Body Politics

Henley, Nancy M. 1977. Body Politics: power, sex and nonverbal communication. Drawings by D. Patrick. Englewood Cliggs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Lingid: Esteri märksõnad: kehakeel, keha, võim, sugupooled, mitteverbaalne kommunikatsioon, seksuaalsus, sotsiaalne käitumine, feminism;
Subjects on Google Books: Psychology › General; Body language; Nonverbal communication; Nonverbal communication (Psychology); Psychology / Cognitive Psychology; Psychology / General;
A feminist analysis of body language as a major means of nonverbal communication used by persons in power, primarily men, to maintain a social hierarchy.

Sissejuhatuses soovitab järgida Albert Schefleni töid ja nimetab eeskujudena Erving Goffmani, Ray Birdwhistelli ja USA sotsiaalpsühholoogi Roger Browni. Henley kasutas ka Albert Mehrabiani , Edward Tichenell Halli, Desmond Morrise, Adam Kendoni, Mary R. Key ja Michael Argylei töid (rääkimata kohustuslikust Charles Darwini mainimisest).
Ka neid, kes on minu järjekorras: Robert Sommer (Personal Space, 1969), Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (Love and Hate: The Natural history of Behavior Patterns, 1970), Ashley Montagu (Touching: The Human Significance of the Skin, 1971), David Efron (Gesture, Race and Culture, 1972) ja Robert Rosenthal (The PONS Test, 1974). Naljakas on see, et pärast radikaalse ökoloogia (Murray Bookchin) ja radikaalse geograafia (anarhistlik geograafia!) vaatan imestusega, et Nancy Henley on ise avaldanud artikli "The Politics of Touch" kogumikus nimega Radical Psychology (1973). Mainitudd on ka Gerald I. Nierenbergi ja Henry H. Calero raamatut How to Read a Person Like a Book (1973), millel põhines Tuurandi Ülekuulatava kehakeele järgimine. Henley mainib, et Nierenberg ja Calero kogusid mahukaid andmeid nii, et kaasasid oma publiku uurimisse, hinnates tähenduslikke ja tähendusetuid liigutusi lootuses avastada "kehakeelekogukonnad" (Morrise language-family). See paneb nende tööd küll teise pilguga vaatama (ja kui selleni jõuan, siis ka lugema), aga ka Henley leiab, et nende andmed ei ole karvaväärtki usaldusväärsed. Siis kui kolm neljandikku raamatust on juba läbi, astuvad mängu Tomkins, Izard, Ellsworth ja Exline.
Kasulikud viited:
This book is concerned not with sex or gender, but power. It attempts to demonstrate that the observed "sex differences," "race differences," and "class differences" in nonverbal behavior may be traced to differences in power; and that these are learned differences which serve to strenghten the system of power and privilege that exists. (Henley 1977: 2)
Ehk Henleyt huvitas samuti mitteverbaalse suhtlemise suhe võimusuhetesse (nonverbal communication in relation with social power).
But there is another side to interpersonal relationship, one that affects us greatly but which we're encouraged to pay little attention to. This is the element of status, power, dominance, superiority - the vertical dimension of human relations, signalled by our spatial metaphor of "higher-ups," "underlings," "being over," and "looking up to" others. Friendship relations make up the horizonal dimension, and the corresponding spatial metaphor refers to closeness, "being near" and "being distant." The power relation is the "other" dimension in the study of nonverbal communication: important as it is in ordering human interaction, it has received little study from investigators of nonverbal behavior. (Henley 1977: 2)
This "trivia" of everyday life - touching others, moving closer or father away, dropping the eyes, smiling, interrupting - are commonly interpreted as facilitating social intercourse, but not recognized in their position as micropolitical gesture, degenders of the status quo - of the state, of the wealthy, of authority, of all those whose power may be challenged. Nevertheless these minutiae find their place on a continuum of social control which extends from internalized socialization at one end to sheer physical force at the other.
In front of, and defending, the political-economic structure that determines our lives and defines the context of human relationships, there is the micropolitical structure that helps maintain it. This micropolitical structure is the substance of our everyday experience. The humiliation of being a subordinate is often felt most painfully when one is ignored or interrupted while speaking, towered over or forced to move by another's bodily presence, or cowed unknowingly into dropping the eyes, the head, the shoulders. Conversely, the power to manipulate others' lives, to take graft, price gouge, or plan the bombing of far-off peasants is conferred in part by others' snapping to attention in one's presence, their smiling, fearing to touch or approach, their following one around for information and favors. These are the trivia that make up the batter for that great stratified waffle that we call our society. (Henley 1977: 3)
Mikropoliitilised žestid? Milline võrratu nimetus! Mikropoliitilise struktuuri asemel saab kõneleda mikropoliitilisest süsteemist või sfäärist, kihistusest; mikropoliitilistest protsessidest vms.
