The Soviet Empire of Signs

Waldstein, Maxim 2008. The Soviet Empire of Signs: A History of the Tartu School of Semiotics. Saarbrüchen: VDM Verlag.
Well, this was a terrific read. I haven't expressed my personal opinion on a book in this blog for a while, but this one certainly merits one. Most of the names were familiar to me from university courses on this exact subject (there are several courses on Yuri Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics in the department of semiotics). This book put all the names in an understandable narrative of the school's history. Many remarks seemed familiar, as if I've heard them from my teachers - it is more than likely that most of them have read this book. As well as they, and my fellow students, should. I gathered some citations about issues I relate to, or need to study further.
The Russian historiography of the School can be divided into a few stages: (1) an initial stream of descriptive, critical and praiseful literature produced in the 1960s and 1970s (see survey in Seyffert 1983), (2) the samizdat (underground "self-publishing") polemics and the attempts of self-reflection in the 1970s-80s (e.g. B.Gasparov 1994a; Panchenko 1995), and (3) the stream of published memoirs, new criticisms and first properly historical and analytical studies produced after 1991 (see Cherednichenko 2001; Egorov 1999; Kim 2003; Koshelev 1994; Nekliudov 1994; Pocheptsov 1998; Städtke 2002). (Waldstein 2008: 4)
This seems to be his personal interpretation of the school's eras. He elaborates them further:
three major periods in the history of the Tartu School: the period of the summer schools (1964-1974), the epoch of Lotman-dominated Tartu School (1975-1985) and the perestroika period. (Waldstein 2008: 39)
The Lotman-dominated period is later on defined as the period of intensive study of Russian daily culture.
...signs are not only models of but also models for (cf. Geertz 1973). At the earlier stages of Tartu semiotics, this "modeling for" was still understood on the model of playing chess: world-models were defined as an "automated formal programs imposed on all members of a group" (Zalizniak, et. al. 1962). Yet, already at this stage, the distinction was made between "limited" (vyrozhdennyi) and "unlimited" models. Artificial languages are most limited, or closed, and most detached from reality; they have the least modeling power. In contrast, such modeling systems as myth and religion are least detached and most powerful. They model not specific aspects of the world but the whole world, its structure and its history ("world-models," modeli mira). This globality, however, comes at the cost of polysemy, loss of precision and openness to multiple interpretative and practical extensions. Their relation to behavior is not the one of rules to operations but exemplars to performances. (Waldstein 2008: 111)
This is where I tend to conflate mythic and religious consciousness: the function of religious texts (e.g. the bible) is not to mediate narratives, but to model aspects the total world view of the religious person: model a sense of god, so to say.
As Lotman (1973b) argued, myth is not about communicating a new message but code itself; it is about preserving and passing along the very structure of the "global world image" of the human condition.(Waldstein 2008: 111)
Following my previous remark, the religious text passes along the image of a created world.
The artistic text is the one which, despite the redundancy of its structural elements, preserves and even increases its own informativeness through multiple contexts and usages. In short, the closer we get to the end of the newspaper article, the less we expect to be surprised; true literature should be able to surprise us all the way through and even upon repeated reading. (Waldstein 2008: 123)
This is why I dare to call a dissertation by a certain researcher scientific poetry (teaduspoeesia): even after repeated readings it continues to avail new ideas.
Bakhtin says that the code is finalized and ready-made but, according to Lotman, it may happen only in the narrow synchronic perspective. Historically conceived, every code is a product of previous making in time and space. Furthermore, the interaction between codes is open-ended. In this respect, the product of such interactions, the text, is similar to human actors. Just like texts, actors are intersections of different codes. Yet they are not reducible to these codes. Lotman makes the analogy between texts and human actors explicit by saying that “the structural parallelism of the semiotic characteristics of texts and persons allows us to define the text of any level as a semiotic individuality and the individuality on any socio-cultural level as a text” ([1983] 1992, 116). Thus an individual personality, a literary work and the whole culture can be considered as “texts” of various levels. (Waldstein 2008: 132)
This is, in effect, an elaboration of Lotman's statement that people (human actors) are socially constructed selections of codes. People are texts, as Lotman says, which we also need to learn to read.
Ultimately, the Tartu School shifted its attention from abstract sign systems to the real time and space pragmatics of "functional correlations" between these systems (Ivanov et al. 1973, 1). In this way, the School opened the doors to the historical studies for cultural production and reproduction. (Waldstein 2008: 132)
Compare this (especially the notion of "functional correlations") to Leeds-Hurwitz (1993: 157).
The secret of this "necessity of culture" is in the kind of work it does. This work consists "in the structural organization of the surrounding world" (Lotman and Uspensky 1971, 328). Cultural texts order the world around us and make it meaningful and reasonably predictable. Furthermore, "culture is a generator of structuredness and thus it creates around the human being the social sphere which, like biosphere, makes life–social, not biological–possible" (1971, 328). Later, in the 1980s, Lotman called this sphere the semiosphere. He theorized this sphere as not just a result of the structuring semiotic activity but as a condition of the possibility of this activity. The semiosphere is the semiotic ecology of human existence, the symbolic space in which languages and media interact (see Lotman 1990, 123-130). In another book, he characterized this space as "the whole resonant space" of human significations "which crosses the boundaries of historical epochs, national cultures and absorbs us into one culture, the culture of humankind" (Lotman 1994a, 8). To say that human activity is enveloped by the semiosphere is to imply that humans act not just on the basis of biological impulses and even immediately available cultural significations but based on "the whole thick mass (tolshcha)" of previous texts of culture, which constitute the semiosphere ([1985] 1992, 201). (Waldstein 2008: 146)
Quoted at lenght, because I'm a sucker for discussion on the semiosphere. I like the wording that it makes social life possible, but presenting it as semiotic ecology or "the culture of humankind" begs to justify calling it an analytically impotent totalitarian notion.
The decade between 1975 and 1985 may be called the Decade of the Semiotics of Russian Culture in the history of the Tartu School. In this period, a series of large articles, often cosigned by Lotman and Uspensky, appeared in the Tartu Works on Slavic and Russian Philology (TRSF) and other publications dedicated to various aspects of medieval and early modern Russian history. The "semiotic" nature of these studies implied the shift in historical research from the "commonplaces" of Soviet historiography (that is the assumptions of social progress, class struggle, Russian backwardness and the quest for causal explanation). (Waldstein 2008: 150)
Instead of "cultural influence," Lotman and Uspensky were concerned about decontextualization, reframing, and ultimately cultural production, rather than re-production of the Western exemplars within local models. Thus, they approached the issues of local agency but interpreted it in terms of the holistic agency of Russian culture as such. (Waldstein 2008: 154)
Holistiline agentsus = individuaaliülene subjektiivsus (kultuur kui tehisintellekt Kultuuritüpoloogiates).
The main benefit of the concept of "parallel science" is that it does not presume the binary picture of the Soviet reality but allows us to analyze it. I have argued that, despite and even due to the emphatic distancing from official procedures, discourses and symbols, parallel science coexisted symbiotically with the formal institutions and official discourses. Precisely because its members and outsiders perceived parallel science to be a form of resistance to and avoidance of the "Soviet realities," parallel science served as a particularly advantageous position within Soviet academia, a site from which Soviet academics engaged in negotiating their place in society and established their effective control over knowledge, culture and languages as valuable social resources. (Waldstein 2008: 186)

Some useful references:
  • Alexandrov, Vladimir. 2000. "Biology, Semiosis, and Cultural Difference in Lotman's Semiosphere." Comparative Literature 52 (4):339-362.
  • Baran, Henryk, ed. 1976. Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union. White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press.
  • Clifford, James and George E. Marcus. 1986. Writing Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Collins, Randall. 1998. The Sociology of Philosophers. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
  • de Certeau, Michel. 1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Eagle, Herbert. 1976. "The Semiotics of the Cinema: Lotman and Metz." Dispositio 1 (3):303-314.
  • Gerovitch, Slava. 2002. From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Gumilev, Lev N. 1990. Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
  • Illich, Ivan. 1972. Deschooling Society. New York: Harrow Books.
  • Kristeva, Julia. 1994. "On Yury Lotman." PMLA 109 (3):375-376.
  • Levinson, S. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Rorty, Richard. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. Brighton: Harvester.
  • Scheler, Max. 1980. Problems of a Sociology of Knowledge. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
  • Scholes, Robert. 1982. Semiotics and Interpretation. London: Yale University Press.
  • Shils, Edward. 1975. Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  • Shukman, Ann. 1977. Literature and Semiotics: A Study of the Writings of Yu.M. Lotman. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co.
  • Vernadsky, Vladimir I. 1998. The Biosphere: Complete Annotated Edition. New York: Copernicus.
  • Voloshinov, Valentin V. 1973. Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. London: Harvard University Press.
  • Wertsch, James V. 1985. Culture Communication, and Cognition : Vygotskian Perspectives. New York: Cambridge University Press.

