Semiotica Vol. 1 (1)

Mead, Margaret 1969. "From Intuition to Analysis in Communication Research". In Semiotica (Vol. 1), pp. 13-25
Siin kurdab Mead selle üle, et uute tehnoloogiatega on läinud kaduma intuitiivne oskus märgata (kultuurilisi) mustreid, kuid õnneks tehnoloogia kompenseerib seda:
We have been concentrating - between 1950 and 1965 - on encouraging and developing finer and finer instrumentation to make our work more accessible to other students and more subject to cross checking (Adair and Worth, 1967). While we were doing this a new generation was growing up, many of them without either the experience or training in the arts from which part of our earlier diagnostic skills derived. But the instrumentation which will make it possible for them to construct patterns, even though they cannot perceive them intuitively, is now there for them to use. (Mead 1969: 19)
Kui eelmine tsitaat vihjas kaudselt Birdwhistelli laborile, siis järgmisel leheküljel nimetab ta kineesikast pärinevaid ühikuid koos Alan Lomaxi ühikutega, mida Birdwhistell julgustas:
For those who insist on having units to count, we can give them units, units which come from kinesic, choreometric or cantometric or proxemic analysis (Hall, 1963). (Mead 1969: 20)
Pelc, Jerzy 1969. "Meanins as an Instrument". In Semiotica (Vol. 1), pp. 26-48
Siin on viidatud Osgoodile ja Morrisele kui "arenenud behavioristidele" ja samas ka nimetatud mitteverbaalse suhtlemise alusteks olevat ikoonilised ja indeksilised märgid (märkasin seda ka Tenjese doktoritöös).
The third group of views on the meaning of expressions is formed on the STIMULUS-RESPONSE theories. They are behaviouristic in nature. In their more primitive variations they state that the meaning of an expression is that situation in which that expression has been uttered, and the listener's response to that utterance as a stimulus. In their more refiner form (Ch. Osgood, Ch. Morris) the theory emphasizes the response to the stimulus, while the stimulus situation is disregarded. The starting point here was an analysis of indexical signs, or natural signs, as opposed to conventional symbols. THe modification consists in that a defined response to an utterance ceases to be considered the meaning of that utterenace; it is replaced in that róle by the type of response, i.e., a regular and potential response. This theory is, as it were, a behaviourist, external aspect of associationism: the association of thoughts and/or ideas is replaced by a relationship between acts and types of behaviour. In both cases, however, the underlying idea is that of certain psychological and physiological regularities, with the proviso that the latter prevail in the case of the stimulus-response theory. The latter makes a bridge to the operational theory, which also is based on certain (active) forms of human behaviour. (Pelc 1969: 34)
Ekman, Paul, and Wallace V. Friesen 1969b. "The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding." In Semiotica (Vol. 1), pp. 49-98
Kohe eesimeses lõigus määratlevad nad pealkirjas esiatus mõisted, millele mina annaksin alternatiivsed nimed etogeenne, kontekstuaalne/pragmaatiline ja semiootiline:
If we are to understand fully any instance of a person's non-verbal behavior - that is, any movement or position of the face and/or the body - we must discover how that behavior became part of the person's repertoire, the circumstances of its use, and the rules which explain how the behavior contains or conveys information. We will call these three fundamental considerations ORIGIN, USAGE, and CODING. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 49)
The term 'usage' refers to regular and consistent circumstances surrounding the occurrence of a nonverbal act. Usage includes (1) the external conditions found whenever the act occurs, (2) the realtionship of the act to the associated verbal behvaior, (3) the person's awareness of emitting the act, (4) the person's intention to communicate, (5) feedback from the person observing the act, and (6) the type of information conveyed by the act. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 53)
Kriitika Birdwhiselli suunas:
Birdwshitell and Scheflen have applied a communication framework to nonverbal behavior, based largely upon the argument that much of the nonverbal behavior they observe influences the behavior of the other interactants. We believe that their use of the term 'communicative' is too broad; it fails to distinguish among that behavior which has a shared decoded meaning (informative), that which influences the other person's interaction (interactive), and that which intended to transmit a message (communicative). Many nonverbal behaviors may have interactive effects, but not be intended to communicate nor best be considered as analogous to verbal communication. Similarly, nonverbal behavior with a shared decoded meaning may not be intended to communicate, nor be best considered as analogous to linguistic phenomena. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 57)
The last of the three aspects of nonverbal behavior which must be examined is the principle of corresponcence between the act and its meaning. The code which describes how meaning is contained is a non-verbal act, that is, the rule which characterizes the relationship between the act itself and that which it signfies, may be EXTRINSIC or INTRINSIC. An extrinsic code is one in which it signifies or stand for something else, and the coding may be arbitrary or iconic. An intrinsic code is in a sense no code in that the act does not stand for but IS its significant; the meaning of the act is intrinsic to the action itself. We will characterize these as three coding principles: ARBITRARY (extrinsic) codes, ICONIC (extrinsic) codes, and INTRINSIC codes. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 60)
Spatial illustrators are iconic if tehy represent spatial relationships, intrinsically coded if they actually change spatial relationships. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 70)
Kuvamisreegleid on nelja tüüpi:
DISPLAY RULES are socially learned, probably quite early in life, and prescribe different procedures for the management of affect displays in various social settings, roles, etc. We can distinguish at least four display rules. One rule is to de-intensify the appearance clues to a given affect; for example, when one is extremely fearful he must attempt to look only moderately or slightly fearful. A second display rule is to over-intensify: for example, when one is slightly fearfl he must attempt to look extremely fearful. A third display rule is to look affectless or neutral; for example, when one is fearful, he must attempt to look as if no affect were being experienced. A fourth rule is to mask the felt affect as completely as possible by dissimulating it with another effect; for example, when one is fearful, he must attempt to look happy. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 75)
Implitsiitse suhtlemise mõiste satub küsimuse alla, kui näoilmed muutuvad embleemideks:
Affect displays can be related to verbal behavior in a number of ways. They can repeat, qualify or contradict a verbally stated affect, or be a separate, unrelated channel of communication. Affect displays can be emblems, in that a particular social group or culture may select an entire affective display or an element of an affective display and code it so explicitly that it is recognized and used as an emblem; the smile in many cultures is such an emblem. (Ekman and Friesen 1969b: 77)
Scholte, Bob 1969. "Compte-rendu / Review article: Lévi-Strauss' Penelopean Effort: The Analysis of Myths". In Semiotica (Vol. 1), pp. 99-124
Sarnasus Juri Lotmaniga:
More importantly, we find the continued use of such logico-mathematical terms as symmetry, inversion, equivalence, homology, isomorphism, etc. (CC: 39). Although admittedly to his prevarious and even naive usage of these concepts, Lévi-Strauss employs them freely and often, almost invariably in diagrammatic representations governed by the familiar binary logic (although analogic models are also in evidence, cf. Lévi-Strauss' reply to Leach on p. 74 of Du Miel aux cendres). (Scholte 1969: 102)
Modaalsuse ja koodid:
As this reference indicates, Mythologiques makes extensive use of codes not previously as pronounced in Lévi-Strauss' work - especially those pertaining to the senses: auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactile. There are still other and related ones (e.g., zoological, botanical, organic, aesthetic, religious), but the codes of the senses dominate Mythologiques - from the reflection on music in the "Ouverture" in Le Cru et le cuit to the analysis of "les instruments des ténébres" in Du Miel aux cendres. (Scholte 1969: 105)

The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (3)

The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (3), September 1972. Ma pole endiselt kindel, kas selline viitamine on õige. Vol. 22 (4) on eriväljaaanne, mille toimetajate nimed (Harrison & Knapp) olid teada, käesoleva väljaande toimetajaks on märgitud Paul D. Holtzmann. Erinevalt eriväljaandest, mis oli pühendatud mitteverbaalsele suhtlemisele, on käesolevas mõned artiklid mis puudutavad žeste ja paralingvistikat, ülejäänud käsitlevad kommunikatsiooniteooriaga seotud aspekte.

Donald Cushamn and Cordon C. Whiting. An Approach to Communication Theory: Toward Consensus and Rules

Kahte tüüpi reeglid:
We believe there is a class of human actions whose significance is largely dependent on consensually shared rules. These rules control the unfolding of the action over time and constitute its meaning. The rules, it seems to us, are of two basic types: (1) those which specify the action's content (its meaning, what it is to count as) and those which specify the procedures appropriate to carrying out the action. It is these rules which assure the success of complex, interdependent transactions in society. The constitutive rules govern, the procedural rules guide. (Cushan & Whiting 1972: 217)

Reeglid saavutavad korra ja regulaarsuse suhtlemisprotsessis:
What do rules attain? Order and regularity in the communication process. They do this by governing and guiding the communicative transactions. As indivated, we distinguish two general classes of communication rules: the content or constitutive rules and the procedural rules. (Cushan & Whiting 1972: 219-220)

Muud huvitavat: tähenduse personaalne ja interpersonaalne tasand.

Abraham Tesser, Sidney Rosen and Thomas Batchelor. Some Message Variables and the MUM Effect

No doubt there are numerous possible determinants of felt desire to communicate. Some of the reasons may be instrumental. For example, the communicator may anticipate some material benefit in exchange for transmitting. Or, he may derive status satisfaction from being perceived as a possessor of news. On the other hand, the reasons may be terminal. For example, he may look forward with enjoyment to the anticipated emotional response of the recipient. Or, he may enjoy talking. He may also enjoy the role of informant. (Tesser, Rosen & Batchelor 1972: 241)

Jacquieline J. Harris and Maxwell E. MeCombs. The Interpersonal/Mass Communication Interface Among Church Leaders

Nada. Statistiline uurimus sellest kui palju kirikutegelased otsivad informatsiooni massimeediast.

Timothy P. Meyer and Vernon E. Cronen. Agnew Meets the Student Dissenters: An Experimental Study of Ego-Involvement and Argumentation

Nada. Poliitiline analüüs tollase asepresidendi ja üliõpilaste suhetest ja kuidas televisioon seda muutis.

Peter Wolff and Joyce Gutstein. Effects of Induced Motor Gestures on Vocal Output

Siin on sama idee mis kumab Tenjese töödes - käežestid eelnevad sõnadele ja on tõenäoliselt sama tähendussüsteemi osad:
While the organized lexicon is presumed to be an integral part of the linguistic production and interpretation system, story production involves a thematic organization which may occur prior to its linguistic interpretation. If so, it is reasonable to propose that the gestures were processed at a level more fundamental than that of a lexicon, and perhaps more fundamental than the vocal system itself. The fact that self-produced gestures, as well as observed gestures affected the stories make the hypothesis at least plausible that during the communication act, non-verbal activity is based in this same prelinguistic meaning system as the concurrent vocal activity. Furthermore, the motoric expressive system may actually influence the vocal. In our observations of video-taped monologues we have isolated several segments which further support this hypothesis. Ocasionally an S[ubject], involved in vocal exposition with accompanying gestures, would express an idea or a physical description motorically before the verbal statement became available.(Wolff and Gutstein 1972: 287)

James C. Cardiner. The Effects of Expected and Perceived Receiver Responses on Source Attitudes

It was reasoned that the communication source brings a number of salient cognitions into a communication event. First, he has a self-concept as a communicator, based on his past successful or unsuccessful performances. Second, he has had an expectation of the response he will receive from the audience. Third, he has an attitude toward the audience. Finally, he has an attitude toward the topic he is presenting. As the communication event progresses, and the receivers respond to the message, these four attitudes will interact and change. The manner in which they are modified was the focus of this study. (Cardiner, 1972: 290)

Geriff Wolf, Roy Gorski and Stephen Peters. Acquaintance and Accuracy of Vocal Communication of Emotions


Harvey A. Eastman. A Communication Theory Bibliography Speaks Out - Softly

Statistiline analüüs märksõnadest mis seostuvad kommunikatsiooniteooriaga.