Nonverbal cues, as Haley and Goffman have illustrated, play an extremely important and complex role in the maintenance of the social order: as signs and symbols of dominance, as subtle messages of threat, as gestures of submission. (Henley 1977: 5)
Minul signs of authority. Subtle võib siin olla metonymical.
Järgmisel leheküljel nöögib kehakeeleõpikuid, vihjab sellele, et verbaalset keelt õpitakse koolis, aga mitteverbaalset suhtlemist peab õppima informaalselt eluujäämise nimel (minul through self-communication).
How important is power in our daily lives? We may think of power as orders, threats, and coercion, and see little evidence of its use on or by us. But as sociologist George Homans has pointed out, the noncoercive form of power is probably far more common than the coercive. These noncoercions of everyday life are often, as we shall see, in the form of gestures which signal power and assert dominance. (Henley 1977: 19)
Signs of power and power of signs.
In most cases in our experience, power and status are confounded, i.e., a person who has one is likely to have the other. Power is the concern fo this book, and a more interesting topic of study in general, but it's harder for social scientists to assess than its outward and visible sign, status. (Henley 1977: 21)
Enne seda defineeris ka domineerimise ja autoriteedi.
These findings differ somewhat from findings in similar studies, and the authors discuss the possible reasons for these differences. In a particularily interesting theoretical contribution, they point out that the loss of individuality (deindividuation) that comes with anonymity in group situations can release not only inhibited negative behaviors, but positive ones as well. (Henley 1977: 40)
Negatiivne - Konrad Lorenz karjakäitumisest; positiivne - Massid ja Võim.
Intimate Time is the most extensive (as Intimate Space is the least extensive). When longer appointments are kept, such as the typical 50 minutes for therapy, marriage counseling, and other forms of consultation, the encounter clearly takes on an intimate aspect, evidenced by the personal nature of the information passed. This is the "far" zone for Intimate Time; the "close" zone, the amount of time spent with true intimates, is limited only by our tolerance for each other. Though couples and families on vacation, or retired, may find themselves spending 24 hours a day together, I believe there is still a preferred limit, which may be no more than a few hours (even on honeymoons!). One or the other may invoke the limit kindly or violently, but it will be invoked.
For all these time zones, as with space zones, violations are perceived when the boundaries are exceeded. We grow irritated with loved ones we've been with for too long, and we grow irritated with the stranger who takes up more than a minute of our time (this is like coming too close). To spend an hour in impersonal business is an imposition also. on the other hand, we are hurt when a loved one gives us too little time, or offended when a business contact does the same. (Henley 1977: 45)
Esimest korda kohtan seda, et keegi on territoriaalset imperatiivi tõlgendanud temporaalseks imperatiiviks. Äge on küll! Põhjalikumaks lugemiseks:
Self-disclosures were ofeered upward even when First Name was not, suggesting to the researchers an exception to Brown and Ford's observation that the higher-status individual of a dyad initiates all acts that increase intimacy. What they say may be true; subordinates probably do seek a (false) sense of intimacy through disclosing personal inforamtion to superiors. But there is another interpretation of this informational relationship. It is that personal information flows opposite to the flow of authority; just as tactual, visual, and emotional information of subordinates is more available to those in power, so is personal history. Or, in the spatial metaphor of our language of disclosure, you can "get closer to," "intrude in the life of," "encroach on the privacy of," "touch on personal aspects of," someone of lower status or less power. (Henley 1977: 73)
Tundub tõene tähelepanek - õppejõud teavad õppurite eraelu kohta rohkem.
There is another set of gestures that further clarify this point, gestures used in everyday sitautions by males or females which resemble those of courtship, but which are not. These gestures, which Scheflen has described so insightfully as quasi-courting, carry some sort of disclaimer so they won't be mistaken for real courting. They signify lively engagement in an interaction, and thus (in systems theory terms) serve a system-maintaining function. Examples of these courtship-like behaviors are high muscle tonus, bright eyes, preening, direct body orientation (vis-a-vis), soft speech quality, flirtatious glances, gaze-holding, "demure gesture," head-cocking, and pelvis rolling. In addition, Scheflen cites invitational gestures specific to women (though none for men): these are crossing the legs, exposing the thigh, placing a hand on the hip, exhibiting the wrist or palm, protruding the breast, and stroking the thigh or wrist. (Henley 1977: 139-140)
Quasi-courtship märgid.
