Information &c.

• Boell, Sebastian K. 2016. Information: Fundamental positions and their implications for information systems research, education and practice
• Mingers, J. C. 1996. An Evaluation of Theories of Information with Regard to the Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects of Information Systems
• Schwarz et al. 2007. Understanding Frameworks and Reviews: A Commentary to Assist us in Moving Our Field Forward by Analyzing Our Past

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Boell, Sebastian K. 2016. Information: Fundamental positions and their implications for information systems research, education and practice. Information and Organization 27: 1-6.

Information is an important concept for the "information age", the "information society" and the discipline of Information Systems (IS). However, different conceptions of information often make incommensurate assumptions about what information is. This essay introduces a 'consequential framework' revealing different assumptions made about the nature of information and the consequences following from these assumptions. According to this consequential framework four stances on the existence of inormation can be distinguished: (1) A first stance assumes information to exist independently of humans as part of the physical world, for instance, in the structure of the universe or the transmission of signals; (2) a second stance assumes that information exists in signs but in an observer independent way, such as in objective facts about things; (3) a third stance sasumes that information exists only in relation to a subject, so that the same document, report or data will convey different information to different individuals; (4) a fourth stance assumes information to exist within a sociocultural setting, as lawyers, doctors or accountants differ in what is information to them. Each of these four stances makes vastly different assumptions about how information can be accessed and used by humans. (Boell 2016: 1)

Finally someone articulates the difficulty with the concept of information. I recall arguments about whether books left unread in a library repository contain "information" if no one reads them (i.e. the third stance here).

Academic fields require shared agreement about concepts that are central to their research as they provide the "theoretical glue" that helps different branches of a field to relate to each other and form a coherent whole (Whetten 1989). [...] In order to overcome the lack of thorough conceptual engagement with information, IS researchers require greater conceptual clarity as to the range of existing conceptions of information, how conceptions differ from each other in their assumptions about what information is, and subsequently what conceptions are useful for different research purposes. [...] Proper engagement with existing conceptions of information is thus essential for developing conceptual clarity (Lee 2010). Moreover, understanding how conceptions differ is necessary for identifying approaches to information that are appropriate and promising for advancing engagement with different IS research problems. [...] Instead of defining one 'correct' or 'best' conception for understanding information the framework introduced here equips IS researchers with meta understanding of the information concept in order to support them in the development of new and diverse conceptions to information for IS. (Boell 2016: 1)

This is what's missing from phatic studies - the central concept is understood in wildly different ways, even within single disciplines.

Secondly, revealing that each of the four stances makes different assumptions about the nature and existence of information the essay discusses consequences following from each of the four different stances. That is, different stances on information have implications for understanding other important IS concepts such as data, knowledge, signs, human beings, social context, and technology. (Boell 2016: 2)

In the three primary lines of phatic thinking, the consequences follow from the linguistic units under discussion and the "representative anecdote" of the definition. What's somewhat problematic is that each actually has more than one representative anecdote but some are preferred more than others.

The first conception understands information as data that is processed. In a survey of the current use of the information concept in IS research McKinney and Yoos (2010) argue that most IS research adopts a ‘token view’ of information according to which information is an “undifferentiated commodity of data bits that are processed” (McKinney & Yoos, 2010, p. 331). (Boell 2016: 2)

Since information content is such a lofty topic in phatic studies, I'll note that the prevalent interpretation is that phatic expressions are meaningless exactly in the sense that they are perfunctory tokens that aren't supposed to contain any actionable information. The form itself should serve as a cue for the proper ritual routine.

There are literally thousands of publications discussing information on a theoretical and conceptual level across IS and its reference disciplines (c.f. Bates, 2010; Zaliwski, 2011). Relevant literature on information was thus reviewed in a way that ensured appropriate breadth in the coverage of the broad range of existing conceptions of information, while also ensuring depth in covering particular conceptions of information that are of interest to IS. (Boell 2016: 3)

Reference groups and reference disciplines?

Based on careful reading and thorough assessment of the whole range of different conceptions of information four criteria for distinguishing individual approaches to information were established: (1) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘physical stance’ on information if the conception relates information to physical concepts or the physical world in general. (2) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘objective stance’ on information if, the conception relates information to human understanding and signs where information is understood as existing objectively independently of a recipient. (3) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘subject-centered stance’ on information if the conception requires the appropriation of information by a subject. And (4) a conception of information was allocated to the ‘sociocultural stance’ on information if information is conceptualized as dependent on a wider sociocultural dimension. (Boell 2016: 4)

The labels for these stances were missing from the abstract.

Importantly, Shannon himself noted, as he was interested in the accurate reproduction of the signals that were initially sent, the question of whether a transmitted message is actually meaningful, relevant or useful is irrelevant as such concerns are not part of his theory (Shannon, 1948, p. 379) (Boell 2016: 6)

Shannon was an accidental phaticist?

The objective stance on information therefore encompasses conceptions that understand information as contained in signs in an observer-independent way. Authors use different approaches to argue for an objective stance on information in relation to signs. Some argue that information is objective as it is contained observer independently in sign-vehicles. Others seek to differentiate information from meaning, or to define meaning as something that is independent of a subject. (Boell 2016: 6)

Interestingly, thus far the receiver's side is dealt with (Peirce is quoted, etc.) but no mention yet of the sender. I would have thought that the difference between physical and objective stance is the distinction between an inanimate and animate source of information.

The subject-centered stance on information understand information in relation to a subject. Information depends on a subject as they regard different messages as relevant or comprehensible and therefore as information to them. Subject-centered conceptions therefore commonly argue that information is something that is appropriated by a subject, which makes information something that can only exist in relation to a subject. (Boell 2016: 7)

This poses two issues for phatic communion: on the one hand phatic expressions may be considered irrelevant or incomprehensible, but still informing them of something.

A second group of conceptions describes information as an internal shaping of a subject. Yet other conceptions link information with knowledge, where knowledge is understood as something that is bound to a subject. One move is then to understand information as a subject's change in knowledge. Another move is to define information as a subset of knowledge that is relevant in a specific situation to a particular subject. (Boell 2016: 7)

This is akin to the Relevance Theory approach to phatic communication, which does look at "internal shaping" of implicatures, for example.

Furthermore what also follows is what MacKay (1969) called ‘conditional readiness’ or ‘state of conditional readiness’ (SCR), namely that an informee's predispositions will determine their ability to be informed by particular messages. Accordingly what is regarded as information will depend on an informees prior knowledge and understanding. (Boell 2016: 8)

This would include "thesic affections" and other kinds of anticipations.

The reason for this is that while IS professionals generally deal with IT they also differ markedly in their orientation towards technology. For instance, practitioners dealing with IT in terms of signal processing and algorithmic aspects generally share a scientific orientation towards information as physically measurable bits and bytes. System analysts and conceptual modeling professionals assume that processes objectively exist in the world and thus objective information about them can be discovered, captured and made available independently of individual users. In contrast, practitioners interested in the implementation and adoption of IT share a psychological conception of information according to which users, depending on their backgrounds, attitudes, and expectations, derive different information from the output provided by an IT system. Finally, practitioners managing IT infrastructure such as social media engage with IT as enabler of “real” organizational change and strategy, understand information as dependent on social processes, the culture of an organization and broader technological and societal changes. (Boell 2016: 12)

The third general iteration of these distinctions solidifies it, for sure. I'm personally situated in the psychological and sociocultural frameworks.

Mingers, J. C. 1996. An Evaluation of Theories of Information with Regard to the Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects of Information Systems. Systems Practice 9(3): 187-209.

Broadly, two views of information can be discerned. The most common suggestion is that information is data that has been processed in some way to make it useful. Philosophically, this involves an implicit assumption that data and information are objective, that is, independent entities with their own structures. An alternative view emphasises the subjective nature of information - the idea that different observers may generate different information from the same data given their differing values, beliefs, and expectations (Lewis 1993). (Mingers 1996: 187)

The previous paper, it turns out, added the extremes - the physical and sociocultural, which respectively stretch these two out further into either independence or interdependence.

Finally, and of lesser importance, is the extent to which a particular concept of information matches our daily, commonsense usage of the term. If other criteria are equivalent, it would seem better to adopt a theory which fits in with our intuitive notions than one which does not. For instance, some theories maintain that information is the change in expectations in a particular person caused by a particular message. In this interpretation, reference books and railway timetables contain no information at all except when they are read, and then only in the head of the reader. Derr (1985) has produced an analysis of the concept of information as used in ordinary language. (Mingers 1996: 192)

This is pretty much the library repository books case. According to this view, phatic communication lacks information because it does not defy expectations, normally.

