Free to protest

Sajó, András (ed.) 2009. Free to protest: constituent power and street demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing.

Győrfi, Tamás 2009. The Importance of Freedom of Assembly: Three Models of Justification. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 1-15.
The emergence of modern mass media overvalues the improtance of symbolic conduct in itself. As I quoted Justice Jackson earlier: "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." Although this proposition was true even in 1943, it gives a particularly apt characterization of present-day media-driven political discourse, where modern means of mass communication multiply the effectiveness of these kinds of messages.
Moreover, this same fact - that is, the change in the channels of communication - made it possible for political candidates to address their constitutents directly, without the mediation of parti organizations. This latter fact is responsible, to a great extent, for the personalization of electoral choice. People increasingly vote for persons instead of party platforms, and the personal qualities of candidates have become an important factor in political competition. Thus, the participants of modern mass demonstrations have a dual role. They are not only the direct addressees of the candidate's message, but also part of that message. As András Sajó writes, "the crowd symbolizes itself." In brief, the changes in representative government, as sketched above, have made mass demonstrations a particularly effective way of communication. (Győrfi 2009: 9)
Ka MVS oskus kuulub "isiklike omaduste" hulka. See, et valitakse isikuid, mitte parteiplatvorme, on näiteks Obama kandidatuuri puhul väga ilmne.

Iancu, Bogdan 2009. Balancing Emotionalism: Contemporary Implicatons of the Impact of Street Demonstrations on Third-Party Interests. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 17-40.
Madison's response, with his general denunciation of "founding [...] political calculations on arithmetical principles" and an evident distrust of crowds ("the confusion and intemperance of a multitude") strikes, on cursory reading, a vaguely Burkean chord. Yet, his uneasiness with masses is not the latter's patrician contempt for the "swinish multitude." Neither is the relates suspicion of "political arithmetic" prompted by aristocratic tradition-related concerns. After all, as readers had gleaned from the very first paragraph of The Federalist, it was for the people of America alone to prove whether "societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice."
The tenor of the argument is egalitarian and rational in the best tradition of classical constitutionalism. His foundational premise is that any large aggregation of individuals - "of whatever characters composed" - is by its very nature unstable and volatile, since collectivities are likely to be dominated by emotions and swayed by passions and sentiments rather than guided by reason and interest. They are, that is to say, prone to collective irrationality. (Iancu 2009: 18)
Konrad Lorenz pajatab samal toonil kuidas ta ise on vältinud mässe, sest teab ette, et ta võib massi hulgas kaotada oma isesuse.
After an initial 1986 split decision, a majority of the Constitutional Court declared the interpretation of Section 240, extending the term "force" to apply to mere physical presence (passive behavior), incompatible with the prohibition on analogy derived from the principle of certainty in defining the elements of crime, as contained in Article 103(2) of the Basic Law. Article 8 of the Basic Law was not directly involved in this analysis, since the judges did not discuss the "reprehensibility" element, and thus the relation between the means (blockade) and the goal of the action (politicla protest). Directly relevant to our present concerns, both decisions stressed that, whereas a sit-down blockade is a form of assembly, the constitutional leeway accorded to legislative restrictions would in such cases be very considerable.
In the 1986 decition, the contention of the petitioners that any demonstration produces a certain hinderance to the public was met with the argument that justifiable obstruction could only constitute reasonable and socially tolerable side effects, rather than the very means by which a message is advanced. This condition would not be met in cases where the obstruction is "actually intended in order to increase attention for the demonstration's concerns." In such situations, third parties are objectified, used as instruments by the protesters in order to bring their message across: "[T]he Basic Law offers wide scope for exerting an influence publicly, but [...] nobody is permitted to increase public attention through direct and intentional obstruction." One of the arguments of the petitioners was that the sit-downs should have been considered constitutionally protected forms of civil disobedience. But civil disobedience, responded the Court, could not represent "the exertion of a dramatic influence on the formation of public opinion." (Iancu 2009: 38)

Gargarella, Roberto 2009. A Dialogue on Law and Social Protests. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 61-86.
...certain conducts should not be penalized even if they affect certain individual interests, as long as they do not substantially affect social relationships... (Gargarella 2009: 64)
He also made references to "certain corrupt leaders, who usually hide their faces, and organize paid manifestations in order to carry out their sinister goals." Similarly, in the Alais decision, Justice Riggi criticized the fact that the protesters "hid their faces" behind bandannas. In his opinion, "those who hide their face [...] do so with the obvious purpose of avoiding the consequences that follow from their behavior." The latter has been a common line among opinion-makers in Argentina, who think that the fact that many protesters covered their faces with bandannas made it clear that protesters were not pursuing legitimate goals. In addition, it seems hard to deny that the protester's group, which is vast and heterogeneous, includes many corrupt leaders who colloborate with either the government or the opposition and people who participate in demonstrations only in exchange for food or clothing. For that reason, so many judges and academics came to affirm that the picketers represented, in fact, merely the 'iron arm' of particular interest groups. (Gargarella 2009: 70)
Näo varjamine demonstratsioonil. Vt. Roy Strideri õigustusi (salapolitsei ja skinheadid pildistavad ja katalogiseerivad demonstreerijate isikuid, et hiljem rünnata).
In the US,, courts have normally denied constitutional protection to demonstrations that engage in violence. It has also been very common to explore the distinction between 'pure speech,' which would refer to writings and leaflets, for example, and 'plus speech,' which would refer to pickets, parades, etc. The distinction was normally used to protect speech while leaving the 'plus' unprotected. (Gargarella 2009: 72)
To start with, one could reject the 'neat dichotomy' between 'pure speech' and 'plus speech' sometimes advanced by Supreme Court Justice. Like Harry Kalven, one could suggest that "all speech is necessarily 'plus speech.' If it is oral, it is noise and many interrupt someone else; if it is written, it may be litter." Leaflets, in this respect, are not "simply litter." They are "litter with ideas." And this is why we need to make an effort to pay attention to the message at play. (Gargarella 2009: 73)

