Sociosemiotic readings

Bourdieu, Pierre 1990 [1980]. Structures, Habitus, Practices. The logic of practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 52-65

The theory of practice as practice insists, contrary to positivist materialism, that the objects of knowledge are constructed, not passivelt recorded, and, contrary to intellectualist idealism, that the principle of this construction is the sysctem of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions. It is possible to step down from the sovereign viewpoint from which objectivist idealism orders the world, as Marx demands in the Theses on Feuerbach, but without having to abandon to it the 'active aspects' of apprehension of the world by reducing knowledge to a mere recording. To do this, one has to situate oneself within 'real activity as such', that is, in the practical relation to the world through which world imposes its presence, with its urgencies, its things to be done and said, things made to be said, which directly govern words and deeds without ever unfolding as a spectacle. (Bourdieu 1990: 52)

Constructionist view in Bourdieu.

The most improbable practices are therefore excluded, as unthinkable, by a kind of immediate submission toorder that inclines agents to make a virtue of necessity, that is, to refuse what is anyway denied and to will the inevitable. The very condition of production of the habitus, a virtue made of necessity, mean that the anticipations it generates tend to ignore the restriction to which the calidity of calculations of probabilities is subordinated, namely that the experimental conditions should not have been modified. (Bourdieu 1990: 54)

Improbable practices are immediately excluded.

The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices - more history - in accordance with the schemes generated by history. It ensures the active presence of past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the 'correctness' of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms. (Bourdieu 1990: 54)

Habitus produces appropriate behavior.

Overriding the spurious opposition between the forces inscribed in an earlier state of the system, outside the body, and the internal forces arising instantaneously as motivations springing from free will, the internal dispositions - the internalization of externality - enable the external forces to exert themselves, but in accordance of which the specific logic of the organisms in which they are incorporated, i.e. in a durable, systematic and non-mechanical way. As an acquired system of generative schemes, the habitus makes possible the free production of all the thoughts, perceptions and actions inherent in the particular conditions of its production - and only those. (Bourdieu 1990: 54-55)

Internalization of dispositions.

Thus the dualistic vision that recognizes only the self-transparent act of consciousness or the externally determined thing has to give way to the real logic of action, which brings together two objectifications of history, objectifications in bodies and objectifications in institutions or, which amounts to the same thing, two states of capital, objectified and incorporated, through which a distance is set up from necessity and its urgencies. This logic is seen in paradigmatic form in the dialectic of expressive dispotitions and instituted means of expression (morphological, syntactic and lexical instruments, literary genres, etc.) which is observed in the intentionless invention of regulated improvisation. (Bourdieu 1990: 56-57)

Nonverbal repertoire is incorporated capital.

Or rather, the habitus is what enables the institution to attain full realization: it is through the capacity for incorporation, which exploits the body's readiness to take seriously the performative force of the social, that the king, the banker or priest are hereditary monarchy, financial capitalism or the Church made flesh. Property appropriates its owner, conforming with its logic and its demands. (Bourdieu 1990: 57)

Habitus invests the social magic with performative force.

An institution, even an economy, is complete and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic, transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, in durable dispotitions to recognize and comply with the demands immanent in the field. (Bourdieu 1990: 58)

Institutions must be inscribed in bodies.

The corrections and adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out presuppose mastry of a common code; and undertakings of collective mobilization cannot succeed without a minimum of concordance between the habitus of the mobilizing agents (prophet, leader, etc.) and the dispositions of those who recognize themselves in their practices or words, and, above all, without the inclincation towards grouping that springs from the spontaneous orchestration of dispositions. (Bourdieu 1990: 59)

Common code is necessary for social control.

Early experiences have particular weight because the habitustends to ensure its own constancy and its defence against change through the selection it makes within new information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its accumulated information, if exposed to it accidentally or by force, and especially by avoiding exposure to such information. One only has to think, for example, of homogamy, the paradigm of all the 'choices' through which the habitus tends to favour experiences likely to reinforce it (or the empirically confirmed fact that people tend to talk about politics with those who have the same opinions). Through the systematic 'choices' through which the habitus tends to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible, that is, a relatively constant universe of situations tending to reinforce its dispositions by offering a market most favourable to its products. And once again it is the most paradoxical property of the habitus, the unchosen principle of all 'choices', that yelds the solution to the information needed in order to avoid information. The schemes of perception and appreciation of the habitus of a non-conscious, unwilled avoidance, whether it results automatically from the conditions of existence (for example, spatial segregation) or has been produced by a strategic intention (such as avoidance of 'bad company' or 'unsuitable books') originating from adults themselves formed in the same conditions. (Bourdieu 1990: 60-61)

Avoiding exposure to disruptive information. #AVOIDANCE of "bad company" or "unsuitable books".

Jensen, Klaus Bruhn 1995. A New Theory of Mass Communication: Constituents of Social Semiotics. The Social Semiotics of Mass Communication. London: Sage Publishing, 55-73.

The origin of the time-in, time-out terminology is in popular culture, in sports. For example, in ice hockey and basketball coaches can call for a break during which to discuss strategy and tactics with their teams. The point is that such a time-out, while apparently suspending action during a moment of reflexivity, addresses and occurs within the total time-in of the game. Similarly, institutionalized cultural activity sucvh as mass media use may suspend other everyday activity, but still takes place in the context of everyday with reference to specific social institutions.
I define time-in culture, first, as the aspect of semiosis which is continuous with and constitutive of other social practices. Comprising the many premises and procedures that serve to orient social interaction, time-in culture is the medium representing and incorporating agency and structure within a context of action. Such situated social semiosis, drawing on face-to-face interactions, mass communication, and other communicative encounters, is a necessary condition for the reproduction of meaningful social relations. Time-in culture is a practice of representation enabling other social action.
Second, I define time-out culture as the aspect of semiosis that may be designated as a separate social practice, and which can be identified by social agents as such. It places reality on an explicit agenda as an object of reflexivity, and provides an occasion for contemplating oneself in a social, existential, or religious rituals and fine arts, mass communication, certainly in a quantitative sense, is the main ingredient of time-out culture in the modern age. Time-out culture is a practice which reflects upon the nature and representation of social reality. (Jensen 1995: 57)

Definitions of time-in and time-out culture. First is more prone to dialogue, second towards monologue. In Berger and Luckmanns terms, time-in would be everyday life as such, and time-out as a problematic episode or an enclave of meaning whereupon to comtemplate everyday reality.

The social-semiotic alternative is to conceive time-out meaning as constituted in conjuction with time-in meaning, by necessity enacting a social purpose with reference to historical context. Communities of communication and inquiry cannot step outside of society or history, but in embracing that condition of semiosis, they participate in the construction of both history and society. (Jensen 1995: 61)

Action's embeddedness in culture.

The concept of 'discourse''is the legacy of textual scholarship in Western philosophy, humanities, and the Logos tradition generally. The assumption has been that language is the primary medium of interchange between humans and reality - in processes of perception, cognition, and action. Contemporary semiotics transcends this position, first, by placing an equal emphasis on other semiotic systems, and, secondly, by studying not just religious, scholarly, or literary 'works,' but equally the contextual, social uses of signs. Discourses, then, is said to include everyday interaction and forms of consciousness, constituting the medium of social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Hence I define discourse as the use of language and other semiotic systems in social contexts, including reflexive practices such as science and time-out culture. It is through discourse that reality becomes intersubjective as an object of scientific analysis and social conflict. (Jensen 1995: 64)

A note on discourse and other sign systems.

Leeds-Hurwitz, Wendy 1993. Semiotics and Communication: Signs, Codes, Cultures. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

From Semiotic Theory to Communication Behavior

A third reason to study food, clothing, and objects is that food, clothing, and objects are clearly utilized as forms of communication, thus they are appropriate topics for communication researchers to study. The majority of the theoretical work in communication explicitly considering semiotics, signs, or coders, analyzes language almost exclusively. However, it is equally possible to apply these concepts to the study of social interaction, incorporating the study of nonverbal behavior with the analysis of language. A parallel to the early study of kinesics, proxemics, and paranalguage can be pointed out.
Today these are understood to be major aspects of a particular part of the field of communication and granted their own label, nonverbal communicaion, although their potential value remained unrecognized for many years. Food, clothing, and objects are largely new, potentially critical, aspects of the field of communication. (Leeds-Hurwitz 1993: 75-76)

Nonverbal communication in communication theory.

Objects as Sign and Code (Chapter 6)

There are many types of objects. An object can be any one of the following: a tool (useful for something), a commodity (having exchange value), or a sign (having social value). Or it can be all of these at once. (Leeds-Hurwitz 1993: 128)

An important distinction for further discussion on nonverbal capital.

Culture (Chapter 7)

The majority of semiotic theory fails to make this final analytical step, to move beyond a single code to the culture as a whole and beyond to the mutual influences existing among cultures. As was pointed out earlier, semiotic writing tends to be abstract, more often discussing details of terminology than analyzing concrete behavior. Such discussions have not generally required a larger analytic set than the code. (Leeds-Hurwitz 1993: 157)

A note on semiotic theorizing.

Buried within the concept of continuity is the assumption that the meaning(s) associated with a particular sign is (are) shared by participants and observers. And yet, signs are polysemous, capable of conveying multiple meanings simultaneously. The concept of layering is a logical consequence of polysemy. When an old sign acquires a new meaning yet retains the original meaning as well, that is layering. Layering results primarily either from extended use of a sign over time (so there is opportunity of elaboration) or from multiple audiences using the same sign, attributing different meaning to carious characteristics. (Leeds-Hurwitz 1993: 161)

Layering and polysemy.

Holý, Ladislav and Milan Stuchlík 1983. Actions, norms and representations: Foundations of anthropological inquiry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Notions and actions (Chapter 2)

To circumscibe meaning, we suggest that it has to do with the processes of understanding, interpretation and expression. It concerns the modes through which people make sense in and of their worlds. When we talk about meaning, we talk about ways in which people understand their world and communicate about it with one another (Dolgin, Kemnitzer and Schneider 1977: 4). Thus, there are two components of meaning: the agents who endow things with meaning and perceive meanings, and the contents of meaning or messages. It is the respective stress on these components which distinguishes the two abovementioned types of approaches, those based on formal linguistics focusing on the message itself, and the phenomenological, intuitionist, Marxist or hermeneutical approaches that tend to focus on the situated actor.
For the structuralist approaches, this holds to such an extent that we can speak about disregarding the actors' interpretative procedures almost entirely. This derives from the basic methodological assumption that the whole culture is structured in a way similar or indentical to the language: 'The indices in non-verbal communication systems, like the seound elements in spoken language, do not have meaning as isolates but only as members of sets. A sign or symbol only acquires meaning when it is discriminated from some other contrary sign or symbol' (Leach 1976: 49). This is the basis of what Turner calls the positional meaning of symbols (Turner 1967: 50-52). When paying attention to the manner in which the object or activity assigned symbolic value is placed or arranged vis-a-vis similar objects or activities, the 'observer finds in the relations between one symbol and other symbols an important source of meaning' (Turner 1972: 1102, 1103). Meaning is understood here not in the sense in which people understand their world and communicate about it with one another but in the sense of the constitution and interrelation of phenomena (objects, persons, relations, etc.). The positional dimension of symbols reveals meaning not only of particular symbols but also of the whole ritual process in which the symbols are employed. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 24)

Compare to Darwin's notion of antithesis.

In Leach's taxonomy, the sorcerer's fallacy lies in treating the victim's hair, not as a metaphoric symbol but as a metonymic sign, and then handling the imputed sign as if it were a natural index. The fallacy is compounded by finally treating the supposed natural index as a signal capable of triggering off automatic consequences at a distance (Leach 1976: 31). One of the sorcerer's mistakes which to this is that he does not allow 'for the fact that the victim's hair, when separated from its proper context on the victim's head, changes its "meaning"' (Leach 1976: 33). (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 27)

Semiosis in magic, explained.

If we do not want simply to observe and report physical movements of people in temporal and spatial sequences, but to study and explain their actions, we can do it only by relating them, implicitly or explicitly, to some notions about such movements, to knowledge, beliefs, ideas or ideals, etc. In practical terms, this means that even when we talk about the study of actions we are necessarily talking about some relationship between actions and notions.
It is in the way actions and notions are related that the second major ambiguity or confusion in the study of actions exists. In the preceeding chapter, we pointed out that quite often verbal statements and observed actions are taken by the researcher to have the same informative status, i.e. to convey information about the same thing. Such treatment of data is possible only if it is assumed that there is some existing reality behind them: social structure, system, form of life, or whatever other term the analyst prefers to use. Both verbal statements and observed actions are veiwed as manifestationf of that structure and, therefore, as informing about its existence and shape in the same way. In theory, very few anthropologists would disagree nowadays with the proposition that structure is at best a property of data. In practice, however, quire a large number of anthropological analyses have been guided by the Durkheimian notion of society as the objective reality making itself manifest in both the verbal statements and the actions of its members. This notion is reaffirmed every time we assume that the verbal statements of the actor, which inform us about their knowledge, are direct and unproblematic descriptions of their behavioural reality, or, in other words, when we confuse the study of actions with the undifferentiated data. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 36)

Explaining physical movements as actions in relation with notions.

The notions about actions, explanations for actions, people's theories and ways of accounting for actions, are considered as highly subjective and essentially not related to actions: they can be discarded and the actions will still remain what they objectively are. In their objective form, they can be better explained on the grounds of the researcher's notions. We suggest that such a procedure removes the research from the sphere of social science, because it denies the basic social nature of the phenomena under study. If people's actions are not viewed in terms of their intentions and reasons, then they must be viewed in terms of some external forces or causes of which the people themselves are unaware. Any research carried out along these lines is research into those external causes or forces: the actors are reduced to the role of accidental performers. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 43)

The problem with not accounting for notions in explaining actions.

Normative notions (Chapter 5)

Yet the assumption of the intentionality of behaviour has been objected to on the grounds that a large category of actions is performed '...without any effort of will, without resolving or deliberating whether to do them, unintentionally, nonvoluntarily, for no purpose, etc.' (White 1968: 7). It would seem, however, that this objection rests on a certain confusion of the characteristics of behaviour. If 'without resolving or deliberating' is supposed to be identical with 'unintentionally' or 'for no purpose', then it is an untenable identification. Deliberation need not be a perpetually repeated process. For some actions, it can be done only once or a few times, after which the action becomes automatic. But this does not mean that it has no purpose or goal. Equally, the fact that the action is performed nonvoluntarily, does not say anything about its goal-orientation or purposiveness or the intentionality of its performance. A schoolboy may do his homework quire involuntarily, in the sense that he would prefer to do something else, yet he is perfectly aware of the purpose of his action and of the goal which will terminate it. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 84)

A note on intentionality and automaticity.

Although, ultimately, the norms are generated by the interactions, the relationship between any given interaction and a norm which is conceived of as determining, guiding or regulating it does not necessarily have to be a direct one. A norm behind any given interaction can emerge not only as a direct cultural response to an ongoing social process but also as the result of an overall adjustment of the whole normative system to the events which are taking place in the given society. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 96)

A note on the generation of norms in interaction.

Representational notions (Chapter 6)

Although people's ideas about the social processes in which they are involved are an important part of every representational model, representations are not merely descriptive. People hold notions not only about what the state of affairs actually is: they also hold specific social theories which are statements of basic values and whose important components are ideas about what the state of affairs ought to be. Such notions are usually called ideologies. (Holy & Stuchlik 1983: 100)

Representational notions may be prescriptive or ideological.

Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann 1966. The social construction of reality : a treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Doubleday.

The Reality of Everyday Life (Chapter 1)

The reality of everyday life is organized around the 'here' of my body and the 'now' of my present. This 'here and now' is the focus of my attention to the reality of everyday life. What is 'here and now' presented to me in everyday life is not, however, exhausted by these immediate presences, but embraces phenomena that are not present 'here and now'. This means that I experience everyday life in terms of differing degrees of closeness and remoteness, both spatially and temporally. Closest to me is the zone of everyday life that is directly accessible to my bodily manipulation. This zone contains the world within my reach, the world in which I act so as to modify its reality, or the world in which I work. In this world of working my consciousness is dominated by the pragmatic motive, that is, my attention to this world is mainly determined by what I am doing, have done or plan to do in it. In this way it is my world par excellence. I know, of course, that the reality of everyday life contains zones that are not accessible to me in this manner. But either I have no pragmatic interest in these zones or my interest in them is indidrect in so far as they may be, potentially, manipulative zones for me. Typically, my interest in the far zones is less intense and certainly less urgent. (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 36)

The zone of bodily manipulation.