TMS of semiotics readings

Winner, Thomas G. 1979. Some Fundamental Concepts Leading to a Semiotics of Culture: An Historical Overview. Semiotics of Culture, Irinis Portis Winner and Jean Umiker-Semeiok (eds.), a special issue of Semiotica, 75-82.
I shall try to show that the Prague contribution lay essentially in three areas: (1) the position that sign systems are not totally immanent, and that they are in complex ways interrelated; (2) the view of function and of the polyfunctional nature of human activity; and (3) the view of the existence of sign systems other than natural language which form a complex system of systems of semiotic codes of all kinds: the various arts, codes of dress, various ethnographic information systems, etc., all of which were seen to co-exist in a vast and complex system of systems. (Winner 1979: 75-76)
Here, he is essentially describing the Prague school foundation for what was to be named as semiosphere by Lotman.
The fertile ideas which originated in Prague in the thirties laid the foundation for modern semiotics, shaping the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, the Polish and Czech schools, and much of the semiotics of Western Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and Israel. (Winner 1979: 78)
The Prague school's reach of influence.
...the Prague scholars who were not satisfied with the Saussurian clearly definable, though arbitrary, relation of the linguistic sign to its denotatum, which hardly applied to the aesthetic sign. The aesthetic sign was seen as polysemantic, its diffuse meaning forcing the perceiver's attention on its inner construction. New formulations were advanced concerning such issues as the question of meaning in art, the relation of the work of art to its creator and its manifold perceivers, the complex interrelationship between art and culture and society, the relationships of the different arts to each other, and the evolution of artistic systems. (Winner 1979: 79)
The polysemantic aspect of artistic signs and their complex interrelationship with culture and society are extremely significant.
Portis-Winner, Irene 2002. Semiotics of Peasants in Transition: Slovene Villagers and Their Ethnic Relatives in America. Sound and Meaning: The Roman Jakobson Series in Linguistics and Poetics. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press Books.
Until the demise of communism in Slovenia, no villager would say anything derogatory about another although there were strong internal fissures between families... ...Yet internal conflicts could be deduced from indirect and nonverbal signals such as intonation, facial expression, and general body language. Indeed, in our long hours of conversation, neighbors rarely mentioned each other despite the fact that a mere narrow path separated their homes. (Portis-Winner 2002: 44-45)
Yup, feelings find less censored expressions through nonverbal means.
Connerton's How Societies Remember (1988) postulates that meaning, not limited to the verbal realm, abides everywhere in culture. he strongly emphasizes nonverbal and particularly bodily sources of memory from the innter point of view, sources he believes have not received adequate attention. (Portis-Winner 2002: 46)
That is an extremely useful hint.
The interpretation of objects and persons as metonymic metaphors proves useful to this study. For example, I interpret one of my important informers, an ethnic Slovene farmer, as a striking human sign. His bearing, every gesture, and language are metonymic or indexical of his village of origin and at the same time metaphoric or symbolic (or replicas or transformations) of the village mores. (Portis-Winner 2002: 55)
In this sense Montag is a metonymic metaphor of firemen. He has black hair just like all other firemen have black hair. Until he meets Clarisse, he "walks and talks" like a fireman, never before reflecting about his similarities with other firemen.
Lotman's and Uspensky's analyses take into account that we live in a world where history from the official point of view is made and remade depending on the ideologies of power holders, and where the subjective history of local peoples may conflict with the ideological positions of power holders. (Portis-Winner 2002: 62)
This wording should be kept in mind when reading Orwell's 1984.
According to Wolf, Bourdieu shows that language functions not only as an instrument of communication, but also as one of power (Wolf 1999, 55 referring to Thompson 1984, 46-47). Indeed, this pertains as much to visual as to audible signs and kinetic signs. In Žernovnica, the tax collector entering the village is a human sign of power. His uniform and authoritative bearing sufficiently emphasize his authority. (Portis-Winner 2002: 73)
I drew the same connection with a longer curve - from Butler, through Foucault' to Bourdieu - in my seminar paper.
Lotman, Michail 2000. A Few Notes on the Philosophical Background of the Tartu School of Semiotics. European Journal for Semiotic Studies 12(1): 23-46.
Ju.M. Lotman was a Kantian. Although he does not often refer to Kant's ideas and writings (the most significant references appear in his later works), Kant was his habitual interlocutor over many years, and in his lectures the name of the Köningsberg thinker appeared much more frequently than in written texts. However, even that is not the point. The most fundamental constructs of the Tartu school reveal a clearly Kantian foundation. (Lotman 2000: 26)
Unlike for classical structuralism, for the Tartu school text is not a directly given reality but, as well as language, it is a problem, a black box, a thing in itself. Text is absolutely immanent in relation to extratextual reality, they are in a complementary relation with each other. Text is a closed and independent structure, and it should be studied precisely as such. (Lotman 2000: 27)
Explanation of the concept of text in the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics.
Lotman, J. M. 1975 [1973]. The Discrete Text and the Iconic Text: Remarks on the Structure of Narrative. Translated by Frances Pfotenhauer. New Literary History 6(2): 333-338.
In the discrete verbal message, the text is made up of signs; in the second case, there are, essentially, no signs: the message is communicated by the text in its entirety. And if we do treat it as discrete, and single out signlike structural elements, this is because of out habit of seeing verbal intercourse as the fundamental, even the sole, form of communicative contact, and a result of making the pictorial text seem like a verbal one. (Lotman & Pfotenhauer 1975 [1973]: 335)
This should be kept in mind when speaking of body motion communication as well. In my seminar paper, the "making of" continuous behaviour seem "discontinuous" was grouped under so-called "epiphenomenal signs" exactly because (unintentional) behaviour is not discrete but may seem discrete when referred to (through language or pictorial representation).
Verbal narration is constructed, first and foremost, by the addition of new words, phrases, paragraphs, chapters. Such narration is always an increase in the size of the text. For the internally nondiscrete text-message of the iconic type, however, narration is a transformation, an internal transposition of elements. (Lotman & Pfotenhauer 1975 [1973]: 335)
This applies to behaviour as well, as non-verbal messages are "fleeting" in time: facial configurations don't accumulate in addition to each other, but replace each other. Only in a recording - say a written description or capturing video - accumulates in an additive manner.
In the iconic text, which cannot be divided into discrete units, the narrative is constructed as the combination of an initial stable state with a subsequent movement. (Lotman & Pfotenhauer 1975 [1973]: 336)
So, in short, nonverbal behavior is foremost an iconic text. But Lotman adds:
Thus, while in primary semiotic systems, two types of narration are possible, in secondary systems of the artistic type, as a result of this clear-cut division in the cultural system, there is a tendency to their synthesis and mutual influence. (Lotman & Pfotenhauer 1975 [1973]: 337)

Lotman, Yuri M. 1990. Universe of the mind: a semiotic theory of culture.Translated by Ann Shukman. Introduction by Umberto Eco. London; New York: Tauris.
...when we are dealing with discrete and non-discrete texts, translation is in principle impossible. The equivalent to the discrete and precisely demarcated semantic unit of one text is, in the other, a kind of semantic blur with indistinct boundaries and gradual shadings into other meanings. If in these other texts we do find segmentation of a sort, it is not comparable with the type of discrete boundaries of the first ones. Given these factors, we are faced with a situation where translation is impossible; yet it is precisely in these situations that efforts to translate are most determined and the results most valuable. For the results are not precise translations, but approximate equivalences determined by the cultural-psychologicla and semiotic context common to both systems. This kind of 'illegitimate', imprecise, but approximate translation is one of the most important features of any creative thinking. For these 'illegitimate' associations provoke new semantic connections and give rise to texts that are in principle new ones. (Lotman 1990: 37)
The generation of new text via translation between incompatible (discrete and continuous) semiotic systems.
...rhetorical texts are distinguished from general language texts by one special feature: namely, while language text are produced by the speaker of that language spontaneously, the explicit rules being apparent only to the researcher who constructs logical models of unconscious processes, in rhetoric the process of producing texts is 'learned' and deliberate; the rules are actively included in the actual text, not only at the metalevel but also on the level of the immediate text structure. (Lotman 1990: 38)
This is important: rhetorical texts are deliberate (intentional) and rules are included in the immediate structure of the text. In behavioural terms, this would amount to being conscious of decorum with the aim of impressing someone. Lotman himself draws up another sense for gestural rhetoric:
The 'rhetoric of figures' belongs to the level of secondary modelling and metamodels; and this distinguishes it from the level of primary signs and symbols. For example, an aggressive gesture by an animal, which serves as a substitute for an actual aggressive act, is an element of symbolic behaviour; in this case the symbol is used in its primary sense. In another example, a symbolic sexual gesture is used in the animal group to indicate submission to the dominant partner and so loses its sexual content; in this instance we can talk of the gesture's metaphorical value and gestural rhetoric. (Lotman 1990: 38)