Lean Vande Creek and John T. Watkins. Responses to Incongruent Verbal and Nonverbal Emotional Cues

Channel reliance, mittemidagiütlev eksperiment.

Eldon E. Baker. Implictions and Explications

Viimaks mõned asjalikud mõtteterad mille kallal nokkida:
  1. "Communication can be associated with successful transmission of information from participant to participant." Participants disrutb light or sound waves. Information or "patterned energy" resides in the participants. Measures of shared information, therefore, must be dependent on the participants' behaviors, not the physical dynamis of transmission.
  2. "Communication involves understanding by the receiver as intended by the source." Communication or "meaning assignation" occurs in the relative absence of understanding by the receiver as intended by the source, perhaps most of the time.
  3. "No major communication theorist has systematically treated content and procedural rules as a fundamental concern in communication theory." I can discern little difference between "content and procedural rules" and "mental sets." Mental sets have been concerned for communication theorists for many years. Cushman and Whiting, however, make a contribution by amplifying the nature and role of rules or mental sets in the communication process.
(Baker 1972: 317)

Book Review Section edited by John L. Petelle

Kõneldes raamatust "Imagery And Verbal Process" mille autoriks on Alan Paivio, öeldakse järgnevat:
Paivio concludes that imagery that is "...nonverbal memory representations of concrete objects and events .... actively generated and manipulated by the individual ..." is generally visual and concrete, whereas the verbal process can be concrete, but is typified by higher abstractness, much as Sir Francis Galton (inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development, 1883) and Count Alfred Korzybski (Science and Sanity, 1933) believed.

Nonverbal means as regulators in communication

Tenjes, Silvi 2001. Nonverbal means as regulators in communication: sociocultural perspectives. Tartu: Tartu University Press

Nüüdseks olen läbi lugenud nii bakatöö, magistritöö ja doktoritöö. Viimase teistkordsel lugemisel sulas tekst pilgu all kiiresti, sest eelnevate tööde lugemisest tundsin paljud teemad ära. Kindlasti jäi selle tõttu ka palju kahe silma vahele, aga üldpilt kujunes seekord paremini. Esimesel korral kurdsin katsekirjelduste rohkuse üle, sel korral tajusin, et samade empiiriliste andmete kohta järeldati erinevates artiklites erinevaid asju.
Kuna enamus tekstist voolas sujuvalt mõttelt mõttele ja iga vähegi kaugeleulatuvam idee oli toetatud tsitaadiga mõnest žeste käsitlevast artiklist, jäi järele väga vähe sellist teksti, mida pean kasulikuks tsiteerida. Järgnev blockquote on kokkuvõte Efroni kategooriatest, mis tegelikult tuleks ümber tõsta Efroni raamatu kokkuvõttesse, kui ma kunagi kord peaksin Efroni raamatut ise lugema.
  • Spatial-temporal. He first studies the spatial-temporal aspects of gestures. Here, a gesture is just a movement that portrays relationships in space:
    1. radius (span of movement);
    2. shape (straightforward, circular);
    3. direction (relathionship between the speaker and the listener);
    4. parts of the body (head, fingers; unilateral or bilateral movement).
  • Interlocutive, i.e. involving interactive aspects of gestures:
    1. familiarity;
    2. performance of simultaneous gestures;
    3. use of space and distance;
    4. gestures towards objects.
  • Linguistic. Efron investigates the referential meaning of a gesture and provides the following classification:
    1. Logic-discursive: Gestures not related to an object or idea but ot the process of expressing these ideas in action. They stress the verbal-vocal behavior or the content of the message, and are related to the presented ideas on the how - rather than on the what - level.
      1. batons, omvement sthat accent a particular word or phrase. They denote the tempo of the mental activity accompanying speech.
      2. ideographs: movements that trace the flow of an idea;
    2. Objective: gestures possessing their own, speech-independent meaning which may or may not change the meaning of the message:
      1. deictic: gestures referring to an observable object, pointing to available referents;
      2. pictographs: gestures conveying their meaning in an observable way:
        1. iconographs: gestures depicting the form of the observable object;
        2. kinetographs: movements that depict a bodily action;
      3. emblems or symbols: gestures that replace words and are encoded arbitrarily and with intent (e.g., the hand signals of a baseball catcher or a coach). They have a standard meaning in a culture that is specifically attached to the meaning. If an emblem possesses a morphological similarity to the depicted object it is considered a hybrid emblem.
(Tenjes 1996: 167-168
Midagi ligilähedast mõistetele "mitteverbaalsele märgi-repertuaar" või "ihuline ajalugu":
Iconic gestures are designed to communicate; they provide imagery and kinaesthetic profiles. Gestures receive the attention of the listener and thereby become components of conceptual understanding. Gestures are functionally adapted to the requirements of understanding in human communication. Therefore, one has to examine how these structures aid listeners in the processing of speech. It is appreciated when speakers have the ability to make themselves understood because of the unconscious intelligence of their bodies, that is, their hand's competence is surrounding speech with subtle, intricate, and "telling" spatial imagery. (Tenjes 2001b: 17)
Mõned viited:
  • Tenjes, Silvi 1996. "Gestures in Dialogue". In Estonian in the Changing World. H. Õim, ed. 163-192, Tartu : University of Tartu
  • Tenjes, Silvi 2001. "Gestures as pre-positions in communication". Trames, Vol 5 (55/50), No 4, pp 302-320.
  • Efron, David 1972. Gesture, Race and Culture. Paris and Hague: Mouton (Originally published in 1941 as Gesture and Environment. New York: King's Crown Press)
  • McNeill, D. 1992. Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal About Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
  • Mehrabian, A. 1971. Silent Messages. Belmont: Wadsworth
  • Poyatos, F. 1980. "Interactive Functions and Limitations of Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviors in Natural Conversation". Semiotica 30, 3/4, 211-244
  • Scheflen, A. E. 1973. Communicational Structure. Bloomington: Indiana University press

The Explanation of Social Behaviour

Harré, Rom & Secord, P. F. 1976. The Explanation of Social Behaviour. Oxford : Blackwell

Viite sellele raamatule leidsin Argyle'i raamatu sissejuhatusest/tänusõnadest. Üks autoritest on sotsiaalpsühholoog ja teine on filosoof. Teose eesmärk näib olevat käitumise uurimiseks "uue meetodi" formaliseerimine. Sisaldab rohkesti kriitikat laborikatsetele ja behaviourismile (Skinner saab jälle vatti) ning laenab sellistelt autoritelt nagu Goffman, Garfinkel, Austin, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss jne.
Raamatu füüsilisel koopial näib olevat pikk ajalugu. Selles on mingi Soome kirjastuse/ülikooli templeid, rohkesti eesti/soome-keelseid harilikuga tehtud ääremärkusi (põhiliselt lõikude üldidee ühe-kahe sõnaga) ning Tartu Ülikooli psühholoogia- ja sotsiaalteaduste osakondade templeid. Mina sain ta sotsiaalteaduste osakonna raamatukogu hoidlast. Hoolimata sellest, et raamatu esimene kolmandik hakkab kergelt välja kukkuma kaante vahelt, leidsin sellest palju huvitavat. Sh on võimalik, et nende autorite "episood" ja Juri Lotmani "tekst" on võrreldavad. Arvan, et seda teost tuleks lugeda vanema-targemana uuesti.

"Mõistatuslikud" episoodid ei oma selget struktuuri ega selgitust (erinevalt paradigmaatilisest):
Most episodes cannot be clearly classified: they are enigmatic, having neither an explicit set of rules, nor produced by well-established causal mechanisms. Enigmatic episodes are explained by applying to them concepts used in the explanation of those paradigmatic episodes which themselves have clear explanations, be they formal or causal. The structure of episodes has two levels: overt and covert. The former consists of the act-action sequence, contained in the episode; the latter, of the permanent and transitory powers and states of readiness and the flux of emotions that underlie the episode. (Harré & Secord 1976: 12)

Social behavior must be conceived of as action mediated by meanings, not responses caused by stimuli. (Harré & Secord 1976: 29)

Ühiskondlik käitumine on tähenduslik käitumine ja muuhulgas suhtlemise tähtsus:
Social behaviour is meaningful behaviour. It involves an agent with certain intentions and expectations, an agent capable of deliberating and choosing from a variety of courses of action, and whose words and actions are understood by his fellows. A central part of this whole process is communication between people. (Harré & Secord 1976: 35)

Semiootilise reaalsuse algmed:
...if we consider people as agents, then we must connect their social behaviour to a network of concepts appropriate to the description of self-controlled actions in a world of agents who have interests and who follow rules and plans in their dealings with other agents. So, what we see in social reality, is not, for example, an arm moving upwards, but a man trying to attract attention, a man greeting a friend, and so on. When we see an action of a certain sort we thus connect what we see with a conceptual context uttely different from that involved in seeing movements, and this context determines the form of explanation that is appropriate. (Harré & Secord 1976: 38)

Siit tuleneb võimalus astuda edasi kehaliste liikumiste uurimisest ühiskondliku käitumise suunas:
In effect, the philosophers we referred to above are recommending a consideration of the kind of explanation of behaviour that is familiar to us as laymen, and that is naturally couched in the subtle and expressive medium of ordinary language. It is an explanation of action that is intentional and purposive. Actions are explained in terms of the ends for which they are performed. Objections to teleological forms of explanation that had once been considered definitive have been re-examined by philosophers and found to be neither as sound nor as final as they once seemed to be. This point of view also implies that the behaviourist programme of reducing complex actions to simple, independent behavioural elements, capable of independent explanation, is impossible, since psychologists would then be studying something quite different from the social life of human beings. It is complex and deliberate actions, unified through their contributions to the meaning of the total act, that constitute the true subject matter of human social behaviour.
Our view of man, which we elaborate still further as our investigation develops, may be summarized as follows:
1. A man is capable of initiating action, action that may take place only after deliberation and with a more or less clear end in view. The whole of the action sequence may be anticipated in a more or less clearly formulated plan.
2. Most human action cannot be, and may need not be traced to antecedent events linked to the actions in a regular, chain-like fashion in order to be explained in a satisfactory manner. An explanation is not unscientific because it makes reference to such items as plans and rules, or because it assumes the social actor to be one who deliberately follows them.
3. Action cannot be described reductively in terms of movements which are the vehicles for action, without losing its character and meaning. Human action is by nature psychological, and it cannot be reduced to physiological or physics, or even to simply observed behavioural elements without destroying it. (Harré & Secord 1976: 40-41)