Nauta (1972) and Artandi (1973) do bring in the actual state of knowledge of a receiver. Nauta (1972: 179) describes pragmatic information as "that which removes the doubt, restricts the uncertainty, reduces the ignorance, curtails the variance." This clearly makes information strictly relative to the receiver. The more prior knowledge that the receiver has, the less information that a message can provide. Indeed, a message that is repeated must convey zero information since it is already known by the recipient. Conversely, the message must be comprehensible to the receiver for it to reduce uncertainty, so messages in unknown languages or unfamiliar symbolic systems also convey no information for particular people. Nauta (1972: 222) also clarifies the pragmatic nature of information by making it clear that the uncertainty to be reduced is always relative to particular purposes or goals. (Mingers 1996: 197)

This might prove valuable for the pragmatic re-interpretation of Malinowski's "language as a mode of action". It's been over half a decade since I first read Nauta.

Luhmann takes Mackay's idea that meaning is not primarily content, but a function for selection. Meaning functions at two levels - the psychic (individual), where it frames or orders our experiences, and the social (society), where it makes possible intersubjective experience and communication. Meaning, in fact, connects these two levels and makes possible their differentiation. (Mingers 1996: 200)

So, you can find meaning in both intrapersonal and interpersonal communication.

Meaning is a relation between what is selected (presenced) and what is not. What is selected is only as it is by virtue of its difference from what it is not. Meaning connects present actuality to future possibility. It is the way the present is selected, and is the connection to the next instant's selection. It can be characterised by differences, or rather negations (what is not selected), in three domains - factuality, what is selected, sociality, who is selected, and temporality, when in terms of before/now/after. The particular selections made depend on our individual preexisting set of readiness or expectations, but the resulting experiences may, in turn, change our expectations. It is the change that Luhmann terms information - the surprisal value of a meaning complex for the structure of expectations. As before, information is always relative to the receiver while meaning is not. Thus the same message or event will produce different information for different people depending on the extent to which it accords with their prior expectations. And a repeated message retains its meaning but loses its information. (Mingers 1996: 201)

Very reminiscent of Peircean "futurity", though without interpretants, growth and habits. The definition of inormation and meaning here is pretty much that of cultural semiotics. MacKay could be a common source for Lotman and Luhmann.

Machines, such as televisions or computers, transmit all the information they receive, but cognitive systems such as brains can be selective - they exhibit intentionality. That is, out of the large amount of available (nested) information, only some is selected and passed on as a belief or message. Dretske calls this the semantic content of the signal and it is equivalent to meaning. Dretske terms this process of selection a digitalization of the analog. Signals in the world and our perceptions of them are generally analog - they are rich in information. Our nervous system processes these perceptions to focus on some particular aspect of the scene which becomes our conscious experience of it - its meaning for us. (Mingers 1996: 203)

What of quasi-selection, i.e. selection brought about without intention, or even contrary to intent? The latter part is also dubious on the face of it - is meaning simply conscious experience?

Schwarz, Andrew; Manjari Mehta, Norman Johnson and Wynne W. Chin 2007. Understanding Frameworks and Reviews: A Commentary to Assist us in Moving Our Field Forward by Analyzing Our Past. ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in Information Systems 38(3): 29-50.

Our findings suggest that, among other things, a "good" framework article should offer a clear guideline (indicating possible problems that can be examined within the stated framework), consist of a parsimonious set of elements, and have a clearly defined boundary. On the other hand, a good review article should advance the field as a result of consolidating prior research, identify and propose testable hypotheses, and focus on simplifying past results. We also found that both framework and review articles can be characterized according to their stated objective, comprehensiveness, relationship to research boundaries, temporal focus, and content focus. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 29)

Review is past-oriented, framework future-oriented? Review simplifies, framework reduces?

Triangulation, a validity procedure used by researchers to search for convergence among multiple sources of information and methods of data collection and analysis. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 30)

"Triangulation" works for my review aims, as I have three main authorities to review.

Review articles from Annual Review of Psychology and Annual Review of Sociology were retained despite their casual one-time usage of these terms, because they were indeed 'review' articles, albeit without a framework to structure their review. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 31)

I'm afraid my review portion is heavily conditioned by framework, and vice versa, but this appears okay since the latter portion of the paper says that a framework should grow out of a review.

To summarize the assumptions of a research stream. A framework article can examine the literature to uncover the philosophical and epistemological assumptions that underpin a given research domain. While philosophical positions can not necessarily be reconciled with one another, a framework article unifies the views by finding an underlying structure and then illuminating how those differences manifest themselves within the literature. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 33)

Exactly what I'm trying to do, though hampered by the fact that the philosophical and epistemological assumptions of 20th century phatics are very superficial and the ones from 19th century are indecipherable, having to do with then current moral philosophy.

To summarize prior research. While a framework seeks to integrate past research, review articles do not share this objective - rather, a review is a reflective presentation of prior research in a condensed form. Using prior research as the "data" (similar to a framework), a review articles [sic] does not seek unification, but to describe what has been studied before in a condensed version. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 35)

The problem here is the sheer amount of previous research, and the difficulty of staying up to date with even current ones (there are some 300+ Google Scholar Alerts reports in my inbox).

The objectie of framework articles is to either integrate, or summarize, or conceptualize, whereas the objective of review articles is to consolidate. While a framework article focuses on unification (e.g. the key words of integrate, summarize, synthesize), a review article is concerned with critical consolidation (e.g. the key words of critical examination, explain, and reconcile). (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

Unification vs. consolidation. Aren't these near-synonyms?

Framework articles need not be comprehensive, but it is critical that review articles are comprehensive. Because the objective of review articles is to consolidate, it is essential that these articles comprehensively examine all of the prior literature to be effective, while a framework only needs to examine that portion of the literature necessary to adequately unify the particular research streams being considered. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

In a word, I would have to be comprehensive in a review paper but not in a framework paper. In the first case it would be advisable to jam in as much relevant information as possible, whereas the second could do with a smaller selection of sources releant for unification.

Framework articles define boundaries, whereas review articles are centered on or constrained by pre-defined boundaries. Extending our argument about the need for a framework to present a cohesive and comprehensive theoretical system, a framework defines what does (and does not) constitute the boundary of the stream, while a review operates within the pre-defined boundary and summarizes the prior work that has been created within those limits. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

A review paper of phatic studies would have to follow disciplinary lines (anthropology, linguistics, sociolinguistics, social media studies, etc.) but a framework article can draw new boundaries between different approaches, unifying some and dispensing with others.

Framework articles tend to have a prospective focus, whereas review articles have a retrospective focus. A review article is retrospective and focused upon the contributions of past research, while a framework article can be grounded in the past (e.g. to integrate), in the present (e.g. to aid in the analysis of data), or in the future (e.g. to provide a new focus for researchers). Therefore, the time orientation between framework and reniew articles is different, in that a review is more historical (or descriptive of the past), while a framework can be more prescriptive of defining what lies ahead. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

Here arises a minor issue: the framework I'm intending to propose is heavily based on historical data, and aims to go even beyond (further backwards in time) from the first authoritative (historical) studies. So, while Malinowski, La Barre and Jakobson do represent lines along which unification can be undertaken, their core arguments are better represented by older 19th century literature.

To Un Th Hu Be

Grinker, Roy Richard (ed.) 1956. Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior. New York: Basic Books.

Because this is an old and rare book there's a good chance that I'll never gain unmediated access to it. So instead I'll take the next best thing and read the reviews of it available on JSTOR. The significance of it consists of it containing a paper by Jurgen Ruesch - one of the few that Roman Jakobson has cited (ergo, has read).

Sprott, W. J. H 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker.. American Sociological Review 22(1): 110-111.

IN 1951 Jurgen Ruesch, a psychiatrist, and Roy Grinker, the Director of an Institute for Psychosomatic and Psychiatric Research, got together some seventeen representatives of allied disciplines - a zoologist, some sociologists, an historian and so on, making a committee of nineteen, who set out to hold bi-annual week-end conferences at which they were to discuss the possibilities of a "Unified Theory of Human Behavior'. A report of the first four conferences is presented in this book. (Sprott 1957: 110)

Apparently Ruesch took to Morris in attempting something like unified science.

They discussed the possibilities of a unified theory of human behavior. But what could that mean? That, alas, was not a question to which they addressed themselves for any length of time. The setting of the problem is straightforward: social systems are "run" by humans, humans have personalities, they are also physical organisms and therefore allied to all living organisms. Now does a "unified theory" mean a set of rules from which one can deduce the rules of biology, psychology and sociology? This was scarcely discussed, and to be sure the nature of such rules is obscure. Does it mean a new-Spencerean statement of evolutionary process? This was touched on and provided the bright idea that in social development it is symbols that ensure continuity and changes, performing thus the same role that genes do in the history of physical organisms. More extensive and rewarding was another line: are there concepts which apply to all these fields, and if so do they mean the same wherever they are used? Much is said about homeostasis and the discussion of this by Emerson and Anatol Rapoport is well worth reading. (Sprott 1957: 110)

So an amalgamation of psychosomatics and social sciences? The idea of change and continuity effected by symbols in analogy with genes precedes the idea of "memes".

