The Strength of Weak Ties

Granovetter, Mark S. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 78(6): 1360-1380.

I will argue, in this paper, that the analysis of processes in interpersonal networks provides the most fruitful micro-macro bridge. In one way or another, it is through these networks that small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, and that these, in turn, feed back into small groups. (Granovetter 1973: 1360)

Phatic communication is one of those processes in interpersonal networks. In the modern social network perspective phaticity pertains to the establishment, maintenance and expansion of interpersonal networks. In simplest terms, making new acquaintances expands said networks.

Most intuitive notions of the "strength" of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie. Each of these is somewhat independent of the other, though the set is obviously highly intracorrelated. (Granovetter 1973: 1361)

It is too early for me to bring Aristotle to bear on this but it may be noted that NE book IX "On Friendship" deals with all of these aspects. The more immediate source to back up these aspects is early Malinowski: "It may be taken for granted that the sentimental side most essentially determines in a given society any kind of personal relationship. And in the same society the character of a given personal relation - be it parental kinship or anything else - varies with the intensity of the feeling and is essentially defined by the latter." (Malinowski 1913: 191-192)

Ties discussed int his papr are assumed to be positive and symmetric; a comprehensive theory might require discussion of negative and/or asymmetric ties, but this would add unneccessary complexity to the present, exploratory comments. (Granovetter 1973: 1361; ff2)

Aside from communization and consummation, which represent the main features of La Barre's and Jakobson's conceptions of phaticity, respectively, I think that the main feature of Malinowski's phatic communion is incommunication, the effect of giving off the impression that communication has taken place when it actually hasn't. In this aspect it is Jean Piaget who caught Malinowski's drift most accurately: when people engage in small talk they're performing a collective monologue. "For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement." (PC 5.5) - but bringing this to bear on modern conceptions of phaticity does add "unnecessary complexity" to the matter.

Included in "absent" are both the lack of any relationship and ties without substantial significance, such as a "nodding" relationship between people living on the same street, or the "tie" to the vendor from whom one customarily buys a morning newspaper. That two people "know" each other by name need not move their relation out of this category if their interaction is negligible. In some contexts, however (disasters, for example), such "negligible" ties might usefully be distinguished from the absence of one. This is an ambiguity caused by substitution, for convenience of exposition, of discrete values for an underlying continuous variable. (Granovetter 1973: 1361; ff4)

By definition, this "nodding" relationship is not phatic because it does not include speech as a mode of mutual action. In contrast, the looser contact-oriented conception of Jakobson would consider this "nodding" relationship phatic because there is a (nonverbal) channel and an undefined psychological connection operative in the nodding, as even "a look is a means of contact" (Durkheim 1915: 203).

The hypothesis which enables us to relate dyadic ties to larger structures is: the stronger the tie between A and B, the larger the proportion of individuals in S to whom they will both be tied, that is, connected by a weak or strong tie. This overlap in their friendship circles is predicted to be least when their tie is absent, most when it is strong, and intermediate when it is weak. (Granovetter 1973: 1362)

This tends towards Jurgen ruesch's communization: mutual acquaintances help frame the ongoing interaction, offers some common "social" ground. Note that the hypothesis here is explicitly aimed at a micro-macro bridge, and these days it is possible to chart these kinds of overlaps within a social network like Facebook by automatically processing ties as data points.

Implicit here is Homan's idea that "the more frequently persons interact with one another, the stronger thir sentiments of friendship for one another are apt to be" (1950, p. 133). (Granovetter 1973: 1362)

This is an older insight: constant companionship makes for a stronger bond of fellowship.

Bott argued that the crucial variable is that of whether one's friends tend to know one another ("close-knit" network) or not ("loose-knit" network). (Granovetter 1973: 1370)

Terminological finding relevant for distinguishing social media (loose) from co-presence (close) network studies.

Information and ideas thus flow more easily through the specialty, giving it some "sense of community," activated at meetings and conventions. Maintenance of weak ties may well be the most important consequence of such meetings. (Granovetter 1973: 1373)

This has to do with professional and technical specialties.

Small talk, rapport, and competence

Pullin, Patricia 2010. Small talk, rapport, and international communicative competence: Lessons to learn from BELF. Journal of Business Communication 47(455-476).

In writing on the collapse of Enron, Wong (2002, p. 2) identified "social-spiritual capital" in terms of "ethics, relationships, meaning and purpose" as a key element in "Healthy corporate cultures" that "...create a positive work climate, which is conducive to productivity and job satisfaction..." (p. 7). He contrasts such cultures to "toxic corporate cultures," which are dysfunctional in terms of relationships and adjustment to changing times. (Pullin 2010: 455)

We're not far off from "phatic capital", which is what Elyachar (2010) came close to in defining channels as a commodity. But whereas Elyachar follows Paul Kockelman, who in turn follows Roman Jakobson, this comes closer to Malinowski - a positive work climate here stands for "a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse" (PC 9.4), and dysfunctional relationships for "the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence" (PC 4.6).

Increasingly, change in workplace cultures is leading to recognition of the importance of building trust and common ground through informal communication and the value of this for companies in sharing knowledge [...] In particular, informal discussions have been cited by newly employed graduates as the most frequnet type of communication and of importance for team work and building and fostering relations [...] (Pullin 2010: 456)

In other words, informal social communication (Festinger 1950) is important for workplace culture and team work. "Informal discussion" is a functional synonym for phatic communion and/or small talk. Building and fostering relations, trust and common ground amounts to "establish[ing] bonds of personal union between people" (PC 9.1)

It is argued that one major force of small talk may be in helping to build solidarity and rapport. Rapport is an essential element in the building and maintenance of strong working relations and has been studied by both linguists and management researchers. (Pullin 2010: 456)

This is very "stipulative" - associations are mapped without explanation. Rapport is essential, but not essential enough to define it in clear terms? As a reader, am I supposed to have an intuitive knowledge of what rapport is? In that case I would go with the archaic definition of someone like Sapir, who said that rapport is a pullulation of behaviour patterns. Likewise, what is solidarity? A feeling of unity or belonging? Ambiguity.

Holden (2002, p. 234) refers to the importance of a "conducive, collaborative atmosphere," which can be achieved through "social adroitness, professional competence, and by applying intelligence and tact to interactions." (Pullin 2010: 457)

The phraseological similarity is astounding. But whereas a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse is aimed at "convivial gregariousness" (PC 7.6), a collaborative atmosphere is conductive for business and industry. Adroitness is cleverness or skill, which along with tact, meaning skill and sensitivity in dealing with others or with difficult issues, comes across as just a tad bit Machiavellian.

In terms of classification, small talk and social talk have been conceptualized in a number of different ways. For example, McCarthy (2000) defined small talk as "non-obligatory talk in terms of task requirements" (p. 84). In his research, he found that participants, whether consciously or unconsciously, seemed to be aware of the importance of relational talk in ensuring the achievements of goals and cementing a positive ongoing relationship. (Pullin 2010: 458)

This is of course from Coupland ed. Small Talk (2000). I like how McCarthy's quotes here parallel older phraseology: non-obligatory sums up the insight that "there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate" (PC 9.3) and in terms of task requirements that "the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking" (PC 7.3), i.e. speech that is "[un]connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing" (PC 1.4). The latter bit about cementing a positive ongoing relationship could have been inspired by John Laver's (1975), e.g. announcing a continuing provisional consensus for future interactions.

Holmes (2000, p. 38) situates interactional talk on a continuum: Core business talk → Work-related talk → Social talk → Phatic communication [...] The data analyzed in this study fall within the category of social talk, which covers topics such as cultural activities. Finally, phatic communication tends to have little referential content and includes utterances such as greetings. It is worth noting that small talk is dynamic in nature and shifts along the continuum, reflecting its flexibility and multifunctional nature. (Pullin 2010: 459)

This is a common conundrum for linguists attempting to put the concept of phatic communion to work without really grasping its origin or purpose. By definition, Phatic Communion would subsume both social talk and phatic communication, as defined here. This is the difficulty with linguistic application - phaticity can pertain to a type of discourse and a type of utterance. Any aimless discussion or meaningless utterance could be described as phatic. It's almost funny that "social talk" covers cultural activities; in this light one should ask what "relational talk" (somewhere above) covers? Relationships? Odd.

Small talk is closely related to "rapport" in building and nurturing relations and a sense of community among colleagues. Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2002, 2005) uses the term rapport in referring to "the relative harmony and smoothness of relations between people" and "rapport management" in connection with the management (or mismanagement) of relations between people. (Pullin 2010: 459)

Pretty much Sapir's pullulation of behaviour patterns. Made me finally add one of Spencer-Oatey's papers to my readings list (i.e. download it) because rapport requires a closer examination, and it would be nice to look into it to see if the earliest occurrences of it in phatic studies add up to modern theories of rapport management. Presently I still hold it as somewhat ambiguous or "intuitive" (harmony and smoothness aren't exactly exact terms).

Campbell and Davis (2006, p. 43) cite Gremler and Gwinner (2000) who outlined two important facets of rapport, that is, enjoyable interactions and personal connection. Campbell and Davis noted in a study on sales that rapport can be of crucial importance in relation to the quality of relationships with customers. (Pullin 2010: 459)

Nice. Enjoyable = pleasant (polite social intercourse), and personal connection is a functional amalgamation of Jakobson's "psychological connection" and Malinowski's "bonds of personal union between people". The quality of relationships could be elaborated with the aid of Alaina Lemon's (2013) social or phatic qualia.

In what ways does small talk function within the context of meetings to build, maintain and reinforce rapport and solidarity. (Pullin 2010: 460)

At this point I need a designation for these... umm... operational terms (from "channel operations"). Perhaps I could call these kinds of lists of activities operation sets? Build = establish, maintain = prolong, and reinforcing does away with discontinuation or termination or closing, so "rapport and solidarity" are an example of an open-ended operation set. An act of communication is limited (discrete), rapport and solidarity are continuous.

Politeness is considered to be a universal phenomenon involved in the creation and maintenance of good interactional relations, although politeness norms may vary from one community or individual to another. (Pullin 2010: 460)

Another operation set on the very same page? This one even lacks a third term, which is usually - if it's not termination - an enhancer term (growing, developing, reinforcing, nurturing, etc.).

Koester (2001, p. 99) argues that: "...expressions of solidarity [...] go beyond politeness, and are indicative of an affective dimension of relational goals..." She identifies two main types of relational orientation, first, politeness itself as exemplified in Brown and Levinson's model and second, solidarity, which "...refers to the affective dimension of interpersonal relations, and involves the expression of mutuality and common ground." (Pullin 2010: 461)

Finally a definition of solidarity, though not very precise. Is rapport (harmony and smoothness) not indicative of an affective dimension? What dimensions are there? It could be that rapport pertains to the practical dimension (though "affective" usually goes along with "cognitive" and "conative" - the latter doesn't apply because rapport has very little to do with intentions). Actually, my new set of terminology can do wonders here: solidarity pertains to communization (sharing emotions) and rapport to consummation (engaging in a mode of action).

First, it is in and around meetings that there is an "...ongoing process of constructing, developing and maintaining workplace power and rapport..." (Holmes, 2000, p. 64). (Pullin 2010: 462)

No wonder I feel the need to construct a new meta-term when this paper presents a new operation set on nearly every succeeding page. The problem with operation sets is that they give off the impression of saying something exact while actually hiding a lack of elaboration. There's probably more to operation sets than meets the eye - philosophically, or, ideally, they mark a beginning, middle, and end of something; or, alternatively, the past, present, and future of something. I say "something" because the object is always shifting: often it's relationship, originally (in Jakobson 1960d) it was the communication channel, and here it's... workplace rapport.

Second, it is argued that solidarity built through small talk can help mitigate tensions. (Pullin 2010: 462)

That is, can help "to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence" (PC 4.6).

Relevant points mentioned by the senior members of staff I interviewed in relation to effective face-to-face communication included the following:
  • empathy/building rapport
  • including people in conversations both business and social
  • regular opportunities for staff to come together in a social context
  • demonstrating interest in staff as individuals and enquiring about their well-being, personal interests, goals, and so on
  • accepting others' points of view without necessarily agreeing with them
(Pullin 2010: 462)

These are very interesting points. In comparison with Malinowski's phatic communion:

  • No, "It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment" (PC 2.3). Just like accepting someone's point of view does not necessitate agreeing with it, acknowledging someone's emotions does not automatically create empathy or make for harmonious and smooth interaction.
  • Yes, "There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company." (PC 3.2) - Phatic communion is about inclusiveness, anyone can engage in small talk.
  • Yes, "As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings [people] into a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse." (PC 9.4) - That is, creates an opportunity to come together and enjoy each other's company.
  • Yes, "personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history" (PC 5.4) are listened to with some slightly veiled impatience, which here takes on the strategic quality of the employer consciously handing out "social pleasure and self-enhancement" (PC 5.5) to employees.
  • Lastly, yes, again, the others' points of view are listened to "with slightly veiled impatience", implying no agreement, only "affirmation and consent" (PC 5.3) to go on gabbing.

