happiness according to their distinctions. Not all that important for the moment but an interesting thing in itself.

Postulating strange instincts. One of the main faults of instinct psychology is also that of faculty psychology - there is seemingly no agreement as to how many of them there are. Here McDougall writes that there is a trigger-happy tendency to postulate strange instincts of all kinds, to explain any and all tendencies noticed in human conduct, "as lightly and easily as a conjurer produces eggs from a hat or a phrenologist discovers bumps on a head" (McDougall 1916: 8). That this is truly the case is easy enough to show by compiling the numerous instincts postulated by McDougall himself, Shand, Ross, but also basically any writer from the period. One curious case that frequently comes to mind is E. R. Clay's lingual instinct. How do you know if a sentence is ungrammatical? Oh, due to the lingual instinct.

Moralisation of the individual. Quoting Hastings Rashdall on "the raw material [...] of Virtue and Vice" being the same, meaning "desires which in themselves [...] are simply non-moral", McDougall makes moralisation and socialisation synonymous and sets this question up as "the fundamental problem of social psychology". The human being in itself is "a creature in which the non-moral and purely egoistic tendencies are so much stronger than any altruistic tendencies" (McDougall 1916: 18), and the society surrounding that poor creature socializes him or her towards more altruistic tendencies. For my purposes, this is a tangential question that concerns manners in Ross's treatment, particularly how there is supposedly a tricle-down (not his term, but that is what it amounts to) of manners from the higher classes of society to the lower ones. The "uneducated classes", in short, are less moralized than the "educated" classes.

Innate tendencies. Malinowski substitutes this with "innate trends" (PC 3.3). Somewhere I've gone over the etymologies of "trends" and "tendencies", which is interesting in itself. Here, specifically, is a discussion of how the innate trend of gregariousness or sociability in the human species "no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule" (PC 4.4). Thus, McDougall writes that there are "certain innate or inherited tendencies" in the human mind, which are "the essential springs or motive powers of all thought and action" (but not feeling?). These tendencies can be individual or collective, and "under the guidance of the intellectual faculties" they form and gradually develop "the character and will of individuals and of nations". Thus, "These primary innate tendencies have different relative strengths in the native constitutions of the individuals of different races" (McDougall 1916: 19). How does the universality of gregariousness or sociability remain true as a general rule? Writes McDougall: "but they are probably common to the men of every race and every age" (ibid, 19).

Instinct - a mysterious faculty. Complaining once more about the vagueness of the word "instinct", McDougall writes that it and the adjective form "instinctive" are used by contemporary writers "so loosely that they have almost spoilt them for scientific purposes" (McDougall 1916: 20-21). Interestingly, "the adjective "instinctive" is commonly applied to every human action that is performed without deliberate reflexion" (ibid, 21), which would make the exchange of words in phatic communion a form of instinctive languaging, as they "are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener" (PC 6.4), meaning that both speaking and hearing are instinctive in this particular sense. Further, McDougall writes that "the actions of animals are popularly attributed to instinct, and in this connexion instinct is vaguely conceived as a mysterious faculty, utterly different in nature from any human faculty" (ibid, 21). This is pretty much what Gregory Bateson (1969) had to say about them. To top it off, McDougall adds that these two words - "instinct" and "instinctive" - "are used with a minimum of meaning, generally with the effect of disguising from the writer the obscurity and incoherence of his thought" (ibid, 21). Well put.

The triad. I thought I can ignore it but it looks like I cannot. McDougall subscribes fully to the triad, as did numerous contemporaries. As elsewhere on this blog, I'll use (1), (2), and (3) to signify the three aspects. McDougall's particular take on it is that "The cognitive or intellectual processes" (3) "lends itself well to introspective discrimination, analysis, and description", while "the emotional" (1) and "conative" (2) "consciousness has but little variety of content, and that little is extremely obscure and elusive of introspection" (McDougall 1916: 7). Never mind that Peirce would not agree to this - thought, too, is pretty difficult to catch on the fly. What's important is that McDougall subscribes to triadism and uses it throughout. Thus, he writes that "There is every reason to believe that even the most purely instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly mental process" (McDougall 1916: 26), and breaks down "the three aspects of all mental process" as follows (ordered in the sequence I'm accustomed to):

1. affective/emotional aspects of consciousness - "a feeling in regard to" some thing or object;
2. the conative aspects of consciousness - "a striving towards or away from that object";
3. the cognitive/intellectual aspects of consciousness - "a knowing of some thing or object";

The first and third are terminologically varied (it happens) and pretty standard - how we feel about something and what we know about that thing. The second is curious because he uses the term conative, which also made it to Roman Jakobson's scheme of linguistic functions. It doesn't surprise so much anymore, as I've met earlier uses of it, e.g. amongst authors in the Aristotelian Society, but it's still neat that it's so concrete. Conation is "an inclination (such as an instinct, a drive, a wish, or a craving) to act purposefully" (Merriam-Webster), from Latin conatio, "act of attempting" and/or conari, "to attempt". Effectively it stands for "desire" in the Ancient Greek triads, perhaps even "cupidity" ("a strong feeling of wanting to have something, especially money or possessions"). Whereas in Jakobson's scheme it stands for the imperative use of language - giving the other person a command to do something - here it stands for wanting to do or attempt to do something oneself, respective of the object (to strive towards or away from it). The overall point being that how we feel about something and whether we are drawn towards it or away from it is by and large unconscious, does not lend itself easily to introspection. I hope I don't get too bogged down in triadism here because I've already written a serviceable paper (in press) about its origins and it'll be some time before I want to go into it again. To avoid it here, I'll just skip over what McDougall writes about animal behaviour (his proto-Umwelt theory).