Is there, it is asked, a set of rules, or a mode of analysis of communication, which applies to the signals that flash from cell to cell, to communications from id to ego, and to the communications from man to man in society? The concepts are discussed and, if nothing else, communication theory is clarified in the process. But then, as one may imagine, all sorts of difficulties of a basic nature reveal themselves. Systems may have some homeostatic control to keep them intact, their parts are in a communication net-work and systems communicate with one another. But - what is a system? What are boundaries, and how permeable are they? The discussions on this question are among the most valuable in the book. Another even more fundamental problem loomed up. Speigel presents is with a diagram of systems related to one another: the soma, the psyche, the group, the society, and - obscure indeed - the universe. Perhaps the concepts of homeostasis and communication theory apply to them all - except the last. Perhaps, suggests Morris, they are linked by a system of common symbols in any given society that - to take his example - "policeman" has a meaning in the communication system, and it has a meaning in the social system in that it defines a role; it also has a meaning in the personality system in that if a person becomes a policeman and now symbolizes himself as a policeman, he has become a policeman," and he might have added that when he became a policeman he may become flat-footed. (Sprott 1957: 110)

The communication matrix of Ruesch and Bateson is here pretty apparent - intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, and society are here soma, psyche, group, society - and universe. Clarifying communication theory is pretty much what Ruesch does at every step. And the question, "What is a system?", still looms large to this day. The Morris here, it turns out, is the self-same Charles Morris. And now that I dared to dream a little and looked this title up in our library system it turns out that Sebeok's collection does indeed have it. So I will actually gain unmediated acces to it, but reading these reviews cannot hurt, so I'll continue.

Each system can be dealt with independently, but the link between them is the system of common symbols. All this seems to help us on a bit, but we constantly hear, particularly from Ruesch who presented a paper on it, disturbing references to "the observer." This is both salutory and irritating. All our theories are the views of observers; how far does his perspective contaminate objectivity? (Sprott 1957: 111)

The former part is what sociosemiotics is all about. Ruesch's insistence on the perspective of the participant-observer is also Jakobson's takeaway from this book.

Deutsch, Morton 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy. R. Grinker. Administrative Science Quarterly 1(4): 543-546.

One approaches a book like this with mixed feelings: it has such an imposing list of contributions but such a pretentious title. To speak of a general theory of human behavior at this stage of the development of the behavioral sciences, when the more mature physical sciences have no "general theory," smacks of grandiosity. Our situation is that there are hardly any well-developed small theories, and the linkages between empirical research and theoretical statements are most often weak or lacking. Yet I suppose it is these very lacks and uncertainties in the field, combined with the urgent feeling that "something ought to be done about something," which give rise to the earnest searchings for an all-embracing formulation. Something of the same motivation led me to look forward to reading this volume, hoping that some salvation from the tension of intellectual uncertainty might be offered by the distinguished group of contributors. (Deutsch 1957: 544)

The situation is not much different almost 60 years later. Only the linkages between empirical research and theoretical statements are more tangential than ever.

The focus of the conferences was the concept of "system," and the basic theme was that a unified theory could be developed which subsumed the various systems that are relevant to the study of human behavior, for example, the organic, the psychological, the social, the cultural. (Deutsch 1957: 544)

Aren't we still looking for a viewpoint that would integrate these systems coherently?

The discussion of boundaries centered around an outline presented by Ruesch which classified boundaries in terms of a host of miscellaneous characteristics and in terms of the physiological, psychological, social action, and communication universes. Ruesch's classification has a richness of detail which is appealing, but on closer inspection it looks like a trop in which stretched analogies could ensnare one in rather fruitless discussion if they are taken seriously. (Deutsch 1957: 545)

Curiously, I have the same feeling with Ruesch's theory of communication (or synopsis of it). It looks beautiful on paper, but it feels threatening to put it into any meaningful action. Perhaps that is why there is so little follow-up to Ruesch's work? (But then again, the same could be said for both Morris and Jakobson.)

Useem, John 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. Social Forces 35(4): 376.

The individual scholars, one may infer, were not expected to act, nor did they conceive of themselves as acting, in the capacity of formal representatives of their own disciplines (an illusion not uncommon in many interdisciplinary meetings); hence they were free to explore whatever theoretical aspects of their fields were of interest to them personally and to those present. (Useem 1957: 376)

This is ideally the everyday life of a semiotician.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of this book lies primarily in the insights it offers those sociologists who are curious about the development of theoretical models and the methodological problems involved in the formulation of appropriate concepts. These can be explored with profit with respect to such areas as schemes for linking of the intrapersonal and interpersonal, the significance of the observer for what is observed, the connections between the principles of stability and change within systems, boundaries between systems, etc. In these and comparable topics, the analyses are characterized by sophistication, erudition, and a sensitivity to the frontiers of our total fund of theory about man's behavior. (Useem 1957: 376)

I am interested in appropriate concepts, linking intra- and interpersonal communication, and whatever these scholars (especially Morris and Ruesch, whom I did not dream to meet between the same book covers) have to offer.

Stephenson, William 1959. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. American Journal of Sociology 64(5)

The first of the conferences had before it brief formulations by Spiegel (that everything is interdependent on everything else); by Shakow (there are needs, which may or may not be gratified); Ruesch (that communication theory has much to offer, but all observers must be psychoanalyzed first, otherwise facts are distorted); Talcott Parsons (who provides a neat account of his general theory of action); Laura Thompson (who interjects core values); and by Florence Kluckhohn (who recommends value orientation and a questionnaire as a framework for the comparison of cultures). In the discussion, Weiss remarks that all, so far, is "rationalization," "schemes and diagrams," merely "a statement of the facts." What is missing, he adds, is quantification, to reduce the immense variety of facts to a few more common ones. (Stephenson 1959: 524)

That everything may be dependent on everything else is something E. R. Clay finds to be not inconsistent. That Ruesch holds psychoanalyzing observers up as a contingency seems dubious, but I'll see if I read it. And I'm a bit excited to read "a neat account" of Parsons' theory, which has thus far eluded me.

Jules Henry in a richly good-humored paper asks who in a maternity ward is being kept in a steady, homeostatic state, the new-born baby, the mother, the hospital, American society as a whole, or the world? However, Deutsch restores the serious note and provides, in a paper entitled "Autonomy and Boundaries According to Communication Theory," the first approach to unification of a kind. It would be such as invites the behavioral sciences to talk the language of boundaries, decision points, memory pools, higher-order feed-backs, homeostasis, and the like. (Stephenson 1959: 524)

I wonder how this metalanguage compares to Lotman's boundaries, bifurcation points, texts, self-descriptions, heterogeneity, and the like.

Those of us who are privileged, through this volume, to look in upon the day-by-day (more or less) thinking of so many authorities can at least draw the conclusion that, if a brew of experts in the behavioral sciences is concocted, it will have a polyglot taste. It is difficult otherwise to understand how, after the mixing, the basic results are homeostasis, transaction, information theory, metabolism, reproduction, irreversibility, goal-seeking, sex differentiation, and permanent coupling. (Stephenson 1959: 524-525)

From this selection I'm most interested in transaction and irreversibility - will keep an eye on these.

Gillin, John 1957. General and Theoretical: Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. American Anthropologist 59(6): 1092-1093.

For those who wish a neat package or a finished theoretical system, the present volume will probably prove tiresome and irritating, although Grinker provides a summary at the end. However, the book explicitly represents work in progress and for those, like the present writer, who are interested in the development of such unfinished business it is very stimulating. (Gillin 1957: 1092)

With reviews like these emphasizing the book's irritability it's no wonder that it's not so well known outside of its own era. But alas I am also intested in the development of these ideas (especially, as mentioned above, by Ruesch and Morris).

Fairly general agreement was achieved on three broad "principles" applying to all types of systems having to do with human behavior. The first is the principle of homeostasis, conceived as stability or trend toward stability or equilibrium. The second is the principle of transaction, meaning a reciprocal relationship among all parts of the field and not merely interaction, which is regarded as a relationship between only two systems. The third area of agreement is on communication of information as it operates in various types of systems ranging from the biological to the social and cultural. (Gillin 1957: 1092)

Well, Ruesch was a transactionalist. I'm interested in if and how these principles could be reconciled by the views of Jakobson and Tynyanov (1928).

German Philosophy in 1912

Ewald, Oscar 1913. German Philosophy in 1912. Translated by E. Jordan. The Philosophical Review 22(5): 484-501.

Pure tehory of knowledge is the philosophical tendency which stretches the concept of knowledge so far as to include within it all questions about the being of things. (Ewald 1913: 484)

This seems to be one of the tendencies of social constructivism.

Kant's results are here regarded as less authoritatuve and significant than his method. The method, however, points back to Plato, since it was Plato who first understood that the procedure of thought does not consist in establishing a rigidly fixed system of ideas, but involves unceasing movement. And for Kant also thought is infinite movement. There is nothing that is not involved in this process of motion, there are no objects at rest, no things in themselves, which thought might, as it were, approach from without in order to imprint its form upon them. (Ewald 1913: 484-485)

Compare this to Peirce's infinite semiosis and the equivalence of thought and sign-processes.