Verbaalsete interaktsioonide ritualiseeritus:
A good many verbal interactions between strangers are constrained by highly developed rituals, as in many customer-salesman interactions, such as the rituals governing calls at service stations, purchases in a shop, paying conductors on buses and the like. In the cases just mentioned there is a clear role definition for each participant and that determines which ritual is performed. By adhering to the role definitions other aspects of the self are protected. Even when there are no clear role definitions interaction between strangers occurs under powerful conventions giving it a highly ritualstic character. Most, if not all cultures, have definite rituals by which this situation is handled. (Harré & Secord 1976: 62)

Veenmisel pööratakse tähelepanu aspektidele, millele varem tähelepanu ei pööratud:
The over-riding of the self-ascription of mentalistic predicated does occur, but not by confrontation with any bodily fact. It occurs by a restructuring of meaning. When we try to persuade the person to 'see' his situation differently, to attend to other aspects of a situation than those he was considering, and so on, we are trying to change the meaning of the situation for him. We are trying to get him to ascribe different meanings to things and situations from those he ascribed before which influenced his past choice of mentalistic predicates. If this is true, it must be possible for out subject to counter-persuade us to see the matter his way too. (Harré & Secord 1976: 113)

Kaks käitumist suunavat äärmust, väline ja sisemine mõju:
The regularities observed in the behaviour of people may be explained according to several different schemata. One of the most interesting and natural dimensions along which these explanatory schemata may be contrasted is the extent to which the person is regarded as an agent directing his own behaviour. At one extreme he may be seen simply as an object responding to the push and pull of forces exerted by the environment. At the other, he may be seen as an agent guiding his behaviour toward some explicit goal by some means of which he is thoroughly aware. We may think of the former as focusing upon environmental contingencies and biological mechanisms and the latter as emphasizing self-direction, often by such means as following a rule. (Harré & Secord 1976: 136)

Episoodi kontsept:
1. Any natural division of social life is an episode.
2. The content of a social episode includes not only overt behaviour, but the thoughts, feelings, intentions and plans, etc., of the participants. (Harré & Secord 1976: 147)

Kehalised liigutused, tegutsemine ja tegu:
A person makes all sorts of bodily movements in the course of an episode, contracting and relaxing muscles in various sequences. Some of these movements can be seen or heard or felt by others, some are known to others only through their effects. Some of these movements we wish to treat as actions, and in some of these actions we see acts performed. We watch a man's hand move toward the extended fourth finger of a woman and slip a gold ring on that finger. If this movement meets certain criteria it is an action in the performing of which, together with certain other actions, a marriage is achieved, that is, an act is performed. A movement is given meaning as an action by being identified as the performance or part of the performance of an act. (Harré & Secord 1976: 158)

Jagatud tähendused - sarnased käitumised:
On the Role-rule group of models similarities in people's behaviour does not necessarily derive from similarities in external manipulation or change of a parameter, or from internal modifications, but from shared meanings and commonly accepted conventions, rules and paradigms. (Harré & Secord 1976: 234)

Võimu peatükist leidsin midagi sümbolitega manipuleerimisest; lõpus esitatud väide, et mitteverbaalne interaktsioon ei ole refleksiivne pärineb Argyle'i raamatust "Social Interaction":
Thus possibility in the ethogenic context is related to such concepts as 'plan', 'foresight' and the like. These in turn can be referred to that very generla linguistic capacity or power to handle symbols. Such powers endow their possessors not only with the capacity to conceive plans and to discuss what might or could be done, but also endow them with the powers of symbolic interaction, which were seen by G. H. Mead as the basis of all social phenomena, among men and social animals. This entails the existence of capacities to understand symbols as well as to emit them, and is what enables us to use symbols reflexively, i.e., to understand what we are saying as well as to give ourselves orders. Non-verbal interaction is not reflexive since it need contain no element of awareness. (Harré & Secord 1976: 246-247)

Nonverbal Communication

Mehrabian, Albert 1972. Nonverbal Communication. University of California, Los Angeles

Kohe esimesel leheküljel annab Mehrabian mitteverbaalsele suhtlemisele määratluse:
In its narrow and more accurate sense, "nonverbal behavior" refers to actions as distinct from speech. [...] In the broader sense in which the concept has been used traditionally, however, the term "nonverbal behavior" is a misnomer, for a variety of subtle aspects of speech frequently have been included in discussions of nonverbal phenomena. These include paralinguistic or vocal phenomena, such as fundamental frequency range and intensity range, speech errors or pauses, speech rate, and speech duration. (Mehrabian 1972: 1)

Miks Mehrabian eelistab "implitsiitset kommunikatsiooni"? Sest mitteverbaalse suhtlemise jaoks puuduvad eksplitsiitsed kodeerimisreeglid enamikes kultuurides:
It is more the subtlety, then, of a communication form than its verbal versus nonverbal quality which determines its consideration within the nonverbal literature. Nonverbal behaviors per se form the backbone of this literature. Their subtlety can be attributed to the lack of explicit coding rules for these behaviors in most cultures. Whereas verbal cues are definable by an explicitndictionary and by rules of syntax, there are only vague and informal explanations of the significance of various nonverbal behaviors. Similarly, there are no explicit rules for encoding or decoding paralinguistic phenomena or the more complex combinations of verbal and nonverbal behavior in which the nonverbal elements contribute heavily to the significance of a message. (Mehrabian 1972: 2)

Mida mina mõtlesin arusaamatuse vältimiseks nimetada "prokseemiliseks vahetuseks" (immediacy), et eristada seda meediumi vahetuseks, on siin Watsoni järgi vahetuskäitumised:
Differential preferences of proxemic or immediacy cues have been the major focus of the available studies of cultural communication codes. Immediacy behaviors are those which increase the mutual sensory stimulation between two persons. (Mehrabian 1972: 6)

Meediasemiootiline diskussioon:
Beyond its use for categorizing posture and position cues, the concept of immediacy broadly describes the extent to which any communication behavior reflects or involves a closer interaction. For the posture and position cues, greater immediacy is the result of increasing physical proximity and/or perceptual availability of the communicator to the addressee. Thus, a face-to-face conversation is more immediate than one via video tape, which in turn is more immediate than a conversation over the telephone. Less immediate still is a communication, such as a letter, involving the written medium only. The basic hypothesis relating immediacy to attitudes predicts that less immediacy is selected by a communicator when he has negative feelings toward his addressee, toward the contents of his communication, or toward his addressee, toward the contents of his communication, or toward the act of communicating those contents (Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968). An employer is using less immediate communication when he expresses discontent to ann employee via an intermediary rather than in a face-to-face confrontation. In line with the hypothesis, the employer's choice illustrates his difficulty or discomfort in expressing what he has to say. The "Dear John" letter also exemplifies the preference for a less immediate medium to convey contents that are distressing to express in person. (Mehrabian 1972: 31)

Verbal communications seem to have evolved to denote an "objective" world. Consequently, experiences of affect, evaluation, or preference, which are concomitant with the experience of a complex stimulus, cannot be readily and verbally expressed. That is, in most cultures there are restraints imposed on the communication of affect, evaluation, or preference, particularly when these are negative. If a person experiences affect about an event and does not describe it, then there is an additional component accruing to his experience - the relative uncommunicability of that affect. This unverbalized affect can interfere with the communication process, resulting in ambiguous or idiosyncratic references to internal states. It can also lead to speech disruptions such as the slips, errors, or false starts analyzed by Mahl (1959), or to blocking and hesitation. For example, if someone cannot use the direct form, "Jack makes me anxious," sequencing may be evident in his statements as follows: "I see Jack. . . . I don't feel so good." In this instance both components are present in the communication, but they are not related. (Mehrabian 1972: 32-33)

Miks tüübid kes tänaval jalutades ALATI naeratavad näivad olevat väga madala enesekindlusega:
...frequent smiling in a socially akward situation may indicate a less confident feeling in the communicator rather than a liking for the addressee. In other social situations, however, where the communicator and addressee are moderately familiar, frequency of smiling could be more an indicator of liking than of discomfort. (Mehrabian 1971: 82)

Veel üks nimekiri kommunikatsiooninähtustest, mille üle tasuks mõtiskleda:
Thus, the study included negative affect-arousing cues in combination with social situations varying in formality. One group of factors was: (1) liking of the addressee, (2) degree of conflict and irritation between the speaker and addressee, and (3) pleasantness of the addressee's behavior toward the speaker. A second group of factors related to the formality of the communication situations: (4) the degree of formality of the communication setting, (5) the status of the speaker relative to the addressee, (6) the presence versus absence of bystanders at the time of the addressee to accept unambiguous expressions of dislike toward himself, and (8) the implicit versus explicit quality of a negative message from the addressee to the speaker. (Mehrabian 1972: 111)

Midagi feministliku diskursuse tarbeks:
These findings supported the view expressed by Wiener and Mehrabian (1968) that our culture discourages the explicit verbalization of negative feelings, and consequently the implicit communication channels have assumed the function of expressing such attitudes. The finding that females are better encoders of negative attitude than are females is in line with this cultural explanation, since males seem to have greater latitude to express negative feelings explicitly. (Mehrabian 1972: 145)

Siin ilmneb, et manipulatiivse käitumise puhul suureneb responsiveness, kuid tegelik positiivne suhtumine suureneb väga vähesel määral. Kõlab loogiliselt, sest veenmisele orienteeritud suhtluskaaslased üritavad tagasside kaudu kontrollida oma esitust, kuid liigse sõbralikkusega kaotaksid nad oma ohjad olukorra üle:
The second factor, responsiveness, which is correlated only slightly with communication of liking, reflects the extent to which the subject is reacting to another, whether in a positive or a negative way. In persuasive communication situations, for instance, in which the nonverbal expression of liking may be construed as manupulative or insincere, it has been found that increased attempts at persuasion are associated with increased responsiveness to the listener but with only slight increases in actual positiveness toward him. (Mehrabian 1972: 153)