Sustaining pleasure. McDougall holds that the principle of hedonistic psychology errs by putting the cart before the horse, in a sense. Namely, that "pleasure and pain are not in themselves springs of action, but [...] serve rather to modify instinctive processes" (McDougall 1916: 43). This would be more poignant with regard to Jakobson's phatic function but perhaps it can still be worked into Malinowski's social pleasure and self-enhancement. Thus, McDougall writes that "pleasure tend[s] to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short" (ibid 43). In Jakobson's case it is more apparent because he emphasizes "prolonging" explicitly: the parrot talks only to prolong the presence of its trainers or audience. Analogously, the selfish monologueist (the blabbermouth who goes on and on about something irrelevant) tends to sustain and prolong the exchange of words (as a mode of action) because it is pleasurable. In this scenario, the hearer, the listener who is impatiently waiting for his or her turn to talk, is, in a sense, under pain to cut the speaker short.

Fluidity of emotions. This has very little import on phatic communion specifically, aside from perhaps the interplay of sympathies and antipathies, but since McDougall holds that emotions and conations are not readily available to introspection, "the emotions are fluid and indefinable, that they are in perpetual flux and are experienced in an infinite number of subtle varieties" (McDougall 1916: 45). As I commented when first reading the book, I agree with this view of emotions rather than the modern approaches which assume that emotions are as if logical symbols that can be operated on. I'm thinking of a specific paper I tried to read. A few years ago there was a conference, "Emotions: Rationality, Morality and Social Understanding" (Tartu, 7^th-9^th September 2017), and I tried to read one of the keynote speaker's, Mary Carman's "How Emotions do not Provide Reasons to Act" (2017; 10.1007/s11406-017-9896-y), and I just couldn't make heads or tails of it: "emotions have an intentional content that is assessable for correctness". Uhm, okay...

Rigid definition. Concerning the word "emotion", McDougall sets a terminological dictum, that words such as this, which are used in popular speech "loosely and somewhat vaguely", "have to undergo a certain specialisation and more rigid definition before they are fit for scientific use" (McDougall 1916: 47). This is worth going over because I think phatic communion exhibits the opposite tendency: a term wrought for scientific use entered popular speech (it is telling that the first notable use was in the New Yorker magazine in 1925) and became more loose and vague because of it. This is of course somewhat Malinowski's own fault because his definition is not very rigid - it is full of ambiguous language and seeming self-contradictions that don't exactly aid in getting the exact sense of it.

Fear of the unfamiliar. Discussing the instinct of fear, McDougall writes that simultaneously the most interesting and most difficult to understand aspect of its mode of operation is "the unfamiliar or strange as such": "Whatever is totally strange, whatever is violently opposed to the accustomed and familiar, is apt to excite fear both in men and animals, if only it is capable of attracting their attention" (McDougall 1916: 54). The discourse surrounding this is illuminating but not very useful for my purposes. A child will become fearful from "the facial contortions or playful roarings of a familiar friend" or "thrown into a paroxysm of terror by the approach of some hideous figure that he knew to be but one of his playfellows in disguise" (ibid, 54). Ross's discussion of the fear of the stranger is more easily connected with phatic communion.

Fear and social discipline. Further removed from fear of the stranger but still very interesting is the role of fear in social discipline. McDougall writes that "fear, once roused, haunts the mind; it comes back alike in dreams and in waking life, bringing with it vivid memories of the terrifying impression" (McDougall 1916: 55). It is well known that fear can easily form impressions which stick to memory better than anything. These terrifying impressions are "the great inhibitor of action, both present action and future action, and becomes in primitive human societies the great agent of social discipline through which men are led to the habit of control of the egoistic impulses" (ibid, 55). I drew a connection with Spencer (1876: 12-13), who wrote that the social state, i.e. living in society, forsters feelings that check impulsiveness. These being, first and foremost, "the fear of surrounding individuals", followed by "the instinct of sociality, the desire to accumulate property, the sympathetic feelings, the sentiment of justice". The idea seems to be that the presence of other people implies "checks upon the prompting of the simpler passions" (whatever they may be) because we fear the people around us, we desire their company, need them to get things, have warm feelings toward them, and lastly check our behaviour so as to not act unjustly.

