Augustine On Lying

Gramigna, Remo 2011. Augustine On Lying: A Semiotic Analysis. University of Tartu, Department of Semiotics. Master's Thesis

"a false signification uttered with the intention to deceive" (Gramigna 2011: 6)

Augustinuse valetamisteooria põhiklausel.

When we undertake to deceive others intentionally, we communicate messages meant to mislead them, meant to make them believe what we ourselves do not believe. We can do so through gesture, through disguise, by means of actions or inaction, even through silence. Which of these innumerable deceptive messages are also lies? (Bok, Sissela 1978 [1999]. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. New York: Vintage Books: 13-14)

To wit, in the case of lying, the liar first knows the truth and only after is he able to fake it. He knows more than the dupe. Indeed, the liar's cognitive condition is determined by the fact that he can count on a full account of what is falsity and truth for himself, whereas the dupe has access only to half of it. (Gramigna 2011: 30)

Meelitaja teab minu MVKst rohkem kui mina.

He lies [...] who holds one opinion in his mind and who gives expression to another through words or any other outward manifestation. (De mend. 3.3)

Notably, 'true' and 'false' in this context refer to the liar's state of mind, namely what the liar believes or thinks to be true or false. To put it another way, these terms do not refer to an ontological conception of truth as correctness or correspondence between what is said and things in the world. Rather, they refer to a pragmatic conception on truth that is based on what the liar takes to be true, regardless of the adequacy of comprehension and the thing. (Gramigna 2011: 33)

Sincerity is a quality of the self [...] It designates a relationship of congruence or harmony between different parts, aspects or manifestations of the self. These includes not only thoughts, feelings and emotions, but also the awareness - or lack of it - that the subject has of them. [...] Sincerity is the commendable disposition to match what we express to what we feel (Stern-Giller, Suzanne 2008. "Augustine and the philosophical foundations of sincerity". Philosophy: Book Chapters, Paper 2: 1-26: 3-4)

...God has the capacity to scrutinize men's interiority (Gramigna 2011: 38)

MVS-oskus

This ingredient, the assuming of responsibility, which is so prominent in solemn assertion, must be present in every genuine assertion (Peirce, In Chisholm, Roderick M.; Feehan, Thomas D. 1977. "The intent to deceive." The Journal of Philosophy 74(3). Pp. 143-159: 150-151)

MVS alateadvus, automaatsus.

[esimene lugemine]

Nonverbal Communication In Human Interaction

Knapp, Mark L. 1972. Nonverbal Communication In Human Interaction. New York [etc.] : Holt, Rinehart and Winston

For some, kinesic study includes touch behavior; for others, however, actual physical contact constitutes a separate class of events. Some researchers are concerned with touching behavior as an important factor in the child's early development; some are concerned with adult touching behavior. Subcategories may include: stroking, hitting, greetings and farewells, holding, guiding another's movements, and other, more specific instances. (Knapp 1972: 7)

Further testimony to the prevalence and importance of nonverbal communication is available if we scrutinize specific facets of our society: the use of nonverbal cues in psychiatry, teaching the deaf, doctor-nurse communication during operations, disturbed nonverbal communication, audience-speaker nonverbal communication, advertising, music, our use of time, art, pictures, dance, nonverbal aspects of written and printed language, nonverbal cues in deceptive communications, communication across cultures, communication across ethnic groups within a culture, drum and whistle languages - the list is interminable. This same idea can be illustrated by briefly noting the role of nonverbal communication in four areas: televised politics, classroom behavior, behavioral research, and courtship behavior. (Knapp 1972: 13)

Classroom Behavior. The classroom is a veritable goldmine of nonverbal behavior which has been relatively untapped by scientific probes. Acceptance and understanding of ideas and feelings on the part of both teacher and student, encouraging and criticizing, silence, questioning, etc. - all involve nonverbal elements. Consider the following isntances as representative of the variety of classroom nonverbal cues: (1) the frantic hand waves who is sure he has the correct answer; (2) the student who is sure he does not know the answer and tries to avoid any eye contact with the teacher; (3) the effects of student dress and hair lenght on teacher-student interaction; (4) facial expressions - threatening gestures, and tone of voice are frequently used for discipline in elementary schools; (5) the teacher who requests student questioning and criticism, but whose nonverbal actions make it clear he will not be receptive; (6) absence from class communicates; (7) a teacher's trust of his students is sometimes indicated by his arrangement of seating and his monitoring behavior during examinations; (8) the variety of techniques used by students to make sleeping appear to be studying or listening; (9) the professor who announces he has plenty of time for student conferences, but whose fidgeting and glancing at his watch suggest otherwise; (10) teachers who try to assess visual feedback to determine student comprehension; (11) even classroom design (wall colors, space between seats, windows) has an influence on student participation in the classroom. (Knapp 1972: 14-15)