Here, small talk appeared to function in helping to create a relaxed atmosphere before the beginning of the meeting and thus in nurturing rapport. (Pullin 2010: 463)

Relaxed is pleasant. The rest of the paper, the recorded chats, offer little beyond safe conversation topics like music, food, and pets. This paper was sub par.

Efforts Towards a Means-Ends Model of Language

Jakobson, Roman 1963d. Efforts Towards a Means-Ends Model of Language in Interwar Continental Linguistics. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 522-526.

Meantime both in the formal and even more in the private discussions at the First Congress of Linguists, there proved to be partisans of similar views and paths among the younger scholars from different countries. Students, pioneering solitarily at their own risk, discovered to their great surprise that they were fighters for a common cause. (Jakobson 1963d: 522)

Phraseological finding. This is also the case in phatic studies where representatives from distinct and disparate fields come to similar conclusions and, working away on their own derivation of phaticity, come to "fight for a similar cause", most frequently attempting to vindicate the concept of phaticity in some form or another.

In 1930, the Circle convoked the International Phonological Conference of Prague, where the basic principles of the new appreach to language and especially to its sound pattern were vividly and intensely discussed. (Jakobson 1963d: 522)

Lexical finding: to convoke is to "call together or summon (an assembly or meeting)." Agreement upon the basic principles of phaticity is what is missing at the moment. I argue that there is no "phatic theory" to speak of because every researcher nearly begins anew with every attempt. At best there are various micro-"schools" of thought, i.e. some common references to some particular representatives, most frequently (it seems) in the realm of phatic technology studies (Wang, Miller, Vetere, et al.). I think we need to convoke a vivid and intense discussion at some point, but presently it would be a great leap forward just to survey the field and the diffusion of the main conceptual domain.

When we look at the interwar period sub specie historiae, we find, however, that what was often taken for Prague's specific contribution to the development of modern linguistics appears to a high degree to have been a common denominator of several convergent currents in the scholarly life of various European countries at that time. (Jakobson 1963d: 522)

What's interesting about phatic studies is that the sub specie historiae in question, i.e. the most formative period, is the post-WWII decade, particularly the mid-1950s (Jakobson and La Barre), but less explicitly the years 1949-50, when Morris and Festinger came up with communization and consummation (in my current working theory these can serve as "explanatory mechanisms", for lack of a better terminology, for the underlying principles in La Barre's phatic communication and Jakobson's phatic function, respectively). More generally, "phatic" is a common denominator for an all too broad of a selection of approaches from all around the world (these days intensified by the internet), giving some credence to the case of illegitimate diffusion, which can only be dampened by the survey.

The title of this paper defines this common drift as aiming towards a means-ends model of language. These efforts proceed from a universally recognized view of language as a tool of communication. Statements about language as a tool, instrument, vehicle, etc., can be found in any textbook, but, strange as it seems, the apparently self-evident inference from this truism was not drawn in the linguistic tradition of the last century. (Jakobson 1963d: 523)

This is exactly the stuff Malinowski went against in his formulation of phatic communion. He disagreed with linguists of his time in other regards as well (such as the speech/language distinction, for example), but here he objects to the tool, instrument, vehicle view by writing that "words in Phatic Communion [are "Certainly not!"] used primarily to convey meaning" (PC 6.3). The "principal aim" of words in Phatic Communion is to "fulfil a social function" (ibid, 6.4). In Phatic Communion, language is not a tool, "an instrument of reflection" (PC 7.9), nor a vehicle ("a means of transmission of thought", PC 6.5). And yet it does achieve something, it does have an aim ("bring[ing people] into a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse", PC 9.4).

Thus the elemental demand to analyze all the instrumentalities of language from the standpoint of the tasks they perform emerged as a daring innovation. The prolonged neglect of any inquiry into the means-ends relationship in language - a neglect which still survives in some academic biases - finds its historical explanation in the inveterate fear of problems connected with goal-directedness. Therefore questions of genesis outweighed those of orientation, search for prerequisites supplanted the examination of aims. (Jakobson 1963d: 523)

These problems are somewhat apparent even in the aforementioned paradox: phatic communion "does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas" and in the very same breath it "serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship" (PC 9.1). When looking into it with goal-directedness in mind, we'll find, for example, that there may be cases where companionship is a means to an end, where "the speaker pretends to achieve no other aim than displaying a socially appreciated form of interactional behavior, whereas in actual fact his/her behavior serves to reduce the negative face involved in the ultimate request" (Haverkate 1988: 61). This is termed pseudophatic communion since it is not completely pure: "Indeed there need not or perhaps there must not be anything to communicate" (PC 9.3), including something to inquire, request, demand or direct. In phatic communion, companionship (or speaking) is its own - indeed that is what the terminological invention and religious archaism refer to: it is a verbal togetherness (Rank 1984) pure and simple (without any hidden external, extra-linguistic aims). I'll also note that orientation is a synonym for Jakobson's "set" in his definitions of functions, and "the examination of aims" is exactly what it leads to, e.g. James Kinneavy's "The Aims of Discourse" (1971).

The study of sound production with reference to its acoustic effects and the analysis of speech sounds with consistent regard for the various tasks they perform in language were among the first achievements in the systematic build-up of the means-ends model of language. (Jakobson 1963d: 524)

Here we see the speech/language distinction (as problematic) in play. Malinowski was looking at the social function of speech. Jakobson was looking at the phatic function of speech sounds in language. Thus, the bifurcation point here leads to a broader consideration of small talk and speech as a mode of (social) action and to a more strict consideration of the parts of speech that carry no information (e.g. phatic interjections, cf. Ameka 1992; or pragmatic markers as phatic devices, cf. Stenström 2014).

It was precisely the reference to the tasks performed by the phonic elements of language which enabled the investigators to replace step by step the grossly material, metrical description of speech sounds by a relational analysis and to dissolve the sound-flow continuum into discrete constituents. (Jakobson 1963d: 524)

Highlight: contoural feature, the discrete constituent of the sound-flow continuum that indicates the ending of a speech utterance and signals the end of the turn, a possible continuation, or an appeal to a specific type of reaction (interrogative and directive utterances). "Metrical description of speech sounds" takes special importance with regard to the spectral analysis of seech contours and the discussion of the ending semi-cadence. That is, this sentence is chalk full of relevant phraseology for discussing the more phonological aspects of the phatic function, which have thus far remained completely unnoticed because no-one really wants to get into the nitty-gritty of Jakobson's linguistics and poetic analyses.

The ever higher focusing upon the tasks fulfilled by sound elements revealed an intimate connection between the differentiation of grammatical constituents and categories and the stratification of the sound pattern used to express them. (Jakobson 1963d: 524)

Here he is describing the relevance of his functional scheme, which is essentially a differentiation of functional categories. Note that his functions are primarily distinguished by grammatical categories (interjections, vocativess, etc.), and the narrowing down of phatic parts of speech to meaningless sounds is a perfectly rational response from the corps linguists who look for phaticity in utterances and vocal expressions which are really nothing more than "pragmatic markers". The sad part is that the grammatical categories and "sound pattern" associated with the phatic function is not obvious, and is not even made explicit in The Sound Shape of Language where its theoretical underpinnings find its most eloquent expression.

The consistent concern with meaning, a true yield of the entire trend, and the systematic analysis of grammatical meanings with a rigorous distinction between general and contextual meanings demanded a similar exploration of lexical meanings, and the imperative need to treat vocabulary as "a complex system of words mutually coordinated and opposed to each other" was comprehensively advocated by Trubetzkoy at the First Congress of Slavists. (Jakobson 1963d: 525)

Here's the problem with the meaninglessness of words in phatic communion, which do not convey "meaning which is symbolically theirs" (PC 6.3). This probably has to do with Ogden and Richards' (1923) curiously strict definition of symbolic meaning and how the referential function "lapses" in greetings. This may be where the likes og Gardiner and Jakobson got the impression that phaticity pertains first and foremost to linguistic formulae, which have this lapse of reference, i.e. have general instead of contextual meaning, or are lexically meaningless (what does "Hello" mean?).

The sense for the multifarious character of language saved the Prague group from an oversimplified, bluntly unitarian view; language was seen as a system of systems and especially Mathesius' papers on intralingual coexistence of distinct phonemic patterns opened new outlooks. The regard for the various "functional dialects", or, in other words, the different styles of language radically altered the view of linguistic change. The two stages of a change in progress were reinterpreted as two simultaneous styles of language; the change was conceived as a fact of linguistic synchrony, and as any fact of synchrony it demanded a means-ends test with respect to the whole system of language. (Jakobson 1963d: 525)

This is one Jakobson's favourite topics (1981m). The scheme of speech functions in "Linguistics and Poetics" (1960d) is a condensed expression of the multifarious character of language. That is to say, the permanent dynamic synchrony of language is manifest in language consisting of distinct sub-codes, i.e. functional dialects. But this does not describe only the different grammatical and phonetic patterns of language characterizing different speech functions but stands equally for phatic speech registers. I recently saw great example of this in Jordan Peele's Get Out (2017), where the girlfriend's father says "Yo, my man." As the daugter put it: "Oh, my god, and then my dad with the "my man" stuff. My man! My man! I don't think he's ever heard that or said it, and now he just... It's all he says." - The dad takes on an uncharacteristic "functional dialect" in the presence of a black man..

Professional Communication as Phatic

Porter, James E. 2017. Professional Communication as Phatic: From Classical Eunoia to Personal Artificial Intelligence. Business and Professional Communication Quarterly 80(2): 174-193.

My purpose in this article is to call attention to the importance of the phatic function (or purpose) in professional communication - a purpose at least as important as informing, persuading, and helping others, and perhaps a necessary foundation for all forms of digital communication and interaction. (Porter 2017: 175)

"Purpose" pretty much hits the mark, as Roman Jakobson himself explains his functionalism in terms of means and ends, so that his "goal" is pretty much equivalent to "purpose". Where it gets troublesome is the earlier Malinowskian conception, in which there is no purpose - it is literally a "purposeless" type of interaction. Hence Jakobson's insistence that cliches and stereotyped formulas are phatic, meaning that they have no communicative purpose. But it is also easy to see where this lack of purpose gets confusing: Jakobson's channel-functions (checking whether the phone-line works, whether the other person is actually listening and can reply, etc.) can stand for that putative purpose. Likewise, in Malinowski there as-if is a purpose, the purpose of achieving a pleasant atmosphere of polite social interaction, but his diminutive view of it stems from this atmosphere itself being purposeless and not, as Durkheim hypothesized, a means for concretizing religious ideas.

Phatic (from the Greek word phanai, "to speak") refers to the rhetorical function of creating effective communication channels, keeping them open, and establishing ongoing and fruitful relationships, all of which are especially important in the age of digital rhetoric, social media, and global intercultural exchange. (Porter 2017: 175)

The trick performed here is re-framing the phatic function as a necessary prelude or prerequisite for the practical function of communicating information. Instead of viewing it in the reflexive mode - as both Malinowski and Jakobson meant it - of establishing contact and that's it, here and in many instances elsewhere by a number of authors who take only a cursory interest in the phatic function, the focus is on the channel, which is of course necessary for any communication to occur, but is not automatically reflexive as such. The problem here really is "effective", by means of which the conventional meta-communicative (sensu Zabor) view creeps back in: the phatic function establishes the possibility for transmitting information. This is directly opposed to Malinowski's statement about it being necessery for there not to be anything to communicate about for it to qualify as phatic. Phatic communion is reflexive - a thing performed for the mere sake of performing it, for enjoying the process itself. Phatic function, sensu Jakobson, likewise is reflexive and maximizes the trope of communication for the sake of communication - the newlyweds utter "Well" back and forth because they have nothing else to say to each other. Their conversation is not "effective" in any sense of the word.