Shklovsky, Viktor - Art as Technique
And so [automatic] life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours work, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war. "If the whole complex lives of many people go on unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been." And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar," to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and lenght of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object is not important... (Shklovsky)
Here Shklovsky describes the process of defamiliarization. It is a beautiful thought and makes one wonder if art is truly a way of experiencing artfulness, instead of the object, perhaps everyday behavior, too, can be an object of aesthetic ends.
A work is created "artistically" so that its perception is impeded and the greatest effect is produced through the slowness of the perception. As a result of this lingering, the object is perceived not in its extension in space, but, so to speak, in its continuity. Thus "poetic language" gives satisfaction. According to Aristotle, poetic language must appear strange and wonderful; and, in fact, it is often actually foreign: the Sumerian used by the Assyrians, the Latin of Europe during the Middle Ages, the Arabisms of the Persians, the Old Bulgarian of Russian literature, or the elevated, almost literary language of folk songs. (Schklovsky)
This is equally true, I think, for photographs young people today adore. It could well be said that the poses and gestures in typical tumblr pictures must appear strange and wonderful.
Veltruský, Jiří 1981. The Prague School Theory of Theater. Poetics Today 2(3): 225-235.
...all that goes on during the performance centers on the actor, so to speak.It is through him that the other components receive their theatrical function and meaning (Mukařovský, 1941). This does not necessarily presuppose that all he does is strictly integrated in the representation of a dramatic character (Bogatyrev, 1938a; Honzl, 1940a; Mukařovský, 1937). The reason why everything centers on the actor is that he is a real, live person, so that the signs he produces with his own body cannot be reduced to a mere signans/signatum relation (Zich, 1931: 55; Bogatyrev, 1938b; Honzl 1940a; Mukařovský, 1941). In acting, the artist himself is personally present in his work. All the other components appear, therefore, as in some sense less real. (Veltruský 1981: 230)
That is to say, the human sign is more pertinent than other signs.
Zich laid the foundation of the semiotics of theater when he conceptually separated the signans from the signatum in acting, namely the stage figure created by the actor from the character, or dramatis persona, represented by that figure - and when he separated them both from the actor as an artist (Zich, 1931: 55-6). Most of the theoreticians belonging to the Prague Linguistics Circle were reluctant to adopt this concept of the stage figure as distinct from both the actor and the character. (Veltruský 1981: 232)
The idea that the sign has simply two facets, the signans and the signatum, does not quite apply to acting. In a specific work of acting, it is often hard and sometimes utterly impossible to determine what belongs to the stage figure and what to the character. The borderline between the two is blurred, a great many features are part of the signans in some respect and of the signatum in some other. Since in acting human beings, their actions and behavior represent human or antropomorphous beings, their actions and behavior, the difference between similarity and sameness tends to canish (Zich, 1931: 56). (Veltruský 1981: 233)
From my perspective, this three-part distinction is perfectly understandable: in Fahrenheit 451 (1966), the Austrian actor Oskar Werner (1) embodies Guy Montag (2), a character from Ray Bradbury's novel (3). (2) and (3) are similar, but not the same (due to intersemiotic translation, or untranslatability).
Veltruský, Jiří 1987. Structure in Folk Theater: Notes Regarding Bogatyrev's Book on Czech and Slovak Folk Theater. Poetics Today 8(1): 141-161.
Theatricality cannot be fully understood without a study of its roots in everyday life. But if it is to be fruitful this study must avoid confusing distinct categories. The tempration to see theater everywhere is very strong. Let us take the following statement: "Out own life and sphere of work - emploi - which obliges us to play, for most of our life, the part of a teacher, shopkeeper, civil servant, etc., rarely gives us the opportunity to 'jump out' of this role and perform a different one" (Bogatyrev, p. 8). This exercise of an occupation can certainly be called playing a part but the phrase is merely a metaphor. The teacher really is a teacher, the shopkeeper a shopkeeper, the civil servant a civil servant and so on: one teaches, the second sells merchandise, the third does paper work, etc. By contrast, the stage murderer surely does not do away with his fellow actor - not even when it is a rival, whether in love or in casting. In the theater, the closest an actor can come to murder is to simulate it; he can represent it by a sign the signans of which closely resembles its signatum. (Veltruský 1987: 144)
Here is basically the difference between instrumental and communicative behaviors: first refers to actually performing the action; the second to seaming or simulating the action. Real life is instrumental (non-signs), theater is communicational (signs).
The actor's contribution is to create a stage figure which is a structure of signs. Some of these are the actor's own physical characteristics; to put it very crudely, a tall actor cannot create a short figure. Others are artificial, in the sense that they are the products of an art or craft; this applies to the make-up or mask, the dress, etc., but also - up to a point - to the color, the strenght and the pitch of the voice (which can differ to some extent from his own), to the way he moves, gestures, uses his facial muscles, etc. (Veltruský 1987: 153)
Yet again I see my own three-part distinction: (1) physical/biological, (2) artificial/cultural, and (3) personal capabilities.
In theatrical action, each stage figure is interconnected with all the others, as well as with all the other components of theater. Therefore the stage figure also carries a variety of meanings that are related indirectly, if at all, to the character. (Veltruský 1987: 154)
This sounds vaguely related to what Irene Portis-Winner called the human sign.
...such stage objects as raised platforms, chairs and tables are used to draw attention to some characters' importance, dignity, and so on. Their sole purpose is to convey a feature of the character in the simplest possible way: in order to signal the character's importance or dignity the actor merely steps or climbs onto an elevated platform, sits on a chair, takes a place behind a table and so forth. (Veltruský 1987: 157)
Yet again conjuring up the simple connection between being higher and being more important. A simple, yet effective device.
Honzl, Jindřich [1940]. Dynamics of the Sign in the Theater. Ladislav Matejka, Irwin R. Titunik (eds.) Semiotics of Art. Cambridge: MIT Press, 75-94.
...it is not its constructional nature that makes it a stage but the fact that it represents dramatic space. The same can be said about the actors: the actor is usually a person who speaks and moves about the stage. However, the fundamental nature of the actor does not consist in the fact that he is a person speaking and moving about the stage but that he represents someone, that he signifies a role in a play. Hence it does not matter whether he is a human being; an actor could be a piece of wood, as well. If the wood moves about and its movements are accompanied by words, then such a piece of wood can represent a character in the play, and the wood becomes an actor. (Honzl 1976: 75)
The treatment of stage characters as merely a structures of signs enables one to liberate them from human bodies:
Liberation awaits dramatic character, up to now closely associated with human gestures and motions, as it also does the playwright's text, hithero verbal text, and so on for the other devices of dramatic art. And much to our amazement, we are discovering the stage "space" need not be spatial but that sound can be a stage and music can be a dramatic event and scenery can be a text. (Honzl 1976: 76)
This seems a bit schizophrenice: this chair can be a lamp post and this window can be a grave, etc. But Honzl is trying to demonstrate the role of semiosis in the theater devices.
...we cannot tell what a contraption on stage is supposed to signify until it is used by an actor. He has first to sit on it or rock on it or climb out of it. [...] The sign (representative) function of the scenery and props is determined solely by the movements of the actor and by the manner in which he uses them, but even then their representative function is not entirely unambiguous. (Honzl 1976: 78)
It should be cautioned that Honzl is here talking about ambiguous stage props, the function of which "is not carried by either color or shape".
Mukařovský, Jan 1978. Structure, Sign and Function: Selected Essays. Translated and edited by John Burbank and Peter Steiner. New Haven: Yale University Press.
During a performance it seems quite natural that such and such word of the text is pronounced in a certain way or is accompanied by a certain gesture, that its effect manifests itself in a particular manner in the facial expression, gestures, and movements of the actors, and so on. But during rehearsals the spectator would see that the connection of a word with a gesture, and so forth, is the result of an intentional selection from many possibilities, that no component of theater follows automatically from another, and that the theatrical performance is a very complex and dangerously fluid structure. (Mukařovský 1978: 202-203)
Here Mukařovský describes the naturalness with which we glean performances, while the rehearsals avail the tenuous efforts to establish naturalness.
If a statue is part of the set, sculpture is present on stage. Even in such a case, however, the function of the statue is different from what it is off stage. Off stage, for instance, right in the lobby of a theater, a statue is merely a thing, a depiction, whereas on stage it is a motionless actor, a contrast to a live actor. (Mukařovský 1978: 205)
This - difference in function - was pointed out also by Lotman: the icon functions differently in the temple and in a museum. But it should be doubted whether Mukařovský's analogy can be taken very seriously, as a statues of people in public space then become "motionless people".
Lotman, Ju. M. and B. A. Uspensky 1978. Myth — Name — Culture. Semiotica 22(3): 211-233.
In the first instance (descriptive description) [The world is matter] we are referring to a metalanguage (to a category or element of a metalanguage). In the second (mythological description) [The world is a horse] we are referring to a metatext, that is, to a text that fulfills a metalinguistic function with respect to what is given; here the described object and the describing metatext belong to one and the same language. (Lotman and Uspensky 1978: 212)
This is the essence or conclusion of their distinction.
Mythological thinking, from our point of view, can be regarded as paradoxical, but in no way primitive, since it deals successfully with complex problems of classification. Comparing its mechanism with the logical apparatus to which we are accustomed, we can establish a certain parallelism of funtions. (Lotman and Uspensky 1978: 213)
Here they are trying to avoid being normative: mythological thinking is not lesser than logical/scientific/metalingual thinking.
Lotman, Jurij 1976. Semiotics of Cinema. Translated by Mark E. Suino. University of Michigan Press.
Statements of the type "The Volga flows into the Caspian Sea," for a person who already knows that fact, carry no information. Information is the removal of some uncertainty, the destruction of ignorance and its replacement by knowledge. Where there is no ignorance there is no information. (Lotman 1976: 13)
This is Lotman's definition of information which should be compared to other definitions of information and knowledge. An elaboration:
...the quantity of potential information depends on the presence of alternative possibilities. Information is the opposite of automatism: where an event automatically has another as a consequence, no information arises. (Lotman 1976: 13)
In one of his works L. Kulešov quite properly recommended, when discussing the practical methodology of film work, that students train their vision by looking at potential subjects through a piece of paper containing a hole cut in the shape and size of a film frame. The difference between the cisible world in life and on the screen comes about in just this manner. The former is not discrete (it is continuous). While our hearing divides audible speech into words, our vision sees the world as "a single chunk." The world of cinema is the world which we see plus discreteness. It is a world divided into pieces, each one having a certain degree of autonomy, as a result of which we have the possibility for multiple combinations, not available in the real world. The world becomes a visible artistic world. (Lotman 1976: 23)

Tynjanov, Yuri 1977. The Fundamentals of Cinema. Translated by L. M. O'Toole. Formalist theory. s.l.: Oxon Publishing Ltd, 32-54.
The flatness of film (which still does not deprive it of perspective), this technical 'failing' is expressed in the art of cinema through the positive constructive principles of simultaneity of several sequences of visual images, on the basis of which a quite new interpretation of gesture and movement is achieved. (Tynjanov 1977: 35)
On page 39 he puts it in shorter words: "camera angle replans the relations between people and things". An elaboration:
It is quite obvious that in the process of this stylistic transformation (which is necessarily also a semantic transformation), it is not the 'man-as-seen' and not the 'object-as-seen' which are the 'hero' of the cinema, but a 'new' man and a 'new' object - people and objects transformed within the dimension of the art form - that is, 'man' and 'object' of cinema. The visible relationships between visible people are broken down and replaced by relationships between cinematic 'people' - every instant, unconsciously and almost naively - so deeply rooted in this principle in the very basis of the art form. (Tynjanov 1977: 38)
This amounts to what Zich described as the "third" - the dramatis persona in theater.
Here Tynjanov talks about (panto)mime in cinema:

Kull, Kalevi 1999. Towards biosemiotics with Yuri Lotman. Semiotica 127(1): 115-131.
...According to the view which has been adpoted by many contemporary biosemioticians, these [biolocial semiotics and cultural semiotics] are different branches of semiotics. But there also exists another view, which places the semiotics of nature into the framework of a more general cultural semiotics (I would prefer in this case to apply the term 'ecosemiotics', as different from 'biosemiotics' in the sense of the former approach). (Kull 1999: 117)
I had not realized that ecosemiotics embodies the clashing of bio- and cultural semiotics, but it makes perfect sense.
In 1978, the Tartu theoretical biology group, together with similar groups from Moscow and St. Petersburg, organized a conference, 'Biology and linguistics', held in Tartu on February 1-2. One of the key lecturers was Y. Lotman and many of his colleagues participated. (Kull 1999: 117)
I'm noting this down because the very idea of combining biology and linguistics seems enticing.
In the autumn of 1977, when the Section of Theoretical Biology of the Estonian Naturalists' Society had been established, one of the first invited speakers was Y. Lotman. He agreed willingly, but confessed that he did not know much about the topic. The talk was titled 'The forms of collective life' and held on December 15, 1977. At the beginning of the talk, he paid attention to the book by Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses (The RUssian translation of which had just appeared in 1977), with the subtitle Archeology of Humanities, which contained quite a large number of connections between linguistics and biological taxonomy. (Kull 1999: 121)
Upon first reading of this article, a year ago, I had not noticed this valuable piece of information, which reframes the relationship of Foucault and Lotman for me entirely.
Y. Lotman's lecture 'Two approaches to behaviour', was delivered at the Spring School of Theoretical Biology 'Theory of Behaviour' on May 7, 1982, which took place at Puhtu Biological Station, the former house of Jakob von Uexküll (Lotman 1982). That meeting has remained the largest ethological conference ever organized in Estonia (about 130 participants). Y. Lotman distinguished between two appraoches concerning the question of behavior. The first takes as its starting point the behavior of an individual as the main reality and point of reference, from which scientific modeling of behavioral acts begins. The second view takes as its basis the 'behavioral space' as an integral structure, which is programmed primarily in relation to the hierarchically lower-level program of individuals. According to Y. Lotman,
this leads us to assume that besides the biosphere and semiosphere, it is reasonable to speak about the sphere of behaviour, which is invariant for all living matter and its forms. This would make it possible to move away from pure empirism and to approach typological methods in behavioural research.
According to him, the reconciliation of the two aspects would be the most fruitful. The major part of the lecture was devoted to the phenomenon of asymmetry in semiosis and to brain lateralization. He also made a more general claim, that in any complex semiotic system, a spatial asymmetry arises. (Kull 1999: 122-123)
I quoted this in lenght because the "sphere of behavior" is essentially what I am studying, and recently I managed to find a single page abstract in Estonian of his lecture [link], which in personal communication with Kalevi Kull was claimed to be the only surviving document of the lecture.
Ivanov, Vyacheslav V. 2008. Semiotics of the 20th century. Sign Systems Studies 36(1): 185-230.
Modern studies of endangered languages suggests that no more than 600 languages out of 6,000 that exist in the world may survive in the next generation (Robins, Uhlenbeck 1991). This possible catastrophe of the nearest future might be even more serious than the one studied by the specialists in ecology. Mankind is rapidly losing the degree of linguistic diversity that it had for last thousands of years. (Ivanov 2008: 202)
Like was noted on similar topic in one of Irina Avramets's lectures, sic transit gloria mundi.
Modern neurophysiological research has shown the connection of different forms of rhythmical activity (such as rhytmic music, dance or jogging) to the positive action of endogeneous opioid peptide neurotransmitters like the five amino-acid encephalins, endorphines and dynorphin. The latter are mimicked by the drugs spreading in the modern society. (Ivanov 2008: 215)
Something I already knew, bit didn't have a source on. This explains why jogging and music are addictive.
In the semiotic studies of cinema the first stage consisted of the comparison of a movie's structure and a verbal text. Specialists were interested in finding units corresponding to words and sentences in a cinematographic discourse. (Ivanov 2008: 219)
In my analysis for the course on film semiotics, I followed this first stage by describing the most evident differences in the verbal text and filmic realisation.
Continuous messages that are particularly important for mass media are still much less investigated by semioticians, with the only important exception being film semiotics. (Ivanov 2008: 288)
Another noteworthy passing remark. Noteworthy because it seems to hold true: discrete signs are much more investigated, and studying continuous messages (which compose the overwhelming majority in nonverbal communication) might be fruitful if novel methods are applied.
Pavel Florenskij (1882-1937; executed in the time of Stalin's purges after being kept in a Northern Russian camp for political prisoners) was among the first to suggest the opposition of Logos or "ectrophy" (represented by culture and cult) to the second principle of thermodynamics determining the growth of entropy (cf. Ivanov 1995). Approximately at the same time Szilárd (1898-1964) published his study on the entropy being diminished by an interference of a thinking person measuring a physical process and serving as a paradoxical Maxwell's demon (Szilárd 1929). According to later cybernetic works by Wiener and Brillouin a probable explanation of the difference in the minus/plus sign between the "negentropy" (negatice entropy = Florenskij's ectrophy) or information (in the sense of Shannon's mathematical information theory) and entropy may be understood in a similar vein. Suggesting a special pneumatosphere (from Greek πνεύμα "soul, spirit" to Florenskij) - semiosphere (sphere of signs in the sense of Lotman 1990) based on the principles of exact science. In that case we may say that the works of Teilhard and Vernadskij suggest a general tendency of the growth of the amount of information. The arrow of time in the human biological evolution as well as in the history of noosphere/pneumatosphere/semiosphere is defined by this tendency just as the time direction in the physical world is measured according to the second law of thermodynamics. (Ivanov 2008: 228)
I quoted this footnote at lenght because I'm fairly familiar with notions related to the semiosphere and this is my first acquaintance with the notion of pneumatosphere.
Pavel Florenskij in his posthumous works suggested the importance of organoprojection (the continuation of our body through some technological devices). The same idea was discussed by Niels Bohr in some of his philosophical essays: to him a scientist and his device are united, the constitute one observer. Can a border between a scholar and his library be drawn ... ? (Ivanov 2008: 234)
The continuation of body through extrabodily devices (especially information technology) is an interest of mine also, and it links up with Aldo Leopolds remark on how a true modern person is separated from the rest of the world (especially nature) with "innumerable physical gadgets". References related to Florenskij and pneumatosphere:
  • Florenskij, Pavel A. 1993. Analiz prostranstva i vremeni v hudozhestvennoizobrazitel’nyh proizvedeniyah [Analysis of Space and Time in the Works of Representational Art]. Moskva: Progress. [In Russian].
  • - 1995. Lo spazio e il tiempo nell’arte. [Misler, N., trans.] Milano: Adelphi edizioni.
  • Ivanov, Vyacheslav V. 1995. Florensky: A symbolic View. Elementa 2(l).
  • Szilárd, Léo. 1929. Über die Entropieverminderung in einem thermodynamischen System bei Eingriffen intelligenter Wesen. Zeitschrift für Physik 53: 840–856.