Faces are the means by which we attempt to create an impression, and they will therefore be a major focus for displaying the impression of status, power, or authority. We all have a mental image of "the stern face of authority," the jutting chin, overhanging eyebrows, the frown, the drawn muscles, the unwavering stare. These together make a formidable challenge. It may be in fact that the face is particularly implicated in hierarchical relationships. (Henley 1977: 169)
...to laugh long and hard at the boss's jokes is a clicé, but at the same time a painful reality. Both smiling and laughing are ostensibly expressions of pleasure and relaxation which, when coming from subordinates, belie the true nature of the situation. It is as if they are exhibited for the purpose of maintaining the myth of pleasant relations and equality between superior and subordinate. Those powerful and successful persons surrounded by a thousand suns are likely to see serious faces only in their peers: it's no wonder that they think of their subordinates - be they "contented darkies," "beer-loving workers," "brawling hardhats," or "flighty dames" - as happy-go-lucky and carefree. (Henley 1977: 172)
In less hierarchical situations too, we often try to keep some of our personal power by not disclosing personal information. "Cool" is nothing more than the withholding of information, that is, refusing to disclose one's thoughts and emotions. The value it gives to street people, poker players, and psychaitrists is of the same sort. Smart ones, those in power, those who manipulate others, always keep their cool, maintaining an unruffled exterior. (Henley 1977: 173)
Kokkuvõtvad punktid:
  1. Nonverbal behavior is a major medium of communication in our everyday life.
  2. Power (status, dominance) is a major topic of nonverbal communication; and nonverbal behavior is a major avenue for social control on a large scale, and interpersonal dominance on a smaller scale.
  3. Nonverbal power gestures provide the micropolitical structure, the thousands of daily acts through which nonverbal influence takes place, which underlies and supports the macropolitical structure.
  4. Because our culture considers trivial, ignores, and doesn't educat eits members to nonverbal behavior, it constitutes a vague stimulus situation. Its interpretation is then highly susceptible to social influence (e.g. explanations utilizing sex stereotypes) which further maintain the status quo. (Henley 1977: 179)
  5. Nonverbal control is of particular importance to women, who are more sensitive to its cues and probably more the targets of such control.
  6. Many nonverbal behaviors have the dual function of expressing either dominance or intimacy, according to whether they are asymmetrically or symmetrically used by the partners in a relationship.
  7. The behaviors expressing dominance and subordination between nonequals parallel those used by males and females in the unequal relation of the sexes. (Henley 1977: 180)
  8. The overwhelming bulk of sex-differentiated behavior is learned and is developed to display otherwise unobtrusive differences. (Henley 1977: 184)
  9. Many nonverbal behaviors that seem meaningless and non-power-related in fact are aspects of sex privilege or reflect sociatal biases ultimately founded in power differences. (Henley 1977: 188)
  10. Power is the capability of influencing or compelling others, based on the control of desired resources. (Power, status, and dominance are different, though related and often confound, concepts.)
  11. The ultimate underpinning of power is force. The resources on which power is based are in demand and those who control them must defend them from others' claims. However, force is the last-ditch, not front-line defense.
  12. Power is exercised along a continuum, from least to greatest application of force. This continuum, from least to greatest application of force. This continuum involves at least the following points:
    1. Internalized controls. This is colonization of the mind, achieved through socialization. The easiest way to ensure we don't challenge the establishment is to have us stop ourselves, by implanting police officers inside our heads (through childhood teaching).
    2. Environmental structuring. Should our internal police be asleep, and we forget ourselves, strategically-placed reminders in our surroundings can stop us, one point further along the way to break through the control.
    3. Nonverbal communication. Should the environmental reminders fail to stop us, other people - both "friend" and "foe" - will make us aware of our place and what we're doing, by subtle cues.
    4. Verbal communication. Are we ignoring even the nonverbal communication? Words are certainly now in order. These, too, have their spectrum, from mild surprise, cajoling, and joking through straight-forward explanations and strong threats of consequences.
    5. Mild physical sanctions. When verbal communication fails to restrain us, our fellows must restrain us physically. A girl holds back her friend's arm from throwing a snowball at a disliked teacher, the wife holds the husband back from beating the child, buddies hold back two men from fighting, the police line holds back the angry crowd from appraoching the government figure. People take us by the hand and lead us away from our contemplated action, hold our arms and hands down, place hands on our shoulders to keep us sitting, kick us under the table or put their hand ove rour mouth (or wash it with soap) for saying the wrong thing, hold us by the upper arms or around the waist to keep us from somewhere, slap our faces or punch us or beat us up. Such physical sanctions take two main forms, temporary restraint and mild punishment. (Henley 1977: 189)
    6. Long-term restraint and its ramifications. When ordinary citizens, or nonpersonally applied police power fails, the state is allower to retain, imprison, isolate, and apply physical and mental punishment to its members should they break the legal/social code (or threaten it, or be suspected of it). The main tools of this enforcement are jails, prisons, and mental hospitals.
