Brentano on the mind

Mulligan, Kevin 2004. Brentano on the mind. In: Jacquette, Dale (ed.), the Cambridge companion to Brentano. Cambridge (etc.): Cambridge University Press, 66-97.

Brentano attaches great importance to the fact that the answers to even apparently unimportant or minute questions of descriptive psychology often turn out to be heavy with consequences for all parts of metaphysics and epistemology (cf. USP, p. 79, MWO, p. 39). Failure to notice subtle distinctions in descriptive psychology is often the first step in the construction of metaphysical edifices which turn although nothing turns with them. This conviction, like the role of ontological frameworks in his work, reflects the fact that Brentano was primarily a metaphysician and only secondarily a philosopher of mind. (Mulligan 2004: 66)
Turning but nothing turning with the turned edifice is a nice metaphor for unsuccessful innovations. Brentano being primarily a metaphysician makes a lot of sense - especially when considering the work of his students and everyone who follows this line of thought.
Although the practical activity of rooting out conceptual confusion is an important philosophical task, Brentano thought that it was best carried out by developing a theoretical, descriptive psychology which would underpin explanatory psychology, which Brentano calls "genetic psychology." The latter depends on physiology and physics, whereas descriptive psychology is "relatively free" of this dependence. To say that descriptive psychology is, like explanatory psychology, a theoretical discipline, is to say that it consists of a system of interconnected truths. It is not a practical discipline, a collection of truths the unity of which derives from some practical goal external to them - for example that of rooting out conceptual confusions. (Mulligan 2004: 67)
For me it seems that it has rather spawned a lot of conceptual confusion in its "relatively free" theorising.
Descriptive psychology consists in large measure of conceptual truths about and analyses of psychological phenomena in which classifications, the identification of the fundamental types of psychological phenomena, and claims about relations of necessary coexistence are prominent. (Mulligan 2004: 67)
All this seems fine and well but I have an uneasy feeling that the fundamental types of psychology should not be metaphysical.
The first of the two main ontological frameworks emplyed by Brentano is traditional in its commitments: mental phenomena and acts belong to the category of individual accidents, non-repeatable particulars which are not substances (what are today sometimes called "particularized properties" or "tropes"), their bearers to the category of substances. (Mulligan 2004: 68)
I don't know what to do with a notion such as "substance" (is it synonymous with "content"?), but non-repeatable individual accidents can be thought of as episodic private signs. But does Brentano also have something like constant private signs?
Presentings, judgings, lovings, and hatings are "psychological" or "mental phenomena". Brentano sometimes calls these phenomena "acts" (PES-E, p. 79, PES-G, I, p. III) and "activities" although every mental phenomenon has a cause and so belongs to the category of undergoings (passio, Leiden). (Mulligan 2004: 69-70)
Esitamised, hindamised, armastamised ja vihkamised (mis on äkki hindamiste tulemused?) on konkreetsed teadvuse aktid.
Finally, Brentano distinguishes between psychological phenomena and their structures, on the one hand, and psychological dispositions, for example irritability, on the other hand. Such dispositions are bound up with laws, in particular the laws of genetic psychology, and it is important not to lose sight of the relevant laws in talking of dispositions, something it is all too easy to do if one mistakenly takes dispositions to be real entitios (GA, pp. 54-6). (Mulligan 2004: 70)
Again, a bit more concrete. Psychological structures and psychological dispositions are easy to comprehend. Though Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski (thus far) only handle the first.
Judgings come in two basic kinds - accepting and rejecting. To judge that Jules is jubilant is for a presenting of jubilant Jules to be qualified by an accepting. To judge that Jules is not jubilant is for a presenting of the same type to be qualified by a rejecting. Later, Brentano added to the distinction between accepting and rejecting a further distinction between attributing (Zuerkennen) and denying (Absprechen) something of something. Judging, then, is not a propositional attitude. Throughout all the developments of his analysis of judging he almost always retains the claim that the presentations which provide judgings with their "matter" do not contain negation. Like judgings, affective relations (Gemütsbeziehungen) come in polarly opposed kinds - loving and hating. But within the class of presentings no such porarly opposed kinds are to be found. (Mulligan 2004: 70)
I likewise am trying to build a scheme that involves proxemic accepting and rejecting: presence(-seeking) and avoidance. Vastuvõtmine/tunnustamine vs tagasilükkamine/hülgamine; omistamine vs eitamine.
External perception does not give us the right to assume that physical phenomena exist. On the other hand, external perception does not tell us that colors cannot exist without being presented (PES-E, p. 93, PES-G, I, p. 130). (Mulligan 2004: 71)
Väärt point. Sama lugu on märkidega, millega seoses tõstatub küsimus: kas märgid "on" või nad "on meie jaoks". Lihtne vastus on, et märk on alati kellegi joaks märk, aga mis saab siis märgikandjatest? Kui ma saan aru, et tegu on märgiga, aga ei tea selle märgi tahendust, kas see ei ole siis märk?
Is inner perception itself not a psychological phenomenon? Is inner perception, for example, of hearing a tone not just as much a psychological phenomenon as the hearing? In 1874 Brentano combines an affirmative answer to this question and his claim that every psychic phenomenon is given in inner perception in the following way:
The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon, it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. (PES-E, p. 127, PES-G, I, p. 179)
When I hear a sound the sound is the "primary" object of the hearing and the hearing is its own "secondary" object:
Apart from the fact that it presents the physical phenomenon of sound, the mental act of hearing becomes at the same time its own object and content, taken as a whole. (PES-E, p. 129, PES-G, I, p. 182)
Since inner perceiving is a judging, there are no judgment-free mental phenomena. (Mulligan 2004: 71)
Ma olen ilmselt juba lootusetu juhtum, sest see meikib isegi senssi. Nt Pjatigorski semiootika fenomenoloogilistes eeldustes vastab sellele asja "omadus olla kaks erinevat asja", ehk kaksuse omadus. Esimeses M. ja P. seminaritekstis oli ka selline väike vihje, et teadvus on igasuguste teadvuse aktide kõrval olemas, st metateadvus käib teadvusega kaasas, aga ma ei leia momendil seda katkendit üles, et seda kinnitada. // Siin samal leheküljel on selle idee Brentano versioon: "Every mental act is conscious, it includes within it a consciousness of itself."
To notice is to judge, it is therefore not to be confused with being struck by something, which is an affective state, or with something's being conspicuous. Something can be noticed without being conspicuous. But nothing strikes us without being noticed. Being struck by something is not to be confused with attending or paying heed, which is a desire. Attention ar paying heed differs from keeping or bearing in mind. Noticing admits of no degrees, unlike being struck by something and keeping or bearing something in mind (DP-E, pp. 37ff., DP-G, pp. 35ff.). (Mulligan 2004: 73)
Ohjummel. Kui seda segaputru hakata lahti harutama ja võtta arvesse ka Polanyi tähelepanu-filosoofia ja Kantori mälu-psühholoogia, siis saaks sellest isegi täitsa põhjaliku teadvuse-semiootika ehitada.
It is also very useful in his campaign to show that mental phenomena - but not the psychological dispositions mentioned above - are always conscious. Some of the phenomena which are said to be unconscious are merely unnoticed but conscious (PES-E, pp. 102ff., PES-G, I, pp. 143ff.). (Mulligan 2004: 73)
Fuuuuu, see on kõige selgemõistuslikum väide "alateadvuse" kohta mida ma olen üle tüki aja kohanud. Sellest eelistan ma ise rääkida "mittemärkamise" ja "automaatsuse" võtmes.
An apodictic judging is always a denying of something as impossible. An assertonic judging is an accepting or denying without any such modal moment. It is either a mere opinion (presumption) or assured (LRU, p. 112). The features of self-evidence is simple and so can only be introduced by means of examples and by contrasting self-evidence with the vastly more frequent phenomenon of the blind, instinctive tendency to believe something which is typical of external perception and memory; the latter but not the former exhibits differences of degrees (SNC, pp. 4ff., 15, PES-G, III, pp. 3ff., 19-20). (Mulligan 2004: 74)
This is the first of Brentano's six distinctions. I'm not sure about the other ones yet, but this can be quite applicable in my own field, especially in relation to dubious statements about body language.
In external perceiving one sees, hears, or otherwise senses a sensory object - something which is colored, a tone, or something warm (PES-E, p. 9, PES-G, I, p. 13). Brentano follows the tradition which says that inner perceivings of such sensings are themselves sensory. Similarly, if such a sensing is the primary object of memory, the latter too is a sensory act. Sensory objects, then, may be either physical or psychological. Presentings are either sensory (intuitions) or conceptual. (Mulligan 2004: 75)
There's a speck of truth in this. For my purposes it relates to somatoception or oneiroception, but the idea is very general indeed: mental actions are sometimes very close to physical actions. E.g. the case of a runner who continues to practice while laying in bed with a broken bone but can run very well when the cast is removed, because he had been "practicing in his mind" the whole time.
To imagine is to enjoy presentings which are not the bases of judgings. What is the difference between seeing a man and imagining a man? Sensations and phantasy presentations differ, Brentano thinks, in that they have different objects, although their objects may seem to be the same. Most phantasy presentations are not intuitive but conceptual presentings with an intuitive kernel (GA, pp. 82, 83). (Mulligan 2004: 76)
Relevant for my interests. But what about phantasy presentings that are intuitive? E.g. ideas and images that just pop into one's mind?
"A person who affirms something as past or future," runs Marty's summary of Brentano's lectures, "affirms the same matter but the type of affirmation is in each case different." But Brentano's assumption that present, past, and future are three discrete types of judgment had as a consequence, he thought, that time cannot be a continuum. His second account of time-consciousness, developed between 1870 and 1894, therefore, locates time-consciousness within the matter of presentations. Marty summarizes the view as follows:
If you have a presentation of this pencil that I am now moving around in a circle, you do not merely have a presentation of it as at a point (for then you would have a presentation of it at rest), rather you have a presentation of it as being situated at different points on its path, but not as simultaneously so situated (for then your presentation would be of a body as long as the stretch through which the pencil moves) but rather you have a presentation of it as having been at various points on the stretch longer and longer ago. And, to be sure, that the body was there longer and longer ago is something that is, in a peculiar way, intuitively present to you. This intuition is a thing pertaining to a peculiar activity of the imagination (Phantasie), but not an activity of the imagination in the usual sense of the word, for the latter is not really original, but is productive only through experineces and acquired dispositions; in the presentation of the past, on the other hand, we have something that is absolutely new, for which there is no analogue whatsoever in experience ... Brentano therefore called this activity of the imagination original association in contrast to acquired association.
This innate original association Brentano calls "proteraesthesis." Now Marty's account of Brentano's analysis is only a first approximation. Brentano does not think that a moving pencil can be the object of a sensory presentation for it is not a physical phenomenon (which, for Brentano, as we have noted, are colours, sounds, and their ilk). (Mulligan 2004: 78-79)
So, the past is constructed in the present? Proteraesthesis is explained in the Standford Encyclopedia as "a part of the act that keeps likely what was exprienced a moment ago." E.g. in music you hear the first note and then the second, but by the second note you haven't forgotten the first, and so on. Brentano supposedly explains how we can perceive temporally extending objects and events with this concept.
In his Psychology, Brentano notes that language suggests that certain emotions relate to objects - we say we are sad or upset about this or that. In such cases emotions "relate to what is presented in" the presentation they are based on (PES-E, p. 90, PES-G, p. 126). In other words, the intentionality of emotions is inherited from that of their bases, presentations and, in some cases, judgings. (Mulligan 2004: 81)
Of course Brentano relates emotion and intention. So does Marty. This is one of the main reasons I'm tracking down this line of thought. So-called "genetic psychology" would probably not agree unconditionally with this view, because we know that emotions don't necessarily demand an "object". In fact, a lot of the times we say something like "I'm [insert emotion] about [insert cause or object]" it's a rationalization of something that is inexplicable.
Brentano also says that every movement of the heart (Gemütsbewegung), or emotion, is a mental phenomenon and gives as examples: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt (PES-E, p. 78, PES-G, I, p. 112),). There are differences between these phenomena, in particular between, say, sadness, and acts of the will but these differences are not as great as the differences between what brentano calls the class of emotions, on the one hand, and all other psychic phenomena, or between presentation and judgment (PES-E, pp. 235-8, PES-G, II, pp. 83-6). (Mulligan 2004: 81)
You don't have to be very specific when conducting metaphysics. I disagree completely with the statement that emotions are mental phenomena. They are affective phenomena. Although related to cognition and "judgment", emotions have a life of their own. But actual emotions are too much invested in neurochemical processes, e.g. "genetic psychology" to be of any interest to phenomenologists.
Oppositions, Brentano says, "pervade" the class of emotions (PES-G, II, p. 102, PES-E, p. 248). He mentions joy and sorrow, hope and fear, desire and aversion, and willing and not-willing. In a note Kraus says that not-willing, "Nichtwollen," "is not to be understood as the negation of willing but as a willing that something not exist" (PES-G, II, p. 290 n. 8). (Mulligan 2004: 82)
It almost sounds like Brentano read Darwin's Expressions and took the antithesis principle to the heart. Nichtwollen actually makes sense, although not for Mulligan, in that it is willing not to do something, not to create something. (andreas w kirjutamajäetud teosed on hea näide.)
Other notable revisions are the arguments of Geiger and Scheler that affective phenomena, both episodes and enduring non-dispositional sentiments, may be unconscious; the rejection, by the early Husserl and Scheler, of the view that inner perception is infallible; the rejection by Stumpf and Husserl of the view that all psychological phenomena are intentional. (Mulligan 2004: 90)
Is it possible that Hadamard's episodic and constant private signs are an elaboration of episodic and enduring "non-dispositional sentiments" in Geiger and/or Scheler?
Through all the more or less radical transformations of Brentano's analyses of the mind, the vivisections of Husserl, Pfänder, and Scheler, still unfortunately the most thorough descriptions of the mind we possess, it is possible, for those with earl to hear, to discern variations on the Austrian melody initially composed by Brentano. (Mulligan 2004: 91-92)
Njah. Ka meie ei ole sellest meloodiast puutumatud. See jõuab meieni ühest käest mööda rada Brentano -> Marty -> Jakobson -> Lotman ja teisest käest mööda rada Brentano -> Scheler -> Bahtin -> Lotman.
On his early view, every mental phenomenon contains a representation or presentation of itself. On his later view, every sufferer and lover, for example, is an internal presenter of himself.
All my external perception and all my conceptual thinking is, Brentano thinks, in the first instance, about me. For all such mental activity contains an inner perceiving by me of myself albeit an inner perceiving which involves no direct acquaintance with myself. (Mulligan 2004: 92)
Mine võta näpust - isegi natuke autokommunikatsioonile lahenevat arutlust. Midagi sellist, et kogedes maailma koged iseennast, sest sa koged maailma läbi iseenda.

Teadvuse struktuurid

Mamardašvili, Merab K. ja Aleksander M. Pjatigorski [1997]. Sümbol ja teadvus. Tõlkinud Silvi Salupere.

Teadvuse struktuur on põhimõtteliselt mitte-individuaaln. Teadvuse struktuuri võib nimetada nii sisuks kui vormiks, seega katab ta osaliselt seda, mida mõnedes filosoofiavooludes ja -koolkondades nimetatakse "teadvuse vormiks". (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Miks siis mitte juba öelda, et "teadvuse struktuur" on sisuliselt märk.
Ruum ise võib olla teadvustatud kui teadvuse sisuline nähtus. Teadvuse sisuline fakt või sisuline materjal on teadvuse materjali enda ruumiline laotumine - mitte selles mõttes ,et teadvus on ruumi "sees", vaid selles, et see teadvus ise (kui teadvuse struktuur) on teatud ruumiline asetus iseenda suhtes. Teadvuse struktuur ise on teatud ruumiline konfiguratsioon, on ise mingi ruum. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
See on jällegi väga fenomenoloogiline või taotluslikult "lõdev" lähenemine ruumidele. Ricoeur räägib samas võtmest umbes mingisugusest ruumist teksti ja lugeja vahel. Natukene asjalikumas võtmes on siin järjekordne paralleel semiosfääriga, sest ka selle ruum on abstraktse iseloomuga (Lotman 2005 [1984]: 207).
Me räägime mingist teadvuse faktist kui struktuurist selles mõttes, et ta võib olla keeruline, st sisaldada endas mingit mitmekesisust. Me ütleme: "kuskil on teadvuse fakt", "kuskil on üks teadvuse fakt, aga mujal hoopis teistsugune". Meie mõtisklused teadvuse fakti üle on juba ise mõtisklused teadvuse struktuurist. See on fakt, kuni me ei ole talle omistanud seda viimast tähtsat omadust - sisemist keerukust, erinevalt teadvuse seisundi ühetaolisusest. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Keerukus on siin mõtestatud mitmekesisusena. Sellel vastandub ühetaolisus. Teadvuse fakt on seega ühetaoline, aga teadvuse struktuur on mitmekesine.
Ja metaarutlus, mis liigendab, strktureerib teadvuse materjali, saab olema esemeliselt teistsugune, sest ta on mingi iseseisev ese ja mingist vaatepunktist on meie liigendus vahendavaks teise liigenduse suhtes, mida viiks läbi inimene ise, kes satub või sattus ühte või teise teadvuse struktuuri. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Samamoodi on minu kommentaarid justkui iseseisvad, vähemalt "esemeliselt teistsugused", aga mitte päris sõltumatud või rippumatud, sest nende kommentaaride tõlgendamine sõltub siiski tsitaatide sisust ja visuaalselt ripuvad kommentaarid otseselt tsitaatide all. Neid saab üksteisest eristada, aga mitte päris lahutada ilma, et tekiks mingisugune kadu. Teisel tasandil on minu tsitaadid-kommentaarid "esemeliselt teistsugused" lähtetekstist endast, kust tsitaadid on ümber kirjutatud. See on täiesti kasutu arutelu, aga tekst ise ei luba ennast koheslet avada mistõttu tuleb selle ees natuke tantsida ja teistkordsel lugemisel loota paremat.
Me ei ole ju võimelised, johtuvalt tuntud komplementaarsuse reeglist vaatluses, üheaegselt elama üle teadvuse fakti ka tema struktuursuses: võib olla siis me osutuksime juba olevat teises või kolmandas struktuuris või üldse väljuksime teadvuse struktuurist johtunud teadvuse valda, mida me ei saa struktureerida. Seetõttu ei saa me öelda, et kus on fakt, seal on teadvuse struktuur, kuna me ei saa igale teadvuse faktile lisada/kaasata struktureerituse tõlgendust. Me vaid eeldame, et teadvuse sisulisus võib esituda struktuurina. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Suvalise analoogia võib tõmmata "privaatsete märkidega" mida Hadamard (1945) jaotab kaheks. Teadvuse struktuurile vastaksid siinses võrdluses püsivad (constant) privaatmärgid ja teadvuse faktidele juhuslikud (episodic) privaatmärgid. Nagunii ei anna see võrdlus midagi juurde, sest see oleks vastandi fakt/struktuur koletu lihtsustamine, aga kuidagi tuleb ju tantsida! Kui tantsupeol üks lugu hakkab lõppema ja teine alles algama ning kahe erineva pala helid on segunenud nii, et rütmid on kahekordselt keerulised, mis sa teed? Peatud ja ootad kuniks uus lugu on hoo sisse võtnud või teed sellest endale katsumuse ja tantsid edasi kahekordselt keerulisemat tantsu? Teine variant on märksa huvitavam.
Me leppisime kokku, et empiiriliselt leitud teadvuse fakti ei saa me üldjuhul ühemõtteliselt seostada teadvuse struktuuriga. Me ei saa ka oma metaarutlust ennast siduda kindla teadvuse struktuuriga. Kuid iga etapp meie metaarutluses on, ühelt poolt, teadvuse fakt, teisalt, mis eriti tähtis - vastab teatud teadvuse seisundile. Seega osutub võimalikuks ettekujutus mingist ühesuunalisest semiootilisest seosest: teadvuse struktuurid, tulevased struktuurid, mitte-struktuurid, struktuuride puudumine või faktide puudumine meie metaarutluse etapil võivad olla teadvuse seisundi märkideks. Kuid mitte vastupidi, me ei saa minna teadvuse seisundilt teadvuse sisu juurde. Kuna sisusust vaatleme me kui püsivat teadvuse seisundi võimalust. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Ma kahtlustan, et neid variante saab vaadelda (Greimasi) semiootilise ruudu seisukohast, aga seda taipasin alles siis kui olin need neli varianti visuaalselt ära märgistanud ja leidsin, et semiootilise ruudu kasutamine oleks liiga suur ajuakrobaatika (selle jaoks peab olema ettevalmistus ja piisavalt energiat).
Inimene lülitab teadvuse fakti mingisse oma "mina" ruumilis-füüsilisse (tegelikult "pseudofüüsilisse") sfääri. Ta ütleb: "mul tekkis/tuli mõte", "ma mõtlesin midagi välja", "mu peas sündis idee". Meie jaoks oleks huvitav, kuna me loobume genereerimise ideest, pakkuda välja omalaadne ümberpööratud "antikujund". Kui me ütleme miitte "mul tekkis idee" vaid "mina tekkisin idees", mitte "ma mõtlesin midagi välja" vaid "ma sattusin millessegi/miskisse", "ma sattusin mõttesse millestki", "ma osutusin olevat mingi tedavuse fakti sees" siis võib see "esteetiliselt" aidata harjuda teise lähenemisega, aidata tunnetega vastu võtta mõttelisi konstruktsioone, millega me tahame ennast intellektuaalselt harjutada, aidata arendada uusi refleksiivseid protseduure. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
"Among Rimbaud's (1871) most well-known aphorisms is his reflection: "Je est un autre" ("I is an other)" (p. 347). In broader context, the thought comes up twice in his writing, first in a letter to Georges Izambard: "It's not my doing at all. It's wrong to say: I think. Better to say: I am thought. I is an other" (Rimbaud, 1871/1967, p. 100). And in a letter to Paul Demeny he wrote, "For I is an other. ... This is plain to me: I am present at the unfolding of my thought: I watch it, listen to it: I strike the chord: the symphony stirs in the depths, or leaps onto the stage" (Rimbaud, 1871/1963, p. 347; see also Lawler, 1992, p. 3)." (Macke 2008: 141)
Sellega seoses pöördume tagasi juba räägitu juurde: teadvus on selline tekst, mis tekib teksti, mis ennast tähistab jaendale viitab, lugemise aktiga. See eneseleviide muutub jälle tekstiks kuni lõpmatuseni. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
The "semiosphere is simultaneously an object- and a metaconcept." (Torop 2005: 159). Kultuur loeb iseennast. Ka lõputu semioosi kontseptsioon, mis tõlgendab isennast iseendast lähtuvalt. // Joonealune märkus jõudis minust ette ja soovitab seda sama katkendit võrrelda lõputu semioosi ja hermeneutilise ringiga.
Teadvuse struktuur on faktiliselt isiksuse väline, kvaasiesemeline teadvuse seisund. Metafooriliselt väljendudes on teadvuse struktuur teatud "olemise aukude täitmine", "aukude" mis on jäetud põhjus-tagajarje agregaatide poolt. Selles kvaasiesemelises struktureeritud "augus" (millel ei ole muud struktuuri, sest ta on "auk") on/asetsevad terviklikud teadvuse struktuurid. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Samavõrd meelevaldselt võib siin neid "kvaasiesemelisi struktureeritud auke" tõlgendada tühikutena teadmistes. Ma tean, et on midagi mida ma ei tea, aga niipea kui ma selle augu täidan ja saan seda teadma mida ma ei teadnud, avan ma selle kaudu seni sujuva pinnasena näinud ümbruses veel lugematul hulgal auke. // Lacani tedraeeder on tundmatu asi - ei leia selle kohta ka netist midagi.
Me ütleme "rekurrentsioon on teadvuse struktuur". Kuid mingem mõistmise etappe mööda. Kõigepealt ilmub see kui ettekujutus sellest, et iga asi, isiksus, sündmus või fakt on absoluutselt ilma jäetud unikaalsusest, st et kõik, mis meiega juhtub (ja ka meie ise), juba oli lõputu arv kordi ja kordub veel lõpmatu arv kordi. Muidugi võime me seda endale ette kujutada kui bukvaalset [sõnasõnalist, sõna otseses mõttes] faktide kordumist ühesuunaliselt orienteeritud aja tsüklites (minevikust läbi oleviku tulevikku). Või kui sündmuste liikumist mööda mingit suletud ajakõverat (siin sisadub ka meie endi liikumine, kui sündmused on fikseeritud, aga meie liigume). (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Idamaine filosoofia lööb välja. Ajasilmus. The Matrix kujutab sündmusi maatriksi kuuendas iteratsioonis. Aeg on tsükliline. Elu on reinkarnatsiooni tõttu väljapääsmatu, jne.
Milles siis seisneb igasuguse sümboli abstraktne analüüs? Eelkõige näitamaks, mil moel igasugune sümboli sisulisus esineb kui täiesti tühi kest, mille sees konstitueeritakse ja struktureeritakse ainult üks sisu, mida me nimatame "teadvuse sisuks". Kuid enne kui arutleda selle "sisulisuse" (nagu sellest räägitakse ptk 13.) üle, tuleb meil mõelda sellisest asjast nagu "märgilisus". Kui semiootika vaatleb inimest kui "märgilist olendit", siis peab ta selle all mõtlema mitte sellist olendit, kes mõtleb märke välja, vaid sellist, kes iga kord, kui algab tema individuaalne töö asjade ja sündmustega (jaka iseenda kui asja ja sündmusega), kasutab neid kui juba valmis, märgisüsteemi. Seda süsteemi mõtestatakse meie poolt teadlikult teda kasutava "olendi" suhtes kui midagi kunstlikku, teatud sorty "aparaati" ("aparaadi" all mõtleme siin "teatud automaatselt funktsioneerivat seadeldist"). (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Siin on sisuline erinevus minu ja mõnegi teise lähenemisega, mis julgustab just "märkide välja mõtlemise(le)" lähenemist. Selle jaoks sabib nt privaatmärkide mõiste, aga see ei ole hädavajalik. Seisukoht igatahes on taoline, et märgitegevus ei sõltu mingist etteantud aparaadist täielikult, vaid iga uus tõlgendus või tõlgendustöö on samaaegselt uue aparaadi ehitamine vanadest juppidest. Aga eks see vahekord individuaalse loovuse ja sotsiaalsete normide vahel on juba parasjagu vana ja paljude poolt käsitletud. Igatahes, ma ei nõustu väitega, et märgisüsteem on "juba valmis" või isegi "alati juba valmis".