Seeing communication from a phatic perspective means positing different goals for discursive action - goals such as goodwill, trust, cooperation, partnership, harmony - and building a different kind of relationship between rhetor and organization, among rhetors within an organization, and between the organization and its customers/its market/the public. The core of the phatic function is the formation of an ethical relationship between rhetor and audience and that relationship is very much based on ethos, the persuasive appeal having to do with the character and credibility of the rhetor. (Porter 2017: 175)

This is very interesting, if only because it is one of several instances I've noticed of someone attempting to posit an ethical dimension to phaticity. Another one that immediately comes to mind is Anette Holba's (2008) work in the philosophy of leisure and her Buberian view of phatic communication as something that "offers recuperative potential", which is a variation on the atmosphere of polite social interaction, just like the array of "goodwill, trust, cooperation, partnership, harmony", which seems to once again put "effectiveness" into where originally there was none. There's also an ethical point in Makice's (2009) approach to online community design, where phatic interactions allow "community members to understand the current state of others". That comes across as a communal approach to what is here attempted individualistically. But in all this I'm still disappointed that the connection between Malinowski and Herbert Spencer is not considered, because that debate hides a great potential for elaborating on the ethical side of social union. The "ethical relationship" Spencer had in mind and Malinowski negated had to do with the way the presence of others curbs impulsive behaviour, so that an otherwise quite violent person (beats his wife and kids, for example) checks himself when in the company of strangers who wouldn't stand for such behaviour. Durkheim of course added that social gatherings help us solidify these attitudes, in this example come to the realization that domestic violence is something inherently bad. There's a very small step from there to how our current social media platforms play into the modification of attitudes in the broader picture.

In this article, I will identify the sources of phatic theory in linguistics and rhetoric, making the case for seeing the phatic function as a primary purpose of human communication interaction, not a secondary or meaningless one; [...] (Porter 2017: 175)

Phatic theory‽ Just recently I had a plan to write a paper about how there is no phatic theory. By all standards of what constitutes a theory, phaticity lacks even the most crudest characteristics of a theory. There are no hypotheses, nothing to really test and nothing to test it by. In my opinion it is more the case of an illegitimate diffusion, meaning that the concept of phaticity has lofty terminological appeal and hence gets bound up with all kinds of things unrelated to what it was originally about. Even more so, its sources lie in anthropology (Spencer's comparative psychology and Durkheim's sociology of religion) and it entered into linguistics instead of stemming from it. By all accounts, phaticity is extra-linguistic, evidenced by the multitude of parts of speech described as phatic, which really depends on the linguist's personal choice and fancy.

[I will] consider four particular areas where the phatic function has special relevance for professional communicators: (a) email, online small talk, informal chat, and correspondence; (b) virtual teamwork; (c) online user help communities; and (d) design of intelligent agents, or what we might call "phatic bots." (Porter 2017: 175)

On the subject of personal fancy: make "phatic" equivalent to "chatting" and voila chatbots become "phatic bots".

The concept of phatic communication was first articulated by the cultural anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1923), who saw the phatic function as a feature of primitive languages in the respect that the peoples he studied used language as a mode of action as opposed to using language "to convey meaning" (p. 315). (Porter 2017: 175)

First of all, Malinowski articulated the concept of phatic communion and never used the combination "phatic function" - these points of confusion were shown even by Hartmut Haberland. Secondly, the "feature" makes no sense at all. To quote: "I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of primitive speech." (Malinowski 1923: 315) - and to reinforce the interpretation that he was really just prejudiced against the "Savage Community" just consider the following sentence from his doctoral thesis: "The aborigenes are not able to think exactly, and their beliefs do not possess any "exact meaning."" (Malinowski 1913: 213) - in his opinion the phatic function is not a feature of primitive language but phatic communion is the only type of speech primitive people were - in his opinion - capable of.

Subsequent discussions of the phatic function in cultural anthropology and sociolinguistics largely follow Malinowski's lead: The phatic function must be acknowledged, but it is not all that important. At best, the phatic function is secondary, supportive function of language, but it is not a primary purpose. (Porter 2017: 176)

The footnote reads that "The notion of phatic function was adopted by the sociolinguist Roman Jakobson" who was actually the forefather of linguistics and poetics - Porter must have confused him with the sociolinguist Dell Hymes, who also treated the phatic function (after Jakobson's lead). As to the matter at hand, Porter appears to be attempting a return to Malinowski's own view of the primacy of phatic communion: it precedes the "highly developed and specialized uses of speech" "in works of science and philosophy [...] used to control ideas and to make them common property of civilized mankind" (1923: 316). I actually like this view because in this case "primitive" can be reformulated in the sense of Durkheim (1915: 1) as "surpassed by no others in simplicity". In this a connection may be found with modern neurology where the part of the brain that goes about babbling about its worries and egocentric interests - the so-called "default network" or "monkey mind" - is the most simplistic and the effort to make ideas the common property of humankind by way of textual practices the most complex function of language.

But what if the "savages" have it right? Maybe what is primitive here, or at least incomplete, is Malinowski's communication frame, which assumes that the ultimate purpose of discourse is "communicating ideas." Is it? Really? What if friendship is not so "mere"? (Porter 2017: 176)

This is a very false image of Malinowski's communication frame. The ultimate purpose of discourse is communicating ideas. His point is that it is not the only purpose of speech, but merely the most refined one. It may appear incomplete because nearly no-one recognizes Malinowski's negations of other communicative functions, i.e. those outlined by Ogden and Richards in the main body of the book. Besides the referential function, Malinowski also negates emotive - since phatic communion does not establish common sentiments - and conative - since phatic communion may accompany some manual work but is not aimed at directing it. Friendship is wholly extraneous to his formulation. Bonds of personal union may arise out of phatic communion but mostly we engage in it with strangers and acquaintances. With friends we probably have something more substantial to discuss, e.g. common memories, future plans, etc.

To say that the purpose of communication is "communicating ideas," informing, or persuading is to beg the question: What is the purpose of doing that? If an informative or persuasive communication is a means to some end, then, what is the end exactly? Here is where discourse theory meets ethics: To ask the question, "Why are we communicating?" is to posit some end or outcome outside and beyond the communication itself. It is that purpose outside of discourse that Malinowski's form of linguistics neglects. (Porter 2017: 176)

First of all, Malinowski's essay on primitive speech is not a very good representative of his linguistics. As I understand it, his main linguistic contributions were first handed forward to Z. Harris and then published very inconspicuously in the second volume of Coral Gardens, which is - according to one author who wrote about his linguistic theory - why it is not so well known as that one piece about phatic communion. Secondly, Malinowski does not treat communication in the essay on primitive speech so looking for a theory of communication there is pointless. To this relevant question about the ends of communication one may readily turn to his contemporaries. Charles Morris, for example, has a very lucid definition: communication is the establishment of a commonage of signification, which is very close to but more exact than "communicating ideas." In this strict sense the end or outcome outside or beyond communication itself is the sharing of meaning, i.e. making something understood. Phatic communion is distinct from this since making something understood is not the goal in this kind of discourse; spending time together pleasantly talking is.

What is that goal? Aristotle (1976) provided one clear answer to this question in Nichomachean Ethics, where he linked the art of rhetoric to the social good: "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good" (Nichomachean Ethics 1.1). For Aristotle, the greatest good for rhetoric and politics to aim for was "the good of the polis" (Nicomachean Ethics 1.2) and happiness for all. For Aristotle, the final end - or ultimate cause - of rhetorical action (and for other arts as well, such as politics, music, sculpture) was peace, harmony, well-being, stability, and happiness. (Porter 2017: 176)

I've considered reading Nicomachean Ethics in relation with phatic communion before and even got around to reading some few pages, but this is still on hold. A suitable alternative for this kind of inquiry would be the connection between Malinowski and Spencer, i.e. the stuff outlined by both as the substance of social union: "the desire to accumulate property" (HS) vs (ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth" (BM). The general headig, under which both Aristotle's good of the polis and these as well as other related topics meet is probably Spencer's "social progress".

We do not necessarily have to agree with Aristotle's particular [---] the common good, the public good, and the good of us all. (Porter 2017: 176)

I suspect that there's more to Aristotle here than meets the eye. Mostly because the archaic terminology in Malinowski's influences (the long-form terms such as "bond of fellowship" and "the sentiment of sympathy" are characteristic of the time as the Estonian author Eduard Vilde, writing at the same time, in the first decade of the 20th century, use these phrases equally liberally) may lead up to ideas that can be traced to Aristotle. With the "philosophy is a footnote to the classics" view in mind, it may very well be that the 19th century philosophers in support of "derived sciences" like sociology, psychology, semiotics, etc. gained their first insights from the likes of Plato and Aristotle. Right now I'm barely making it past the few last centuries, as finding links with Rousseau and Locke is a bit more difficult than expected.

The list of outcomes here is commendable, and pretty much encapsulates my intention to compile a similarly themed list of the final good bestowed upon the participants in phatic communion. The first and foremost being pleasant and polite atmosphere in social intercourse. Followed perhaps by the communizationalists with La Barre's nonverbal, vocial and emotional communication and then the consummationalists with Jakobson's channel operations and the avoidance of prematurely closing the connection. I just figured out that "consummationalists" like Laver and his followers may share a pseudo-phatic base of definition because the incremental increase of meaning described by Dewey as a characteristic of consummation is of a non-speech variety, meaning that there is a possibility of further differentiating between those consummation-points which place their emphasis on a deepening of meaning (creating mutual emotional baggage?) and those which include an "extra-communicational" emphasis, such as Haverkate's original "pseudo-phatic", Elyachar's literally "communal" troubles (installing a water-heater requires chit-chat to find someone who can get it done), as well as Malinowski's own "communion of food".

As a side-note, the same analysis on earlier authorities might prove interesting, because in Spencer, the point of checking impulsiveness of uneducated people for the social good (polite interaction and service) acts upon emotions, and Durkheim's origin of religious ideas from collective effervescence involves an ideational end-goal, the exact one Malinowski was protesting against when formulating phatic communion. It has gone unnoticed that Malinowski's argument against "communicating ideas," as Porter puts it, has to do not so much with the strict transmission of ideas but instead their development in "collective consciousness". Indeed, the primary point of contention between Malinowski and Durkheim is that when people gather and talk, even hold lectures and sermons, or attempt to convince people from atop the soap box, they do not necessarily constitute a collective mind. Malinowski contended that Durkheim's rather naive conception of the influence of social environment. Here's where I could bring Locke to bear on innateness, but Durkheim basically writes that people feel compelled to "see things from a certain angle and feel them in a certain way" and consequently "modifies the ideas which we would ordinarily make of them for ourselves and the sentiments to which we would be inclined if we listened only to our animal nature" so that the social environment alters our sentiments, even puts contrary sentiments "in their place" (Durkheim 1915: 66). It would appear that Durkheim, too, is following the logic in Spencer's passages about the nature of emotions. The interesting thing here perhaps would be to dissect this "compelling" nature of society, the reasons for people checking their impulsive behaviour in society, and the role Durkheim the social constructionist (1915: 347) attributes to language, sciences, arts and moral beliefs in altering human nature, includinc beliefs, traditions, and aspirations (thus questioning the semiotic reality of society).

An ethical theory of rhetoric [---] They are, in a sense, the whole point. (Porter 2017: 177)

This seems to be arguing Malinowski's point (while first giving off the impression of refuting Malinowski). We are dealing with consummationalism - that the end-goal of this primitive form of speech is a sense of communion, a sense of belonging and/or familiarity, group formation, etc. The stereotypical "for the sake of" formulation can be bypassed by paraphrasing Durkheim: [communication], though aimed primarily at other ends, has also been a sort of recreation for [people]. This would of course confuse communion and communication and ignore the religious connotations of communion. Looking up Durkheim's phraseology, I found an interesting thought: the Christian communion is embodied in what goes in through the mouth - e.g. the communion of food, particularly bread as the flesh of the lord - and phatic communion in what comes out of it (words); this would be a play on the old saying that God judges not by what comes out of the mouth but only what goes in (concerning alcoholic drinks and forbidden foods).

The phatic function is of immense importance in rhetoric, though phatic is a term rarely used in rhetoric. (Porter 2017: 177)

This seems natural. If the purpose of rhetoric is to be persuasive then the phatic communion is "anti-persuasive" since the listeners may not even listen all too attentively to what the speakers are talking about, only acting according to the situation, affording the speakers a face of attentive on-listeners. In the pejorative use of "phatic" this sentiment is taken to the extreme: the babbermouth homeless drunkard on the bus is a "phatic" man because people around him don't want him to continue talking (to no-one in particular and thus everyone in general within ear-shot).

Where we see the phatic function in Western rhetoric is the classical Greek concept of eunoia. [---] and pathos (appeal to feeling). (Porter 2017: 177)

The crucial piece, which is apparently missing, is what kind of appeal ethos is - if feeling and reason are taken then it must be action. And in this sense it would fit perfectly with Malinowski's pragmatic orientation to language. Goodwill is indeed at the center focus in phatic communion - particularly in the pleasant social atmosphere, which can be paraphrased as conversational goodwill.

Looking for verification in my downloaded copy of NE, I stumbled upon Christof Rapp's "The emotional dimension of friendship: Notes on Aristotle's account of philia in Rhetoric II 4" (2012), which might be worth a read. It could help to disentangle the otherwise compelling want to associate phaticity with pathos as a communizationalist would - but we've already established that this paper is on the consummationalist line, ideally emphasizing speech as a mode of action (rather than, say, the role of common sentiments).