    7. Weapons, death, war. At this point it is clear that neither reminders, nor punishments, nor threats nor restraints will work to deter the person moving against the norms. All the stops are out, and those in power will attempt to stop the behavior at all costs. (And at this point the behavior will be harder to stop.)
  13. Generally speaking, the mildest form of force which is effective will be used. (Henley 1977: 190)
  14. Nonverbal behavior occupies a crucial point in the continuum, between covert and overt control (and between covert and over resistance).
  15. Sexual attraction cannot sufficiently explain men's greater usage of gestures which indicate both intimacy and dominance.
  16. Usurpation of the nonverbal symbols of power by women (and other powerless people) may be ignored, denied, or punished by others, rather than accepted.
  17. Denial of nonverbal power gestures made by women often takes the form of attributing the gesture to sexual advances rather than dominance.
  18. Much of women's behavior which is interpreted as self-limiting may in reality be the end of a sequence in which assertion was attempted, and suppressed, on the nonverbal level. (Henley 1977: 200)
The Hit Is Gone, But the Hurt Lingers On. From a historical viewpoint, we may note the preponderance of dominance behaviors that seem to be remnants of actual physical conflict. Moving close to or towering over another, staring, pointing, touching, leaning toward - all are elements of actual combat, and may be residuals of an earlier time when dominance was settled in more direct and over physical ways. (Some behaviors of dominance - leaning back, turning away, relaxing - do not carry this suggestion of aggression, but rather indicate the posture of one secure in the hierarchy. In such conditions, the behaviors of subordinates - tension, physical lowering, smiling, head and eye lowering - take on the characteristics of defensive and submissive postures.) (Henley 1977: 183)
"The personal is political" is a statement of the movement that has been taken in many ways, but basically it refers to the position that there is nothing we do - no matter how individual and personal it seems - that does not reflect our participation in a power system: our politics are reflected in the way we deal with others in our personal lives; they are the way we live, as well as what we profess. This belief takes on new dimensions when viewed with regards to nonverbal communication, in which we see just how much of the seemingly personal is truly political. (Henley 1977: 198)
Self-communication and personal signs reflect power relations.
Some people will contend that changing nonverbal behavior is the way to achieve social change - if every individual is changed, we will have changed the social structure. This philosophy pops up in different contexts among well-meaning people, but I cannot accept it. This slow-but-sure idea, favored because it is nonviolent and legal and involves a minimal bucking of the system, like other such plans has weaknesses in its nondisruptiveness and its direction of energies to individual (rather than social) solutions for what are really social problems. And we seldom if ever come into face-to-face contact with those who have the most power over us, anyway. (Henley 1977: 205)
Midagi muud:
  • Herdt, Gilbert, and Robert Stoller 1990. Intimate Communication: Erotics and the Study of Culture. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Jones, Stanley 1994. The Right Touch: Understanding and Using the Language of Physical Contact: Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

The Ecology of Freedom

Bookchin, Murray 2005. The Ecology of Freedom: The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy. Oakland, California: AK Press.

I shall begin by asking: What is humanity's place in natural evolution? This question is not simply an environmental one; it has far-reaching social and philosophical implications. Human beings and human society in varying respects are products of natural evolution; further, human beings are organized anatomically and physiologically by natural evolution to interact with nonhuman nature productively, as creatures that consciously produce their own meaqns of life with tools, machines, and the organized deployment of their very capacity to labor. (Bookchin 2005: 21)
Social ecoloty is almost alone these days in dealing with these two developments of "nature-as-a-whole" as a higher creative and shared evolution rather than as an oppositional and purely dualistic antinomy. By contrast, mystical ecologies [such as in Princess Mononoke] - with their "biocentric" notions - often disdain the problem of humanity and second nature; indeed, they tend to venerate first nature as "wilderness." These ecologies often view human species as an evolutionary aberration - or worse, as an absolute disaster, a "cancer" on the biosphere. (Bookchin 2005: 23)
Kõlab täpselt nagu Princess Mononoke moto: "humans are the cancer of the forest!"