Olen varem lugenud selle kohta, kuidas Mehrabiani jt katseid on väärtõlgendatud. Nüüd leidsin, et käesoleva raamatu 182. lehekülg on selle väärtõlgenduse põhjuseks. Kuigi kõne all on taaskord inconsistent messages, ütleb sõnastus, et need arvud võivad kehtida enamikel juhtudel ("Our studies have produced an answer for most cases in the form ofa simple linear model."). Kaasa aitab ka see, et sama valem on samal leheküljel kaks korda, esimesel korral "Total liking" ja teisel korral "Total feeling". Mis tuli mulle aga üllatusena on otsene väärtõlgendus: kehakeeleõpikud ütlevad, et 55% infost pärineb "kehakeelest", Mehrabian ise ütleb aga, et näoilmetest!
Total liking = 7% verbal liking + 38% vocal liking + 55% facial liking
Lõppkokkuvõttes oli raamatu sisu midagi muud kui olin lootnud. Tegelik sisu koosnes teaduslike katsetuste kirjeldustest. Nagu oli hoiatatud, läks keskel tõepoolest väga kvantitatiivseks. Kohe nii väga, et neist arvudest tehtud järeldused olid lugemisel kogu aeg kahtluse all. See pani mõtlema, et kui keegi väidab midagi tühja koha peale ja teeb seda veenvalt, on seda väga kerge tõe pähe võtta; teisalt kui esitatakse põhjalik kirjeldus sellest kuidas hüpoteesi kontrollitakse, tekib ikkagi kahtlus, kas tulemusi annab usaldada. Kvantitatiivses osas saavutatud järeldustele pöörasin lugedes ka vähem tähelepanu. Mul on teos PDF failina olemas, niiet kui on vaja midagi järele vaadata, on selleks alati võimalus. Kunagi tuleks üle vaadata ka raamatu lõpus esitatud nimekiri muutujatest, mida Mehrabian oma katsetes kasutas. Nimekiri on põhjalik ja kuigi tänapäeval enam ei ammenda suurt midagi, annab vähemasti aimu kuhu poole katsetes on tüüritud. Teistkordsel lugemisel tuleks silma peal hoida ka sellel, kuidas Mehrabian oma semantilist ruumi (kolme dimensiooni) igas peatükis kirjeldab - just nagu Lotman oma teksti ja kultuuriga, näis Mehrabian oma semantilist ruumi vastavalt vajadusele nipet-näpet muutvat. Nendest erinevustest võib midagi saada.

The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (4)

Arvatavasti tuleb viitamisel lisada artikli autori ja pealkirja järele just selline lausung: The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (4), December 1972

Randall P. Harrison and Mark L. Knapp, Specia Issue Editors. Towards an Understanding of Nonverbal Communication Systems

Mitteverbaalse suhtlemine ja kommunikatsioonimudelid:
Historically, scholars have long wrestled with "models" for communication which, on one hand, could sort out the most crucial variables, while, on the other hand, capturing the richness and complexity of human interaction. Implicitly and explicitly, these models have influenced the way researchers have appraoched the communication process. And, conversely, they present an interesting historicla sketch of the assumptions man has held about communication.
To touch just a few: (a) Aristotle talked about the speaker-speech-audience; (b) Lasswell asked: who says what in which channel to whom with what effect? (c) Shannon investigated the source-transmitter-channel-receiver-destination; (d) Berlo emphasized source-message-channel-receiver. Each of these has proven a useful intellectual tool. But these models have been most appropriate in analyzing communication systems which are linear, directional, one-way, source-oriented, single-channel, where messages are verbal rather than affective, and where the primary concern has been on the transmission of information or influence, rather than on other possible communication outcomes. Currently, we see a growing interest in communication systems, total communication ecology, affective as well as cognitive consequences, and pluralistic communication outcomes. The interest in nonverbal symbolism has fed upon and in turn stimulated these new concerns. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 342)

Kaks olulist küsimust, mis Tartu-Moskva koolkonna sõnades kõlaks järgnevalt: Kui mitteverbaalne suhtlemine oleks semiosfäär siis (a) kus asub selle piir verbaalse suhtes ja (b) kuidas eristada (heterogeenseid) käitumisi mis on motiveeritud ja mis ei ole:
This array presents an exciting and challenging domain. but it also reflects a lot of intellectual confusion, particularly when researchers try to move from speculation to investigation. The confusion exists at two levels: (a) where to draw the boundary between verbal and nonverbal; and (b) where to chart the far perimeter between communication and non-communication. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 343)

Selleks ajaks oli juba selge, et mitteverbaalset suhtlemist uuritakse erinevatelt platvormidelt, üks on lingvistilise suunaga ja on harjunud mõtlema keelestruktuurides ning teine on psühholoogilise suunitlusega ja on huvitunud märgist:
Perhaps one final ambiguity is worth noting. Increasingly, there has been a move toward specifying the signs and sign patterns used in nonverbal communication. (This at least sorts out observable communication systems from the less observable, e.g., mental telepathy, extrasensory perception, casting spells, etc.) But there is still a theoretical difference between the linguistically oriented researches, who is used to thinking of language system or structure, and the psychologically oriented researcher who is happy with looking at a stimulus, e.g., a sign. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 345)

Väga tähtis on ka küsimus kuidas eristada signaale mida märkavad osalejad ja mida märkavad jälgijad/uurijad:
Increasingly, however, there is a recognition that there may be nonverbal acts or events which are "sign-vehicles" or "markers" (i.e., perceivable stimuli for some observer). But these markers may or may not be "signs" for a given receiver. (i.e., they may or may not have "sign value" or "meaning". This is an open question for investigation and not an assumption which can be made without empirical exploration. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 345)

Just nagu bahavioreme ja acteme, tabab nagu välk selgest taevast mind järjekordne tähelepanuta jäänud termin:
Another anthropologist, Roger Wescott, has suggested "coenesis/coenesics" as a label to blanket paralanguage, proxemics, posture, facial expression, body movement, intonation, and interactional events. This label is supported by Adam Kendon, who feels that "nonverbal communication" is too vague, and that more specific, and less negative, terminology should be used. (Harrison & Knapp 1972: 346)

Paul Ekman and Walace V. Friesen. Hand Movements

Jälle näen mina autokommunikatsioonist kõnelemist, sel puhul mitteverbaalset laadi:
People have experiences as individuals when alonge, changes in feelings and mood. Nonverbal behavior may then be the only source of information about their experience, since people rarely speak when alone; and nonverbal behavior may be an especially rich source in such circumstances, because when the individual is alone his nonverbal behavior is less subject to inhibition or control for social reasons. If we are to understand the infleunce of social rules about nonverbal behavior in interpersonal interactions, particularly about the management of what we have defined as affect displays and self-adaptors, we msust also examine the individual when he is alone. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 354)

Loomuomane (intrinsic) käitumine on mulle varem silma jäänud, siit sain ka tähenduse - need on tegevused mis tähistavad iseennast:
We distinguished three types of coding. An arbitrarily coded act has no visual resemblance to its significant; the movement in no way looks like or contains a clue to what it means. An iconically coded act carries the clue to its decoding in its appearance; the sign looks in some way like what it means. An intrinsically coded act is like an iconic one, visually related to what it signifies, but here the act does not resemble its significant; it is its significant. For example, if one person hits another during conversation, the hitting act is not iconic but intrinsic, the act is the significant. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 356-357)

Kaheksa erinevat illustraatori tüüpi:
  • batons: movements which accent or emphasize a particular word or phrase
  • ideographs: movements which sketch the path or direction of thought
  • deictic movements: pointing to an object, place, or event
  • spatial movements: movements which depict a spatial relationship
  • rhythmic movements: movements which depict the rhythm or pacing of an event
  • kinetographs: movements which depict a bodily action, or some non-human physical action
  • pictographs: movements which draw a picture in the air of the shape of the referent
  • emblematic movements: emblems used to illustrate verbal statements, either repeating or substituting for a word or phrase
(Ekman and Friesen 1972: 360)

Enesetapu embleemid erinevates kultuurides:
Many messages are emblematic in more than one culture, but a different movement is used in each culture. With many of these the message involves a use of tools. For example, in the U.S. the emblem for suicide is placing the hand on the temple, with the index finger, with the hand in the "gun-shooting" emblem position (index finger extended, thumb raised and moved towards and away from the index finger, and the other fingers curled into the palm). In the Fore of New Guinea the emblem for suicide is grabbing the throat with an open hand and pushing up, a representation of hanging, which is how these people commit suicide. In japan the suicide emblem is either to plunge one fist into the stomach, a representation of hari-kari, or to draw the index finger across the neck, a representation of slitting the throat. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 365)

Mida lotmaanias võiks nimetada haptiliseks autokommunikatsiooniks, kannab hea lapsena mitmeid nimesid:
All have a category similar to our self-adaptors; Rosenfeld [24] called this category self-manipulations, Mahl [21] called it autistic, and Freedman and Hoffman [15] called it body-focused. All agree that this behavior related to negative feelings. There is disagreement about the specific negative feelings involved, their functions and meanings, and the usefulness of drawing further distinctions within this sphere of activity. (Ekman and Friesen 1972: 372)

See oli huvitav artikkel. Nad jätsid oma täielikust tüpoloogiast palju välja mahukuse tõttu, kuid see-eest korvasid pildi ja mõne hea faktoidiga. Näiteks, et valetavad inimesed suunavad avatud peopesi "teadmatuses" kauem/rohkem üles (kvantitatiivselt), valetades väheneb illustraatorite kasutamine, masenduses/tüdimuses/väsimuses väheneb illustraatorite kasutamine samuti ja žest mis Argyle raamatust leitud tabeli järgi Kolumbias ja USAs (allikas: Saitz and Vervenka 1972) kannab tähendust 'faux pas' tähendab Ekmani ja Frieseni järgi samas ka enesetappu. Terviklikum tähendus oleks vististi "mul on nii häbi oma normi-hälbiva käitumise tõttu, et sooviksin teha enesetappu" (juhul, kui see žest on suunatud enda käitumisele muidugi).

Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Linda M. Ludwig. Visual Behavior in Social Interaction

Visuaalne interaktsioon (silmkontakt) on tuttav sõnapaar ühest aimekirjanduslikust kehakeeleõpikust. Siis pidasin seda juba tähelepanuväärseks kontseptiks.
The study of visual behavior in social interaction (or "eye contact," or "gaze direction," or "visual interaction") has become increasingly popular during the last decade; interest is high, articles are numerous, and the topic is clearly eligible for review. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 375)

Other research has been concerned with higher-level interactive functions of visual behavior within the relationship, and thus has typically varied the visual behavior of one interactant and observed its effects on the other. Most broadly conceived, these studies involve the influence of one member's visual behavior on the behavior of another member. The behavior influenced can be verbal or nonverbal, and the manipulated visual behavior can be conceived as a stimulus or as a reinforcer. When dealing with questions of influence, it is also possible to ask how the visual behavior of one member affects the cognitions of the other member: what does he think about the person looking; what sorts of attributions does he make. Finally, it is possible to study the communicative aspects of visual behavior, where "communication" implies that the sender's visual signal is intentional, and the receiver's interpretation assumes that intentionality. This is an area which has not yet been researched successfully, probably largely due to the difficulty of dealing with intentionality as a variable in psychological research. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 376-377)

Perhaps as a consequence of the importance of visual behavior in maintaining dominance hierarchies in primates, several studies have examined correlations between interpersonal dominance and visual behavior in humans. Strongman and Champness [51] paired ten subjects with each other in all combinations of two. The pair interacted briefly with each other and the frequency of breaking eye contact first was taken as a measure of submission. On each trial, the subject having fewer visual submissions was defined as the dominant member of the pair. The investigators found a highly consistent dominance hierarchy. Although a wide range of within-subject variation was found, it seemed to be operating within limits imposed by the dominance hierarchy. Argyle [1] suggested that dominant and/or socially poised persons look more at ohters than submissive and/or socially anxious persons. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 381)

The "information-seeking" function [2] of visual interaction is variously labelled "monitoring" [31], or "feedback" [1, 4]. The question subsumed under these rubrics are somewhat similar to those asked by researchers who study individual differences: the focus of attention is the person doing the looking - what he is looking for, why he is looking, what he sees, and how he uses it. Argyle and Kendon [3] have put forth a model of social interaction as a serial motor skill. The social skill performer uses the verbal and nonverbal cues of others in the interaction to change and correct his performance, in much the same way as the motor skill performed uses perceptual feedback from the environment to correct his performance [1]. In social interaction each person is continually looking for feedbacks from the others in order to modify his behavior [1, 3]. (Ellsworth and Ludwig 1972: 386)

Mõned üldised tähelepanekud, mis on huvitavad, kuid ei vääri viidetega tsiteerimist. Naised sõltuvad visuaalsest käitumisest suhtlemisel rohkem: vaatavad rohkem ja tunnevad end vaadatuna rohkem kui mehed. Sellest järeldati, et with regard to visual appearance females are the performers and males the audience. Huvitav on see, et järjepideva vaataja tõstab vaadatava vererõhku rohkem kui see, kes väldib pilku. Silmside tõstab vererõhku!
Viidetest leidsin kaks peaaegu järjestikkust tuttavat nime: (1) Simmel, G. (tahaks öelda, et see on George Simmel) avaldas 1921. a teose "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction" ja (2) Tomkins, S. S. 1963. "Affect, Imagery, Consciousness".

Allen T. Dittman. Developmental factors in Conversational Behavior

Mõned väga üldised sõnakõlksud mis tutvustavad uurimisssuunda:
In this paper I shall be discussing a number of topics which have been related to nonverbal communication over the years: encoding and decoding speech, feedback in social interaction, the development of communication skills, and the usefulness of coded information sources for efficiency in communication. (Dittman 1972: 404)

Siin on diskussioon sellest, kuidas kuulaja vastused (listener responses) on nii verbaalsed kui mitteverbaalsed, neil ei ole loomuomast (intrinsic) ega ka sümboolset tähendust, nad ei moodusta keelt, kuid funktsioneerivad signaalidena:
Listener responses (LR) comprise a borderline group of behaviors between the verbal and nonverbal. Some of them consist of linguistic forms ("Yeah," "I see," and the like), while others do not (head movements and some types of smile). They are all discrete events, arbitrary in the sense that they have no intrinsic meaning, and yet they are not symbolic in the sense of having reference. Thus they do not qualify as a "language," but are perhaps best described as specific signals that the listener is paying attention to the speaker, is keeping up with him, or that he has understood what was just said. The variety of LRs, especially the nonverbal ones, has not been studies in any grat detail, and it is not known to what extent different classes of them serve similar functions in conversation. (Dittman 1972: 405)

Kui verbaalne ja mitteverbaalne vastus olid samaaegsed, näis sel olevat sotsiaalne funktsioon (kõnevooru nõudmine või kõneleja tagassidevajadusele vastamine):
It was in our study of the relationship between nods and vocalizations that we found the possibility of using these responses as ways of getting at social regulation. The nod and the vocalization coincided far more frequently than chance prediction from their individual frequencies, and when they did coincide, they appeared to have a social function: a signal to the speaker that the listener now wants the floow, or a specific response to the speaker's need for feedback. (Dittman 1972: 409)

Siin kasutatakse kvantitatiivseid meetodeid, et uurida laste kuulamisvastuseid, mida on oluliselt vähem kui täiskasvanute puhul. Kuid sellega järeldused ka enam-vähem piirduvad. Arutlus on märksa huvitavam, sest tuuakse üles Piageti eristus egoistliku ja sotsiaalse suhtlemise vahel ning Meadi sotsiaalse mina konstrueerimisest. In fact, arutlus on igati põhjalikum kui artikli sisu, kuid vastuste asemel esitab hoopis rohkem küsimusi.

Howard M. Rosenfeld. The Experimental Analysis of Interpersonal Influence Processes.

Siin hoiatab uurija ilma empiiriliste tõestusteta käitumistele tähenduste omistamisest:
An assumption of the present paper is that classifications of behavior in the field of communication tends to be based excessively upon arbitrary and superstitious beliefs, rather than on empirical evidence of the functional organization of behavior. Virtually any distinct response may be assigned a unique personal or social meaning. Interpretations of responses on such gratuitous grounds as face validity (for example, the inference that the act of scratching oneself represents a self-deconstructive motive) may have heuristic value as hypotheses to be validated by empirical criteria; but too often a deceptively plausible hypothesis becomes uncritically accepted as a statement of fact. (Rosenfeld 1972: 425)

Lk 437 jutustatkse anekdootlikust eksperimendist, kus 40 paari (õpilane ja õpetaja) suhtlesid läbi ühendatud televiisorite. Õpetaja pidi õpilasele selgeks tegema mingi vaevuhoomatava kontsepti läbi sõnapaaridest õige valimise. Punktiskoori peeti elektroonilise näidikuga. Tuli välja, et edukad olid need paarid, milles õpetaja ja õpilane suutsid mitteverbaalsete signaalide abil õigeid ja valesid vastuseid eristada.
Sellest katsest said uurijad teada, et naeratuse roll on informatsiooni edastamisel vähemtähtis kui näiteks noogutused või kokkusurutud huuled.

O. Michael Watson. Conflicts and Directions in Proxemic Research.

Autor tsiteerib kohe alustuseks Halli definitsiooni prokseemikast, öeldes, et see huvitub nii "mikroruumis" toimimisest (inimestevahelised kaugused) kui ka sellest kuidas inimene suhestub oma elukeskkonnaga nt linnaruumid majade vahel - mida mina tean jalakäijate dünaamikana (pedestrian dynamics). Ta toob välja ka selle, et hilisemates kirjutistes asetab Hall rõhu mitte inimestevahelistele kaugustele vaid sellele kuidas inimesed oma meelte abil neid kaugusi reguleerivad (mis näib olevat semiootiline küsimus). Prokseemilise käitumise muutujad on määratletud järgnevalt:
  1. Postural-Sex Identifiers. Thhis variable is scored to indicate the sex of the interactants and whether they are standing, sitting, squatting, or prone.
  2. Sociofrugal-Sociopetal Axis. This variable concerns the relation of the axis of one person's shoulder to that of another person. Scoring is from fac-eto-face behavior to back-to-back.
  3. Kinesthetic Factors. This variable is scored to indicate the distance of one person from another in terms of the potential for touching the other person. The scoring range is from within body contact distance to just outside reaching distance.
  4. Touch Code. This variable is scored to provide for the amount and kind of touch which takes place during an interaction.
  5. Visual Vode. The coding of this variable provides an index of the amount of visual contact during an interaction, from eye-to-eye to gazing off into space.
  6. Voice Loudness. The measurement of the intensity of a person's voice during an interaction.
  7. Thermal Code. The measurement of this variable provides information concerning the detection of thermal radiation or conduction from an interactant's body.
  8. Olfactory Code. The measurement of this variable is concerned with the detection of undifferentiated body and breath odors.
(Watson 1972: 444-445)

Katseid mõjutavate muutujate kategooriad on Watsonil hästi huvitavad:
Included in the category of environmental characteristics are those features of the physical environment which are external to the interaction but which may play a role in influencing the interaction (e.g., light, temperature, noise, available space, etc.). Interactant characteristics are, of course, attributes of the interactants themselves, and include physical factors (height, weight, disfigurement, etc.), physiological factors (states of fatigue, anger, excitement, etc.), personal factors ("personality properties"), social factors (status, role, etc.), and interpersonal factors (past relationships between the interactants, degree of acquaintance, etc.). (Watson 1972: 447)

Lk 452 leidsin sõnad "definition of the situation", mis annab märku, et autor on arvatavasti lugenud Goffmani. Tal on selle kohta öelda nii palju, et kõik eelnevalt üles rivistatud faktorid võivad mõjutada osaliste olukorramääratlust. Samal leheküljel on ka märk ajastust, mil kõnealiseid katseid sooritati (60ndad) - välisõppuritega uurimuses osalesid ainult meessoost katsealused, sest "sel ajal ei olnud piisavalt naisssoost välisõpilasi". Selle kommentaariga tuli lagedale üks autori juhendatavatest doktoriõppuritest ja lehekülje allmärkuses on kena avaldus sotsiaalsest survest: "it is hoped that seeing his name in print will inspire Mr. Griswald to finish his dissertation."

Lk 453, alapeatüki "Directions in Proxemic Research" alguses kohtan ootamatult väga tuttavat sõna, millele järgneb arutlus Kenneth Pike'i kahest tuntuimast mõistest:
For me to explicate what I feel should be some directions in proxemic research, it is necessary to point out gaps that exist in our knowledge of proxemic behavior as a system of nonverbal communication. I will attempt to achieve this goal by discussing proxemic behavior within two contexts: levels of analysis in proxemic research, and proxemic behavior as a process of semiosis.
Using as an analogy the analytical distinction made by linguists between phonetic and phonemic approaches to sound systems, the terms "etic" and "emic" have been coined by Kenneth Pike, and applied to two different approaches, or levels of analysis, to the study of systems of human behavior [14]. The etic approach involves viewing system of behavior from outside the system, using criteria which are external to the system: ". . . phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of scientific observers." [12:575] The etic approach provides an initial base from which the observer can begin his analysis of the system.
The emic approach, on the other hand, is concerned with studying behavior from inside a single, culturally specific system of behavior. Criteria used in an emic description are drawn from the contrasts made within the system itself and are relevant to the internal functioning of the system. Emic distinctions are those that are recognized as meaningful to the "users" of the system themselves. (Watson 1972: 453-454)

Edasi läheb diskussioon niivõrd huvitavaks (märgiteoreetiliseks), et ma pidin järgnevad kolm lehekülje (koos viidetega sh) suisa sisse skanneerima:

Randall P. Harrison, Akiba A. Cohen, Wayne W. Crouch, B. K. L. Genova and Mark Steinberg. The Nonverbal Communication Literature.

1971 Nebraska Symposium on Motivation!

Proxemic Behavior: A Cross-Cultural Study, Michael Watsoni sulest, ilmus "Approaches to Semiotics" seerias Sebeoki toimetusel.

Muud teosed kirjanduse-artiklist kui ka ajakirja algusest:
Thomas Sebeok - Animal Communication
Robert Hinde - Non-Verbal Communication
Albert Scheflen - Body Language and the Social Order
Roger W. Wescott - Introducing coenetics
Ashley Montagu - Tocuhing: The Human Significance of Skin
Robert Sommer - Personal Space

Conclusion: This has been an epic read!