Sliminess. "The manners or speech of an otherwise presentable person may excite the impulse of shrinking in virtue of some subtle suggestion of sliminess" (McDougall 1916: 56). Somewhat related to phatic communion: "If you describe a person or their manner as slimy, you mean that they appear to be friendly but in a way that you find unpleasant" and "If you describe a person as slimy, you mean that the person appears to be friendly but cannot be trusted and is not sincere" (Cambridge English Dictionary). That is, sliminess is "otherwise presentable", but there is "some subtle suggestion" that the person is not really all that friendly, that the friendliness is not sincere and cannot be trusted. The illustrative sentence from the same source is symptomatic: "He was the very worst kind of slimy salesman". Salespeople naturally must act friendly but their friendliness is not an end in itself but is a means to sell you some crap. As in pseudophatic communion (Haverkate 1988).

The impulse of self-assertion. Going under the heading of "The Instinct of Pugnacity and the Emotion of Anger", McDougall left a footnote which is really interesting, relating to several aspects of phatic communion. Anger is not as universal as fear, he writes, and adds that pugnacity is less manifest in the females of some species, probably including humans. Curiously, pugnacity "occupies a peculiar position in relation to the other instincts, and cannot strictly be brought under the definition of instinct proposed in the first chapter" (McDougall 1916: 59). So it might not even be an instinct, pulling the rug from under what little Malinowski says on the subject. Rather than being a "spring" or motive force, "The condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts" (ibid, 59). In other words, getting angry is not an instinct as much as a reaction to the twarting of instincts. In the footnote, he deals with a possible counter-argument to this interpretation: "if a man strikes me a sudden and unprovoked blow, my anger is effectually and instantaneously aroused, even when I am at the moment not actively engaged in any way" (ibid, 59; footnote). In reply he writes: "To raise this objection would be to ignore my consciousness of the personal relation and my personal attitude towards the striker" (McDougall 1916: 60). What he says next is particularly important, and touches upon that social pleasure and self-enhancement very generally: "The impulse, the thwarting of which in this case provokes my anger, is the impulse of self-assertion, which is habitually in play during personal intercourse" (ibid, 60). The context almost doesn't matter. The gist here is that personal intercourse involves self-assertion. If another person intentionally strikes me, he is striking my person. This emphasis might seem odd but is explained by what follows, that "if the blow came from a purely impersonal source" (e.g. a falling branch) or if it were "quite accidental", then no offense against one's self-assertion, one's self, was intended. Getting angry at inanimate objects or pure accidents is not sensible, it would be getting irrationally angry. But when someone intends to diminish us by striking a blow, it is a valid cause for anger. Yet, the main takeaway should be that personal intercourse is a play of egos, a field for self-assertion.

Self-feeling. The next section right after the one on pugnacity is a mouthful: "The Instincts of Self-abasement (or Subjection) and of Self-assertion (or Self-display), and the Emotions of Subjection and Elation (or Negative and Positive Self-feeling)". Whew. First of all, McDougall writes that "These two instincts have attracted little attention" (McDougall 1916: 62). I don't imagine many would agree that self-abasement and self-assertion even are instincts. He is relying on Théodule Ribot's The Psychology of the Emotions (1897), which I'd place as high as Sumner's Folkways in my future readings. In any case, McDougall noted the awkward translation of "self-feeling" from the French, yet this corresponds exactly with the Estonian word (enesetunne). In any case, McDougall puts forth his own equivalents, so that subjection = negative self-feeling and elation = positive self-feeling. The latter appears to be the more important, according to McDougall, "of the first importance for the psychology of character and volition" (ibid, 62). Thus: "The instinct of self-display is manifested by many of the higher social or gregarious animals, especially, perhaps, though not only, at the time of mating" (McDougall 1916: 62). It is commonsensical enough, and everyone has probably had the experience of someone bragging and boasting in order to impress the opposite sex.

Superfluous vigour. "Superfluous" might be redundant (superfluous) in this formulation, as vigour is "exuberant and resilient strength of body or mind; vitality. substantial effective energy or force" (Dictionary.com), as in already a superabundance of strength. McDougall namely begins this discussion with an example from the animal realm, with the self-display of a horse: "The muscles of all parts are strongly innervated, the creature holds himself erect, his neck is arched, his tail lifted, his motions become superfluously vigorous and extensive, he lifts his hoofs high in air, as he parades before the eyes of his fellows" (McDougall 1916: 62). There is a certain analogy to be found in phatic communion, yet again in that curious social pleasure and self-enhancement. Namely, the excessively talkative person is, in a sense, engaged in this kind of self-display. Talking more loudly and for longer than others - the competitors - a conversation devolves into a kind of pissing contest in which the stream is not urine, but "a flow of language" (PC 5.1), the semiotic equivalent of urine.