From Nicomachean Ethics, where eunoia might be translated into "good will": "What sort of goods would one call good in themselves? Is it those that are pursued even when isolated from others, such as intelligence, sight, and certain pleasures and honours? Certainly, if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, yet one would place them among things good in themselves." - Concerning the "for the sake of" stereotype of the phatic function as a reflexive or autonomic function (in Jakobson's meta-functions: a poetic message is about the message, a meta-lingual message about language, and a phatic message is about contact).

The orator who hoped to persuade the audience [---] where the rhetor expressed goodwill toward the addressee. (Porter 2017: 177)

The vulgar word for this is pandering (in Bo Burnham's song it rhymes with "phatically meandering"). The point of creating good-will (or pleasant atmosphere) has already been treated. What's interesting is the end-goal of "building social and political alliances", which links it with recent authors who treat phaticity in diplomatic relations (Lemon's phatic qualia, Ansell's phatic blessings). "Phatic" is a component in politeness theory already. Friendly disposition hooks with conviviality and the whole ordeal about strangeness (and the intrinsic threat of a stranger), magnanimity in the communion of food, showing respect in honorifics (e.g. Marija Liudvika Drazdauskienė), but "complimenting one's audience or interlocutor" is pretty rare, found perhaps in Volotskaja et al. (1962) where the phatic function in nonverbal communication is found in clapping - by extension, this would include other backchannels (like head nods, "mhm"), too. The latter part, making an audience "attentive, docile, and well disposed" veers closer to the interpretation of Jakobson's phatic function focusing on attention and maintaining it (e.g. checking whether the other person on the phone is listening, which is taken to the extreme in Paul Virilio's "phatic image", which grabs the viewer/listener's attention as if by force, e.g. in the manner of E. R. Clay's vice-attention; which, I now realize, is comparable to vice-judgement in being conversant about agenda, thus ideal for the topic of ideology). The good news is that I now prepared NE's Book IX (on Friendship) for reading, the bad news is that it's from George H. Lewes' 1910 version.

Securing goodwill is fundamental to Cicero's conception of ethos and of rhetoric [---] principles for the sake of justice" (R. L. Enos, 2008, p. 131). (Porter 2017: 177)

In Spencer's "The Comparative Psychology of Man" (1876), the sympathetic feelings are followed by "the sentiment of justice", which Malinowski left out. What he didn't leave out is character, which occurs twice in a row: "[...] taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character [...]" (Phatic Communion 4.3-4). I've noticed the importance of "character" elsewhere, too. Durkheim, for example, writes of moral character, which is determined by feeling morally obliged to act in a certain way, such as observing the rites of the tribe and fulfilling his duty not only out of fear but also out of respect (1915: 190). Durkheim also has some qualifications for what constitutes a sacred character and could be useful for examining the process of proselytization.

There are good ways and bad ways to do captatio benevolentiae - some treatments can make [---] the captatio became installed as a canned piece of discourse. (Porter 2017: 177)

This is eerily reminiscent of the stereotyped formulae in Gardiner and Jakobson, and although "canned" is an expression rarely if ever used in this regard, similar descriptions are frequent enough (stereotyped, formulaic, fixed, etc.). The implication is that greetings and other openers are not made up on the spot (tokens) but ingrained in culture and language as stock pieces of linguistic material (types). I have wondered before if this is due to recognizability - something everyone says when meeting is much easier to recognize, even expected, than something idiosyncratic and containing new information. Christiane Nord presents something similar to this "positive buffer" in her study of student text books, where the phatic elements act in a manner very similar to greetings and capturing the audience's attention.

If the speaker is using the phatic function as a rhetorical technique for persuasion, isn't that insincere? Isn't that false flattery? Isn't that manipulating the audiencec? And the answer to these is yes, yes, and yes - if the speaker is using such strategies merely as a rhetorical technique to achieve his or her ends. (Porter 2017: 178)

This lack on sincerity is perhaps at the forefront of "phatic" as a ("pejorative") critical term. It is already present in Malinowski's text where reciprocity is concerned, but it becomes much more concrete in Alan Gardiner's formulation: "The sentences certainly mean something, but from a shifted angle question and answer seem to follow one another like the mechanical utterances of automata. What is said is of little account." (1932: 46) - or in similar words, "Rhetoric [...] can sometimes devolve into mechanical, formulaic strategy" (infra, 177). The opposition concerning sincerity was already articulated in the middle of the previous century in Basic Training in Speech: "It is of course simply a social gesture, performed perfunctorily by some as a concession to convention, and in a lively and friendly manner by others" (Thonssen & Gilkinson 1953: 32). This is where nonverbal and paralingual elements play a role: a perfunctory and a sincere performance of a greeting or any other social gesture can be distinguished by its tone, context, and many other "infracommunicational" (to use Birdwhistell's terminology) elements. In sum, I think this concern with sincerity is something that has followed phaticity at least since Gardiner (which is to say, almost, "from the very earliest").

Would we say that someone who is polite to strangers is insincere? Yes, if we happen to know that the person is usually rude and just happens to be faking it to secure some benefit. But no, not if we know from experience that the person is always that way, if the person is beig polite because they have learned to be polite, because they have learned that is what you are supposed to do, because they have embraced that as their fundamental ethos in interacting with strangers. In such a case we would say, rather, that politeness is who the person is: She or he is a polite person. It is embodied in their character. That is, the virtue lies in the person; it is not merely a technique they are using in their discourse to manipulate audiences. (Porter 2017: 179)

The keyword here is consistency. Personality is judged on the basis of repeated exposure. In this light in may be worthwhile to go over Theophrastus' Characters because some there are whose insincerity or lack of ethical character is outlined by two-facedness. On a broader scale this topic could probably be related to the subject of strangers in longer history, e.g. how urbanization has relinquished community ties (living amongst familiars all your life) in favor of city life with its nearly endless barrage of strange faces. This is once more amplified by the internet: one may have life-long online friends with whom one never meets IRL. Character becomes much more lax, self-presentation takes the forefront.

The rhetorical and ethical fallacy here is to see the phatic function as simply a piece of language that the speaker or writer plugs into a discourse in order to achieve their persuasive or informative goal - for example, "small talk" at the beginning of a business meeting in order for a manager to meet her goals for the meeting. Rather, view the phatic function in a broader, more ethical sense as, first, the formation and maintenance of a positive relationship with those the rhetor interacts with, and, second, as fundamental to the rhetor's rhetorical identity (ethos), as their overall behavior and practice as a rhetor. (Porter 2017: 179)

There is no lack of broadening the phatic function (it can get cosmically broad) but it must be addressed why it is so often felt that broadening its meaning is necessary. Here I think the problem is apparent in the wording: "a piece of language", which hints at a structural reading of Jakobson's structural-functionalism, where a function is attributed a specific domain of language, in which case only greetings and stereotyped formulae meet the qualification for "phatic". On the other hand is a functional reading which is inherently broader because it doesn't tie it down to any particular "piece of language" but recognizes it as a function any piece of language can perform. Indeed, the hierarchy of functions stipulates that any utterance actually performs several functions simultaneously. This interpretation can, of course, get cosmically broad, as Katharina Reiss' (1981) pointed out, every message minimally performs the phatic function if contact is achieved. In contrast to "a piece of language", Reiss posits that the phatic function does not lead to particulars of the text construction, e.g. does not arise from the text form, but from the use to which the text is put (181: 125). This is another way of saying that the phatic function is a pragmatic function of language (which makes me wonder if the other meta-functions do not accord to Morris's three prongs: is the metalingual function not semantic and the poetic function not syntactic?).

As to the meat of the matter, "the formation and maintenance of a positive relationship" is exctly the stuff Charles Zuckerman (2016) opposes with his concept of phatic violence. Even Malinowski recognized that besides bonds of fellowship phatic communion can also give rise to bonds of antipathy. It is not all milk and honey in the realm of small talk: there are also those theophrastine characters among us who abuse the public duty to give an ear to people addressing us, who employ small talk as a means to an end (panhandlers come to mind), or in a crisis situation use it to gauge if we're on their side or their putative enemies to be targeted with brute force. It is perfectly reasonable to read positive implications into phatic communion because the original end-goal was indeed "a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse", but this says nearly nothing about positive relationship. Effectively, this reading of positive relationality into it is a near-equivalent of the trick performed by many on Jakobson's channel operations, where establisting, prolonging and discontinuing communication are stripped of the terminal phase (of a communication act) and replaced with maintaining, developing, rekindling and so on (of a personal relationship). In my opinion, the ideal goal of phatic communion is not necessarily a positive relationship but a neutral one: that you are not threatening to those around you and get by just enough to be tolerable to each other; we can't go around making new "true" friends without ultimately disappointing many of them (Dunbar's number, though it's apparently possible to circumvent it on social networking sites).

The virtues of courtesy, politeness, friendliness, and the importance of building and maintaining goodwill in one's relations with others are universally valued, it is safe to say - though they may or may not take form as linguistic or rhetorical concepts per se. However, we also need to note that the particular standards, practices, and expectations for the phatic function - that is, the particulars of how the rhetor should develop and exhibit goodwill and build relations - can vary across cultures and contexts. (Porter 2017: 179-180)

Politeness and friendliness are pretty standard, courtesy on the other hand is by definition "excellence of manners or social conduct", much like consideration, and the more archaic comportment (to which one may add the equally archaic custom, which at least in E. R. Clay's book concretized both culture and context). As to the conceptual issue, I think it may very well add to the claim of intuition: since phatic communion is such an intuitive concept, most peoples around the world probably have some beliefs and practices related to everyday social conduct and how to go about it respectfully. Aristotle's book on friendship just happens to be a fixed instance of such teachings, which has probably been taught from older generations to the younger ones as long as the former has found the latter's conduct lacking. I'm slowly on my way towards writing about these concepts in Estonian language and culture.

For instance, in Japanese culture, aizuchi is certainly a phatic principle, referring to discourse and bodily behaviors (e.g., nodding, gruting, eye contact) that one uses in a conversation to signal the listener's presence, interest, and engagement with the speaker: "Aizuchi has a social function: to keep connectedness with others. The stage of connectedness is always characterized by a very high degree of alertness... [and] confirmation of presence" (Radovanovic & Ragnedda, 2012, pp. 11-12). Aizuchi is an important component of Japanese interaction. Without it, an interlocutor will assume that the listener is disengaged or uninterested in the conversation. (Porter 2017: 180)

First of all, there already is a term for phatic principles out there and in moderate use: following Shunsuke Nozawa's (2015) discussion of the "contact" trope, Zuckerman writes of contact tropes or "condensations of semiotic ideologies" according to which "the fact of communicative contact (or its absence) is itself thematized [and] made into a sign of something else" (Zuckerman 2016: 295). Aizuchi and tachiba-role can probably be considered contact tropes in this sense, although the semiotic ideologies they point to should be examined more closely (ideally by a Japanese representative). And secondly, the Serbian (Danica Radovanovic) and the Italian (Massimo Ragnedda) in their paper on "Small talk in the Digital Age" (2012) left out the reference for their source for their discussion of aizuchi, which is by all indications Sotaro Kita and Sachiko Ide's "Nodding, aizuchi, and final particles in Japanese conversation" (2007). It's almost funny how a slip of reference can cause an avalanche of misattributions.

In Confucian rhetoric, glib and aggressive styles of conversation, or "sharp tongues," are to be avoided because what is valued is humility, a facet of ren, or true virtue: "the truly virtuous person [is] cautious and simple with words" (Xu, 2004, p. 123). Thus, a style of chatty, garrulous friendly discourse, perhaps viewed as effective relationship building in one culture (e.g., a U.S. business culture), may be seen as nonsensical, disrespectful idiocy in another. (Porter 2017: 180)

I'm glad that U.S. business culture is specified because this no doubt varies greatly with U.S. subcultures as well as within European national cultures. It even varies across individual personalities and in accordance with a person's mood. Some similar comparisons immediately come to mind, such as the nonverbal observation that Russians smile when they're happy and Americans nearly constantly (verified, in parts, by Isurin, Furman and White's (2015) study of Russian immigrants during a U.S. Census). This would make perfect sense with J. Ruesch and G. Bateson's examination of literature on American culture, upon which the posit that Europeans have a friendship culture (true lifelong friends) and Americans a popularity culture (effervescent utilitarian relationships), which I now realize may mimick Aristotle's distinctions of friendship.