There can be nothing absolutely foreign to thought. Such a conception is precluded by the 'Copernican' revolution of view accomplished by Kant, according to which being finds in thought its ultimate explanation. But the categories must not be regarded as fixed schemes and forms of the mind - an error from which Kant was not quite free. They must not be conceived as proceeding from an immovable point, but rather as constituted by the reciprocal functional relationships and determining conditions; they must be resolved again into the living thought process itself which created them. (Ewald 1913: 485)

This is comparable to the structural-functional approach of the russian formalist school and the Prague Linguistic Circle, i.e. the notions of hierarchy and dominant.

Logical thought becomes a world-creating power since it not merely circumscribes the forms of things, but penetrates into their innermost nature. It must not limit itself to a sensuous significance; it must represent a creative act, a dynamic mode of reality. (Ewald 1913: 486)

Again a congeniality with Peirce, who indeed investigated not only perception but the innermost nature of thought-signs.

Neo-Kantianism denies the possibility of transcending consciousness and reaching the thing in itself, on the grounds that subject and object and the relation between them which is exhibited in an act of knowledge are not immediate reality, but merely an expression of a logical act and similar in character to the limiting concept of a 'thing in itself' which is postulated as lying beyond the correlation of subject and object. (Ewald 1913: 486)

Compare this to how in Peirce's scheme the interpretant mediates the subject and object or the representamen and the object.

Quite recently there appears to be a reaction against this extreme logism (Logismus), of which mention was made in last year's report. (Ewald 1913: 486)

A term that can equally well describe Peirce's semeiotic. The translator has clearly laboured under translating the variants of the word "logic" that appear in this paper. In one instance Logismus becomes "logistics" and in another "logicism".

But in thought values the factual character of thought is not exhausted: thinking is always found connected with a thinking being. And so it appears that the organic unity of subject and object, which thelogicist tries to make dependent on thought, is in reality already presupposed by thought. This is indeed the real sense of the Cartesian principle which forms the point of departure for modern philosophy. Even where the value of thought and its results are still under dispute, the reality of thought, and with it of the thinking Ego, seems assured. The logicist will escape this consequence by regarding pure thinking as a completely impersonal process which does not presuppose the empirical subject, but only creates it continuously. But in that case a superpersonal, metaphysical consciousness must be required as a bearer of thought. And really many logicists recognize the fact that they are driven to this consequence, to which, to be sure, they give a very unsafe and ambiguous expression in the notion of 'consciousness in general.' I have already shown in early articles that only a real consciousness can serve as the bearer of a real process of thought, and that this implies in our case therefore a real All-consciousness liket he Hegelian World-Spirit. Doubtless this position is influenced to a much greater extent by metaphysical considerations than are the theories which refer thought merely to an empirical Ego. (Ewald 1913: 487-488)

This is somewhat related to the cultural semiotic definition of culture as, essentially, a thinking device (a kind of cybernetic system) composed of a collective self (a group with a certain unity and self-description) bearing supraindividual consciousness (here, superpersonal consciousness). E.g. "The world "reality" denotes two different phenomena. On the one hand, this reality is phenomena, in the Kantian sense, i.e. it is that reality which correlates to cultur, either resisting it, or merging with it. On the other hand, there is the noumenal sense (in Kantian terminology) in which we may refer to reality as a space which is forever beyond the limits of culture. However, the whole structure of these definitions and terms changes, if at the center of our world we place not one isolated "I" but a more complex organised space of the many mutually dependent correlative "I"'s." (Lotman 2009: 24)

The notion of an external world is not gained through the operation of intelligence, but through a voluntaristic activity. When we meet with an obstacle in our active willing experience, we become immediately aware of a foreign existence. The consciousness of the object is consequently transferred into a pre-logical sphere. (Ewald 1913: 488)

Similarly, Lotman's argument continues that because of the heterogeneity of culture and complex relationships between the translatable and the untranslatable, there are possibilities for a breakthrough into the space beyond the limits (into the extra-semiotic sphere or, here, into the pre-logical sphere). "Thus, the world of semiosis is not fatally locked in on itself: it forms a complex structure, which always "plays" with the space external to it, first drawing it into itself, then throwing into it those elements of its own which have already been used and which have lost their semiotic activity." (Lotman 2009: 24)

In mathematics thought creates continuously its own objects without regard to whether or not these objects belong to any reality at all. In the concrete sciences, on the contrary, thought is bound up with objects which, by virtue of their own nature, prescribe to thought its direction. (Ewald 1913: 490)

An antinomy not unlike this one can be found very generally between the theoretical and the empirical sciences, between prescriptive and descriptive approaches, etc.

The idealistic objection that even in this case objects are not something given ready-made, is justified in so far that thought is never a mere process of mirroring, but is rather a process of constructing and defining. (Ewald 1913: 490)

I recall the memory theory according to which remembering is not simply recalling a memory like picking up a book and rereading the words we already knew were there, but more like a rewriting activity like glancing at the words in a book for a brief moment and then proceeding to paraphrase in new words what you thought that given passage said. E.g. every remembering is re-membering (if that distinction makes sense).

The process of construction and determination, however, is in this case not free, or dominated by merely ideal laws, but is dominated by the actual character of the material. (Ewald 1913: 490)

I could see the Russian Formalists at the time (1914-1924) interpreting this very passage as saying something like "the process of construction and determination of an artistic work is not free or dominated merely by the artistic idea but by the material itself". It is unknown whether this specific passage was ever read by the Formalists, but the terminology and approach sure is similar.

Knowledge consists neither in mirroring nor in creating; it is a comprehension of realities which are not given, but whcih are made manifest through what is given. (Ewald 1913: 491)

In other words, knowledge does not exactly mirror reality nor is it completely removed from it but rather an interplay between the two.

Broder Christiansen shows another direction of interest in his Philosophie der Kunst< (Verlag von Claus und Feddersen, Hanau). His formulation of the problems - in many respects not unlike that of Guyau - remains much closer to reality, especially to the reality of life. Art is self-revelation of the absolute and the meta-physical in man. (Ewald 1913: 493)

Huh. Broder Christiansen and his book, Philosophie der Kunst, supposedly influenced the Russian Formalis (which is why I seeked out for it and found this paper instead), but this is the only statement about it given here, and it doesn't seem to connect with anything in the Formalist thought, as far as I know.

Christiansen's book Vom Selbstbewusstsein (Verlag Friedrich Feddersen, Berlin, pp. 87) may be considered as a completion of his earlier work. By means of an acute process of analysis, the author tries to reach in the course of the discussion the surprising result that there is no immediate knowledge of the spiritual, and no immediacy of self-consciousness; and that not perception, but rather reflection is the instrument through which the self is known. The depths of the soul life remain unknown. The author seeks a proof of this proposition in the fact that psychology, in spite of efforts of more than two thousand years, is not able to point out the elementary processes of the internal world in a way that is free from contradiction. (Ewald 1913: 194)

The direct equivalent of Selbstbewusstsein seems to be "self-confidence", although it is also used in terms of "self-consciousness" and "self-awareness". In any case it concerns autocommunication and these phrases here indicate that no amount of self-communication will reveal the greatest depths of the self.

For pragmatism it is thecontent of a conception, its serviceableness, whic hgives to the concept its truth-value; "for Goethe it is the process of conceiving, the living function which conception calls into play in connection with spiritual development." (Simmel 1913 in Ewald 1913: 500)

This does not sound like the pragmatism that I know.

Lévy-Bruhli arvustused

Kirkpatrick, Clifford 1936. Review of Promitives and the Supernatural by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 184: 243-244.

Professor Lévy-Bruhl has written another book in support of the thesis that the mental life of primitive peoples is totally different from our own. One feels, however, that There is something almost primitive in the way Professor Levy-Bruhl adheres to this thesis in the face of seemingly cogent criticisms. He argues that he must take facts that support his case out of their settings and from widely scattered tribes, because it is evidence of primitive mentality for which he is looking. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 243)

See on päris kena ümberpööramine. Umbes samamoodi võiks võtta Marie Poland Fish'i töö ja öelda, et there's something fishy about it. Kriitika ise on siin tegelikult huvitav, sest see osutab metodoloogilisele probleemile: kui sa uurid mentaliteeti, siis kas sa uurid kindla kultuuri mentaliteeti või, nagu Levy-Bruhl nähtavasti on teinud, primitiivset mentaliteeti kui sellist. Veel enam, siit jääb tegelikult mulje, et Lévy-Bruhlil oli kindel ettekujutus, mida primitiivne mentaliteet endast kujutas ja siis otsis fakte mis toetasid seda ettekujutust. Natukene tagurpidi töötamine.

Either Professor Levy-Bruhl is selecting his evidence according to the much discredited comparative method, or he is using the word "primitive" in a vague and mystical sense which does no credit to the Aristotelian logic which supposedly renders the primitive mind incomprehensible. If the term "primitive" be regarded as identical with the term "preliterate" as used by Faris, the problem is greatly clarified. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 243)

Nii võib tõepoolest olla, aga kuna mõiste "primitiivne" hüljati antropoloogia poolt juba ammu ja ma ei ole sel teemal ise midagi lugenud siis on raske öelda, kas preliterate ikkagi on primitiivne. Võib-olla primitiivne kirjaoskuse seisukohast, aga see oleks ehk samaväärne lausungiga "rahvastel, kel pole kirja, on vähe arenenud kiri".