Boasting and swaggering. The instinct of self-display is "essentially a social one, and is only brought into play by the presence of spectators" (ibid, 62-63). McDougall goes on to discuss that "Such self-display is popularly recognised as implying pride" (ibid, 63), but immediately gets bogged down with the semantics of Shand's theory of sentiments. Animals don't have pride because pride implies self-consciousness. Is it an emotion or sentiment? Pride is obviously "the name of one form of the self-regarding sentiment, and such sentiment does imply a developed self-consciousness such as no animal can be credited with" (ibid, 63). Nevertheless, we recognize in animal self-displays the germ of that positive self-feeling he calls "elation" - which is another way of putting that we recognize that self-display appears to raise the creatures sense of self, that it gives it a positive emotion. "Self-enhancement" might be just this - feeling good about oneself, more exactly raising one's sense of sense. McDougall finds this instinct also in children: "before they can walk or talk the impulse finds its satisfaction in the admiring gaze and plaudits of the family circle as each new acquirement is practiced" (McDougall 1916: 63). Later on the child starts to request the admiring gaze - Watch me to this! to adults, and Can you do this? to peers. Significantly: "A little later, with the growth of self-consciousness the instinct may find expression in the boasting and swaggering of boys, the vanity of girls" (ibid, 64). This is reminiscent of a similar remark on Ross, who explicitly relied on McDougall: "the bragging lies of boys usually relate to what they can do, while girls are more apt to lie about their possessions" (Ross 1920: 109). This is exceedingly interesting from a triadic point of view if you know that the Ancient Greek firstness concerns possessions (wealth, body), and secondness concerns actions (honor, virtue).

Insanity. I cannot let it slip that McDougall connects exaggerated self-display with insanity, marking it as "the leading symptom" of the "general paralysis of the insane". Not sure what the word "paralysis" is doing there, but whatever. The topic is much the same as phatic subjects in general: irrational creatures who talk (children, parrots, "ideots", etc.). Thus: "The unfortunate patient is perpetually in a state of elated self-feeling, and his behaviour corresponds to his emotional state; he struts before the world, boasts of his strength, his immense wealth, his good looks, his luck, his family, when, perhaps, there is not the least foundation for his boastings" (McDougall 1916: 64). We have recently seen an illustration of this in the political realm: "I'm so young. I can't believe it, I'm the youngest person" and "I am perfect physical specimen and I’m extremely young" says the diaper-wearing obese 72-year-old president, the oldest person to assume the presidency in the history of the country.

The pleasure of contact. Although I've long considered "contact" a Jakobsonian phatic trope, it would be absurd if this word did not show up here and there, though it does not in Malinowski's text (at least not in that of phatic communion, I've found him saying profound stuff about contact elsewhere). Thus, treating of parental tenderness, McDougall writes: "[Alexander] Bain taught that it is generated in the individual by the frequent repetition of the intense pleasure of contact with the young; though why this contact should be so highly pleasurable he did not explain" (McDougall 1916: 70). In my original comment I noted that this is analogous to Zuckerman's critique of Malinowski. It is understandable enough. If silence induces "unpleasant tension" (PC 4.6), talkativeness should be pleasurable; there is reportedly "social pleasure" (PC 5.5) at stake in who can talk more in a conversation; that the listener really listens is "quite essential for [the talker's] pleasure" (PC 5.6); and overall phatic communion should be "a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse" (PC 9.4). But why exactly should casual conversation be pleasant and pleasurable (question #25) is as if without a straight answer. With the subject of self-display (and self-feeling) we're as if approaching an answer (if not the answer).

Self-seeking feelings. Looking at the context, it becomes clear that the question is about "parental feeling" on the parents side. McDougall goes on by noting that some have explained the tender feelings of the parents with self-interest: parents take care of children because they expect the children to take care of them when they're in their old age: "the expectation by the parent of filial care in his or her old age" (McDougall 1916: 70). This he thinks absurd, something along the lines of the logic of Adam Smith's economic theory, an "attempt to reveal all altruism as arising essentially out of a more or less subtle regard for one's own welfare or pleasure" (ibid, 70). This view is encapsulated once again in Bain: "Tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure, and makes no inquiry as to the feelings of the beloved personality" (Bain; inMcDougall 1916: 71). The quotation continues: "It is by nature pleasurable, but does not necessarily cause us to seek the good of the object farther than is needful to gratify ourselves in the indulgence of the feeling" (ibid, 71). By this token, phatic communion is also self-seeking: casual social interaction is by nature pleasurable but (contra Mahaffy) does not aim to please but to gratify oneself in the indulgence of social pleasure.