Smilov, Daniel 2009. The Power of Assembled People: The Right to Assembly and Political Representation. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 87-104.
...expression requiring the physical presence of the individual in public places. Because of this emphasis on body language, the right to assembly has a performative element to its nature, and as such is the foundation of the theater of politics. In politics, as in other areas of social life, theater has long given way to other artistic forms: most notably the cinema and television. This transformation has affected the status of the right to assembly understood as the right to individual physical presence: it has shifted the focus towards virtual physical presence. In other words, nowadays it is more important for an individual to make an impression as physically present somewhere than to be really present in that place. To sum up, from and individual point of view, the right to assembly empowers the individual to make a statement through physical presence, although virtual presence might be really all that is needed. (Smilov 2009: 88)
These are the leaders who assemble the people without the mediation of the traditional political parties. They achieve this through their personal charisma or through appeals to issues such as nationalism, identity, personal integrity, and public morality - issues which appeal to everybody regardless of their party affiliation or ideological bend. (Smilov 2009: 92)
Definition of a political leader.

Body language and social order

Scheflen, Albert Edward; and Scheflen, Alice 1972. Body language and social order: communication as behavioral control. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall.
Thus, at present, there are in the behavioral sciences two schools of thought about bodily behavior. In the psychological school, "nonverbal" communication is considered to be the expression of emotions, as it has always been in Western thought. From the communicational point of view (held primarily by anthropologists and ethologists) the behaviors of posture, touch, and movement are studied in relation to social processes like group cohesion and group regulation.
We will see in this book that these views are not incompatible. The behaviors of human communication are both expressive and social or communicational. (Scheflen 1972: xii-xiii)
In short, animals (including man) can face each other and engage in exchanges or displays of aggressive or affiliative behavior that do not excalate to physical engagement. Elements of an action represent the entire action, whether or not it reaches consummation. Any escalating nonlanguage face-to-face interaction we call a "reciprocal." (Scheflen 1972: 6)
Ähvardus on metonüümia.
To some degree the domesticated mammals and the primates can use kinesic behavior or sounds "on purpose"; i.e., they can produce them not simply as reflex actions to environmental stimuli, but apart from the stimuli. (Scheflen 1972: 8)
Some kinds of teaching are carried out in twosome and rely primarily on demonstration. In this example, actonic, or "physical task," behaviors (M. Harris, 1964) are shown to a child. (Scheflen 1972: 22)
Kinesic behavior instructs about, qualifies, modifies, and directs the behaviors of human communication which are in progress. When we speak of communication about the ongoing communication, we use the term "metacommunication" (Bateson, 1955). The signals, cues, and monitors that influence the stream of activities will be termed "metabehaviors." These kinesic acts are different in function from the simple gestures that depict a concept and punctuate the stream of speech. (Scheflen 1972: 58-59)
In the simpler situation the participants have similar backgrounds and share a common repertoire of activity programs. When they assemble on a particular occasion at a particular place, they know pretty much what is supposed to be done. If they are old friends, relatives, or business associates they may have already established routines for their gatherings. In many cases the participants have been instructed beforehand about why they are meeting or, in more formal situations, they are provided with an agenda at the beginning of the meeting. (Scheflen 1972: 61)
A situation is defined by the place, the occasion, and the conduct of the participants - their affiliation and their style and manners. All participants contribute to knowing what behavior is expected and what program should be used. At each point of decision or option, a specific instruction signal will be given about how to proceed. (Scheflen 1972: 62)
Generally speaking, whites interpret gaze avoidance as shame, evasiveness, or submission, while Blacks interpret middle-class face-to-face gazing as a putdown or a confrontation. These differences in gaze behavior dissappear in the Black middle-class of the present generation. Eye avoidance is, as we noted earlier, also not used by the Black militant, who may quite actively use the gaze as a belligerent confrontation. (Scheflen 1972: 96)
Abusing the gaze.
Stylized, method-acting versions of emotional expressions, close distance, and touch are also used by many of the new liberal therapies. These contrived kinesic-like acts are used to simulate "real" caring or "real" anger.
The people who use these stylized kinesic behaviors know little about natural kinesic behaviors. They seem honestly to believe that they are expressing "real" emotion as opposed to what they consider the false affects of our culture. However, using and teaching these contrived systems of facial, tactile, and spacing behavior introduces a sad paradox. When we seek to approach communication in this way, we threaten to make kinesic communciation as untrustworthy as language. (Scheflen 1972: 101)
We will describe three types of monitors: (1) simple responses that are probably universal in man; (2) signals that are often elaborations of these responses in the custom of a particular tradition; and (3) self-censure. (Scheflen 1972: 105)
Sometimes the mere glance of the orienting reflex toward the source of disturbance will be sufficient to extinguish it. A man who has been scratching himself lustily sees others looking at him, for example, and he immediately stops scratching. Or a passerby sees others looking and so he stops singing or walking noisily until he has passed out of earshot. (Scheflen 1972: 106)
Gaze-control, Self-censure; blockquote.
We must not assume that kinesic censure is simply imposed by conventional people on rebels and deviants; often it is the transgressor himself who performs the monitor. (Scheflen 1972: 112)
Each person may have a multifaceted personality and a large repertoire of possible performances, but at any given transaction he is supposed to specialize. He is expected to reduce the variability of his activities and take a particular role which he is to carry out in a customary and predictable way. In this role at least, the talents, styles, inclinations, and affiliations of a particular person tend to be constant for many years or even for a lifetime. (Scheflen 1972: 126)
Fixing blame and causation stems from the practice of looking selectively and prejudicially at elements of a context and from grandly exaggerating human powers. It is widely believed in Western society that human behavior is caused by the thoughts and feelings of the behavor as though he decided on everything he did. But human behavior is not generally transcontextual. To remain this omnipotent about behavior, man often has had to add a linguistic comment to his contextual behavior to reinforce the illusion that he caused it. But the fact is that human behavior is usually a very automatic fulfillment of traditional programs or a nonconscious response to contextual change. (Scheflen 1972: 130)
If the kinesic monitors are enacted by people of sufficient status or authority, they will be effective with nothing at all being said. (Scheflen 1972: 141)


It's Not You, It's Biology

Quirk, Joe 2006. It's Not You, It's Biology: The Science of Love, Sex and Relationships. Running Press

Valdkond (umbmääraselt) evolutionary psychology, mitte sociobiology.