Semiootika ajaloo lugemine


All teaching is teaching of either things or signs, but things are learnt through signs. (Augustinus X: 1)
Vrd Schefleni tähelepanekuga kuidas praktilisi tegevusi (nt haamerdamist) õpetatakse läbi imitatsiooni, kus instrumentaalne tegevus on samas ka kommunikatiivne tegevus.
...nobody uses words except in order to signify something. From this it may be understood what I mean by signs: those things which are employed to signify something. So every sign is also a thing, since what is not a thing does not exist. But it is not true that every thing is also a sign. (Augustinus X: 1)
Ilmselgelt Augustinus ei tundnud kõneakti teooriat, tema jaoks olid sõnad ainult tähistamiseks, märkamata, et tähistamine (ja tähenduse edastamine) on tegevused. Märk on Augustinuse jaoks asi, mis tähistab midagi. Iga märk on seega ka samaaegselt asi, sest mis ei ole asi, ei eksisteeri (märgiprotsesside ontoloogia küsimus).
For a sign is a thing which of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that it presents to the senses. (Augustinus X: 2)
Märk on asi mis kutsub mingi teise asja vaimus esile, peale mulje (impression) mida see avaldab meie meeltele. Saab seostada märgi immanentsuse (intrinsic coding) küsimusega - on ka märke, mille tähendus ongi see, et nad meie meeltele end avalduvad.
Some signs are natural, others given. Natural signs are those which without a wish or any urge to signify cause something else besides themselves to be known from them, like smoke, which signifies fire. (Augistinus X: 2)
Mõned märgid on loomulikud, teised antud. Loomulikud märgid on need mis tähistavad ilma soovita tähistada ja teevad midagi endast teistsugust teatavaks. Kas reguleerimata näoilmed on loomulikud märgid?
Given signs are those which living things give to each other, in order to show, to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything that they have felt or learnt. There is no reason for us to signify something (that is, to give a sign) except to express and transmit to another's mind what is in the mind of the person who gives the sign. (Augustinus X: 2)
Antud märgid on, lühidalt, kommunikatiivsed märgid. Augustinus ütleb siin, et muud eesmärki tähistamisel ei olegi, kui teisele märgi andmine. Tähendab, Augustinus ei arvestanud endale märkide andmist, ehk autokommunikatsiooni.
Certain movements of the hands signify a great deal. Actors, by the movement of all their limbs, give certain signs to the cognoscenti and, as it were, converse with the spectators' eyes; and it is through the eyes that flags and standards convey the wishes of military commanders. All these things are, to coin a phrase, visible words. (Augustinus X: 2)
Enne seda tsitaati nimetas Augustinus ka näoilmeid. Žestide kohta ütleb ta, et need on nagu "nähtavad sõnad", st tegelikult arvestab vaid neid žeste millel on leksikaalne affiliaat.
There are certain words in particular languages which just cannot be translated into the idioms of another language. This is especially true of interjections, which signify emotion, rather than an element of clearly conceived meaning: two such words, it is said, are racha, a word expressing anger, and osanna, a word expressing joy. (Augustinus X: 4)
See on päris asjalik tähelepanek: hüüdsõnu on raske tõlkida, sest nende eripära võib olla pralingvistiline.
2. Märk on Augustinuse jaoks asi mis ise kutsub vaimus esile mingi teise asja, mis on midagi muud kui mulje mida see asi meeltes tekitab. Selliselt välistab Augustinus märkide immanentsuse - märkide enese-tähistamise (intrinsic seme). Veel eristab Augustinus loomulikke ja antud märke, mis kummalisel kombel ühilduvad väga kenasti Paul Ekmani mõistetega "näoilme" (facial expression, mis on loomulik, nt naeratus ja lihtne silmapilgutus) ja "näožest" (facial gesture, mis on antud, nt teeseldud naeratus ja "tähenduslik" silmapilgutus).


Nüüd on loomulik mõelda, et märgiga (nimega, sõnaühendiga, kirjamärgida) on seotud peale tähistatu, mida võib kutsuda osutuseks [Bedeutung], veel ka see, mida ma tahaksin nimetada märgi tähenduseks [Sinn], milles sisaldub antuse viis. Selle põhjal oleks meie näites väljendite 'a ja b lõikepunkt' ning 'b ja c lõikepunkt' osutus küll sama, mitte aga nende tähendus. Sama oleks 'Ehatähe' ja 'Koidutähe' osutus, aga mitte tähendus. (Frege X: 23)
"Koidutäht" ja "ehatäht" osutavad samale taevakehale, aga nende tähendus on erinevad.
Kui kaks kujutlevad üht ja sama, siis on kummalgi ikkagi omaenda kujutlus. Mõnikord on küll võimalik kindlaks määrata eri inimeste kujutluste, isegi aistingute erinevust; kuid nende täpne võrdlus ei ole võimalik, sest need kujutlused ei saa esineda koos ühessamas teadvuses. (Frege X: 26)
Kujutlused on subjektiivsed, personaalsed.
Kujutlusest ja kaemusest pole rohkem vaja rääkida, neid on siin mainitud vaid selleks, et kujutlust, mille mingi sõna kuulajas tekitab, ei aetaks segi sõna tähenduse või osutusega. (Frege X: 27)
Millegi pärast näen siin jälle kolmikut. Tõmban nõrga analoogia: bioloogiline on seotud osutusega - see on universaalne ja ühene, reaalne; kultuuriline on seotud tähendusega - ühine, kuid erisusi täis, ideedemaailm; personaalne on seotud kujutlusega - see on individuaalne ja mingis mõttes jagamatu.
4. Märgi kujutlus on Frege järgi "seesmine pilt" tajutavast objektist mis tekib mälestustest meeleliste muljete kohta. Kujutlus on tunnetest läbi ilmunud ja ainult üksikisiku jaoks kindla tähendusega seotud. Kujutlus on individuaalne, subjektiivne, idiosünkraatne. Kui osutust on üks (Veenus) ja tähendusi on mitu (Ehatäht, Koidutäht), siis kujutlusi võib olla piiritult (selle taevakehaga seotud tajupildid ja mäluseosed). Praktiline näide: vestluses nina sügamine osutab sellele, et keha on vallandanud noradrenaliini mis paneb nina sisekoe paisuma ja histamiinid selle koe sügelema, tähendus võib olla vestluses esile kerkinud ebameeldiv teema, ebameeldiva vestlusekaaslase käitumine jms, kujutluses võib mõelda, et keegi valetas või oli muul moel häiritud, et nina sügelema hakkas.


See, et keel on märgisüsteem, paistab juba algusest peale olevat ilmne ja fundamentaalne väide, mida keeleteoorial tuleb juba varajases staadiumis arvesse võtta. Mida tähendab see väide, ja eriti mõiste "märk", seda peab keeleteooria oskama meile öelda. Seniks peame jääma ebamäärase reaaltähenduse juurde, mis on meieni jõudnud traditsiooni kaudu. Selle järgi on märk eelkõige määratud märkima midagi muud - see omadus peab juba algusest peale huvitav tunduma, kuna näib, nagu märk oleks funktsiooniga defineeritud. Märk funktsioneerib, märgib, tähendab; märk on vastupidiselt mittemärgile tähenduse kandja. (Hjemslev X: 91)
Keel on oma eesmärgilt eelkõige märgisüsteem; selleks et olla täielikult oma eesmärgi teenistuses, peab keel alati olema valmis looma uusi märke, uusi sõnu või uusi sõnajuuri. Aga keel peab samas, et olla täielikult oma eesmärgi teenistuses, olema sellest piiramatust rikkusest hoolimata kergesti käsitletav, omandatav ja kasutatav, mida saab piiramatu märkide hulgaa nõude kehtides saavutada ainult nii, et kõik märgid on moodustatud mittemärkidest, mille hulk on piiratud ja pigem rangelt piiratud. Selliseid mittemärke, mis sisestuvad märgisüsteemi kui märkide koostisosad, nimetame me siinkohal figuurideks; see on puht operatsiooniline termin, mis tuuakse sisse ainult mugavuse nimel. Keel on niisiis korraldatud sel moel, et käputäie figuuride abil ja üha uute figuurikombinatsioonide kaudu võib moodustada lugematu arvu märke. (Hjemslev X: 96)
...räägime... nimelt märgifunktsioonist, mis on asetatud kahe suuruse - väljenduse ja sisu vahale. Sellest põhikäsitusest lähtuvalt saame otsustada, kas märgifunktsiooni on otstarbekas käsitada märgiks kutsutava suuruse välise või sisemise funktsioonina.
Väljendus ja sisu on siin sisse toodud märkimaks funktiive, mis sisaldavad kõnesolevat funktsiooni, märgifunktsiooni; see on puht operatsionaalne ja formaalne määratlus ja selles kontekstis ei kätke nimetused väljendus ja sisu midagi muud ega rohkemat. (Hjemslev X: 101-102)
9. Hjemslevi jaoks on märk defineeritud selle funktsiooniga. Märk funktsioneerib, ehk märgib või tähendab. Märgifunktsioon toimib kahe suuruse - väljenduse ja sisu - vahel. Need on de Saussure tähistaja ja tähistatava analoogid. Ka Hjemslev leiab, et märgifunktsioon ei saa kunagi esineda kui mõlemad funktiivid pole samaaegselt kohal.