There is infinitely less pragmatic justification for the collection, since there is no attempt at analysis in terms of mental association or imperatives of group living. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 244)

Vaimsed seosed on juba päris hea mõiste, aga kuidas neid analüüsida? Semiootikuna tahaks öelda, et sümbolite kaudu.

There is hardly an example cited in the book which could not be paralleled in the superstitions of Western European culture, in the mental processes of children, and in the delusions of the insane. Even the superstitions and practices of American college students, Aristotelian logic notwithstanding, bear a striking resemblance to those of preliterates. There is reason to think that the human mind the word over has components which are infantile, emotionalized, and autistic. The anxious gut, the vivid imagination, and the helter-skelter interplay of associated ideas undisciplined by formal categories of causality and objectivity are fundamental human traits. (Kirkpatrick 1936: 244)

See näib tõepoolest tõenäoline. Infantile on samas mitte ainult lapsik, aga infantia on ka kõneoskamatu (Sprachlose). Nii inatiilne, emotsionaliseeritud kui ka autistlik näivad selles võtmes olevat rohkem või vähem seotud mitteverbaalsusega. Need omadused on omased kõigile inimestele enne kui nad õpivad rahustama oma kõhtu, hoidma kujutlusvõimet vaos ja distsiplineerima ideede seostumist põhjuslikkuse ja objektiivsuse kategooriatega. Samas, on see vajalik? Kunstiinimesed näivad just sellisest "primitiivsusest" midagi positiivset loovat.

Benedict, Ruth 1928. Review of L'âme primitive by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. The Journal of Philosophy 25(26): 717-719.

The "soul" here considered is not a religious concept, but the spirit of man, its relation to the social conventions of the group, its boundaries of personality, its fate at death. (Benedict 1928: 717)

X rahva hing. (Supraindividuaalne) hing on selles tähenduses vististi võrdväärdne rahvusliku karakteri või iseloomuga.

In contrast to his two preceding books, Prefessor Lévy-Bruhl no longer insists on the contrast between the "completely rational" motivations of our own civilization and the pre-rational theories and representations of the primitive. Nor is he using as formerly his favorite term of "collective representations" for which "cultural traits" seems to be by this time a more definitive designation and in wider use. (Benedict 1928: 718)

Ka Eesti "kehakeel" moodustub sisuliselt "eel-ratsionaalsetest teooriatest ja representatsioonidest", aga ratsionaalsuse aspekt on siiski vaieldav (või on asi selles, et ma ei tea täpselt mida ratsionaalsus endast kujutab). Mõistete asendumine viitab ilmselt antropoloogia arengule, niiet "kollektiivsetest representatsioonidest" kindlamaks ja laiemalt kasutatud tähistuseks osutub "kultuurijoon" (või "kultuuriline tunnus").

Professor Lévy-Bruhl in all his books has cleared the way for further research by his insistence on the irrationality of human procedure, and in his latest book it is noteworthy that he has further contributed by omitting our own civilization as the shining exception to this rule. (Benedict 1928: 719)

Märksõna: etnotsentrism. "Teised on irratsionaalsed, meie oleme ratsionaalsed." Selle hoiaku oleme õnneks ületanud. Nüüd on ülesandeks pigem oma kultuuri irratsionaalsuste uurimine, aga siin kerkib metodoloogia probleem jälle esile, sest kuidas uurida ennast? Enda suhtes ollakse ju poolpime (inimene pidavat ennast peeglist vaadates end kuus korda nägusamana nägema kui teised), st oma kultuuri irratsionaalsusi on raske täheldada, sest see tundub "loomulik".

Wright, William Kelley 1923. Review of La mentalité primitive by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. The Philosophical Review 32(4): 419-421.

The words 'savage' and 'primitive' are used more or less interchangeably in accordance with popular custom; no thesis is based on such an identification. Nor does the author intend to imply that savages have a common mentality is specific details. 'La mentalité primitive' is simply employed as a conventient term to designate certain mental traits which are common among savages and are much rarer among civilized men; the term has only this abstract significance. The author's positions clearly imply that wherever there are differences in custom and environment in the savage world, mental traits vary correspondingly; and he would probably be the first to insist that future ethnographic research will disclose variations in mental traits. (Wright 1923: 419)

Jälle: vaimsed jooned, kalduvused või tunnused. Abstraktne tõepoolest.

In calling savage mentality 'prelogical' Professor Lévy-Bruhl now makes it clear that he does not claim that savages are wholly incapable of reasoning as we do, nor that they have defective memories and torpid intellects. They neglects our methods of observation and inference because they are indifferent to them. This indifference is accounted for by their very different mental habits in consequence of their peculiar social conditions and customs. (Wright 1923: 419)

Metslased on "tsiviliseeritud inimeste" ratsionaalsuse ja loogika suhtes ükskõiksed. (Mul on midagi ühist metslastega!) Seda ükskõiksust selgitab erinevus vaimsetes harjumustes mis tulenevad omapärastest/kummalistest ühiskondlikest tingimustest ja tavadest/kommetest.

Living, thinking, feeling, moving, and acting in a world of collective representations so different from our mental outlook, savages are convinced that the events of most concern to themselves are primarily caused by "mystical and invisible powers." For instance, what we should call the couse of a death - the thrust of a spear, the bite of a crocodile, or the action of a poison - is to the savage a phenomenon of little moment. The real cause is the action of an "invisible power" probably set into motion by a sorcerer. (Wright 1923: 420)

Vaimne väljavaade! Ma peaksin hakkama kogume erinevaid mentaliteedi-mõisteid. Mida saab teha kollektiivsete representatsioonide (kultuuri) maailmas? Elada, mõelda, tunda, liikuda ja tegutseda. Jääb mulje, et kõik eelnimetatud kuuluvad kultuuri valdkonda. Mis puudutab metslaste ebaloogilist maailmavaadet kus tegutsevad "müstilised ja nähtamatud jõud" ei ole väga erinev meie omast. Vähemalt akadeemilises kontekstis võib jääda mulje, et paljud teoreetikud on reaalsusest peaaegu täielikult irdunud ja elavad müstilises ja nähtamatus maailmas kus võim, diskursus, sugu, patriarhia, ideoloogia, vms kontseptsioon toimib sortsi rollis.

But for savage mentality, causes (impersonal and invisible powers) are often extra-temporal and extra-spatial and effect action at a distance. The effect is a visible phenomenon definitely located in a particular spot at a particular time; the cause of this effect is invisible, mystical, extra-spatial, and extra-temporal. Neither space nor time is homogeneous; nor are they necessary media for causal action (Chap. II). For pre-logical mentality what is seen in a dream is real; the evidence afforded by a dream is often preferred to that of a witness; an agent is often held responsible for acts done in his own dreams and in those of others; a person can be in two places at the same time (Chap. III). (Wright 1923: 420)

Hm. Mu tüdruksõber oli metslane! Unenägude reaalsuse kohta kirjutasid hilisemad antropoloogid rohkem ja idee oli unenägude struktuuri kaudu mõtestada hõimu terve kultuuri struktuuri. Siinne toon on "oh, need rumalad metslased, millises kummalises ja lapsikus maailmas nad elavad", aga neid kirjeldusi lugedes tahaks küsida, et kas selline maailm ei ole mitte ihaldusväärne? Olla jälle laps ja näha sündmistu tegelike, argieluliste ja morjendavate põhjuste taga müstilisi jõude? Miks ma eksamil läbi kukkusin? Kuri haridusvaim pani minu peale loitsu!

[...] a favourable omen guarantees success (p. 131); for it is not merely a sign (signe) but a cause, or rather sign and cause are indistinguishable (p. 143). (Wright 1923: 420)

Mingis mõttes ongi. Ettekuulutus võib olla self-fulfilling prophecy. Õppejõud ütles: "Ah, sul läheb hästi." väga usaldusväärse ilme ja tooniga ja sooritadki eksami hästi. Õppejõud on muidugi liiga isikustatud. Nägin unenäos, et läks hästi...

This book is professedly merely an anthropological study; it does not go into questions of logic and metaphysics. However, the significance of Professor Lévy-Bruhl's views for these subjects is most important. If his contentions are sound - and they are supported by vast erudition and a great wealth of empirical evidence - it follows that the Kantian view must be abandoned that space and time and the categories (in the forms that we know them at least) are constitutive of all human thought and experience. In the light of this book, pragmatists may urge that space, time, the Kantian categories, and perhaps even the very laws of identity and contradiction themselves, are tools of thought, 'hypotheses,' that have gradually emerged into human consciousness from a cultural level in which they either were not present in the forms that we know them, or at any rate were ignored in favor of other categories such as the 'law of participation, which among us only persist in mystical religious doctrines, superstitions, and toher 'survivals.' In the opinion of the reviewer, such considerations do not prove that categories are wholly subjective or capricious; they are human devices by which men have sought to adjust themselves to the independent physical environment. Our categories have gradually supplanted those of primitive man because they have been found to effect this adjustment more successfully. (Wright 1923: 420-421)

Kõlab päris usutavalt. Samas ei tea ma jällegi Kanti kategooriatest peaaegu, et mitte midagi. Küll aga usun, et nö "mõtte-tööriistad" on kultuurilised. Eks näeb kas mentaalsuse semiootika puudutab seda või mitte.