Childhood helplessness on korrelatsioonis parental investment-iga. Mida abitum on laps, seda rohkem peavad vanemad hoolt kandma tema eest. Inimese areng on primaatide hulgas kõige pikem, ergo inimesed peavad investeerima lastesse kõige rohkem.

Despite the sperm and egg problem that created radically different breeding strategies, our prolonged childhoods meant we evolved to form intense attachments to whomever we happen to be boffing.
Biologists call this the pair-bond. We’ve institutionalized it as marriage. The bad news is our pair-bond is designed to last for as long as it takes our offspring to reach some level of independence. Genes aren’t designed to make us happy. They design us to make more copies of themselves. To last “until death do us part,” sexual relationships must develop the natural bonds of friendship and affinity that we also evolved on the Pleistocene savanna. How lifelong friendship evolved is a subject we will explore later. (Quirk 2006: 15)
If all the men in the world dropped dead except that pimply teenager at Kinko’s, and women organized a global round-robin to make him repopulate the earth, the young man would heroically shoulder his responsibility to humanity without complaining.
A female would be less excited to be in his position. Anybody who bears the baby is going to want one prime choice for a sperm donor. And the turn-ons are different. A man is attracted to a woman’s ability to grow a baby inside her. A woman is attracted to a man’s ability to grow a baby outside him. How does he do that?
Resources. (Quirk 2006: 26)
"Female macaque monkeys are attracted to power, but even more so to signs of potential power." (Quirk 2006: 27)
"Among all hierarchical primates, females are attracted to ambitious males." (Quirk 2006: 27)
Hominids still displayed their expensive possessions - before SUVs there were seashell necklaces—but what they really wanted was respect. How much crap you owned was less important than how many people wanted to do you a favor. The real natural environment of hominids was less the savanna than the social group. If you were a hominid male, and people paid attention to you, craved our approval, shut up and listened when you spoke, that meant you were a leader. Men who commanded attention commanded access to community support. That meant a good nest-maker. (Quirk 2006: 41-42)
Even among Homo sapiens with our prolonged childhoods, male feelings will be structured to love the primary mate and children, but still be capable of supplemental sex without emotional commitment. Over the millennia, male Homo sapiens evolve to look at some women as potential wives, others as potential concubines. Women’s concern that they are still “respected” after sex suddenly sounds like their genes asking, “Am I a potential wife or concubine?”
This is the female bind. Women know that to entice men, sexual behavior is necessary. Yet they also know that if men perceive them as promiscuous, they may put them in the concubine category and not the wife category. A man’s desire to assure paternit means he is less inclined to invest his resources in a woman who is promiscuous. (Quirk 2006: 51)
Skin with fur likes to be scratched. Skin without fur likes to be caressed. Naked skin on apes is generally reserved for the genitals. Not so for Homo perverto. Our skin stays hairless and baby-like all through our breeding years. We have sexual nerves going to extraneous hot spots all over our bodies, like our inner thighs, the backsn of our knees, our toes, our nipples, our necks. This is all located a long way from our genitals. A Homo sapiens, really, is built to be one giant genital. When you see a naked woman, you’re basically seeing a giant clitoris. Men are dicks, but in a good way. (Quirk 2006: 75)
I define Murphy’s Law as the tendency for humans to notice what doesn’t go right. Let me also define Quirk’s Law: almost everything in civilization is perpetually and simultaneously going right, and nobody will ever notice. (Quirk 2006: 90)
Cross-cultural variability in beauty tastes reveals one constant: prestige is beautiful. Symbols of status change. Attraction to status does not, even if rich teens decide the true mark of status is connection with the gritty streets.Third-world men like ’em fat and fair. Industrialized men like ’em thin and tanned. Whatever symbolizes high status, we try to screw it. (Quirk 2006: 186)

Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome

Aldrete, Gregory S. 1999. Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press
...attitude [of Roman rhetoricians] is best exemplified by an anecdote that Cicero, Quintilian, and nearly every other commentator on oratory repeated concerning Demosthenes, the greatest Greek orator. When asked to list the three most important elements of rhetoric, Demosthenes replied that the single most important element of great oratory was delivery, the second was delivery, and the third was also delivery. Roman rhetoricians conventionally divided their discipline into five portions: invention (inventio), arrangement (collatio), style (elocutio), memory (memoria), and delivery (actio). Delivery itself was formally defined as having two components, voice tone and gesture. Gesture, therefore, formed an integral part of ancient oratory, which in turn was one of the most prominent features of life at Rome. (Aldrete 1999: 4)
Retoorika komponendid.
The story of Demosthenes practicing his speech with a mouth full of pebbles in order to clarify his enunciation is well known (Quint. Inst. 11.3.68). Quintilian noted that gestures could convey meaning without words and constituted an entire language that the orator can and must master in addition to his control of words. He commented that for the mute, gestures took place of language, and for the orator, they were no less valuable (11.3.65-66). Cicero too spoke of the sermo corporis, the "language of the body," which was at least as influential in swaying an audience as the words of the oration (Cic. Orat. 58). This idea in antiquity of the existence of a natural language of gesture can perhaps be found in Lucretius's account of the early days of humanity. He described an era before the development of speech when communication was accomplished nonverbally through gestures and inarticulate noises (Lucr. De Rerum Natura 5.1031). (Aldrete 1999: 5)
Peegli kasutamine kõne harjutamisel. Sermo corporis e. "kehakõne".
Although explicit literary references to exploitation of features of the environment are scarce, enough exists to indicate that Cicero and others did take advantage of the symbolic richness of their surroundings and made direct verbal and nonverbal allusions to them. A famous example that seems to have particularly impressed the ancient rhetoricians occurred in a speech by Gaius Gracchus in which he emphasized his unhappy situation by repeatedly asking, "Where can I turn?" After each repetition he suggested a destination that should have offered him refuge, such as the Capitol or his home, and then explained why he could not go there. Gracchus acted out his pleas by stretching out his arms toward each failed santuary in turn. (Aldrete 1999: 24)
The Romans seem to have believed that certain gestures constitute a natural language in which the signifiers were based not on meaning but on emotion. These comments show that a complex nonverbal vocabulary was not confined to the elites but rather that all sectors of the populace were accustomed to watching and being able to interpret such a language. (Aldrete 1999: 53)
Žestid kui loomulik keel milles tähistatav on emotsioon.
The great orator Quintus Hortensius was one of the most avid students of gesture, since he devoted more time to developing his delivery and planning his body movements than he did to composing the speech and practicing his elovution (Val. Max. 8.10.2). His theatrical delivery drew censure on the grounds that he too closely resembled an actor because he "used energetic hand gestures excessively," and on one occasion he was taunted by being addressed as Dionysia, a notable dancing girl (Aul. Gel. 1.5). (Aldrete 1999: 68)
Adding to an orator's difficulties in making himself heard was the reality that Roman audiences were not passive listeners; they actively and vocally reacted to the speaker's message as well as making known their own desires through shouts, clapping, and chants. At an oration given in the Forum (such as during a law trial) there would also have been considerable backgound noise from other trials, from people conducting business in the area, and from those passing through or simply loitering about. (Aldrete 1999: 77)
If the gestures used were unusual ones, or if the distances were great enough, even this strategy was not always successful and could result in misunderstandings. A notorious incident involving both difficulty in hearing a person and a misunderstood gesture was Julius Caesar's oration to his troops before crossing the Rubicon. The soldiers "on the fringe of the assembly, who could see better than they could hear," misinterpreted Caesar's pointing gestures toward his ring to mean that he was promising to give all of them equestrian rank in exchange for their support (Suet. Caes. 33). Similarly, during one of Tiberius Gracchus's speeches appealing to the people for help, "those who were standing farther away . . . could not hear his voice." Becoming aware of the problem, Tiberius tried to convey his message nonverbally by pointing to his head, indicating that he was in danger. This unfamiliar gesture backfired when it was misunderstood by some as being a request for a crown, an interpretation that his enemies advertised widely (Plut. T. Gracch. 19). (Aldrete 1999: 82)
In some specialized circumstances such as gladiatorial combats, nonverbal exchanges formed an important part of the performance itself. The most notable of these dialogues was the much copied "thumbs up" or "thumbs down" gesture used to determine whether a beaten gladiator would be slain. Hollywood has decreed that the "thumbs down" gesture meant death for the gladiators and "thumbs up" life, but the ancient sources, while confirming that some gesture involving turning the thumbs was used, are vague concerning the precise nature of this gesture. Indeed it may be that the "thumbs down," rather than denoting death, actually was the crowd's way of calling for the victorious gladiator to drop his sword and spare his vanquished foe. (Aldrete 1999: 90-91)
The English word acclamation has acquired connotations of approval and praise, but the Latin word from which it is derived, acclamatio, simply means any shouted comment, whether positive or negative. Similarly, the first definition of the verb acclamo is "to shout," the second is "to protest," and only the third is "to shout approval, or applaud." The following discussion demonstrates that the Romans used acclamations for all of these purposes, and that sometimes even a single acclamation could contain elements of both praise and criticism. Thus, in the following chapters the term acclamation will be used in its original sense to denote any shouted comment. (Aldrete 1999: 101)
For the urban plebs to a much greater degree than for the other groups, however, acclamations became the primary means of communication and interaction with the emperor. The numerous occasions at which acclamations could be employed facilitated with various areas of the city of Rome offered plentiful opportunities for interaction between emperor and plebs. (Aldrete 1999: 102)
The subsequent discussion focuses on this most flexible use of acclamations, those directed at the emperor by the urban plebs. On these occasions the basic forms that acclamations took were, in increasing order of complexity, simple applause; rhythmic applause of various types; individual shouted words or titles; brief formulaic phrases; longer, often rhythmic sentences; and, finally, entire series of phrases that were chanted or even sung. These types of acclamation were used alone or in any combination and could be delivered by any number of persons, from a single individual to tens of thousands. The urban plebs used acclamations for three basic purposes: to greet or praise, to react to a speaker, and to criticize or petition. Acclamations possess several unique features that made them versatile forms of communication between emperor and urban plebs. The existence of a body of well-known acclamation formulas and the rhythmic nature of many of the acclamation chants themselves are the two most significant of these chracateristics. The rhythmic and formulaic nature of acclamations made it easy for large numbers of people not only to deliver them in unison, but also spontaneously yo vary and improvise upon the standard formulas. (Aldrete 1999: 103)
In addition to its role in greeting the arrival or entrance of the emperor, applause could also be used to praise a popular emperor. If, for example, the emperor's name was mentioned by a public official, a well-disposed crowd would often spontaneously spring to its feet and applaud. Such a reaction could also occur even when the emperor's name was only implied, as in the well-known incident when an actor in a comedy at which Augustus was present spoke a line about a "good and benevolent lord" (O cominum aequum et bonum), and the crowd immediately jumped up and applauded enthusiastically (Suet. Aug. 53). These actions were so clearly identified as a mark of favor that they could be used to praise others, so that when a line from Virgil was recited in the course of a theatrical performance at which he was present, the spectators rose to their feet and applauded, giving "homage to the poet, just as they would have done to the emperor himself" (Tac. Dial. 13.2). (Aldrete 1999: 107)
Vrd. Nõukogude Liidu ritualistlike ürituste transkriptsioonides esinevate kirjetega "palav applaus Leninile" jne.
Not only was the emperor expected to attend, bu thtere were expectations about how he should behave. Many of these expectations revolved around the idea that the emperor and the audience were coparticipating in the performance. At the games, the emperor and the people were psychologically linked by both being spectators of the performance. More than this, however, they joined together to take an active role in directing the performance, particularly in those entertainments involving violence. The most ibvious form that this interaction took was at gladiator games when the emperor and the spectators played a role in deciding the outcome of the combats. When a wounded fighter dropped his shield and raised a finger of his left hand in submission, the people made gestures and shouted to indicate whether the unfortunate man should be spared or dispatched. Although the decision was the emperor's, only rarely would he disagree with the consensus of the crowd. The awards given to the victor were also determined by an exchange of gestures and mutual consultation between the emperor and the rest of the crowd. (Aldrete 1999: 120)
Both acclamations and gestures seem to have acquired greater prominence and complexity during the transition from republic to empire. Between Cicero and Quintilian, the nonverbal vocabulary available to orators became much more elaborate and the conventions of acceptable behavior grew broader so that orators were expected to gesticulate more frequently and more vigorously. Acclamations directed at the emperor grew out of the informal applause accorded to popular individuals as a token of approval whenever they appeared in public, but rapidly became a central facet of imperial identity. (Aldrete 1999: 166)
  • Key, Mary R. 1982. Nonverbal Communication Today: Current Research. New York: Mouton
  • Davies, M. and J. Skupien eds. 1982. Body Movement and Non-Verbal Communication: An Annotated Bibliography, 1971-1981. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
  • Bull, Peter 1983. Body Movement and Interpersonal Communication. London: John Wiley and Sons