Üks olulisimaid Peirce'i semiootilise klassifikatsiooni tunnusjooni on nutikas äratundmine, et kolme põhilise märgiklassi vaheline erinevus on vaid suhtelise hierarhia erinevus. Mitte signansi ja signatumi vahelise sarnasuse või piirnevuse olemasolu või puudumine, ega ka mitte puhtfaktiline või puhttinglik, harjumuslik seos kahe osise vahel ei pane alust märkide jaotumisele ikoonideks, indeksiteks ning sümboliteks, vaid lihtsalt ühe faktori ülekaal teiste üle. Seega viitab õpetlane "ikoonidele, milles sarnasusele on abiks kokkuleppelised reeglid" ning võib meenutada erinevaid perspektiivitehnikaid, mida vaatajal tuleb õppida, et mõista erilaadsete kunstikoolkondade maale. (Jakobson X: 4)
Peirce ei jaga märke tähistajaks ja tähistatavaks ning väida, et kõik märgid on kokkuleppelised või meelevaldsed, vaid tunneb ära, et erinevate märkide vahel toimivad erined märgiseosed (ikoonilisus, indeksiaalsus, sümbolilisus). Jakobson lisab, et nende märgiklasside vaheline erinevus on vaid suhtelise hierarhia erinevus, aga see võib olla Jakobsoni eriarvamus, sest tema kommunikatsioonimudeliski oli funktsioonidel hierarhia ja alati üks valitsev funktsioon. Oluline on siin see, et kokkuleppelisus mõjutab ka ikoonilisust, ehk sarnasuste äratundmisel on samuti eelnev harjumus/kogemus mängus.
Peirce'i lemmiktsitaat on pärit John Salisbury teosest Metalogicus: "Nominatur singularia, sed universalia significantur." Palju triviaalset poleemikat oleks olnud võimalik vältida keeleteadlaste seas, kui nad oleksid põhjalikult omandanud Peirce'i raamatu Speculative Grammar ning eriti selle teesi, et “tõeline sümbol on sümbol, millel on üldine tähendus" ja et see tähendus omakorda "saab olla ainult sümbol", kuna "omne symbolum de symbolo". Sümbol osutab konkreetsele asjale ja tingimata " tähistab mingit asja", samas "on see ise liik ja mitte üksik asi." Sümbol, näiteks sõna, on "üldreegel", mis saab tähenduse ainult läbi selle erinevate kasutusjuhtude, nimelt suuliselt väljendatud või kirjutatud — asjaga sarnaste — koopiate. Kui mitmekülgsed need sõna kehastumised ka poleks, see jääb igal sellisel juhtumil "üheks ja samaks sõnaks". (Jakobson X: 9)
Seda sümbolimääratlust tuleks meeles pidada kui jõuan raamatuteni mis kõnelevad sümbolitest ühiskonnas.
7. Peirce'i oluline innovatsioon seisnes äratundmises, et märke ei jagune mitte tähistajateks ja tähistatavateks ning kõik märgid on kokkuleppelised või meelevaldsed, vaid tundis ära erinevate märkide vahel toimivad märgiseosed (kaardistas loogika abil palju võimalusi). Jakobson väidab, et märgiseoseid ei määra harjumuslik seos vaid ühe seosetüübi (ikoonilisus, indeksiaalsus, sümbolilisus) ülekaal teiste üle. Kahtlustan, et Peirce ise ei pruukinud niimoodi arvata ja tegu on Jakobsoni tõlgendusega.


There are three kinds of interest we may take in a thing. First, we may have a primary interest in it for itself. Second, we may have a secondary interest in it, on account of its reactions with other things. Third, we may have a mediatory interest in it, in so far as it conveys to a mind an idea about a thing. In so far as it does this, it is a sign, or representation. (Peirce X [1894]: 2)
Esmasus on tunne, teisesus on reaktsioon, kolmasus on sümbol.
But pictures alone, —pure likenesses, —can never convey the slightest information. Thus, figure 3 suggests a wheel. But it leaves the spectator uncertain whether it is a copy of something actually existing or a mere play of fancy. (Peirce X [1894]: 4)
Peirce'i kahtlus on asine - kas koomiks-ajakiri Fahrenheit 451s saab edastada informatsiooni?
Any ordinary word, as "give," "bird," "marriage," is an example of a symbol. It is applicable to whatever may be found to realize the idea connected with the word; it does not, in itself, identify those things. It does not show us a bird, nor enact before our eyes a giving or a marriage, but supposes that we are able to imagine those things, and have associated the word with them.(Peirce X [1894]: 6)
Sõnad on sümbolid mis on ühenduses ideedega, võimaldab meil ette kujutada asju mida nende märkidega seostatakse.
Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from likenesses or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of likenesses and symbols. We think only in signs. These mental signs are of mixed nature; the symbol-parts of them are called concepts. If a man makes a new symbol, it is by thoughts involving concepts. So it is only out of symbols that a new symbol can grow. (Peirce X [1894]: 7)
Üks Kalevi Kulli artikkel on siit saanud alguse. Ehk vrd sümbol, tekst, meem.
7. Peirce eristab esmasust (huvi asja kui sellise vastu), teisesust (reaktsioon teiste asjadega) ja kolmasust (vahenduslik huvi kuniks asi vahendab vaimule ideed asja kohta). Kolmasus on sümboli vald - sümbolid on märgid mis vahendavad üldisi tähendusi. Iga tavaline sõna on sümbol - seda võib rakendada ükskõik millele mis realiseerib (kutsub vaimus esile) sõnaga seotud ideede. Sümbolid kasvavad - nad arenevad välja teistest märkides, eriti ikoonidest.


"Tõene" ja "väär" on aga sõnad, mida rakendatakse lausetele, ning eeldavad seega keele olemasolu. (Ma ei kavatse eitada, et mälestus, mis ei koosne sõnadest, vaid kujutluspiltidest, võib olla tõene või väär; kuid seda veidi teises mõttes, mis meid praegu ei puuduta.) (Russell X: 81)
Huvitav, kas kujutluspiltide tõesus ja väärus seisneb nende moonutustes?
Kui me hilisemas elusõpime ära mõne uue sõna tähenduse, teeme seda harilikult sõnaraamatu abiga, see tähendab, defineerides nende sõnade kaudu, mille tähendust me juba teame. Aga kuna sõnastik defineerib sõnu teiste sõnade kaudu, peavad olema mõned sõnad, mille tähendust me teame ilma verbaalse definitsioonita. Teatud väike arv sõnu nende hulgast ei kuulu primaarkeelde; sellised on "või" ja "ei". Kuid rõhuv enamus on primaarkeele sõnad, ja nüüd tuleb meil võtta vaatluse alla nende sõnade tähenduse selgeksõppimise protsess. Sõnastikusõnad võivad kõrvale jääda, kuna teoreetiliselt on nad ülearused; sest neid on peaaegu kõikjal võimalik asendada vastavate definitsioonidega.
Objektsõnade õppimise juures tuleb uurida nelja asja: kuuldud sõnast arusaamine objekti esinedes, selest arusaamine objekti puududes, sõna ütlemine objekti esinedes, selle ütlemine objekti puududes. Jämedates joontes omandab laps need neli võimet just niisuguses järjekorras. (Russell X: 84-85)
Järjekord on huvitav ja siin ta täpsustab:
Objektsõna tähendust saab selgeks õppida ainult sel teel, et kuuldakse korduvalt seda sõna öeldavat objekti esinedes. Sõna ja objekti vaheline assotsiatsioon on täpselt samasugune kui mis tahes harjumuslik assotsiatsioon, nt nägemise ja kompimise vaheline. Kui assotsiatsioon on kujunenud, toob objekt mõttesse sõna ja sõna toob mõttesse objekti just niisamuti, nagu objekti nägemine kutsub esile kompimisaistingu või objekti puudutamine pimedas kutsub esile nägemisaistingud. Assotsiatsioon ja harjumus ei ole seotud spetsiaalse keelega, need on psühholoogia ja füsioloogia üldised tunnused. Nende tõlgendamine on muidugi raske ja vastuoluline küsimus, kuid see pole spetsiaalselt keeleteooria küsimus.
Niipea kui on kujunenud assotsiatsioon objektsõna ja tema tähenduse vahel, tekib sõnast "arusaamine" objekti puududes, st sõna "seostub" objektiga täpselt samamoodi, nagu nägemine ja kompimine teineteisega seostuvad.
Ütleme, et te olete kellegagi koos ja teie kaaslane ütleb äkki "rebane", sest ta näeb rebast, ja oletame, et te küll kuulete teda, kuid ei näe rebast. Mis teiega tegelikult toimub selle tagajärjel, et te saite aru sõnast "rebane"? Te vaatate ringi, kuid seda teinuksite ka siis, kui oleksite öelnud "hunt" või "sebra". Võib-olla te kujutlete rebast. Kuid vaatleja seisukohast näitab teie arusaamist antud sõnast see, et te käitute (teatud piirides) nii, nagu te oleksite käitunud rebast nähes. (Russell X: 86)
See rebase nimetamise näide on otseselt seostatav Fahrenheit 451-s kuu nimetamisega: "Kui ma eile öösel ütlesin midagi kuust, te vaatasite kuud. Teised ei teeks seda kunagi. Teised läheksid ära ja jätaksid mu rääkima." (Bradbury 2005: 30)
5. Russell väidab, et objektsõnade tähendust õpitakse ainult sel teel, et kuuldakse korduvalt sõna selle objekti esinedes. Nii tekib sõna ja objekti vahel assotsiatsioon või harjumusseos. Kui see on tekkinud, manab sõna kuulmine vaimus esile asja (idee) ja sõnast saadakse aru ka objekti puududes.