On a deeper level, we can see that the basis for Confucian rhetoric is the fundamental relationship between the self and other, which should be governed by shu, "often translated as 'reciprocity' or as 'putting oneself in the other's place'" (Mao, 2006, p. 102; see also Mao, 1994). In other words, the foundation and starting point for communication is a fundamental awareness and respect for the other. (Porter 2017: 180)

In the lingo of George Herbert Mead and Kenneth Burke (at least in one of his posthumously published manuscript "On Persuasion, Identification, and Dialectical Symmetry") this is participation in the other. In E. R. Clay's The Alternative there is a similar conception of the life and consciousness of others, the sense-perception (in modern cognitive psychology, simulation) of which underlies empathy (in Clay's terminology, homogeneous sympathy). I should probably revisit Burke's manuscript when treating the lack of symmetry (in speakin and listening roles) in Malinowski's essay.

Radovanovic and Ragnedda (2012) see the Facebook "poke" as the purest form of phatic confirmation of presence, signaling simply that "I am here." A "like" button serves a phatic function as well, but also signals confirmation or agreement. (Porter 2017: 181)

I don't think this is a grand distinction. There is "Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent" (PC 5.3). Following the contact trope, even "poking" someone on Facebook is not a pure act of confirming presence but also signals that this connection or presence is in some way agreeable or desired.

In business communication research, phatic communication is more likely to be labeled as "small talk" and to be seen as perhaps important and helpful for effective communication, but as peripheral or subordinate to serious, on-task talk. Even researchers who take the phatic function seriously view it mainly as serving (often preliminary to) some other, more important business function (e.g., Pullin, 2010). The phatic certainly includes forms of salutations and polite greeting - and politeness generally - but, according to Laver (1975), is broader than that. It might also include efforts to break down barriers related to age, social status, workplace hierarchy, gender, degree of familiarity, power differentials (real and perceived), and so on. (Porter 2017: 183)

REFERENCE: Pullin, Patricia 2010. Small talk, rapport, and international communicative competence: Lessons to learn from BELF. Journal of Business Communication 47(455-476). DOI: 10.1177/0021943610377307

I'm not sure how seriously Pullin (2010) takes the phatic function since she attributes phatic communication (no phatic communion) to Malinowski, which is a frequent confusion I now realize may have to do with Laver's re-printing of the Phatic Communion section in Communication in Face to Face Interaction (1972), which was titled "Phatic Communication". So the fault ultimately rests on John Laver.

The interesting parts in Puller's definition of phaticity is the take on "women's work", which is referred to a book about gender (Fletcher 1999), which may have taken its bearing from the likes of A. R. Hochschild's "Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure" (1979). Puller posits that "Small talk has often been regarded as peripheral or even a distraction in the workplace. Curiously, she says that "in linguistics, a general lack of interest in small talk has often been attributed to its categorization by Malinowski" (Puller 2010: 458), which takes a critical stance as implicitly hypothesizes that there would be more research on small talk if Malinowski had not written his essay. It is curious because almost all of the research I have surveyed ignore the critical aspects of Malinowski's essay and take his coinage without a qualm, perhaps quibbling only for its scarce treatment in some field or other. Most, also, do something with the base term, coining further terminological inventions (cf. "phatic bots" here). So, that's odd and gives off the distinct impression of being critical for the sake of being critical without actually considering the field - there are plenty of denigrating views of phaticity but I've only spotted a very tiny handful of comments, and mostly from female researchers in marginalized areas (Russia and Middle-East) where phaticity is attributed to women (sexist) or old people (ageist) in a generalizing manner (e.g. Olga Jur'evna's "Revisiting some linguistic gender markers of woman's speech in English chat communication and blogs and mechanisms of women self-presentation in the English computer-mediated communication" (2014) says in the abstract: Female communication is phatic.").

Puller also commits the "phatic theory" sin of defining it by negation: "[Malinowski] implied that small talk was devoid of information" (ibid, 458). The trouble is, information theory followed Malinowski's essay by some two and a half decades. Porter's "communicating ideas" is commendable in this sense because it's straight from Malinowski's essay, and bringing Aristotle to bear on pure sociabilities is the right way to go about it because Malinowski's phraseology does include serving any purpose of communicating ideas (wandering thought: Jakobson's writings on the ends and means topic that explain his particular brand of linguistic functional structuralism could be a worthwhile venture to corroborate on Malinowski's "social function").

Building trust is a key component of the phatic function - and building trust is often cited as a key factor in intercultural and cross-cultural communication and particularly for intercultural virtual teamwork (Rush Hovde, 2014). For a team to perform effectively and do its work as a team, it helps to have social cohesion. (Porter 2017: 183)

On the face of it, trust is most definitely not a key component of the linguistic phatic function. But it is in the center of anthropological phatic communion, because it can serve as a softened version of the implicit xenophobia in Malinowski's essay. Particularly with regard to the representative anecdote, "When a number of people sit together at a village fire" (PC 1.2), which is in direct contrast with numerous pronouncements in Malinowski's doctoral thesis where he reports the datum in literature that "Under no circumstances is a strange native allowed to approach the fire of a married man" and how there were rules that "show clearly that each hut, each fire-place, was reserved for one family" (1913a: 164). On the one hand a derived image of people casually sitting around a fireplace but without a specification of whether it is a festive occasion like it would be in a modern Western culture or a fireplace near a literal family encampment. Such information would have profound implications for the later remarks about fear of the stranger.

Trust is most definitely a component of phatic function per se, i.e. Roman Jakobson's interpretation, which does not address the psychological connection between the addresser and addressee beyond the words "psychological connection". Jakobson was not a psychologist, and where his interests met psychology had to do with aphasia and child language development. Only in a German paper does he mention the Naturvölker, whose speech is reportedly on par with a child or a neuropathological patient. As a proponent of the linguistic study of poetry (let's not forget that the paper in which the definition of the phatic function appeared carried the title "Linguistics and Poetics") and the psychological connection between the addresser and addressee is rather vague in his writings, having to do with the author, and the intended receiver, of a poem.

Now that I think about it, Jakobson's meagre few writings on the phatic function, even the ones only tangentially related to the topic, deal with trust in only two rather indirect ways. One has to do with the communication radius: the intended receiver of a message can be a specific person as well as no-one in particular, addressed To Whom It May Concern, an ancient letter salutation used when the letter has no contact person and is thus open to be read by everyone. Such is the case, for example, of published poems, which may have originally been addressed to a specific person but is now on record as a literary work. Jakobson's own writing on the matter, written in explanation to "Linguistics and Poetics", deals with the communicative life-cycle of E. A. Poe's "The Raven", and paints a very technical image of the transmission of a linguistic message through various meta-channels (on-hearing, reading).

The other piece of trivial, unformed nonsense about Jakobson's phatic function is the tangential connection with the contours of a relationship and particularly its discontinuation. Somewhat poetically, seeing as love and death are the two major leitmotifs of poetry in general, Jakobson combines these in the death of a romantic relationship, including the image of a poet (like Pushkin) gloating about the fantastic joy of running away from your wife-to-be on the wedding altar, and the poetics of permanent loss of contact in "Language in Operation" (the companion-piece about The Raven), where the life-cycle of the poem includes both intra- and extra-textual contiguous frames, reaching down to the previous owner of the talking bird who must have taught it the word "Nevermore" with which the bird tormented its new owner over the death of his beloved wife. With this added context, I believe, the exchange of "Well"'s between the newlyweds in Dorothy Parker's short story carries an additional emphasis with the problem of achieving trust in a new relationship and the confusing phase of insecurity where the discontinuation of communication, the trust in the relationship, is most vulnerable.

In their research, Jarvenpaa et al. (2004) did not explicitly reference phatic communication, but that is what they are talking about when they emphasize the importance, first, of team members maintaining contact with others on the team. The first component of trust is simply signaling to the coworker that he or she is there, present, and attentive - and of course in a virtual environment the person's body isn't physically there, so the employee signals here presence via email, chat spaces, notes on a shared document, video presence, and so on. This is important early in the team-building process, but maintaining presence is also important throughout a project. (Porter 2017: 184)

REFERENCE: Jarvenpaa, Sirkka L.; Thomas R. Shaw and D. Sandy Staples 2004. Toward contextualized theories of trust: The role of trust in global virtual teams. Information Systems Research 15(3): 250-267. DOI: 10.1287/isre.1040.0028

The abstract is definitely intriguing: "there has been little theorizing to explain how trust evokes sentiments". Whether or not the personal bonds created in polite social exchanges are powerful enough to evoke common sentiments is at the exact core of the Malinowski's criticism of Durkheim, who did not make it clear enough how feelings and ideas are supposed to meld into collective consciousness through public speech. The relevant bit here is probably this: "In face-to-face situations, Meyerson et al. (1996) emphasize that members must observe behavioral evidence - others acting in a trusting manner - to maintain their trust in the team. Communication behavior within the team assures a member of the others' existence - proof that someone else is out there" (Jarvenpaa, Shaw, and Staples 2004: 254).

"Existence" is extreme but understandable for 1998, when the paper was received by the journal. By now the term in vogue is copresence, focused on the "ambient" nature of being constantly in potential connection with people far exceeding Dunbar's number and can be more assured in the existence (continued communication and information sharing) of an unimaginable multitude. These "IT-enabled relationships" are so ubiquitous nowadays that Malinowski's criticism of Durkheim, Simmel, and Wundt on the grounds of accepting the concept of "collective consciousness" should be placed under scrutiny with regard to our new forms of "communicating ideas", which appear to exceed "a man speaking to a crowd [and] entering into communion with it [with] a grandiloquence that would be ridiculous in ordinary circumstances" (Durkheim 1915: 210). James Porter, actually, is the ideal person to take a look at the connection between Malinowski's "demon of terminological invention" and Durkheim's "demon of oratorical inspiration" (ibid, 210).

Trust is especially important in context operating with what Jarvenpaa et al. (2004) called "weak structure" (i.e., teams that havevery little shared social history, are not tied to a common physical location, that are ad hoc and temporary, etc.). (Porter 2017: 184)

Might as well just read Mark Granovetter's "The Strength of Weak Ties" (1973).

These findings about phatic presence, connectedness, and social cohesion have been reinfurced in other research, including Pavel Zemliansky's (2012) study of intercultural virtual teamwork (based on a classroom involving students from the United States and Ukraine):
Teams which managed to establish more systematic and regular patterns of collaboration and information exchange produced better documents [...] levels of frustration in those teams were lower because their members had developed multiple and redundant communication channels (email, Facebook, class wiki, and so on), which gave them the ability to restart communication quickly. (p. 282)
The participants in the study reported "unanimously that social interactions and 'small talk' were very important" to their teamwork. (Porter 2017: 184)

"Phatic presence" would literally be the presence of speech, which makes very little sense (outside, for example, from the fact of communicating perspective). Here, phaticity amounts to redundant communication channels. In the long run I should probably re-read Vincent Miller and Julia Elyachar with an eye to this network perspective, which has a heavy leaning on the consummation factor of sustaining the communication network connecting a group of people.

Researchers may not always use the word phatic in describing the focus of their studies, but, in effect, that is what they are describing. For instance, in his research on international teamwork Jakob Lauring (2011) called for "informal interaction practices" that aim at building trust. And he emphasized the importance of "micro dynamics of human interaction," or the informal exchanges that build relationships in the first place. Such "micro-level strategic actions," or phatic interactions, have a significant effect on the quality and effectiveness of intercultural exchange. (Porter 2017: 185)

This is a frequent case. One of the earliest entries in this regard is Leon Festinger's "Informal Social Communication" (1950). There are probably many strands of research that are effectively about phatic communion but do not use the, perhaps justly off-putting, anthrpological term. One that immediately comes to mind is the study of rumours and gossip in the 1970s. As to the micro dynamics, this could lead down to - possibly due to the emphasis on power in Lauring's paper - to Nancy Henley's (1977) work, at the very least.

The job of content curation is a task traditionally associated with library science and includes maintaining, organizing, tagging, and editing content created by others. (Porter 2017: 185)

This is about the third of fourth such instance where library or collection tasks parallel the channel operations of Jakobson's phatic function. This probably merits more consideration in the future, particularly in the field of crown organization of knowledge. In summary, good paper.

Tuhkur Hobune: Suur Algus

Jakobson, August 1928. Tuhkur Hobune. Vol. 1: Suur Algus. Tartu: Loodus.