Keha ja tähendus nüüdistantsus

Nigu, Leenu 2008. Keha ja tähendus nüüdistantsus: Fine5 Tantsuteatri lavastus "Panus". Magistritöö. Tartu : Tartu Ülikool

Eelmisel aastal kuulsin mitmelt inimeselt selle töö kohta. Üks neist oli sealjuures selle töö juhendaja, Silvi Salupere, kui ma pärisin talt kehakeele uurimise kohta. Esteri kataloogiotsingu kaudu ma seda tööd aga ei leidnud ja sinnapaika ta jäigi. Nüüd lõpuks komistasin selle otsa magistritöid uurides ja haarasin selle järgi kohe.
Leenu Nigu on proovinud ühendada/võrrelda semiootikat ja fenomenoloogiat ning rakendanud seda uurimise käigus konkreetsele tantsuetendusele. Sealjuures on minu jaoks tähelepanuväärne, et ta kasutab muuhulgas seda sama Lanigeri, kes oli minuga samal kombel leidnud seose Rueschi ja Lotmani vahel ning hõiganud välja kommunikoloogia. Jätan siia allika:
Laniger, Richard L. 2005. The semiotic phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Foucault. Sign System Studies 33.1.: 5-25
Leenu on teinud väga huvitava tabeli semiootika ja fenomenoloogia võrdluses (pilt allpool), kuid sellega näib tema semiootilisus ka piirduvat. Erinevalt tüüpilistest semiootilistest kirjutistest ei ehita ta märgimudeleid ega sega vestlusesse Peirce'i justkui igaüks peaks viimast teadma ja mõistma. Seetõttu on Nigu teksti ühest küljest äärmiselt lihtne ja meeldiv lugeda, kuid teisalt ei paku see erilist tsiteerimismaterjali. Harilikult on teaduslikud kirjutised nagu laoplats plekist konteineritega, mida saab omatahtsi üles tõsta ja ümber paigutada; Nigu tekst on siin analoogias jõgi, millest kuupmeetri välja tõstmisel idee jääb ikkagi samaks.

Just eile mõtlesin jalutades sõnadele võim, võime ja võimekus. Siin on sisuliselt sama mõttekäik (v.a. esimene kontsept, millega Nigu ei tegele):
Ihulise kogemuse saab jagada kahele tasandile - hetke-kehaks ja harjumuse kehaks. Hetke-keha on see, mis antud hetkel siin ja praegu mõnd tegevust sooritab. Harjumuslik keha aga on justkui motoorne mälu, mis viitab meie kehalisele võimekusele, ihusse talletatud teadmisele, mis kujuneb aja jooksul ning pideva kordamise teel. Merleau-Ponty toob ka ise siinkohal näitena uue tansu õppimise. See ei toimu reeglina mitte liikumise ratsionaalse analüüsi teel, vaid just ajapikku ja läbi korduste, mis muudab kehalise liikumise ihuliseks teadmiseks, liigutused ladestuvad korrates lihastesse ja muunduvad harjumuseks, mis sobivas situatsioonides aktiveeruda võib ja mille esilekutsumiseks teadlikku mõttetegevust enam vaja ei olegi. (Nigu 2008: 39)

Järgnevas katkendis on märke tähenduste sotsiaalsusest, kontseptist "ka märgi puudumine on märk" ja autokommunikatsioonist (ma näin seda kohtavat kõikjal):
Kultuuriliste olenditena oleme sunnitud tõdema, et nõnda nagu aistitav maailmgi, on ka ühiskond alati juba kohal, enne meid olemas ja meil tuleb selles paratamatult toimida (Merleau-Ponty 1981: 384). Seepärast tuleb meil loodusliku maailma kõrval avastada ka sotsiaalne maailm ja avastada seda mitte kui objekti või objektide summat, vaid kui pidevat välja või olemise dimensiooni - ma võin küll sotsiaalsest maailmast ära pöörduda, kuid sellega suhestumast ei lakka ma kunagi. Suhe sotsiaalse maailmaga on sügavam kui mistahes otsene aisting või hinnang (samas, 362). Selles valguses näivad ütlused igasuguse tähenduse ja kommunikastiooni kadumisest mitte fenomenoloogilised, vaid pigem solipsistlikud. Seejuures on Merleau-Ponty sõnutsi isegi suhtlemisest keeldumine üks suhtluse vorme (samas, 361). Uurija pilgu jagamine fenomenoloogiliseks ja semiootiliseks, millest üks keskendub kogeja isiklikule enesetajule ning teine kultuurilistele tähendustele, eeldab valikut iseenda ja teiste vahel. Kuid Merleau-Ponty ise väidab, et valides ühe teise asemel, kinnitame me seeläbi mõlema olemasolu - üksindus ja kommunikatsioon ei saa olla dilemma kaks otsa, vaid ühe ja sama nähtuse kaks "hetke" (samas, 359-369). (Nigu 2008: 43-44)

Nigu töö põhineb peamiselt Lotmanil ja Merleau-Pontyl (semiootikal ja fenomenoloogial, muidugi). Märkus raskesti tsiteeritavuse kohta vääris parabooli, sest seda on tõepoolest hea lugeda (isegi oleks juurde tahtnud), kuid tsiteerida teda väga hästi ei saa. Siin on küll rohkesti häid ideid, kuid nende laenamine oleks kohatu kui mitte võimatu. Näiteks mõiste "ihuline ajalugu" seostub minu jaoks mõistega "käitumuslik repertuaar", kuid sellal kui viimast ma oskan kasutada, oleks esimese mõistmise jaoks vaja Merleau-Pontyd lugeda. Kord oleksin ääre pealt seda teinud, raamat oli laenutatud, kuid kultuuriteooriate lugemikud neelasid vastava aja.
Magistritöö lisades on "Panuse" kavaleht ja DVD-videosalvestis. Vaatasin selles poole läbi, jõudsin momendini mis oli isegi kirjelduses lahe: kõigepealt žongleerib pallidega, siis ainult kätega ja viimaks ilma käteta. Sealtmaalt jätsin pooleli ja tirisin taas alla oma lemmikalbumi, et ise tantsima hakata.

Žestid eestikeelses dialoogis

Tenjes, Silvi 1995. Žestid eestikeelses dialoogis. Magistritöö. Tartu : Tartu ülikool

Redundancy on eesti keeles liiasus
Liiasuse mõiste on lähedalt seotud info mõistega. Liiasus on see, mis on teates prognoositav või kokkuleppeline. Vastandmõiste liiasusele on entroopia. Liiasus on kõrge prognoositavuse, entroopia aga madala ennustatavuse tulemus. Nii on madala prognoositavusega teates kõrge entroopia ja kõrge info protsent, ning kõrge prognoositavusega teates on suur liiasus ning madal info protsent. Kui ma kohtan tänaval sõpra ja ütlen "Tere!", siis on selles teates kõrge prognoositavus ja kõrge liiasus. (Tenjes 1995: 11)

Meediumite kategooriad:
  1. Presentatsiooniline meedium: hääl, nägu, keha. Siin kasutatakse loomuliku keele sõnu, väljendeid, žeste jne. Nad nõuavad suhtleja kohalolu, kuna ta on meedium; nad on siin ja praegu ning loovad kommunikatsiooniakte.
  2. Representatsiooniline meedium: raamatud, maalid, fotod, artiklid, arhitektuur, sisekujundus, iluaiandus jne. On arvutu hulk meediume, mis kasutavad kultuurilisi ja esteetilisi konventsioone, et luua mingit liiki "tekst". Nad on kujutavad, loovad. Nad võivad luua teksti, mis märgib üles 1. kategooria meediumi ja mis elab suhtluse osapoolest sõltumatut elu. Nad loovad kommunikatsiooni teoseid.
  3. Mehhaaniline meedium: telefonid, raadio, televisioon, teleks. Nad edastavad 1. ja 2. kategooriat. Peamine erinevus 2. ja 3. kategooria vahel: 3. kategooria meedium kasutab tehniliselt loodud kanaleid ning on seega tehnoloogiliste konstruktsioonide subjekt. Ta võib A-tasandil rohkem müra põhjustada kui 2. kategooria esindajad.
(Tenjes 1995: 14)

Midagi intertekstuaalsuse suunas: teises peatükis (lk 21, "Keele kasutamine vestluses") kirjeldab Tenjes kolme teooriat neljalt isikult:
  1. George Herbert Meadi sümboliline vastastikune tegevus (interaktsionism);
  2. Jogn Langshaw Austini ja John Searle'i kõneaktide teooria ja
  3. Paul Grice'i idee koostööst kui kõige põhilisemast inimestevahelisest suhtlusest.
Mind kummastas, et olen kõigi kolmega juba vähemal või rohkemal määral kohtunud. Meadi enda raamatut pole ma veel kätte saanud, kuid olen veel väga asjatundmatus faasis lugenud ühte tema õpilastest. Grice'i tähendusteooriat selgitati mitteverbaalse suhtlemise pragmaatikas ning Austini ja Searle'iga kohtusin sotsiosemiootika seminarides. Kommunikatsiooniteaduste maailm on väike? Üha enam hakkab näima nii.

Mingil momendil unistasin kognitiivteaduste valdkonnast midagi mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kohta leida, kuid seni on vaid psühhisemiootikas olnud udujuttu mudelitest (ennekõike Umweltist). Siin on märksa konkreetsemalt ära märgitud tasandid mida ma juba tean ja tunnen. Küsimus on selles, kas seda "kognitiivset seisundit" annab mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kaudu uurida.
Lähtudes üldiselt tunnustatud inimkäitumise teooriatest võib kommunikatsioonis eristada kolme liiki infot: info kognitiivsuse kohta; motivatsiooniline info ja kõneleja tundeliigutuslikud seisundid. Kognitiivne seisund vastab sellele, mida kõneleja parajasti mõtleb; motivatsiooniline seisund vastab eesmärkidele, mida kõneleja tahab saavutada - see, mida ta kavatseb; ja tundmuslik seisund vastab tema tundmuste füsioloogilisele astmele. Kognitiivsed seisundid võivad näiteks tekitada tundmuslikke seisundeid ja vastupidi. Kognitiivsete seisundite uurimine võib ka küsimuse juurde, kuidas meie teadmised maailmast on esindatud mälus ja kuidas me nende teadmistega suhtleme keele kaudu. Motivatsioonilised ja tundmuslikud seisundid võivad olla aluseks mõnele ideele või mõttele. Kanalid, milles info kodeeritakse inimkommunikatsioonis, on vastavuses inimeste meeleorganitega. Käitumine või signaalid on vaid märgid niivõrd, kui nad kannavad infot kõnelejalt kuulajale.
Mitteverbaalne käitumine on tavaliselt multi-funktsionaalne - samad käitumuslikud aspektid võivad edasi toimetada erinevat infot ning sama infot võib kodeerida erinevatesse kätumuslikesse aspektidesse. Oluline on teada saada, kuidas sellist infot edasi antakse. Kognitiivsed seisundid antakse edasi peamiselt verbaalse käitumisega ning sellest aspektist on käitumist ka uuritud. Motivatsiooniliste ja tundmuslike seisundite uurimisel jäeti mitteverbaalne valdkond algselt unarusse. Kuigi motivatsioonilisi seisundeid antakse edasi nii verbaalse kui mitteverbaalse käitumisega. Mitteverbaalsed vahendid on väga olulised, kui saatja oma motiive pole teadvustanud. Info alateadlike motiivide kohta leitakse sageli teadvustatud käitumise teatud versioonidena. Kõige lihtsam näide: öeldes "Head aega!" ei ole me samaaegselt käega lehvitamisest enamasti teadvustanud. (Tenjes 1995: 31-32)

