Lévy-Bruhli arvustused

Kirkpatrick, Clifford 1936. Review of Promitives and the Supernatural by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 184: 243-244.

Professor Lévy-Bruhl has written another book in support of the thesis that the mental life of primitive peoples is totally different from our own. One feels, however, that There is something almost primitive in the way Professor Levy-Bruhl adheres to this thesis in the face of seemingly cogent criticisms. He argues that he must take facts that support his case out of their settings and from widely scattered tribes, because it is evidence of primitive mentality for which he is looking. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 243)

See on päris kena ümberpööramine. Umbes samamoodi võiks võtta Marie Poland Fish'i töö ja öelda, et there's something fishy about it. Kriitika ise on siin tegelikult huvitav, sest see osutab metodoloogilisele probleemile: kui sa uurid mentaliteeti, siis kas sa uurid kindla kultuuri mentaliteeti või, nagu Levy-Bruhl nähtavasti on teinud, primitiivset mentaliteeti kui sellist. Veel enam, siit jääb tegelikult mulje, et Lévy-Bruhlil oli kindel ettekujutus, mida primitiivne mentaliteet endast kujutas ja siis otsis fakte mis toetasid seda ettekujutust. Natukene tagurpidi töötamine.

Either Professor Levy-Bruhl is selecting his evidence according to the much discredited comparative method, or he is using the word "primitive" in a vague and mystical sense which does no credit to the Aristotelian logic which supposedly renders the primitive mind incomprehensible. If the term "primitive" be regarded as identical with the term "preliterate" as used by Faris, the problem is greatly clarified. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 243)

Nii võib tõepoolest olla, aga kuna mõiste "primitiivne" hüljati antropoloogia poolt juba ammu ja ma ei ole sel teemal ise midagi lugenud siis on raske öelda, kas preliterate ikkagi on primitiivne. Võib-olla primitiivne kirjaoskuse seisukohast, aga see oleks ehk samaväärne lausungiga "rahvastel, kel pole kirja, on vähe arenenud kiri".

There is infinitely less pragmatic justification for the collection, since there is no attempt at analysis in terms of mental association or imperatives of group living. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 244)

Vaimsed seosed on juba päris hea mõiste, aga kuidas neid analüüsida? Semiootikuna tahaks öelda, et sümbolite kaudu.

There is hardly an example cited in the book which could not be paralleled in the superstitions of Western European culture, in the mental processes of children, and in the delusions of the insane. Even the superstitions and practices of American college students, Aristotelian logic notwithstanding, bear a striking resemblance to those of preliterates. There is reason to think that the human mind the word over has components which are infantile, emotionalized, and autistic. The anxious gut, the vivid imagination, and the helter-skelter interplay of associated ideas undisciplined by formal categories of causality and objectivity are fundamental human traits. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 244)

See näib tõepoolest tõenäoline. Infantile on samas mitte ainult lapsik, aga infantia on ka kõneoskamatu (Sprachlose). Nii inatiilne, emotsionaliseeritud kui ka autistlik näivad selles võtmes olevat rohkem või vähem seotud mitteverbaalsusega. Need omadused on omased kõigile inimestele enne kui nad õpivad rahustama oma kõhtu, hoidma kujutlusvõimet vaos ja distsiplineerima ideede seostumist põhjuslikkuse ja objektiivsuse kategooriatega. Samas, on see vajalik? Kunstiinimesed näivad just sellisest "primitiivsusest" midagi positiivset loovat.

Benedict, Ruth 1928. Review of L'âme primitive by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. The Journal of Philosophy 25(26): 717-719.

The "soul" here considered is not a religious concept, but the spirit of man, its relation to the social conventions of the group, its boundaries of personality, its fate at death. (Benedict 1928: 717)

X rahva hing. (Supraindividuaalne) hing on selles tähenduses vististi võrdväärdne rahvusliku karakteri või iseloomuga.

In contrast to his two preceding books, Prefessor Lévy-Bruhl no longer insists on the contrast between the "completely rational" motivations of our own civilization and the pre-rational theories and representations of the primitive. Nor is he using as formerly his favorite term of "collective representations" for which "cultural traits" seems to be by this time a more definitive designation and in wider use. (Benedict 1928: 718)

Ka Eesti "kehakeel" moodustub sisuliselt "eel-ratsionaalsetest teooriatest ja representatsioonidest", aga ratsionaalsuse aspekt on siiski vaieldav (või on asi selles, et ma ei tea täpselt mida ratsionaalsus endast kujutab). Mõistete asendumine viitab ilmselt antropoloogia arengule, niiet "kollektiivsetest representatsioonidest" kindlamaks ja laiemalt kasutatud tähistuseks osutub "kultuurijoon" (või "kultuuriline tunnus").

Professor Lévy-Bruhl in all his books has cleared the way for further research by his insistence on the irrationality of human procedure, and in his latest book it is noteworthy that he has further contributed by omitting our own civilization as the shining exception to this rule. (Benedict 1928: 719)

Märksõna: etnotsentrism. "Teised on irratsionaalsed, meie oleme ratsionaalsed." Selle hoiaku oleme õnneks ületanud. Nüüd on ülesandeks pigem oma kultuuri irratsionaalsuste uurimine, aga siin kerkib metodoloogia probleem jälle esile, sest kuidas uurida ennast? Enda suhtes ollakse ju poolpime (inimene pidavat ennast peeglist vaadates end kuus korda nägusamana nägema kui teised), st oma kultuuri irratsionaalsusi on raske täheldada, sest see tundub "loomulik".

Wright, William Kelley 1923. Review of La mentalité primitive by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. The Philosophical Review 32(4): 419-421.

The words 'savage' and 'primitive' are used more or less interchangeably in accordance with popular custom; no thesis is based on such an identification. Nor does the author intend to imply that savages have a common mentality is specific details. 'La mentalité primitive' is simply employed as a conventient term to designate certain mental traits which are common among savages and are much rarer among civilized men; the term has only this abstract significance. The author's positions clearly imply that wherever there are differences in custom and environment in the savage world, mental traits vary correspondingly; and he would probably be the first to insist that future ethnographic research will disclose variations in mental traits. (Wright 1923: 419)

Jälle: vaimsed jooned, kalduvused või tunnused. Abstraktne tõepoolest.

In calling savage mentality 'prelogical' Professor Lévy-Bruhl now makes it clear that he does not claim that savages are wholly incapable of reasoning as we do, nor that they have defective memories and torpid intellects. They neglects our methods of observation and inference because they are indifferent to them. This indifference is accounted for by their very different mental habits in consequence of their peculiar social conditions and customs. (Wright 1923: 419)

Metslased on "tsiviliseeritud inimeste" ratsionaalsuse ja loogika suhtes ükskõiksed. (Mul on midagi ühist metslastega!) Seda ükskõiksust selgitab erinevus vaimsetes harjumustes mis tulenevad omapärastest/kummalistest ühiskondlikest tingimustest ja tavadest/kommetest.

Living, thinking, feeling, moving, and acting in a world of collective representations so different from our mental outlook, savages are convinced that the events of most concern to themselves are primarily caused by "mystical and invisible powers." For instance, what we should call the couse of a death - the thrust of a spear, the bite of a crocodile, or the action of a poison - is to the savage a phenomenon of little moment. The real cause is the action of an "invisible power" probably set into motion by a sorcerer. (Wright 1923: 420)

Vaimne väljavaade! Ma peaksin hakkama kogume erinevaid mentaliteedi-mõisteid. Mida saab teha kollektiivsete representatsioonide (kultuuri) maailmas? Elada, mõelda, tunda, liikuda ja tegutseda. Jääb mulje, et kõik eelnimetatud kuuluvad kultuuri valdkonda. Mis puudutab metslaste ebaloogilist maailmavaadet kus tegutsevad "müstilised ja nähtamatud jõud" ei ole väga erinev meie omast. Vähemalt akadeemilises kontekstis võib jääda mulje, et paljud teoreetikud on reaalsusest peaaegu täielikult irdunud ja elavad müstilises ja nähtamatus maailmas kus võim, diskursus, sugu, patriarhia, ideoloogia, vms kontseptsioon toimib sortsi rollis.

But for savage mentality, causes (impersonal and invisible powers) are often extra-temporal and extra-spatial and effect action at a distance. The effect is a visible phenomenon definitely located in a particular spot at a particular time; the cause of this effect is invisible, mystical, extra-spatial, and extra-temporal. Neither space nor time is homogeneous; nor are they necessary media for causal action (Chap. II). For pre-logical mentality what is seen in a dream is real; the evidence afforded by a dream is often preferred to that of a witness; an agent is often held responsible for acts done in his own dreams and in those of others; a person can be in two places at the same time (Chap. III). (Wright 1923: 420)

Hm. Mu tüdruksõber oli metslane! Unenägude reaalsuse kohta kirjutasid hilisemad antropoloogid rohkem ja idee oli unenägude struktuuri kaudu mõtestada hõimu terve kultuuri struktuuri. Siinne toon on "oh, need rumalad metslased, millises kummalises ja lapsikus maailmas nad elavad", aga neid kirjeldusi lugedes tahaks küsida, et kas selline maailm ei ole mitte ihaldusväärne? Olla jälle laps ja näha sündmistu tegelike, argieluliste ja morjendavate põhjuste taga müstilisi jõude? Miks ma eksamil läbi kukkusin? Kuri haridusvaim pani minu peale loitsu!

[...] a favourable omen guarantees success (p. 131); for it is not merely a sign (signe) but a cause, or rather sign and cause are indistinguishable (p. 143). (Wright 1923: 420)

Mingis mõttes ongi. Ettekuulutus võib olla self-fulfilling prophecy. Õppejõud ütles: "Ah, sul läheb hästi." väga usaldusväärse ilme ja tooniga ja sooritadki eksami hästi. Õppejõud on muidugi liiga isikustatud. Nägin unenäos, et läks hästi...

This book is professedly merely an anthropological study; it does not go into questions of logic and metaphysics. However, the significance of Professor Lévy-Bruhl's views for these subjects is most important. If his contentions are sound - and they are supported by vast erudition and a great wealth of empirical evidence - it follows that the Kantian view must be abandoned that space and time and the categories (in the forms that we know them at least) are constitutive of all human thought and experience. In the light of this book, pragmatists may urge that space, time, the Kantian categories, and perhaps even the very laws of identity and contradiction themselves, are tools of thought, 'hypotheses,' that have gradually emerged into human consciousness from a cultural level in which they either were not present in the forms that we know them, or at any rate were ignored in favor of other categories such as the 'law of participation, which among us only persist in mystical religious doctrines, superstitions, and toher 'survivals.' In the opinion of the reviewer, such considerations do not prove that categories are wholly subjective or capricious; they are human devices by which men have sought to adjust themselves to the independent physical environment. Our categories have gradually supplanted those of primitive man because they have been found to effect this adjustment more successfully. (Wright 1923: 420-421)

Kõlab päris usutavalt. Samas ei tea ma jällegi Kanti kategooriatest peaaegu, et mitte midagi. Küll aga usun, et nö "mõtte-tööriistad" on kultuurilised. Eks näeb kas mentaalsuse semiootika puudutab seda või mitte.

Kofoid, Charles A. 1937. Review of Primitives and the Supernatural by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Isis 27(1): 104-105.

It is well organized and skillfully related presentation of the primitives' unreal world, which to their untutored minds is capricious, unpredictable, unstable, and terrifying. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

See on öeldud justkui tsiviliseeritud inimene, või vähemalt kindlat tüüpi või kindlas olukorras tsiviliseeritud inimene, ei võiks kogeda maailma sarnaselt "ebareaalsena".

The communal life of the primitives is profoundly influenced and organized by this fear of the unseen. The whole social group combines in ceremonies, dances, masques, songs, rhythm, and music, in collective ecstasis in propitiation of the unseen powers. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

Siin on väärtuslik see sõnastus, fear of the unseen. Nimelt näen ma võimalust arutada selle vastanduse, fear of the seen, kaudu ühte nüanssi nö "mitteverbaalse eetika" juures. Eriti seostub see Batesoni tähelepanekuga, et meile ei meeldi kui meie käitumist sõnades kirjeldatakse ja, et kultuurist sõltub see kui väga meeldib või sobib inimestele, et neid vaadatakse. (Bateson väitis siinkohal, et tema-aegsetele Ameeriklastele ei meeldinud, kui vaadati nende jalgu, sest need paljastasid liiga palju informatsiooni.) Selle vastaskülg on see, kui palju tahetakse näha. On olukordi milles me "vaatame kõrvale" või "pöörame pilgu". Selle jaoks võib muidugi olla erinevaid põhjusi, nt vestlemise ajal vaadatakse kõrvale, sest ilma teisele otsa vaatamata on kergem mõttetööga tegeleda (Argyle uuris selle välja), aga on ka muid võimalusi millest nii mõndagi saab kahtlemata ka eetikaga (niivõrd lõdvas tähenduses kui see ka ei oleks siinkohal mõeldud) seostada. Igaks juhuks täägin: #nonverbal ethics.

These same mysterious misfortunes and all others lead the primitives to seek a source nearer to hand than the unseen powers and to attribute magical powers to members of the immediate society, to the witch, the sorcerer, or the evil eye of man, or even to plants, animals, or inanimate objects. Witchcraft is thus the creation of the affective category of the supernatural. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

"Hohoho, küll nad on ikka primitiivsed," aga kuri silm, niivõrd metafooriline kui ta ka ei ole, on päris. St kui keegi vaatab sulle hirmuäratava grimassiga otsa, veel enam, jälitab sind pilguga, väljendades seeläbi ähvardust ja nö malicious intent'i, siis see võib täiesti vabalt päeva ära rikkuda. Ka vastupidine on muidugi tõsi - jalutad tänaval ja keegi mööduja naeratab sulle nii soojalt, et endal tuleb ka tahtmatult nägu naerule. Mimees.

Ames, E. S. 1926. Review of Primitive Mentality by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. International Journal of Ethics 36(4): 429-430.

The method is that of selecting certain categories - such as the native's limitation to perceptual rather than conceptual experience, his restriction to a small number of objects, his indifference to secondary causes, his unreserved belief in mystic and invisible forces - and then illustarting these from various peoples. (Ames 1926: 429)

Võib juhtuda ka vastupidine, et tajukogemuse asemel põhinetakse "kontseptuaalsetel kogemustel". Nii võib minu arvates juhtuda teoreetikuga kes hakkab oma teooriatesse uskuma nii väga, et vastukäiv tajukogemus jääb märkamata.

It is not concerned with the life of one people, but rather with the lower levels of culture as manifest in several regions. (Ames 1926: 429)

Mis on need madalamad tasandid? Mille poolest on nad madalamad? Mille suhtes on nad madalamad?

The final impression, however, is that the author is right in his insistence that the primitives live and move in a radically different system of ideas and emotions from those of civilized man. (Ames 1926: 429)

Ideede osa on arusaadav, aga emotsioonide osa on universaalsete emotsioonide valguses kaheldav.

Moreover, the dead are not dead in the sense of being without animation. Apparently they live as long as they are remembered. A great chief thus lives longer than a common man because the rites and stories concerning him may be longer maintained. (Ames 1926: 430)

Kas selles pole mitte tõetera? Öeldakse, et surnud elavad mälestustes edasi. Seda enam, et kirjasõna võimaldab meil "suhelda" surnutega - ka selle arvustuse autor ei ole enam tõenäoliselt elavate kirjas, aga tema arvamus elab edasi.

An old fishing net, full of holes, which has been used successfully to catch fish is better than an unbroken one which has never been used successfully. (Ames 1926: 430)

Irratsionaalne! Uuem on alati parem! Isegi kui vana endiselt töötab, uuem on alati parem. (Buy) new shit, or fix what I have temaatika.

White doctors, after treating sick natives for weeks, have found that the natives expected the doctors to make them presents. It was a great inconvenience to be in bed so long, and the doctor brought in all sorts of alien influences. (Ames 1926: 430)

Jällegi tõsi. Võõral inimesel on alati võõras mõju. Ma kujutan ette, et kingitusel on siin tegelikult faatiline funktsioon - maandada pingeid, justkui öelda "ma olen nagu sina"; või Batesoni μ funktsiooni kasutada, siis kingitus teadvustab, et on suhe ja see suhe on positiivne (meeldiv ja kasulik - mitte ainult praktiline, Lääne arsti seisukohalt).

Lenoir, Raymond 1939. Review of L'expérience mystique et les symboles chez les primitifs by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. American Journal of Sociology 44(4): 580-582.

For the primitive mind the data or evidences for this kind of experience are provided by such phenomena as chance, play or circumstance, unusual occurrences, dreams, relations between the living and the dead, and the visions from the world of the invisible. This reality, always present yet occult, is apprehended symbolically. But by imagined and dramatized participation in it, these symbols become the medium for the magical operations. (Lenoir 1939: 580)

Lugu on üsna sarnane meie kultuuri sümbooliliste faktidega. Võim, sugu, ideoloogia jne on kõikjalviibivad, aga sümbolite vahendusel tajutav.

Sometimes it is localized in time and space; sometimes it lingers in a diffuse and vague state in the mythical world which is not confined by laws of time; or sometimes in the mystic realms. (Lenoir 1939: 580)

Huvitav kas internetti saaks kirjeldada samalaadselt. "Lugesin internetist..." - "Lugesid kust?" - "Ööm, õhus ja juhtmete kaudu liikuvatest andmevoogudest." - "Jaa, jaa."

But do not mental concepts correspond to social functions established by the societies of antiquity? The contrast between certainty and doubt, life and death, wakefulness and dream life, luck and skill, all so familiar to the Greeks, testifies to the intimate dependence persisting between concepts of thought and the objects of perception. A social organization, more or less closely knit according to its degree of concentration, includes both work and play activities, which are a mild form of conflict that creates the sanction for inequalities of power, of talents, and of personal quality. Such a society then produces the subject matter of its visions from its collective imagination, although the interpretations are supplied by the dreamers themselves. (Lenoir 1939: 581)

Vaimsed kontseptid (As opposed to what? Physical concepts?). Kontseptsioonide ja ühiskondlike funktsioonide kohtumine on samas üks selliseid kokkupuutepunkte mille kaudu saab kehakeele ja mentaalsuse ühildamist katsetada. St kehalised käitumised mängiksid siin tajuobjektide (objects of perception) rolli. Võib isegi järele katsuda väidet, et käitumise tõlgendamisel usaldatakse ennekõike kollektiivseid kujutlusi.

Magic acts represent their sentiments and demands in simplified and conventionalized forms that accompany the overt gestures. Such manipulation juxtaposes a series of dramatized gestures with the chant, of which it is an expression, in order to communicate the meaning of otherwise unintelligible words. This recognition of similarities is indeed a very old conception. Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato employ it to explain sensation and even thought. In the societies in which the power of abstraction is only moderately developed. and does not therefore stifle empirical observation, such "analogies" reveal so strikingly these empirical similarities that they cannot but act as a stimulus to thought and to mental development. It imputes to colors and forms the ability to express the unknown, thereby creating enduring emotions and constituting for the senses a significant language. The symbol, therefore, remains as it had already been defined by Kant in his Critique of Judgment, namely, a representation based on analogy, containing nothing that pertains to the intuition of the object, and consisting only in the affective reaction to it. (Lenoir 1939: 581-582)

Sümboli ja anoloogi seost sellisel viisil kohtan esmakordselt. Selle märkuse juurde tasub tagasi pöörduda kui olen sümbolist teadlikum.

Benedict, Ruth 1925. Review of Primitive Mentality by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Journal of Social Forces 3(3): 557-558.

Professor Levy-Bruhl has attempted this very thing. But for him the moral points all all in one special direction; he has given himself at the outset to the "world of difference that lies between primitive mentality and our own"; a difference summed up in the inability of savages to attain the completely logical motivations, the habits of thought that "proceed by general abstract ideas," the orderly and intelligible notion of things, that we boast in our white civilization. Even in 1910 when Professor Levy-Bruhl published his first book elaborating this point of view, there were those who felt chagrined at the boast; now after thirteen years that have included the war and "reconstruction," it seems an echo from the complacency of a no-longer-existing world. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Jääb mulje, et "tsiviliseeritud" inimese loogilisus osutus sotsiaalseks konstruktsiooniks mis Maailmasõjas varises kokku.

The book is entirely untroubled by skepticism as to the rationality of modern behavior. It accumulates great stores of evidence to show the disapprobation and sense of ill-omen that are occasioned in primitive society by uncustomary behavior. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Jätkub, et Levy-Bruhl ei kahelnud hetkekski, et tema tsivilisatsioon on loogiline. Ebahariliku käitumise pidamine halvaks endeks ei ole küll midagi väga märkimisväärset. Kui Toomas Nipernaadi toob Habahanneselt kaasa Kudisilmale andmiseks mullika ja Lokile kleite siis raputab Kudisilm pead ja pomiseb omaette: "Ega see hääd tähenda, ega see tõesti hääd tähenda!" (Gailit 1928: 36).

The assumption is everywhere implicit that all the acts and beliefs of modern Europeans have been built up from the beginning on a basis of dispassionate investigation and scrupulous logic.
And yet the materal gathered in this book is of interest from an almost opposite point of view. It is not the differences between primitive mentality and our own that the citations convey; it is the sameness. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Täpselt sama mõju on tekitanud minus need arvustused. Viisid kuidas need "metslased" meile sarnanevad torkavad rohkem silma.

But the essential difference between them and us is not the difference between perfect logic and the lack of logic. It is our complete familiarity with out own culture which makes all its familiar concepts "natural" and "logical" to us, while those of all other civilizations seem, in the terminology of this book, "prelogical." (Benedict 1925: 558)

Lõpuks ütleb üks arvustaja ka selle välja.

Reichard, Gladys A. 1936. Review of La mythologie primitive: Le Monde Mythique des Australiens et des Papous by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. American Anthropologist 38(2): 329-330.

We could cite many examples from our own society in which Levy-Bruhl's concept of participation is illustrated. A locomotive engineer may so thoroughly identify himself with his engine that his whole life is void if circumstances require that he give it up. He treats it like a person and even refers to it as "she." I have seen people pat an automobile as they would a horse or dog. (Reichard 1936: 330)

Viimaks ka näide.

The study of culture as well as of psychology has tought us that the two are so intimately interrelated that they can never be entirely separated. Levy-Bruhl's treatise implies that they can. (Reichard 1936: 330)

Kena.