Näis, nagu oleks noor ema oodanud kõik see aeg juhust, et rääkida oma haigest lapsest. Ta nägu muutus äkki kuidagi lahkeks, rõõmsaks ja sõbralikuks. Mingi sisemise kõlaga hääles hakkas ta vadistama oma pisukesest tütrekesest, kes olevat olnud tunaeila ja enne seda nii raskes palavikus, et ta olnud sunnitud kartma iga silmapilk kõige pahemat. (Jakobson 1928: 17)

Dell Hymes: kui naised räägivad oma lastest. Sotsiolingvisti arvates on faatiline funktsioon rohkem nagu vastastikkune väljenduslik funktsioon, st keele sotsiaalne funktsioon on lubada kõigil vestluses osalejatel ennast väljendada nii, nagu Malinowski (PC 5.5) kirjutas, et nad sellest ka mingi ärakuulamisrahulduse saaksid. Konatiivne või tegevuslik aspekt siin seisneb selles, nende sõnu on tähele pandud, aga emotiivne või ekspressiivne funktsioon selles, et kõnelejad saavad südamelt ära, misiganes nende peakõlusid parasjagu keeleliselt okupeerib. Igaüks võib märgata, et inimesed kalduvad rääkima sellest, mis neid huvitab, mis valmistab neile muret, jne. Dell Hymes'i näidete hulgas on olukorrad, milles emad räägivad oma lastest, nagu siin (Jakobson 1928: 17), ja samuti kui nt antropoloogid räägivad oma välitöödest. Leitakse ühine teema.

Siin lisab Jakobson põhimõtteliselt mitteverbaalse poole sellele vestlusnähtusele: nägu muutub lahkeks, rõõmsaks ja sõbralikuks - mis on ka puhtsõnalise osaduse eesmägid (meeldiv, viisakas atmosfäär, milles lõimida isiklikke suhteid, vt PC 7.5). Siin haarab see ka hääletooni: selles on "mingi sisemine kõla", st hääletoon, mis mõjub kuulajasse kuidagi "sisemiselt". See sisemine "mõju" või "midagi" on võib-olla kõnelejale endalegi ebamäärased, teadmata missugused tegurid seda sütitavad. Ameerika Antropoloog Weston La Barre on seda aspekti lähemalt käsitlenud: faatiline kommunikatsioon levitab edukalt informatsiooni üksikisendi või -isiku vaimuseisundist ja kommunikeerib "üldistatud emotsionaalset tooni", et vastuvõtjad saaksid oma afektiseisundit ümbritsevatega harmonseerida (La Barre 1954: 57). Siinkohal võib täheldada, et selliste "ühiste tundmuste" koha pealt on Malinowski oma faatilist osadust kitsendanud reaktsioonina Spencerile ja Durkheimile, aga La Barre lähtub siin laiapinnalisemast suhtumisest, mille kohaselt häälitsemise kaudu selliste ebamääraste tundmuste jagamine on vähemalt kõrgemate imetajate hulgas tüüpiline (konnade kommunaalsest krooksumisest koerte haukumise ja ulgumiseni on käsitletud sellest ühise häälitsemise faatilisuse aspektist).

Sellistel puhkudel vadistatakse, st räägitakse kiiresti ja elavalt (vt sugulassõna vadima e vudima, sibama). Vadinal räägitakse uudiseid, aga ka "maast ja ilmast" (ÕS 2013), ja tulemuseks on vadin, ehk vada, loba, sädin (varblaste sädin; naised sädistavad). Loba on ÕSis määratlemata, aga sünonüümisõnastik annab mõned päris relevantsed tulemused: jutumulin, kõnemulin, jõudejutt, muidujutt, piibujutt ("me ei tulnud siia piibujuttu puhuma"). Mitmel neist on faatilise osaduse konnotatsioonid: loba ajatakse jõude, st mitte parasjagu töötades või vähemalt mitte midagi tähtsat toimetades, muidu, st tähtsusetult, tähendusetult, niisama ajaviiteks, ja piibu suitsetamise saatel, st lihtsa ja meeldiva ühistegevuse taustal.

Isa aga lonkas tagasi voodi juurde, ning venitas sõbraliku ükskõiksusega: - No mes sa n'd lõõbid... (Jakobson 1928: 48)

Sõbralik ükskõiksus.

Hakkas teine kohe seletama, et nalja tehtud ja sedasi... Äh, mõne asi! Tee sa nalja või mis tahad, kes sind siis ilmaaegu keelama tuleb... Aga head läbisaamist, - seda ära sa rikkuma kipu... (Jakobson 1928: 56)

Hea läbisaamine.

Säärasele väitele ei vastanud Tiina midagi; sest niisugust kiitust on isegi temasugusel lihtsameelsel raske uskuda. Ja et Juhkami moorgi taipas, et ta oli seekord kiitusega liiga kaugele läinud, tekkis mõneks ajaks laudaesisesse piinlik vaikus. (Jakobson 1928: 112)

Õige Eesti asi.

- Jah, eks jäägu's selle pargiskäimise ja tantsimisega kudas tahes... Aga tühja juttu, - vaat seda ta oskab ajada... tühja juttu... Nagu täna hommikulgi... (Jakobson 1928: 122)

Miks juttu "ajatakse"? - ja kuhu?

Tühja jutu kõlistamine ta suurem viga ongi... tühja jutu kõlistamine... (Jakobson 1928: 122)

Palju parem. Suuline kellavärk.

Oskad sa's alati öelda seda, mis oleks mokka mööda mõlemale poolele. (Jakobson 1928: 142)

Peab oskama laveerida.

Ah siis terved te olete kõik praegu, terved nagu purikad, mes? (Jakobson 1928: 155)


Ning sellepärast ei puudunud ta häälest isegi too pääletikkuv, familjaarne sõbralikkus, kui ta ütles: - Jah, löömist tuleb... see on kindel... löömist tuleb... - Noorpaar vaikis kohmetult. (Jakobson 1928: 175)

Õige Eesti asi.

- No lasete's õige nelja kee kaupa... seda tühjajutu lõnga... - ütles Prits ja teretas. (Jakobson 1928: 181)


Ning kui leidus siin-sääl vastastikuseid tutvusi, hakkasid lendama läbisegi küsimused ja vastused. (Jakobson 1928: 189)

Kenneth Burke: küsimine on kavalaim faatiline võte.

Teised aga vaikisid. Igal oli nähtavasti tegemist oma südames keevate mõtetega ja keegi ei pööranud tähelepanu pisut napaka seltsimehe lobisemisele. (Jakobson 1928: 202)

Mitte just väga kaugel faatilise ebasümmeetria sõnastusest.

Sattus vastu veelgi tuttavaid. Mõni oli mures, mõni vaimustatud, mõni vahtis mõtliku pilguga kaasvestlejatest mööda. Kuid kõigi huulilt pääsis üks ja sama küsimus, mida võis kuulda nüüd igal sammul: - Tead sa midagi uuemat...? Kas on õigus, mis see ja see rääkis...? - Näis, nagu seisaks kuski keegi tundmatu-teadmatu, kes surub sadadele inimestele huultele samad sõnad, pähe samad mõtted. (Jakobson 1928: 203)


Too haiglane vaimustus oligi see, mis tõukas vabatahtlikkude ridadesse noori poisikesi ja hallipäisi vanamehi ning meelitas halastaja-õe pääkatte alla tuhandeid naisi, ehkki viimase puhul räägiti suure suuga inimlikkusest ja heroilisest vennaarmastusest. (Jakobson 1928: 207)

Vilde ajal oli vennaarmastus argisem, siinseks pateetiline.

- No ä'ä nüüd nii pakilt kohe.... Ega sa aja's natuke juttu kah... Kindlasti poleks meil kellegil selle vastu... Nagu sõbramehed... ja asi ja komme... (Jakobson 1928: 212-213)

Väga faatiline.

- Ah et sa sõtta pead minema... - kordas neiu mõttetult ja pühkis käeseljaga üle pisaratest märja näo. (Jakobson 1928: 248)

Alati rõhk kinnitamisel.

Tavaline pilkamishimu, vajadus rääkida tühje jutte, - need ta iseloomu kaks põhiomadust, on järsku kuhugi kadunud, sootuks hääbunud. (Jakobson 1928: 283)

Pilkamishimu läheb ka vististi teemasse, tagarääkimise kilda.

Sest tänane õhtu, - see olevat ju veel viimne kord, mil saavad nad istuda sõbralikus jutuvestmises ja tuletada meelde ühiseid rõõmu- ning murepäevi. (Jakobson 1928: 284)

Ühiste mälestuste kommunisatsioon.

Ja tuppa sigines tõsine, karm vaikus, otsekui oleksid kõik äkki taibanud, et praegune silmapilk pole kaugeltki kohane tühisteks sõnadeks. (Jakobson 1928: 304)


Sest ta lootis endamisi, et säärane kõrvalise tähtsusega asju käsitav arutelu suudab kas või minutikski peletada ta pääst neid raskeid kurbust sisendavaid mõtteid ja mälestusi. (Jakobson 1928: 398)

Vestlus muremõtete peletamiseks.

See tüübiline, kivine nägu vihastas vahest nüüdki veel ema Luugust unenägudes, olgugi et selle kalkkülma, kivise näo omanik magas juba ammu maamullas. Oi seda valjust, toorust ja seisuseuhkusest tõusvat halastamatust, millega suutis see inimene küll hakkama saada. Ta oli nagu väike parun oma väikeses mõisas. Ta ilmus vaikselt, kadus vaikselt, rääkis ainult harukordadel. Vist kunagi oma elus polnud ta naeratanud häätahtlikult, soojalt-sõbralikult, vaid ikka kas halvakspanevalt, pilkav-kurjalt või kuidagi üleolevalt. Ta ei sallinud nalja. Lapsed hoidusid tast eemale ja püüdsid võimalikult ruttu pääseda ta lähedusest. (Jakobson 1928: 400)

Anti-faatiline. Õige Eesti asi.


Eit ohkas ja noogutas tehtud nukrusega. Jah, nii ta on ja nii ta läheb... Ei neil seisa siis ei riided ega kedagi, neil meestel... (Jakobson 1928: 15)

Tehtud nukrus.

Siis aga ümises ta teadlikult pahuraks tehtud häälega: - Ni sina kah...! (Jakobson 1928: 41)

Tehakse teadlikult.

Kuid Mannu, kes oleks harilikul ajal häämeelega teisi veelgi tagant õrritanud, püüdis neid nüüd lepitada. Ta ütles sõbralikuks moonutatud häälega: - No Karli... ole mõistlik... Sa ju tead, ega Prits valeta... (Jakobson 1928: 81)


Kuid Prits ei hoolinud tast nähtavasti midagi, sest ta jätkas kohe pisut liiga tehtult-venitatult häälega: - Sedasi oli nagu jah... Ja siis mina nagu raputasin puud... ja teised nagu korjasid... (Jakobson 1928: 84)

Moonutatud venitus.

- Jah, ju see elu teada on... see su elu... - noogutas Maali ja kiskus oma kondisele näole nukra kaastundmusegrimassi. (Jakobson 1928: 111)

Mitte ainult tehtud vaid suisa kistud.

- Kui nüüd ütleks kord, et... - Kuid ta taltsutas siiski oma kihelevat suud ningil ausus, hääles tehtud imestus: - Tohoh, säh... (Jakobson 1928: 114)

Imestus on vaikimisi spontaanne.

Ning kohe hästi tehtud uudishimuga kondistel põskedel: - Aga su Selma... kudas tema kah sul elam...? See su Selma...! (Jakobson 1928: 117)

Uudishimu ei ole vaikimisi spontaanne, aga teda saab "hästi teha".

Äkki valdas teda tahtmine kuulutada seda uudist ka Juhanile. Ta andis oma näole võimalikult hooletu ilme, surus käed tasku ja pöördus üle kolekitsa sillarummi õue. Juba eeskotta kandusid talle vastu ähvardavad sõnad, mis sundisid teda miskipärast muigama. (Jakobson 1928: 172)

Andmine kaugendab veel rohkem kui tegemine.

- No ikke, kus sa's muidu... - noogutas Luugus tehtud tõsidusega, rüübates kulinal viina. Või's sinul paremad päevad on? (Jakobson 1928: 178)

Kõike saab teha.

Prits aga, kes haistis selles jutukõminas väljapääsu tekkinud olukorrale, hüüdis tehtud lustlikkusega: - Oi-i... Tuleb vaatama minna...! (Jakobson 1928: 186)


Männiku Ott, lühike, kuid tüse noormees, oli kõige murelikum. Kuid temagi püüdis oma murelikkust varjata ükskõiksuse maski taha. Ja ta hääl isegi ei värisenud, kui ta ütles: - Jah, saagu mis saab... Aga ega nutta kah maksa... Ükskord tuleb surra ikke... (Jakobson 1928: 195)

Jah, eks "tegemine" ongi ju Ekmani terminoloogias simulatsioon.

- Eh, poisid, ega's sellepärast muretseda kah maksa... Teeme näod ette, nagu põleks kedagi... Sest memmedeks hakkaminegi ei toida... (Jakobson 1928: 200)


Kuid ehkki ta püüdis anda oma naerule võimalikult muretu kõla, tundus selles siiski midagi kartlikku, hirmunult tagasitõmbuvat ja alandlikku. (Jakobson 1928: 273)

Tehtus on sageli läbipaistev.