Sympathetic pain. We cannot get around sympathy. McDougall takes it in its literal sense, which is something along the lines of co-suffering or together-suffering. Quoting Bain once again, we get the following definition: "the principle of sympathy [is] the prompting to take on the pleasures and pains of other beings, and act on them as if they were our own" (Bain; in McDougall 1916: 76). Bain immediately points out that sympathy is not a source of pleasure: "the primary operation of sympathy is to make us surrender pleasure and to incur pains" (ibid, 76). This makes it clear that he is using the word not in the sense some use sympathetic (likeable, pleasant) but in the sense of pity. Let's say someone says that their mother or father has just died. You surrender your pleasure - now you're thinking of your own dead parent(s) or their inevitable future death(s). You sympathize, you have incurred pains, are beset by a like mental anguish your conversation partner is troubled by. After a page and a half of discussing sympathy in relation with criminality, for some reason, McDougall reformulates the above-given as follows: "the sympathetic pain or pleasure we experience is immediately evoked in us by the spectacle of pain or of pleasure, and that we then act on it because it is our own pain or pleasure; and the action we take (so long as no other principle is at work) is directed to cut short our own pain and to prolong our own pleasure, quite regardless of the feelings of the other person" (McDougall 1916: 78). The example I gave above must now be specified a little: you know the acquaintance but you don't know the parent(s), haven't met them, don't know anything about them, etc. Their deaths, let's put it as cruelly as we can, you don't care about. The spectacle of pain now presented to you - I've already as if read into it that you can't feel anything for the actual deceased persons; the sympathetic pain in this case is purely reflective: another's loss makes you think about your own. Now, with Malinowski, you pour forth with "expressions of sympathy" (PC 2.3): I'm so sorry about your loss, etc. You express your condolences. What is actually going on now, and how is this "avowedly spurious on one side", as Malinowski put it? The Durkheimian reading of this situation would be that the condolence is merely expected, it is a sort of ritual, the situation calls for it. In this case we must assume that indeed the condolences do not "establish a common sentiment", as Malinowski put it - you don't know the deceased person(s) and you're in too good of a mood to start reflecting about your own relations and their eventual death(s). In this case, indeed, it is spurious. Bain and McDougall on the other hand seem to be aiming at the situation of actual sympathetic pain rather than mere expressions of sympathy: the others pain has become your pain. Now, "the action we take" (as McDougall put it), expressing condolences - is it "directed to put short our own pain [...] regardless of the feelings of the other person"? I'd like to think that the condolences are aimed to do both: to console the person who experiences loss, and stave off our own ideation about such things. I don't know what to do with this - McDougall says in several places that all this is perplexing.

Cheerful company. Here we strike upon common theme which I've captured in the saying "Misery may love company but company does not love misery". McDougall concludes the topic of sympathetically induced pain by saing that it "simply inclines us, then, to avoid the neighbourhood of the distressed and to seek the company of the cheerful" (McDougall 1916: 78). His statement follows the discussion of sympathetically induced pain - it is (psychologically) easier to avoid people in distress. Something along this line can be found in Ross, though in a very different context. While discussing "egoistic society", which "apes the manners and amenities of good-will association" but is not actually that (see sliminess, above), he writes that "Cronies who are not good fellows show their yellowness when one of them falls into trouble"; "Then he is given to understand that no one cares to see his long face or listen to his tale of woe"; "For such fair-weather friendship the refrain is, "If you're out of health or money you need n't come around."" (Ross 1920: 112-113). The difference lies in the latter case not being a sympathetic company - the "egoistic society" is only interested in self-display. A fair-weather friend is "A person who is dependable in good times but is not in times of trouble" (Dictionary.com). This is an expression, trope, and/or idea that merits further examination somewhere further down the line.

Gregarious instinct. This "is one of the human instincts of greatest social importance" (McDougall 1916: 84). I've already treated, in the first paper on Malinowski's phatic communion (in Estonian), the gregarious instinct in Wilfred Trotter's book. In Malinowski's text there is this pair of words, "convivial gregariousness" (PC 7.6), which, curiously enough, is more-or-less a synonym of cheerful company. Unlike Trotter, McDougall has given a kind of source (though it may not be the definitive source, who knows): Francis Galton reportedly gave "the classical description of the operation of the crude instinct" (ibid, 84). The South African ox "displays no affection for his fellows, and hardly seems to notice their existence, so long as he is among them" - much like the modern city-dweller according to Ross - but "if he becomes separated from the herd, he displays an extreme distress that will not let him rest until he succeeds in rejoining it", and when he does so, he is "seeking the closest possible contact with the bodies of his fellows" (ibid, 84). Long story short, the gregarious animal cares none for its fellows until he loses them, in which case its erratic behaviour evidences, when generalized, "a mere uneasiness in isolation and satisfaction in being one of a herd" (ibid, 84). In human affairs, Malinowski translates this into the realm of linguistic activity: greetings and polite phrases "are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence" (PC 4.6). Notice the similitude between "uneasiness" and "unpleasantness". In conjuction, the human being feels uneasiness not only when completely alone but also when surrounded by people who are unresponsive or do not speak a language s/he can understand. And the first clause may not even be true, as evidenced by the many people who enjoy solitude, the lonesome life, the great outdoors, and generally being away from other people: "Such was the American backwoods type who, when he could hear the sound of a neighbor's ax, reckoned "Folks are gittin' too crowded," and moved on" (Ross 1920: 100).

Imitation. McDougall connects imitation with gregariousness. I've yet to read Gabriel Tarde but the association is obvious: "the individual is born into a society of some sort and grows up in it, and the being with others and doing as they do becomes a habit deeply rooted in the instinct" (McDougall 1916: 84). I reckon this aspect will avail itself when I finally do read Tarde (or Giddins for that matter). Imitation is not explicitly present in phatic communion but this passage in McDougall has plainly influenced some other parts of Malinowski's writings: "The real rule guiding human behaviour is this: "what everyone else does, what appears as norm of general conduct, this is right, moral and proper"" (Malinowski 1922: 326-327). How being with others and doing as they do becomes rooted in the instinct, I do not know - how malleable are instincts? What are they, anyway?