Kirjeldus Birdwhistelli strukturaalsest lähenemisest mitteverbaalsele suhtlemisele:
Strukturaalse lähenemise eesmärk on anda selliste normatiivsete näidiste kogum, mida suhtluse osapooled interaktsioonis kasutavad. Eeldatakse, et osapoolte käitumine interaktsioonis on teatud määrani organiseeritud varjatud kommunikatiivsete koodidega. Strukturaalse lähenemise idee on esitada tegevuse varjatud koodide organiseerituse määr. Selle suuna teoreetilistel seisukohtadel on mitmeid ühisjooni deskriptiivse või strukturaalse keeleteadusega, kultuuriantropoloogiaga ja strukturaalse sotsioloogiaga. Kehaliste liigutuste uurimist seoses kommunikatiivsete funktsioonidega interaktsioonis võib nimetada kineesikaks sõna lingvistika analoogial. (Tenjes 1995: 38)

Vahemärkus: mida mina teadsin haptikana, on lk 44 ära märgitud taktiilse stimulatsiooni uurimise valdkonnana ja kannab nime takeesika. Lk 55 kohtan esimest korda sellist väljendit nagu ekstrakommunikatiivsed žestid. See mõiste pärineb Payratólt ja tähistab mängulisis või praktilisi žeste.

Tänu mahukale lisamaterjalile on see jämedaim magistritöö mida ma näinud olen. Just nagu Tenjese doktoritööga, on ka sel puhul empiirilise materjali, ehk ülesmärgitud žestid, nende verbaalsed saatjad ja umbkaudsed verbaalsed tähendused, liiga palju, et korraga võiks hoomata. Toon põhjalikkusest vaid ühe näite:
Siin on verbaalseks saateks selline tekst: "Ja siis oli Eedu Tinn. Ja tema (1) siis läks minema (2)..." Kus (1) üleval toimuva žesti kirjelduseks on "parema käe nimetissõrm sirgu, löök ülalt alla" ja (2) allpool toimuva žesti kirjelduseks "pöörab käe teistpidi, nii et osutaja on pöial". Ja see ei ole isegi kogu lause! Täislause on "Ja tema siis läks minema ja see koht jäi vakantseks", kus lause lõpuks tõuseb käsi üles pea juurde. Käežestide puhul toimub nii lühikese aja jooksul nii palju sündmusi mida võib üles märkida ja analüüsida. Siin tahaks lamedate reklaamide stiilis öelda: There's got to be a better way!, aga see küsimus jääb praegu õhku rippuma. Peagi loen üle ka doktoritöö, vb leian sealt midagi mis esimesel korral märkamata jäi.

Augustine On Lying

Gramigna, Remo 2011. Augustine On Lying: A Semiotic Analysis. University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. Master's Thesis

Augustine lifted up the discussion of lying from an ontological paradigm that dominated in Greek culture and that tackled the problem of lying within the frame of objective falsehoods, to the metalevel of the interpreter's beliefs and intentionality. The latter is thus conceived as a conscious performer that willingly uses a deceptive mode of signification, that is, making use of signs in order to deceive. As it will be argued in what follows, the current study suggests a semiotic reading of Augustine's theory of lying for it envisages lying as an intentional act performed by an agent by means of signs with the specific purpose of misleading others. 'Agency' is hereby conceived as the capacity of an agent to act in the world. Suffice to note, for the present, that lying always entails the usage of signs by an interpreter in order to deceive someone else. The nature of these signs will be clarified in the course of the present analysis.
Belief and intentionality are key terms in the conceptualization of the phenomenon of lying in an Augustinian fashion. As we shall see in what follows, Augustine points out that the characteristics of the lie are the split between thought and speech in the signification of the lie and the intention to deceive. The liar's mode of signification is mis-informative and his discourse is the manipulation of the dupe's beliefs and knowledge. (Gramigna 2011: 8)

Samal leheküljel on öeldud, et kuigi Augustinus mõtles esmajärgus verbaalseid märke, saab tema proto-semiootilist märgiteooriat rakendada ka mitteverbaalsetele märkidele. Näiteid sellest (tähendusest raseda vaikuse või žestidega valetamisest) leidis Gramina järgnevatest töödest:
Colish, Marcia L. 1978. St. Augustine's rhetoric of silence revisited. Augustinian Studies 9: 15-24
Genosko, Gary 1995: 92-94. Augustine gives us the finger. Semiotica 104 (1/2): 81-97.

Eristus valetamise ja petmise vahel:
The demarcaion between humanities and hard sciences in the treatment of lying seems to have produced also a demarcation in terminology concending that lying is a human feature whereas deception may also occur in the animal kingdom. I hereby refer to the terminological distinction between 'lying' and 'deception'. However, the abovementioned separation seems to be problematic and there is no general agreement upon it. (Gramigna 2011: 13)
The potentiality of semiosis and communication available for interpreters of a given community is provided by shared conventional sign systems - natural langauge for instance. The liar exploits this potentiality by possibilities of communication in order to pursue his deceptive goals, that is, to model the dupe's beliefs according to a pattern that the liar himself is aware to be false. To sum up, lying entails duplicitous signification, conceived as split between inner thought and outwards manifested signs. (Gramigna 2011: 33)

Lk 38 leidsin midagi, mis tuli ähmaselt tuttav ette siit: Jumal ei vaja inimesega suhtlemiseks sõnu, sest Jumal on cordis inspector, tähendab, Jumalal on võime vaadelda inimeste sisemust. See pani mind mõtlema, et "Jumal kõneleb kehakeelt". See tähendab, Jumal rakendab intersubjektiivset suhtlemist intrapersonaalsel tasandil (Rueschi terminites). See meikib senssi seniks kuni palvetamine on vajalik vaid selleks, et Jumalal oleks "empiirilist materjali" ehk afektiivseid kehalisi seisundeid, mille arvelt analüüsida "hinge puhtust". Teisalt on selline mõttekäik jabur, sest kui inimene usub südamest, et ta kuriteod olid heateod, siis sama mõistaks ka Jumal.

Before turning to the consideration of the intent to deceive, another point ought to be made. As indicated above, Chisholm and Feeham posed a distinction between lying and other species of deception on the basis of the concept of assertion. To make matters more clear, the authors refer to a specific aspect of deception reported by Emmanuel Kant. In this example, a man may feign to be about to leave on a trip by simply packing his luggage. In other words, the man pretends to be leaving by showing by signs of his behaviour (packing his luggage) because he wants someone else to assume that he is actually leaving. This example goes under the rubric of simulation and in particular under the strategies of "pretending". At this poing deceiving as such can be separated from the intent to assert a falsehood, which is proper to the lie. (Gramigna 2011: 44)

Kokkuvõttes põhjalik töö. Greimas, Pelc, Morris, Ekman jne olid kenasti esindatud. Lõppude lõpuks oli see semiootiline lähenemine Augustinuse valetamisteooriale, mitte Augustinuse märgiteooria seisukohaast valetamisele lähenemine. Palju läks ilmselt kaduma selle tõttu, et mind ei huvita praegu valetamine. Mõtlema jäin selle üle, et valetamine on üks pettuse vormidest. Meeldis, et töö oli sidus ja üksikasjalik. Muidu poleks tähele pannudki, aga kellegi proseminaritööga võrreldes oli see magistritöö tõesti hästi kirjutatud ja vormistatud.

[teine lugemine]

Bodily Communication

Argyle, Michael 1975. Bodily Communication. London : Methuen

Kohe raamatu eessõnas nimetab Argyle raamatuid mis on teda mõjutanud ja mulle juba tuttavate teoste (Mehrabian 1972, Knapp 1972, Birdwhistell 1970) kõrval nimetab ta R. Harre, P. ja F. Secordi teose "The explanation of social behaviour" (1972), mis on sotsiaalteaduste raamatukogu hoidlas olemas!

Condoni väida, et tänapäeval pööratkse rohkem tähelepanu iseendale kui teadmiste objektile, millest mitteverbaalne käitumine on üks osa, on Argyle sissejuhatuses sellisel kujul:
We have a good idea of the different messages which are conveyed by different bodily signals - emotional states, attitudes to other people, information about the self and supporting speech by providing illustrations, feedback, and synchronizing signals, and in sign-language replacing it. It is used as well in ritual and ceremony, art and music, propaganda and politics. (Argyle 1975: 3-4)

Märkide ja signaalide eristamise küsimus kerkib siingi:
By a sign or signal we shall mean an element of the behaviour, appearance, etc., of one organism that is received by the sense organs of a second organism and affects its behaviour. We exclude simply mechanical influence: if A pushed B over this is a mechanical effect (though it will probably a communication as well). Signs normally act at a distance, though we shall consider certain forms of bodily contact as signs. Some signals are intended to communicate - these will be called communications. Signals are a quite distinctive class of behaviour, because they have meanings - they stand for other objects or events, or create expectations of behaviour to follow. (Argyle 1975: 5)

Füüsilise ja sotsiaalse käitumise eristuse saab siit:
A number of sociologists have distinguished between human social behaviour and other events in the natural world. Human social acts, it is said, are initiated and planned with certain goals in mind; the performance is subject to self-direction, follows rules, and is meaningful to the performed in that he can give a verbal account justifying it, or may try to make an anticipated account come true. Furthermore, many social acts, verbal and non-verbal, have a symbolic character, which makes them different from nearly all animal behaviour. NV acts, like verbal ones, communicate quite differently from sheer physical signals. For example, the absence of a NV act, for example, a refusal to shake hands, may constitute an extremely important social act. Small differences in the physical acts performed e.g. small differences in the direction of gaze, can produce very big differences in their meaning. In this respect NV signals are similar to verbal ones, where a change in one letter can totally alter meaning. Furthermore, the same physical act can have quite different meaning in different cultures, just as a word can. Putting these two points together, doing nothing in the same situation may have a quite different significance in two different cultures. (Argyle 1975: 52)

Seos enese-esituse ja käitumusliku valetamise vahel:
[I]t appears to be necessary for both animals and humans to signal their identity to other people, for them to communicate enough information about themselves for others to be able to respond to them appropriately. Such information consists of symbolic information indicating to which of various categories of persons they belong. Presumably such self-presentation in birds is not a product of deliberate and reflective cognitive processes, and probably in many human beings it is not. However, self-presentation often involves quite careful planning, and a certain amount of deception. When this behaviour has been performed over a period of time it becomes spontaneous and unreflective.
It is also necessary for interactors to send enough information about the purpose of their behaviour to make it intelligible to possible onlookers; Goffman (1971) has called this 'body-gloss'. People are evidently aware of what their behaviour looks like to others, and they send additional NV signals to show that it has some acceptable and sensible purpose, or occasionally to communicate a misleading meaning, as in various kinds of deceptive behaviour. In these latter cases there is much more conscious awareness than in relaxed, and spontaneous behaviour. (Argle 1975: 55-56)

Denotatiivse-konnotatiivse suhe mitteverbaalses ja konteksti mõistmise tähtsus:
Psychologists analyse the meaning of signals in terms of the words and images evoked by them. Students of semiotics, however, point out that signs have two kinds of meanings - denotation and connotation. They denote a class of objects or events; they connote the abstract set of ideas which defines this class; connotation depends on the linkage of this sign with other signs in the communication system. Thus a gesture illustrating a large fish both represents the class of large fish and connotes this particular kind of beast. Connotation involves linkades with other concepts - small fish, large animals etc., both between verbalized concepts and between images of these classes. Connotation often deals in terms of opposition (large v: small) and of hierarchies of classes (fish as part of the animal kingdom). Some bodily signals have meanings as part of elaborate sign systems. Kenneth Pike (1957) has made the point that one could not understand what is going on at a religious service, a baseball game, a fishing expedition, or a scientific experiment unless one understood the ideas and plans in the minds of the participants, together with the whole set of concepts and rules connected with the religious service or baseball game. (Argyle 1975: 58)

Kuidas muuta grupi norme:
How can these rules be changed? Studies of change in group norms show that these are changed as the result of an individual's deviating, and persuading the rest of the group that the new norm is to their advantage. The deviate may get his ideas from other groups, or may have thought of the change himself. He will be successful in persuading the other group members if he is of high status in the group, has conformed in the past, possesses persuasive social skills, and can show the others that they will gain from the change. Presumably there is a kind of natural selection in which rules survive which provide the greates satisfaction to the majority of the group members. It follows that there may be sets of social rules as yet unthought of, which might be even more beneficial. Perhaps we should simply do without some of our present rules, just as we manage without the 'Boston switch'. (Argyle 1975: 67)

Kuidas lühiajalised mimeetilised ülekanded mõjutavad sotsiaalset kogemust:
A happy person thinks that other people are happy. In real social situations there is a further reason for this - a happy person produces at least a temporary cheerful state in those that he meets - which he sees as their emotional state, without realizing he has partly induced it himself. (Argyle 1975: 115)

Enamus mitteverbaalsest pettusest kannab positiivset funktsiooni:
In animals interpersonal signals reflect the real attitude of the animals concerned. In human being things are more complicated, and for strategic reasons signals are often sent which are not genuine. The most common form of deception is probably the expression of attitudes that are more friendly than the true attitude; this is partly to ingratiate superiors or others, from whom rewards are sought, partly to make life in social groups easier and pleasanter. Most dissimulation probably takes place in the face, since people are able to monitor their facial expression easily; it is not so widely known, however, that interpersonal attitudes are conveyed by a number of other non-verbal signals such as posture and orientation, which makes it possible to see through deceptive facial expressions. (Argyle 1975: 125-126)

Information about human individuals is conveyed in a similar way - there information is given involuntarily about race, age, and sex. In addition there is also deliberate manipulation of cues, or 'self-presentation'; the ideas which the sender has about himself are converted into bodily signals, which others have to decode. The manipulation of cues extends to some degree of control over the apparently fixed and involuntary cues for age, physique, and even race and sex. Though this is difficult to achieve and there are obvious limits to what can be done, nevertheless some people do change their voice and appearance to a remarkable degree by various methods including surgical operations. Human beings need information about each other, just as animals do. We have additional motives for sending it however; by creating a favourable impression on others we can gain material advantages, sustain a satisfying positive self-image, and a 'self-fulfilling prophecy' - become more effective in many social skills - teachers can teach their pupils more, psychiatrists can make their patients recover faster, if they are believed competent.
Personality can be interpreted in terms of the encoding and decoding of mainly non-verbal signals. But what is the message which is being sent? The involuntary cues convey all kinds of information about the sender's body, roles, and whatever cognitive dimensions or categories they use. In the case of the manipulated cues, the information sent is how the sender perceives himself, and how he wants others, in general or particular, to see him. The situation is made more complicated by the fact that people use quite different cognitive constructs in this sphere - people classify each other in terms of a great variety of dimensions, partly derived from the culture, partly individually developed. (Argyle 1975: 134-135)

Diskussioon metakommunikatsioonist:
If the verbal contents are the 'message', the non-verbal framing signals are a message about the message; but it is really the combination of the two that constitutes the complete message. Some psychologists have maintained that the message and the grame belong to completely differnt communication systems; but it is perfectly possible for the 'real' message to be carried by the non-verbal signals, as when two people agree about the contents but not about their relationship. These are really 'messages about the relationship'. However, from the point of view of the message proper it may be argued that the two channels combine to produce a total act of verbal communication, for example, a question asked in a spirit of polite inquiry, a piece of information given as a devastating rebuttal, or an order given as a mild suggestion. (Argyle 1975: 157)

Siin jätab Argyle blatantly välja autokommunikatsiooni:
Although individual rituals may employ similar kinds of symbolism, no communication is involved, because there are no shared signals. (Argyle 1975: 175)

Peatükk 10 ("NVC in society - politics & persuasion") väärib käesoleval momendil erilist tähelepanu.
In large groups of animals social order is maintained and leadership exercised by non-verbal encounters, mainly between the older and stronger males. In primitive human societies things are similar, except words are used - though words have little effect unless backed up by the appearance or reality of power. (Argyle 1975: 193)
We can distinguish five different kinds of political activity each of which makes use of non-verbal signals:
  1. Direct political action
  2. Civil disobediance
  3. Peaceful demonstration
  4. Demonstration of power by the authorities
  5. Attempts to change the social position of a group
(Argyle 1975: 194-199)

Võib-olla see, millele van Dijk vihjas:
Racial and other minority groups, members of the lower social classes, and young people occupy underprivilieged positions in society. In addition to their material frustrations there are also those of being treated as social inferiors in everyday social contacts: the style of non-verbal behaviour of members of superior groups constitutes the main source of frustration. (Argyle 1975: 198)

Whether or not a political leader is elected to high office depends partly on his personal public image, quite apart from the policies he and his party stand for. This public image is derived partly from real events in his career, partly from the impression he gives on TV and in person, and it is partly the result of impression-management by public relations experts. (Argyle 1975: 205)

Ülesmärge: "Rhetoric of Nonverbal Communication" by Haig A. Bosmajian.

Mõtlesin seda teha juba ühe varasema teose puhul, kuid seekord tegin mõtte teoks: skännida põnevamad skeemid sisse.
1. Lk 217: Emotions perceived in schematic faces (from Thayer and Schiff, 1969: 76)

2. Lk 222: Birdwhistelli 60-märgiline kehakeel (näide sellest miks lingvistikat ei tasuks rakendada kehakeelele)

3. Lk 259: kõrge ja madala kodeeritusega žestid. Selle nägemisel meenus koheselt näost-näkku vestlus Tenjesega - tajusin, et tema žestid on kõrge kodeeritusega ja minu omad madala kodeeritusega. Kõrvalleheküljel on tekst: "...it has been found by Baxter, Winters, and Hammer (1968) that people with greater verbal facility used more gestures, suggesting that gestures are supplements rather than substitutes."

Gesture: action of shooting self
Meaning: faux pas
(lk 261)

Kuidas erinevad inimese ja looma mitteverbaalne suhtlemine:
Most animal communications are triggered directly by immediate stimuli and motivational states. Human communications, verbal or non-verbal, are partly the product of cognitive processes, are directed towards long-term goals, and depend in a complex way on the nature of the situation and its rules. As we have seen, social acts may be consciously planned and monitored; where they are more spontaneous the processes involved are similar, though there is less conscious attention to the performance. (Argyle 1975: 365)

Käitumise modelleerimine videomaterjali järgi:
Another form of social skills training uses 'modelling' - imitating the performance of skilled practitioners, seen either in person or on film. Again it may be necessary to use verbal intervention, to draw attention to certain aspects of the model's performance. And simply watching other people is not enough - the learner has to have a go himself. Research on training teachers at Stanford showed that watching a filmed model was valuable, especially if there was verbal commentary on it; role-playing, with verbal feedback and video-tape replay was also effective. However, with modelling and video-tape playback, verbal intervention is unnecessary (McKnight 1971). (Argyle 1975: 368)

Kokkuvõte. Hea. Võttis kolm päeva, et läbi närida, aga oli seda väärt. Olen kindel, et see on üks põhilisi allikaid, kust Pease oma jama ümber kirjutas. Argyle on kogunud ja tõlgendanud ise piisavalt, et see oleks, nagu sissejuhatuses on õeldud, samaagselt teaduslik ja populaarne. Siiski tundsin paljud kohad ära Pease'i töödest, ainult, et viimane oli teinud asja banaalselt lihtsaks, kirjutades tekstist välja kõik vähegi teaduslikud terminid. Jälle kord tunnen, et suhtluskoolitustel Pease'i tõlgenduste edasi andmine on vale.
Õppejõule seda teost näidates seostus sõna leheküljelt talle vastu vaatav sõna 'behaviour' tema jaoks behaviourismiga. Pärast seda mõtlesin järgi, kas see võib olla 'undercover' jätk behaviourismile, kuid tõendid osutavad teises suunas. Mitteverbaalse suhtlemise ajalool on oma ajalugu (Darwin, Efron, Birdwhistell ja Mehrabian, keegi neist pole minu teada seotud behaviourismiga). Argyle'i töö on sotsiaal-psühholoogiline, kuid kasutab põhiliselt "signaali" ja "sümboli" mõisteid. Argyle tõlgitseb paljuski tekste sellistelt tegelastelt nagu Levi-Strauss, Sebeok, McLuhan ja Huizinger (kellede seminaritekste me semiootika ainetes oleme lugenud).
Argyle'i sulest ilmus 1969 veel põhjalikum teos, Social Interaction, mis on 500 lehekülge pikk ja mille lugemiseks ma pean end varuma (lugemisjärjekorras on praegu palju teoseid). Tema väidetavalt olulisim panus valdkonda, The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour, pole Tartus saadaval. Wiki räägib, et Argyle oli üks esimesi ja mõjukamaid Inglise (Oxfordi) sotsiaalpsühholooge. Eriliselt huvitas teda inimese pilk (gaze) ja see oli ka teema, millest ta pärast Bodily Communicationi koos Mark Cookiga raamatu (Gaze and Mutual Gaze) raamatu kirjutas 1976. aastal. Good stuff.