Social ecologists use the word social, in turn, in a way that is free of the slipshod, often metaphorical confusion that leads to an identification of animal groups, herds, and ecocommunities with society. It is basic to social ecology that whereas animals form communities, they do not form societies. Society is the exclusive province of humans, for what distinguishes a human society from an animal community is the existence of social institutions. (Bookchin 2005: 23)
Libertarian municipalism, potentially a very significant form of public life today, has a long historical pedigree in cities from the Middle Ages well into the nineteenth century. It was practiced with varying degrees of democracy to countervail emerging centralized nation-states. Libertarian municipalism today seeks to recover and render viable the original Hellenic meaning of the term politics - the management of the polis's affairs by means of a truly participatory democratic body of institutions. (Bookchin 2005: 57)
poliitika, poliitiline kohustus
A direct democracy, in turn, avoids the corruptive "politics" produced by political professionalism, bureaucracy, and top-down representative systems of governance. Citizenship, expressed through popular assemblies, can avoid a statist "politics" based on the privatized anonymous "constituent" who exercises no control over his or her social life. (Bookchin 2005: 58)
political professionalism = political leadership (a la Page 1985) ?
Unless hierarchy is to be used in Schjelderup-Ebbe's cosmic sense, dominance and submission must be viewed as institutionalized relationships, relationships that living things literally institute or create but which are neither ruthlessly fixed by instinct on the one hand nor idiosyncratic on the other. By this, I mean that they must comprise a clearly social structure of coercive and privileged ranks that exist apart from the idiosyncratic individuals who seem to be dominant within a given community, a hierarchy that is guided by a social logic that goes beyond individual interactions or inborn patterns of behavior. (Bookchin 2005: 94)
Siin on sama trihhotoomia: species-specific (instincts), socio-cultural (institutions), ja idiosyncratic (individual).
What we flippantly call "leadership" in organic societies often turns out to be guidance, lacking the usual accountrements of commands. Its "power" is functional rather than political. Chiefs, where they authentically exist and are not the mere creations of the colonizer's mind, have no true authority in a coercive sense. They are advisors, teachers, and consultants, esteemed for their experience and wisdom. Whatever "power" they do have is usually confined to highly delimited tasks such as the coordination of hunts and war expeditions. It ends with the task to be performed. Hence, it is episodic power, not institutional; periodic, not traditional - like the "dominance" traits we encounter among primates. (Bookchin 2005: 122)
Tuleks analüüsida expert power võtmes.
The male, in a hunting community, is a specialist in violence. From the earliest days of his childhood, he identifies with such "masculine" traits as courage, strenght, self-assertiveness, decisiveness and athleticism - traits necessary for the welfare of the community. [...] "feminine" traits: caring and tenderness. (Bookchin 2005: 148-149)
Its [the State] capacity to rule by brute force has always been limited. The myth of purely coercive, omnipresent State is a fiction that has served the state machinery all too well by creating a sense of awe and powerlessness in the oppressed that ends in social quietism. Without a high degree of cooperation from even the most victimized classes of society such as chattel slaves and serfs, its authority would eventually dissipate. Awe and apathy in the face of State power are the products of social conditioning that renders this very power possible. Hence, neither spontaneous or immanent explanations of the State's origins, economic accounts of its emergence, or theories based on conquest (short of conquests that yeld near-extermination) explain how societies could have leaped from a stateless condition to a State and how political society could have explored upon the world. (Bookchin 2005: 165)
Riigi autoriteet põhineb vähem toorel jõul, kuiet hirmus/aukartuses ja passiivsuses mida see meis tekitab. Tegu on ikkagi virtuaalse, mitte reaalse, nähtusega.
The consent of an animal, say a bear, is an essential part of the hunt in which it will be killed. When its carcass is returned to the camp, Indians will put a peace pipe in its mouth and blow down it as a conciliatory gesture. Simple mimesis, an integral feature of magic and ritual, implies by its very nature unity with the "object," a recognition of the "object's" subjectivity. Later, to be sure, the word was to be separated from the deed and become the authoritarian Word of partiarchal deity. Mimesis, in turn, was to be reduced to a strategy for producing social conformity and homogeneity. But the ritual of the word in the form of incantations and work songs remind us of a more primordial sensibility based on mutual recognition and shared rationality. (Bookchin 2005: 170)
1948; "lammas"
The most common definition of direct action are usually exemplary rather than theoretical. They consist of citing strikes, demonstrations, "mob violence," sit-ins of all kinds and in all places, Ghandian civil disobedience, and even vigilantism. In all such cases, our attention is directed to events rather than goals and theoretical generalizations. What unites this behavior under the term "direct action" is the unmediated intervention of people into affairs that are usually resolved by parliamentary debates and legislation. People take over the streets; they may even occupy the parliamentary structures and rely on their own action rather than on political surrogates to achieve certain ends. (Bookchin 2005: 205)
"Nothing is sin except what is thought of as sin." (Bookchin 2005: 289)
Why does that sound familiar? Hey, it's missing a the letter "n"!