For the male, it may be such things as his clothes, sideburns, lenght of hair, an arrogant grace, a thrust of his hips, touch gestures, extra long eye contact, carefully looking at the woman's figure, open gestures and movements to offset closed ones exhibited by the woman, gaining close proximity, a subtleness which will allow both parties to deny that eithed had commited themselves to a courtship ritual, making the woman feel secure, wanted, "like a woman," or showing excitement and desire in fleeting facial expressions. (Knapp 1972: 17)

...students tend to develop stronger friendships with students who share their classes, or their dormitory or apartment building, or who sit near them, than with others who are geographically distant. (Knapp 1972: 35)

If a case can be made that there are clearly defined and generally accepted physique-temperament stereotypes, we can reason that they will have a lot to do with the way you are perceived and responded to by others, and with the personality traits expected of you by others. (Knapp 1972: 72)

The self-image is the root system from which all of our overt communication behavior grows and blossoms. Our overt communication is only an extension of the accumulated experiences which have gone into making up our understanding of self. In short, what you are, or think you are, organizes what you say and do. (Knapp 1972: 74)

Common meanings of words, as found in a variety of contexts, are studied, and individual differences are compared to these common usage patterns. Similarly, movements can be studied within a range of contexts to determine their usual meaning. The importance of considering the specific context and individuals involved in the study of body movements is clear, but not all the empirical research has operated on this assumption. In the interest of experimental control, some studies eliminate context and personality completely. (Knapp 1972: 92)

Isiksus = valik sotsiaalselt konstrueeritud koode (Lotman). Kontekst = välised tingimused mis modifitseerivad nende koodide aktualiseerumist.

Tha analog of kinesics is linguistics. Just as there are subdivisions of linguistic study (descriptive and historical), there are also subdivisions of kinesic study (macrokinesics, prekinesics, and social kinesics). While there is no kinesic analog to historical linguistics, such work will be plausible in future kinesic study - using the vast number of reels of films and video tapes currently capturing man's body motion in a variety of contexts and in a variety of cultures. Microkinesics and prekinesics seem to parallel descriptive kinesics. Prekinesics deald with the physiological study of the limits of movements and the physiological determinants of movement; microkinesics deals with the derivation of units of movements. Social kinesics concerns with the study of units and patterns of movement in context in order to determine their function in communication. (Knapp 1972: 93)

...in our discussion of body movement, we must remember its specificity to this culture. The study of body movement in this country has, to this date, primarily focused on the following areas: (1) attitudes, (2) status, (3) affective states or moods, (4) approval seeking, (5) quasi-courtship behavior, (6) inclusiveness, (7) leakage or deception, (8) warmth, and (9) interaction "markers". (Knapp 1972: 97)

Visual Interaction. Kendon has hypothesized four functions of gazing: (1) cognitive: subjects tend to look away when having difficulty encoding; (2) monitoring: subjects may look at their interactant to indicate the conclusion of thought units and to check their interactant's attentiveness and reaction; (3) regulatory: responses may be demanded or suppressed by looking; and (4) expressive: degree of involvement or arousal may be signaled through looking. We can also discuss visual interaction or eye contact according to the following classification: (1) seeking feedback; (2) controlling the communication channel; (3) in the context of a specific interpersonal relationship - e.g. status, attitude, or personality differences; and (4) when distance is a factor. (Knapp 1972: 131)

Channel Control. Eye contact also occurs when we want to signal that the communication channel is open. In some instances, eye contact can almost establish an obligation to interact. When you seek eye contact with your waiter in a restaurant, you are essentially indicating the communication is open, and you want to say something to him. (Knapp 1972: 132)

Addington factor analyzed his ["The Relationship of Selected Vocal Characteristics to Personality Perception"] personality data and concluded that the male personality was generally perceived in terms of physical and emotional power, while the female personality was apparently perceived in terms of social faculties. (Knapp 1972: 153)

You should know as much as you can about the social behavior which occurs - who does what to or with whom, form of behavior, its intensity, toward whom it is directed, what initiates it, apparent objective of the behavior, effect on the other interactant(s), etc. (Knapp 1972: 184)

