Augustine On Lying

Gramigna, Remo 2011. Augustine On Lying: A Semiotic Analysis. University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. Master's Thesis

Augustine lifted up the discussion of lying from an ontological paradigm that dominated in Greek culture and that tackled the problem of lying within the frame of objective falsehoods, to the metalevel of the interpreter's beliefs and intentionality. The latter is thus conceived as a conscious performer that willingly uses a deceptive mode of signification, that is, making use of signs in order to deceive. As it will be argued in what follows, the current study suggests a semiotic reading of Augustine's theory of lying for it envisages lying as an intentional act performed by an agent by means of signs with the specific purpose of misleading others. 'Agency' is hereby conceived as the capacity of an agent to act in the world. Suffice to note, for the present, that lying always entails the usage of signs by an interpreter in order to deceive someone else. The nature of these signs will be clarified in the course of the present analysis.
Belief and intentionality are key terms in the conceptualization of the phenomenon of lying in an Augustinian fashion. As we shall see in what follows, Augustine points out that the characteristics of the lie are the split between thought and speech in the signification of the lie and the intention to deceive. The liar's mode of signification is mis-informative and his discourse is the manipulation of the dupe's beliefs and knowledge. (Gramigna 2011: 8)

Samal leheküljel on öeldud, et kuigi Augustinus mõtles esmajärgus verbaalseid märke, saab tema proto-semiootilist märgiteooriat rakendada ka mitteverbaalsetele märkidele. Näiteid sellest (tähendusest raseda vaikuse või žestidega valetamisest) leidis Gramina järgnevatest töödest:
Colish, Marcia L. 1978. St. Augustine's rhetoric of silence revisited. Augustinian Studies 9: 15-24
Genosko, Gary 1995: 92-94. Augustine gives us the finger. Semiotica 104 (1/2): 81-97.

Eristus valetamise ja petmise vahel:

The demarcaion between humanities and hard sciences in the treatment of lying seems to have produced also a demarcation in terminology concending that lying is a human feature whereas deception may also occur in the animal kingdom. I hereby refer to the terminological distinction between 'lying' and 'deception'. However, the abovementioned separation seems to be problematic and there is no general agreement upon it. (Gramigna 2011: 13)

The potentiality of semiosis and communication available for interpreters of a given community is provided by shared conventional sign systems - natural langauge for instance. The liar exploits this potentiality by possibilities of communication in order to pursue his deceptive goals, that is, to model the dupe's beliefs according to a pattern that the liar himself is aware to be false. To sum up, lying entails duplicitous signification, conceived as split between inner thought and outwards manifested signs. (Gramigna 2011: 33)

Lk 38 leidsin midagi, mis tuli ähmaselt tuttav ette siit: Jumal ei vaja inimesega suhtlemiseks sõnu, sest Jumal on cordis inspector, tähendab, Jumalal on võime vaadelda inimeste sisemust. See pani mind mõtlema, et "Jumal kõneleb kehakeelt". See tähendab, Jumal rakendab intersubjektiivset suhtlemist intrapersonaalsel tasandil (Rueschi terminites). See meikib senssi seniks kuni palvetamine on vajalik vaid selleks, et Jumalal oleks "empiirilist materjali" ehk afektiivseid kehalisi seisundeid, mille arvelt analüüsida "hinge puhtust". Teisalt on selline mõttekäik jabur, sest kui inimene usub südamest, et ta kuriteod olid heateod, siis sama mõistaks ka Jumal.

Before turning to the consideration of the intent to deceive, another point ought to be made. As indicated above, Chisholm and Feeham posed a distinction between lying and other species of deception on the basis of the concept of assertion. To make matters more clear, the authors refer to a specific aspect of deception reported by Emmanuel Kant. In this example, a man may feign to be about to leave on a trip by simply packing his luggage. In other words, the man pretends to be leaving by showing by signs of his behaviour (packing his luggage) because he wants someone else to assume that he is actually leaving. This example goes under the rubric of simulation and in particular under the strategies of "pretending". At this poing deceiving as such can be separated from the intent to assert a falsehood, which is proper to the lie. (Gramigna 2011: 44)

Kokkuvõttes põhjalik töö. Greimas, Pelc, Morris, Ekman jne olid kenasti esindatud. Lõppude lõpuks oli see semiootiline lähenemine Augustinuse valetamisteooriale, mitte Augustinuse märgiteooria seisukohaast valetamisele lähenemine. Palju läks ilmselt kaduma selle tõttu, et mind ei huvita praegu valetamine. Mõtlema jäin selle üle, et valetamine on üks pettuse vormidest. Meeldis, et töö oli sidus ja üksikasjalik. Muidu poleks tähele pannudki, aga kellegi proseminaritööga võrreldes oli see magistritöö tõesti hästi kirjutatud ja vormistatud.

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