As long as the routines of everyday life continue without interruption they are apprehended as unproblematic.
But even the unproblematic sector of everyday reality is so only until further notice, that is, until its continuity is interrupted by the appearance of a problem. When this happens, the reality of everyday life seeks to integrate the problematic sector into what is already unproblematic. Common-sense knowledge contains a variety of instructions as to how this is to be done. For instance, the others with whom I work are unproblematic to me as long as they perform their familiar, taken-for-granted routines - say, typing away at desks next to mine in my office. They become problematic if they interrpt these routines - say, huddling together in a corner and talking in whispers. As I inquire about the meaning of this unusual activity, there is a variety of possibilities that my common-sense knowledge is capable of reintegrating into the unproblematic routines of everyday life: they may be consulting on urgent instructions from the boss, and so on. On the other hand, I may find that they are discussing a union directive to go on strike, something as yet outside my experience but still well within the range of problems with which my common-sense knowledge can deal. (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 38)

Their example of a problematic situation involves nonverbal behavior.

Social Interaction in Everyday Life (Chapter 2)

The most important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situation, which is the prototypical case of social interaction. All other cases are derivatives of it.
In the face-to-face situation the other is appresented to me in a vivid present I am appresented to him. My and his 'here and now' continuously impinge on each other as long as the face-to-face situation continues. As a result, there is a continuous interchange of my expressivity and his. I see him smile, then react to my frown by stopping the smile, then smiling again as I smile, and so on. Every expression of mine is oriented towards him, and vice versa, and this continuous reciprocity of expressive acts is simultaneously available to both of us. This means that, in the face-to-face situation, the other's subjectivity is available to me through a maximum of symptoms. To be sure, I may misinterpret some of these symptoms. I may think that the other is smiling while in fact he is smirking. Nevertheless, no other form of social relating can reproduce the plenitude of symptoms of subjectivity present in the face-to-face situation. Only here is the other's subjectivity emphatically 'close'. All other forms of relating to the other are, in varying degrees, 'remote'. (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 43)

Face-to-face encounters involve nonverbal exchanges which makes realities impinge on each other.

Language and Knowledge in Everyday Life (Chapter 3)

Human expressivity is capable of objectivation, that is, it manifests itself in products of human activity that are available both to their producers and to other men as elements of a common world. Such objectivations serve as more or less enduring indices of the subjective processes of their producers, allowing their availability to extend beyond the face-to-face situation in which they can be directly apprehended. For instance, a subjective attitude of anger is directly expressed in the face-to-face situation by a variety of bodily indices - facial mien, general stance of hte body, specific movements of arms and feet, and so on. These indices are continuously available in the face-to-face situation, which is precisely why it affords me the optimal situation for gaining access to another's subjectivity. The same indices are incapable of surviving beyond the vivid present of the face-to-face situation. (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 49)

Nonverbal communication here phrased as bodily indices.

Signs are clustered in a number of systems. Thus there are systems of gesticulatory signs, of patterned bodily movements, of various sets of material artefacts, and so on. Signs and sign systems are objectivations in the sense of being objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions 'here and now'. This 'detachability' from the immediate expressions of subjectivity also pertains to signs that require the mediating presence of the body. Thus performing a dance that signifies aggressive intent is an altogether different thing from snarling or clenching fists in an outburst of anger. The latter acts express my subjectivity 'here and now', while the former can be quite detached from this subjectivity - I may not be angry or aggressive at all at this point but merely taking part in the dance because I am paid to do so on behalf of someone else who is angry. In other words, the dance can be detached from the subjectivity of the dance in a way in which the snarling cannot from the snarler. Both dancing and snarling are manifestations of bodily expressivity, but only the former has the character of an objectively available sign. Signs and sign systems are all characterized by 'detachability', but they can be differentiated in terms of the degree to which they may be detached from face-to-face situations. Thus a dance is evidently less detached than a material arfifact signifying the same subjective meaning. (Berger & Luckmann 1966: 51)

Detachability of nonverbal signs.

Environmental Philosophy

Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education.
OR Michael E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Calliot, Karen J. Warren, Irene J. Klaver and John Clark ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education.

Taylor, Paul W. 2005 [1981]. The Ethics of Respect for Nature. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 67-81.

Scientists who have made careful studies of particular plants and animals, whether in the field or in laboratories, have often acquired a knowledge of their subjects as identifiable individuals. Close observation over extended periods of time has led them to an appreciation of the unique "personalities" of their subjects. Sometimes a scientist may come to take a special interest in a particular animal or plant, all the while remaining strictly objective in the gathering and recording of data. Nonscientists may likewise experience this development of interest when, as amateur naturalists, they make accurate observations over sustained periods of close acquaintance with an individual organism. As one becomes more and more familiar with the organism and its behavior, one becomes fully sensitive to the particular way it is living out its life cycle. One may become fascinated by it and even experience some involvement with its good and bad fortunes (that is, with the occurrence of environmental conditions favorable or unfavorable to the realization of its good). The organism comes to mean something to one as a unique, irreplacaple individual. The final culmination of this process is the achievement of a genuine understanding of its point of view and, with that understanding, an ability to "take" that point of view. Conveiving of it as a center of life, one is able to look at the world from its perspective. (Taylor 2005 [1981]: 75-76)

Rolston, Holmes III 2005 [1991]. Challenges in Environmental ethics. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 82-101.

They knew rather well that, while intrinsic pain is a bad thing whether in humans or in sheep, pain in ecosystems is instrumental pain, through which the sheep are naturally selected for a more satisfactory adaptive fit. Pain in a medically skilled culture is pointless, once the alarm to health is sounded, but pain operates functionally in bihorns in their niche, even after it becomes no longer in the interests of the pained inviduals. To have interfered in the interests of the blind sheep would have weakened the species. The question, Can they suffer? is not as simple as Bentham thought. What we ought to do depends on what is. The is of nature differs significantly from the is of culture even when similar suffering is present in both. (Rolston 2005 [1991]: 86)

Leopold, Aldo 2005 [1949]. The Land Ethic. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 102-115.

Perhaps the most serious obstacle impeding the evolution of a land ethic is the fact that our educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land. Your true modern is separated from the land by many middlemen, and by innumerable physical gadgets. He had no vital relation to it; to him it is the space between cities on which crops grow. Turn him loose for a day on the land, and if the spot does not happen to be a golk links or a 'scenic' area, he is bored stiff. If crops could be raised by hydroponic instead of farmind, it would suit him very well. Synthetic substitutes for wood, leather, wool, and other natural land products suit him better than the originals. In short, land is something he has 'outgrown.' (Leopold 2005 [1949]: 114)

Calliott, J Baird 2005 [1999]. Holistic Environmental Ethics and the Problem of Ecofascism. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 116-129.

...from an evolutionary point of view, the social contract theory and its variants put the cart before the horse. Indeed, from an evolutionary point of view, the hypothesized state of nature - the supposition that rationa human beings ever actually lived as solitaries in a condition of universal war - is absurd and preposterous. (Calliott 2005 [1999]: 120)

Gaard, Greta and Lori Gruen 2005. Ecofeminism: Toward Global Justice and Planetary Health. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 155-177.

When women have access to education and employment, they tend to want fewer children. Until women are valued in ways other than and in addition to their reproduction capabilities, and men's virility is established in ways other than through the production of many male offspring, there will be little hope of reducing birth rates. (Gaard & Gruen 2005: 167)

Shiva, Vandana 2005 [1993]. The Impoverishment of the Environment: Women and Children Last. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 178-193.

In a book entitled Poverty: the Wealth of the People, an African writer draws a distinction between poverty as subsistence, and poverty as deprivation. It is useful to separate a cultural conception of subsistence living as poverty from the material experience of poverty resulting from dispossession and deprivation. Culturally perceived poverty is not necessarily real material poverty: subsistence economies that satisfy basic needs through self-provisioning are not poor in the sense of deprivation. Yet the ideology of development declares them to be so because they neither participate overwhelmingly in the market economy nor consume commodities produced for and distributed through the market, even though they might be satisfying those basic needs through satisfy basic needs through self-provisioning mechanisms. People are perceived as poor if they eat millets (grown by women) rather than commercially produced and distributed processed foods sold by global agribusiness. They are seen as poor if they live in houses self-built with natural materials like bamboo and mud rather than concrete. They are seen as poor if they wear home-made garments of natural fibre rather than synthetics. Subsistence, as culturally perceived poverty, does not necessarily imply a low material quality of life. On the contrary, millets, for example, are nutritionally superior to processed foods, houses built with local materials rather than concrete are better adapted to the local climate and ecology, natural fibres are generally preferable to synthetic ones - and often more affordable. The cultural perception of prudent subsistence living as poverty has provided legitimization for the development process as a "povery-removal" project. "Development," as a culturally biased process, destroys wholesome and sustainable lifestyles and instead creates real material poverty, and misery, by denying the means of survival through the diversion of resources to resource-intensive commodity production. Cash crop production and food processing, by diverting land and water resources away from sustenance needs, deprive increasingly large numbers of people from the means of satisfying their entitlements to food. (Shiva 2005 [1993]: 180).

Warren, Karen J 2005. The Power and the Promise of Ecofeminism, Revisited. In Michael E. Zimmerman et. al. ed. Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical Ecology. 4th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, 252-279.

Oppression consists in institutional structures, strategies, and processes whereby some groups (Downs) are limited, inhibited, coerced, or prevented from mobilizing resources for self-determined goals by limiting their choices and options. Oppressive institutions use various tools of subjugation (e.g., violence, threats, exploitation, colonization, exclusion) to reinforce the power and privilege of Ups in oppressive systems and to enforce the subordination or domination of Downs. Domination is one such tool of subjugation: it reinforces the power and privileges of Ups over Downs in Up-Down relationships of domination and subordination. All oppression involves domination.
By contrast, not all domination involves oppression. This is basically because oppression limits choices and options. So it is only beings who can meaningfully be spoken of as "having options" who also can meaningfully be said to be oppressed. Since I assume that from a Wester philosophical perspective trees, rivers, mountains, communities of flora and fauna, species, and ecosystems are not the sort of things that make choices or have options, I assume that they cannot be oppressed. But they can be dominated. (Warren 2005: 261-262)

Textual Translation and Live Translation

Poyatus Fernando 2008. Textual Translation and Live Translation: The total experience of nonverbal communication in literature, theater and cinema. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

...rather than making a count of nonverbal components, textual selections are shown chronologically, using abbreviations for paralanguage (p), kinesics (k), proxemics (px), food (f), object-adaptor (oa), body-adaptor (ba). (Poyatos 2008: 42)

Poyatose tähised kirjanduses esinevatele mitteverbaalsetele elementidele.

Verbal language-kinesics, that is, verbal expressions which are always accompanied by the corresponding kinesic equivalent, either because there is a verbal reference to the gesture or because the speaker of the source culture typically accompanies specific verbal expressions with fixed kinesic cobehaviors as emblematic constructs or as those ‘most native’ speech‐accompanying behaviors we call ‘speech markers,’ in either case unsuspected by the foreign reader. (Poyatos 2008: 55)

Tenjese nimetatud lexial affiliates (käežestide puhul) on siin vastupidiselt ja laiemalt, sõnadega koos-esinevad kineesilised konstruktsioonid, sj emblemaatilised ehk kultuurist sõltuvad.

Directly related to our experience are the characteristics of the different spaces, shapes and volumes of the different environments we interact with in many ways, with their protuberances, sharp or blunt edges, corners, round surfaces. All this our bodies perceive through the sense of kinesthesia, that is, awareness of the position of our body and limbs with relation to a substratum and whatever we come in contact with and which operates through joints, muscles, tendons and nerves. That is how we perceive, for instance, the person we embrace or share a couch with, an airport’s moving travellator under our feet, the very ground we tread or drive on, our tugging at a bell’s chain, or the vehicle we ride on or drive and the pavement. But not infrequently the translator will have to convey the characters’, hence the reader’s, kinesthetic experiences that belong to other historical periods, such as those involving transportation conveyances, although these experiences we actually see now in films, which easily trigger all manner of synesthesial imagined perception. (Poyatos 2008: 67)

Huvitav, et mida muidu tuntakse embodiment nimetuse all, on Poyatosel kinesteesia, ehk pisut tuntum meditsiiniline termin.

However, we must concede that between the playwright’s character and the reader-actor’s and director’s there exists a behavioral margin which makes it possible for the latter two to see a Willy Loman, a Laura, or Ibsen’s Edda Gabbler slightly different, particularly as to their paralanguage and kinesics, just as real-life people may naturally vary due to specific circumstances. It is precisely this narrow personality margin, skilfully defined in the stage director’s notes and in the movie script, that reveals the fictional nature of those characters, without going beyond the features suggested by the possible initial presentation and subsequent stage directions... (Poyatos 2008: 139)

"Käitumise serv", ehk kirjutaja enda, režissööri ja tegeliku näitleja tegelaskujude käitumusliku repertuaari erinevused.

Other self-adaptor sounds (some, as can be seen, audible only to oneself, but meaningfully so nevertheless) include, for instance: chattering, clicking, grating, grinding, gritting, gnashing or clicking teeth; clapping hands; clicking fingernails, cracking the knuckles; pounding fist to hand-palm; rubbing hands, scratching vigorously; slapping one’s forehead or thigh; snapping fingers; thudding on chest with a first. (Poyatos 2008: 222)

Enese-kommunikatiivsed helid, ehk enese-kommunikatiivne fonokineesika.

If the performers cannot intuit that kinesics which is not explicitly described, or not specified in its execution and parakinesic features, it leads above all to a failed cultural interpretation which is quite frequent when some foreign actors are unfamiliar with the characters’ original background and, therefore, carry out on the stage what we can call intercultural masking, which is tantamount to ‘intercultural mistranslation.’ (Poyatos 2008: 282)

Nii juhtub Fahrenheit 451s (1966 film) selle tõttu, et osalised (kirjanik, režissöör ja näitlejad) on erinevate kultuuriliste taustadega. Filmis teeb Guy Montagi kehastav Oskar Werner kultuuriliselt kohatuid käežeste.

Body Politics

Henley, Nancy M. 1977. Body Politics: power, sex and nonverbal communication. Drawings by D. Patrick. Englewood Cliggs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Lingid: Esteri märksõnad: kehakeel, keha, võim, sugupooled, mitteverbaalne kommunikatsioon, seksuaalsus, sotsiaalne käitumine, feminism;
Subjects on Google Books: Psychology › General; Body language; Nonverbal communication; Nonverbal communication (Psychology); Psychology / Cognitive Psychology; Psychology / General;

A feminist analysis of body language as a major means of nonverbal communication used by persons in power, primarily men, to maintain a social hierarchy.

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Sissejuhatuses soovitab järgida Albert Schefleni töid ja nimetab eeskujudena Erving Goffmani, Ray Birdwhistelli ja USA sotsiaalpsühholoogi Roger Browni. Henley kasutas ka Albert Mehrabiani , Edward Tichenell Halli, Desmond Morrise, Adam Kendoni, Mary R. Key ja Michael Argylei töid (rääkimata kohustuslikust Charles Darwini mainimisest).
Ka neid, kes on minu järjekorras: Robert Sommer (Personal Space, 1969), Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (Love and Hate: The Natural history of Behavior Patterns, 1970), Ashley Montagu (Touching: The Human Significance of the Skin, 1971), David Efron (Gesture, Race and Culture, 1972) ja Robert Rosenthal (The PONS Test, 1974). Naljakas on see, et pärast radikaalse ökoloogia (Murray Bookchin) ja radikaalse geograafia (anarhistlik geograafia!) vaatan imestusega, et Nancy Henley on ise avaldanud artikli "The Politics of Touch" kogumikus nimega Radical Psychology (1973). Mainitudd on ka Gerald I. Nierenbergi ja Henry H. Calero raamatut How to Read a Person Like a Book (1973), millel põhines Tuurandi Ülekuulatava kehakeele järgimine. Henley mainib, et Nierenberg ja Calero kogusid mahukaid andmeid nii, et kaasasid oma publiku uurimisse, hinnates tähenduslikke ja tähendusetuid liigutusi lootuses avastada "kehakeelekogukonnad" (Morrise language-family). See paneb nende tööd küll teise pilguga vaatama (ja kui selleni jõuan, siis ka lugema), aga ka Henley leiab, et nende andmed ei ole karvaväärtki usaldusväärsed. Siis kui kolm neljandikku raamatust on juba läbi, astuvad mängu Tomkins, Izard, Ellsworth ja Exline.
Kasulikud viited:

• Messages of the Body (1974);
• Goffman, Erving. The Nature of Deference and Demeanor. Interaction Ritual (1967);
• Argyle, Michael 1970. The Communication of Inferior and Superior Attitudes by Verbal and Non-verbal Signals. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology. Tasuline PDF
• Sapir, Edward 1949 [1927]. Unconscious patterning of behavior in society. Selected Writings of Edward Sapir.
• Shcheflen, Albert 1974. How behavior means.
• Scheflen, Albert E 1965. Quasi-Courtship Behavior in Psychotherapy. Psychiatry, 28, 245-57. Tasuline PDF

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This book is concerned not with sex or gender, but power. It attempts to demonstrate that the observed "sex differences," "race differences," and "class differences" in nonverbal behavior may be traced to differences in power; and that these are learned differences which serve to strenghten the system of power and privilege that exists. (Henley 1977: 2)

Ehk Henleyt huvitas samuti mitteverbaalse suhtlemise suhe võimusuhetesse (nonverbal communication in relation with social power).

But there is another side to interpersonal relationship, one that affects us greatly but which we're encouraged to pay little attention to. This is the element of status, power, dominance, superiority - the vertical dimension of human relations, signalled by our spatial metaphor of "higher-ups," "underlings," "being over," and "looking up to" others. Friendship relations make up the horizonal dimension, and the corresponding spatial metaphor refers to closeness, "being near" and "being distant." The power relation is the "other" dimension in the study of nonverbal communication: important as it is in ordering human interaction, it has received little study from investigators of nonverbal behavior. (Henley 1977: 2)

This "trivia" of everyday life - touching others, moving closer or father away, dropping the eyes, smiling, interrupting - are commonly interpreted as facilitating social intercourse, but not recognized in their position as micropolitical gesture, degenders of the status quo - of the state, of the wealthy, of authority, of all those whose power may be challenged. Nevertheless these minutiae find their place on a continuum of social control which extends from internalized socialization at one end to sheer physical force at the other.
In front of, and defending, the political-economic structure that determines our lives and defines the context of human relationships, there is the micropolitical structure that helps maintain it. This micropolitical structure is the substance of our everyday experience. The humiliation of being a subordinate is often felt most painfully when one is ignored or interrupted while speaking, towered over or forced to move by another's bodily presence, or cowed unknowingly into dropping the eyes, the head, the shoulders. Conversely, the power to manipulate others' lives, to take graft, price gouge, or plan the bombing of far-off peasants is conferred in part by others' snapping to attention in one's presence, their smiling, fearing to touch or approach, their following one around for information and favors. These are the trivia that make up the batter for that great stratified waffle that we call our society. (Henley 1977: 3)

Mikropoliitilised žestid? Milline võrratu nimetus! Mikropoliitilise struktuuri asemel saab kõneleda mikropoliitilisest süsteemist või sfäärist, kihistusest; mikropoliitilistest protsessidest vms.

Nonverbal cues, as Haley and Goffman have illustrated, play an extremely important and complex role in the maintenance of the social order: as signs and symbols of dominance, as subtle messages of threat, as gestures of submission. (Henley 1977: 5)

Minul signs of authority. Subtle võib siin olla metonymical.
Järgmisel leheküljel nöögib kehakeeleõpikuid, vihjab sellele, et verbaalset keelt õpitakse koolis, aga mitteverbaalset suhtlemist peab õppima informaalselt eluujäämise nimel (minul through self-communication).

How important is power in our daily lives? We may think of power as orders, threats, and coercion, and see little evidence of its use on or by us. But as sociologist George Homans has pointed out, the noncoercive form of power is probably far more common than the coercive. These noncoercions of everyday life are often, as we shall see, in the form of gestures which signal power and assert dominance. (Henley 1977: 19)

Signs of power and power of signs.

In most cases in our experience, power and status are confounded, i.e., a person who has one is likely to have the other. Power is the concern fo this book, and a more interesting topic of study in general, but it's harder for social scientists to assess than its outward and visible sign, status. (Henley 1977: 21)

Enne seda defineeris ka domineerimise ja autoriteedi.

These findings differ somewhat from findings in similar studies, and the authors discuss the possible reasons for these differences. In a particularily interesting theoretical contribution, they point out that the loss of individuality (deindividuation) that comes with anonymity in group situations can release not only inhibited negative behaviors, but positive ones as well. (Henley 1977: 40)

Negatiivne - Konrad Lorenz karjakäitumisest; positiivne - Massid ja Võim.

Intimate Time is the most extensive (as Intimate Space is the least extensive). When longer appointments are kept, such as the typical 50 minutes for therapy, marriage counseling, and other forms of consultation, the encounter clearly takes on an intimate aspect, evidenced by the personal nature of the information passed. This is the "far" zone for Intimate Time; the "close" zone, the amount of time spent with true intimates, is limited only by our tolerance for each other. Though couples and families on vacation, or retired, may find themselves spending 24 hours a day together, I believe there is still a preferred limit, which may be no more than a few hours (even on honeymoons!). One or the other may invoke the limit kindly or violently, but it will be invoked.
For all these time zones, as with space zones, violations are perceived when the boundaries are exceeded. We grow irritated with loved ones we've been with for too long, and we grow irritated with the stranger who takes up more than a minute of our time (this is like coming too close). To spend an hour in impersonal business is an imposition also. on the other hand, we are hurt when a loved one gives us too little time, or offended when a business contact does the same. (Henley 1977: 45)

Esimest korda kohtan seda, et keegi on territoriaalset imperatiivi tõlgendanud temporaalseks imperatiiviks. Äge on küll! Põhjalikumaks lugemiseks:

Self-disclosures were ofeered upward even when First Name was not, suggesting to the researchers an exception to Brown and Ford's observation that the higher-status individual of a dyad initiates all acts that increase intimacy. What they say may be true; subordinates probably do seek a (false) sense of intimacy through disclosing personal inforamtion to superiors. But there is another interpretation of this informational relationship. It is that personal information flows opposite to the flow of authority; just as tactual, visual, and emotional information of subordinates is more available to those in power, so is personal history. Or, in the spatial metaphor of our language of disclosure, you can "get closer to," "intrude in the life of," "encroach on the privacy of," "touch on personal aspects of," someone of lower status or less power. (Henley 1977: 73)

Tundub tõene tähelepanek - õppejõud teavad õppurite eraelu kohta rohkem.

There is another set of gestures that further clarify this point, gestures used in everyday sitautions by males or females which resemble those of courtship, but which are not. These gestures, which Scheflen has described so insightfully as quasi-courting, carry some sort of disclaimer so they won't be mistaken for real courting. They signify lively engagement in an interaction, and thus (in systems theory terms) serve a system-maintaining function. Examples of these courtship-like behaviors are high muscle tonus, bright eyes, preening, direct body orientation (vis-a-vis), soft speech quality, flirtatious glances, gaze-holding, "demure gesture," head-cocking, and pelvis rolling. In addition, Scheflen cites invitational gestures specific to women (though none for men): these are crossing the legs, exposing the thigh, placing a hand on the hip, exhibiting the wrist or palm, protruding the breast, and stroking the thigh or wrist. (Henley 1977: 139-140)

Quasi-courtship märgid.

Faces are the means by which we attempt to create an impression, and they will therefore be a major focus for displaying the impression of status, power, or authority. We all have a mental image of "the stern face of authority," the jutting chin, overhanging eyebrows, the frown, the drawn muscles, the unwavering stare. These together make a formidable challenge. It may be in fact that the face is particularly implicated in hierarchical relationships. (Henley 1977: 169)

...to laugh long and hard at the boss's jokes is a clicé, but at the same time a painful reality. Both smiling and laughing are ostensibly expressions of pleasure and relaxation which, when coming from subordinates, belie the true nature of the situation. It is as if they are exhibited for the purpose of maintaining the myth of pleasant relations and equality between superior and subordinate. Those powerful and successful persons surrounded by a thousand suns are likely to see serious faces only in their peers: it's no wonder that they think of their subordinates - be they "contented darkies," "beer-loving workers," "brawling hardhats," or "flighty dames" - as happy-go-lucky and carefree. (Henley 1977: 172)

In less hierarchical situations too, we often try to keep some of our personal power by not disclosing personal information. "Cool" is nothing more than the withholding of information, that is, refusing to disclose one's thoughts and emotions. The value it gives to street people, poker players, and psychaitrists is of the same sort. Smart ones, those in power, those who manipulate others, always keep their cool, maintaining an unruffled exterior. (Henley 1977: 173)

Kokkuvõtvad punktid:

1. Nonverbal behavior is a major medium of communication in our everyday life.
2. Power (status, dominance) is a major topic of nonverbal communication; and nonverbal behavior is a major avenue for social control on a large scale, and interpersonal dominance on a smaller scale.
3. Nonverbal power gestures provide the micropolitical structure, the thousands of daily acts through which nonverbal influence takes place, which underlies and supports the macropolitical structure.
4. Because our culture considers trivial, ignores, and doesn't educat eits members to nonverbal behavior, it constitutes a vague stimulus situation. Its interpretation is then highly susceptible to social influence (e.g. explanations utilizing sex stereotypes) which further maintain the status quo. (Henley 1977: 179)
5. Nonverbal control is of particular importance to women, who are more sensitive to its cues and probably more the targets of such control.
6. Many nonverbal behaviors have the dual function of expressing either dominance or intimacy, according to whether they are asymmetrically or symmetrically used by the partners in a relationship.
7. The behaviors expressing dominance and subordination between nonequals parallel those used by males and females in the unequal relation of the sexes. (Henley 1977: 180)
8. The overwhelming bulk of sex-differentiated behavior is learned and is developed to display otherwise unobtrusive differences. (Henley 1977: 184)
9. Many nonverbal behaviors that seem meaningless and non-power-related in fact are aspects of sex privilege or reflect sociatal biases ultimately founded in power differences. (Henley 1977: 188)
10. Power is the capability of influencing or compelling others, based on the control of desired resources. (Power, status, and dominance are different, though related and often confound, concepts.)
11. The ultimate underpinning of power is force. The resources on which power is based are in demand and those who control them must defend them from others' claims. However, force is the last-ditch, not front-line defense.
12. Power is exercised along a continuum, from least to greatest application of force. This continuum, from least to greatest application of force. This continuum involves at least the following points:
    1. Internalized controls. This is colonization of the mind, achieved through socialization. The easiest way to ensure we don't challenge the establishment is to have us stop ourselves, by implanting police officers inside our heads (through childhood teaching).
    2. Environmental structuring. Should our internal police be asleep, and we forget ourselves, strategically-placed reminders in our surroundings can stop us, one point further along the way to break through the control.
    3. Nonverbal communication. Should the environmental reminders fail to stop us, other people - both "friend" and "foe" - will make us aware of our place and what we're doing, by subtle cues.
    4. Verbal communication. Are we ignoring even the nonverbal communication? Words are certainly now in order. These, too, have their spectrum, from mild surprise, cajoling, and joking through straight-forward explanations and strong threats of consequences.
    5. Mild physical sanctions. When verbal communication fails to restrain us, our fellows must restrain us physically. A girl holds back her friend's arm from throwing a snowball at a disliked teacher, the wife holds the husband back from beating the child, buddies hold back two men from fighting, the police line holds back the angry crowd from appraoching the government figure. People take us by the hand and lead us away from our contemplated action, hold our arms and hands down, place hands on our shoulders to keep us sitting, kick us under the table or put their hand ove rour mouth (or wash it with soap) for saying the wrong thing, hold us by the upper arms or around the waist to keep us from somewhere, slap our faces or punch us or beat us up. Such physical sanctions take two main forms, temporary restraint and mild punishment. (Henley 1977: 189)
    6. Long-term restraint and its ramifications. When ordinary citizens, or nonpersonally applied police power fails, the state is allower to retain, imprison, isolate, and apply physical and mental punishment to its members should they break the legal/social code (or threaten it, or be suspected of it). The main tools of this enforcement are jails, prisons, and mental hospitals.
    7. Weapons, death, war. At this point it is clear that neither reminders, nor punishments, nor threats nor restraints will work to deter the person moving against the norms. All the stops are out, and those in power will attempt to stop the behavior at all costs. (And at this point the behavior will be harder to stop.)
13. Generally speaking, the mildest form of force which is effective will be used. (Henley 1977: 190)
14. Nonverbal behavior occupies a crucial point in the continuum, between covert and overt control (and between covert and over resistance).
15. Sexual attraction cannot sufficiently explain men's greater usage of gestures which indicate both intimacy and dominance.
16. Usurpation of the nonverbal symbols of power by women (and other powerless people) may be ignored, denied, or punished by others, rather than accepted.
17. Denial of nonverbal power gestures made by women often takes the form of attributing the gesture to sexual advances rather than dominance.
18. Much of women's behavior which is interpreted as self-limiting may in reality be the end of a sequence in which assertion was attempted, and suppressed, on the nonverbal level. (Henley 1977: 200)

The Hit Is Gone, But the Hurt Lingers On. From a historical viewpoint, we may note the preponderance of dominance behaviors that seem to be remnants of actual physical conflict. Moving close to or towering over another, staring, pointing, touching, leaning toward - all are elements of actual combat, and may be residuals of an earlier time when dominance was settled in more direct and over physical ways. (Some behaviors of dominance - leaning back, turning away, relaxing - do not carry this suggestion of aggression, but rather indicate the posture of one secure in the hierarchy. In such conditions, the behaviors of subordinates - tension, physical lowering, smiling, head and eye lowering - take on the characteristics of defensive and submissive postures.) (Henley 1977: 183)

"The personal is political" is a statement of the movement that has been taken in many ways, but basically it refers to the position that there is nothing we do - no matter how individual and personal it seems - that does not reflect our participation in a power system: our politics are reflected in the way we deal with others in our personal lives; they are the way we live, as well as what we profess. This belief takes on new dimensions when viewed with regards to nonverbal communication, in which we see just how much of the seemingly personal is truly political. (Henley 1977: 198)

Self-communication and personal signs reflect power relations.

Some people will contend that changing nonverbal behavior is the way to achieve social change - if every individual is changed, we will have changed the social structure. This philosophy pops up in different contexts among well-meaning people, but I cannot accept it. This slow-but-sure idea, favored because it is nonviolent and legal and involves a minimal bucking of the system, like other such plans has weaknesses in its nondisruptiveness and its direction of energies to individual (rather than social) solutions for what are really social problems. And we seldom if ever come into face-to-face contact with those who have the most power over us, anyway. (Henley 1977: 205)

Midagi muud:

• Herdt, Gilbert, and Robert Stoller 1990. Intimate Communication: Erotics and the Study of Culture. New York: Columbia University Press.
• Jones, Stanley 1994. The Right Touch: Understanding and Using the Language of Physical Contact: Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

The Ecology of Freedom

Bookchin, Murray 2005. The Ecology of Freedom: The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy. Oakland, California: AK Press.

I shall begin by asking: What is humanity's place in natural evolution? This question is not simply an environmental one; it has far-reaching social and philosophical implications. Human beings and human society in varying respects are products of natural evolution; further, human beings are organized anatomically and physiologically by natural evolution to interact with nonhuman nature productively, as creatures that consciously produce their own meaqns of life with tools, machines, and the organized deployment of their very capacity to labor. (Bookchin 2005: 21)

#instrumentality

Social ecoloty is almost alone these days in dealing with these two developments of "nature-as-a-whole" as a higher creative and shared evolution rather than as an oppositional and purely dualistic antinomy. By contrast, mystical ecologies [such as in Princess Mononoke] - with their "biocentric" notions - often disdain the problem of humanity and second nature; indeed, they tend to venerate first nature as "wilderness." These ecologies often view human species as an evolutionary aberration - or worse, as an absolute disaster, a "cancer" on the biosphere. (Bookchin 2005: 23)

Kõlab täpselt nagu Princess Mononoke moto: "humans are the cancer of the forest!"

Social ecologists use the word social, in turn, in a way that is free of the slipshod, often metaphorical confusion that leads to an identification of animal groups, herds, and ecocommunities with society. It is basic to social ecology that whereas animals form communities, they do not form societies. Society is the exclusive province of humans, for what distinguishes a human society from an animal community is the existence of social institutions. (Bookchin 2005: 23)

Radikaalne.

Libertarian municipalism, potentially a very significant form of public life today, has a long historical pedigree in cities from the Middle Ages well into the nineteenth century. It was practiced with varying degrees of democracy to countervail emerging centralized nation-states. Libertarian municipalism today seeks to recover and render viable the original Hellenic meaning of the term politics - the management of the polis's affairs by means of a truly participatory democratic body of institutions. (Bookchin 2005: 57)

poliitika, poliitiline kohustus

A direct democracy, in turn, avoids the corruptive "politics" produced by political professionalism, bureaucracy, and top-down representative systems of governance. Citizenship, expressed through popular assemblies, can avoid a statist "politics" based on the privatized anonymous "constituent" who exercises no control over his or her social life. (Bookchin 2005: 58)

political professionalism = political leadership (a la Page 1985) ?

Unless hierarchy is to be used in Schjelderup-Ebbe's cosmic sense, dominance and submission must be viewed as institutionalized relationships, relationships that living things literally institute or create but which are neither ruthlessly fixed by instinct on the one hand nor idiosyncratic on the other. By this, I mean that they must comprise a clearly social structure of coercive and privileged ranks that exist apart from the idiosyncratic individuals who seem to be dominant within a given community, a hierarchy that is guided by a social logic that goes beyond individual interactions or inborn patterns of behavior. (Bookchin 2005: 94)

Siin on sama trihhotoomia: species-specific (instincts), socio-cultural (institutions), ja idiosyncratic (individual).

What we flippantly call "leadership" in organic societies often turns out to be guidance, lacking the usual accountrements of commands. Its "power" is functional rather than political. Chiefs, where they authentically exist and are not the mere creations of the colonizer's mind, have no true authority in a coercive sense. They are advisors, teachers, and consultants, esteemed for their experience and wisdom. Whatever "power" they do have is usually confined to highly delimited tasks such as the coordination of hunts and war expeditions. It ends with the task to be performed. Hence, it is episodic power, not institutional; periodic, not traditional - like the "dominance" traits we encounter among primates. (Bookchin 2005: 122)

Tuleks analüüsida expert power võtmes.

The male, in a hunting community, is a specialist in violence. From the earliest days of his childhood, he identifies with such "masculine" traits as courage, strenght, self-assertiveness, decisiveness and athleticism - traits necessary for the welfare of the community. [...] "feminine" traits: caring and tenderness. (Bookchin 2005: 148-149)

Its [the State] capacity to rule by brute force has always been limited. The myth of purely coercive, omnipresent State is a fiction that has served the state machinery all too well by creating a sense of awe and powerlessness in the oppressed that ends in social quietism. Without a high degree of cooperation from even the most victimized classes of society such as chattel slaves and serfs, its authority would eventually dissipate. Awe and apathy in the face of State power are the products of social conditioning that renders this very power possible. Hence, neither spontaneous or immanent explanations of the State's origins, economic accounts of its emergence, or theories based on conquest (short of conquests that yeld near-extermination) explain how societies could have leaped from a stateless condition to a State and how political society could have explored upon the world. (Bookchin 2005: 165)

Riigi autoriteet põhineb vähem toorel jõul, kuiet hirmus/aukartuses ja passiivsuses mida see meis tekitab. Tegu on ikkagi virtuaalse, mitte reaalse, nähtusega.

The consent of an animal, say a bear, is an essential part of the hunt in which it will be killed. When its carcass is returned to the camp, Indians will put a peace pipe in its mouth and blow down it as a conciliatory gesture. Simple mimesis, an integral feature of magic and ritual, implies by its very nature unity with the "object," a recognition of the "object's" subjectivity. Later, to be sure, the word was to be separated from the deed and become the authoritarian Word of partiarchal deity. Mimesis, in turn, was to be reduced to a strategy for producing social conformity and homogeneity. But the ritual of the word in the form of incantations and work songs remind us of a more primordial sensibility based on mutual recognition and shared rationality. (Bookchin 2005: 170)

1948; "lammas"

The most common definition of direct action are usually exemplary rather than theoretical. They consist of citing strikes, demonstrations, "mob violence," sit-ins of all kinds and in all places, Ghandian civil disobedience, and even vigilantism. In all such cases, our attention is directed to events rather than goals and theoretical generalizations. What unites this behavior under the term "direct action" is the unmediated intervention of people into affairs that are usually resolved by parliamentary debates and legislation. People take over the streets; they may even occupy the parliamentary structures and rely on their own action rather than on political surrogates to achieve certain ends. (Bookchin 2005: 205)

"Nothing is sin except what is thought of as sin." (Bookchin 2005: 289)

Why does that sound familiar? Hey, it's missing a the letter "n"!

Moreover, human subjectivity itself can be defined as the very history of natural subjectivity, not merely as its product - in much the same sense that Hegel defined philosophy as its own history. Every layer of the human brain, every phase in the evolution of the human nervous system, every organ, cell, and even mineral component of the human body "speaks," as it were, from its given level of organization and in the graded subjectivity of its development, to the external habitat into which it has been integrated. The "wisdom of the body," like the wisdom of the mind, speaks in a variety of languages. We may never adequately decipher these languages, but we know they exist in the varied pulsations of our bodies, in the beat of our hearts, in rhe radiant energy of our musculature, in the electrical impulses emitted by our brains, and in the emotional responses generated by complexes of nerve and hormonal interactions. A veritable "music of the spheres" resonates within each living form and between it and other living forms. (Bookchin 2005: 320-321)

QUOTE FOR WIN!

Critics of "irrationality do not clarify these distinctions by wantonly banishing every subjective experience other than "linear thought" to the realm of the "irrational" or "antirational." Fantasy, art, imagination, illumination, intuition, and inspiration - all are realities in their own right that may well involve bodily responses at levels that have not been meticulously closed off to human sensibility by formal canons of thought. This blindness to large areas of experience is not merely the product of formal education; it is the result of an unrelenting training that begins at infancy and carries through the entire lenght of a lifetime. To polarize one area of sensibility against another may well be evidence of a repressive "irrationality" that is masked by reason, just as "linear thought" appears in the mystical literature under the mask of "irrationality." Freud, in his ineptness in dealing with these issues from his bastion of Victorian biases, is perhaps the most obvious example of a long line of self-appinted inquisitors whose rigid notions of subjectivity reveal a hatred of sensibility as such. This has long ceased to be a light matter. If the Freuds of the late nineteenth century threatened to destoy our dreams, the Kahns, TOfflers, and similar corporate "rationalists" threaten to destroy our futures. (Bookchin 2005: 359)

Võimetus kõneleda kehalisest teadmisest/tundelaadist.

The matrix from which objective reason may yet derive its ethics for a balance and harmonized world is the nature conceived by radical social ecology - nature that is interpreted nonhierarchically, in terms of unity in diversity and spontaneity. Here, nature is conceived not merely as a constellation of ecosystems but also as a meaningful natural history, a developing, creative, and fecund nature that yields an increasing complexity of forms and interrelationships. And what makes this complexity so significant is not just the stability it fosters (an obvious desideratum in its own right, needed for both the biotic and social worlds). Nature's evolution toward ever more exomplex forms is uniquely important in that it enters into the history of subjectivity itself. From the transition of the inorganic to the organic and through the various phases of evolution that crystallized into human forms of rationality, we witness an increasingly expansive history of molecular interactivity - not only of neurological responses but of an ineffable sensibilité that is a function of increasingly complex patterns of integration. Subjectivity expresses itself in various gradations, not only as the mentalism of reason but also as the interactivity, reactivity, and the growing purposive activity of forms. Hence, subjectivity emphatically does not exclude reason; in part, it is the history of reason - or, more precisely, of a slow forming mentality that exists on a wider terrain of reality than human cerebral activity. The term subjectivity expresses the fact that substance - at each level of its organization and in all its concrete forms - actively functions to maintain its identity, equilibrium, fecundity, and place in a given constellation of phenomena. (Bookchin 2005: 364)

Siin näib Bookchin tegevat loodusega sama, mida Juri Lotman tegi kultuuriga - innustas mõtlema sellest kui subjektiivsusest.

To Fourier, the physical world is governed not by Newton's law of universal gravitation but by his own "law of passionate attraction" - a law that he exuberantly proclaimed as his greatest contribution to modern knowledge. In place of Newton's mechanical interpretation of the universe, Fourier advances a concept of a cosmos as a vast organism that is suffused by life and growth. A vibrant vitalism so completely replaces the despiritized matter of conventional physics that even the idea of planets copulating is not implausible. Life, as we normally conceive it, and society are merely the offspring of a progressive elaboration of the passions. Fourier, to be sure, is not unique in conceiving of the universe in biological terms. But in contrast to most vitalists, he carries his "law of passionate attraction" from the stars into humanity's inntermost psychic recesses. (Bookchin 2005: 427)

Seksikas vitalism.

