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Filmisemiootika


Lotman, Juri 2004 [1973]. Filmisemiootika. Tallinn : Varrak

Keel - see on korrapärane kommunikatiivne (info edastamise eesmärk teeniv) märgisüsteem. Keele defineerimisest kommunikatiivseks süsteemiks tuleneb tema sotsiaalse funktsiooni iseloom: keel tagab infovahetuse, säilitamise ja kogumise kollektiivis, kes seda kasutab. Keele märgilisele iseloomule viitamine sedastab teda semiootilise süsteemina. Oma kommunikatiivse funktsiooni täitmiseks peab keele käsutuses olema märkide süsteem. Märk - see on kollektiivi nähtuste ja mõistete asendus. Järelikult on märgi peamiseks tunnuseks tema asendusfunktsiooni realiseerimise võime. Sõna asendab asja, objekti, mõistet; raha asendab maksumust, ühiskondlikult hädavajalikku tööd; kaart asendab piirkonda; militaarsed eraldusmärgid asendavad neile vastavaid auastmeid. Kõik need on märgid. Inimene elab ümbritsetuna kahte laadi asjadest. Ühed on need, mida kasutatakse vahetult, ning kuna nad ei asenda midagi, ei saa neid ka asendada. Asendamisele ei kuulu õhk, mida inimene hingab, leib, mida ta sööb, elu, armastus, tervis. Kuid nende kõrval ümbritsevad inimest asjad, mille väärtusel on sotsiaalne tähendus ning mis ei vasta vahetult materiaalsetele omadustele. (Lotman 2004: 8-9)
Siit saab arutlust edasi arendada kahes suunas: esiteks Cassireri järgi märgi "vahendatuse" problemaatika: märk asendab midagi. Mida ta asendab mitteverbaalse suhtlemise puhul? Kas (psühho)füsioloogilisi protsesse või suhtlusprotsessi enda omadusi? Ja teiseks saab siit välja lugeda loomuomase kodeerituse probleemi: kuidas tegeleda käitumistega, mis ei asenda midagi, vaid toimivad vahetult, ilma sotsiaalse tähenduseta (mida muidugi saab neile omistada, kuid mis ei ole nende toimimiseks vajalikud).
..."tekst mis võib olla väär - tekst, mis ei või olla väär". See võis ilmneda opositsioonina "müüt - ajalugu" (ajalooliste tekstide tekke eelsel perioodil kuulus müüt tingimatult tõeste tekstide kategooriasse), "poeesia - dokument" jne. (Lotman 2004: 22)
Müüt kui "tekst mis võib olla väär" selgitab "kehakeelt" kui müüti. Teaduslikust vaatepunktist on populaarteaduslikud käsitlused väärad, argiteadvuse seisukohast võivad nad olla tõesed.
Filmikunstis tekib semiootilises mõttes omapärane situatsioon: selleks, et süsteemi saaks nimetada keeleks klassikalises mõttes, peab ta omama piiritletud arvu korduvaid märke, mida igal tasandil võib käsitleda kui veel piiramatu arvu eristamistunnuste kimpe, kuid see, et filmikeele märgid ja nende tähendusi eraldavad tunnused võivad tekkida ad hoc, räägib selle reegli vastu. (Lotman 2004: 56-57)
Samal põhjusel ei saa ka mitteverbaalse käitumist nimetada "kehakeeleks" ja olla tões.
Kuid keskse koha filmi "sõnade" maailmas hõivavad inimkujud. Inimkuju tungib filmikunsti kui terve keeruliste kultuurimärkide maailm. Ühel poolusel asub siin erinevatele kultuuridele omane inimkeha sümboolika (silmade, näo, suu, käte jne sümboolika), teisel - näitleja mängu probleem kui vaatlejaga suhtlemise ja teatud märgilise kommunikatsiooni vahend.
Kuid žesti ja miimika semiootika kujutab endast omaette probleemi, mis puudutab meie teemat, kuid mida tuleb vaadelda eraldi. (Lotman 2004: 75)
Üks eksplitsiitsemaid mitteverbaalse suhtlemisega tegelevaid katkendeid mida ma Lotmani kirjutistes kohanud olen. Kahjuks pole ma veel leidnud seda kirjatükki, milles Lotman selle "omaette probleemiga" eraldi tegeleb.

The Society of the Spectacle


Debord, Guy [1967] 1994. The Society of the Spectacle. New York : Zone Books

Käesolev teos on sisuliselt üks suur agitatsioon:
agitation.png
Selles sisaldub ideid, mis ühest käest on tuttavad ja teisest käest formuleeritud moel mida on raske vastu võtta. Näiteks on siin Marxi klassiteadvuse teooria luhtumisest ja Lääne ühiskonna majanduslikust edust kirjutatud nii, nagu olen kuulnud kultuuriteooriate loengutes. Siis on siin ideoloogiast kui väärteadvusest kirjutatud nii nagu ma olen kuulnud diskursuseteooriates. Ja viimaks tsüklilisest ja lineaarsest ajast nagu ma olen lugenud Juri Lotmani sulest. Ometi on Debordi kirjaviisis midagi eemaletõukavalt filosoofilist, taolist keelestamist mis pöörab asju ümber selleks, et pöörata asju ümber. Arvan, et "vaatemängu ühiskond" on eellane Baudrillardi simulatsioonidele, aga ei raatsi täpsustada kuidas. Kaasa võtsin ainult ühe tsitaadi
131
The emergence of political power, seemingly associated with the last great technical revolutions, such as iron smelting, which occurred at the treshold of a period that was to experience no further major upheavals until the rise of modern industry, also coincided with the first signs of the dissolution of the bonds of kinship. From this moment on, the succession of the generations left the natural realm of the purely cyclical and became a purposeful succession of events, a mechanism for the transmission of power. Irreversible time was the prerogative of whoever rules, and the time yardwstick of rulership lay in dynastic succession. The ruler's chief weapon was the written word, which now attained its full autonomous reality as mediation between consciousnesses. This independence, however, was indistinguishable from the general independence of a separate power as the mediation whereby society was constituted. With writing came a consciousness no longer conveyed and transmitted solely within the immediate relationships of the living - an impersonal memory that was the memory of the administration of society. "Writings are the thoughts of the State," said Novalis, "and archives are its memory." (Debord 1994: 95-96)
Siin on lineaarne aeg, sündmuste järgnevus, võimu ülekandmise mehhanism (dünastiate järgnevus, võimu pärimine). Sellele, et pealiku põhiline relv oli kirjasõna, mis nüüd saavutas autonoomse tegelikkuse teadvuste vahelise vahendajana, võin nüüd nimeks panna, Judith Butleri järgi, lingvistifikatsioon. Nonverbalistifikatsioon seisneks võimuoperatsioonide mitteverbaalsete aspektide uurimises - mis tegi valitsejast valitseja? Millised on võimu välised, kehalised, ilmingud? Nendele küsimustele ei ole ma näinud erilist tähelepanu pööratavat.

Keel ja müüt


Cassirer, Ernst 2007 [1925]. Keel ja müüt : Täienduseks jumalate nimede probleemile. Tallinn : Eesti Keele Sihtasutus

Pärast esmakordset lugemist jäi mind painama, mida ma sellest välja ei lugenud? Aasta aega tagasi oli see etümoloogiline karavan, millega Cassirer siit justkui niisama läbi jalutab, liiga võõras, et ennast avada. Seekordsel lugemisel avastasin aga, et siin ei olegi väga midagi, mis võiks end avada. See teos on väike vahepala Cassireri põhitööde kõrval, kommentaar probleemidele millega ta juba on tegelenud Sümboolsete vormide filosoofias.
Palju sarnasusi leidsin Juri Lotmani mõttetööga, nt keele, müüdi ja kultuuri käsitlemises. Nimetamise osa puudutas mind sügavalt, aga jätsin tsiteerimata. Siia kandsin ümber Cassireri märgidefinitsiooni ja hetkejumala kirjelduse:
Kõiki märke aga köidab vahendatuse needus: märk peab varjama, et midagi ilmutada. (Cassirer 2007: 14)
Meie jaoks vanima eristatava tasandina müüdilises mõtlemises tõuseb esile "hetkejumala" teke. Neis ei personifitseeru mingi üldine loodusjõud ega inimeste elu teatud kindel tahk, et mõni samasena korduv joon või seisund võiks fikseeruda ja muutuda püsivaks müütilis-religioosseks kujndiks, vaid see on täiesti momentne, silmapilkne erutus, põgusalt ilmuv ning sama kiiresti kaduv hingeline sisu, mis end objektiveerib ja väljapoole maha laeb, luues hetkejumala kujundi. Iga inimest puudutav mulje, erutav soov, peibutav lootus või ähvardav hädaoht võib temas sel moel religioosselt tegusaks muutuda. Kui silmapilkne aisting annab asjale meie ees, seisundile, millest end leiame, meid hämmastavale väe toimele, korraga jumaliku aktsendi ja väärtuse - siis kogetakse ja luuakse hetkejumal. Ta seisab meie ees vahendamatus ainukordsuses ja omaette, mitte kui mingi jõu osa, mis end siin ja seal, erinevates kohtades ruumis ja eri ajahetkedel ning eri subjektidele mitmekesisena ja siiski samasugusena võib ilmutada, vaid kui miski, mis ainult siin ja praegu ühes jagamatus elamuse momendis on ainsa subjekti jaoks kohalolev, teda oma kohaloluga vallutades ja lummates. (Cassirer 2007: 27)

The Hermeneutics of the Subject


Foucault, Michel 2005. The hermeneutics of the subject : lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982 / Michel Foucault ; edited by Frédéric Gros ... [et al.] ; translated by Graham Burchell. New York : Picador

Käesolev on kolmas lugemine. Esimene lugemine. Teine lugemine.

Subjekti küsimus (lk 3): subjekti teadmiste küsimus, subjekti teadmine iseendast.

Sokrates käis Ateenas ringi ja manitses kodanikke hoolitsema enda eest (lk 7).

Epikuurlastele oli enesehool eeltingimus filosoofiliseks eluks, aga Kreeka ja Rooma mõtte arengu käigus sai selles üldine kultuurinähtus mis on ka tänapäeval tähtis osa subjektiks olemisest (lk 9).

Foucault' eesmärk oli selle loenguseeria käigus lahti mõtestada kuidas enesehoole tähendus muutus ja paljunes aja jooksul, kuidas Sokratese kombest peatada noori inimesi tänaval ja käskida neil enda eest hoolt kanda sai läbiv põhimõte nt kristlikus askeetluses (lk 10).

Enesehoole ideed on filosoofilistes tekstides mida Foucault uuris, väljendatud sõnadega "endast hoolimine", "enese eest hoolitsemine", "endasse tõmbumine", "iseendale sõbraks olemine", "endas puhkamine", "iseendas naudingu leidmine", "mitte mingi muu naudingu otsimine kui on iseendas", "iseendas kui kindluses olemine", "enda järele vaatamine" või "endale pühendmine"; "enese austamine", jne (lk 12).

Foucault' nimetab naljatlevalt "Descartese momendiks" seda hetke, mil taaskindlustati "eneseteadmine" ja samal ajal välistati "enesehool". Enese teadmist tunnustati teadvuse (consciousness) vormina mis on tõele ligi pääsemiseks fundamentaalne (lk 14). Selline mõtteviis välistas enesehoole modernsest filosoofiast, sest filosoofia küsimus on, kas tõde on olemas ja kas tõde on võimalik valest eristada. Enesehool langeb aga spirituaalsuse rubriiki, sest hõlmab otsinguid, praktikaid ja kogemusi läbi mille subjekt transformeerib iseennast selleks, et pääseda tõele ligi (lk 15).

Tõde antakse subjektile ainult sel määral kui ta toob oma subjektiivsuse enda mängu. Sest nagu ta on, ei ole subjekt tõeks võimeline. Selleks, et tõele ligi pääseda, peab subjekt enese kallal töötama, harrastama askeesi. Spirituaalsus ja ligipääs tõele on antiigis lahutamatult seotud (lk 17).

Spartalastele tähendas enesehool poliitilisi, majanduslikke ja sotsiaalseid privileege. Sparta artistokraadid usaldasid oma töö (maaharimise) orjadele, et tegeleda enesehoolega, kuid see ei olnud sugugi mitte intellektuaalne, filosoofiline enesehool ehk enese kultiveerimine (lk 31).

Ateenas on lood teistsugused. Sokrates juhendab Alkibiadest, kes tahab muuta oma kõrget staatust tõeliseks poliitiliseks tegevuseks, et oma madalat haridust peab ta korvama tehnikaga, mis lubaks tal astuda teistele vastu. See seisneb täpselt enese puuduste tundmises. Enesehool on siin vajalik poliitilisele areenile astumiseks (lk 37).

Enesehoole objektiks pole mitte keha, vaid hing. Enesehool on siin keele, tööriistade ja keha kasutamine selleks, et transformeerida hinge (lk 55). See ei tähenda, et kehal on instrumentaalne hinge mõjutamiseks, vaid et subjekt ise ainuline (singulaarne) ja ümbritsetud objektide ning teiste inimeste poolt kellega ta suhtes on ning viimaks ka suhtega iseendasse. Enesehool on enesehool vaid seniks kui subjekt "on allutatud" kindlatele nähtustele, milleks on instrumentaalne tegevus, suhe teiste inimestega, käitumine ja suhtumine üldiselt ja subjekti suhe iseendaga (lk 57).

Alkibiades vajab enesehoolt, sest Ateena haridus on ebapiisav poliitiliseks valitsemiseks. Hiljem aga muutub enesehool üldiseks põhimõtteks, mida peab tegema nagunii, sest haridus seda ei paku (lk 75).

Rooma stoikude kirjutistes varasemad enesehoole tingimused (pead olema noor aristokraat kel on eeldused valitseda ja kes peab ennast tundma õppima) langevad ära (lk 82). Post-platonistlikes liikumistes hõlmab enesehool kogu elu (lk 86). Noored peavad seda harrastama, et valmistuda poliitiliseks eluks ja vanad selleks, et kasvada taas nooreks (lk 88). Enesehool on seega eluaegne amet.

Esimese ja teise sajandi vahetusel ei olnud enesehool enam kindla sihiga. Enesehoole eesmärk ei olnud enam valmistada isikut ette teiste üle valitsemiseks. Enesehoolest sai ettevalmistus, mida kõik inimesed võinuks harrastada (lk 112).

Kreekas ja Roomas oli enesehool seotud kindlate praktikate, institutsioonide ja gruppidega, mis välistasid üksteist. Enesehool ei olnud ainult aristokraatide asi, vaid ka madalad klassid võisid moodustada ühendusi, milles tegeleti eneseteraapiaga (lk 113-114).

Interindividuaalse praktikana oli enesehool seotud sõprusega. Siin on näiteks toodud Seneca ja Serenuse suhe, mis peale majandusliku toetuse sisaldas ka nö "hingeteenust" (lk 115).

Antiigis oli enesehool seotud üldise elamiskunstiga. Enesepraktika sulandub ühte elu endaga. Enesepraktika eesmärk seega on ettevalmistus vanaks eaks, mis näib priviligeeritud olemisvormina ja subjekti enesetäiuse ideaalse punktina. Sa pead olema vana, et olla subjekt (lk 126).
...question og ignorance and memory, memory being precisely what enables one to pass from ignorance to non-ignorance, from ignorance to knowledge (savoir), it being understood that ignorance cannot escape from itself on its own. (Foucault 2005: 129)
"The philosopher is the hegemon (guide) for everyone in what concerns the things apporpriate to their nature." (C. Musonius Rufus, Reliquiae (O. Hense editor) p. 71)
Rhetoric is the inventory and analysis of the means by which one can act on other by means of discourse. Philosophy is the set of principles and practices acailable to one, or which one makes available to others, for taking care of oneself. (Foucault 2005: 135-136)
...in Plato's text, in Socrates' contribution, care of the self is definitley distinguished from the care of the body, that is to say diatetics, the care for one's goods, that is to say economics, and the lover's care, that is to say erotics. Well, you see now, rather, that these three domains - diatetics, economics, erotics - are reintegrated, but as a reflecting surface, as the occasion, so to speak, for the self to test itself, train itself, and develop the practice of itself which is its rule of life and its objective. Diatetics, economics, and erotics appear as domains of application for the practice of the self. (Foucault 2005: 162)
...Epicurean conception of friendship maintains to the end the principle that in friendship one seeks only oneself or one's own happiness. Friendship is just one of the forms given to the care of the self. (Foucault 2005: 195)
To know oneself is to know the true. To know the true is to free oneself. And these different elements are joined together in the act of recollection as the fundamental form of knowledge. (Foucault 2005: 210)
Seneca says that philosophy spins the subject around on himself, that tis is to say it performs the action by which, traditionally and legally, a master freed his slave. There was a ritual gesture in which the master turned his slave around on the spot in order to show, to demonstrate and effectuate his freedom from subjection. (Foucault 2005: 213)
...if we take the question of power, of political power, situating it in the more general question of governmentality understood as a stretegic field of power relations in the broadest and not merely political sense of the term, if we understand by governmentality a stretegic field of power relations in this mobility, transformability, and reversibility, then I do not think that reflection on this notion of governmentality can avoid passing through, theoretically and practically, the element of a subject defined by the relationship of self to self. Although the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical conception of the subject of right, it seems to me that the analysis of governmentality - that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships - must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self. QUite simply, this means that in the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for some time you can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of ethics. (Foucault 2005: 252)
Enesesse pöördumine toimub läbi enese praktika enesel. Selleks praktikaks on askeesis (lk 314).
[järelmärkustest] 28. In his edition of Seneca, Paul Venye notes: "scratching the head with one finger, an 'autistic' action, lacked virile dignity; it was a feminine gesture" (p. 720). [lk 353]

Excitable Speech


Butler, Judith P. 1997. Excitable speech: a politics of the performative. New York : Routledge

Introduction: On Linguistic Vulnerability
Austin distinguishes "illocutionary" from "perlocutionary" speech acts that, in saying do what they say, and do it in the moment of that saying; the latter are speech acts that produce certain effects as their consequence; by saying something, a certain effect follows. The illocutionary speech act is itself the deed that it effects; the perlocutionary merely leads to certain effects that are not the same as the speech act itself. (Butler 1997: 3)
Ma ei ole veel Austinit ennast lugenud, kuid siin tundub mulle, et illucutionary ja perlocutionary on seostatavad loomuomase kodeeritusega. Tähendab, perlokutiivne liigutus on instrumentaalne (loomuomane) ehk tegu mis toob endaga kaasa tagajärgi teo käigus, illokutiivne (mitte-loomuomane) aga toob endaga kaasa tagajärgi tänu konventsioonile.
Who speaks when convention speaks? In what time does convention speak? In some sense, it is an inherited set of voices, an echo of others who speak as the "I". (Butler 1997: 25)
Siin on jutt Althusserist, hõikamisest ja rituaalist. Põlvitamine ja huulte liigutamine palves paneb sind uskuma. Tühi žest täitub aja jooksul, kokkuleppelise (rituaalse) žesti kordamine toodab idee (ideation).
...subject's autogenesis... (Butler 1971: 26)
Hea sõnapaar, võib aidata Foucault' enesehoolega.
Indeed, one can be interpellated, put in place, given a place, through silence, through not being addressed, and this becomes painfully clear when we find ourselves preferring the occasion of being derogated to the one of not being addressed at all. (Butler 1997: 27)
Another case of "märgi puudumine on ka märk": väljahõikamine ei pea olema verbal conduct, see võib toimuda ka läbi mitte-väljahõikamise (nt spordimängus valivad kaptenid meeskonnaliikmeid ja viimast last ei vali keegi). Tekitas minus küsimuse, kas väljahõikamine võib olla ka mitteverbaalne nähtus? Kui jah, siis mis see oleks? Kas kellegi suunas vaatamine on sel juhul väljahõikamine? Kas siin on mingi piir? Peaks see silmside olema kindla kestuse, intensiivsuse või korduvusega? Või peaks see olema tahtlik (käe)žest?
...social positionality... (Butler 1997: 33)
Is that even a word?
Interpellation is an act of speech whose "content" is neither true nor false: it does not have description as its primary task. Its purpose is to indicate and establish a subject in subjection, to produce its social contours in space and time. Its reiterative operation has the effect of sedimenting its "positionality" over time. (Butler 1997: 34)
Answer: I guess now it is. Selline kirjeldus väljahõikamisest näib sobivat silmsidemega. Kindlam oleks öelda, et väljahõikamine saaks olla kinemorfiline konstruktsioon, mis peale silmsideme koosneb ka "metasuhtelisest" väljendusest (nt pilk kohtub Teisega ja näole ilmub disgust).

1. Burning Acts, Injurious Speech
...according to his [Austini] view of the illocutionary speech act, the name performs itself, and in the course of that performing becomes a thing done; the pronouncement is the act of speech at the same time that it is the speaking of an act. Of such an act, one cannot reasonably ask for a "referent," since the effect of the act of speech is not to refer beyond itself, but to perform itself, producing a strange enactment of linguistic immanence. (Butler 1997: 44)
Vist ei tasuks Butleri kaudu Austinit "lugeda", aga seni on minu paralleel coherent: kangi tõmbamine või sigareti süütamine ei pruugi viitada millelegi muule, kui iseendale.

2. Sovereign Performatives
Finally, I read the figure of sovereignty as it emerges within the contemporary discourse on the performative in terms of the Foucaultian view that contemporary power is no longer sovereign in character. Does this figure of the sovereign performative compensate for a lost sense of power, and how might that loss become the condition for a revised sense of the performative?
The interest in this figure of the performative follows from a conviction that a similar way of regarding speech as conduct is at work in several political spheres at the same time and for political purposes that are not always reconcilable with one another. Utterance itself is regarded in inflated and highly efficacious ways, no longer as a representation of power or its verbal epiphenomenon, but as the modus vivendi of power itself.
We might regard this overdetermination of the performative as the "linguistification" of the political field (one for which discourse theory is hardly responsible, but which it might be said to "register" in some important ways). (Butler 1997: 74)
lingvistifikatsioon
semiotifikatsioon
nonverbalistifikatsioon

3. Contagious Word: Paranoia and "Homosexuality" in the Military
Paeluv, aga ei andnud tsitaate.

4. Implicit Censorship and Discursive Agency
This paradoxical production of speech by censorship works in implicit and inadvertent ways. Thus, it becomes important to distinguish between explicit and implicit censorship. The latter refers to implicit operations of power that rule out in unspoken ways what will remain unspeakable. In such cases, no explicit regulation is needed in which to articulate this constraint. (Butler 1997: 130)
Implitsiitsed võimuoperatsioonid välistavad kindlaid väljendusi ette ära ja ei nõua välist sekkumist või keelamist.
Clearly, the military's efforts to regulate speech is not paradigmatic of all kinds of censorship. It does, however, introduce at least two "productive" modalities of power that contrast with the conventional view of censorship as juridical power. By "productive" I do not mean positive or beneficial, but rather, a view of power as formative and constitutive, that is, not conceived exclusively as an external exertion of control or as the deprivation of liberties. According to this view, censorship is not merely restrictive and privative, that is, active in depriving subjects of the freedom to express themselves in certain ways, but also formative of subjects and the ligitimate boundaries of speech. This notion of a productive or formative power is not reducible to the tutelary function of the state, that is, the moral instruction of its citizens, but operates to make certain kinds of citizens possible and others impossible. (Butler 1997: 132)
Foucault' võimukontseptsiooni järgi ei ole selline tsensuur mitte ainult piirav ja välistav, vaid loob subjekte ja legitiimseid piire kõnele. Produktiivne võim teeb kindlat tüüpi kodanikud võimalikuks ja teised võimatuks.
To become a subject means to be subjected to a set of implicit and explicit norms that govern the kind of speech that will be legible as the speech of a subject. (Butler 1997: 133)
Veel Foucault'd. Subjektiks saamine tähendab olla allutatud hulgale implitsiitsetele ja eksplitsiitsetele normidele mis valitsevad sellist tüüpi kõnet mis on legible (vastuvõetav?) subjekti kõnena.
Some would argue that no text can be fully freed from the shackles of censorship because every text or expression is in part structured through a process of selection that is determined in part by the decision of an author or speaker and in part by a language that operates according to selective and differential rules that no individual speaker ever made (that may well be collectively forged, but not tracable to a single author, except in specific cases of grammatical revision and coinage). A highly generalized thesis, it appears to apply to any and all language. And though it may well be true and valid, I think that in its generalized form, it does not directly translate into a political consideration of censorship. Indeed, taken in its most generalized form, one normative implication of such a view is the following: because all expression is always already censored to some degree, it makes no sense to try to oppose censorship, for that would be to oppose the conditions of intelligibility (and, thus, to oppose the very terms by which the opposition is articulated).
The view that I am proposing, however, revises this more generalized thesis in the following direction: the conditions of intelligibility are themselves formulated in and by power, and this normative exercise of power is rarely acknowledge as an operation of power at all. Indeed, we may classify it among the most implicit forms of power, one that works precisely through its illegibility: it escapes the terms of legibility that it occasions. That power continues to act in illegible ways is one source of its relative invulnerability.
The one who speaks according to the norms that govern speakability is not necessarily following a rule in a conscious way. One speaks according to a tacit set of norms that are not always explicitly coded as rules. Charles Taylor argues that our understanding of these rules cannot be reduced to having a self-conscious representation of these rules: "it is carried in patterns of appripriate action." A "background understanding ... underlies our ability to grasp directions and follow rules," and this background understanding is not only embodied, but embodies as a shared social sense: one does not follow a rule alone. (Butler 1997: 133-134)
Kõik väljendused on ette ära tsenseeritud ja arusaadavus on võimu poolt formuleeritud. Kõneledes järgitakse mitte-teadlikult alati vastavalt kindlatele normidele mis ei ole eksplitsiitselt kodeeritud reeglitena. Taust-arusaam on kehastunud sotsiaalses mõttes, reegleid ei järgita üksinda.
...entrance into language comes at a price: the norms that govern the inception of the speaking subject differentiate the subject from the unspeakable, that is, produce an unspeakability as the condition of subject formation. (Butler 1997: 135)
The rules that constrain intelligibility of the subject continue to structure the subject throughout his or her life. And this structuring is never fully complete. Acting one
s place in language continues the subject's viability, where the viability is held in place by a thread both produced and defended against, the threat of a certain dissolution of the subject. If the subject speaks impossibly, speaks in a way that cannot be regarded as speech or as the speech of a subject, then that speech is discounted and the viability of the subject called into question. The consequence of such an irruption of the unspeakable may range from a sense that one is "falling apart" to the intervention of the state to secure criminal or psychiatric incarceration. (Butler 1997: 136)
The view of censorship as one in which a centralized or even sovereign power unilaterally represses speech suggests that the subject of speech is burdened by the exteriority of power. The subject is not quite as victimized in the view that asserts that citizens wield the power to deprive each other of the freedom of speech. When that subject, through its derogatory remarks or representations, works to "censor" another subject, that form of censorship is regarded as "silencing" (Langton). In that form, the citizen addressed by such speech is effectively deprived of the power to respond, deauthorized by the derogatory speech act by which that citizen is ostensibly addressed. Silence is the performative effect of a certain kind of speech, where that speech is an address that has its object the deauthorization of the speech of the one to whom the speech act is addressed. It is the subject who now is said to wield such power, and not the state or some other centralized institution, although institutional power is presupposed and invoked by the one who delivers the words that silence. Indeed, the subject is described on the model of state power, and though the locus of power has shifted from the state to the subject, the unilateral action of power remains the same. Power is exerted by a subject on a subject; its exertion culminates in a deprivation of speech. (Butles 1997: 137)
Üks subjekt "vaigistab" teise tänu institutsionaalsele võimule. Siin järgib Butler klassikalist võimu definitsiooni: üks subjekt paneb teise tegema midagi (vaikima) mida ta muidu ei teeks.
Apart form the use of the term in real estate matters to refer to legally barring the redeption of a mortgage for value, "foreclosure" means, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, "to bar, exclude, shut out completely."
As an action, it appears to presuppose a subject, but that presupposition may be nothing more than a seduction of grammar. Indeed, psychoanalytically considered, foreclosure is not a singular action, but the reiterated effect of a structure. Something is barred, but no subject bars it; the subject emerges as the result of the bar itself. That barring is an action that is not exactly performed on a pregiven subject, but performed in such a way that the subject him/herself is performatively produced as a result of this primary cut. The remainder of what is cut out constitutes the unperformable in all performativity. (Butler 1997: 138)
Viimasest lausest on raske aru saada, kas välistatu on igasuguse performatiivsuse mitte-performatiivsus või hoopis see, mis pärast välistamist üle jääb... Igatahes meenubtab välistamise kaudu subjekti moodustamine Foucault' kultuurimääratlust, mille järgi kultuuriliste väärtuste omandamine nõuab pingutamist, millega näib kaasnevat ka välistamise protseduur. MVS-s on mõeldav, et ühe kultuuri kommunikatsioonisüsteemi omandamine tähendab samaaegselt kõigi teiste välistamist.
The implicit operation of censorship is, by definition, difficult to describe. If it operates within a bodily understanding, as Taylor and Bourdieu suggest, how can we understand the bodily operation of such a linguistic understanding? If censorship is the condition of agency, how do we best understand linguistic agency? In what does the "force" of the performative consist, and how can it be understood as part of politics? Bourdiey argues that the "force" of the performative is the effect of social power, and social power is to be understood through established contexts of authority and their instruments of censorship. Opposed to this social account of performative force, Derrida argues that the breaking of the utterance from prior, established contexts constitutes the "force" of the utterance.
In the introduction I maintained that the speech act is a bodily act, and that the "force" of the performative is never fully separable from bodily force: this constituted the chiasm of the "threat" as a speech act at once bodily and linguistic. Feldman's contribution to speech act theory underscores that speech, precisely because it is a bodily act, is not always "knowing" about what it says. In other words, the bodily effects of speech exeeds the intentions of the speaker, raising the question of the speech act itself as a nexus of bodily and psychic forces. (Butles 1997: 141)
See, et performatiivi jõud ei ole lahutatav kehalisest, sarnaneb väga Argyle'i väitega, et "words have little effect unless backed up by the appearance or reality of power". Ja, et sotsiaalne võim on mõistetav ainult autoriteedi ja tsenseerimisvahenditega suhestatuna, meikib ainult senssi.
Pierre Bourdiey offers one account of how norms become embodied, suggesting that they craft and cultivate the habitus of the body, the cultural style of gesture and bearing. (Butler 1997: 142)
Pierre Bourdieu writes that "modalities of practices ... are powerful and hard to resist precisely because they are silent and insidious, insistent and insinuating. (Butler 1997: 142)
Focusing on the work of Heidegger, Bourdieu argues that Heidegger's language consistently engages strategies that produce the illusion that it has broken with ordinary language. Codes of legitimacy are established precisely through the invocation of non-ordinary words in ways that appear to have a systematic relation to one another. (Butler 1997: 142-143)
See on huvitav tähelepanek. Filosoofi keelekasutus legitimeerib end läbi ebaharilike sõnade mis näivad olevat omavahel süsteemselt suhestatud. Sarnane mõju tekib Lotmani terminite kasutamisel mvs peal, "struktuuriline asümmeetria" kõlab väga tähendusrikkalt, aga tegelikult saab sama nähtust väljendada palju arusaadavamas keeles palju paremini.
For Bordieu, then, the distinction between performatives that work and those that fail has everything to do with the social power of the one who speaks: the one who is invested with legitimate power makes language act; the one who is not invested may recite the same formula, but produce no effects. The former is legitimate, and the latter, and imposter. (Butler 1997: 146)
If iterability is a structural characteristic of every mark, then there is no mark without its own proper iterability; that is, for a mark to be a mark, it must be repeatable, and have that repeatability as a necessary and constitutive feature of itself. (Butler 1997: 149)
Sama saab väita kinemorfiliste konstruktsioonide kohta kui neid käsitleda "mitteverbaalsete märkidena".
That speech is not the same as writing seems clear, not because the body is present in speech in a way that is not in writing, but because the oblique relation of the body to speech is itself performed by the utterance, deflected yet carried by the performance itself. To argue that the body is equally absent in speech and writing is true only to the extent that neither speech nor writing makes the body immediately present. But the way in which the body obliquely appears in speech is, of necessity, different from the way it appears in writing. Although both are bodily acts, it is the mark of the body, as it were, that is read in the written text. Whose body it is can remain permanently unclear. The speech act, however, is performed bodily, and though it does not instate the absolute presence of the body, the simultaneity of the production and delivery of the expression communicates not merely what is said, but the bearing of the body as a rhetorical instrument of expression. This makes plain the incongruous interrelatedness of body and speech to which Felman refers, the excess in speech that must be read along with, and often against, the propositional content of what is said.
Bourdieu offers a theory of bodily knowingness in his notion of the habitus, but he does not relate this discussion of the body to the theory of the performative. The habitus refers to those embodied rituals of everydayness by which a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own "obviousness". In this way, Bourdiey underscores the place of the body, its gestures, its stylistics, its unconscious "knowingness" as the site for the reconstitution of a practical sense without which social reality would not be constituted as such. The practical sense is carried by the body, where the body is not a mere positive datum, but the repository or the site of an incorporated history. (Butler 1997: 152)
Kõnes on keha kohal, tekstis mitte. Tekst on justkui "keha jälg", midagi mida keha on teinud, midagi mis on kehast kaugenenud. Kelle keha kirjutas teksti, võib jääda alatiseks selgusetuks. See bearing of the body võib siin olla mvs.
Interpellations that "hail" a subject into being, that is, social performatives that are ritualized and sedimented through time, are central to the very process of subject-formation as well as the embodied, participatory habitus. To be hailed or addressed by a social interpellation is to be constituted discursively and socially at once. This interpellation need not take on an explicit or offical form in order to be socially efficacious and formative in the formation of the subject. (butler 1997: 153)
But this bodily habitus is generated by the tacit normativity that governs the social game in which the embodied subject acts. In this sense, the body appropriates the rule-like character of the habitus through playing by those rules in the context of a given social field. Its participation in the game is the precondition for a mimesis or, more precisely, a mimetic identification, that acquires the habitus precisely through a practical conformity to its conventions. "The process of acquisition," Bourdieu writes, is "a practical mimesis (or mimeticism) which implies an overall relation of identification and has nothing in common with an imitation that would presuppose a conscious effort to reproduce a gesture, an utterance or an object explicitly constituted as a model." This acquisition is historical to the extent that the "rules of the game" are, quite literally, incorporated, made into a second nature, constituted as a prevailing doxa. Neither the subject nor its body forms a representation of this conventional activity, for the body is itself formed in the hexis of this mimetic and acquisitive activity. The body is, thus, not a purely subjective phenomenon that houses memories of its participation in the conventional games of the social field; its participatory competence is itself dependent on the incorporation of that cultural memory and its knowingness. (Butler 1997: 154)

Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19


Cole, James K. (ed) 1971. Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press

  1. Elkind, David 1971. Cognitive Crowth Cycles in Mental Development. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 1-31
  2. Longstreth, Langdon E. 1971. A Cognitive Interpretation of Secondary Reinforcement. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 33-80
  3. Donaldson, Margaret 1971. Preconditions of Inference. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 81-106
  4. Mehrabian, Albert 1971. Nonverbal Communication. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 107-162
  5. Exline, Ralph 1971. Visual Interaction: The Glances of Power and Preference. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 163-206
  6. Ekman, Paul 1971. Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 207-286

Elkind, David 1971. Cognitive Crowth Cycles in Mental Development. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 1-31
In order to pursue stimulus nutriment the child must frequently ignore or tune out distracting stimuli. (Elkind 1971: 2)
Seda mõttekäiku saab rakendada ka mitteverbaalsete märkide lugemisele. Olen kohanud isegi Juri Lotmani tekstides midagi taolist, et autojuht peab õppima ignoreerima ja välja lülitama segavaid stiimuleid, et normaalselt sõita. Mitteverbaalse suhtlemise uurimise puhul tähendab see tähelepanu pööramist sellele, milliseid modaalsusi ja märke märgatakse ja mida eelistatakse ignoreerida või välja lülitada.
In the most general sense, perception can be said to involve the process by which we read information which comes to us throuh our senses. (Elkind 1971: 6)
Siin on taju defineeritud kui protsess mille kaudu me loeme informatsiooni mis tuleb meile läbi meeleelundite. Siin on justkui võimalus pansemiootika arendamiseks - taju tõlgendamine on semiootiline protsess.
In language learning, too, the child may hear what he knows rather than what he listens to. (Elkind 1971: 12)
See sama motiiv on rakendadav ka mvs uurimisele. Mitmetes uurimistöödes ilmneb, et uurija märkab ainult neid liigutusi mille jaoks tal on kategooriad olemas. Selle asemel, et jälgida mis tegelikult toimub, jälgib ta seda, mida ta teab, et toimub.
Gating and storage are likewise present at the semantic level. With regard to gating, Piaget (1952) long ago described what he called "parallel play." In such play two children talk at rather than to one another. One child talks about his new jacket while the other talks about a trip to the store and neither child acknowledges the other's utterance. In such parallel play, the child effectively gates out the semantic input of his companion. It is important to point out that the child could understand the utterances - he certainly does so when he is talking to an adult - but when engaged in play his language accompanies and reinforces his actions; distracting stimuli are effectively gated from consciousness. (Elkind 1971: 13)
Sama toimub päris tihti ka täiskasvanutega isegi intellektuaalsetes aruteludes.
It is at least possible that some children get "imprinted" on intellectual kinds of nourishment during critical periods of mental growth while others do not and that these differential experiences set up lifelong preferences in these pursuits. It is a hypothesis that seems worthy of exploration in a more systematic way. (Elkind 1971: 20)
Sõnu:
cognitive structure - kognitiivne struktuur
mental structure - vaimne struktuur
symbolic function - sümboolne funktsioon (võime sümbolitega mängida)
perceptual process - tajuprotsess
sensory gating - aistingute väravdamine (stiimulitega kohanemine, mittemärkamine)

Longstreth, Langdon E. 1971. A Cognitive Interpretation of Secondary Reinforcement. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 33-80
behaviorism, loomkatsed, blablabla

Donaldson, Margaret 1971. Preconditions of Inference. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 81-106
inferents, loogika, blablabla

Mehrabian, Albert 1971. Nonverbal Communication. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 107-162
The importance of nonverbal behavior is also highlighted in situations in which unfamiliar persons interact and so one seeks to influence the other (as in political speeches or advertising). (Mehrabian 1971: 117)
Mitteverbaalne suhtlemine on väga oluline situatsioonides, kus võõrad inimesed suhtlevad ja üks proovib teist mõjutada (nt poliitilised kõned ja reklaamindus).
A consideration of the literature in the nonverbal communication area led to the postulation of three orthogonal dimensions for characterizing the nonverbal aspects of social interaction: communications of liking (which include all of the nonverbal cues within the first factor), responsiveness to the target (or, alternatively, the salience of the target for oneself), and potency or status as conveyed by great relaxation (Mehrabian, 1970a). The present results show that when verbal cues are also considered within the complex of social interaction, the same three factors emerge, and that most of the verbal cues which measure amount of verbal interchange are part of the first factor, liking-affiliation. The second factor, responsiveness, is correlated only slightly with the communication of liking, and reflects the extent to which the subject is reacting to another, whether in a positive or negative way. For instance, in persuasive communication situations in which the nonverbal expression of liking may be construed as manipulative and insincere, it has been found that increased attempts at persuasion are associated with increased responsiveness to the listener, but with only slightly increases in actual responsiveness toward the listener (Mehrabian & Williams, 1969).
Postural relaxation has been found to be a correlate of higher status of the speaker relative to his listener. The composition of the relaxation index is somewhat different for standing and seated positions. For seated postures, asymmetry in positioning of the limbs and the degree of reclining or sideways lean are the best indicators; for standing positions, sideways lean of the body again serves as a measure of relaxation, but rocking movements and leg and foot movements while in the same place are also important indicators. (Mehrabian 1971: 128)
Semantilise ruumi kolm dimensiooni: (1) meeldivus, (2) vastavus või reageerimine ja (3) potents või staatus. Ja poosi mugavus osutab suhtelisele staatusele.
In a variety of contexts, we have seen that nonverbal behaviors are more important or basic (possibly because they are more difficult to censor) than verbal ones: untrained observers assign greater weight to the feelings communicated nonverbally in vocal and facila expressions that to the feelings expressed verbally. Further, some nonverbal channels are more subtle than others. For instance, communications of attitude or status with posture and position cues are more subtle and probably less subject to censorship or deliberate control than are facial or vocal expressions of the same attitudes. (Mehrabian 1971: 148-1489)
Conceptualizing the referents of nonverbal behavior in terms of evaluation, potenxy, and responsiveness, it is expected that (1) affiliative dispositions correlalte with more immediate nonverbal behaviors toward others; (2) dominant personality dispositions correlate with relaxation; (3) anxious or disturbed individuals exhibit less relaxation and, depending on the form of psychopathology, possibly less immediacy, as in the face of withdrawal and less responsiveness to people in general, are reflected in low levels of activity. (Mehrabian 1971: 152)

Exline, Ralph 1971. Visual Interaction: The Glances of Power and Preference. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 163-206
Throughout the literature two themes recur - the theme of preference and the theme of power. Both the sociologist Simmel (1969) and the philosopher Sartre (157) have stressed the role of mutual glances in the establishmjent of significant interpersonal bonds. According to Simmel, it is the mutual as distinct from the one-way glance which signifies union - whether we seek or avoid such visual contact depends upon our desire for union with each other. Sartre, on the other hand, stresses the threat to individual autonomy inherent in the mutual glance: "Either the other looks at me and alienates my liberty, or I assimilate and seize the liberty of the other" (Schetze, 1948). (Exline 1971: 166)
The studies mentioned to date provide rather good evidence that persons are more prone to engage in mutual glances when they find the relationship with another attractive rather than aversive. The relationship between considerations of interpersonal power and visual interaction, however, was only indirectly touched upon in the study of affiliation and competitiveness. (Exline 1971: 181)
Thibaut and Kelley (1959) define social power as the control one person has over another's oucomes. Assuming that individuals are aware of the difference in power which defines their role relationship, we would expect that in a face-to-face interaction in which outcomes are in question, the person in the less powerful position would have a greater need to monitor the expressive behavior of the other. Such monitoring would serve two purposes: (a) it would provide the low power person (LP) with information concerning the reaction of the other to LP's efforts, information which LP could use to adjust his own behavior; (b) it enables the LP person to indicate that he is attentive to the higher power person (HP), thus serving as a signal that he accepts his role, or at least is behaving in a manner appropriate to his position. (Exline 1971: 182-183)
Perhaps the potency impressions help to explain the rather complicated set of interactions shown in Figure 1.1. If one has control needs and wishes to retain the floor, it would behoove him not to look too much at one he feels has the capacity to wrest it from him, should he catch his eye. On the other hand, if the confederate looks steadily without attempting to speak, he may be seen as weak, which would enable one to look more steadily at him with impunity. The reverse could be true for the less controlling subject. The data shows, though the interaction was not significant, that the control-oriented subjects did not look less steadily at the nonlooking than at the looking listener, while the reverse tended to be true for the less controlling subject. To look or not to look, that is the question. The answer, for those who need to control, may lie in the perceived force of the other.
Much of what I have reported in these studies of visual behavior and interpersonal power problems seems to be concerned with the avoidance of eye contact. Powerful peopled do not monitor less powerful people. Those who feel that another's power is illegitimate avoid potential eye contact with the usurper. Dominant men seem more impressed with the personal force of one who listens without looking and also seem more reluctant to look at those whom they perceive to be forceful. Why su much avoidance? (Exline 1971: 192)
While more work remains before we can precisely characterize the context in which open eyes are sufficient to elicit threat, we do believe that an affirmative answer to Diebold's question is possible. We believe, that is, that eye engagement does serve an interpersonal-regulatory function in a shared primate ethogram. Perhaps men are generally predisposed to avoid visual engagement with another (especially in silence) to reduce the probability of getting caught up in disturbing dominance struggles. (Exline 1971: 198)

Ekman, Paul 1971. Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotion. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 207-286
...[LaBarre] concludes, "There is no 'natural' language of emotional gesture" (p. 55). A problem with this statement is LaBarre's failure to distinguish facial expressions of emotion from facial gestures. While some gacial expressions of emotion can also be used as intentional communicative gestures to convey an explicit message (e.g., the smile), many facial gestures are independent of the facial behaviors usually considered as relevant to emotion. Such gestures as the head shake "no," raising one eyebrow, winking, et.c, may well be culturally variable, while facial exspressions of emotion are not. Darwin (1872) mentioned the need to distinguish between facial expressions of emotion, which are innate and universal, and facial gestures, which are learned and therefore culturally variable. (Ekman 1971: 209)
Cultural differences in facial expression occur (a) because most of the events which through learning become established as the elicitors of particular emotions will vary across cultures, (b) because the rules for controlling facial expressions in particular social settings will also vary across cultures, and (c) because some of the consequences of emotional arousal will also vary with culture.
We have called our theory neuro-cultural because it emphasizes two very different sets of determinants of facial expressions, one which is responsible for universals and the other for cultural differences. Neuro refers to the facial affect program - the relationships between particular emotions and the firing of a particular pattern of facial muscles. This program, as we will explain, is at least partly innate, and can sometimes be activated with relatively little prior cognitive processing or evaluation. Cultural refers to the other set of determinants - most of the events which elicit emotion, the rules about controlling the appearance of emotion, and most of the consequences of emotion. These, we hold, are learned and vary with culture. (Ekman 1971: 212)
We have described four management techniques for controlling facial behavior: (a) intensifying a felt emotion; (b) deintensifying a felt emotion; (c) neutralizing a felt emotion; and (d) masking a felt emotion with the facial configuration associated with a different emotion. We have hypothesized that these management technieuqes for controlling facial appearance are operative in most social situations. The concept of display rules concerns what has been learned, presumably fairly early in life, about which management techniques to be applied by whom, to which emotions, under what circumstances. Display rules may take account of four characteristics in specifying when and by whom a management technique is to be applies: (a) static personal characteristics (e.g., age, sex, and body size); (b) static social characteristics (e.g., ecological factors, the social definition of the situation, such as funeral, job interview, or a party; enduring interpersonal relationships); (c) transient personal characteristics (e.g., role, attitude); and (d) transient interaction regularities (e.g., entrances, exits; listening, talking; in play, out of play).
Display rules govern facial behavior on a habitual basis. Rarely will a person pause to consider what display rule to follow; such a pause would indicate that there is no display rule, or that something is ambiguous in the situation and the person does not know which display rule to follow. The operation of display rules is more noticeable when they are violated than when properly applied. (Ekman 1971: 225-226)
  • Eibl-EIbesfeldt, I. Ethology: The biology of behavior. New York: Hold, Rinehart & Winston, 1970
  • Lorenz, K. Studies in animal and human behavior. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Hardvard University Press, 1970.
  • Nummenmaa, T. The Language of the face. (Jyvaskyla Studies in Education, Psychology and Social Research 9) Jyvaskyla, Finland: Jyvaskylan Yliopistoyhdistys, 1964).
  • Thomkins, S. S. Affect, imagery, consciousness. Vol. 1. The positive affects. New York: Springer, 1962.

The Hermeneutics of the Subject


Foucault, Michel 2005. The hermeneutics of the subject : lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982 / Michel Foucault ; edited by Frédéric Gros ... [et al.] ; translated by Graham Burchell. New York : Picador

Kohe teisel leheküljel lausub Foucault' kursuse sisu:
This year I would like to step back a bit from this precise example, and from the sexual material concerning the aphrodisia and sexual behavior, and extract from it more general terms of the problem of "the subject of truth." More precisely, while I do not want in any way to eliminate or nullify the historical dimension in which I tried to situate this problem of subjectivity/truth relations, I would, however, like to present it in a much more general form. The question I would like to take up this year is this: In what historical form of the relations between the "subject" and "truth," elements that do not usually fall within the historian's practice or analysis, take shape in the West? (Foucault 2005: 2)
Leheküljel 10 annab Foucault ülevaate küsimustest, mida ta loengute käigus täpsustab:
  • First, the theme of a general standpoint, of a certain way of considering things, of behaving in the world, undertaking actions, and having relations with people. The epimeleia heautou is an attitude toward the self, others, and the world.
  • Second, the epimeleia heautou is also a certain form of attention, of looking. Being concerned about oneself implies that we look away from the outside to... I was going to say "inside." Let's leave to one side this word, which you can well imagine raises a host of problem, and just say that we must convey our looking from the outside, from others and the world etc., towards "oneself." The care of the self implies a certain way of attending to what we think and what takes place in our thought. The word epimeleia is related to melete, which means both exercise and meditation. Again, all this will have to be elucidated;
  • Third, the notion of epimeleia does not merely designate this general attitude or this form of attention turned on the self. The epimeleia also always designates a number of actions exercised on the self by the self, actions which one takes responsibility for onself and by which one changes, purifies, transforms, and transfigures oneself. It involves a series of practices, most of which are exercises that will have a very long destiny in the history of Western culture, philosophy, morality, and spirituality. These are, for example, techniques of meditation, of memorization of the past, of examination of soncsience, of cheking representations which appear in the mind, and so on.
(Foucault 2005: 10-11)
"
  • Esiteks, üldise seisukoha teema, kindlast viisist arvestada asju, käituda maailmas, võtta ette tegemisi, ja omada suhteid teiste inimestega. Epimeleia heautou on suhtumine iseendasse, teistesse ja maailma.
  • Teiseks on epimeleia heautou kindel tähelepanu või vaatamise vorm. Iseendast muretsemine eeldab, et me vaatame eemale väljastpoolt... Ma tahtsin öelda "sissepoole". Jätame selle sõna, mis toob tõstatab terve hulga probleeme, ühele poole, ja ütleme lihtsalt, et me peame oma vaatlemise pöörama väljastpoolt, teistelt ja maailmalt, "iseenda" poole. Enesehool eeldab kindlat teguviisi selle suhtes mida me mõtleme ja mis võtab aset meie mõtetes. Sõna epimeleia on seotud sõnaga melete, mis tähendab korraga harjutamist ja mediteerimist. Jällegi, kõike seda tuleb selgitada;
  • Kolmandaks ei tähista epimeleia mõiste mitte ainult üldist suhtumist sellesse enesele suunatud tähelepanu vormi. Epimeleia tähistab alati ka hulka tegevusi mida harjutatakse enese poolt enese peal, tegevusi mille kaudu inimene võtab enese üle vastutust ja mille kaudu ta muudab, puhastab, transformeerib end ja muudab oma kuju. See sisaldab tervet seeriat praktikaid, millest enamus on harjutused millel on väga pikk saatus Lääne kultuuri, filosoofia, moraalsuse ja spirituaalsuse ajaloos. Need on näiteks mediteerimise, mineviku mäletamise, teadvuse uurimise ja vaimus ilmuvate representatsioonide kontrollimise jne tehnikad.
"
Siin võtab Foucault senikõneldu kokku:
You recall that in the Alcibiades there were, it seems to me, three conditions which determined both the raison d'etre and form of care of the self. One of these conditions concerned the field of application of care of the self: Who must take care of themselves? On this the Alcibiades was quite clear: Those who must take care of themselves are the young aristocrats destined to exercise power. This is clear in the Alcibiades, I am not saying that we find this in other texts of Plato, or even in other Socratic dialogues, but those who must take care of themselves in this text are Alcibiades and those like him, young aristocrats whose status determines that one day they will have to run the city-state. The second determination, obviously linked to the first, is that care of the self has an objective, a precise justification: It is a question of taking care of oneself so that one will be able to exercise properly, reasonably, and virtuously the power to which one is destined. Finally, the third limitation, which appeared quite clearly at the end of the dialuge, is that the major if not exclusive form of the care of the self is self-knowledge: To take care of the self is to know oneself. I think we can say, again as a schematic overview, that when we move to the period I am now talking about, that is to say the first and second centuries A.A., these three conditions appear to have fallen away. When I say that they have fallen away I certainly do not mean, and I would like to stress this once and for all, that this happens at a precise moment and that something brutal and sudden took place at the time of the establishment of the Empire that made the care of the self suddenly and all at once take on new forms. In reality these different conditions laid down for the practice of the care of the self in Alcibiades finally disappeared at the end of a long evolution that is already visible in Plato's work. This evolution, then, can already be seen in Plato and it continues throughout the Hellenic period largely as the effects of, and driven by, all those Cynical, Epicurean, and Stoic philosophies that are put forwards as Arts of living. Anyway, in the period I now want to consider these three determinations (or conditions), which characterized the need to be concerned about oneself in the Alcibiades, have disappeared. At any rate, at first sight, it does seem as if they have dissapeared. (Foucault 2005: 82-83)
"Alkibiadeses oli kolm tingimust mis määrasid niii valitsemisviisi kui ka enesehoole vormi. Üks neist tingimustest puudutas enesehoole rakendusvälja: Kes peavad enese eest hoolt kandma? Selles suhtes on Alkibiades üpris selge: Enda eest peavad hoolt kandma noored aristokraadid kes on määratud kasutama võimu. See on Alkibiadeses selge. Ma ei väida, et me leiame seda teistes Plato tekstides või isegi teistes Sokraatilistes dialoogudes, aga need kes peavad enda eest hoolitsema selles tekstis on Alkibiades ja temasarnased, noored aristokraadid kelle staatus ütleb, et ühel päeval peavad nad linnriiki juhtima. Teine määratlus, ilmselgelt seotud esimesega, on enesehoole eesmärk, täpne õigustus: Enese eest peab hoolitsema selleks, et olla võimeline valitsema õigesti, mõistlikult ja vooruslikult võimu üle mis on talle määratud. Viimaks, kolmas piirang, mis ilmub päris selgelt dialoogi lõpus, suurim või eksklusiivne enesehoole vorm on eneseteadmine: Enda eest hoolitseda tähendab teada iseennast. Võib öelda, jällegi skemaatilise ülevaatena, et kui me liigume perioodi poole millest ma nüüd räägin, see tähendab esimese ja teise sajandi juurde pKr, on need tingimused langenud ära. Kui ma ütlen, et nad on langenud ära, ei mõtle ma seda, et see juhtus täpsel momendil ja midagi julma ja äkitset võttis aset ajal kui Keiserriik kerkis, mis sundis enesehoole järsku ja kogu korraga võtma uusi vorme. Tegelikkuses need erinevad tingimused mis laoti enesehooleks Alkibiadeses kadusid lõplikult pika evolutsiooni lõpus mis oli näha juba Plato töödes. See evolutsioon, seega, on nähtav juba Platos ja see jätkub läbi Hellenistliku perioodi suuresti tänu Küünikute, Epikuurlaste ja Stoikude filosoofiate mida esitletakse elamiskunstidena. Igatahes, perioodil mida ma nüüd arvesse võtan need kolm määrajat (või tingimust), mis kirjeldasid enesehoolt Alkibiadeses, on haihtunud. Igatahes näib esmapilgul, et nad on haihtunud."
There was a tendency to practice, disseminate, and develop the practice of the self outside the philosophical institution, and even outside the philosophical profession, and ot turn it into a mode of relationship between individuals by making it a sort of principle of the individual's supervision by others, of the formation, development, and establishment for the individual of a relationship to himself which finds its fulcrum, its mediating element, in another person who is not necessarily a professional philosopher, although having studied some philosophy and having some philosophical notions is, of course, indispensable. In other words, what I think is at stake here is the problem of the figure and function of the master. In the time of the Sophists, of Socrates and Plato, the master's specificity was based either on his competence and Sophistical know-how, or, with Socrates, on his vocation as theios aner (divine and inspired man), or, as in Plato's case, on the fact that he had already achieved wisdom. Well, this kind of master is not exactly in the process of disappearing, but of being outflanked, encircled, and challenged by a practice of the self that is a social practice at the same time. The practice of the self links up with social practica or, if you like, the formation of a relationship of the self to the other quite clearly connects up with the relationship of the self to the Other. (Foucault 2005: 155)
"Enesepraktika kaldus olema praktiseeritud, levitatud ja arendatud väljaspool filosoofilist institutsiooni, ja isegi väljaspool filosoofilist ametit, kalduvus muutuda suhteks individuaalide vahel, luues sellest individuaali ülevaatamise printsiibi teiste poolt ja kalduvus individuaalil moodustada, arendada ja asutada suhe iseendaga mis leidis võlli, oma vahendava elemendi, isikus kes polnud ilmtingimata ametilt filosoof, kuigi filosoofia õppimine ja mõne filosoofilise mõiste omamine oli muidugi asendamatu. Siin on kaalul meistri funktsioon. Sofistide, Sokratese ja Plato, ajal põhines meistri omapära kas tema kompetentsil ja Sofistlikul teadmisel, või Sokratese puhul tema elukutsel püha ja inspireeritud mehena, või Plato puhul faktil, et ta oli juba saavutanud tarkuse. Sellist tüüpi meisterlus polnud just hääbumise protsessis, aga oli ümbritsetud ja proovile pandud enesepraktika poolt mis oli samal ajal sotsiaalne praktika. Enesepraktika ühineb sotsiaalse praktikaga, enda suhte kujunemine endaga päris selgelt ühendus enda suhtega Teisse."
When the objective of ascesis is to arrive at the constitution of this full relationship of oneself to oneself, its function, or rather its tactic or instrument, is the constitution of a paraskeue. What is it? Well, the paraskeue could be called both an open and an orientated preparation of the individual for the events of life. What I mean is this: In the ascesis, the paraskeue involves preparing the individual for the future, for a future of unforseen events whose general nature may be familiar to us, but which we cannot know whether and when they will occur. It involves, then, finding in ascesis a preparation, a paraskeue, which can be adapted to what may occur, and only to this, and at the very moment it occurs, if it does so. (Foucault 2005: 320-321)
"Kui askeesi eesmärk on jõuda iseenda suhestumiseni isendaga, siis selle funktsioon, või pigem taktika või instrument, on paraskeue moodustamine. Mis see on? Noh, paraskeue-t võib nimetada individuaali avatud ja suunatud ettevalmistust elusündmusteks. Tähendab, askeesises seostub paraskeue individuaali ette valmistamisega tuleviku jaoks, ettenägematute tulevikusündmuste jaoks mille üldine loomus on meile teada, aga mille kohta me ei tea kas ja kuna nad juhtuvad. See seostub, seega, askeesises ettevalmistuse, paraskeue, leidmisega, mida saab kohandada sellele mis juhtub ja ainult sellele, ja just täpselt siis kui see juhtub, kui see juhtub."
Second, of what is this equipment (paraskeue) made up? Well, this equipment with which we must provide ourselves and which enables us to respond properly, at once and with the simplest and most effective means, is made up of logoi (discourses). We must pay close attention here. By logoi it is not enough to understand merely a supply of true propositions, principles, and axioms, etcetera. Discourses should be understood as statements with a material existence. The good athlete, who has the sufficient paraskeue, is not merely someone who knows this or that about the general order of nature or particular percepts corresponding to this or that circumstance. He is someone who has - for the moment I will say "in his head," but we will have to come back to this subject and examine it more closely - driven into him, embedded in him (these are Seneca's expressions in letter 50). (Foucault 2005: 322-324)
"Teiseks, millest see varustus (paraskeue) koosneb? See varustus mida me peame endale pakkuma ja mis võimaldab meil vastata kohaselt, üheselt ja kõige lihtsamail ja mõjukamail moel, koosneb logostest (diskursustest). Me peame siin olema väga tähelepanelikud. Logosed ei ole kõigest varustus tõeseid väiteid, põhimõtteid ja aksioome jne. Diskursuseid tuleks mõista väidetena millel on materjaalne olemasolu. Hea atleet kellel on piisav paraskeue ei ole lihtsalt keegi kes teab seda või teist üldise loomuse või kindlate tajumuste kohta mis vastavad sellele või tollele tingimusele. Ta on keegi kel on - momendil ma ütlen, et "peas", aga me tuleme selle küsimuse juurde tagasi ja uurime seda lähemalt - [paraskeue] sees olemas, osaks saanud."
Secondly, if they approve, and to show they approve, they must express this by a smile and a slight movement of the head. And finally, if they wish to indicate that they are confused, that they do not follow, well, they must gently shake their head and raise the forefinger of the right hand, the gesture we too have all learned at school. So, you see that there is this double register of statuesque immobility, which guarantees the quality of attention and thus allows the logos to penetrate the soul. but also this semiotic game of the body by which the listener both signals his attention, and indicates to himself and assures himself, as it were, that he really does follow and really has understood, and which also, at the same time, guides the speaker's rhythm, guides the rhythm of the discourse and the speaker's explanations. So a sort of active and meaningful silence is required of the good listener of philosophy. This is the first aspect of the, as it were, physical regulation of attention, of correct attention and correct listening. (Foucault 2005: 345)
"Teiseks, kui nad kiidavad heaks, ja et näidata, et nad kiidavad heaks, peavad nad väljendama seda naeratuse ja kerge pealiigutusega. Ja viimaks, kui nad soovivad osutada, et nad on segaduses, et nad enam ei järgi, siis peavad nad õrnalt raputama pead ja tõstma parema käe nimetissõrme, žest mida ma ka meie kõik oleme õppinud koolis. Niiet sa näed, et see väärika liikumatuse kahekordne register, mis tagab tähelepanu kvaliteedi ja seega lubab logosel tungida hinge, aga et see keha semiootiline mäng mille kaudu kuulaja korraga annab märku oma tähelepanust ja osutab endale ja kinnitab endale, justkui, et ta tõesti järgib ja tõesti mõistab, ja mis samal ajal juhatab kõneleja rütmi, juhatab diskursuse rütmi ja kõneleja selgitusi. Seega nõutakse healt filosoofia kuulajalt kindlat aktiivset ja tähenduslikku vaikust. See on esimene aspekt tähelepanu füüsilisest reguleerimisest, õigest tähelepanust ja õigest kuulamisest."
What is anger? Anger is, of course, the uncontrolled, violent rage of someone towards someone else over whom the former, the angry person, is entitled to exercise his power, is in a position to do so, and who is therefore in a position to abuse his power. When you look at these treatises on anger you see that the question of anger is always a question of the anger of the head of the family towards his wife, his children, his household, or his slaves. Or it is the anger of the patron towards his clients or those dependent on him, or of the general towards his troops, and, of course, of the Prince towards his subjects. That is to say, the question of anger, of being carried away by anger or of the impossibility of controlling oneself - let's say more precisely: the impossibility of exercising one's power and sovereignity over oneself insofar as and when one exercises one's sovereignity or power over others - is situated precisely at the point of connection of self-control and command over others, the government of oneselv and government of others. (Foucault 2005: 374)
"Mis on viha? Viha on kellegi kontrollimatu vägivaldne raev kellegi teise suunas, kelle üle vihasel isikul on õigus rakendada oma võimu, on selleks vastavas positsioonis ja kes on seega positsioonis väärkasutada oma võimu. Kui vaadata neid uurimusi vihast siis on näha, et viha küsimus on alati küsimus perekonnapea vihast oma naise vastu, oma laste, oma majapidamise, või orjade vastu. Või on see isanda viha oma klientide või temast sõltuvate vastu, või kindrali viha oma vägede vastu, ja muidugi Printsi viha oma alluvate vastu. See tähendab, viha küsimus, vihast ära kandumise või enese kontrollimise võimatuse küsimus - oma võimu ja valitsemise iseenda üle rakendamise võimatus kuniks ja kui üks rakendab oma valitsemist ja võimu teiste üle - on asetatud täpselt enesekontrolli ja teiste juhtimise, enesevalitsuse ja teiste valitsemise, ristumispunkti."
We can see here then in what respect and how studious otium can play the role of delimiting the function he performs. As an art of onself, which has the aim of ensuring that the individual establish an appropriate and sufficient relationship to himself, studious otium ensures that the individual does not invest his own self, his own subjectivity, in the presumptuous delirium of a power that exceeds its real functions. He puts all the sovereignity he exercises in himself, within himself, or, more precisely, in a relationship of himself to himself. And on that basis, on the basis of this lucid and total sovereignity that he exercises over himself, he will be able to define and delimit the performance of his office to only those functions it has been assigned. This, then, is the good Roman functionary. I think we can use this term. He can exercise his power as a good functionary precisely on the basis of this relationship of the self to self that he obtains through the culture that is his own. (Foucault 2005: 377-378)
"Siin näeme me seda millises mõttes ja kuidas õpinguline vaba aeg võib mängida täidetavate funktsioonide piiramise rolli. Kui enesekunst, millel on siht kindlustada, et individuaal saavutab kohase ja piisava suhte iseendaga, õpinguline vaba aeg kindlustab et individuaal ei investeeri iseennast, oma subjektiivsust, häbematule deliiriumile võimust mis ületab selle tegelikke funktsioone. Ta asetab kogu oma valitsemise mida ta rakendab issendas, iseenda sisse, või täpsemalt, iseenda suhtesse iseendaga. Ja selle alusel, selle selgemõistusliku ja täieliku valitsemise baasil mida ta rakendab iseenda üle, on ta võimeline defineerima ja piiritlema oma kabineti kohusetäitmisi ainult nendele funktsioonidele mis on talle määratud. See on järelikult hea Rooma funktsionäär. Ma arvan, et me võime kasutada seda mõistet. Ta võib rakendada oma võimu kui hea funktsionäär täpselt läbi iseenda suhte iseendasse mille ta saavutab läbi kultuuri mis on ta enda oma."

Viimaks lk 414 kirjeldab Aulus Gellus ka seda, kuidas Pythagoras võttis oma õpilasi vastu nende füsiognoomia järgi ja õpingutele seatud vaikusekohustus sõltus sellest füsiognoomilisest analüüsist.
Ja lk 416-417 defineerib Foucault' askeetika kui "rohkem või vähem koordineeritud kogumik harjutusi mis on saadaval, soovitatavad ja isegi kohustuslikud, igal juhul kasutatavad individuaalide poolt moraalses, filosoofilises ja religioosses süsteemis, et saavutada kindel spirituaalne eesmärk." Viimase all mõtleb ta kindlat transformatsiooni mille kaudu individuaalid saavutavad tõese teadmise.

Suhtluse reguleerimine näo kaudu


Ainsalu, Annaliisa 2000. Suhtluse reguleerimine näo- ja pealiigutuste kaudu eestikeelses meediavestluses. Bakalaureusetöö. Juhendaja Silvi Tenjes. Tartu : Tartu Ülikool

"Vestlus vajab regulatsiooni, sest keeruline on suhelda, kui osutub võimatuks aimata, kes tahab sõna võtta ning kes oma kõnevooru loovutada või katkestada." (lk 4)

"Vestluses kasutab nii kuulaja kui ka kõneleja kõiki oma aistinguid, et luua suhtluspartneri lausete, žestide ja näoväljenduste ühistöö põhjal enda jaoks tähendus." (lk 9)

"Käitumusliku tegevuse alla liigitub verbaalne keel ehk sõnadega väljendatav; paralingvistika - hääletoon, artikulatsioon, häälekõrgus, rütm, valjusus jne ja kineesika ehk kehaga edastatavad liigutused, puudutused ja poosid; kuid mittekäitumusliku hulka võib arvata erinevad füsioloogilised nähtused nagu higistamine, kahvatamine, punastamine, keha temperatuuri tõus, pisarad jne. - nähtused, mis kaasnevad emotsioonidega ja mida on väga raske kontrollida ning ohjeldada." (lk 9) Kentsakal kombel on see Potayoselt pärinev liigitus kooskõlas Rueschi kategooriatega: esimene on action language ja teine on body language. See ei pruugi olla kokkusattumus, sest järgmine ülemkategooria Potayosel on "personaalselt tunnetatavad kehaga seotud aistingud" (lk 10), mis Rueschil on lihtsalt object language.

"Paljud teadlased on seisukohal, et verbaalsel teel edastatud sõnum täidab eelkõige tahtlikku suhtluslikku funktsiooni. Kuid mitteverbaalsel teel edastatud signaaliga rõhutatakse esmajärjekorras oma seisundeid ja kommunikatiivne roll osutub teisejärguliseks..." (lk 12) Vana hea intentsiooni küsimus. Sellele saab väga kergelt vastu vaielda, sest ka enamus käitumisi on vähemal või rohkemal määral tahtlik. Ja samas pole meil ju ka sõnade üle täielikku kontrolli - slip of the tongue, kalduvus öelda seda, mida tegelikult ei tahaks öelda jne. Oma seisundi väljendamine on samuti vaid üks killuke suurest pildist. Lisada võib ka suhtumise vestluspartnerisse, vestluse sisule ja keskkonnale jne.

Näoembleemid: "Enamasti on embleemid käežestid, kuid eksisteerivad ka näoembleemid. Neil embleemidel on sama funktsioon, mis käeembleemidel - nad asendavad sõnu või "teevad märkusi" järgneva lausungi kohta." (lk 15) Kohe järgneb arutlus "infotehnoloogia" teemal, kus Ainsalu mõtleb emootikone, kuid minu mõte triivis kohe näomeemide juurde. Pildid nagu ISHYGDDT, forever alone või trollface tõepoolest täiendavad Internetis verbaalset suhtlemist. Näoembleemide kategooria tuli mulle üllatusena, kuid teisalt saaks sarnaselt käsitleda muidki modaalsusi. Nt minu ühel jalal signatuurpoos oleks seisakuembleem ja jalanõude otsad kokku viimine oleks jalaembleem, aga taolised kategooriad ei näi momendil viivat kuhugi. Iga kehaliigutus võib kanda sümboolset (kokkuleppelist, arbitraarset) tähendust. Siin tuleks muidugi olla tähelepanelik, et Ainsalu räägib korraga näoilmetest (näo lihaste konfiguratsioonid nagu nt emootikonidel) ja näoväljendustest (nt tongue-in-cheek või peakallutus).

lk 16 - nimekiri emootikonidest mida ma ei kujuta ettegi, et keegi tänapäeval Internetis kasutaks ;-J

"Žestid ja näoliigutuse võivad olla kõnet reguleeriva funktsiooniga, sel juhul on kehaliigutused tihedalt seotud vestlusega. Reguleerimine sisaldab mitteverbaalseid märke, mis jälgivad või juhivad vestluspartneri kõnet." (lk 19) Eeldan, et see pidi olema "järgivad", aga ikkagi ei tea, mida ta sellega öelda tahtis. Võib-olla tähtis ta sellega öelda, et ühelt poolt jälgitakse neid märke, et ennast koordineerida ja teiselt poolt kasutatakse selleks, et teist juhtida.

"Ootamatu hingetõmme koos suu avamisega või liialdatud huulte liigutused annavad tunnistust sellest, et kuulajal on öeldule midagi lisada, tavaliselt kaasneb sellega ka käega tehtav žest - sõrme tõstmine andmaks märku, et inimene soovib sõna." (lk 19) Siin on huvitav paralleel - Foucault' analüüsis Vana-Kreeka filosoofide õpetamiskommetest ilmnes, et tõstetud sõrm tähendab arusaamatust. Esmakordsel lugemisel mõtlesin just, et kui tänapäeval loengus parema käe nimetissõrm tõsta, siis ei annaks ma sellega märku arusaamatusest, vaid soovist sõna võtta, nagu on siin kirjeldatud.

"Pilgu suunamise üks olulisematest funktsioonidest on vestluse reguleerimine." (samas) Aga kõige olulisem on ikkagi "vaatamine". Siinkohal märkus endale, et tuleval aastal peaks ikkagi Argyle'i ja Cook'i "Gaze And Mutual Gaze" RVL-i kaudu tellida, kaua ma ikka unistan sellest.

"Kui kuulajaga vastastikust pilkkontakti ei saavutata, siis kõneleja tavaliselt kordab lausungit kõrgendatud või mõnel muul hääletoonil." (lk 20) Tundub liiga absoluutne, aga isiklik kogemus kinnitab. Meenub loeng, kus ma olin "see", kelle poole õppejõud vaatas kõige tihemini ja juhtuski nii, et õppejõud jäi mõnikord samale mõttejupile toppama kuniks ma talle taas oma pilgu ulatasin. See on kummaline näide, sest tegu polnud vestluse, vaid üks-paljudega suhtlemisega, aga silmsideme tähtsus ilmneb siit siiski.

"Suhtluses on kuulajal täita passiivne roll." (lk 23) Verbaalselt, jah - see implikatsioon on juba sõna "kuulaja". Hea kuulaja on kuulates "aktiivses ja tähenduslikus vaikuses", nagu Foucault' seda nimetab.

"Erinevates kultuurides on väljendus- ehk esiletoomise reeglite (ingl display rules) väga erinev osakaal." (lk 30) Mina tõlkisin display rules-i eesti keelde kui kuvamisreeglid.