Moreover, human subjectivity itself can be defined as the very history of natural subjectivity, not merely as its product - in much the same sense that Hegel defined philosophy as its own history. Every layer of the human brain, every phase in the evolution of the human nervous system, every organ, cell, and even mineral component of the human body "speaks," as it were, from its given level of organization and in the graded subjectivity of its development, to the external habitat into which it has been integrated. The "wisdom of the body," like the wisdom of the mind, speaks in a variety of languages. We may never adequately decipher these languages, but we know they exist in the varied pulsations of our bodies, in the beat of our hearts, in rhe radiant energy of our musculature, in the electrical impulses emitted by our brains, and in the emotional responses generated by complexes of nerve and hormonal interactions. A veritable "music of the spheres" resonates within each living form and between it and other living forms. (Bookchin 2005: 320-321)
Critics of "irrationality do not clarify these distinctions by wantonly banishing every subjective experience other than "linear thought" to the realm of the "irrational" or "antirational." Fantasy, art, imagination, illumination, intuition, and inspiration - all are realities in their own right that may well involve bodily responses at levels that have not been meticulously closed off to human sensibility by formal canons of thought. This blindness to large areas of experience is not merely the product of formal education; it is the result of an unrelenting training that begins at infancy and carries through the entire lenght of a lifetime. To polarize one area of sensibility against another may well be evidence of a repressive "irrationality" that is masked by reason, just as "linear thought" appears in the mystical literature under the mask of "irrationality." Freud, in his ineptness in dealing with these issues from his bastion of Victorian biases, is perhaps the most obvious example of a long line of self-appinted inquisitors whose rigid notions of subjectivity reveal a hatred of sensibility as such. This has long ceased to be a light matter. If the Freuds of the late nineteenth century threatened to destoy our dreams, the Kahns, TOfflers, and similar corporate "rationalists" threaten to destroy our futures. (Bookchin 2005: 359)
Võimetus kõneleda kehalisest teadmisest/tundelaadist.
The matrix from which objective reason may yet derive its ethics for a balance and harmonized world is the nature conceived by radical social ecology - nature that is interpreted nonhierarchically, in terms of unity in diversity and spontaneity. Here, nature is conceived not merely as a constellation of ecosystems but also as a meaningful natural history, a developing, creative, and fecund nature that yields an increasing complexity of forms and interrelationships. And what makes this complexity so significant is not just the stability it fosters (an obvious desideratum in its own right, needed for both the biotic and social worlds). Nature's evolution toward ever more exomplex forms is uniquely important in that it enters into the history of subjectivity itself. From the transition of the inorganic to the organic and through the various phases of evolution that crystallized into human forms of rationality, we witness an increasingly expansive history of molecular interactivity - not only of neurological responses but of an ineffable sensibilité that is a function of increasingly complex patterns of integration. Subjectivity expresses itself in various gradations, not only as the mentalism of reason but also as the interactivity, reactivity, and the growing purposive activity of forms. Hence, subjectivity emphatically does not exclude reason; in part, it is the history of reason - or, more precisely, of a slow forming mentality that exists on a wider terrain of reality than human cerebral activity. The term subjectivity expresses the fact that substance - at each level of its organization and in all its concrete forms - actively functions to maintain its identity, equilibrium, fecundity, and place in a given constellation of phenomena. (Bookchin 2005: 364)
Siin näib Bookchin tegevat loodusega sama, mida Juri Lotman tegi kultuuriga - innustas mõtlema sellest kui subjektiivsusest.
To Fourier, the physical world is governed not by Newton's law of universal gravitation but by his own "law of passionate attraction" - a law that he exuberantly proclaimed as his greatest contribution to modern knowledge. In place of Newton's mechanical interpretation of the universe, Fourier advances a concept of a cosmos as a vast organism that is suffused by life and growth. A vibrant vitalism so completely replaces the despiritized matter of conventional physics that even the idea of planets copulating is not implausible. Life, as we normally conceive it, and society are merely the offspring of a progressive elaboration of the passions. Fourier, to be sure, is not unique in conceiving of the universe in biological terms. But in contrast to most vitalists, he carries his "law of passionate attraction" from the stars into humanity's inntermost psychic recesses. (Bookchin 2005: 427)
Seksikas vitalism.