Recreation. Addressing the gregarious instinct (or instinct of gregariousness), McDougall affirms that "almost all anthropologists agree that primitive man was to some extent gregarious in his habits" (McDougall 1916: 85). Likewise, "In civilised communities we may see evidence of the operation of this instinct at every hand" (McDougall 1916: 86). Except very few "highly cultivated" persons, "the one essential condition of recreation is the being one of a crowd" (ibid, 86). Not sure what the solitary recreations of the highly cultivated people are (opium?) but the point here seems to hold true: "The normal daily recreation of the population of our towns is to go out in the evening and to walk up and down the streets in which the throng is densest" (ibid, 86). Indeed, that is the normal daily recreation to this day. Likewise, people gather "to those resorts in which they are assured of the presence of a large mass of their fellows", such as all kinds of sport events (cricket, football): "Crowds of this sort exert a greater fascination and afford a more complete satisfaction to the gregarious instinct than the mere aimless aggregations of the streets, because all their members are simultaneously concerned with the same objects, all are moved by the same emotions, all shout and applaud together" (ibid, 86). This last description differs very little from the collective effervescence and union of sentiments described by Durkheim: "It is by uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object that they become and feel themselves to be in unison" (Durkheim 1915: 230).

Sociability. The gregarious instinct on the other hand "does not necessarily imply sociability of temperament" (McDougall 1916: 87). People can "live a most solitary, unsociable life" in "the thronged city" (ibid, 87). Like Galton's oxen, they are "unsociable but gregarious", that is, enjoy being in a crowd (or, on the contrary, get anxious when away from other people), but seem to hardly notice other people. On the basis of this observation McDougall postulates that the gregarious instinct is at the foundation of sociability but sociability itself "is a more complex, more highly developed, tendency" (ibid, 87). The gregarious instinct is responsible for social recreations and "the pleasure we find in attendance at the theatre, at concerns, lectures, and all such entertainments" "especially if the house is unanimous and loud in the expression of its feelings" (ibid, 87), but this does not necessarily imply that you become fast friends with all the theatre-goers present.

Another triad. In his treatment of "Some General or Non-specific Innate Tendencies" McDougall effectively expands the above triad (emotional, conative, and cognitive consciousness) into one of communication: each "involves an interaction between at least two individuals, one of whom is the agent, while the other is the person acted upon or patient" (McDougall 1916: 90-91). These three types of interaction, he writes, "are sometimes ascribed to special instincts" but "are more properly classed apart from the instinctive tendencies" (McDougall 1916: 90). Thus, he calls them "pseudo-instincts" (ibid, 90). Thus, expanding the overview of the first triad:

1. sympathy - [the communication of] affective/emotional aspects of consciousness - "a feeling in regard to" some thing or object; "an affective or emotional excitement of the agent induces a similar affective excitement in the patient";
2. imitation - [the communication of] the conative aspects of consciousness - "a striving towards or away from that object"; "the assimilation of the bodily movements of the patient to those of the agent";
3. suggestion - [the communication of] the cognitive/intellectual aspects of consciousness - "a knowing of some thing or object"; "some presentation, idea, or belief of the agent directly induces a similar presentation, idea, or belief in the patient";

Sympathy was a popular topic for decades before this, as evidenced by Susan Lanzoni's study "Sympathy in "Mind" (1876-1900)" (2009). Gabriel Tarde, as McDougall notes, brought imitation to the forefront. And suggestion was used extensively by Sigmund Freud.

Sympathy. It "generally implies a tender regard for the person with whom we are said to sympathise" (McDougall 1916: 92). This, is a "special and complex form of sympathetic emotion", "The fundamental and primitive form of sympathy is exactly what the word implies, a suffering with, the experiencing of any feeling or emotion when and because we observe in other persons or creatures the expression of that feeling or emotion" (ibid, 92). The "commonest example" in gregarious animals is "the spread of fear and its flight-impulse among the members of a flock or herd" (ibid, 92). Likewise, when "one of a pack of gregarious hunting animals, dogs or wolves, comes upon a fresh trail, sights the prey, and pursues it, uttering a characteristic yelp that excites the instinct of pursuit in all his fellows and brings them yelping behind him" (ibid, 92-93). These examples are curiously all vocal. QCQCQC

Cement. This is a common expression in my so-called "data-set", and there are some modern instances in which phatic communion is said to be such a "cement". Here it is sympathy: "Sympathy of this crude kind is the cement that binds animal societies together, renders the actions of all members of a group harmonious, and allows them to repeat some of the prime advantages of social life in spite of lack of intelligence" (McDougall 1916: 93). What's interesting about this quote is that he goes through all the pseudo-instincts in one sentence: (1) sympathy binds them together; (2) enables imitation; and (3) gives them some advantage despite the "lack of intelligence" - though few would agree today that animals lack intelligence. In any case, "cement" pops out to me because I found it in Ross, too: "The Mohammedan world still relies on religion as the cement of society and its schools teach little else than sacred lore" (Ross 1920: 596).