Vahemärkus: kui semioloogiat hakatakse organiseerima, peab ta endalt küsima, kas väljendamise viisid, mis põhinevad täielikult loomulikel märkidel — nagu pantomiim — kuuluvad tema kompetsentsi. Oletades, et ta võtab nad vastu, jääb tema peamiseks objektiks [endiselt] süsteemide kogum, mis on rajatud märgi meelevaldsusele.
Tõepoolest, kõik ühiskonnas omaks võetud väljendusvahendid põhinevad kollektiivsel harjumusel (habitude) või kokkuleppel, mis teeb sama välja. Näiteks viisakuse märgid omandavad tihti teatud loomuliku väljenduse (kui mõelda hiinlastele, kes oma keisrit tervitades kummardavad üheksa korda maani), olles samas mitte vähem reeglite (règle) poolt fikseeritud; just reegel ja mitte sisemine väärtus (valeur intrinsèque) on see, mis kohustab neid kasutama. (Saussure X: 3)
Kollektiivsel harjumusel põhinevad ühiskondlikud viisakusavaldused (nö decorum) on Saussure arvates reeglite poolt fikseeritud ja reeglid kohustavad neid kasutama. Meelevaldsuse ja motiveerituse kohta veel:
Lingvistilise märgi määratlemiseks on kasutatud sõna sümbol, või täpsemini seda, mida me nimetame tähistajaks (signifié). Siinkohal tuleb möönda [teatavaid] ebamugavusi, just meie esimese printsiibi tõttu. Sümbolit iseloomustab see, et ta pole kunagi täielikult meelevaldne; ta ei ole tühi, tähistaja (signifiant) ja tähistatava (signifié) vahel on loomuliku sideme jäänus (rudiment). Õigluse sümbolit, kaalu ei saa asendada ükskõik millega, näiteks vankriga.
Sõna meelevaldne (arbitraire) vajab samuti märkust. See ei tohi edastada arusaama, et tähistatav (signifiant) oleneb kõneleva subjekti vabast valikust (allpool näeme, et lingvistilises grupis kord juba loodud märgi puhul pole indiviidi võimuses midagi muuta); soovime öelda, et ta on mittemotiveeritud (immotivé), see tähendab, et tähistatava — millega tal pole reaalsuses mingeid loomulikke sidemeid — suhtes meelevaldne. (Saussure X: 3)
Saussure, Ferdinand De 2007 [1972]. Course in General Linguistics. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Translated by Roy Harris. Illinois: Open Court.
All the individuals linguistically linked in this manner will establish among themselves a kind of mean; all of them will reproduce - doubtless not exactly, but approximately - the same signs linked to the same concepts.
What is the origin of this social crystallisation? Which of the parts of the circuit is involved? For it is very probably that not all of them are equally relevant.
The physical part of the circuit can be dismissed from consideration straight away. When we hear a language we do not know being spoken, we hear the sounds but we cannot enter into the social reality of what is happening, because of our failure to comprehend. (Saussure 2006 [1972]: 13)
Siin on see ühiskondliku kristalliseerumise moment millest ma sekundaarallikate kaudu teadsin. Here one may note that in nonverbal communication, the physical part can not be dismissed from consideration, but rather should be considered as extremely important, as it enables one to enter the social reality of what is happening by merely observing the physical movements of bodies.
Amid the disparate mass of facts involved in language, it stands out as a well defined entity. It can be localised in that particular section of the speech circuit where sound patterns are associated with concepts. It is the social part of language, external to the individual, who by himself is powerless either to create it or to modify it. It exists only in virtue of a kind of contract agreed between the members of a community. On the other hand, the individual needs an apprenticeship in order to acquaint himself with its workings: as a child, he assimilates it only gradually. It is quite separate from speech: a man who loses the ability to speak none the less retains his grasp of the language system, provided he understands the vocal signs he hears. (Saussure 2007 [1972]: 14)
This line of thought can also be applied to knowledge of nonverbal phenomena, which in this sense becomes a special (second-order?) language (of description).
A language, as we have just seen, is a social institution. But it is in various respects distinct from political, juridical and other institutions. Its special nature emerges when we bring into consideration a different order of facts.
A language is a system of signs expressing ideas, and hence comparable to writing, the deaf-and-dumb alphabet, symbolic rites, forms of politeness, military signals, and so on. It is simply the most important of such systems. (Saussure 2007 [1972]: 15)
Keel teiste märgisüsteemide hulgas: võrreldav teiste süsteemidega, aga nende hulgast kõige tähtsam.
5. De Saussure kahtles kas loomulikud märgid (nagu pantomiim, mis põhineb ikoonilisusel) kuuluvad semioloogia kompetentsi, sest tema nägi semioloogia peamiseks objektiks olevat süsteemide kogum (semiosfäär?) mis on rajatud märgi meelevaldsusele. Kollektiivsed märgid nagu viisakusväljendused (nö decorum) on kokkuleppelised. Sellised on ka keelemärgid, ehk sümbolid, mis pole küll täielikult meelevaldsed, sed põhinevad loomuliku sideme jäänusel (kaalud sümboliseerivad õiglust paremini kui vanker). Mittemotiveeritud on selline märk mille tähistaja ja tähistatava vahel pole reaalsuses mingeid loomulikke sidemeid. Meelevaldsus ei ole ka subjektiivne: indiviidil pole võimu keelemärke vabalt muuta. Keelemärgid on ühiskondlikult kristalliseerunud - samad märgid on ühenduses samade kontseptidega. Keel eksisteerib (justkui) tänu ühiskonnaliikmete kokkuleppele.


Oluline osa treenimisest seisneks selles, et õpetaja osutab esemetele, juhib nendele lapse tähelepanu ja lausub sealjuures mingi sõna; näiteks sõna "plaat", näidates ette vastava vormi. ... Ma hakkan seda nimetama "sõnade ostensiivseks õpetamiseks". - Oluliseks osaks treenimisest nimetan ma seda sellepärast, et inimeste puhul see nõnda on, mitte sellepärast, et seda ei saaks teisiti ette kujutada. See sõnade ostensiivne õpetamine loob nii-öelda assotsiatiivse seose sõna ja asja vahele. (Wittgenstein 2005: 20)
Ostensiivne õpetamine on nagu ettenäitamine, seose loomine tähistaja ja tähistatava vahel.
Eksitav paralleel: psühholoogia tegeleb protsessidega psüühilises sfääris, nii nagu füüsika - füüsilises sfääris.
Nägemine, kuulmine, mõtlemine, tundmine, tahtmine ei ole samas mõttes psühholoogia objektid nagu kehade liikumised, elektrinähtused jne. on füüsika objektid. See selgub sellest, et füüsik näeb ja kuuleb neid nähtusi, mõtleb nende üle järele, informeerib meid nendest, psühholoog aga jälgib subjekti avaldumist (käitumist). (Wittgenstein 2005: 244)
1. Ostensiivne õppimine sarnaneb Russelli objektkeele õppimisega: sõna seostatakse asja (ideega) läbi ettenäitamise, seose loomise. Õpetaja osutab esemele, juhib lapse tähelepanu sellele ja lausub sõna. Sel moel demonstreerib õpetaja sõna "osutust" ilma ekslike tähenduste või kujutlusteta mis võiksid tekkida kui asjale ei oleks võimalik osutada.


Märgid, mis viitavad samale objektile, ei pruugi omada sama märgitavat, kuna see, mida arvestatakse objekti puhul, võib erinevate interpreteerijate poolt erinev olla. Objekti märk võib ühes teoreetilises äärmuses lihtsalt panna märgi interpreteerija sõltuma objektist, samas kui teises äärmuses lubaks see interpreteerijal arvestada kõiki kõnealuse oleva objekti omadusi objekti enese puudumisel. Nõnda on olemas potentsiaalne märgi kontiinuum, milles iga objekti või situatsiooni suhtes võib väljendada kõiki semioosi astmeid.
Juhul kui see, millele viidatakse, on tegelikult olemas kui viiteobjektile viidatu, on osutatav (denotatum) . Nõnda saab selgeks, et kuigi igal märgil on märgitav, pole igal märgil osutatavat. Märgitav pole asi, vaid objekti liik või objektide klass — ning klassil võib olla palju liikmeid või üks liige või mitte ühtegi liiget. Osutatavad on klassi liikmed. See eristus teeb seletatavaks fakti, et võib minna võtma jääkapist õuna, mida seal pole ning teha ettevalmistusi eluks saarel, mida pole kunagi eksisteerinud või mis on ammu sügavustesse vajunud. (Morris X: 3)
Märgikandjad kui loomulikud eksistentsid osalevad ekstraorgaanilistes ja intraorgaanilistes protsessides. Kõneldavad ja lauldavad sõnad on täpselt orgaaniliste reageeringute osad, samas kui kirjutamine, maalimine, muusika ja signaalid on vahetud käitumise produktid. Juhul kui märgid tulenevad muust materjalist kui käitumine või käitumisproduktid – nagu märgifaktorid taju puhul – muutuvad märgid omavahel seotuks , kuna märgikandjad on omavahel seotud. Äikesemürin saab välgu märgiks ja välk ohu märgiks just sellepärast, et äikesemürin, välk ja oht on teatud moel omavahel seotud. (Morris X: 5)
üntaktilised reeglid määravad ära märgiseosed märgikandjate vahel, semantilised reeglid korreleerivad märgikandjaid teiste objektidega, pragmaatilised reeglid sätestavad interpreteerijatele tingimused, millal märgikandja on märk. Iga reegel, kui seda tegelikult kasutatakse, toimib käitumistüübina ning selles suhtes leidub kõigis reeglites pragmaatiline komponent. Kuid mõnes keeles on märgikandjaid, mida valitsevad reeglid , mis on kaugel süntaktilistest või semantilistest reeglitest, mis võivad valitseda neid märgikandjaid ning sellised reeglid on pragmaatilised reeglid.(Morris X: 15)
Seostub mitte-märkamisega.
Semiootilisest seisukohast ei saa ei ‘märgikandjat’ ega ‘interpretanti’ defineerida ilma üksteisele viitamata.
Seega ei ole need isoleeritud eksistentsid, vaid on asjade eripärad teatud erilistes funktsionaalsetes seostes teiste asjade või omadustega. “Psüühiline seisund” või isegi reaktsioon pole selline interpretant, kuid saab selliseks ainult siis kui see on “millegi arvestamine”, mis on märgikandja poolt esile kutsutud. Ükski objekt pole selline osutatav, kuid saab selleks kui ta on mõne märgikandja poolt selle märgikandja jaoks kehtiva semantilise reegli põhjal märgistatava objektideklassi liige. Miski pole tõeliselt märk või märgikandja, vaid saab selliseks ainult siis kui see lubab millelgi arvestada midagi selle vahenduse kaudu. Tähendusi ei saa paigutada eksistentsidena ükskõik kuhu semioosi protsessis, vaid neid tuleb iseloomustada selle protsessi kui terviku terminites. (Morris X: 17)
5. Morrise designaat on analoogne Frege tähendusega (Sinn), sest see on esmasem - igal märgil on designaat/tähendus, aga mitte denotaat/osutus (Morrise koera-näiteks oleks siis kellahelin tähendus ja toit osutus); ja sarnane tähistatavaga, sest see on see mida märk (Morrisel täpsemalt interpretant) esile kutsub vaimus - de Saussure'i ei paistnud see väga huvitavat kas sõnad tähistavad tegelikke objekte või mitte.