We also must recover the terrain necessary for the personification and the formation of a body politic. To defend society's molecular base - its neighborhoods, public squares, and places of assembly - expresses a demand not only for "freedom from ..." but also for "freedom for ...." The fight for shelter has ceased to be a matter of defending one's private habitat; it has become a fight to autonomously assemble, to spontaneously discuss, to sovereignly decide - in short, to be a public person, to create a public sphere, and to form a body politic against entrenched power and bureaucratic surveillance. What began in the late 1970s as a squatters' movement for more housing in Holland has now turned into a fervent struggle by young people in Switzerland for space free from authority and surveillance. Issues of habitation and logistics have turned into issues of culture, and issues of culture have become issues of politics. What the future of these specific trends in Central Europe may be, I shall not venture to predict. (Bookchin 2005: 434)

Finally I must emphasize that direct democracy is ultimately the most advanced form of direct action. There are doubtless many ways to express the claims of the individual and community to be autonomous, self-active, and self-managing - today as well as in a future ecological society. To exercise one's powers of sovereignty - by sit-ins, strikes, nuclear-plant occupations - is not merely a "tactic" in bypassing authoritarian institutions. It is a sensibility, a vision of citizenship and selfhood that assumes the free individual has the capacity to manage social affairs in a direct, ethical, and rational manner. This dimension of the self in self-management is a persistent call to personal sovereignty, to roundedness of ego and intellectual perception, which such conjoined terms like "management" and "activity" often overshadow. The continual exercise of this self - its very formation by one's direct intervention in social issues - in asserting its moral claim and right to empowerment stands on a higher level conceptually than Marx's image of self-identity through labor. For direct action is literally a form ot ethical character-building in the most important social role that the individual can undertake: active citizenship. To reduce it to a mere means, a "strategy" that can be used or discarded for strictly functional purposes, is instrumentalism in its most insidious, often most cynical form. Direct action is at once the reclamation of the public sphere by the ego, its development toward self-empowerment, and its culmination as an active participant in society. (Bookchin 2005: 438)

The greatness of the Dadaist tradition, from its ancient roots in the gnostic Orphites to its modern expression in Surrealism - a celebration of the right to indiscipline, imagination, play, fancy, innovation, iconoclasm, pleasure, and a creativity of the unconscious - is that it criticizes this "hidden" realm of hierarchy more unrelentingly and brashly than the most sophisticated theoretical games in hermeneutics, structuralism, and semiology so much in vogue on the campuses of contemporary western society. (Bookchin 2005: 450)

Käesoleval aastal loetud raamatutest on The Ecology of Freedom paistnud silma kõige avarama sõnavara poolest. Jälle kord olen sunnitud rivistama tundmatuid sõnu ja otsima definitsioone.

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avaricious - Having or showing an extreme greed for wealth or material gain.
lodestone - A piece of magnetite or other naturally magnetized mineral, able to be used as a magnet.
morass - A complicated or confused situation. [synonym:quagmire]
larder - A room or large cupboard for storing food.
ardor - Enthusiasm or passion.
emolument - A salary, fee, or profit from employment or office.
sybaritic - Fond of sensuous luxury or pleasure; self-indulgent: "their sybaritic lifestyle
insouciant - casual: marked by blithe unconcern; "an ability to interest casual students"; "showed a casual disregard for cold...
paean - A thing that expresses enthusiastic praise. A song of praise or triumph.
fetid - Smelling extremely unpleasant.
yeomanry - A group of men who held and cultivated small landed estates. (in Britain) A volunteer cavalry force raised from such a group (1794–1908).

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usufruct - The right to enjoy the use and advantages of another's property short of the destruction or waste of its substance.

opprobrium - The public disgrace arising from someone's shameful conduct.

corvee - unpaid labor (as for the maintenance of roads) required by a lord of his vassals in lieu of taxes.

onerous - (of a task, duty, or responsibility) Involving a burdensome amount of effort and difficulty.

nadir - The lowest point in the fortunes of a person or organization.

turgid - Swollen and distended or congested: "a turgid and fast-moving river".

nisus - striving: an effortful attempt to attain a goal.

beleaguered - Lay siege to: "he is leading a relief force to the aid of the beleaguered city". Beset with difficulties.

extirpate - Root out and destroy completely.

lurid - Very vivid in color, esp. so as to create an unpleasantly harsh or unnatural effect: "lurid food colorings".

supineness - Lying on the back or having the face upward. Having the palm upward. Used of the hand.

maudlin - Self-pityingly or tearfully sentimental, often through drunkenness.

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Power: A Radical View

Lukes, Steven 2005. Power: A Radical View. Second Edition. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that because power, as they conceptualize it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place. (Lukes 2005: 27)

In the first place, they are revisionary persuasive refinitions of power which are out of line with the central meanings of 'power' as traditionally understood and with the concerns that have always centrally preoccupied students of power. They focus on the locution 'power to', ignoring 'power over'. Thus power indicates a 'capacity', a 'facility', an 'ability', not a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power - the fact that it is exercised over people - dissapears altogether from view. And along with it there disappears the central interest of studying power relations in the first place - an interest in the (attempted or successful) securing of people's compliance by overcoming or averting their opposition. (Lukes 2005: 34)

...the word 'power' is polysemic: like, say, the words 'social' and 'political', it has multiple and diverse meanings, appropriate to different settings and concerns. Another is that, like the word 'game', 'power' denotes a range of different objects or referents that have no single common essence, no one property that they all share other than their name: it exhibits what Wittgenstein called 'family resemblance'. (Lukes 2005: 61)

Third, consider the telation between power and intention. Bertrand Russell defined power as 'the production of intended effects' (Russell 1938: 25), Max Weber and C. Wright Mills connected power with the realization of the 'will' of the powerful, and many, like Goldman, think that power involves 'getting what one wants' (Goldman 1972, 1974a, b). Obviously, some abilities are abilities to bring about intended consequences. (There are actually two possibilities here: the ability to bring about what I actually intend, and the ability to bring about what I might, hypothetically, intend). (Lukes 2005: 76)

Moreover, the features of agents that make them powerful include those that render activity unnecessary. If I can achieve the appropriate outcomes without having to act, because of the attitudes of others towards me or because of a favorable alignment of social relations and forces facilitating such outcomes, then my power is surely all the greater. It may derive from what has been called the rule of anticipated reactions (Friedrich 1941: 589-91), where others anticipate my expected reactions to unwelcome activity (or inactivity) on their part, thereby aiming to forestall overt coercion: a clear example is the self-censorship practiced by writers and journalists under authoritarian regimes. The inactive power accumulated by such regimes is, of course, often the residue of past uses of active power, often coercive and sometimes on a massive scale. (Lukes 2005: 77-78)

Spinoza's formula enables us to see what is at issue here, for it can be given various interpretations that go beyond the minimal view, not all of which are mutually compatible. Here I can only sketch what is involved in the different ways there are of answering the question: 'What do my nature and my judgment dictate?', among which Spinoza's own way is only one. The formula plausibly suggests that we think of freedom as autonomy (broadly understood), that is as invoking the ideas of authenticity (being true to one's nature or 'self') and autonomy (more narrowly understood - thinking for oneself). On Spinoza's own account, living (authentically) according to the dictates of one's judgment is to be rational. (Lukes 2005: 115)

...the victims of domination are to be seen as tactical and strategic actors, who dissemble in order to survive; as Tilly puts it, 'compliance, under Scott's microscope, turns out to be a sort of constant rebellion' (Tilly 1991: 598) or to cite the Ethiopian proverb Scott uses as an epigraph to his book, 'When the great lord passes, the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.' He adduces evidence of two main kinds. On the one hand, there are the 'hidden transcripts' - generated in secluded settings, behind the scenes in the victims' 'life apart in the slave quarters, the village, the household, and in religious and ritual life', in 'a social space in which offstage dissent to the official transcript of power relations may be voiced', in forms such as 'linguistic disguises, ritual codes, taverns, fairs, the "hush arbors" of slave religion' and consisting in 'hopes of a returning prophet, ritual aggression via witchcraft, celebration of bandit heroes and resistance martyrs' (pp. 85, xi). On the other hand, there are the open but disguised expressions of ideological insubordination that can be decoded by interpreting 'the rumors, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes and theater of the powerless as vehicles by which, among other things, they insinuate a critique of power while hiding behind anonymity or behind innocuous understandings of their conduct' (p. xiii). (Lukes 2005: 124-125)

There are convincing and well-studied cases, in both pre-modern and modern settings, of 'bodily knowledge' reflecting and reproducing hierarchies of social positions with 'fields' (see, for instance, Wacquant 2003), but how far can they be generalized? Where, when and how does tacit, practical embodied knowledge set limits to 'discursive' learning and self-transformation? Our ways of speaking doubtless go deep, and it is both plausible and illuminating to see social significance in the ways people view, use and treat their bodies, as 'body language', for instance, expressing and perpetuating class, gender and indeed national identities. But these can also be understood as responses to a whole array of 'discursive' cultural influences, from early socialization to religious teachings and the mass media, that are in turn subject to political influence and to historical changes. (So, for instance, it is likely that, after decades of feminism, there will have been changes in how young women view, hold and use their bodies, in sport, say, or during pregnancy.) (Lukes 2005: 143)