Art Must Be Beautiful

Talvistu, Tiiu (ed.) 2011. Art Must Be Beautiful. Selected Works by Marina Abramović. Tartu: Greif

Mitme nädala öökapilugemine. Iga artikkel on oma maailmast, eri riikide kunstnike ja kuraatorite sulest. Minu jaoks põnevamad köite teisel poolel. "SKC as Space of Production" sisaldab näiteks sellist tähelepanekut Abramovići kunagise kultuurikeskuse tegevuste kohta:
One of the most interesting aspects of SKC-as-cultural-experiment was the fact that it dismissed the binary opposition of "institutional vs. self-organized" as the demarcation line, which is often the main epistemological tool of the contemporary interpretation of cultural histories in the real-socialist countries. Instead, SKC offered another model of production, which can be presented through the formula of self-organization - institution - self-organization. This formula underlines the fact that the process of self-organization of the generation-in-protest fueled the initiation of this particular institution, and that a self-organizational modus operandi was continually reproduced in various practices and projects developing within the "contested institutional roof". (Vesić 2011: 43)
Iseorganiseerumine läbi institutsiooni? Ainult endise Jugoslaavia kunstiringkonnas, yo!

Esmakordselt lugesin midagi Kiwa sulest. Sellised väljendid nagu "finding and consuming new meanings - or maximizing the cognitive intake" on parasjagu lotmaniaanlikud. Isegi tema lühikirjelduses on selline sõnapaar nagu "personal semiosphere", mis on... eem... ilmselt... see (Lotmani sõnutsi) marginaalne juhtum mil semiosfääri piirid on vastavuses individuaali nahaga.

Kokkuvõttes tribüüt Marina Abramovićile ja arutlus kunstniku keha kohalviimismisest (the artist is present). Talle pühendatud näitusel Art Ist Kuku Nu Ut-is Abramovići keha kohal ei viibinud.

P.S. Jah, Kristel, Abramović on tõepoolest oma rindu kirurgiliselt suurendanud.