Filmisemiootika lugemine

Bazin, André 1997a. Filmikeele areng I. Teater. Muusika. Kino. 10, 44-47.
Montaaži saab kasutada "nähtamatult"; ameerika klassikalistes ennesõjaaegsetes filmides on see enim levinud võte. Plaanide killustamisel ei ole muud eesmärki kui analüüsida sündmust vatavalt stseenide materiaalsele või dramaatilisele loogikale. Analüüsi loogika muudabki montaaži tajumatuks, kuna vaataja mõistus omastab loomulikul kombel režissööri pakutud seisukohad, sest neid õigustab tegevuse asukoht või dramaatilise pinge raskuspunkti ümberpaiknemine. (Bazin 1997a: 45)
Fahrenheit 451s juhtub ühel hetkel see, et plaanid killustuvad väga nähtavalt, toimub järsk nihe aegruumis. See on niivõrd selgelt tajutav, jätab mulje halvast montaažist. Samamoodi rongi trepi langemine, millega kaasneb tajutav kaadrilõige.
Millised nad ka poleks, ikka on neis olemas see ühine joon, mis on montaaži enda määratluseks: tähenduse loomine, mida kujutised objektiivselt ei sisalda ning mis tuleneb vaid nende omavahelisest suhtest. Heaks näiteks on montaaži omaduste kohta on kuulus Lev Kulešovi eksperiment Ivan Mozžuhhinist, kelle naeratus tundub muutuvat sõltuvalt talle eelnevast kujutisest. (Bazin 1997a: 45)
Montaaži määratlus tähendusloomena tundub väga semiootiline. Kulešovi eksperiment - mis iseenesest on seotud mitteverbaalse suhtlemisega, on semiootika osakonnas justkui commonsense knowledge - tuleks nimega seostada, et järgmine kord kui mõni õppejõud niimuuseas seda mainib ja küsib nime, oskaks vastata.

Metz, Christian 1974. The Cinema: Language or Language system? Language and Cinema. s.l.: Walter de Gruyter, 31-91.
Nevertheless there are certain "syntactical procedures" that, after frequent use as speech, come to appear in later films as a language system: They have become conventional to a degree. Many people, misled by a kind of reverse anticipation, have antedated the language system; they believed they could understand film because of its syntax, whereas one understands the syntax because one has understood, and only because one has understood, the film. The inherent intelligibility of a dissolve or a double exposure cannot clarify the plot of a film unless the spectator has already see other films in which dissolves and double exposures were used intelligibly. On the other hand, the narrative force of a plot, which will always be understood only too well - since it communicates with us in images of the world and of ourselves - will automatically lead us to understand the double exposure and the dissolve, if not in the first film we see them, at least by the third or fourth. As GIlbert Cohen-Séat has aid, the language of film will always have the advantage of being "already entirely written out in actions and in passions important to us." (Metz 1974: 41)
Siin on päris hea tsitaat filmikeele mõistetavusest ja argument, et me mõistame filmikeelt juhul kui oleme sellega varem kokku puutunud. Teisest käest mõistame filme ka selle tõttu, et need põhinevad jagatud kogemustel - näiteks Fahrenheit 451 puhul mõistame firemani esekahtlemist, sest tajume Bradbury ümberpööramisi. Tulemehed põletavad mitte ei kustuta, toru viib üles mitte alla ja rong sõidab õhus, mitte maal.
...above all [in silent films] there was the gesticulation in acting, whose true reason for being [...] was not, as has been wrongly said, in the infirmity of the silent image, or in acting habits mechanically inherited from the theater (how to explain that in some silent pictures there is no gesticulation?), but in a subconscious attempt to speak without words, and to say without verbal language not only what one would have said with it (which is never entirely impossible), but in the same way it would have been said. Thus there came into being a kind of silent gibberish, simultaneously overexited and petrified, an exuberant gabbing whose every gesture, every bit of mimicry, stood with scrupulous and clumsy literalness for a linguistic unit, almost always a sentence whose absence, which would not otherwise have been catastrophic, became abundantly obvious when the gesticulated imitation so clearly emphasized it. (Metz 1974: 50)
Arutelu sel teemal, kuidas tummfilmides žestikulatsioon ja kõiksugused muud kehaliigutused asendasid verbaalseid väljendusi. Sealjuures nii, et sõnadele oli koht, kuid neid ei olnud. Lk 54 annab ta sellele nähtusele ka nimetuse: pseudo-verbal gesticulation.
In short, the universaility of the cinema is a two-fold phenomenon. Positive aspect: The cinema is universal because visual perception varies less throughout the world than languages do. Negative aspect: The cinema is universal because it lacks the second [double] articulation. There is a solitary relationship between the two observations that must be emphasized. A visual spectacle entails a joining of the signifier to the significates, which in turn renders impossible their disjunction at any given moment and, therefore, the existence of a second articulation. (Metx 1974: 64)
Negatiivne aspekt on siin tähistaja ja tähistatava lähedus, mistõttu filmis on intrinsic seme-d. Sama tähelepaneku (topeltartikulatsiooni puudumine) tegi mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kohta Lange-Seidl. MVS puhul saab sellest arutelust välja kasvatada instrumentaalse tegevuse käsitluse, filmide puhul pole kindel.
The concept of expression is used here as defined by Mikel Dufrenne. There is expression where a "meaning" is somehow immanent to a thing, is directly released from it, and merges with its very form. Some of Eric Buyssens's "intrinsic semes" perhaps fall under this definition. Signification, on the contrary, links from the outside an isolable signifier to a significate that is itself - this has been known since de Saussure - a concept and not a thing. There are the "extrinsic semes" Buyssens writes about. A concept is signified, a thing is expressed. Being extrinsic, signification can only derive from a convention; it is of necessity obligatory, since one would deprive it of its only support - consensus - by rendering it optional. (Metz 1974: 78)
Tuleb välja, et intrinsic ja extrinsic coding, mis mulle on tuttav Ekmani ja Frieseni kategooriatest, pärineb 1930ndatest (Eric Buyssensi kohta ei leidu internetis palju infot).

Metz, Christian 1990 [1978]a. Some Points in the Semiotics of the Cinema. Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. Translated by Michael Taylor. s.l.: University of Chicago Press, 92-107.
In film a "house" would be a shot of a staircase, a shot of one of the walls taken from the outside, a close-up of a window, a brief establishing shot of the building, etc. Thus a kind of filmic articulation appears, which has no equivalent in photography: It is the denotation itself that is being constructed, organized, and to a certain extent codified (codified, not necessarily encoded). Lacking absolute laws, filmic intelligibility nevertheless depends on a certain number of dominant habits: A film put together haphazardly would not be understood. (Metz 1990: 98-99)
Siin on foto ja filmi erinevus see, et filmis on fotosid palju ja nende vaheldumise kaudu artikuleeritakse või konstrueeritakse denotaat. Milline täpselt on vahe kodifitseerimise ja enkodeerimise vahel, jääb siin praegu lahtiseks. Näide haphazardly put together filmist tuli meelde Banksy filmist Exit Through The Gift Shop, kus peategelane pani oma kaua-kogutud videlõikudest kokku mingi jura milles iga sekund sisaldab mitu kaadrit erinevatest aegruumidest vms, midagi täiesti vaadatamatut mille ajendil Banksy pidi väidetavalt ise (uue) filmi tegema.
Contrary to what many of the theoreticians of the silent film declared or suggested ("Ciné langue," "visual Esperanto," etc.), the cinema is certainly not a language system (langue). It can, however, be considered as a language, to the extent that it orders signifying elements within ordered arrangements different from those of spoken idioms - and to the extent that these elements are not traced on the perceptual configurations of reality itself (which does not tell stories). Filmic manipulation transforms what might have been mere visual transfer of reality into discourse. Derived from a kind of signification that is purely analogous and continuous - animated protography, cinematography - the cinema gradually shaped, in course of its diachronic maturation, some elements of proper semiotics, which remain scattered and fragmentary within the open field of visual duplication. (Metz 1990: 105)
Keele ja keelesüsteemi erinevuse kohta oli eelmises tekstis rohkem kirjutatud. Siin on lühike kokkuvõte. Väga kenasti kõlab lause, et filmiline manipulatsioon muudab selle, mis võinuks olla kõigest reaalsuse ülekanne, diskursuseks. Mul on kahtlusi puhta analoogsuse või kontinuaalsuse suhtes, kuigi selle üle vaidlemine võib minna filosoofiliseks. Proper semiotics näib Metzi jaoks olevat kokkuleppeliste märkide sfäär.

Barthes, Roland 1977a. The Photographic Message. Image, Music, Text. Edited and translated by Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 15-31.
What is the content of the photographic message? What does the photograph transmit? By definition, the scene itself, the literal reality. From the object to its image there is of course a reduction - in proportion, perspective, colour - but at no time is this reduction a transformation (in the mathematical sense of the term). In order to move from the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to divide up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs, substantially different from the object they communicate; there is no necessity to set up a relay, that is to say a code, between the object and its image. Certainly the image is not the reality but at least it is its perfect analogon and it is exactly this analogical perfection which, to common sense, defines the photograph. Thus can be seen the special photographic image: it is a message without a code; from which proposition an important corollary must immediately be drawn: the photographic message is a continuous message. (Bathes 1977: 17)
Siin jätkub intrinsic codingu teema. Analogon on siin denotaat ja konnotatsioonide kaudu suhtleb ühiskond oma arvamusi sellest. Kui täiuslik on foto analogon, jääb minu arvates kahtlaseks, sest ka pildistamisel mängib denotaadi konstrueerimisel rolli mitu faktorit mida Metz oma tekstis nimetas (kaamera kaugus, suund, jne). Pildi kontinuaalsus on TMKst liigagi tuttav ja kõige varasemaks selliseks arutluseks pean ikkagi Rueschi ja Keesi (1956) vastandust digitaalse ja analoogilise vahel.
The purely 'denotative' status of the photograph, the perfection and plenitude of its analogy, in short its 'objectivity', has every chance of being mythical (these are the characteristics that common sense attributes to the photograph). In actual fact, there is a strong probability (and this will be a working hypothesis) that the photographic message too - at least in the press - is connoted. Connotation is not necessarily immediately graspable at the level of the message itself (it is, one could say, at once invisible and active, clear and implicit) but it can already be inferred from certain phenomena which occur at the levels of the production and reception of the message: on the one hand, the press photograph is an object that has been worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated according to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms which are so many factors of connotation; while on the other, it is read, connected more or less consciously by the public that consumes it to a traditional stock of signs. (Barthes 1977: 19)
Siin suunabki Barthes ise arutelu foto denotaadi täiuslikkuse müütilisusele: foto (vähemasti ajakirjas) on läbinud töötluse, valitud, komposeeritud, konstrueeritud, koheldud professionaalide poolt esteetiliste või ideoloogiliste normide kohaselt jne. Need on tema järgi konnotatsiooni faktorid.
2. Pose. Consider a press photograph of President Kennedy widely distributed at the time of the 1960 election: a half-lenght profile shot, eyes looking upwards, hands joined together. Here it is the very pose of the subject which prepares the reading of the signifieds of connotation: youthfulness, spirituality, purity. The photograph clearly only signifies because of the existence of a store of stereotyped attitudes which form ready-made elements of signification (eyes raised heavenwards, hands clasped). A 'historical grammar' of iconographic connotation ought thus to look for its material in painting, theatre, associations of ideas, stock metaphors, etc., that is to say, precisely in 'culture'. (Barthes 1977: 22)
Kogu pildile jäädvustatud mitteverbaalne käitumine on Barthesil koondatud poosi mõistesse. Siinkohal ma ei oska öelda, mis erinevus on sõnadel pose ja posture. Selles aspektis tuleks vist arvesse võtta Poyatose (2008: 258) tähelepanekut, et filmis esineb ka dünaamilisi poose (keha püsivad konfiguratsioonid liikumises). Birdwhistellil, Kendonil ja Dittmanil oli selleks oma sõna, vististi stance.