Teadmine on alati märgiline struktuur. Võib ette kujutada teatud potentsiaalse, absoluutse teadmise olemasolu, mis on antud mingi, kuid mda me ei tunne teadmise kui niisugusena, mida me ei saa eritleda ruumis teadvuse struktuuride läbimise käigus ega ajas teadvuse seisundi pikendamise käigus. Teadmine võib samuti olla esitatud kui mingi seadeldis, kui informatsiooni ekstraheerimise mehhanism märgisüsteemidest. Selline mehhanism, mis paljudel juhtudel enam-vähem samamoodi taasluuakse ajas ja ruumis vahelduvate indiviidide massis. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Äkki midagi sellist, et erinevad inimesed erinevatel aegadel erinevates kohtades võivad jõuda samade teadmisteni, aga erinevates märkides. Märgid on sel juhul sisuliselt vaid material trappings, nagu Sapir utleb.
Kui me alles hakkame vaatlema teadvuse "märgilist" seisundit, siis võib näha umbes sellist pilti: individuaalne psüühiline mehhanism läbib rea erisuguseid teadvuse seisundeid ja seisundite alljuhte, kusjuures osad neist teadvuse seisundeist ei ole kuidagi tähistatud, st ei satu selliste teadvuse faktide hulka, mille sisuks oleks märgilisus. Kuid tähtis on pidada silmas, et iga kord, kui me vaatleme nähtust, mida me tinglikult nimetame "inimene", oleme me juba harjunud tema kohta mõtlema, et tema käitumine kogu selle psüühilise efekti dünaamikas, elus, on alati orienteeritud sellistele seisunditele, mis sisaldavad endis olemist märgilisuse sisulises korras. Just seetõttu eksisteerib, ühelt poolt, võimalus igasugust käitumist vaadelda märgilisena, teisalt - puht subjektiivne oma isikliku elu tunnetus märgilisusele orienteeritud, mittemärgilist märgiliseks üleviivat/tõlkivat seisundite katkematu kulgemise/vooluna. Kuid tavaliselt mittemärgilisi seisundeid kas ei registreerita teadvuse jälgimisel või registreeritakse ekslikult kui märgilised. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Või nagu Juri Lotman ütleb väga üldiselt: Inimese käitumine on alati tähenduslik. See on tõepoolest huvitav nähtus, et me omistame teiste ("inimeste") ja iseenda sisemistele tundmustele tihtipeale märgilist tähendust. Oma "Kehakujutlustes" võtsin ma üles Acconci mõiste "põgenevmärgid" (fugitive signs), mis osutab just sellele tõigale, et inimkeha on selliste (põgenev)märkide spontaanne generaator. St põgenevmärgid on sellised mis tekivad iseenesest, justkui olemise kõrvalnähuna. Selles on ka paranoia aspekt, kujutelm kunstnikust kelle pelgas eksistents toodab lõputult puhaste tähistajate ahelaid. (vt Dworkin 2001: 109)
Teadvuse vaatepunktist (ja mitte ainult sellest vaatepunktist!) võib märgi loomusest mõelda järgnevalt: "Miski, et olla märgiks, eeldab teadvuse peatamist ja samaaegselt eeldab inimese refleksioon enda kui põhimõtteliselt märgilise olendi kohta, kes opereerib märkidega ja eksisteerib märkide keskel." Ja sel juhul märke ei leiutata; nad ilmnevad inimesele stiihiana, millesse ta on sukeldunud, ja selle stiihia elemendid asuvad või võivad asuda kui väljaspool inimest antud ja "valmis" märgisüsteemid. Iga kord, kui ta "eritleb" refleksioonis oma psüühilise mehhenasmi, avastab ta märgid. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Pean siinkohal minema oma metatasandile: vaeveldes pikalt terminoloogilise leiutamise deemoni küüsis "peatus minu teadvus" just sellise refleksiooni juures ja sellest nähtusest - eeldusest, et inimene on märgiline olend, kes opereerib märkidega ja eksisteerib märkide keskel - sai märk. Tähendab, ma andsin sellisele mõtteviisile nime ja selletaolisi vihjeid kohates märgin ära, et ma nimetan seda semiofreeniaks. Inimene, kes reflekteerib iseenda kui märgikasutaja ja end ümbritseva märgilise keskkonna üle, on "märgimeelne". Semiootikud vaevab märgimeelsus tihemini kui mitte-semiootikuid, aga ma kahtlustan, et viimasedki ei ole selles tülikast teadvuse seisundist vabad.
Selles mõttes on huvitav meenutada Platoni õpetust ideedest. See on ilmselt inimmõtlemise ajaloos esimene tekstuaalselt väljendatud mõtlemine märkidest. Platoni jaoks dubleeris tegelikkust teatud teine maailm, mis on faktiliselt suhestus sellega kui märgilisus tähistatavusega.
Platoni vaatepunkti erinevus üldistatud semiootilisest seisneb vaid selles, et seal toimus omalaadne kohtade muutus: esemele vastas idee, kuid idee märgiks oli ese, aga mitte idee ei olnud eseme märgiks. Sel juhul ilmneb märgilisuse (kui "miinusteadvuse") ja mittemärgilisuse vaheliste piirseisundite võimalus ja saab mõeldavaks selline teadvuse vald, mida me nimetame "märgiliseks". (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Selles on ka terake tõtt, ma arvan, sest ideede maailm on kuidagi rikkam kui esemete maailm. St semiootilises reaalsuses "on" palju rohkem nähtusi. Samast esemest võib olla lõputult ideid. Seostub ka ükssarvikute teemaga (me saame neist rääkida) või sellega kuidas teadusulme kujutab esemeid mida veel ei eksisteeri, rääkimata esemetest mis on olnud, aga alles on vaid märk (nt mitu maailmaimet veel päriselt alles on?).
[...] kui me räägime, et teadvus opereerib märkide ja esemetega, siis faktiliselt (aga mitte metafooriliselt) me mõistame, et iga märgiga opereerimise fakt eeldab, et see ei ole keele, kui meie poolt mõistetud süsteemiga opereerimine, vaid meie tegutsemine olenditena, kes juba teavad keelt ja opereerivad esemete kui niisugustega. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
J.G. vaade, et inimesed on keele organonid on selle kõrval ikka väga naiivne. Aga mingisuguse naiivsuse reserveerin endalegi, sest minu jaoks ei ole keel "meie poolt mõistetud süsteem" vaid aktiivselt mõistmist nõudev süsteem. Keel ei ole minu arvates kunagi kellelgi täielikult selge, just nagu Tallinna linn pole kunagi täielikult valmis vms. Sellised lihtlabased tõigad, et ma pidin sõna "stiihia" sõnastikust järgi vaatama ja olen leiutanud liitsõna "semiofreenia" mida varem ei eksisteerinud, justkui räägivad minu vaate poolt. (Samas hoian kinni päästenöörist, et keel ei ole minu uurimisobjekt, lingvistikas olen parandamatu võhik ja nonverbalistina isegi keele suhtes vähekene vaenulik - niiet minu arvamus keele kohta on tegelikult kaalutu ja minu vaidlemist tuleb mõista keele-analoogi vastandina, ehk katsega tuua mitteverbaalse käitumise tõlgendamise loovust ja paigalpüsimatust ka keele valda.)
Ja me võime anda keelemehhanismi, mis tegutseb automaatselt just seetõttu, et teadvuses asetseva informatsiooni eritlemise tingimus on väljatõrjutud sellesama mehhanismi tegevusel. Kuna mehhanism on juba üle viidud automaattasandile, võime me rääkida keeles, järgides tema reegleid ilma igasuguse arusaamiseta neist reeglitest. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Sama nähtus esineb mitteverbaalses vallas. Inimesed võivad olla väga tabavad näoilmete, žestide ja kehahoiakute tõlgendajad, aga nt mitte osata öelda mis operatsiooni nad teostasid. Selles suhtes oli hiljuti väga kena vaheldus vestelda teatrikunstitudengiga, kes pani seltskonnas samu pisikesi iseärasusi tähele, aga kuna tema ei osanud nendest rääkida ja mina ei tahtnud neist rääkida (sest sellistel puhkudel ma võin lausa loengut anda), leppisime me lihtsalt kokku, et "me mõistame küll". Mema mõttes jättan siia märksõnad - tegu oli alter- ja autoadapteritega mis esinesid kindla isiku lähedalviibimisel, aga mis kadusid niipea kui see isik eemaldus. Sellised nüansid on kergesti tõlgendatavad, aga mitte tõlgitavad (neist on puhuti raske rääkida).
Selline viis mõelda keelest sunnib meid teatud kahtlusega suhtuma Ferdinand de Saussure'i ideesse keelest kui süsteemist, mida saab uurida vaid seestpoolt/isemiselt. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Ma saan aru, et see on nähtavasti kirjaviga ja õigem oleks "sisemiselt", aga mul tekkis jälle "semitoics" moment mil kirjavigane sõna saab lugemisel automaatselt mingi sisuga siiski täidetud. Isemine oleks "teadvuseülese" (zaumnaja) sõnana päris vahva. St isemine on samaaegselt ka sisemine, aga siin on põhirõhk sellel, et see asub isiku "enda sees". Paralleele võib tuua ka Jakobsoni sõnaga selfsome (samovityj) ("From Aljagrov's letters"). Isemus sobiks vististi ka innovatiivse tõlkevastena sõnale selfhood.
Kuid siin on alati vajalik just teadvus. Otse öelda me seda ei saa, see oleks sama, mis tõmmata iseennast juustest üles. Kui teadvus on alati järgu võrra kõrgemal sisuelementide (mis moodustavad teadvuse kogemuse) järgust, siis ei ole meil võimalust rääkida sellest kõrgemast järgust teisiti kui kaudselt, sümboliliselt. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Järjekordselt on tunne, et teadvusest rääkimine on nagu arhitektuurist tantsimine.
Me räägime sellest, et sümbol on mittemillegi märk. Kuid mis mõttes? Teadvuse mõttes, sest teadvus ei saa kanda endas seda sisu, mida peetakse silmas, kui räägitakse asjast, sellest, mis on tähistatud märgiga. Iga kord, kui mõtleja uurib järjepidevalt metafüüsilise analüüsi käigus märgilisi situatsioone, milles miski eksisteerib kui märk ja tähistatav, jõuab ta vältimatult järelduseni, et "märk on ainult märk". (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Ka Peirce'i semeiootikas esineb, vähemalt Jakobsoni järgi, arusaam, et sümbolid on alati paratamatult üldised. Aga: märk on ainult märk on ainult märk on ainult märk.
Aga kas need on erinevad "eimiskid"? Sümboli "eimiski", kui sisuliselt hoomamatu teadvus, ja märgi "eimiski", kui reaalse eseme puudumine tähistatava rollis? Kuid kui märki vaadelda kui seda, mille taga midagi ei ole, siis võib ta ilmuda ka kui miski mis eksisteerib täiesti iseseisvalt pseudonatuurse esemena, mis on ... märk, millele lihtsalt ei vasta midagi. Loomulikult tekib siin küsimus: aga miks siis seda eset nimetatakse märgiks? Märk ju esitab märgi ja tähistatava dualismi. Ja sellele on väga lihtne vastus: jah, nii oli, kuni me ei vaadelnud seda duaalset struktuuri lõpuni, aga nüüd me ammendasime selle, me saime teada, et märgil ei ole tähistatavat, me viisime tähistatu üle mitteolemisse ja jäi järgi märk kui miski, täiesti eraldatud igasugusest sisust kui natuurse vaatluse objektist ja sel juhul ... osutuvad märk ja sümbol olevat ühel tasandil. Kuid see ei tähenda, et nad on üks ja sama, kuna siin on kaks reduktsiooni. (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Ernesto Laclau'l oleks oma tühjade tähistajatega siinkohal vist midagi öelda.
Märk on sel juhul mateeria, mille kui märgi teadmine sõltub subjekti teatud (so märgilisest) orientatsioonist, mis tekitab hüpoteesi: kui tuli vilgub, tähendab miski sinnub teda vilkuma? Kuid kas vilkumine on teadmine, meie teadmine? Ja millistel tingimustel võib see olla meie teadmine? Ainult tingimusel, et vaatlev subjekt viiakse üle selle teadmise võimaliku tekitamise situatsiooni. Ja ainult siis on see mõistmise märgiks, aga praegu on see meil puuduv teadmise märk! (Mamardašvili & Pjatigorski [1997])
Kuhu me oleme jõudnud? Kui ristmikul põleb foor, aga tänavad on inimtühjad, kas foorituli on endiselt märk?

Semiootika eeldustest

Pjatigorski, Aleksandr 2010 [1973]. Mõningatest semiootika teoreetilistest eeldustest. Tõlkinud Silvi Salupere. Acta Semiotica Estica VII: 307-309.

Kui võtta semiootikat kui intuitiivselt konstrueeritud ja empiiriliselt kasutatavat teaduslikku meetodit, siis osutub tema keskseks mõisteks "märgilisus", aga mitte "märgisüsteem" või "märk". Kuid märgilisus ei ole esmane (või elementaarne) semiootika mõiste, kuna see on teatud omaduse abstraktsioon, ja nimelt, kui formuleerida see kõige üldisemal viisil - omaduse olla märk, või, veidi laiemalt formuleerides, - millegi omadus olla millegi märk kellegi jaoks ja kusagil. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 307)
Tõlgitavusega tekib siin probleeme, sest "märgilisus" oleks otsetõlkes signicity, mis on samavõrd kohmakas kui Glebi väärtõlgitud materiality ja systemity. Olukorda parandab natuke kui "märgilisus" asendada üldisema terminiga "semiootilisus". Semioticity has been used by Anti Randviir and a quick google search says that this term is used in two books published last year: A Buddhist Theory of Semiotics and Materialist Film.
Siin on probleemi semantiline aspekt väljendatud sõnades "olla millegi märk", pragmaatiline - "olla märk kellegi jaoks", kommunikatiivne - "olla kuskil märk". (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 307)
See on üksjagu kummaline viis määratleda kommunikatiivseid märke, sest neid iseloomustab saatja ja vastuvõtja olemasolu, mis tõttu nad pole lihtsalt "kuskil" vaid "teatud kuskil" või "kuskil kust vastuvõtja (vähemalt potentsiaalselt) teab vastu võtta". // Muidugi on siin tegu Morrise kolmikuga: semantika, süntaktika ja pragmaatika. Jääb üle oletada, et "olla kuskil märk" tähendab "olla märk teiste märkide keskel ja nendega suhestudes".
Kuid jääb veel laiem formuleeringu alus, mis sisaldab endas küsimust: "Mille omadus olla märk?", või isegi, kui me juba eeldasime märgilisuse mõiste olemasolu, lihtsalt - "mille omadus?". Seejärel, kuna see "millegi omadus" on keeruline ja tuletatud omadus, tuleb välja selgitada, millised (teised) omadused võivad tema suhtes olla osaliseks või esmaseks. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 307)
Siin juba tekib arusaamatus, sest osalisus ja esmasus tulevad esmakordselt mängu ja neid ei näida selgitavat.
[...] ma arvan, et elusolendid võivad kasutada asju märkidena just seetõttu, et mingid asjades (ja mitte elusolendite psüühikas või signaalse kommunikatsiooni faktides) olemasolevad omadused võimaldavad objektiivselt asju niimoodi kasutada. See on omalaadne semiootilise teooria ontoloogiline eeldus. Selline eeldus on psühholoogiliselt reaalne vaid sel juhul, kui kõrvaline "asjade vaatleja" asetab end justkui neid asju kasutava subjekti taha, kuid mitte mingil juhul subjekti asemele, ega mitte subjekti ja asjade vahele ega mitte asjade taha. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 307)
See osa on natuke arusaadavam, aga pohiliselt zoosemiootika seisukohalt. Need "omadused" oleksid justkui Uexkülli "toonid" mida tingib isendi või liigi Omailm. Loomade suhtlemist uurides nt ei aseta me end loomade asemele vaid vaatleme neid "väliselt" - "tagant".
Esimeseks asjade sedalaadi omaduseks arvatakse siin omadus "olla igal antud hetkel üks asi ja mingi teine asi", s.t. omadus olla kaks erinevat asja. See tees ei eelda mingil moel, et asi samal ajal ilmneb ("ilmneb" tähenduses "on") ja ei ilmne iseendana, kuna ainult olleks kaks asja üheaegselt, ta võibki olla asi ise (kaksuse omadus). (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 308)
Mina ütleksin kahesus, kui mitte isegi kahekordsus. Näiteid on kerge leida, eeldades, et siin on tegu mingi asja märgikandjaks olemisega. Nt näoilme on samaaegselt näolihaste konfiguratsioon ja näoilme. Näoilme lahutamatus näolihaste konfiguratsioonist demonstreerib selle olemist iseendana ainult juhul kui ta on need kaks asja iseenesest. St igal näol on ilme. Ka magaval või surnud inimesel on ilme, kui tal on nägu. Seda aga eeldusel, et ka nullmängu on märk ja sellist asja nagu "ilmetus" või "ilme puudumine" ei ole võimalikud. Cannot not communicate situatsioon. // Siin on jällegi Brentano süüdi. Umbes nagu eristatakse nägemist/vaatamist eristas Brentano kahte etappi asja tajumises - temast sai alguse selle "topeldamise" traditsioon (sealjuures mitte ainult kaheks topeldamine, vaid ka neljaks topeldamine).
Teiseks omaduseks võib lugeda iga asja esitatavust väljaspool tema poolt hõivatud kohta (locus, seejuures antud asja mõiste ise eeldab tema spetsiifilisi ruumilisi karakteristikaid (koordinaadid, mõõtmed jne, mida summaarselt tähistatakse kui spatio). Asja ettekujutatavust/esitatavust väljaspool locus't (ja abstraheerudes spatio'st) võib mõtestada kui tema samaaegset olemist konkreetsete asendite või positsioonide (positio) seerios, mis muutuvad sõltuvalt seda asja kasutava subjekti asukohavahetusest (koos temaga vahetab asukohta ka teda järgiv "asjade vaatleja"). Sellist omadust võib nimetada positsiooni omaduseks. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 308)
Meenutab Bahtinit, kes pööras tähelepanu nt sellele, et näost-näkku vesteldes näovad osapooled erinevat osa neid ümbritsevast keskkonnast. Ma pole kindel kuidas selline ruumiline suhestatus märkidega täpselt seostub, sest märgi enda mõiste tundub olevat natuke abstraktsem - jutt tundub käivat märgikandjaga suhestumisest. // Bahtin sai väga palju mõjutust Schelerist, kes oli järjekordne Brentano õpilane. Aga see selleks. Siin ei räägita tõenäoliselt märgikandjast vaid millegagi kui asjana suhestumisest. Kahjuks on see teema liiga keeruline, et ma suudaksin seda veel hästi selgitada.
Kolmandat omadust määratleme kui asja võimet "lülituda" teda kasutava subjekti olemasoleva, antud hetke situatsiooni faktina, mis teadaolevalt eelneb sellele (ja igasugusele mõeldavale) situatsioonile. Või siis, kui pöörata see ütlus ümber: asja ajas (nii konkreetses kronoloogilises kui ka ükskõik kui üldisel moel) fikseerituse fakt ise eeldab tema "etteheidetuse" (projectio) võimalust, tema "tulevase" situatiivse kasutamise võimalust, tema assimileerimist subjekti poolt konkreetsete situatsioonide seerias. (Sel juhul jääb asjade vaatlejale, kui ta ei soovi "vahetada" asju kasutavat subjekti teise vastu, üle vaid eeldada selle subjekti eelolemist analoogselt asjade eelolemisega.) (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 308)
Suudan seda hetkel mõtestada vaid nii, et nt võõras linnas esmakordselt orienteerudes jätad meelde kus on mis ja mis neid asju ühendab, et hiljem samas kohas omada ettekujutust kus võiks asuda bussijaam või kohvik.
Need omadused ise ei tee asjadest märke; nad kujutavad endast vaid "puhtaid võimalusi", neid võimalusi, mis nende elusolendite (subjektide) psüühiliste ja käitumuslike mehhanismide läbi muunduvad märgiliseks tegelikkuseks kommunikatsiooni ja autokommunikatsiooni aktides. Kuid iseendast, vaadelduna väljaspool psüühilisi ja käitumuslikke mehhanisme on need "puhtad võimalused" akroonilised. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 308)
Midagi saab märgiliseks kui seda kasutada suhtlemiseks või tähistamiseks - ma eeldan, et autokommunikatsioon on siin enam-vahem samaväärne signifikatsiooniga, st minimaalselt midagi saab märgiks subjekti enda jaoks.
Viimati käis Pjatigorski Tartus 2002. aastal, Lotmani 80. sünniaastapäevale pühendatud konverentsil. Tema esinemine jättis kohalviibijatele usutavasti kustumatu mulje. Ta oli suurepärane lektor, emotsionaalne, väljendusrikka kehakeelega. Kuigi tema tervislik seisund ei olnud kõige parem ja vastuvõttudel nägi ta välja jõuetu ja hädine, seisis vaevu jalul, siis ettekande ajal toimus hämmastav muutus: temast õhkus lausa Piibli prohvetite kirglikkust ja jõudu ning kui ta hoogsaid väljaasteid sooritades kõuehäälselt semiootikat ründas, tõmbusid esireas istujad hirmunult tagasi ja kiirustasid energiliste peanoogutustega nõustuma, et pääseda selle puuriva pilgu alt. Lõpupoole valis ta endale oponendiks saali seinal asuva hiigelsuure peegli. (Pjatigorski 2010 [1973]: 309)
Sellisele esinejale on vaja võrdväärset kuulajat, kes jääb vankumatuks ja "ründab vastu".

Anthropology is Not Ethnography

Ingold, Tim 2008. Anthropology is Not Ethnography. Proceedings of the British Academy 154: 69-92.

He [Radcliffe-Brown] did so in terms of a contrast, much debated then but little heard of today, between idiographic and nomothetic inquiry. An idiographic inquiry, Radcliffe-Brown explained, aims to document the particular facts of past and present lives, whereas the aim of nomothetic inquiry is to arrive at general propositions or theoretical statements. Ethnography, then, is specifically a mode of idiographic inquiry, differing from history and archaeology in that it is based on the direct observation of living people rather than on written records of material remains attesting to the activities of people in the past. Athropology, to the contrary, is a field of nomothetic science. (Ingold 2008: 70)
From this light semiotics of culture is closer to anthropology than ethnography. Although, it does seem to combine the idiographic and nomothetic. Go and figure.
The distinction between the idiographic and the nomothetic was first coined in 1894 by the German philosopher-historian Wilhelm Windelband, a leading figure in the school of thought then known as neo-Kantianism. Windelband's real purpose was to lay down a clear dividing line between the craft of the historian, whose concern is with judgements of value, and the project of natural science, concerned as it is with the accumulation of positive knowledge based on empirical observation. But he did so by identifying history with the documentation of particular events and science with the search for general laws. And this left his distinction wide open for appropriation by positivistic natural science to denote not its opposition to history but the two successive stages of its own programme: first, the systematic collection of empirical facts; and secondly, the organisation of these facts within an overarching framework of general principles. (Ingold 2008: 70-71)
Put this way the distinction is probably comparable with Dilthey's "explaining nature" and "understanding history". But only on the surface, because there seem to be quite different matters at work.
One way treats every entity or event as an objective fact, the other attributes to it some meaning or value. [...] Contemporary readers will immediately recognise in this a forerunner to the so-called etic-emic distinction. (Ingold 2008: 71)
As Mary Ritchie Key put it in 1979, the etic/emic distinction is not often understood. Here etics treats "every entity or event as an objective fact" and emic "attributes to it some meaning or value". Making unjust generalizations again, semiotics of culture seems to deal with the emic side more - but this hunch is based solely on the hint towards "meaning or value".
The theoretician operating in a nomothetic mode imagines a world that is, by its nature, particulate. Thus the reality of the social world, for Radcliffe-Brown, comprises 'an immense multitude of actions and interactions of human beings' (1952: 4). Out of this multitude of particular events the analyst has then to abstract general features that amount to a specification of form. (Ingold 2008: 72)
This sounds acceptable, but what does "a specification of form" entail? Is it something like a typology of forms (of actions and interactions)?
Let us suppose, Nadel postulated, taht between persons A nad B we observe diverse behaviours denoted by the letters a, b, c ... n, but that all index a condition of 'acting towards' - of A acting towards B and of B acting towards A. We denote this condition with the colon (:). It then follows that a formal relationship (r) exists between A and B, under which is subsumed the behavioural series a ... n. Or in short:
A r B, if
A (a, b, c ... n): B, and vice versa
∴r ⊃ Σ a ... n
My purpose in recovering this formulation from the rightful oblivion into which it quickly fell is only to highlight the sense of integration epitomised in the last line by the Greek 'sigma', the sign conventionally used in mathematics to denote the summation of a series. The abstract relation, here, takes the form of a covering statement that encompasses every concrete term in the series. (Ingold 2008: 72-73)
Category: failed attempts to apply logical thinking in the study of behaviour. Aleksei Lotman's 1988. "On axiomatic method in ethology" belongs to this category. What is frightening about this is the notion of "series". Especially in Jakobson and Tynyanov's 1928. theses the notion of "series", as an synonym for "system", produces an eery feeling that there has been a lot of quasi-mathematical dabbling going on without us non-mathematically thinking ignorants really understanding what's going on.
When Kroeber spoke of 'descriptive integration', however, he meant something quite different: more akin, perhaps, to the integration of an artist's picture on the canvas as he paints a landscape. To the artist's gaze, the landscape presents itself not as a multitude of particulars but as a variegated phenomenal field, at once continuous and coherent. Within this field, the singularity of every phenomenon lies in its enfording - in its positioning and bearing, and in the poise of a momentarily arrested movement - of the entangled histories of relations by which it came to be there, at that position and in that moment. And as the artist tries to preserve that singularity in the work of the brush, so, for Kroeber, does the anthropologist in his endeavours of description. This is what he meant when he insisted that the aim of anthropology, as of history, must be one of 'integrating phenomena as such' (1935: 546). (Ingold 2008: 73)
A nice analogy that can be compared with the discrete/continuous distinction in the semiotics of culture, at least when viewed from Langer's dscursive/non-discursive standpoint (as I was told by Indrek Grigor, viewing the d/c distinction as the d/n-d distinction is "ideological", so I'm keeping open an option that there are many interpretations of what the d/c distinction entails; perhaps several interpretations are valid, perhaps not and mine is wrong).
Thus what Kroeber called the 'nexus among phenomena' (ibid.) is there to be described, in the relational coherence of the world; it is not something to be extracted from it as one might seek the general features of a form from the range of its concrete and particular instantiations. For precisely that reason, Kroeber thought, it would be wrong to regard the phenomena of the social world as complex (ibid.). Contemplating the landscape, the painter wolud be unlikely to exclaim 'What a cpmolex landscape this is!' He may be struck by many things, but complexity is not one of them. Nor is it a consideration in the regard of the historically oriented anthropologist. Complexity only arises as an issue in the attempt to reassemble a world already decomposed into elements, as a picture, for example, might be cut up to make a jigsaw puzzle. (Ingold 2008: 73)
Here I actually feel that the issue is "ideological". Or, rather, methodological? I believe that the social world is indeed complex. The artist's rendering and the social anthropologis's - for a lack of a better world - conclusion may indeed be simple, but... Argh. I guess we have a classical noumenal/phenomenal or Ding-an-sich problem at our hands (donotwant.jpg).
But like the painter, and unlike the puzzle-builder, Kroeber's anthropologist seeks an integration 'in terms of the totality of phenomena' (1935: 547) that is ontologically prior to its analytical decomposition. (Ingold 2008: 74)
This is where I recall that Kroeber advocated something termed cultural holism.
Yet if the anthropologist describes the social world as the artist paints a landscape, then what becomes of tmie? The world stands still for no one, least of all for the artist or the anthropologist, and the latter's description, like the former's depiction, can do no more than catch a fleeting moment in a never-ending process. In that moment, however, is complessed the movement of the past that brought it about, and in the tension of that composition lies the farce that will propel it into the future. It is this enfolding of a generative past and a future potential in the present moment, and not the location of that moment in any abstract chronology, which makes it historical. Reasoning along these lines, Kroeber came to the conclusion that time, in the chronological sense, is inessential to history. Presented as a kind of 'descriptive cross-section' or as the characterisation of a moment, a historical account can just as well be synchronic as diachronic. (Ingold 2008: 74)
One could probably compare this treatment to Jakobson's idea of "permanent diacronic synchrony" and Lotman's Culture and Explosion.
Evans-Pritchard roundly condemned, as had Kroeber, the blinkered view of those such as Radcliffe-Brown for whom history was nothing more than 'a record of a succession of unique events' and social anthropology nothing less than 'a set of general propositions' (evans-PRitchard 1961: 2). In practice, Evans-Pritchard claimed, social anthropologists do not generalise from particulars any moret han do historians. Rather, 'they see the general in the particular' (ibid.: 3). Or to put it another way, the singular phenomenon opens up as you go deeper into it, rather than being eclipsed from above. (Ingold 2008: 75)
All this sounds like micro-macro discussion applied on historical events. There are other neat varieties of this. Creative use of language vs social communication in linguistics; the individual self vs the social structure or organization or formation or whatever in some forms of (socal) philosophy; the single text vs literature in, pfff, structuralism or something... The list could go on.
The other kind of generalisation, of which Leach approved, works by exploring a priori - or as he put it, by 'inspired guesswork' - the space of possibility opened up by the combination of a limited set of variables (Leach 1961: 5). A generalisation, then, wolud take the form not of a typological specification that would enable us to distinguish societies of one kind from those of another, but of a statement of the relationships between variables that may operate in societies of any kind. This is the approach, Leach claimed, not of the botanist or zoologist, but of the engineer. Engineers are not interested in the classification of machines, or int he delineation of taxa. They want to know how machines work. The task of social anthropology, likewise, is to understand and explain how societies work. Of course, societies are not machines, as Leach readily admitted. (Ingold 2008: 76)
What are these variables? The semiotician can, if he or she so wishes, view signs as variables, pick out a limited set through "inspired guesswork" and continue to search for different interactions of these signs/variables in different cultures. Is it something like that?
'My own view', Radcliffe-Brown asserted, 'is that the concrete reality with which the social anthropologist is concerned ... is not any sort of entity but a process, the process of social life' (1952: 4). The analogy, then, is not between society and organism as entity, but between social life and organic life understood as processes. It was precisely this idea of thesocial as a life-process, rather than the idea of society as an entity, that Radcliffe-Brown drew from the comparison. And it wsa for this reason, too, that he compared social life to the functioning of an organism and not to that of a machine, for the difference between them is that the first is a life-progess whereas the second is not. In life, form is continually emergent rather than specified from the outset, and nothing is ever quite the same from one moment to the next. (Ingold 2008: 77)
And once again the difference is between process and structure (much like in Brentano vs Wundt). Also' I'll note that it was indeed not Sokrates but Heraclitus who put forth the constantly changing river metaphor (although Plato does quote it in Cratylos).
In an extraordinarily prescient paper on 'The self and its behavioral environment', published in 1954, Hallowell concluded that no physical barrier can come between mind and world. 'Any inner-outer dichotomy', he maintained, 'with the human skin as boundary, is psychologically irrelevant' (Hallowell 1955: 88). Fifteen years later, Gregory Bateson made exactly the same point. Mind, Bateson insisted, is not confined within individual bodies as against a world 'out there', but is immanent in the entire system of organism-environment relations within which all human beings are necessarily enmeshed. 'The mental world', as he put it, 'is not limited by the skin' (Bateson 1973: 429). Rather, it reaches out into the environment along the multiple and ever-extending sensory pathways of the human organism's involvement in its surroundings. Or as Andy Clark has observed, still more recently, the mind has a way of leaking from the body, mingling shamelessly with the world around it (Clark 1997: 53). (Ingold 2008: 79-80)
Oh god, yes! I can't find Hallowell's paper, but his 1955. book Culture and Experience is on archive.org. Curiously, this was also the time when something called "ecological psychology" emerged, especially in Roger Barker's One Boy's Day (1952). // No, wait, the paper is actually chapter 4 of Hallowell's book.
One thing he [Hallowell] learned from them is particularly worthy of consideration here. It concerns dreaming. The world of one's dreams, Hallowell's mentors told him, is precisely the same as that of one's waking life. But in the dream you perceive it with different eyes or through different senses, while making different kinds of movements - perhaps those of another animal such as an eagle or a bear - and possibly even in a different medium such as in the air or the water rather than on land. When you wake, having experienced an alternative way of being in the same world in which you presently find yourself, you are wiser than you were before (Hallowell 1955: 178-81). (Ingold 2008: 84)
This was the time when dreams were a hot topic for anthropologists. Other tribes around the world also viewed the dream world as equally or even more real than the waking world. The suggestions about perceptions and movements are worth consideration when I again venture into this domain (my first attempt was artistic, in "Somatoception").
Students are told that anthropology is what we do with our colleagues, and with other people in other places, but not with them. Locked out of the power-house of anthropological knowledge construction, all they can do is peer through the windows that our texts and teachings offer them. It took the best part of a century, of course, for teh people once known as 'natives', anh latterly as 'informants', to be admitted to the big anthropology house as master-collaborators, that is as people we work with. It is now usual for their contributions to any anthropological study to be fulsomely acknowledged. Yet students remain excluded, and the inspiration and ideas that flow from our dialogue with them unrecognized. I believe this is a scandal, one of the malign consequences of the institutionalised division between research and teaching that has so blighted the practice of scholarship. For nideed, the epistemology that constructs the student as the mere recipient of anthropological knowledge produced elsewhere - rather than as a participant in its ongoing creative crafting - is the very same as that which constructs the native as an informant. And it is no more defensible. (Ingold 2008: 89-90)
Our Institute of semiotics sometimes brags about how students and professors were like colleagues in the Tartu-Moscow school. Today this is kind of rare. Some lecturers take it as a challenge when you engage with their teachings.

Papers from Jakobson's SW (7)

Jakobson, Roman 1971 [1955]. One of the speculative anticipations An Old Russian treatise on the divine and human word. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 369-374.

Amid the numerous grammarian writings of the ninth to the seventeenth centuries, carefully reprinted by I. V. Jagić from Church Slavonic manuscripts ("Rassuždenija južnoslavjanskoj i russkoj stariny o cerkovno-slavjanskom jazyke", Issledovanija po russkomu jazyku, I. Akdemija Nauk, Otd. rus. jazyka i slovenosti, vol. I, St. Petersburg 1885-95), there occurs an anonymous Colloquy on Teaching Letters (Besěda o učenii gramotě), found in Muscovite manuscripts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see pp. 673-685 of the cited publication). It is a series of brief questions and detailed answers. After an inquiry and reply to "What is literacy?" the author introduces the question of the genetic relationship between reason and letters and his answer, affirming the primacy of reason, broaches a wider problem: he attempts to define the place of language in human life (pp. 673-676). (Jakobson 1971 [1955]: 369)
As always, I proceed to draw analogies with the study of nonverbal communication. John Bulwer worked in the seventeenth century and his works in old English even seem somewhat readable. From him, one could also proceed to Francis Bacon, who also wrote about gestures. But whereas here "letters" are related to reason, Bulwer treats facial expressions as related to emotions. And most all the early nonverbalists, like Birdwhistell, Hall, Goffman, etc. attempted to define the place of nonverbal behaviour in human (social) life.
The early history of the science of language has not yet been worked out. We do have an inkling of the monumental Scholastic achievements in the theory of verbal signs, whereas the development of Byzantine linguistic thought remains nearly unknown. (Jakobson 1971 [1955]: 369)
The situation is similar in the nonverbal sphere. We have Theophrastus, Cicero, Bulwer, etc. but almost nothing from Byzantine philosophy. For the longest time I've had an inkling that Arab scholarship, for example, contains lengthy treatises on nonverbal communication and behaviour, but they have yet to come to light in the West.
The grammarian treatise inversely resorts to the twofold birth of the Son of God in order to explain the fundamental verbal dichotomy, the seemingly antinomical relationship between the speech event and the pre-existent language design (parole and langue, in the terms of Ferdinand de Saussure, who promoted this conceptual dyad in modern linguistics). For the author of the Colloquy, it is not a mere illustrative analogy but one of the striking manifestations of the godlike nature of man: "Imitating the twofold birth of the Son of God, our word, too, has its twofold birth. For first, our word is born of the soul, through some incomprehensible birth, and abides unknown near teh soul, and then, born again through a second, fleshy birth, it emerges from the lips and reveals itself by the voice to the hearing." (Jakobson 1971 [1955]: 370)
Just as the anonymous author of the Colloquy imputes "the pre-existent language design" to some that "abides unknown near the soul", Bulwer believed that "the soul's motive faculty cause the mobile spirits to fly to their appropriate organs" (Green & Tassinary 2002: 280).
The analogy of "the ray from the sun" as an illustration of the generation of the Logos is used by the Church Fathers with some qualification (cf. PCF, I, pp. 300-301). (Jakobson 1971 [1955]: 373ff)
This is exactly the stuff I'm trying to discover more about. In the holy texts, there's a lot of sun ray symbolism involving light, eyes, and soul.

Jakobson, Roman 1981 [1932]. Is the film in decline? In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings III: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 732-739.

We are witnessing the rise of a new art. It is growing by leaps and bounds, detaching itself from the influence of the older arts and even beginning to influence them itself. It creates its own norms, its own laws, and then confidently rejects them. It is becoming a powerful instrument of propaganda and education, a daily and omnipresent social fact; in this respect it is leaving all the other arts behind. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 732)
The same is currently happening with the internet and computer games, which are influencing every sphere of art (from e-mail exchanges in literature to CGI in films). But mainly the last sentence is valuable for its wording. One aspect of my "historical" or "historiological" study of nonverbal communication as a cultural phenomenon involves it becoming "a daily and omnipresent social fact" as well as an instrument of propaganda and education. The latter point has yielded a neat empirical example: recently "emotion cards" (Tunnete Kaardid) came on sale in Estonia. They are supposed to develop your child's social skills and enrich emotion-related vocabulary, but their actual didactic value is very dubious (which would make them an interesting object of study).
We can say about the same person: "hunchback", "big-nose", or "big-nosed hunchback". In all three cases the object of our talk is identical, whereas the signs are different. Likewise, in a film we can shoot such a person from behind - his hump will be seen, then en face - his nose will be shown, or in profile, so that both will be seen. In these thre shots we have three things functioning as signs of the same object. Now let us demonstrate the synechdochic nature of language by referring to our ugly fellow simply as "the hump", or "the nose". The analogous method in cinema: the camera sees only the hump, or only the nose. Pars pro toto is a fundamental method of filmic conversion of things into signs. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 733)
At first glance this made the variant/invariant distinction pop into my mind, but what Jakobson is really after is the metaphorical/metonymical nature of cinematic art.
The theoretician who disclaims cinema as art perceives the film as a mere moving photograph; he does not notice the montage, nor does he want to acknowledge the fact that here a specific sign system is involved - this is the attitude of a reader of poetry for whom the words of the poem make no sense. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 734)
This is the plight of the semiotician - drawing attention to the fact that there are sign systems involved in stuff that seems "natural", as opposed to "cultural". The last sentence about "a reader of poetry" likens it to someone who doesn't understand the poetic function and reads poetry from the standpoint of other functions (referential, for example).
They have hurriedly assumed that the features of today's films are the only ones that cinema will devise. They forget that the first of the sound films cannot be compared with the last of the silent ones. The sound film is absorbed today with new technical achievements (it's good enough if one can hear well..., etc.) and preoccupied with the search for new forms to utilize them. We are in a period analogous to that of the prewar silent film, whereas the most recent silent films have already achieved a standard, have created classical works, and perhaps just this realization of a classical canon contained its own demise and the necessity of a fundamental reform. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 734)
In the first instance there's a critique of the "fallacy of finality" (Colin Cherry, as well as Mamardašvili and Pjatigorski) but in relation with cinematic art. And in the second instance we have an example of Tynjanov's theory of literary evolution applied on cinematic art. Silent films have achieved a standard, produced classical works and now we need to deform the norms and make things strange. // Though Tynjanov did write about film, too.
As long as the film was silent, its only material was the visual object; today it is both visual and the auditory objects. Human behavior is the material of the theater. Speech in film is a special kind of auditory object, along with the buzzing of a fly or the babbling of a brook, the clamor of machines, and so forth. Speech on the stage is simply one of the manifestations of human behavior. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 735)
Of course it comes as no surprise that Jakobson was happy about speech appearing in film. His object of study "conquered" another domain.
Silence in the cinema is valued as an actual absence of sounds; consequently, it becomes an auditory object, just like speech, like a cough, or street noise. In a sound film we perceive silence as a sign of real silence. It is sufficient to recall how the classroom grows quiet in a scene of L. Vančura's film Before Graduation (1932). In cinema it is not silence but music that announces the exclusion of the auditory object. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 735)
There's a modern example of this that I enjoy. The youtube reviewer YourMovieSucksDOTorg points out how in the pilot of The Walking Dead, when a little girl turns around and avails her zombie face to the protagonist, there is no music or jump-scare noise, but exactly silence that gives it the frightening effect. One could probably say that the absence of artificial sounds at that moment made the zombie girl more real.
It is highly probable that precisely the lack of a burdensome tradition facilitates experimentation. Real virtue arises from necessity. (Jakobson 1981 [1932]: 738)
More truth than I can take in at the moment.

Jakobson, Roman 1981 [1960]. Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings III: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 87-97.

Later, in his preliminary notes to the planned Foundations of Language, Sapir outlined the fundamental types of referents which serve as "a natural basis for parts of speech", namely existents and their linguistic expression, the noun; occurrents expressed by the verb; and finally modes of existence and occurrence represented in language by the adjective and theadverb respectively. (Jakobson 1981 [1960]: 88)
There are quite a few such typologies out there, but at this moment existents/occurrents and their respective modes seem actually useful. E.g. Tom (existent) frowns (occurrent), though I can't say if Tom's displeasure is an existent or a mode.
Particular attention has been paid by scholars to the biblical parallelismus membrorum rooted in the archaic Canaanite tradition and to the pervasive, continuous role of parallelism in Chinese verses and poetic prose. A similar pattern proves to underlie the oral poetry of Finno-Ugric, Turkic, and Mongolian peoples. (Jakobson 1981 [1960]: 90)
Here's an example of a biblical parallelismus membrorum: "A wise son gladdens his father but a foolish son grieves his mother." (Proverbs 10:1). Finno-Ugric oral poetry is mentioned and indeed it seems that Estonian "proverbs exhibit the same feature. E.g. "Hallpead austa, kulupead kummarda.", "Hea naine võib halvast mehest asja saada, aga hea meest halvast naisest naljalt mitte." and "Hundid söönud, lambad terved.".
However immense the difference is between Thomism and the ideology of the anonymous author of Zisskiana cantio, the shape of this song totally satisfies the artistic request of Thomas Aquinas: "the senses delight in things duly proportioned as in something akin to them; for, the sense, too, is a kind of reason as is every cognitive power". (Jakobson 1981 [1960]: 96)
Sounds like an early manifestation of the idea that there is something like a "visceral understanding" of art. // On second thought this reminds me of Brentano, who was apparently into Scholasticism (that's where he revivide intention from). Namely, Brentano does view the senses as a kind of reason - so much so that even emotions are imputed to involve judgment.

Jakobson, Roman 1971 [1962a]. Anthony's contribution to linguistic theory. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 284-288.

As Vygotsky's profound investigation of inner speech has disclosed, the so-called egocentric talk of children is an "intermediate link between overt and inner speech". We have been taught that "egocentric speech is inner speech in its functions; it is speech directed inward." In a child's development, speech proves to be "interiorized psychologically before it is interiorized physically". Anthony adds a new and apposite angle to Vygotsky's discovery: the transition from overt to inner speech displays a graduated order. (Jakobson 1971 [1962a]: 285)
Here the "directed inward" part is significant, as other forms of autocommunication are more about directing inner experience outwards. E.g. all talking to oneself is not egocentric. There is also the case of the self being an "unintended" addressee, of the sender becoming a "cryptanalyst" of his own messages, even of messages directed towards another addressee. Presently there is no typology of autocommunication to speak of, but such a thing can be imagined.
Children's egocentric talk has no concern for any outside addressee, but it tolerates, not seldom even favors the presence of a listener, whereas their pre-sleep speech does imply the absence of human hearers. It is meant as a genuine soliloquy, the speaker's privatissimum, ready to be cut off as soon as he realizes that his solitude has been broken. Hence the verbal activities of the child in his crib bring us a step nearer to true inner speech, namely, to its most hidden and perplexing variety, the speech of dreams. The soliloquies of Anthony falling asleep give us a suggestive insight into the speech of our dreams, which in the whole of our verbal behavior plays a no less vital part than do dreams themselves in our mental life. (Jakobson 1971 [1962a]: 285)
So Jakobson even ventured to the "weird" domain of linguistic study of dreams? (E.g. Read's 1969. "Dreamed Words".) Though Louise Pound opened this domain already in 1934 ("On the Linguistics of Dreams").
According to Ruth Weir's subtle observations, the lowering of the cognitive, referential function in Anthony's soliloquies brings to the fore all the other language functions. A typical property of children's speech is an intimate interlacement of two functions - the metalingual and the poetic one - which in adult language are quite separate. Although the pivotal role which in language learning belongs to the acquisition of metalanguage is well-known, the predominantly metalingual concern of the somnolent child with language itself comes as a great surprise. (Jakobson 1971 [1962a]: 286)
The metalingual function of a stream such as "Not the yellow blanket - The white... It's not black - It's yellow..." is abundantly clear: Anthony is trying to find a word for the color he has in mind. But where is the poetic function at play in this?
Grammatical alterations and purely phonemic minimal pairl are purposely strung together: /tɔk/ - /tʋk/ - /bæk/ - tʋk/ - /tek/ - bʋk/ ... /wat/ - /nat/ - /naɪt. Light and like or likes and lights attract each other Back and wet are blended in the portmanteau word Babette. Thus in the child's pre-sleep speech, lexical, morphological, and phonemic sets appear to be projected from the paradigmatic axis into the syntagmatic one. (Jakobson 1971 [1962a]: 287)
Ok, here's the poetic function. Like in his "Linguistics and poetics" a year earlier, Jakobson is demonstrating the poetic function mainly on the basis of aesthetic similarities in speech sounds, e.g. how the words the light/like and likes/lights "attract each other" (much like "I like Ike").
Anthony's bedtime play with language as a condensed summary of his day imperatively calls for further investigation of how usual such self-educational linguistic games are among dozing children. Yet however prominent the metalingual function is in Ruth Weir's records, she is right in considering the copresence of other functions. (Jakobson 1971 [1962a]: 287-288)
"A condensed summary" is an implicit reference to Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams, where dreams are viewed as "condensed memory traces" of daytime activities. I believe this hypnagogic metalingualizing is not specific to dozing children. I believe this because I, too, tend to play around with words before falling asleep, but I mostly just imagine myself writing - I don't feel the need to articulate my experimentations. That is, the ends are much the same but the means are a bit more developed.

Jakobson, Roman 1971 [1962b]. Efforts toward a means-ends model of language in interwar continental linguistics. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 522-526.

The title of this paper defines this common drift as aiming toward a means-ends model of language. These efforts proceed from a universally recognized view of language as a tool of communication. Statements about language as a tool, instrument, vehicle, etc., can be found in any textbook, but, strange as it seems, the apparently self-evident interference from this truism was not drawn in the linguistic tradition of the last century. (Jakobson 1971 [1962b]: 523)
In some areas, "language" and "communication" were even viewed as synonymous - a trait that ultimately spawned "body language" from "full-body language (communication)". But the impulse to view language as primarily a communication tool sometimes lead to an aversion, a need to deform the canon, and gave way to Langer's treatment of language as an artistic tool. This strand had existed for a long while (Schleiermacher comes to mind), but now it was recognized and developed further.
One of the most intricate networks, the strikingly hierarchic make-up of the paradigmatic pattern, was subjected to penetrating scrutiny, particularly in the research of Kuryłowicz. The consistent concern with meaning, a true field of the entire trend, and the systematic analysis of grammatical meanings with a rigorous distinction between general and contextual meanings demanded a similar exploration of lexical meanings, and the imperative need to treat vocabulary as "a complex system of words mutually coordinated and opposed to each other" was comprehensively advocated by Trubetzkoy at the First Congress of Slavists. (Jakobson 1971 [1962b]: 525)
Another aspect to which Jakobson imputes a hierarchy. The distinction between "general" and "contextual" meanings sounds like Marty's auto- and synsemantic distinction.
The sense for the multifarious character of language saved the Prague group from an oversimplified, bluntly unitarian view; language was seen as a system of systems and especially Mathesius' paper on intralingual coexistence of distinct phonemic patterns opened new outlooks. (Jakobson 1971 [1962b]: 525)
Just like for the Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics culture was seen as a system of systems.
Finally, the third and most far-reachinf form of comparison, the typological one, leading to the introduction of universals into the model of language, was sketched in the '20's as the final goal of that international trend in linguistics which was christened by the Prague Circle in 1929 "functional and structural analysis".
If that label, however, is avoided in our survey, this is only because during the last decades the terms "structure" and "function" have become the most equivocal and stereotyped words in the science of language. In particular, the homonyms function 'role, task' - viewed from the means-ends angle and function as correspondence between two mathematical variables, are often used promiscuously, and as Lalande's Philosophical Dictionary justly warns, "there is here a source of confusion which makes certain pages of our time scarcely intelligible." (Jakobson 1971 [1962b]: 526)
The case indeed confusing with the notion of function. Lotman, for example, would seem to talk of "role" and "task", were it not for the fact that at some point he actually sets up a "representation" function between two variables, image and object.

Jakobson, Roman 1971 [1964/1965]. An example of migratory terms and institutional models On the 50th anniversary of the Moscow Linguistic Circle. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 527-538.

In connection with language study the term kružok entered into Hungarian, when in the late nineteenth century a noted German philologist in Budapest, Joseph Budenz, took Russian lessons from an employee of Russia's general consulate. The instructor called the regular, informal tavern meetings with his pupil and the latter's colleagues their kružok; weekly gatherings for drinks and free scientific discussions became customary among the Budapest linguists under the old label Kruzsok. Both this custom and its name have survived until the present and have been adopted by Hungarian scholars of other fields, as well. (Jakobson 1971 [1964/1965]: 529)
I wonder if Tyler Bennett's "Semiotic Thursdays" constitute something like a kružok.
[...] and finally the theoretical counterpart of teh turbulent Futurist displays, Opojaz, the Petersburg Society (Obščestvo) for the Study of Poetic Language, which arose at a time when youth played a particularly independent, creative, combative and frequently decisive role. (Jakobson 1971 [1964/1965]: 529)
I also wonder if we're not living at a similar time and not realizing it?
The Moscow Circle maintained close relations with Opojaz; there were, however, notable differences in the guiding interests of the two associations: MLK placed much stronger emphasis on linguistics and was inclined to interpret poetry as language in its aesthetic function. In vehement disputes on linguistic essentials - phenomenology of language and the strictly empiricist approach; the place of phonetics and semantics in the science of language; the problem of the Humboldtian internal form; criteria for the delimitation of poetic and ordinary language; or finally the relation between language and culture - the Moscow team lost its former unity of purpose and principles. New institutions, like for instance the State Academy for the Study of Arts (GAXN), attracted the most active workers of MLK, and in the summer of 1924, during the tenth pear of its existence, the Moscow kružok was formally dissolved. (Jakobson 1971 [1964/1965]: 532)
"Poetry as language in its aesthetic function" is what Jakobson is known for; phenomenology of language definitely and the Humboldtian internal form maybe are related to Marty; and the relation between language and culture is the main connection with Tartu-Moscow semiotics of culture.
The fatal role in the nefarious ravage of the kroužek was played by the professional slanderer Petr Sgall. His amazingly illiterate and base denunciations published in the Prague journal Tvorba of 1951 and forced upon the periodical of the Circle, Slovo a slovenost, defamed PLK for propounding structural linguistics. The latter, according to Sgall, "has served only to prolong the domination of the bourgeoisie and to justify this domination". He condemned the Circle also for the "mendacious" recognition of a difference between the poetic and referential functions in language and for succumbing to the vicious influences of Saussure, Husserl, and Carnap. Yet, according to Sgall, "the genuine evil spirit of our linguistics is Roman Jakobson, who deceived and deluded many of our excellent linguists. [...] The role of Jakobson as the chief pillar of structuralism in linguistics [...] is one of the refined ideological weapons used for the disorientation of the outstanding representative intellectuals of the left and for a struggle against the proletarian Weltanschauung." This "cosmopolitan enemy who endeavored to devastate our science by his pseudo-theories" naturally found "his last refude in the den of American imperialists." The unscrupulous prosecutor finished by calling for the crushing rout of "cosmopolitanism in our linguistics" and by summoning the former structuralists to repent of their blunders and "by means of criticism and self-criticism to eradicate both the false theories of structuralism and their survivals". This coerced "self-criticism" resulted in the disastrous self-destruction of the kroužek, a ruin which caused real bewilderment among the linguists of the West and East. (Jakobson 1971 [1964/1965]: 535ff)
This is comedy gold. I especially like that Jakobson's "recognition of a difference between the poetic and referential functions in language" is mendacious (not telling the truth, lying).

Jakobson, Roman 1985 [1974]. The twentieth century in European and American linguistics Movements and continuity. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology, 1972-1982. Preface by Linda R. Waugh. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 265-278.

Trubetzkoy had a very high opinion of the American linguist whom he called "my Leipzig comrade". This was Leonard Bloomfield, who in 1913 shared a bench with Trubetzkoy and Lucien Tesnière at Leskien's and Brugmann's lectures. Bloomfield praised "Trubetzkoy's excellent article on vowel systems" of 1929 and devoted his sagacious 1939 study on "Menomini Morphophonemics" to N. S. Trubetzkoy's memory. (Jakobson 1985 [1974]: 266)
A happy coincidence, like Sebeok and Birdwhistell being dorm roommates.
The Prague Circle had very close ties with Edward Sapir. When we held the International Phonological Conference of 1930, Sapir, though unable to attend, kept up a lively correspondence with Trubetzkoy about his Prague assembly and the development of the inquiry into linguistic, especially phonological, structure.. Almost nothing remains of this exchange. Those of Sapir's messages which had not been seized by the Gestapo were lost when the Viennese home of Trubetzkoy's widow was demolished by an air raid. In their turn, Trubetzkoy's letters perished when Sapir, at the end of his life, destroyed his entire epistolary archive. (Jakobson 1985 [1974]: 266)
Destruction of letter exchanges, manuscripts and notes is of course sad (I recently learned of de Courtenay's similar loss in St. Petersburg). But this does explain why Jakobson had such a fond predisposition towards quoting Sapir (and Boas) at every chance.
Boas strongly believed in the international character of linguistics and of any genuine science and would never have agreed with an obstinate demand for a regional confinement of scientific theories and research. He professed that any analogy to a struggle for national interests in politics and economics was superficial and far-fetched. In the science of language there are no patented discoveries and no problems of intertribal or interpersonal competition, of regulations for imported and exported merchandise or dogma. The greater and closer the cooperation between linguists of the world, the vaster are the vistas of our science. Not only in the universe of languages, but also throughout the world of convergent development of bilateral diffusion. (Jakobson 1985 [1974]: 268)
Thus he ought to have said not that "there is no private property in language" but that "there is no private property in linguistics" (on any science for that matter).
From the very outset of his concern for phonemic problems, Bloomfield confronted the difference between the discreteness of phonemes and "the actual continuum of speech sound" and Saussure's opposition of langue/parole, and he found "explicit formulations" in Baudouin de Courtenay's Versuch einer Theorie der phonetischen Alternationen of 1895. From this book he also got the fruitful concept and term morpheme, coined by Daudouin. Upon the same label, likewise borrowed from Baudouin's terminology, French linguistic literature mistakenly imposed the meaning "affix". (Jakobson 1985 [1974]: 272)
I did not know that Jan Baudouin de Courtenay coined the morpheme. Apparently he did so in 1880.
In this paper of 1925 Weiss envisions a "compound multicellular type of organization" produced by language behavior, and he assigns to written language the rise of an even "more effective sensorimotor interchangeability between the living and the dead". Bloomfield's wide-scale outline of 1939, Linguistic Aspects of Science, with its numerous references to Weiss, picks up and develops this image: "Language bridges the gap between the individual nervous systems. Much as single cells are combined in a many-celled animal, separate persons are combined in a speech community. We may speak here, without metaphor, of a social organism." (Jakobson 1985 [1974]: 274)
Finding organicism in unexpected places.

Jakobson, Roman 1985 [1975]. The grammatical buildup of child language. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology, 1972-1982. Preface by Linda R. Waugh. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 141-147.

To be sure, important new observations have been made concerning children's beginning attempts and efforts to learn to communicate at pre-verbal age, and at the treshold of verbal exchange with their teacher, in particular their mother. (Jakobson 1985 [1975]: 141)
By way of a memo to myself I'll note that the term "nonverbal" very likely originated from either "pre-verbal" (e.g. Cooley 1909: 66). JSTOR destifies that the term "pre-verbal" was used only four times before 1910 - all of them in book reviews and one reviewing Cooley.

Jakobson, Roman 1985 [1979a]. Einstein and the science of language. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology, 1972-1982. Preface by Linda R. Waugh. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 254-264.

In accordance with Hadamard's proposal, I sketched, and he inserted into his study, my brief linguistic outlook of those days on the puzzle of wordless deliberations:
Signs are a necessary support of thought. For socialized thought (stage of communication) and for the thought which is being socialized (stage of formulation), the most usual system of signs is language properly called; but internal thought, especially when creative, willingly uses other systems of signs which are more flexible, less standardized than language and leave more liberty, more dynamism to creative thought. Amongst all these signs or symbols, one must distinguish between conventional signs, borrowed from social convention and, on the other hand, personal signs which, in their turn, can be subdivided into constant signs, belonging to general habits, to the individual pattern of the person considered and into episodical signs, which are established ad hoc and only participate in a single creative act.
At the very moment of sending his book to the printer, Hadamard received, as he states in a footnote, "a letter from Professor Einsten containing information of capital interest". This late "Testimonial" was adjoined to the volume as its second appendix. Both of us subjected the "circumstantial and thorough" answers of Einstein's message to a close examination and confronted his introspection wit hthe aforementioned linguistic summary. The innermost and nearly wordless character of Einstein's creative process was described in his replies to the questions about the kinds of signs that emerge in his mind when absorbed in scientific discoveries: "The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought." (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 255)
The similarity of Jacques Hadamard's "personal signs" to Charles Morris's "personal signs" is so similar and put forth at such an opportune time that is is quite likely that there is a direct influence between them. Hadamard's An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field is available on archive.org - check out pp. 96-97. // I was intending to check out the topic of "private signs" at a later date, perhaps when again discussing autocommunication, but as luck would have it, I found a possible source for Hadamard's distinction today! (while reading something that quoted Marty quoting Brentano.) In his overview of Brentano's view of the mind, Kevin Mulligan discloses the arguments of Geiger and Scheler that "affective phenomena, both episodic and enduring non-dispositional sentiments, may be unconscious" (Mulligan 2004: 90; italics added). I won't know the exact origin of Hadamard's distinction until I can (have the time to) read the relevant passages in his book, but this find does suggest a possible line of thought he was immersed in at the time.
As Einstein testified in the letter appended to Hadamard's book, "certain signs and more or less clear images" (italics added), the two kinds of "psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought", can be - already in this preverbal period - deliberately reiterated and reordered and thus become a personal repertory of significative devices. The question of joint repreduction and recombination indicates that the identification and rearrangement of components, or, in other terms, the complementary ideas of invariance and contextual variability, actually obsessed Einstein with regard to a prelinguistic, individually semiotic stage. For him, as he states in his "Testimonial", it was evident that the "desire to arrive finally at logically connected concepts in the emotional basis of this rather vague play wit hthe above mentioned elements". (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 256)
All of this sounds so very similar. Perhaps Jakobson himself has discussed this in less explicit terms? In any case, it's nice to know where Morris might have derived his concept of personal signs.
Three subjective factors - desire, emotion, and "pure intuition" - underlie Einstein's conception of creative thought as selective, assertive, and combinatory play. He repeated reference to "this rather vague play" is connected with his profession de foi launched at the conclusion of the same testimonial: "what you call full consciousness is a limit case which can never be fully accomplished." (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 256)
If possible, compare these to Marty's emotive, assertive and suggestive (and moreover, and again if possible, to Brentano's concomitant terms).
Similar evidence appears in "Conversations with Albert Einstein", recorded by the physicist R. S. Shankland: "When I read, I hear the words. Writing is different, and I communicate this way very badly." It is notable that in Einstein's case, as elucidated by Hadamard, the primordial element of usual thought, "before the words intervene", seem to be of the visual, as well as of the muscular, apparently gestigulatory type. (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 257)
Personally, I consider articulating difficult and communicate rather by writing. But I have the luxury of a keyboard and a Dvorak keyboard at that.
Winteler's dissertation, issued in 1876, displays a challenging methodological novelty and acuity in his approach to the sound system of languages, with his fundamental distinction between its "accidental features" (variations) and "essential properties" (invariants). But the author's theoretical fundamentals were received among academic bureaucrats with biased distrust. Hence the courageous seeker was doomed to sacrifice his far-sighted scientific plans for the gloomy lot of a lifelong, first active but early retired schoolmaster. (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 258)
It would be nice to find out whether Jakobson was influenced by Winteler himself, or if he discovered Winteler later and saw a parallel to his thinking. Mainly I'd like to know where the variant/invariant distinction originates from so that I could exclude Marty's "constructive inner form" and "outer linguistic form" from imputed origins.
In "Einstein's Theory of Relativity" as conceived by the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, "there exists only the unity of certain functional relations, whic hare differently designated according to the system of references in which we express them". (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 262)
Apparently in 1923 there appeared a book by Ernst Cassirer titled Substance and Function & Einstein's Theory of Relativity. (Also available on archive.org)
The appreciation of the relativity of the form of thought attempted by two of the most original American linguists, Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941), and in particular the former's direct reference to "the physical relativity of Einstein", offer another significant example of a daring linguistic initiative that purposely bordered upon Einstein's conceptual framework and upon the direct, albeit restrictive, question posed in Einstein's broadcast of 1941: "to what extent the same language meant the same mentality". Any impact necessarily implies not only similarities but also instructive cleavages of opinion. (Jakobson 1985 [1979a]: 262)
Relevant for the semiotic analysis of mentality. Whorf's position is known, Sapir's I'll get to, hopefully, but I'm curious as to how Mamardašvili and Pjatigorsky (would) answer this question.

Jakobson, Roman 1985 [1979c]. From Aljagrov's letters. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology, 1972-1982. Preface by Linda R. Waugh. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 358-361.

These included, in particular, his attempts at supraconscious poetry (zaumnaja poèzija) built of invented words. In literary history it was apparently the first endeavor to construct in this way longer, connected texts alien in their sounds and sequences to those of the given language and free of any inserted traces of verbal motivation such as references to dreams, zoological sound emissions, or machine noises. (Jakobson 1985 [1979c]: 357)
First explanation of zaum I meet in my readings.
Remember, you said that poetry is any sequence of letters in direct or inverted order, and called this a demonic or 'underground' point of view. (Jakobson 1985 [1979c]: 360)

Jakobson, Roman 1985 [1979b]. Toward the history of the Moscow Linguistic Circle. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VII: Contributions to Comparative Mythology. Studies in Linguistics and Philology, 1972-1982. Preface by Linda R. Waugh. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 279-282.

According to an early report of the first secretary of the MLC, G. O. Vinokur, the activity of the Circle consisted "both in adducing new materials and in the interpretation of old ones yet from a new standpoint". The work in the Circle had a laboratory character and ready-made academic lectures played a smaller role than debates where methods and approches were developed in a joint collective exchange of opinions. An important place in the Circle's activities was given to the summer expeditions of its members according to programs coordinated beforehand. (Jakobson 1985 [1979b]: 280)
This is what seminars would ideally consist of: not only revisiting old ideas but building new ones on top of the old.
The foundations of a phenomenology of language in the arresting treatment by Husserl's disciple G. G. Špet left a notable imprint on the development of MCL in its final period and provoked heated arguments about the place and limits of empiricism and about the role of semantics in the science of language. The probelms of "inner form" launched by Humboldt and the criteria of delimiting poetic and unusual language were among the points at issue. (Jakobson 1985 [1979b]: 281)
And now I have to check out Gustav Shpet.