• G. Nielsen, Studies in Self-Confrontation (Copenhagen: Munksgaard; Cleveland: Howard Allen, 1962)
• J. R. Davitz, ed., The Communication of Emotional Meaning (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964)
• Sommer, R. Personal Space. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
• R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966)
• M. F. Ashley Montagu, ed., Man and Aggression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969)
• Berscheid, E. and Walster, E. H. Interpersonal Attraction. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.
• A. T. Dittman, "Review of Kinesics in Context," Psychiatry 34 (1971): 334-42
• G. W. Hewes, "The Anthropology of Posture," Scientific American 196 (1957): 123-32
• M. F. A. Montagu, Touching: The Human Significance of the Skin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)
• Dittman, A. T. "The Body Movement-Speech Rhythm Relationship as a Cue to Speech Encoding." In Studies in Dyadic Communication, edited by A. W. Siegman and B. Pope. New York: Pergamon press, 1971
• Lamb, W. Posture and Gesture. London: Gerard Duckworth and CO., 1965
• Knapp, P., ed. Expression of the Emotions in Man. New York: International Universities Press, 1963
• Lindfeld, J. "Verbal and Non-Verbal Elements in Discourse." Semiotica 3 (1971): 223-33

Nonverbal Communication, Interaction, and Gesture

Kendon, Adam (ed.) 1981. Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Approaches to Semiotics, 41. The Hague [etc.] : Mouton

Kendon, Adam 1981a. "Introduction: Current Issues in the Study of 'Nonverbal Communication'". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 1-53. The Hague: Mouton.

The term 'nonverbal communication', as it is currently employed, is most frequently used to refer to all of the ways in which communication is effected between persons when in each other's presence, by means other than words. It refers to the communicational functioning of bodily activity, gesture, facial expression and orientation, posture and spacing, touch and smell, and of those aspects of utterance that can be considered apart from the referential content of what is said. Studies of 'nonverbal communication' are usually concerned with the part these aspects of behavior play in establishing and maintaining interaction and interpersonal relationships. (Kendon 1981a: 3)

A third characteristic of 'nonverbal communication' is that messages that are at the center of interest (whether in fact conveyed by words or not), are typically those messages that are not given excplicit formulation. They are the messages that may be inferred from or are implied by a person's actions. It is for this reason, in particular, perhaps, that such 'nonverbal' codes as sign language are not usually regarded as being part of the purview of 'nonverbal communication' studies. Sign language, like spoken language, is a vehicle for highly 'detachable' messages and it no more seems to 'embody' what it conveys than spoken language does. It can be considered abstractly, in its own right, and it is employed consciously for explicit communicational purposes. (Kendon 1981a: 4)

Writers such as Birdwhistell and Scheflen, and also Bateson and Ruesch, use the term 'communication', thus, to refer to the process of conveying information in any form whatever. This is the sense of the term intended by Shannon and Weaver (1949) and other information theorists. In this sense of the term, the focus is entirely upon the effect of the behavior upon a perceiver of it. No reference is made to the intentions or motives or causes that may lie behind the behavior that is perceived to occur. Ekman and Friesen, however, are proposing to include in the definition of the term 'communication' a reference to what was intended by the person in producing the behavior in question. This is a different, and more restricted, sense of the term that the usage of it that had come to be proposed by those influenced by communication theory. (Kendon 1981a: 8-9)

Freedman provides a very perceptive discussion of the problems inherent in any project of this sort. He points out that, for example, quite apart from the fact that it is probably impossible to devise a machine that will objectively record all aspects of behavior, if something like this were to be achieved we would have no way of interpreting such a record. Bouissac's totally objective record, it appears, seeks to describe bodily movement as a succession of spatial volumes. Freedman reminds us that the human body is organized into distinguishable anatomical systems that tend to be employed differentially with respect to different communicational functions. A totally nonselective recording system that did not make such anatomical discriminations would present insuperable problems for interpretation. (Kendon 1981a: 15)

A gesture is usually deemed to be an action by which a thought, feeling, or intention is given conventional and voluntary expression. Gestures are thus considered to be different from expressions of emotion, involuntary mannerisms, however revealing, and actions that are taken in the pursuit of some practical aim [instrumental action, intrinsic coding], however informative such actions may be. (Kendon 1981a: 28)

Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V. 1981. "The Repertoire of Nonverbal Behavior: Categories, Origins, Usage, and Coding". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 57-105. The Hague: Mouton.

An act has idiosyncratic meaning if there is some regularity in the information associated with its occurrence but the association is peculiar to a single individual. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 62)

Isegi idiosünkraatne tähendus nõuab regulaarsust.

We must admit that there may be actions which are meaningless - random activity or noise, movements which have no regularities in either their encoding or decoding, not even for a single person. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 62)

"Kordumatu on tähendusetu" põhimõte.

We would expect that emblems are usually learned much like verbal material. Emblems can be shown in any area of the body, although in the U.S. emblems are primarily shown in the face and hands. Emblems can be based upon what we will later describe as affect displays and adaptor nonverbal behaviors; for example, raising of the brows and horizontal forehead wrinkle which are usually part of the surprise affect display can be emblematic, if the culture pays specific attention to and prescribes a very specific meaning to a facial behavior, although the emblematic meaning might be different from the affect. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 73)

Näoembleemid. Ameeriklaste naeratus ligineb emblemaatilisusele.

The EVOKING STIMULI which elicit and affect may well differ from one culture to another. Tomkins has argued that while there are at least some unlearned affect evokers, social learning teaches the individual a number of associations between events, memories, anticipations and affect. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 81)

Facial behavior in general, and affective displays in particular, receive great attention and external feedback from the other interactant, in terms of direct comments on facial behavior. While people do not continually look at each other's faces, for to do so would be to start flirtations, power struggles or questions of suspicion or distrust, the face receives more visual attention from the other person than any other part of the body, and we are more likely to comment on a facial expression. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 85)

We are not at all certain about the coding principles involved in regulators; some are obviously intrinsically coded, like shifts in posture to bring about greater or lesser attention, or more or less distance. But we suspect that there are many iconic and arbitrarily coded regulators. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 91)

We use the term ADAPTORS because we believe these movements were first learned as part of adaptive efforts to satisfy self or bodily needs, or to perform bodily actions, or to manage emotions, or to develop or maintain prototypic interpersonal contacts, or to learn instrumental activities. Thus we distinguish and will separately discuss self-adaptors, alter-adaptors, and object-adaptors.
The confusing aspect of these adaptors is that while they were first learned (usually in childhood) as part of a total adaptive pattern where the goal of the activity was obvious, when these actions are emitted by the adult, particularly during social conversation, only a fragment of the original adaptive behavior is seen. These fragments or reductions of previously learned adaptive acts are maintained by habit. When originally learned the adaptor was associated with certain drives, with certain feld emotions, with expectancies, with types of interpersonal interaction, or in a given setting. When the adaptor appears in the adult it is because something in the current environment triggers this habit; something has occurred currently which is relevant to the drive, emotion, relationship or setting originally associated with the learning of the adaptive pattern. (Ekman & Friesen 1981: 92-93)

Pyoatos, Gernando 1981b. "Forms and Functions of Nonverbal Communication in the Novel: A New Perspective of the Author-Character-Reader Relationship". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 107-149. The Hague: Mouton.

...a substantial part of the printed text is aimed at describing nonverbal activities which are produced either simultaneously with words or alternating with them; (Poyatos 1981a: 108)

Vocal-Verbal [verbaalne], Vocal-Nonverbal [parakeeleline], and Nonvocal-Nonverbal [kineesiline] forms of communication (Poyatos 1981a: 109)

...ritualistic and etiquette behaviors, occupational activities, general task-performing activities, and activities conditioned by clothes, hairdo, furniture, etc. (Poyatos 1981a: 133)

But those personal features, which are not at all difficult to invent and handle throughout the story, must be put to good use in two ways that represent some of the writer's most important responsibilities towards the reader.
First, those featurest must reflect, not a random inventory of easily replacable linguistic, paralinguistic, or kinesic characteristics, but a conscious selection that may give the characters the necessary consistency as credible people. To say that a character must look real to us may be the personal view of many, and not of many others, but we should expect him to maintain that unique personality from the beginning to the end of the story, in a progressive, logical way, just as we become gradually acquainted with real-life people. (Poyatos 1981a: 136)

Freedman, Norbert 1981. "Toward a Mathematization of Kinetic Behavior: A Review of Paul Bouissac's La Mesure des Geses". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 151-164. The Hague: Mouton.

...we have come to recognize siz characters -- six models: an expressive behavior model in which movements are embedded in personal strivings, conscious as well as unconscious drives; a dyadic model in which body movements are regulated by the forces inherent in the interpersonal relationships (frequently power relationships); an ethnological model in which the motions of the body are a dance regulated by the code of the culture; an information processing model in which movements are part and parcel of cognitive structure and of the processing of thought; a choreographic model in which the actions of the body are construed as an expression of the capabilities of skeletal musculature; and, more recently, Bouissac's attempt at what we shall only half-facetiously term the acrobatic model. Like all models, each is a myth, some more productive than others. Each of these models is tenable; each has its heuristic advantages; none can be viewed to be true or false; none is all encompassing. (Freedman 1981: 151)

Bouissac arrives atht the conclusion that the linguistic translation of corporal dynamic behavior is essentially ascientific because any description is a selective reconstruction of events: not only does it involve the selection of points of the body already contained in natural language (arms, legs, feet) but there is always a mix of models (political, geometric, etc.), each invoked as it suits the describer. Recognizing these limitations in the linguistic description of events, the question must nevertheless be raised that, in spite of the mix of models, natural description provides the investigator with the continuing resource for the discovery of intrinsic units of behavior and the discovery of functional relationships. (Freedman 1981: 153)

The recording of a behavioral sequence, be it an acrobatic act or social interchange, comprises a tremendous range of phenomena infinitely more complex than the horse's gait in Muybridge's work. The movements range in locus, in size (from micro-to macrokinetic), in speed, and in rhythm. On strictly technical grounds, it seems difficult to envisage a machine which can appropriately record all these attributes of behavior. Can a machine simultaneously monitor posture, limb activity, eye blink, and facial display and describe all of these in terms of volumes in space? It would seem that each of these behaviors operates in a very different space, time, and dynamic dimensions. Yet even if such a machine were feasible, can the resultant data be interpreted without reference to the anatomy of the behaving organism? (Freedman 1981: 160)

In sum, the unitized corporal sequences derived by Bouissac's machine [TACS] would lack validity for they do not encompass cross-channel units of behavior; they would tend to digitalize what is essentially analogic or metaphoric and would attribute a quasi-linguistic structure to kinesics which is often not warranted by the facts of behavior. (Freedman 1981: 162)

Seaford, Henry W. Jr. 1981. "Maximizing Replicability in Describing Facial Behavior". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 165-195. The Hague: Mouton.
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Collet, P., Marsh, P. 1981. "Patterns of Public Behavior: Collision Avoidance on a Pedestrian Crossing". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 199-217. The Hague: Mouton.

Despite the everyday nature of pedestrian avoidance behavior, and the important question which is raised concerning interpersonal coordination, the phenomenon has not, at least until very recently, received the attention it deserves. (Collett & Marsh 1981: 199)

Apart from instances of 'blind coordination' (that, solutions achieved in the absence of 'monitoring'), the individual processes which simultaneously maintain lane formation and ensure against collision are the processes of MONITORING and what Goffman has termed EXTERNALIZATION or BODY GLOSS. Body gloss refers to those observable body movements which, whether they be performed consciously or unconsciously, serve to offer an ongoing commentary on someone's likely behaviour to those who approach and those who follow him. A pedestrian's monitoring processes will therefore involve his watching (and probably listening to) both people who move in the same direction as himself and those who approach him, and the more well-defined the streaming, the more easily he will be able to ignore oncomers. In this sense, streaming may be seen as a corporate and informally constituted means of reduced monitoring and locomotor problems of individual pedestrians. (Collett & Marsh 1981: 200)

Negative values of the index indicate that the subject was turned towards, and positive values away from, the person that he or she was passing. We refer to these two orientations as 'open' and 'closed' passes respectively. A pass index of zero indivates a 'neutral' pass. (Collett & Marsh 1981: 204)

...a great deal of pedestrial behaviour may be inadvertently rather than intentionally communicative. Coordinations may also arise in the absence of communication, through adherence to rule by convention or through actions, which are not culturally prescribed, but which have some type of biological or physical base. (Collett & Marsh 1981: 213)

Two important notions of 'rule' can be distinguished. First there is the idea of the rule as it can be said to guide behaviour. In this case members of a community must be able to articulate the rule and/or recognize instances of its breach. Some would argue that recognition of a breach is, in itself, a sufficient condition for saying that particular behaviour is rule-guided. The second sense of rule involves the idea of the rule as an explanatory device employed by professional observers to account for regularities in behaviour among the members of a community. (Collett & Marsh 1981: 213)

Givens, Davis 1981. "Greeting a Stranger: Some Commonly Used Nonverbal Signals of Aversiveness". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 219-235. The Hague: Mouton.

Anthropologists have described numerous standardized greetings, such as the Polynesian embrace, the Afro-American long distance greeting, the Papuan genital-pressing salutation, and Japanese bowing. These greeting activities, which can be used with friends and strangers, may be construed as cultural solutions to the problem of social tension, as standardized recognition signals serving partially to ease the anxiety of initial meeting periods. (Givens 1981: 219)

...unfocused interaction, as evidenced by a definite phase of social contact, was accompanied by various combinations of the following activities: lip-compressing, lip-bite, tongue-show, tongue-in-cheeck; downward, lateral, and maximal-lateral gaze avoidance; hand-to-face, hand-to-hand, hand-to-body, and hand-behind-head automanipulations; and postures involving flexion and adduction of the upper limbs. These behaviors were initiated during the contact-phase and were terminated abruptly after social contact with the stranger was stopped. Unlike affiliative nonverbal units, such as smiling, touching, embracing, and so on, the above activities correlated with non-contact, and seemed to signal that contact would not be well received. (Givens 1981: 222)

Self-touching activity occurred most frequently in contact situations, in settings where interaction was more likely to be initiated or prolonged. When quick avoidance was possible there was little or no automanipulation. At the Public Market, head-scratching, hand-to-nose, hand-to-ear, adjust-glasses, and other automanipulations were performed when the initial contact phase of recognition was prolonged, i.e., when gaze contact was kept up beyond a few seconds or when close physical proximity was protracted somewhat longer than the quick pass-by. Men, for example, were observed to automanipulate as they gazed steadily at other shoppers while the latter walked by them. Or a shopper would automanipulate while facing and waiting for someone to move out of the way. In these cases there seemed to be more of a likelihood that waiting and/or gazing might elicit a reaction in the stranger, a reaction that could entail possibly uncomfortable social interaction. (Givens 1981: 227)

By way of pure speculation it might be hypothesized that the aversive signals are used most frequently by individuals who are more likely to use submissive-like nonverbal units, especially those held by the author to derive from the shoulder-shrugging complex (Givens 1977). That is, there may be an empirical relationship between submissive and aversive nonverbal presentations. By contrast, dominant-like individuals might be expected to experience less anxiety in the presence of strangers and would be less likely to automanipulate or to respond with aversive facial expressions of gaze avoidance. And in some cases the dominant or high status person experiencing little or no stress in the presence of a low status stranger... (Givens 1981: 232)

Schiffrin, Deborah 1981. "Handwork as Ceremony: The Case of the Handshake". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 237-250. The Hague: Mouton.

In modern society, kinship position is no longer the main determinant of social relationships and behavior appropriate to those relationships; status in groups other than the fmaily plays a great role in determining one's range of contacts and relationships. Thus traditional avoidance signs and joking relationships are replaced, and then re-applied to individuals other than kin. (Schiffrin 1981: 240)

De Long, Alton J. 1981. "Kinesic Signals at Utterance Boundaries in Preschool Children". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 251-281. The Hague: Mouton.
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Argyle, M., Ingham, R., Alkema, F., and McCallin, M., 1981. "The Different Functions of Gaze". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 283-295. The Hague: Mouton.
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Beattie, Geoffrey W. 1981. "Sequential Temporal Patterns of Speech and Gaze in Dialogue". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 297-320. The Hague: Mouton.

It was suggested that there are certain social pressures on individuals in conversation to comply to certain behavioral standards regarding amount of gaze, and lenght of glances, if they wish to make a favorable impression. (Beattie 1981: 317)

Kendon, Adam 1981b. "Some Functions of the Face in a Kissing Round". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 321-356. The Hague: Mouton.

Facial displays can serve to mark out points of emphasis in speech, they can serve to mark off whole segments of speech as distinct units or as contained or embedded units, and they can also provide a commentary and supplement to what is being said. If we watch the faces of listeners too, we can see that nods, smiles, frowns, and raised eyebrows appear frequently in some circumstances. Such facial behavior probably plays an important part in the regulation of the behavior of the speaker. Similar observation on the regulatory functions of facial behavior have been made by Ekman and Friesen (1969. (Kendon 1981b: 323)

The facial patterns F[emale] shows in this sequence are far different from what expects to see in seriously erotic or passionate kissing. It is as if F is regulating the amount of arousal M[ale] can achieve by herself offering displays that do not otherwise fit the immediate context. Thus she turns to M with vigor and approaches him with 'fierce' faces. Yet, for but 9/24 of a second, just before their lips touch, F's face is posed for passionate, not for playful, kissing. Here, perhaps, she hints at passions someday (or sometime) to be aroused. Perhaps we see here an instance of what appears to be a common principle of courtship: the continued interest of the other partner is maintained, and even heightened, by fleeting displays of behavior that belong to later stages of the courtship program. If F can hint to M what possibilities the future holds in store for him, she can hold his interest. (Kendon 1981b: 341)

A central problem in any investigation of interaction from this point of view will be to see how, in terms of the functioning of observable behavior, the 'working consensus' for a given behavioral system is established and maintained [etogeenne perspektiiv]. In particular, this means that we must identify those aspects of behavioral function which serve to control or regulate the behavior of the participants in relation to the currently established pattern of relationship. This requires that we not only look for regularities in a behavioral relationship, but also that we look close at places where these regularities change. (Kendon 1981b: 344)

Courtship is the process by which a more or less stable relationship is formed between individuals of the opposite sex, within which mating can take place. Since the relationship is to be one within which mating occurs, many of the behaviors which serve to establish and maintain the pair-bond that is the outcome of courtship are similar to behaviors that precede mating. An important feature of the behavior of courtship, indeed, appears to be that it should create some degree of sexual arousal in the partners. It seems that the 'kissing round' of the sort we have studied in this paper, which is obviously so characteristic of a certain stage of courtship, has this function. (Kendon 1981b: 350)

Rosenburg, Marc 1981. "The Case of the Apple Turnover: An Experiment in Multichannel Communication Analysis". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 357-368. The Hague: Mouton.

Related to and implied by the first constraint is the second requirement, namely, that intrapsychic states (motives, feelings, intentions, etc.) not be invoked as causes or explanations of observed behavior: The emphasis here is interactional: one is concerned with what goes on between persons, not with what supposedly happens inside them.
The basic axiom on which this research rests is that metacommunication cannot not occur. The commonsense notion of interpersonal communication as synonymous with information sharing fails to take into account that people label their statements. That is, we not only make statements to each other, but we also (and necessarily) make statements about these statements. These labeling statements constitute the metacommunicational level of human interaction. By classifying the kind of statement that one is making, one also necessarily expresses an expectation of a particular (and appropriate) kind of response from the other. A joke implies a laugh, a question implies an answer, a move to 'change the subject' requires the agreement of the other, and so on.
By labeling one's own statements and thereby implying the expectation of a particular kind of response, a person acts to define his relationship with the other. If the expectation is met, then we say that the other has agreed to the proposed relationship definition. If the expectation is not met, it is because the other has proposed a different relationship definition. This, in turn, may be accepted or rejected by the first person, and so on throughout the stream of interaction.
In task-oriented situations, in which persons are attempting to reach some decision about a substantive issue, it is communicationally efficient to keep relationship battles (rejections of proposed relationship definitions to proposals of alternative definitions) to a minimum. Formal rules of procedure, such as those used in parliamentary debates or in classroom, are intended to serve just this function. In less formal contexts, these rules often have to be negotiated through the interaction. It is clear, however, that with a finite amount of time in which to reach substantive decisions, the more time spent in negotiating the rules, the less time there will be for dealing with the issue. (Rosenburg 1981: 358)

The ensuing twenty-one seconds of verbal silence points up one of the advantages of thinking in terms of levels of communication. For those who concern themselves solely with the content of communication, this duration must be seen as one in which the couple is 'not communicating'. From out viewpoint, however, communication cannot not occur. Or, to quite Birdwhistell, "Nothing never happens."
This twenty-one seconds, however wrought with tension it may be, marks the duration of a mutually agreed upon relationship definition. It is a difficult relationship to change. If we construe it as "We are not communicating", then we see this couple as enmeshed in one of the now classical paradoxes of communication. (Rosenburg 1981: 363)

This agreement, if strictly adhered to, could not be renegotiated by the wife, for to initiate a renegotiation of the rules would constitute a violation of those rules. (Rosenburg 1981: 364)

Poyatos, Fernando 1981b. "Gesture Inventories: Fieldwork Methodology and Problems". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 371-399. The Hague: Mouton.

By GESTURE I understand a conscious or unconscious body movement made mainly with the head, the face alone, or the limbs, learned or somatogenic, and serving as a primary communicative tool, dependent or independent from verbal language; either simultaneous or alternating with it, amd modified by the conditioning background (smiles, eye movements, a gesture of beckoning, a tic, etc.).
MANNER, although similar to gesture, is a more or less dynamic body attitude that, while somatogenically modified, is mainly learned and socially codified according to specific situations, either simultaneous or alternating with verban language (the way one eats at the table, greets others, coughs, stretches, etc.).
POSTURE is a conscious or unconscious general position of the body, more static than gesture, learned or somatogenic, either simultaneous or alternating with verbal language, modified by social norms and by the rest of the conditioning background, and use less as a communicative tool, although it may reveal affective states and social status (sitting, standing, joining both hands behind one's back while walking, etc.).(Poyatos 1981b: 375)

...if an inventory of gestures is meant to contribute to mutual knowledge and understanding among men, it should undoubtedly help its users not only in detecting the more conspicuous levels of a society, but in performing their appropriate repertoires, and this could not be achieved unless the gestures, manners and postures of the rustic are observed, compared with those of the urbanites and recorded in each semantic or situational label (dismissal, beckoning; table manners, hand-shakes; sitting, standing) as separate culturemes. (Poyatos 1981b: 382-383)

Still photography:

• basic posture positions
• mono-kinemorphemic movements
• non-elaborate, simple gestures

Film:

• parakinesic qualities
• direction of movement
• formation of the movement
• multi-kinemorphemic movements
• elaborate kinesic constructs
• kinesic pausal features
• continuous eye movements

(Poyatos 1981b: 385)

I have elsewhere proposed and defined the CULTUREME as: any portion of cultural activity sensorially or intellectually apprehended in signs of symbolic value, which can be divided up into smaller units or amalgamated into larger ones. (Poyatos 1981b: 387)

[semiotic point of view:] FREE (emblems, illustrators, affect displays); BOUND (self-adaptors, object-adaptors, alter-adaptors). (Poyatos 1981b: 389)

Johnson, H. G., Ekman, P., Friesen, W. V. 1981. "Communicative Body Movements: American Emblems". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 401-419. The Hague: Mouton.
0
Sparhawk, Carol M. 1981. "Contrastice-Identificational Features of Persian Gesture". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 421-458. The Hague: Mouton.