We also must recover the terrain necessary for the personification and the formation of a body politic. To defend society's molecular base - its neighborhoods, public squares, and places of assembly - expresses a demand not only for "freedom from ..." but also for "freedom for ...." The fight for shelter has ceased to be a matter of defending one's private habitat; it has become a fight to autonomously assemble, to spontaneously discuss, to sovereignly decide - in short, to be a public person, to create a public sphere, and to form a body politic against entrenched power and bureaucratic surveillance. What began in the late 1970s as a squatters' movement for more housing in Holland has now turned into a fervent struggle by young people in Switzerland for space free from authority and surveillance. Issues of habitation and logistics have turned into issues of culture, and issues of culture have become issues of politics. What the future of these specific trends in Central Europe may be, I shall not venture to predict. (Bookchin 2005: 434)
Finally I must emphasize that direct democracy is ultimately the most advanced form of direct action. There are doubtless many ways to express the claims of the individual and community to be autonomous, self-active, and self-managing - today as well as in a future ecological society. To exercise one's powers of sovereignty - by sit-ins, strikes, nuclear-plant occupations - is not merely a "tactic" in bypassing authoritarian institutions. It is a sensibility, a vision of citizenship and selfhood that assumes the free individual has the capacity to manage social affairs in a direct, ethical, and rational manner. This dimension of the self in self-management is a persistent call to personal sovereignty, to roundedness of ego and intellectual perception, which such conjoined terms like "management" and "activity" often overshadow. The continual exercise of this self - its very formation by one's direct intervention in social issues - in asserting its moral claim and right to empowerment stands on a higher level conceptually than Marx's image of self-identity through labor. For direct action is literally a form ot ethical character-building in the most important social role that the individual can undertake: active citizenship. To reduce it to a mere means, a "strategy" that can be used or discarded for strictly functional purposes, is instrumentalism in its most insidious, often most cynical form. Direct action is at once the reclamation of the public sphere by the ego, its development toward self-empowerment, and its culmination as an active participant in society. (Bookchin 2005: 438)
The greatness of the Dadaist tradition, from its ancient roots in the gnostic Orphites to its modern expression in Surrealism - a celebration of the right to indiscipline, imagination, play, fancy, innovation, iconoclasm, pleasure, and a creativity of the unconscious - is that it criticizes this "hidden" realm of hierarchy more unrelentingly and brashly than the most sophisticated theoretical games in hermeneutics, structuralism, and semiology so much in vogue on the campuses of contemporary western society. (Bookchin 2005: 450)

Käesoleval aastal loetud raamatutest on The Ecology of Freedom paistnud silma kõige avarama sõnavara poolest. Jälle kord olen sunnitud rivistama tundmatuid sõnu ja otsima definitsioone.
avaricious - Having or showing an extreme greed for wealth or material gain.
lodestone - A piece of magnetite or other naturally magnetized mineral, able to be used as a magnet.
morass - A complicated or confused situation. [synonym:quagmire]
larder - A room or large cupboard for storing food.
ardor - Enthusiasm or passion.
emolument - A salary, fee, or profit from employment or office.
sybaritic - Fond of sensuous luxury or pleasure; self-indulgent: "their sybaritic lifestyle
insouciant - casual: marked by blithe unconcern; "an ability to interest casual students"; "showed a casual disregard for cold...
paean - A thing that expresses enthusiastic praise. A song of praise or triumph.
fetid - Smelling extremely unpleasant.
yeomanry - A group of men who held and cultivated small landed estates. (in Britain) A volunteer cavalry force raised from such a group (1794–1908).

usufruct - The right to enjoy the use and advantages of another's property short of the destruction or waste of its substance.
opprobrium - The public disgrace arising from someone's shameful conduct.
corvee - unpaid labor (as for the maintenance of roads) required by a lord of his vassals in lieu of taxes.
onerous - (of a task, duty, or responsibility) Involving a burdensome amount of effort and difficulty.
nadir - The lowest point in the fortunes of a person or organization.
turgid - Swollen and distended or congested: "a turgid and fast-moving river".
nisus - striving: an effortful attempt to attain a goal.
beleaguered - Lay siege to: "he is leading a relief force to the aid of the beleaguered city". Beset with difficulties.
extirpate - Root out and destroy completely.
lurid - Very vivid in color, esp. so as to create an unpleasantly harsh or unnatural effect: "lurid food colorings".
supineness - Lying on the back or having the face upward. Having the palm upward. Used of the hand.
maudlin - Self-pityingly or tearfully sentimental, often through drunkenness.