Tasane sumin jätkus endise hooga. Prits puges kapist, seinast ja lauanurgast sünnitatud kitsasse urkasse, toetas küünarpää õllepudelite kõrvale ning tegi asjalikult-tõsise näo. (Jakobson 1928: 276)


- Kes teab, ehk juhtub siiski... - naeratas poiss sunnitult. (Jakobson 1928: 340)

Veel tehtum kui tehtu.


Nojah, seda n'd ikke küll, et iga lori uskuda ei maksa... iga lori... - kiitis kepitaoline moor talle järele, silmis samal ajal salakaval läige. (Jakobson 1928: 20)

Läige silmis on salakaval.

Kuid mees ei pannud teda miski. Ta oli nähtavasti alles minut tagasi voodist tulnud ja sellepärast polnud ta tuju kuigi hää. Ainult korraks riivas ta naist mitte just sõbraliku pilguga, pöördus siis Liispeti poole, ning küsis, maigutades iga sõna juures uniselt: - Noh... ja kudas siis... jälle... selle sinu Juhani tervis on kah....? (Jakobson 1928: 23)

Sõbralikkuse skaala.

Silmad olid tal unised ja kiivas, ja kui ta nendega raejalgade ees tippivat õekest riivas, välgatas neis loomalikult tige tuluke. (Jakobson 1928: 39)

Silmades on tuluke. (vt Piibli lambi-metafoori!)

- Helmi... mis kell on...? - küsis ta võltsimata hirmuilmega silmis. - Ega's ometi...? (Jakobson 1928: 42)

Võltsimata ehk mitte-"tehtud".

Siis vaigiti vähe aega; ja siis küsisi juhkam, kes vaatas jälle murelikult kella: - No saad's omaga vahest valmis või...? (Jakobson 1928: 62)

Murelik kellavaatamine.

- No eks alata ju võib... jah, alata ju võib... - ütles pisuke, küürakas kellasepp, vidutades veidralt vasemat silma ning astus, käed seljal risti, pudukaupluse trepile. - Proua Andreesen, lubage küsida, kudas teie meeleolu on? (Jakobson 1928: 191)

Miks just vasakut?

Ta kitkus pika kasteheina kõrre, torkis sellega hammaste vahelt vorstitükke, haigutas siis laia lõuaga ja võttis Selma käe pihku. Kuid tüdruk tõmbus tast eemale. Ta viskas sellele küsiva pilgu, tõstes korraks oma pakse kulme ja laskus seliti murule. Ja kui Selma teisegi lähenemiskatse tagasi tõrjus, venitas ta ükskõikse häälega: - Jah, tikuvõitlus ei ole naljaasi... oi jah... (Jakobson 1928: 259)


Ning nähes vanema venna silmis pilkavat muiet, karjub ta sellele näkku: - Sa oled ju memm...! memm, memm...! (Jakobson 1928: 260)

Kuidas saab muie olla silmis?

Ümberringi tukas uus rütm, kärsik ja ruttav. Näod, milledel oli lamanud alles eila tuim loiduspitsat, lõkendasid ärevusest ja miskist tundmatust teotsemistungist, silmad, milledest võis harilikul ajal vaevalt midagi lugeda, pildusid sõnatuid küsimusi ja kuski hingesügavuses rakatavid leeke. (Jakobson 1928: 333)


Mann punastas kohmetuse pärast, kuid sai siiski mahti naeratada. Ja ta saatis sulipoistele koketeeriva pilgu, jälgides rahvamurrus nende kaugenevaid kogusid, millede ümber hilbendasid tolmused räbalad. (Jakobson 1928: 350)


Helmi aga, kes piilus, armukadedus silmis, talle tundmatu plikaga vestlevat Kase Vollit, ütles pahura kõlaga hääles: - Seal ta seisis... (Jakobson 1928: 373)

Armukadedus on silmi kirjutet.

- Ta ei taha omale häbi teha, - naeris Mann ja pilgutas miskipärast vasemat silma, mille ümber oli ta joonistanud söega musta rõnga. (Jakobson 1928: 382)

Y tho?


- No s-seda ma juba arvasingi... - ütles Liispet äkki ähvardavalt ja tõmbas oma teravad kulmud sügavale alla, mis andis talle kohe mingi tigeda, peaaegu röövlinnulise ilme. - N-no m-muidigui...! seda ma arvasin juba jah...! s-siga...! (Jakobson 1928: 23)


- Ma tahass.... väl-ja-a...! - kiunus Anni ja tõmbas näo kõveraks. - Mam-ma-a... ma tahass... välja...! (Jakobson 1928: 39)

Kõveraks tõmmatud nägu.

- Mis on, kuule...? - küsis ta, näol koomiline kohkumiseilme. (Jakobson 1928: 74)

Nagu tummfilmis?

Prits prunditas jälle tusaselt huuli, kuid pöördus kohe Mannu poole. (Jakobson 1928: 75)

Tusane huuleprunditamine.

- Ah ikke veel või? - küsis Karli, vingutades kuljalt huuli. (Jakobson 1928: 80)

Kuidas see veel välja peaks nägema?

Juhkami eit naeris, Tiina aga, keda vihastas säärane ümberkäimine ta pisut lihtsameelse pojaga, tõstis pahuralt kulme ning sõnas: - No mes sa n'd padistad, Prits.... kas sul's tõesti midagi paremat rääkida põle...! (Jakobson 1928: 118)

Pahuralt tavaliselt langetatakse kulme.

Tumedad juuksed korralikult rätiku alla kammitud, lihavad käsivarred küünarnukkideni paljad ja kulmud miskipärast ähvardavalt alla tõmmatud, - säärasena jättis too noor naine koguni meeldiva mulje. (Jakobson 1928: 128)

Meeldivalt ähvardav.

Perenaise nägu oli üks ainus suur, rasvane imestusgrimass, ta oli viimse võimaluseni ärritatud, ta suu ümber kõverduv joon rääkis tigedast kadedusest. (Jakobson 1928: 158)

Ebakõla. Grimass ütleb üht, aga jooned räägivad teist.

- Ah sinul tuleb's kah juba homme minna? - küsis Selma ja kahvatas äkki. - Kas sa's... kas sa's... (Jakobson 1928: 181)

Viskas kahva sisse.

Ta tõstis jala esmalt põlvele, asetas aga siis kohe toolipulgale, vingutas huuli, otsekui püüdes hoida tagasi pääletikkuvat nuttu, ning tõusis viimaks. (Jakobson 1928: 182)

"Vingumine" tuleb nutuilmet kirjeldavast huulte liigutusest?

- Ah siin sa mul oledki... - ütles Luugus ja naeratas kuidagi mehiselt tagasihoidlikult. (Jakobson 1928: 183)

Ega ole'p vist väga mehine tõesti liiaselt naeratada.

Äkki kummardus vana Luugus vähe edasi ja küsis, ilmetu mulje ümber suure suu: - Aga kudas sa... kudas sa seda tegid...? (Jakobson 1928: 268)

Natuke valgustust sõnasse "mulje", a la midagi näkku "muljutud" (surutud, pressitud).

- Sooh, või mina tegin lolluse... - ütles Tiina kortsus kulmul. (Jakobson 1928: 391-392)

Nagu "nõtkuvi põlvi".


Suure suuga haigutades ning laisalt kukalt kratsides astus selle tüübilise näo omanik üsna naiste selja taha ning ütles kragiseva kurguhäälega: - No tere's, Liispet...! (Jakobson 1928: 21)

Hommikuse tervituse hääleomadused.

- Mis see's on...! - osatas küsitav üle õla, astudes samal ajal hiiliva kassikõnnakuga plangu nurga suunas, mille tagant kostis ikka veel see igasugu häälikutest ja umbhäälikutest koosnev vaakumine, just nagu lamaks sääl haavatud loom või inimene. (Jakobson 1928: 23)


Ning ta kordas äkki üldises vaikuses kuidagi kolevaljuna tunduva häälega, püüdes samal ajal tüütavaid toaloomi kahe käega eemale peletada: - No kuule... kuule... Mart...! (Jakobson 1928: 37)


Kuid samal silmapilgul katkes ta kahjurõõmus naerukihin, ning ta karjatas surutud häälega, sest poiss oli oma teravad rotihambad ta näpusse löönud. (Jakobson 1928: 69)

Naeruga hästitamine.

- On ikke tõprad jah! - kinnitas Mannu häämeele pärast kihistades. - Tappa läheks talle tarvis... sellele Saali rajakale... just tappa... (Jakobson 1928: 79-80)

"Hi hi hii".

Kuid ehkki ta sõnades kõlas koguni otsustav toon, tõi ta toidunõud siiski tagasi lauale, venitades vaenulikult: - No tule lõhmi ennast's täis...! (Jakobson 1928: 134)

Vaenulik venitamine.

Kaupluses oli nähtavasti enam kui üks ostja, sest võis kuulda koguni selgesti segast kõnekõminat. Keegi nuuskas nina, keegi naeris, keegi jutustas midagi monotoonse häälega. Äkki kukkus midagi kolksatades põrandale ja siis kiruti vastiku kohina saatel. (Jakobson 1928: 177)

Selgesti segane.

Sest ise norises säärase kohetaibatava mõnutundega, mis oleks võinud muuta uniseks isegi niisuguse virga inimese kui oli seda ta noorem vend Mannu. (Jakobson 1928: 243)

Kas uni nakkab norskamise kaudu?

Muu kehaline

Ta hoidis end ristluudest tugevasti ettepoole, ümber ta suu kõverdus aga juba kaugelt silmi torkav flegmaatiline naeratus, mis andis laiakondilisele näole säärase ilme, nagu mõtleks ta omanik vahetpidamata üht ja sama mõtet: "Ena mul tühja...! On's minul sellega midagi tegemist...!" (Jakobson 1928: 12)

Flegmaatiline naeratus?

Naine surus pöidla tagurpidi vastu nina ja nuuskas pörinal. Siis pühkis ta käeseljaga üle suu ja kooni ning lisas, kortsutades vihaselt kulme. (Jakobson 1928: 14)

Vene komme.

Isegi hingamise olid nad peatanud, otsekui sünniks nende ees midagi tõepoolest väga tähtsat ja vaatamisväärilist. (Jakobson 1928: 25)

Hinge kinni hoidmine.

Kollased sisselangenud põsed, luine otsaesine, lai nösunina, mida übritsesid tihedad vaokesed, sügavatest kanavarvastest piiratud silmad, suur ja kuivahuuleline suu, nurkades tugevate, ligi koonuni ulatuvate kortsudega, - kõik see kuulus ennemini vanale eidetudikesele kui keskealisele abielunaisele. (Jakobson 1928: 36)

Naise enneaegse vananemise märgid.

Paitav lõunatuul, kõrge taevas, üksikud rändavad pilvesagarad, linna kohal tukkuv suitsuvina, puude sügavtõsine rohelus, - kõik see mõjus tasse kuidagi sisemiselt. (Jakobson 1928: 66)

Sisemiselt mõjuvus.

- Ei tea jah, - vastas Karli ja ajas rinna sõjakalt ette. (Jakobson 1928: 86)

Rind kummi!

Äkki kuuldus kustki tasast krõbinat. Poiss peatas hingamise ja teritas kõrvu. - Jah, seal nurgas ta vist kükitabki, see kassi risu! - mõtles ta. (Jakobson 1928: 87)


Ning kui laps oma roosade igemetega ta rinnapääst kinni naksas, tähendas ta juba ilmselt märgatava üleoluga: - Või juba sellest kaheksandastki sa kipud rääkima... he, he, he...! Jah, tulemas ta on, seda pead sa teadma...! (Jakobson 1928: 125)


- Ei, päris õige... käib jah... Ju tal kondikoonutsil minust's üksi ei saa! Ja kui sa teaks veel kellega!... Va' Riisi Millaga...! (Jakobson 1928: 131)

The what now?

- Teevad jah jälle kuradi tüki läbi... - venitas küürakas mehenäss, kes istus jahukirstu kaanel, tillitades aegajalt oma kõveraid jalgu. (Jakobson 1928: 178)

Kes nokutab pead, kes tillitab jalgu.

Kuid siin ei püsitud kuigi kaua. Mingi mõttetu liikumistung paiskas salga juba varsti tagasi uulitsale. Kõigi nägudelt oli kadunud tavaline laiskus, kõigil silmis vilkus põgus, enneolematu tuluke, kõiki oli vallanud äkki imelik rahutus. Ja ei pandud tähele isegi toda rasket, hingamist matta ähvardavat kõueilma leitsakut, mis rippus alevi kohal, nagu sula klaasimass. (Jakobson 1928: 188)

See mõttetu liikumistung on see, mis meelitab padukaga toast välja.