Kofoid, Charles A. 1937. Review of Primitives and the Supernatural by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Isis 27(1): 104-105.

It is well organized and skillfully related presentation of the primitives' unreal world, which to their untutored minds is capricious, unpredictable, unstable, and terrifying. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

See on öeldud justkui tsiviliseeritud inimene, või vähemalt kindlat tüüpi või kindlas olukorras tsiviliseeritud inimene, ei võiks kogeda maailma sarnaselt "ebareaalsena".

The communal life of the primitives is profoundly influenced and organized by this fear of the unseen. The whole social group combines in ceremonies, dances, masques, songs, rhythm, and music, in collective ecstasis in propitiation of the unseen powers. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

Siin on väärtuslik see sõnastus, fear of the unseen. Nimelt näen ma võimalust arutada selle vastanduse, fear of the seen, kaudu ühte nüanssi nö "mitteverbaalse eetika" juures. Eriti seostub see Batesoni tähelepanekuga, et meile ei meeldi kui meie käitumist sõnades kirjeldatakse ja, et kultuurist sõltub see kui väga meeldib või sobib inimestele, et neid vaadatakse. (Bateson väitis siinkohal, et tema-aegsetele Ameeriklastele ei meeldinud, kui vaadati nende jalgu, sest need paljastasid liiga palju informatsiooni.) Selle vastaskülg on see, kui palju tahetakse näha. On olukordi milles me "vaatame kõrvale" või "pöörame pilgu". Selle jaoks võib muidugi olla erinevaid põhjusi, nt vestlemise ajal vaadatakse kõrvale, sest ilma teisele otsa vaatamata on kergem mõttetööga tegeleda (Argyle uuris selle välja), aga on ka muid võimalusi millest nii mõndagi saab kahtlemata ka eetikaga (niivõrd lõdvas tähenduses kui see ka ei oleks siinkohal mõeldud) seostada. Igaks juhuks täägin: #nonverbal ethics.

These same mysterious misfortunes and all others lead the primitives to seek a source nearer to hand than the unseen powers and to attribute magical powers to members of the immediate society, to the witch, the sorcerer, or the evil eye of man, or even to plants, animals, or inanimate objects. Witchcraft is thus the creation of the affective category of the supernatural. (Kofoid 1937: 104)

"Hohoho, küll nad on ikka primitiivsed," aga kuri silm, niivõrd metafooriline kui ta ka ei ole, on päris. St kui keegi vaatab sulle hirmuäratava grimassiga otsa, veel enam, jälitab sind pilguga, väljendades seeläbi ähvardust ja nö malicious intent'i, siis see võib täiesti vabalt päeva ära rikkuda. Ka vastupidine on muidugi tõsi - jalutad tänaval ja keegi mööduja naeratab sulle nii soojalt, et endal tuleb ka tahtmatult nägu naerule. Mimees.

Ames, E. S. 1926. Review of Primitive Mentality by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. International Journal of Ethics 36(4): 429-430.

The method is that of selecting certain categories - such as the native's limitation to perceptual rather than conceptual experience, his restriction to a small number of objects, his indifference to secondary causes, his unreserved belief in mystic and invisible forces - and then illustarting these from various peoples. (Ames 1926: 429)

Võib juhtuda ka vastupidine, et tajukogemuse asemel põhinetakse "kontseptuaalsetel kogemustel". Nii võib minu arvates juhtuda teoreetikuga kes hakkab oma teooriatesse uskuma nii väga, et vastukäiv tajukogemus jääb märkamata.

It is not concerned with the life of one people, but rather with the lower levels of culture as manifest in several regions. (Ames 1926: 429)

Mis on need madalamad tasandid? Mille poolest on nad madalamad? Mille suhtes on nad madalamad?

The final impression, however, is that the author is right in his insistence that the primitives live and move in a radically different system of ideas and emotions from those of civilized man. (Ames 1926: 429)

Ideede osa on arusaadav, aga emotsioonide osa on universaalsete emotsioonide valguses kaheldav.

Moreover, the dead are not dead in the sense of being without animation. Apparently they live as long as they are remembered. A great chief thus lives longer than a common man because the rites and stories concerning him may be longer maintained. (Ames 1926: 430)

Kas selles pole mitte tõetera? Öeldakse, et surnud elavad mälestustes edasi. Seda enam, et kirjasõna võimaldab meil "suhelda" surnutega - ka selle arvustuse autor ei ole enam tõenäoliselt elavate kirjas, aga tema arvamus elab edasi.

An old fishing net, full of holes, which has been used successfully to catch fish is better than an unbroken one which has never been used successfully. (Ames 1926: 430)

Irratsionaalne! Uuem on alati parem! Isegi kui vana endiselt töötab, uuem on alati parem. (Buy) new shit, or fix what I have temaatika.

White doctors, after treating sick natives for weeks, have found that the natives expected the doctors to make them presents. It was a great inconvenience to be in bed so long, and the doctor brought in all sorts of alien influences. (Ames 1926: 430)

Jällegi tõsi. Võõral inimesel on alati võõras mõju. Ma kujutan ette, et kingitusel on siin tegelikult faatiline funktsioon - maandada pingeid, justkui öelda "ma olen nagu sina"; või Batesoni μ funktsiooni kasutada, siis kingitus teadvustab, et on suhe ja see suhe on positiivne (meeldiv ja kasulik - mitte ainult praktiline, Lääne arsti seisukohalt).

Lenoir, Raymond 1939. Review of L'expérience mystique et les symboles chez les primitifs by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. American Journal of Sociology 44(4): 580-582.

For the primitive mind the data or evidences for this kind of experience are provided by such phenomena as chance, play or circumstance, unusual occurrences, dreams, relations between the living and the dead, and the visions from the world of the invisible. This reality, always present yet occult, is apprehended symbolically. But by imagined and dramatized participation in it, these symbols become the medium for the magical operations. (Lenoir 1939: 580)

Lugu on üsna sarnane meie kultuuri sümbooliliste faktidega. Võim, sugu, ideoloogia jne on kõikjalviibivad, aga sümbolite vahendusel tajutav.

Sometimes it is localized in time and space; sometimes it lingers in a diffuse and vague state in the mythical world which is not confined by laws of time; or sometimes in the mystic realms. (Lenoir 1939: 580)

Huvitav kas internetti saaks kirjeldada samalaadselt. "Lugesin internetist..." - "Lugesid kust?" - "Ööm, õhus ja juhtmete kaudu liikuvatest andmevoogudest." - "Jaa, jaa."

But do not mental concepts correspond to social functions established by the societies of antiquity? The contrast between certainty and doubt, life and death, wakefulness and dream life, luck and skill, all so familiar to the Greeks, testifies to the intimate dependence persisting between concepts of thought and the objects of perception. A social organization, more or less closely knit according to its degree of concentration, includes both work and play activities, which are a mild form of conflict that creates the sanction for inequalities of power, of talents, and of personal quality. Such a society then produces the subject matter of its visions from its collective imagination, although the interpretations are supplied by the dreamers themselves. (Lenoir 1939: 581)

Vaimsed kontseptid (As opposed to what? Physical concepts?). Kontseptsioonide ja ühiskondlike funktsioonide kohtumine on samas üks selliseid kokkupuutepunkte mille kaudu saab kehakeele ja mentaalsuse ühildamist katsetada. St kehalised käitumised mängiksid siin tajuobjektide (objects of perception) rolli. Võib isegi järele katsuda väidet, et käitumise tõlgendamisel usaldatakse ennekõike kollektiivseid kujutlusi.

Magic acts represent their sentiments and demands in simplified and conventionalized forms that accompany the overt gestures. Such manipulation juxtaposes a series of dramatized gestures with the chant, of which it is an expression, in order to communicate the meaning of otherwise unintelligible words. This recognition of similarities is indeed a very old conception. Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato employ it to explain sensation and even thought. In the societies in which the power of abstraction is only moderately developed. and does not therefore stifle empirical observation, such "analogies" reveal so strikingly these empirical similarities that they cannot but act as a stimulus to thought and to mental development. It imputes to colors and forms the ability to express the unknown, thereby creating enduring emotions and constituting for the senses a significant language. The symbol, therefore, remains as it had already been defined by Kant in his Critique of Judgment, namely, a representation based on analogy, containing nothing that pertains to the intuition of the object, and consisting only in the affective reaction to it. (Lenoir 1939: 581-582)

Sümboli ja anoloogi seost sellisel viisil kohtan esmakordselt. Selle märkuse juurde tasub tagasi pöörduda kui olen sümbolist teadlikum.