Power: A Radical View

Lukes, Steven 2005. Power: A Radical View. Second Edition. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. (Lukes 2005: 27)
In the first place, they are revisionary persuasive refinitions of power which are out of line with the central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power. They focus on the locution 'power to', ignoring 'power over'. Thus power indicates a 'capacity', a 'facility', an 'ability', not a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power - the fact that it is exercised over people - dissapears altogether from view. And along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place - an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition. (Lukes 2005: 34)
...the word 'power' is polysemic: like, say, the words 'social' and 'political', it has multiple and diverse meanings, appropriate to different settings and concerns. Another is that, like the word 'game', 'power' denotes a range of different objects or referents that have no single common essence, no one property that they all share other than their name: it exhibits what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblance'. (Lukes 2005: 61)
Third, consider the telation between power and intention. Bertrand Russell defined power as 'the production of intended effects' (Russell 1938: 25), Max Weber and C. Wright Mills connected power with the realization of the 'will' of the powerful, and many, like Goldman, think that power involves 'getting what one wants' (Goldman 1972, 1974a, b). Obviously, some abilities are abilities to bring about intended consequences. (There are actually two possibilities here: the ability to bring about what I actually intend, and the ability to bring about what I might, hypothetically, intend). (Lukes 2005: 76)
Moreover, the features of agents that make them powerful include those that render activity unnecessary. If I can achieve the appropriate outcomes without having to act, because of the attitudes of others towards me or because of a favorable alignment of social relations and forces facilitating such outcomes, then my power is surely all the greater. It may derive from what has been called the rule of anticipated reactions (Friedrich 1941: 589-91), where others anticipate my expected reactions to unwelcome activity (or inactivity) on their part, thereby aiming to forestall overt coercion: a clear example is the self-censorship practiced by writers and journalists under authoritarian regimes. The inactive power accumulated by such regimes is, of course, often the residue of past uses of active power, often coercive and sometimes on a massive scale. (Lukes 2005: 77-78)
Spinoza's formula enables us to see what is at issue here, for it can be given various interpretations that go beyond the minimal view, not all of which are mutually compatible. Here I can only sketch what is involved in the different ways there are of answering the question: 'What do my nature and my judgment dictate?', among which Spinoza's own way is only one. The formula plausibly suggests that we think of freedom as autonomy (broadly understood), that is as invoking the ideas of authenticity (being true to one's nature or 'self') and autonomy (more narrowly understood - thinking for oneself). On Spinoza's own account, living (authentically) according to the dictates of one's judgment is to be rational. (Lukes 2005: 115)
...the victims of domination are to be seen as tactical and strategic actors, who dissemble in order to survive; as Tilly puts it, 'compliance, under Scott's microscope, turns out to be a sort of constant rebellion' (Tilly 1991: 598) or to cite the Ethiopian proverb Scott uses as an epigraph to his book, 'When the great lord passes, the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.' He adduces evidence of two main kinds. On the one hand, there are the 'hidden transcripts' - generated in secluded settings, behind the scenes in the victims' 'life apart in the slave quarters, the village, the household, and in religious and ritual life', in 'a social space in which offstage dissent to the official transcript of power relations may be voiced', in forms such as 'linguistic disguises, ritual codes, taverns, fairs, the "hush arbors" of slave religion' and consisting in 'hopes of a returning prophet, ritual aggression via witchcraft, celebration of bandit heroes and resistance martyrs' (pp. 85, xi). On the other hand, there are the open but disguised expressions of ideological insubordination that can be decoded by interpreting 'the rumors, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes and theater of the powerless as vehicles by which, among other things, they insinuate a critique of power while hiding behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings of their conduct' (p. xiii). (Lukes 2005: 124-125)
There are convincing and well-studied cases, in both pre-modern and modern settings, of 'bodily knowledge' reflecting and reproducing hierarchies of social positions with 'fields' (see, for instance, Wacquant 2003), but how far can they be generalized? Where, when and how does tacit, practical embodied knowledge set limits to 'discursive' learning and self-transformation? Our ways of speaking doubtless go deep, and it is both plausible and illuminating to see social significance in the ways people view, use and treat their bodies, as 'body language', for instance, expressing and perpetuating class, gender and indeed national identities. But these can also be understood as responses to a whole array of 'discursive' cultural influences, from early socialization to religious teachings and the mass media, that are in turn subject to political influence and to historical changes. (So, for instance, it is likely that, after decades of feminism, there will have been changes in how young women view, hold and use their bodies, in sport, say, or during pregnancy.) (Lukes 2005: 143)