Careless company. McDougall repeats his discussion of how sympathetically induced pain "simply inclines us, then, to avoid the neighbourhood of the distressed and to seek the company of the cheerful" (McDougall 1916: 78; above). I'll briefly go over all the examples of "Human sympathy" he gives:

• "the wailing of other children" makes the child wail;
• "the sight of a smiling face, the expression of pleasure, provokes a smile";
• curiosity and anger "are communicated readily in this direct fashion from one child to another";
• "Laughter is notoriously infectious all through life";

Adults respond similarly: "A merry face makes us feel brighter; a melancholy face may cast a gloom over a cheerful company" (ibid, 94). All of these are illustrations of what we today would call emotional contagion. But now he goes over the argument he had with Bain above: "when we witness the painful emotion of others, when we experience sympathetic pain; when we see others terror-stricken or hear their scream of terror, we suffer a pang of fear though we know nothing of the cause of their emotion or are indifferent to it" (ibid, 94-95). The perplexity of his treatment of sympathy is reduced by this: my example was verbal, his is nonverbal, in which case we do not know that the other person's parent had died, we see only the gloomy face. Thus, "There are persons who are equisitively sympathetic in this sense of feeling with another, experiencing distress at the sight of of pain and grief, pleasure at the sight of joy, who yet are utterly selfish and are not moved in the least degree to relieve the distress they observe in others or to promote the pleasure that is reflected in themselves" (ibid, 95-96). Finally, "Their sympathetic sensibility merely leads them to avoid all contact with distressful persons, books, or scenes, and to seek the company of the careless and the gay" (McDougall 1916: 96). To Ross's "If you're out of health or money you need n't come around" I can now add that "joyous natures feel joy in all company that is not disobliging" (Shand 1914: 151). In all probability we have at hand the following sequence: Shand → McDougall → Ross. At this rate it's going to take me a whole week to get through my notes. Hence, going forward I'll skip the bits that aren't directly relevant for the purpose at hand.

Sentiment. "We owe to Mr. A. F. Shand the recognition of features of our mental constitution of a most important kind that have been strangely overlooked by other psychologists, and the application of the word "sentiments" to denote features of this kind" (McDougall 1916: 122). From my reading, Shand elaborated upon Darwin's book on emotional expressions. If it was strangely overlooked before Shand it remained overlooked after him. Shand's system was in fashion for like two minutes. Nevertheless, McDougall was one of the very few who took it seriously, and although it was said to be Malinowski's night-cubboard book, the one identifiable instance in which he did use it he missed the mark so completely it cannot be said to be anything else than utter failure. It is symptomatic that even McDougall's summary of Shand's theory of sentiments is obtuse and flowery. The definition he strikes upon goes as follows: a sentiment is "an organised system of emotional tendencies centred about some object" (ibid, 122). How very informative!

Pity and sorrow. As with pride and vanity, here's a very fine distinction. McDougall acknowledges that both are essentially painful tender emotions: "Pity in its simplest form is tender emotion tinged with sympathetically induced pain (McDougall 1916: 153). What distinguishes pity from sorrow is that the former "does not imply the existence of any sentiment of affection or love, as sorrow does, and is therefore a more transient experience, and one with less tendency to look before and after" (ibid, 153). When watching "the painful and mortal illness" of a stranger, there is sympathetically induced pain, but it is temporary because you do not love that stranger; when you're watching the same effects in a friend, on the other hand, "there is also pain arising from the prospect of the loss of the object of our sentiment of love, which makes the emotion a sorrowful one" (ibid 153). Sorrow, in a word, is "a self-regarding pain" - the suffering of a friend is personal, whereas you can pity the stranger but after he's out of sight he's out of mind.

Self-love. McDougall complains that "older moralists" have confounded self-love and self-respect. Here he gives a workable definition of self-love: it is "the self-regarding sentiment of the thoroughly selfish man, the meaner sort of egoist" so that "Such a man feels a tender emotion for himself, he indulges in self-pity; he may have little positive self-feeling and may be incapable of shame" (McDougall 1916: 161-162). In the "vampires" described by Ross we can recognize this type of self-love. To put it bluntly, the selfish man will talk and talk and talk without actually listening to others because he loves his own voice.

