Free to protest

Sajó, András (ed.) 2009. Free to protest: constituent power and street demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing.

Győrfi, Tamás 2009. The Importance of Freedom of Assembly: Three Models of Justification. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 1-15.
The emergence of modern mass media overvalues the improtance of symbolic conduct in itself. As I quoted Justice Jackson earlier: "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas." Although this proposition was true even in 1943, it gives a particularly apt characterization of present-day media-driven political discourse, where modern means of mass communication multiply the effectiveness of these kinds of messages.
Moreover, this same fact - that is, the change in the channels of communication - made it possible for political candidates to address their constitutents directly, without the mediation of parti organizations. This latter fact is responsible, to a great extent, for the personalization of electoral choice. People increasingly vote for persons instead of party platforms, and the personal qualities of candidates have become an important factor in political competition. Thus, the participants of modern mass demonstrations have a dual role. They are not only the direct addressees of the candidate's message, but also part of that message. As András Sajó writes, "the crowd symbolizes itself." In brief, the changes in representative government, as sketched above, have made mass demonstrations a particularly effective way of communication. (Győrfi 2009: 9)
Ka MVS oskus kuulub "isiklike omaduste" hulka. See, et valitakse isikuid, mitte parteiplatvorme, on näiteks Obama kandidatuuri puhul väga ilmne.

Iancu, Bogdan 2009. Balancing Emotionalism: Contemporary Implicatons of the Impact of Street Demonstrations on Third-Party Interests. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 17-40.
Madison's response, with his general denunciation of "founding [...] political calculations on arithmetical principles" and an evident distrust of crowds ("the confusion and intemperance of a multitude") strikes, on cursory reading, a vaguely Burkean chord. Yet, his uneasiness with masses is not the latter's patrician contempt for the "swinish multitude." Neither is the relates suspicion of "political arithmetic" prompted by aristocratic tradition-related concerns. After all, as readers had gleaned from the very first paragraph of The Federalist, it was for the people of America alone to prove whether "societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice."
The tenor of the argument is egalitarian and rational in the best tradition of classical constitutionalism. His foundational premise is that any large aggregation of individuals - "of whatever characters composed" - is by its very nature unstable and volatile, since collectivities are likely to be dominated by emotions and swayed by passions and sentiments rather than guided by reason and interest. They are, that is to say, prone to collective irrationality. (Iancu 2009: 18)
Konrad Lorenz pajatab samal toonil kuidas ta ise on vältinud mässe, sest teab ette, et ta võib massi hulgas kaotada oma isesuse.
After an initial 1986 split decision, a majority of the Constitutional Court declared the interpretation of Section 240, extending the term "force" to apply to mere physical presence (passive behavior), incompatible with the prohibition on analogy derived from the principle of certainty in defining the elements of crime, as contained in Article 103(2) of the Basic Law. Article 8 of the Basic Law was not directly involved in this analysis, since the judges did not discuss the "reprehensibility" element, and thus the relation between the means (blockade) and the goal of the action (politicla protest). Directly relevant to our present concerns, both decisions stressed that, whereas a sit-down blockade is a form of assembly, the constitutional leeway accorded to legislative restrictions would in such cases be very considerable.
In the 1986 decition, the contention of the petitioners that any demonstration produces a certain hinderance to the public was met with the argument that justifiable obstruction could only constitute reasonable and socially tolerable side effects, rather than the very means by which a message is advanced. This condition would not be met in cases where the obstruction is "actually intended in order to increase attention for the demonstration's concerns." In such situations, third parties are objectified, used as instruments by the protesters in order to bring their message across: "[T]he Basic Law offers wide scope for exerting an influence publicly, but [...] nobody is permitted to increase public attention through direct and intentional obstruction." One of the arguments of the petitioners was that the sit-downs should have been considered constitutionally protected forms of civil disobedience. But civil disobedience, responded the Court, could not represent "the exertion of a dramatic influence on the formation of public opinion." (Iancu 2009: 38)

Gargarella, Roberto 2009. A Dialogue on Law and Social Protests. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 61-86.
...certain conducts should not be penalized even if they affect certain individual interests, as long as they do not substantially affect social relationships... (Gargarella 2009: 64)
He also made references to "certain corrupt leaders, who usually hide their faces, and organize paid manifestations in order to carry out their sinister goals." Similarly, in the Alais decision, Justice Riggi criticized the fact that the protesters "hid their faces" behind bandannas. In his opinion, "those who hide their face [...] do so with the obvious purpose of avoiding the consequences that follow from their behavior." The latter has been a common line among opinion-makers in Argentina, who think that the fact that many protesters covered their faces with bandannas made it clear that protesters were not pursuing legitimate goals. In addition, it seems hard to deny that the protester's group, which is vast and heterogeneous, includes many corrupt leaders who colloborate with either the government or the opposition and people who participate in demonstrations only in exchange for food or clothing. For that reason, so many judges and academics came to affirm that the picketers represented, in fact, merely the 'iron arm' of particular interest groups. (Gargarella 2009: 70)
Näo varjamine demonstratsioonil. Vt. Roy Strideri õigustusi (salapolitsei ja skinheadid pildistavad ja katalogiseerivad demonstreerijate isikuid, et hiljem rünnata).
In the US,, courts have normally denied constitutional protection to demonstrations that engage in violence. It has also been very common to explore the distinction between 'pure speech,' which would refer to writings and leaflets, for example, and 'plus speech,' which would refer to pickets, parades, etc. The distinction was normally used to protect speech while leaving the 'plus' unprotected. (Gargarella 2009: 72)
To start with, one could reject the 'neat dichotomy' between 'pure speech' and 'plus speech' sometimes advanced by Supreme Court Justice. Like Harry Kalven, one could suggest that "all speech is necessarily 'plus speech.' If it is oral, it is noise and many interrupt someone else; if it is written, it may be litter." Leaflets, in this respect, are not "simply litter." They are "litter with ideas." And this is why we need to make an effort to pay attention to the message at play. (Gargarella 2009: 73)

Smilov, Daniel 2009. The Power of Assembled People: The Right to Assembly and Political Representation. Free to Protest: Constituent Power and Street Demonstration. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 87-104.
...expression requiring the physical presence of the individual in public places. Because of this emphasis on body language, the right to assembly has a performative element to its nature, and as such is the foundation of the theater of politics. In politics, as in other areas of social life, theater has long given way to other artistic forms: most notably the cinema and television. This transformation has affected the status of the right to assembly understood as the right to individual physical presence: it has shifted the focus towards virtual physical presence. In other words, nowadays it is more important for an individual to make an impression as physically present somewhere than to be really present in that place. To sum up, from and individual point of view, the right to assembly empowers the individual to make a statement through physical presence, although virtual presence might be really all that is needed. (Smilov 2009: 88)
These are the leaders who assemble the people without the mediation of the traditional political parties. They achieve this through their personal charisma or through appeals to issues such as nationalism, identity, personal integrity, and public morality - issues which appeal to everybody regardless of their party affiliation or ideological bend. (Smilov 2009: 92)
Definition of a political leader.


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