Sel silmapilgul ilmus nurga tagant salk töölisi. Kätega vehkides ja omavahel kuuldavalt mõtteid vahetades ning lärmitsedes valgusid nad lähemale, ümbritsesid äkki tiheda sõõrina kuulutuseposti ja rõhusid toorelt varemseisjate pääle. Nad tõid ülemeeliku tuju, räuskavat vaimukust ja hapukat viinalehka. Kostsid toored vandesõnad, öeldud koguni sõbraliku häälega. (Jakobson 1928: 194)


- Jumal-isake... hakkan's mina teile valetama... - väärutas halli habemega vanamees tõsiselt pääd. (Jakobson 1928: 310)

Mitte ei raputanud, vaid väärutas.

- Ronimine... ronimine on raske, - vastas Mannu, noogutades esikehaga. (Jakobson 1928: 387)

Ülakehaga? Kehaga noogutamine? Ei kõla õigesti, aga samas kergesti ettekujutatav. Poiss õrritab isa puu otsa ronima.


Neli põiktänava veeres seisvat majahütti ja otse üle tänava asuv viltuvajunud aiaplank, mille taga norutasid laiad vahtrad ja tugevad, siksakiliste lehtedega tammed, laotasid enda ümber sellist laiska rahu ja unist ükskõiksust, mis oleks sundinud väsinult haigutama iga virgemagi inimese, kes oleks juhtunud siia säärasel varajasel hommikutunnil. (Jakobson 1928: 9)

Puud evivad varajastel hommikutundidel rahu ja ükskõiksust.

Otsekui virgumiseelne rahutu värin raputas roidunult uinivat majaderida, mingi sisemine ärevus laotus kõikjale, siin-sääl võis kuulda juba laisalt ringutaja unist mõminatki. (Jakobson 1928: 10-11)

Füsioloogiline iseärasus.

Kägisedes ja nagisedes pöördusid ajahambast vigaseks puretud hinged. Uks vajus oma vettinud raskuse all pärani. Ainult paar korda õõtsus ta edasi-tagasi, jäi aga siis seisma kuidagi tardunult ja norutavlaisalt, nagu iga muugi ese sel räpasel hoovil. Korraks lõksatas kulunud link. Ja siis levis jälle kõikjale rammraske hääletus. (Jakobson 1928: 34)

Ilmekas olustikupilt.

Juba esimesel pilgul torkas silma see veider, ebaharilik ilme, mille oli äkki omandanud too alati une käes virisev ja igavalt laisk inimpesa. Tavaline loidus oli nagu käega pühitud. Ajalehepoisid jooksid kisades siia-sinna ja pakkusid värskeid telegramme, kõigi nägudel peegeldus ilmne kärsikus, astuti kiiresti ja rutates, just nagu võidaks muidu jääda kuhugi hiljaks. Vaevalt leidus veel kuulutusposti, mida poleks ümbritsenud uudishimulikkude salgad. Loeti sosistades kui ka kuuldavalt. Näis, nagu oleksid järsku segi paiskunud isegi seisuslikud vahed. Kübaras daam vahetas ärevusest lõkendaval näol mõtteid küüraka turunaisega, keppi kandvad härrad seisid külg külje vastu vilkat keeravate alevipoistega, õrnad, heleroosaks värvitud preilid seletasid välkivail silmil, et nüüd tulevat sõda, et selle olevat alustanud Saksamaa ja et kõik mehed kuni kolmekümne aastani pidavat "soldatiteks hakkama". (Jakobson 1928: 190)

Linnaelu ühise kriisi ajal (ka faatiline).

Looritaoline, vaevalt märgatav õhtuhämarus puges läbi tolmuste ruutude tuppa ja muutis asjade kontuurid segasemaks. (Jakobson 1928: 389)

Hämaruse võlu. (vt Ahto Lobjaka kõnelust eestlase hämarus-mõtlemisest)

Lihtsalt muu

Vähe aega vaigiti. Karli põrnitses tigeda pilguga vanemat venda, Mannu kepsles jalalt jalale, Prits nautis häälmeelel oma salapäraste tähenduste mõju. (Jakobson 1928: 83)

Salapärased tähendused.

Noored Luugused vaatasid aga imestusega oma vanemaid vendi, kes, tundes oma suurt tähtsust, noogutasid korduvalt ja aeglaselt, ja mõtlesid vist kõik üht ja sama mõtet. (Jakobson 1928: 98-99)

Suur enesetähtsus.

Kuid ta valitses jälle mehiselt enda üle. Ja ainult tasane värin ta kuivades suunurkades rääkis ta suurepärasest tujust. (Jakobson 1928: 155)

Selles teoses on õige vähe enesevalitsemist.

Ta sähvas lõõpijat kepiga ja hüüdis: - No kes sinule keele peale sittus, sa irvhammas...? (Jakobson 1928: 210)


Ä'ä ikke kiida kedagi, kui sa ise ei tea... ja tume oled nagu tökati pudel...! (Jakobson 1928: 217)

Romaani päris alguses pidavat lastel olema silmad kriimud ja näod "neegrid". Oleks pidanud ära märgistama koha.

- Et sa mul suu pead, kalkuniunenägu!... (Jakobson 1928: 240)


Kuid enne, kui ta suutis mõelda tolle mõtte lõpuni, vajusid laud nagu iseenesest kinni. Ja muredest muljutud inimene langes painajalikkude nägemuste keerisesse, mis vaevasid ja vintsutasid teda nagu kurjad fuuriad. (Jakobson 1928: 395)

Mõtteid saab mõelda lõpuni? Kusmaal lõppevad mõtted? Asking for a friend (Peirce).

Ja äkki kerkis jälle lamaja vaimusilma ette rida minevikupilte. (Jakobson 1928: 407)

Minevikupildid vaimusilmas.

See järeleandmatu, totter-pime, igal sammul valitsev kius, see kuulus Eesti jonn ajas nad välja oma sünnikohast. (Jakobson 1928: 411)

Õige Eesti asi.


Esimestel siinviibimise aastatel katsus noor abielupaar õnne läheduses asuva kohaomaniku kandimehenagi, sest tol ajal ei mõistnud kumbki neist kujutada, kuis võib inimene saada läbi ilma põllulapita, pärastpoole aga, kui hakkas ihne taat ikka enam ja enam lisama igasugu kohustusi, lõi mees käega, müüs loomad ja tööriistad, ostis saadud raha eest aguli serval asuva majahüti ning muutus üsna pea täisverd tööliseks-proletaarlaseks, kes oskab teha kõike: - juua, laupäeva-õhtuti kõrtsis vedeleda, kakelda ,kodus naist peksta, lapsi muretseda ja - nälgidagi. - Sest vaevaline päevatöölise palk ei löönud kuigi kauaks ette. (Jakobson 1928: 31)

Töölis-proletaarlase skill-set.

Läinud aastal, kui ta Saarmanni akna palliga katki viskas, palusid nad kõik koos, kõik pääle Helmi, tüdrukult, kes oli juhtunud toda õnnetust nägema, vaikimist, ning see lubaski suu pidada; kuid läks mööda vaevalt mõni päev, kui seisis juba Liispet uksel ja sõimas neid röövlibandeks. - Ja sest saadik teadsid kõik Luugused, noored kui ka vanad, et Juhkami Saali, see muidu kaunis kohmetu tüdruku-lita, on viimane kaevukott, kes ei suuda kuidagi pidada keelt hammaste taga. (Jakobson 1928: 69)

Vänged sõnad.

Sest surm, kui ta tuleb majja oma loomulikul sammul, ei külva pea iialgi nii rohkesti pisaraid kui siis, kui ta kannab vägivaldset iseloomu. (Jakobson 1928: 390)

Ära sa ütle.

- Sest lapsed, - need on ju kõige tigedamad, kahjurõõmsamad ja halastamatumad olevused, kelledele teeb nalja valusamgi hoop, mis tabab nende mänguseltsilist... - mõtles ta. (Jakobson 1928: 410)

Children are monsters.

Women B cryin'

Sest säärane nutmine ja ulumine, - sihuke memmede mood ei meeldi talle põrmugi. (Jakobson 1928: 175)


- Aga mis... mis... mis... mina tegema hakkan...! - küsis Selma äkki väriseva häälega ja puhkes nutma. (Jakobson 1928: 184)


- Või nuttis...! No kas sa kuule... Oi, on need naisterahvad kah ühed pipsid! - põlastas isa pääd rapitades. - Oi, on pipsid...! (Jakobson 1928: 270)


- He, he, he!... Näed, Juusep, mihuksed need naised on!... Et oi, oi, oi! kohe!... Meil ennastel on ikke hea meel, et kord sõdida saab, nemad aga muudkui inisevad nutta... Teab, ega neil seal pealuus vist küll muud põlegi kui üks hea laadung soolast vett... (Jakobson 1928: 274)


Kuid ta ei saanud lõpetada; sest jälle ilmus ema uksele ning keelas nutuse häälega, suu ümber kaks valujoont. (Jakobson 1928: 293)


Kuid moor ei pannud ta sõnu tähele, vaid hädaldas nutuse häälega. (Jakobson 1928: 297)

Oh häda, oh häda, mis mina nüüd tegema hakkan?

- Jumal, Jumal... kui sa teaks, kui raske mu süda praegu on... - lausus Selma ja puhkes järsku nutma. Ning kahe väriseva käega voolavaid pisaraid kuivatades lisas ta: - Öö otsa ei saanud magada... Nii kui silmad kinni läksid, nii kohe hakkasin koledaid unesid nägema... (Jakobson 1928: 338)



Seda Baabeli segadust kasutas Pritski: - ta kummardus oma Selma kohale ja suudles teda kaua ning isukalt. Ja vist küll esimest korda terve tutvuse jooksul kuulis neiu tolle karvase näoga mehe suust sääraseid meelitusi nagu:
- Oh sa mu kullakallike küll... -
Oh sa mu likake nihuke... -
- Oh sa mu väike varesekene... -
- ...mu pisike naisuke... - jne., jne., jne. (Jakobson 1928: 263)


Ta saatis jälle kallimale õrna, peaaegu lapsiku pilgu, mis rääkis selget keelt esimesest naiivsest armastusest, mis oli süttinud ta rinnus tolle karvase, pisut lollaka ja inetuvõitu mehe vastu. Ja vist ei aimanud ta isegi, missugused tegurid olid tas süüdanud säärase ebamäärase kiindumusvajaduse. (Jakobson 1928: 335)


Ja nii jäi ta üksi tolle külma, armastusest vaese, mõistmatu-uhke taluvaimu võimupiiridesse, eluvõõras, kurvameelne neiuke, kelle salajased unistused ja mõtted ihkavad alalõpmata soojust ja õrnust, seda soojust ja õrnust, mis peaks osaks langema igale inimesele suguliselt täisealiseks saamise ajal, mil äratavad pakitsevad noorusmahlad lugematuid vastustnõudvaid küsimusi ja mil on ilm alles algusest lõpuni täis saladusi ja arusaamatuid imesid. (Jakobson 1928: 412)

Pakitsevad noorusmahlad. Oi, oi, oi...!


- Noh, kus sa sellega...! Ikke oli...! - noogutas keegi pikk ja kõhetu keskealine mees, kohendades oma madalal nösuninal seisvaid prille. - Oi sihukeseid juhtumisi on küll ja küll... Sest surm, - see ei tule ilmaski etteteatamata... Mu oma ema surma ajal oli kah midagi just sihukest-samast... Oli teine haige, see mu ema... ja me õega istusime kordamööda ta voodi ees... sest kadunuksel oli alati midagi hirmu taolist hinge peal... Ja näe... ühel õhtul, kui ma vähe suikusin, kuulsin ma järsku läbi une, justkui oleks mingisugune loom ukse taha tulnud... ja kaapis... niuksus ja kaapis... Meil omal oli sihuke suur jahikoer... aga see ilmaski sihukest tükki ei teinud... see tuli lihtsalt ukse taha ja haukus... Mõtlesin's... et ena ikke imet... et ime küll, mis sellel Jollal's nüüd on pähe tulnud... ja lähen ust lahti tegema... Aga vaevalt sain ma selle praokile lükata, kui vilksatas must mööda pisuke, must taksi, nuusutas ema kätt ja kadus kohe selle voodi alla... - No nüüd sa, poeg, lasksid küll surma sisse... - ütles ema, sirutas... ja ringutas... ja suri... Ja kui palju me õega kah ei otsinud, mitte hingelistki polnud voodi all... No mis te ütlete, armsad inimesed...! Oli see's nüüd tõesti koer, või...? -
- Ei, see oli surm... - vastas habemik vanamees.
Ja jutustaja noogutas:
- Jah, surm oli see kindlasti... Selles põle midagi kahelda... - (Jakobson 1928: 316)