Active sympathy. It turns out that E. R. Clay's homogeneous sympathy is indeed comparable to McDougall's active sympathy. To reiterate, Clay distinguishes conviviality as homogeneous sympathy and pity as heterogeneous sympathy. In conviviality there is a "concurrence of emotions of the same kind" and it "enhance[s] a feeling of fellowship" (Clay 1882: 142). McDougall's active sympathy likewise "is of prime importance for the development of the sentiment of affection between equals" (McDougall 1916: 168). Heterogeneous sympathy, i.e. pity, "may be wholly one-sided" but active sympathy implies "some degree of reciprocation" (ibid, 168). Now, what makes "homogeneous" sympathy "active" consists in the following: "either party to the relation not only is apt to experience the emotions displayed by the other, but he desires also that the other shall share his own emotions; he actively seeks the sympathy of the other, and, when he has communicated his emotion to the other, he attains a peculiar satisfaction which greatly enhances his pleasure and his joy" (McDougall 1916: 168). The stuff of it is somewhat similar to the treatment of friendship (Ch. 9) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, namely that we desire good for our friends for their own sake. Here, it is only slightly different: active sympathy involves a reciprocity of feelings. Moreover, "This relation of active sympathy is apt to grow up between any two persons who are thrown much together, if they are commonly stirred to similar emotions by similar objects; and that can only be the case if they have similar sentiments" (McDougall 1916: 168). This has broad implications for phatic communion. For one, what makes phatic communion phatic communion and not, say, sympathetic communion, is that people brought together by the mere need for company are not "thrown much together" but thrown together on that particular occasion. They are not already fast friends but may become so in due time. And secondly, "similar sentiments" may pair with Malinowski's "common sentiment" (PC 2.3), though it really feels like he is misusing the word "sentiment" on that occasion.

Conclusion. I was worrying without cause. In the rest of the book there is very little that can be connected with phatic communion. There are only two exceptions: "the fact that meaningless formalities and rites continue to surround almost all ancient institutions" (McDougall 1916: 350). Yet Malinowski does not deal with "ancient institutions". And secondly there is a very good long paragraph about the role of the sex instinct in "normal social intercourse" (McDougall 1916: 400-401), but Malinowski avoids anything to do with sex, at least in his early writings, like the plague. The latter instance has value in itself, and could eventually develop into an independent study of the role of sexual attraction in social intercourse but that is "future music" as they say.

Presently it looks like McDougall, at least, is a red herring. I was lead to him and Shand by this: "Malinowski made use of the contributions of both Gestaltists and behaviorists, but his main theoretical orientation was provided by an early socio-psychological approach of McDougall and Shand" (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1959: 40-41). It may be that I am simply reading the wrong book, as Symmons-Symonolewicz refers to Malinowski's review of McDougall's Group Mind. I've noticed that Ross, too, constantly notes (in margins) the "group mind" in this or that phenomenon but never explains it. It looks like McDougall is not fully off the hook until I've also read that one, but I don't expect it to be too relevant for phatic communion due to Malinowski's persistent resentment of "collective consciousness". I looked up specific words (communion, intercourse, sentiment, vanity), but nothing of interest came up - in that book McDougall uses "intercourse" only in "between nations". So I'm approximately 80% sure that I'm in the clear with McDougall and it would be very surprising indeed if Group Mind turned out to be more important than I thought.

I'm guessing that the situation with Shand is somewhat similar, as I don't recall his book being as on phatic as I found Ross's to be. So it looks like the thesis of my upcoming paper is going to be about how the influence of the known authors, who were popular at the time (there was even a notable dispute between McDougall and Shand on the nature of instincts or sentiments, or sympathy, or who-knows-what), is much lesser and less obvious that the influence of an unknown, a wildcard, this Ross fellow, in whose book the most cryptic parts of Malinowski's phatic communion find a perfect explanation. This is, well, both surprising and deflating. I had thought for a long time that the answers were hidden somewhere in or between McDougall and Shand, and now it turns out that the answers were much more simpler, and hidden elsewhere, in a book no-one notices but which clearly was open on Malinowski's table when he wrote about phatic communion. That's the surprising part. The deflating part is that, well, what if there are more such wildcards? What if I haven't yet reached the bottom and somewhere there is a further forgotten book containing passages that resolve issues I've been wrestling with for years? Have I finally reached the bottom of the barrel or has Boris more to hide?

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Selleks, et oma psühhoanalüütiliste teooriate kriitikas kindel olla, kasutas Malinowski panuseid nii gestaltistidelt kui biheivioristidelt, aga tema põhiline teoreetiline orientatsioon põlvnes McDougalli ja Shandi varajasest sotsio-psühholoogilisest lähenemisest. Oma arvustuses McDougalli teosele The Group Mind rõhutas ta, sealjuures eitades raamatu keskset kontseptsiooni kui "jäänukit Hegelikust teooriast":

[...] McDougall oli üks esimesi, kes mõistis selgelt, et ühiskondlike uskumuste, kommete, ja käitumise küsimustes mängivad tundmus ja instinkt keskset rolli. Kaasaegsed uurimused on seda õpetust õigustanud, mõnel juhul mitte ilma liialdusteta. Ma arvan, et võin turvaliselt ennustada, et tuleviku etnoloogiat mõjutavad McDougalli seisukohad rohkem kui praegu.

Kuus aastat hiljem, raamatus Seks ja Repressioon Metsikus Ühiskonnas, ütleb Malinowski otseselt, et oluline osa tema teoreetilisest argumendist selles raamatus põhines "Shandilikel põhimõtetel", samas kui ühes oma hilisemas töös kirjeldab ta "McDougalli ja Shandi poolt edendatud tundmusteooriat" kui "kõige olulisemat panust kaasaegses psühholoogias". Pärast seda kaob see teooria vakiselt Malinowski kirjutistest, kuivõrd teda huvitab üha enam vajaduste kui tundmuste mõiste. (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1959: 40-41)