Anarchism and Its Aspirations

Milstein, Cindy 2010. Anarchism and Its Aspirations. AK Press

There are many different though often complementary ways of looking at anarchism, but in a nutshell, it can be defined as the striving toward a "free society of free individuals". This phrase is deceptively simple. Bound within it is both an implicit multidimensional critique and an expansive, if fragile, reconstructive vision.
To deepen this definition, a further shorthand depiction of anarchism is helpful: the ubiquitour "circle A" image. The A is a placeholder for the ancient Greek word anarkhia - combining the root an(a), "without," and arkh(os), "ruler, authority" - meaning the absence of authority. More contemporarenously and accurately, it stands for the absence of both domination (mastery or control over other) and hierarchy (ranked power relations of dominance and subordination). The circle would be considered an O, a placeholder for "order" or, better yet, "organization," drawing on Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's seminal definition in What Is Property? (1840): "as man [sic] seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy." The circle A symbolizes anarchism as a dual project: the abolition of domination and hierarchical forms of social organization, or power-over social relations, and their replacement with horizontal versions, or power-together and in common - again, a free society of free individuals. (Milstein 2010: 12-13)
"circle A" on A-ringi allikas
Like all socialists, anarchists concentrated on the economy, specifically capitalism, and saw the laboring classes in the factories and fields, as well as artisans, as the main agents of revolution. They also felt that many socialists were to the "right" or nonlibertarian side of anarchism, soft on their critique of the state, to say the least. These early anarchists, like all anarchists after them, saw the state as equally complicit in structuring social domination; the state complemented and worked with capitalism, but was its own distinct entity. Like capitalism, the state will not "negotiate" with any other sociopolitical system. It attempts to take up more and more governance space. It is neither neutral nor can it be "checked and balanced." The state has its own logic of command and control, of monopolizing political power. (Milstein 2010: 22-23)
võimusuhete struktureerimine
Anarchist principles affirmed humanity's potential to meet everyone's needs and desires, via forms of nonherarchical cooperative and collective arrangements. As we'll see below, adding the prefix "self-" to words that other socialists generally fail to interrogate embodies the grounding for ethical project of creating fully articulated social selves, who strive with others for a society of, for, and by everyone. The early anarchists thus began our ongoing efforts to bring forth self-determination and self-organization, self-management and self-governance, as the basis for a new society. (Milstein 2010: 26-26)
autkommunikatsioon kui anarhistlik organiseerimisviis
Forms of Self-Organization
Here's where we put the icing on the cake: prefigurative forms of self-organization, in all their innovative variety. Fortunately, though, everyone gets to eat the cake. Anarchism's reconstructive visions practice how to reorganize soviety. They put direct action into, well, action.
Direct action takes two forms. Its "positive" or proactive form is the power to create. People do things now the way that they want to see them done, increasingly, in the future, without representative and vertical forms of power. They ignore the "higher" powers, and flex their own collective muscles to make and implement decisions over their lives. The "negative" or reactive form of direct action, the power to resists, uses direct means to challenge the bad stuff - for example, a general strike to stop a war. Both types of direct action are useful, of course. They also go hand in hand. Students, faculty, and support staff at a university, for instance, can occupy an administration building to protest budget cuts and at the same time utilize directly democratic processes to self-determine their course of action (which may then embolden the occupiers to want an altogether different form of education). (Milstein 2010: 70)
produktiivne võim otsese tegevuse mõttes
If freedom is the social aim, power must be held horizontally. We must all be both rulers and ruled simultaneously, or a system of rulers and subjects is the only alternative. We must all hold power equally in our hands if freedom is to coexist with power. Freedom, in other words, can only be maintained through a sharing of political power, and this sharing happens through political institutions. Rather than being made a monopoly, power should be distributed to us all, thereby allowing all our varied "powers" (of reason, persuasion, decision making, and so on) to blossom. This is the power to create rather than dominate. (Milstein 2010: 106)
How can everyone come together to make decisions that affect society as a whole in participatory, mutualistic, and ethical ways? In other words, how can each and every one of us - not just a counterculture or a protest movement - really transform and ultimately control our lives and that of our communities?
This is, in essence, a question of power - who has it, how it is used, and to what ends. To varying degrees, we all know the answer in relation to current institutions and systems. We can generally exlain what we are against. That is exactly why we are protesting, whether it is agianst capitalism or climate change, summits or war. What we have largely failed to articulate, however, is any sort of response in relation to liberatory institutions and systems. We often can't express, especially in any coherent and utopian manner, what we are for. Even as we prefigure a way of making power horizontal, equitable, and hence, hopefully an essential part of a free society, we ignore the reconstructive vision that a directly democratic process holds up right in front of our noses. (Milstein 2010: 112)

Anarchism and other essays

Goldman, Emma 2003 [1969]. Anarchism and other essays; with a new introduction by Richard Drinnon. New York: Dover

Väga soovituslik lugemine igaühele, kes otsivad anarhismi ja feminismi seost. Goldmani esseid on meeldiv ja lihtne lugeda, hoolimata kirjutamise ajast (~1917, peaaegu sajand tagasi). Hea kõnepidamine teeb ka hea kirjutaja. Pean ära märkima, et internetis leiduvad viited sellele raamatule märgivad ilmumisaastaks ainult copyright-i aastat (1969), kuigi TÜ eetikakeskuse riiulil oleval koopia on (ühe ainsa allika järgi) pärit 2003. aastast. Asja kallale:
"The charge that Anarchism is destructive, rather than constructive, and that, therefore, Anarchism is opposed to organization, is one of the many falsehoods spread by our opponents. They confound our present social institutions with organization; hence they fail to understand how we can oppose the former, and yet favor the latter. The fact, however, is that the two are not identical.
The State is commonly regarded as the highest form of organization. But is it in reality a true organization? Is it not rather an arbitrary institution, cunningly imposed upon the masses?
Industry, too, is called an organization; yet nothing is farther from the truth. Industry is the ceaseless piracy of the rich against the poor.
We are asked to believe that the Army is an organization, but a close investigation will show that it is nothing else than a cruel instrument of blind force.
The Public School! The colleges and other instutions of learning, are they not models of organization, offering the people fine opportunities for instruction? Far from it. The school, more than any other institution, is a veritable barrack, where the human mind is drilled and manipulated into submission to various social and moral spooks, and thus fitted to continue our system of exploitation and oppression.
Organization, as we understand it, however, is a different thing. It is based, primarily, on freedom. It is a natural and voluntary grouping of energies to secure results beneficial to humanity.
It is the harmony of organic growth which produces variety of color and form, the complete whole we admire in the flower. Analogously will the organized activity of free human beings, imbued with the spirit of solidarity, result in the perfection of social harmony, which we call Anarchism. In fact, Anarchism alone makes non-authoritarian organization of common interests possible, since it abolishes the existing antagonism between individuals and classes. Uner present conditions the antagonism of economic and social interests results in relentless war among the social units, and creates an insurmountable obstacle in the way of a co-operative commonwealth.
There is a mistaken notion that organization does not foster individual freedom; that, on the contrary, it means the decay of individuality. In reality, however, the true function of organization is to aid the development and growth of personality.
Just as the animal cells, by mutual co-operation, express their latent powers in formation of the complete organism, so does the individual, by co-operative efforts with other individuals, attain his highest form of development.
An organization, in the true sense, cannot result from the combination of mere nonentities. It must be composed of self-conscious, intelligent individualities. Indeed, the total of the possibilities and activities of an organization is represented in the expression of individual energies.
It therefore logically follows that the greater the number of strong, self-conscious personalities in an organization, the less danger of stagnation, and the more intense its life element.
Anarchism asserts the possibility of an organization without discipline, fear, or punishment, and without the pressure of poverty: a new social organism which will make an end to the terrible struggle for the means of existence, - the savage struggle which undermines the finest qualities in man, and ever widens the social abyss. In short, Anarchism strives towards a social organization which will establish well-being for all. (Goldman 2003 [1969]: 34-36)
A natural law is that factor in man which asserts itself freely and spontaneously without any external force, in harmony with the requirements of nature. For instance, the demand for nutrition, for sex gratification, for light, air, and exercise, is a natural law. But its expression needs not the machinery of government, needs not the club, the gun, the handcuff, or the prison. To obey such laws, if we may call it obedience, requires only spontaneity and free opportunity. That governments do not maintain themselves through such harmonious factors is proven by the terrible array of violence, force, and coercion all governments use in order to live. Thus Blackstone is right when he says, "Human laws are invalid, because they are contrary to the laws of nature."(Goldman 2003 [1969]: 58)
Lühidalt: riik ja loomuseadused ei ole harmoonias.
The political superstition is still holding sway over the hearts and minds of the masses, but the true lovers of liberty will have no more to do with it. Instead, they believe with Stirner that man has as much liberty as he is willing to take. Anarchism therefore stands for direct action, the open defiance of, and resistance to, all laws and restrictions, economic, social, and moral. But defiance and resistance are illegal. Therein lies the salvation of man. Everything illegal necessitates integrity, self-reliance, and courage. In short, it calls for free, independent spirits, for "men who are men, and who have a bone in their backs which you cannot pass your hands through." (Goldman 2003 [1969]: 65)
Anarhism on otsene tegevus võtta vabadust nii palju kui soovid, hoolimata seadustest ja piirangutest.

Weapons = implements of civilized slaughter. (lk 136)

Signs, language and behavior

Morris, Charles 1949. Signs, language and behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Kas on erinevusi Peirce`i ja Morrise termini „interpretant“ interpretatsioonis?
Jah, on küll. Sama erinevus, mille üle Jerzy Pelc vaagib Semiotica kõige esimeses osas ja mida mainitakse ka Charles W. Morrise wikipedia leheküljel: Peirce'i tõlgend oli idee või kontsept, Morrise interpretant aga kalduvus (disposition) kuidagi käituda või reageerida. Morrise pragmaatiline tõlgendus interpretandist on paljuks kasulikum kui Peirce'i oma, sest on olemuselt positivistlik - kui märk kutsub 70% kordadel esile sama reaktsiooni, on selle tõlgend vaadeldud organismis 70% usaldusväärne. Saussure'l peab tähistaja ja tähistatava vaheline suhe kristalliseeruma, Peirce'l märgiseos kolme osapoole vahel muutuma harjumuseks, Morrisel aga interpretant olema usaldusväärne (ja erinevalt esimesest kahest on Morris esitanud midagi, mis on vähemalt ideaalis - koera ja söögialarmi ning inimese ja ümbersõidu puhul - mõõdetav).
Morrise Signs, Language, and Behavior on seni parim (minu eesmärkideks sobivaim) märgiteooria millega kokku olen puutunud. Teda on ka selle tõttu hea lugeda, et mõtlejad kellele mu seminaritöö muidu toetub (Birdwhistell, Cicourel jne) on ise Morrist lugenud ja võib-olla mingil määral ka kasutanud. Juri Lotmaniga on sama lugu, Morrise arutlused post-language sümbolitest on justkui üks-ühele arutelu autokommunikatsioonist, senimaani kuniks Morris eristab selgete sõnadega mõtlemist ja sümbolitega opereerimist, aga Lotman seda nii selgelt ei tee, lihtsalt nendib, et see on marginaalne juhtum vms.

P.S. Pragmaatilised reeglid sätestavad interpreteerijatele tingimused, millal märgikandja on märk.