Benedict, Ruth 1925. Review of Primitive Mentality by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. Journal of Social Forces 3(3): 557-558.

Professor Levy-Bruhl has attempted this very thing. But for him the moral points all all in one special direction; he has given himself at the outset to the "world of difference that lies between primitive mentality and our own"; a difference summed up in the inability of savages to attain the completely logical motivations, the habits of thought that "proceed by general abstract ideas," the orderly and intelligible notion of things, that we boast in our white civilization. Even in 1910 when Professor Levy-Bruhl published his first book elaborating this point of view, there were those who felt chagrined at the boast; now after thirteen years that have included the war and "reconstruction," it seems an echo from the complacency of a no-longer-existing world. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Jääb mulje, et "tsiviliseeritud" inimese loogilisus osutus sotsiaalseks konstruktsiooniks mis Maailmasõjas varises kokku.

The book is entirely untroubled by skepticism as to the rationality of modern behavior. It accumulates great stores of evidence to show the disapprobation and sense of ill-omen that are occasioned in primitive society by uncustomary behavior. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Jätkub, et Levy-Bruhl ei kahelnud hetkekski, et tema tsivilisatsioon on loogiline. Ebahariliku käitumise pidamine halvaks endeks ei ole küll midagi väga märkimisväärset. Kui Toomas Nipernaadi toob Habahanneselt kaasa Kudisilmale andmiseks mullika ja Lokile kleite siis raputab Kudisilm pead ja pomiseb omaette: "Ega see hääd tähenda, ega see tõesti hääd tähenda!" (Gailit 1928: 36).

The assumption is everywhere implicit that all the acts and beliefs of modern Europeans have been built up from the beginning on a basis of dispassionate investigation and scrupulous logic.
And yet the materal gathered in this book is of interest from an almost opposite point of view. It is not the differences between primitive mentality and our own that the citations convey; it is the sameness. (Benedict 1925: 558)

Täpselt sama mõju on tekitanud minus need arvustused. Viisid kuidas need "metslased" meile sarnanevad torkavad rohkem silma.

But the essential difference between them and us is not the difference between perfect logic and the lack of logic. It is our complete familiarity with out own culture which makes all its familiar concepts "natural" and "logical" to us, while those of all other civilizations seem, in the terminology of this book, "prelogical." (Benedict 1925: 558)

Lõpuks ütleb üks arvustaja ka selle välja.

Reichard, Gladys A. 1936. Review of La mythologie primitive: Le Monde Mythique des Australiens et des Papous by Lucien Levy-Bruhl. American Anthropologist 38(2): 329-330.

We could cite many examples from our own society in which Levy-Bruhl's concept of participation is illustrated. A locomotive engineer may so thoroughly identify himself with his engine that his whole life is void if circumstances require that he give it up. He treats it like a person and even refers to it as "she." I have seen people pat an automobile as they would a horse or dog. (Reichard 1936: 330)

Viimaks ka näide.

The study of culture as well as of psychology has tought us that the two are so intimately interrelated that they can never be entirely separated. Levy-Bruhl's treatise implies that they can. (Reichard 1936: 330)

Kena.

Some PPR reviews

Kaufmann, Fritz 1957. Review of An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture by Ernst Cassirer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8(2): 283-287.

The present writer had looked forward to this review as part of a dialogue which has gone on between Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology since the earliest writings of Edmund Husserl. Cassirer himself once praised the discussion between Natorp and Husserl as a true paragon of philosophical criticism in point of form, content, and general fairness (Kantstudien, XXX, p. 286). The spirit of this tradition as well as respect and admiration for one of the most venerable figures in recent philosophy, one of the most encyclopaedic of modern minds, cannot but animate these brief and unfortunately posthumous remarks on Cassirer's book - one of the latest and, peprhaps, last documents of the Marburg Neo-Kantian school. (Kaufmann 1957: 283)

My opinion of Cassirer is similar - he seems like a polymath of bygone days. I was quite happy to find out that S. K. Langer translated Cassirer's Language and Myth to English in 1946.

Reiterating the Neo-Kantian emphasis on function as against substance, and considering the objects and patterns of our world as products of objectification, Cassirer defines man as a functional unity, i.e., as the animal symbolicum, distinguished by the gift of symbolical expression. "Symbolization," not "objectification" is the term used, above all because Cassirer is not exclusively interested in the highest results of transcendental synthesis - the canons and objects of pure knowledge, pure will, and pure feeling. Following suggestions in Paul Natorp's Psychology, he extends the range of the transcendental method and the analysis of their "inner forms" from science, morals and art to spheres with a "lower" objective status - like myth, religion and language. All these realms bear witness to the "symbolic" power of man - "the power to build up a world of his own, an 'ideal' world" (p. 228). It is in the formation of these symbols and this world of culture that man's true nature is revealed. (Kaufmann 1957: 284)

This sounds unsurprisingly Lotmanian. Cassirer also gave the impetus to symbolism - e.g. Langer's philosophy of symbolic forms and transformations.

Knowledge and the world of knowledge are one: no thing but only man himself is caught in the net of relations which constitute his "symbolic universe," the "ideal world" of his own making and his own life. While Cassirer cannot bud admit that the very meaning of an ideal world presupposes a real one, he insists that man cannot "confront reality immediately" and as it were "face to face": "he cannot see anything except by the interposition of [an] artificial medium" (p. 25). But it is problematic at least, how autonomous thought is to fulfil this mediatory task by way of mere logical constructions. (Kaufmann 1957: 285)

Cassirer was a Kantian. And his standpoint seems valid. Even such an alectic phenomenon as "nonverbal communication" cannot be "seen" without the "artificial medium" of language and text(s about nonverbal communication).

Though the illustrative schema (pp. 23 f.) is taken from a German book, Johannes von Uexküll's Theoretical Biology, and the anthropological accents betray the influence of, and the reaction to, German Existentialism, the emphasis on culture as a medium between subject and object strikes a new, American note in Cassirer's work. It is apparently with regard to this change of method that Cassirer says in the Preface that the old problems are now seen "in a new sight" and "from a different angle." Still, this change does not come as a complete surprise. The compatibility of Kantianism with different brands of pragmatism had been shown in praxis by thinkers like Dewey and C. I. Lewis. (Kaufmann 1957: 285-286)

And from here stems a "philosophy in a new key", e.g. semiotics (and, especially, cultural semiotics).

The sovereignty of the mind in building up worlds of its own according to its own immaterial laws leads to autonomous realms of culture which were conceived originally as ends in themselves and by no means as mere intermediaries between stimulus and response. (Kaufmann 1957: 286)

I think culture as an intermediary between stimulus and response is best exemplified by Ekman and Friesen's "display rules."

Each of these realms represents a specific unit of synthesis. The synthetic unity of these realms themselves - the unity of culture - had been a grave problem to Cohen and Natorp; it was apparently of less concern to Cassirer. He was satisfied with pointing out quite rightly the unifying function of the "objective mind." Science, art, language, religion, etc. are organs of communication between man and man, carriers of tradition from generation to generation. Through them we are enabled to share in, and contribute to, a community of thought and feeling (p. 244 ff.). But a final unity of mankind cannot be the accidental result of human striving in the different ways of symbolic expression: it must be a final cause which ties together our mental functions and activities for one supreme effort. (Kaufmann 1957: 286)

Compare this to Lotman's view of culture as a supra-individual organism.

In concluding I wish to rehabilitate the idea of the animal symbolicum in a way reminiscent of the conception of man as homo Dei. Man is a symbolical being not so much becaise he is a maker; rather, he is a maker because he is made "in the image, after the likeness" of God. This statement must not be given an orthodox theological interpretation. (Kaufmann 1957: 287)

An unorthodox interpretation would be that of the Ancient Aliens theory. The movie Prometheus is a good example of this: the Engineers created humans and humans in turn created artificial intelligence.

Farber, Marvin 1947. Review of Soviet Philosophy: A Survey of Principles by John Somerville. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8(2): 280-283.

Mention will be made, finally, of the distinction between aesthetics and the philosophy of art (pp. 116 f.). As a result of the tendency to identify the philosophy of art with aesthetics, "the problem of beauty has been made the central, asd sometimes the only, problem of the study." The narrowness and dangers of aesthetics thus conceived are rightly pointed out by the author. The philosophy of art is depicted as being breader and as including aesthetics. The problem of the origin and noture of art, and the part played by art among social institutions, fall to the philosophy of art. But why do not such problems fall to positive social science? The philosopher of art, per se, should be aware of the pertinent findings of the special cultural sciences. Moreover, he may himself be a special scholar in the relevant fields in addition to being a philosopher of art. Thus the philosopher of art in the Soviet Union may deal with questions concerning the relations of art to the rest of society, "in terms of roots and consequences." The philosopher of art must indeed use materials from the positive special sciences. The doctrine that "art is largely a reflection of social reality" requires that social relations and problems enter into the material of the philosophy of art. In the interest of clarity, the reader will wish to have a differentia, or a set of differentiae, of the philosophy of art. When "vulgar sociology" is criticized (pp. 120, 121, e.g.), is it not supposed to be replaced by a sound sociological analysis? In other words, does historical materialism serve here qua philosophy or qua social science? (Farber 1947: 282-283)

The only philosopher of art that I'm currently aware of is S. K. Langer, and she influenced (even if indirectly through other members of the TMS) Lotman who did consider the "cultural sciences" and the relation of art to society. I like the term "vulgar sociology" because I can probably tease my sociologist friend with it.