Barthes, Roland 1977b. Rhetoic of the Image. Image, Music, Text. Edited and translated by Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 32-51.
Today, at the level of mass communications, it appears that the linguistic message is indeed present in every image: as title, caption, accompanying press article, film dialogue, comic strip balloon. Which shows that it is not very accurate to talk of a civilization of the image - we are still, and more than ever, a civilization of writing, writing and speech continuing to be the full terms of the informational structure. In fact, it is simply the presence of the linguistic message that counts, for neither its position nor its lenght seem to be pertinent (a long text may only comprise a single global signified, thanks to connotation, and it is this signified which is put in relation with the image). What are the functions of the linguistic message with regards to the (twofold) iconic message? There appear to be two: anchrorage and relay. (Barthes 1977: 38)
See tähelepanek on Fahrenheit 451 suhtes oluline, sest seal vabaneti sõnadest isegi mitte-kirjanduslikes teabevahendites. Vähemasti filmis oli tahvlile joonistatud skeemidele märgitud ainult numbrid ja ajaleht-koomiksis ei olnud ühtegi sõna. Verbaalsel sõnumitel on ikooniliste sõnumitega seoses kaks funktsiooni Barthesi järgi: ankurdamine aitab valid mitmetähenduslikust pildist kindla/õige tajutasandi, nö ankurdab konnotatsiooni (paljude võimalike konnotatsioonide hulgast); relee-tekst aga lisab tähendusi mida pildis endas ei ole. Üks ja sama verbaalne kirjeldus võib täita mõlemat funktsiooni korraga, aga üks valitseb.
A pseudo-truth is surreptitiously substituted for the simple validity of openly semantic systems; the absence of code disintellectualizes the message because it seems to found in nature to signs of culture. This is without doubt an important historical paradox: the more technology develops the diffusion of information (and notably of images), the more it provides the means of masking the constructed meaning under the appearance of the give meaning. (Barthes 1977: 45-46)
Disintellectualization on kena sõna. Arvustus düstoopiafilmidest Youtube-s ankurdab Fahrenheit 451 "globaalse tähenduse" sõnadega "kirjandus on paha", mida arvustaja lausub disintellektualiseeritud juhma ilmega (justkui Fahrenheit 451 olekski suunatud juhmadele inimestele kes kirjandusest lugu ei pea).

Metz, Christian 1990 [1978]b. Problems of Denotation in the Fiction Film. Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. Translated by Michael Taylor. s.l.: University of Chicago Press, 108-145.
Contrary to what I believed four years ago (notably in "The Cinema: Language or Language System?"), it does not seem atl all impossible to me, today, to assume that analogy is itself coded without, however, ceasing to function authentically as analogy in relation to the codes of the superior level - which are brought into play only on the basis of this first assumption. Many of the misunderstandings and arguments about these subjects derive from the fact that no one has yet attempted to draw up a half-way complete list of the different heterogeneous and superimposed codes copresent in any cultural activity of some importance, and no one has yet tried to clarify the precise organization of their interactions. (Metz 1990: 111-112)
Midagi sarnast ütles aastakümneid Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz (1993: 157): semiootikud mõistavad jada märk-kood-kultuur, aga kui on vaja praktiliselt analüüside mitme või paljude koodide interplay'd, satuvad hätta. Võib-olla see on igasuguste koodide puhul üldine raskus? Koodide tüpoloogiaid on ju palju ja ükski neist ei tundu olevat täiuslik või lõpuni usutav. Vb mul oleks lihtsalt vaja Ecot lugeda.
Even with respect to the signifying units, the cinema is initially deprived of discrete elements. It proceeds by whole "blocks of reality," which are actualized with their total meaning in the discourse. These blocks are the "shots". The discrete units identifiable in the filmic discourse on another level - for, as we shall see, there is another level - are not equivalent to the first articulation of spoken language.
Certainly, it is true that montage is in a sense an analysis, a sort of articulation of the reality shown on the screen. Instead of showing us an entire landscape, a film-maker will show us successively a number of partial views, which are broken down and ordered according to a very precise intention. It is well known that the nature of the cinema is to transform the world into discourse. (Metz 1990: 115)
Veel kord topeltartikulatsiooni teema ja see - mis meeldib mulle väga - kino kirjeldus kui reaalsuse muutmine diskursuseks. Kõlab nagu "film tekstualiseerib elu". Metzi argument on, et kuigi võtete tahtlik konstrueerimine tähendusloomes jätab mulje topeltartikulatsiooniks, ei ole see tõene lingvistilises mõttes, sest iga (isegi osaline) võte esitab segmenti reaalsusest mis kannab tähendust iseendas, erinevalt foneemist, mis peab ühinema jadaks, et olla tähenduslik. Tal on viis mõjukat argumenti: 1) võtteid, erinevalt sõnadest, on lõputult; 2) võtteid loovad filmitegijad, sõnad on sõnastikus olemas - võtted sarnanevad rohkem väidetele/lausetele; 3) võtted on määramatu kogus informatsiooni (pilt ütleb tuhat sõna?), mistõttu isegi väite/lause analoogia on kehv; 4) võte on aktualiseerunud ühik ehk aktuaalne, erinevalt sõnast mis on virtuaalne (siin on intrinsic/extrinsic coding probleem); 5) paradigmaatika probleem - film ütleb midagi just nii nagu ta ütleb, erinevalt lausest, mida võib öelda ka teisiti.
Thus, when it reaches the level of the "small" elements, the semiotics of the cinema encounters its limits, and its competence is no longer certain. Whether one has desired it or not, one suddenly finds oneself referred to the myriad winds of culture, the confused murmurings of a thousand other utterances: the symbolism of the human body, the language of objects, the system of colors (for color films) or the voices of chiaroscuro (for black and white films), the sense of clothing and dress, the eloquence of landscape. In each these cases - and in each of the cases not mentioned here - the study (indispensable, by the way) of the properly filmic creations of the appropriate significations will provide us with no essential paradigm: for those great creative tropes of meaning and of humanity will remain imbedded in culture where only a very general semantics can illuminate them - even if their deep scattered appearance in films contributes, in return, to their partial reformulation. (Metz 1990: 142)
Siin nimetab ta erinevaid koode, mis filmis segunevad.

Barthes, Roland 1977c. The Third Meaning: Research notes on some Eisenstein stills. Image, Music, Text. Edited and translated by Stephen Heath. New York: Hill, 52-68.
I read, I receive (and probably even first and foremost) a third meaning - evident, erratic, obstinate. I do not know what its signified is, at least I am unable to give it a name, but I can see clearly the traits, the signifying accidents of which this - consequently incomplete - sign is composed: a certain compactness of the courtier's make-up, thick and insistent for the one, smooth and distinguished for the other; the former's 'stupid' nose, the latter's finely traced eyebrows, his lank blondness, his faded, pale complexion, the affected flatness of his hairstyle suggestive of a wig, the touching-up with chalky foundation talc, the face powder. I am not sure if the reading of this third meaning is justified - if it can be generalized - but already it seems to me that its signifier (the traits to which I have tried to give words, if not to describe) possesses a theoretical individuality. On the one hand, it cannot be conflated with the simple existence of the scene, it exceeds the copy of the referential motif, it compels an interrogative reading (interrogation bears precisely on the signifier not on the signified, on reading not on intellection: it is a 'poetical' grasp); on the other, neither can it be conflated with the dramatic meaning of the episode... (Barthes 1977: 53)
Tsitaat läheb edasi, aga point on juba koju jõudnud: mulle näib, et Barthes üritab siin käsitleda mitteverbaalset suhtlemist, seda personaalset kehade sfääri kus tähistajad tormlevad ilma tähenduseta.
By contrast with the first two levels, communication and signification, this third level - even if the reading of it is still hazardous - is that of signifiance, a word which has the advantage of referring to the field of the signifier (and not of signification) and of linking up with, via the path opened by Julia Kristeva who proposed the term, a semiotics of the text. (Barthes 1977: 54)
Siin annab ta sellele "kolmandale tähendusele", mis triivib signifikatsiooni ja kommunikatsiooni vahel, nime. Selle lugemine on Barthesile, just nagu see on kõigile teistele, hazardous, sest mitteverbaalsed nähtused - kehade olemasolu ja liikumine, interaktsioon - on raskesti kirjeldatav. See on nagu "juhuslik ankurdamine" - konnotatsioone on lõputult ja ükski pole otseselt "see".
The obtuse meaning is a signifier without a signified, hence the difficulty in naming it. My rading remains suspended between the image and its description, between definition and approximation. If the obtuse meaning cannot be described, that is because, in contrast to the obvious meaning, it does not copy anything - how do you describe something that does not represent anything? The pictorial 'rendering' of words is here impossible, with the consequence that if, in front of these images, we remain, you and I, at the level of articulated language - at the level, that is, of my own text - the obtuse meaning will not succeed in existing, in entering the critic's metalanguage. Which means that the obtuse meaning is outside (articulated) language while nevertheless within interlocution. For if you look at the images I am discussing, you can see this meaning, we can agree on it 'over the shoulder' or 'on the back' of articulated language. Thanks to the image (fixed, it is true; a factor which will be taken up later) or much rather thanks to what, in the image, is purely image (which is in fact very little), we do wihout language yet never cease to understand one another. (Barthes 1977: 61)
Jääb mulje, et Barthes üritab siin sooritada müstitsistlik-semiootilist lugemist mitteverbaalsele käitumisele Eisensteini loomingus, aga tal on suhteliselt hädised vahendid selle läbiviimiseks. Siin mõtiskleb ta selle üle kui väga verbaalse keele vahendusel on võimalik mitteverbaalsust puudutada. Seda peatükki tuleks hiljem vanema-targemana üle lugeda sügavuti.

Burch, Noël 1982. Narrative/Diegesis: Thresholds, Limits. Screen 23(2): 16-33.
One of the critical thresholds crossed in the course of this historical movement was the ban, by certain American companies around 1910, against actors looking at the camera. In teh land of Griffith, Barker and DeMille, it was recognized much earlier than in France, for example, that the glance at the camera addressed itself explicitly to the spectator as corporeal individual; produced him/her as seated in a darkened theatre looking at dancing shadows on a screen. (Burch 1982: 22)
Kaamerasse vaatav näitleja kõnetab pilguga publikut kui kehalist isikut, tekitades ("pealesurutud" selles mõttes, et seda pole võimalik ühe osapoolena kuidagi reguleerida) väga isikliku sideme justkui-kõike-nägeva-näitleja ja vaataja vahel.

Comolli, Jean-Louis 1986 [1971]. Technique and Ideology: Camera, Perspective, Depth of Field (Parts Three and Four). Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader. s.l.: Columbia University Press, 421-443.
To pursue this particular instance further: the closeups of Hollywood stars no more "descend" from the closeups of Griffith's actors than they do from the "animated portraits" of Demeny (1891). We know they were due to the contractual conditions imposed by the star system: the number and kinds of closeups were prescribed even before shooting began, and before the film narrative was completely fleshed out. (Comolli 1986: 428)
Ma ei teadnud, et selline praktika eksisteerib... Aga meikib senssi - ongi commonsensical viis kuidas majandus tungib filmi.