...statesmen seeking to uphold or improve the basic symbols which sustain the social structure; propagandists attempting to discern the ways in which language may be used to direct social change. (Morris 1949: 1)
Huvi märkide vastu. Poliitikud huvituvad selleks, et ühiskonna struktuuri säilitada või parendada, propagandistid selleks, et suunata ühiskonna muutumist.
The proposed formulation also helps to resolve the ambiguities in the various "context" theories of signs. It is true that a sign can be described only by reference to the specific way it functions in specific situations. But since the situation in which the sign appears is generally a very different situation from that in which it does not appear, it is somewhat misleading to suggest that a sign signifies the missing part of a context in which it formerly appeared. The fact that a sign functions as a substitute for an absent something in the control of behavior keeps the "substitutional" emphasis of the context formulations without suggesting that the situation in which the sign does and does not appear are otherwise identical. (Morris 1949: 16)
Märki saab kirjeldada ainult viitega spetsiifilisele viisile kuidas see funktsioneerib kindlas olukorras. Aga kuna situatsioonid milles märk ilmub, on väga erinev situatsioonidest milles sama märk ei ilmu, on eksitav öelda, et märk tähistab puuduvat osa kontekstist millesse see varem kuulus.
Any organism for which something is a sign will be called an interpreter. The disposition in an interpreter to respond, because of the sign, by response-sequences of some behavior-family will be called an interpretant. Anything which would permit the completion of the response-sequences to which the interpreter is disposed because of a sign will be called a denotatum of a sign. A sign will be said to denote a denotatum. Those conditions which are such that whatever fulfills them is a denotatum will be called a significatum of the sign. A sign will be said to signify a significatum; the phrase "to have signification" may be taken as synonymous with "to signify."(Morris 1949: 17)
Morrise märgiteooria põhimõisted.
To the degree that a sign has the same signification to a number of interpreters it is an interpersonal sign; to the degree that this is not so the sign is a personal sign. The interpreters for whom a sign is interpersonal may be called an interpreter-family. A given sign may be in principle entirely interpersonal or entirely personal; most signs are neither. Since it is always possible in principle to find out what a sign signifies for a given interpreter, and so make it interpersonal, no sign is inherently personal; but in actual practice many signs are highly personal - the signs of the schizophrenic provide extreme examples. It may be remarked that we should not necessarily classify a note which a person writes to himself for reading at a later time as interpersonal; such a note would be personal by the criterion proposed if the signs were signs to him alone, and interpersonal if this were not the case even though no one else read the note. (Morris 1949: 21)
Idiosünkraatne = personal. Social = interpersonal. Subculture = interpreter-family.
If the driver in the car had been told to turn to the right at the third intersection, he might have held up three fingers of his right hand until he reached the intersection in question, or might have continued repeating the instructions to himself; such action on his part would be a sign to himself signifying what the original spoken words signified, and such sign would guide his behavior in the absence of the spoken signs. (Morris 1949: 25)
Siin on Morris tahtmatult toonud suurepärase näite Meadi mõistest self-indication. Märkus: 6. Post-Language Symbols (lk 46-49) on päris otseselt autokommunikatsiooni kohta.
Signals, on this view, "announce their objects," while symbols lead their interpreters to "conceive their objects." (Morris 1949: 50)
Signaalid teadustavad oma objekti, sümbolid panevad panevad objekti ette kujutama. Ehk: signaalid hüüavad välja oleva, sümbolid kutsuvad kujutluses välja millegi, mis võib ja võib mitte olla.
Organisms, given certain needs, prefer certain objects to others. Such preferential behavior is a widespread and almost universal characteristic of living systems. So it is natural that it should be reflected in sign-behavior. Itis believed that such preferential behavior gives the behavioral clue for the interpretation of appraisive signs. We have previously defined an appraisor as a sign which signifies to its interpreter a preferential status for something or other, that is, which disposes its interpreter to favor or react unfavorably toward this something or other.
If we call the preferential status which objects have in behavior valuata, then appraisors may be said to signify valuata. The appraisor is a sign since it exercises a control over behavior of the sort which certain objects would exercise if they were present. (Morris 1949: 79)
Valikulisus või eelistatus on iseloomulik elavatele süsteemidele (organismidele). Appraisor - hinnangumärk.
In the informative use of signs, signs are produced in order to cause someone to act as if a certain situation has certain characteristics. If food is present in a certain place, then to produce signs so that a dog will behave to the given pan as containing food would be to use these signs informatively, that is, to inform the dog that food was in the pan in question. Signs may be used by one organism to inform other organisms or to inform itself, as where one makes a note of something observed in order to inform oneself at a later time of what was observed. In the informative use of signs the producer of a sign seek to cause the interpreter to act as if some present, past, or future situation had such and such characteristics. (Morris 1949: 97)
self-informing, mnemootiline autokommunikatsioon.
Through signs the individual directs his behavior with reference to things and situations which he may never have encountered and never can encounter, and yet the evidence which gives the ultimate control of knowledge must always be found in situations in which he himself behaves. (Morris 1949: 111)
Märgid annavad juhiseid kuidas toimida tundmatutes olukordades.
The term 'communication,' when widely used, covers any instance of the establishment of a commonage, that is, the making common of some property to a number of things. In this sense a radiator "communicates" its heat to surrounding bodies, and whatever medium serves this process of making common is a means of communication (the air, a road, a telegraph system, a language). For our purposes 'communication' will be limited to the use of signs to establish a commonage of signification; the establishment of a commonage other than that of signification - whether by signs or other means - will be called communization. A person who is angry may be the occasion for another person becoming angry, and signs may or may not be the means of establishing the commonage: this is an instance of communization. Or a person who signifies anger may by the use of signs cause another person to signify anger without necessarily becoming angry: this is a case of communication. The user of signs who effects communication is the communicator and the organism in which the sign-process is aroused by the signs of the communicator is the communicatee. The communicatee may be the same organism which is the communicator, as when one writes a note to oneself to be read at a later time. The signs used are the means of communication and the signification made common by these means is the content of communication. (Morris 1949: 118)
Sõna communization levinuim tähendus on "kommunismi pööramine". Levinuim sõna Morrise tähenduse jaoks on commonalization.
An age in which printing, photography, painting, film, and television have an important place will call for a semiotic which has not neglected the visual sign; music lovers will rightly ask the sign status of musical sounds; and students of human nature will seek insight into the role of those signs which play such a prominent place in "thinking" and yet which are not spoken or heard. A comprehensive semiotic must then do justice to non-vocal signs.
One of the advantages of our basic terminology lies in its generality: it allows us to talk of all signs, whether language or non-language, and whether drawn from auditory, visual, tactile, or proprioceptive stimuli. So in dealing with non-vocal signs no new principles are involved. (Morris 1949: 190)
Mind huvitavadki mittevokaalsed märgid: muusika/helid ja kehad.
A light which signals food to a dog is as "primitive" as a sound signal; and interpersonal relations are as much determined by the signs gained by the sight of other persons (manner of dress, gesture, facial movements, physical appearance) as by the sounds he utters. (Morris 1949: 191)
Mehrabiani tees kokkuvõtlikult.

4. Effects of Personal Post-Language Symbols (lk 196-198) on autokommunikatsooni jaoks eriliselt olulised, vt self-conditioning. Veel autokommunikatsiooni:
One indication of this is the special form of communication in which an individual communicates with himself (that is, the self of one moment communicates with the self at another moment). This occurs not merely in the writing of diaries or the devices by which the present self acts to remind the future self of something, but takes place in a peculiarly important form in the production of a work of art. For in such a production the artist throughout the process is stimulating himself by the stimuli he produces, and at the end of the process in particular he stands over against his work as a member of his audience [Lotmani näide: luuletaja loeb iseenda trükist]. There is self-communication in so far as the self is interpreter of what it signified as sign producer; there is social communication insofar as the communication involves interpreters other than the artist. (Morris 1949: 213)
Paberi-ja-pastaka märkmed:
  • an organism can respond to other organisms and itself (lk 18). self-observation
  • there are no signs which signify without dispositions to respond (that is, without interpretants) (lk 19). Tõlgenditeta ei ole märke.
  • A sign may, of course, signify without there being a formulation of what it signifies (lk 20). Enamus mitteverbaalseid märke.
  • A complete iconic sign would always denote, since it would itself be a denotatum (lk 23). Täielikult ikooniline märk on loomuomane märk. Lotmanil ka metafoori üks võimalusi.
  • Signals lose their meaning apart from context (lk 24). Sümbolid on plurisituatsioonilised, signaalid mitte.
  • Social behavior (minimal sense) = organisms provide other organisms with reciprocal stimuli (lk 24).