Demos, Raphael 1947. Review of The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding by F. S. C. Northrop. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8(2): 276-280.

Consider the author's account of Locke, the arch-exponent of the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon viewpoint. In criticizing this account, my object is not to show that Locke is right, but to indicate that our author's strictures are invalid on many points. (a) We are told by him that Locke views the self as a self-sufficient substance, an atom in a void. We are also told that Locke reduces the functioning of the self to that of receiving impressions from the external world. I submit that the two propositions are inconsistent. Surely if the very nature of the self is to be acted on by something else, then its essence is relational - an essence disclosed in its relations and not in any substantial properties. (b) We are told by the author that Locke thinks of society as artificial, not natural, and also that Locke has patterned his view of society upon that of Newtonian science concerning the physical world. Again, I submit that the two parts of this sentence are mutually inconsistent. (Demos 1947: 276-277)

The first seems like a radical statement of individualism, the second reminds me of Cassirer's statement on Hume that the self is a "bundle of perceptions".

The reader will sympathize with the author's contention that society is conceived falsely when described as a collection of atomic individuals. At the same time, the sympathetic reader cannot help feeling that there are serious difficulties in Mr. Northrop's own view of society as an organic whole; it is such a doctrine which, in fact, has led to the German versions of totalitarianism. Surely the problem is how to establish mutual obligation among individuals without denying their freedom. (Demos 1947: 277)

Alas these are the socio-philosophical problems that I know not what to do with.

Every natural entity contains an aesthetic and a theoretic component; thus, the self has a body no less than a mind. (Demos 1947: 278)

This is a bit more familiar. But if I were to employ a very general and not at all useful approach, I'd say that the self emerges between the body and the mind. This is, in effect, saying nothing.

Moral values are relative and transitory; why then take them seriously? - so reasons the Oriental, according to Mr. Northrop. (Demos 1947: 279)

I'd take the same position. But as my conversations with Joonas have proven, I know nothing about morals and ethics.

Kineesika ja konteksti arvustused

Järgnevad on raamatuarvustuste lugemistest kogutud infokillud Birdwhistelli teose kohta. Antud valik arvustusi pärineb internetiarhiivist jstor.org

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication by Ray L. Birdwhistell
Review by: Edward E. Hunt, Jr.
American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Aug., 1971), pp. 948-950
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/671381 .

Kultuurilisti mustreid uurivatest teadlastest kõneles ka Margaret Mead Semiotica esimeses köites ja seal tõi ta üles sama ülemineku:

Kinesics, linguistics, and ethology are now undergoing what Birdwhistell calls a "phenomenological revolution" through the use of cinema, television, and tape recordings, and particularly equipment for replaying events in slow motion and still pictures. This instrumentation reveals a wealth of subtle, almost instantaneous kinesic patterns and allows the study of body regions both piecemeal and in combination with each other and with speech. (Hunt 1971: 948)

Birdwhistelli notatsioonisüsteemi võib nimetada ka "kinegraafiliseks tähestikuks".

Birdwhistell rightly considers kinesics as more than "paralinguistic" behavior. To him, communication has many channels such as body contact, olfaction, taste, and proprioception, but speech and kinesics so far are the most feasible channels for study. Indeed, he uses somewhat similar concepts in linguistics and kinesics, which I interpret as follows: Kine: a limited class of motion in one body region (equivalent to phone in linguistics); Kineme: a class of alternative, substitutable kines (allokines), not necessarily in the same body region (analogous to phoneme); Kinemorph: an assemblage of kines in a given body region (comparable to natural class in the theory of sound production); Kinemorpheme: one or more kinemes which contribute minimal isolable meaning to a kinesic communication (similar to morpheme in linguistics). (Hunt 1971:949)

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication. by Ray L. Birdwhistell; Erving Goffman; Dell Hymes
Review by: Weston La Barre
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 5 (Mar., 1972), pp. 999-1000
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776944 .

The fear of data is the beginning of wisdom. And these data are formidable indeed, with a virtually clinical complexity. The reader ready to protest at the horrendously difficult kineme-notation system should keep this complexity in mind and remember that serious involvement with kinesics is no easy amateurism but often sheer hard work. (La Barre 1972: 999)

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication by Ray L. Birdwhistell
Review by: Adam Kendon
The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), pp. 441-455
Published by: University of Illinois Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1420845

By this systemic view of communication, anything that anyone does in the presence of another must be considered as potentially part of the system. Speech and gesture, posture and orientation, touch and relative position in space - all must be taken into account if we are to comprehend communication. We cannot at the outset of our investigations decide not to attend to certain aspects of behavior. So long as it is detectable by the other, it must be presumed communicative until proven otherwise. That is, though we must exclude nothing at the outset, one of the outcomes of our work would be to show what aspects of behavior are not part of the system. (Kendon 1972: 442)

In Birdwhistell's approach, one begins not with an interest in the emotions but with an interest in the face itself. One would ask first, What are the various things the face does? One would then proceed to determine, by careful observation, the various settings in which repeatedly observed units of facial behavior can be seen to occur, and the question would always be, WHat functions for the interaction do these differentiable units of facial behavior have? From this point of view, in other words, the question of what inner state is supposedly made manifest in the face is not relevant. What is relevant is what difference different facial displays make to the organization of the occasions of interaction in which they occur. (Kendon 1972: 444)

Birdwhistell himself, in the book here reviewed, offers an essay on the smile. In it he points out how the smile in itself ia s highly complex phenomenon, with a wide variety of social functions, and that to consider it merely, in this phrase, as a "visible transform of an inner physiological state" would be to miss entirely its significance as a social signal. He also refers, in various places in the book, to how movements in the face may be brought into play in association with speech, and to how these movements, along with movements of the head and libs, have a complex relationship both with the structuring of the speech as an activity and also with its content. Facial displays can serve to mark out points of emphasis in speech, they can serve to mark off whole segments of speech as distinct units or as contained or embedded units, and they can also provide a sort of commentary on what is being said. If we watch the faces of listeners, too, we can see that nods, smiles, frowns, raised eyebrows, appear frequently in some circumstances and are an important part of the repertoire of the listeners' behaviors and serve to regulate the behavior of the speaker. (Kendon 1972: 445)

Siit ilmneb oluline punkt: eristus nö traditsioonilise (afekte uuriva psühholoogilise) lähenemise ja Birdwhistelli rajatud interaktsioonilise lähenemise vahel:

...Ekman's investigations follow the traditional approach - that he is interested in the face only insofar as it seems to allow one to apprehend the inner states of the individual. He does not ask, as Birdwhistell would, How is the face used in interaction? Nor do his findings contribute to any answer to this. When Ekman uses the phrase 'expression of emotion,' he uses it in the traditional sense that the emotion is something 'inside' the individual that 'comes out' on the face in a particular way. Birdwhistell, on the other hand, approaching behavior in terms of its communicative function, rarely discusses emotion as such. (Kendon 1972: 445-446)

Siit ilmneb, et kineemilistel konstruktsioonidel on raamistik, ehk pidevad aspektid käitumisest nagu poos ja suhteline positsioon ruumis. See meikib väga palju senssi ja teisalt ütleb, et Judi Jamesi tõlgendus, et transfix on "vesteldes liikumatuks jäämine kui teine vahele segab", on kineesika seisukohast väär:

A stance, it will be seen, is not a construction of smaller elements but an element in its own right, an element which, as I have indicated, functions to 'frame' sequences of constructions. It is important that this be brought out, for some readers of Birdwhistell get the impression that he regards all of body motion, as it functions in communication, as beuing built up of elementary units, or kinemes. On the contrary, the constructions that do emerge from combinations of kinemes must be joined together and they must always occur within a 'transfixing' frame, which is supplied by such enduring aspects of behavior as posture and relative position in space. (Kendon 1972: 449)

In some ways, Birdwhistell's view of meaning is closest to that known as the context-of-situation theory, originally stated by Malinowski (1923) and later developed by J. R. Firth (1957). (Kendon 1972: 454)

Kirjandus:

• Dittman, A. T., and Llewellyn, Lynn A. 1969. Body movement and speech rhythm in social conversation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 11:98-106
• Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 1970. Ethology: The biology of behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson
• Malinowski, B. 1923. The problem of meaning in primitive languages. In The meaning of meaning, by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, appendix 3. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
• Scheflen, A. E. 1964. The significance of posture in communication systems. Psychiatry 27:316-331
Scheflen, A. E. 1965. Stream and structure of communicational behaviour. Philadelphia: Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute.