Human Conduct

Herbert Blumer - George Herbert Mead and Human Conduct. Altamira Press, 2004. 218 lk

Sain vihje, et George Herbert Meadi kirjutisi tasub lugeda ja asusin otsinguile. Hoobilt leidsin hoopis Herbert Blumeri raamatu ja lugesin sissejuhatusena Meadi töösse selle läbi. Blumer tõlgendas Meadi kirjutisi terve oma akadeemilise karjääri ja arendas välja sellise asja nagu symbolic interactionism, mis sisuliselt ütleb, et iga sisendi ja väljundi vahel on tõlgendamine. Sisaldab palju keerulist mõtisklemist just sel teemal, mida ma pean oma uurimustöös lahkama... Aga minu jaoks praegu veel liiga keeruline, et kõigest kasulikust aru saaksin. Pool raamatust on sotsiaalfilosoofiline jutt objektist, subjektist, sotsiaalsest vahekorrast jne ja ülejäänu on Meadi puudutav kirjavahetus Herbert Blumeri ja teiste sotsiaalteadlaste vahel. Vähemasti teoreetiline osa vajab taaskülastamist siis, kui olen kas Meadi enda tekste lugenud või saanud parema arusaama sellest, mida Meadi terminoloogia sisaldab ja mida mul Meadilt täpselt vaja on. Seniks jätan siia mõned paeluvamad katkendid:

Because they cast the actor in a passive role, Blumer also rejected cultural, social, biological, and environmental determinism, as well as related instinct and behaviorist theories of human action. He accepted the idea of the inseparability and codetermination of the organism and the environment, the actor and the social world, the knower and what is known and, therefore, found no value in theories that disregard the distinctly human process of interpretation and people's ongoing reflective adjustment to the world.

The symbolic interactionists view social interaction as primarily a communicative process in which ... a person responds not to what another individual says or does, but to the meaning of what he says or does. Their view, consequently, might be regarded as inserting a middle term of interpretation into the stimulus-response couplet so that it becomes stimulus-interpretation-response. (Blumer 1937a, 171)

Blumer wrestled with issues in mead's perspective throughout his entire scholarly career. During more than a half century of active scholarship, he engaged in a variety of debates over his interpretations of the relevance of Mead's ideas for developing the theoretical and methodological position of symbolic interactionism.

In accordance with Mead’s scheme of analysis, we pick out in each instance two basic factors - an indication, made by the first person to the second person, and an interpretation of the indication, made by the second person, and an interpretation of the indication, made by the second person. For example, the robber’s command, "Put up your hands," indicates the type of action the victim is called on to perform; confronted with this command, the victim has to interpret the command (i.e., ascertain its meaning) in order to respond effectively. "Indication" and "interpretation" are the two basic components of symbolic interaction. Indication is the presentation of a meaningful gesture; interpretation is the determination of the meaning of the gesture.

Mead's treatment, accordingly, is to locate the source of the meaning of an object in the way in which one is prepared to act toward it. He declares that the features of definition characteristics that make any object what it is arise only out of the kind of action one is prepared to direct toward the object and the kind of experiences that action would yield if it were carried out.

Scrutiny of any act will show that human beings are engaged in a running sequence o f making notations to themselves of details of their action, of aspects of their own condition, of features of their situation, and of prospects of their action as they project it forward in their imagination in terms of what they might do. T h e act falls inside the process of self-indication. As a consequence, it takes on the character of being forged o r constructed by individuals on the basis of what they note, take into account, evaluate, and decide. It is highly important to recognize that in the process of building up our act, we are acting back on ourselves or, more properly put, we are acting toward those aspects of our act that we note and take into account. In noting any aspect of our developing act, we are making an object of it, defining it, and using our definition of it to guide the formation of the remaining part of the act. Thus, when noting the "motive" of our act, such as our hunger, we are in the position to make a given object of it or define it in different ways; we may view it as something to be satisfied immediately; something to be held in abeyance, suppressed, or ignored; something before which we are helpless; or something to be nursed along or transformed.