Pronation and supination refer to the direction of the palm as a result of wrist rotation. If the hands are positioned horizontally, pronation refers to downward (and inward) direction of the palms, and supination refers to upward (and outward) direction. (Evicende for the contrastiveness or palm direction will be presented in the discussion of signation, below). As for the wrist itself, pronate wrist appears as a point of reference in 'what time is it' and contrasts with the whole wrist in 'bracelet'. This constitutes only an analogous contrast, however, and no gesture involving contact with the 'palm side' of the wrist (supinate wrist) appears in this collection. (Sparhawk 1981: 429)

Kirk, L., and Burton, M. 1981. "Physical versus Semantic Classification of Nonverbal Forms: A Cross-Cultural Experiment". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 459-481. The Hague: Mouton.
0
Rosenfeld, H. M., Shea, M., and Greenbaum, P. 1981. "Facial Emblems of 'Right' and 'Wrong': Topographical Analysis and Derivation of a Recognition Test". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 483-501. The Hague: Mouton.
0
Smith, J. W., Chase, J., and Lieblich, A. K. 1981. "Tongue Showing: A Facial Display of Humans and Other Primate Species". In Adam Kendon (ed.), Nonverbal communication, interaction, and gesture : selections from Semiotica. Pp. 503-548. The Hague: Mouton.
0
Huvitav kirjandus:

• Mahl, G. G., 1968. "Gestures and Body Movements in Interviews". Paper presented at the Third Research in Psychotherapy Conference (Chicago, June 1966); in Vol. III, American Psychological Association).
• Tomkins, S. S. 1962. Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. 1, The Positive Affects (New York, Springer).
• Tomkins, S. S. 1963. Affect, Imagery, Consciousness, Vol. 2, The Negative Affects (New York, Springer).
• Poyatos, Fernando 1976. Man Beyond Words: Theory and Methodology of Nonverbal Communication. Oswego: New York State English Council.
• Bateson, G., and M. Mead 1942. Balinese Character. New York: New York Academy of Sciences
• Bär, E. 1974. "Compte rendu: Context Analysis in Psychotherapy", Semiotica 10, 255-81
• Watzlawick, P., J.H. Beavin, and D.D. Jackson 1967. Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes (New York: W.W. Norton)
• Laban, R. 1966. Choreutics. London : MacDonald and Evans.
• Pike, Kenneth L. 1975. "On Kinesic Triadic Relationship in Turn-Taking", Semiotica 13/4, 389-95
• Wundt, Wilhelm 1973. The Language of Gesture, ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok. THe Hague : Mouton
• Masters, W. H., and V. E. Johnson 1966. Human Sexual Response (Boston : Little, Brown)
• Smith, W. John 1965. "Message, Meaning, and Context in Ethology". American Naturalist 99, 405-09
• Smith, W. John 1974. "Zoosemiotics: Ethology and the Theory of Signs", in: T. A. Sebeok (ed.), Current Trends in Linguistics 12 (The Hague: Mouton), 561-626.

Diskursuse kord

Foucault, Michel 2005 [1971]. Diskursuse kord: Collége de France'i inaugaratsiooniloeng 2. detsembril 1970. Prantsuse keelest tõlkinud Marek Tamm. Tallinn : Varrak

...asju, mida öeldakse üks kord ja seejärel pannakse tallele, sest neis usutakse peituvat mingi saladus või aare. (Foucault : 19)

...asjad, mida mina kirjutan märkmepaberitele ja peidan ära.

...piiramissüsteemide kõige pinnapealsema ja nähtavama vormi moodustab see, mida võib koondada nimetuse "rituaal" alla; rituaal määratleb kvalifikatsiooni, mida peavad omama indiviidid, kes kõnelevad (ja kes dialoogi, küsitluse ja retsiteerimise mängus peavad hõivama teatud positsiooni ja sõnastama teatud lausungeid); rituaal määratleb žestid, käitumised, olukorrad ja märkide rea, mis peavad diskursust saatma; viimaks fikseerib rituaal sõnade oodatud või pealesunnitud tõhususe, nende mõju inimestele, kellele nad on määratud, nende sundusliku toime piirid. (Foucault 2005: 31-32)

Alates sellest, kui välistati sofistide mängud ja kauplemine, alates sellest, kui suurema või väiksema enesekindlusega summutati nende paradoksid, näib Lääne mõte valvavat selle üle, et diskursusel oleks võimalikult vähe ruumi mõtte ja kõne vahel; et diskursus oleks pelgalt ühenduskoht mõtlemise ja rääkimise vahel; et diskursus oleks vaid mõte, mis rüütatud märkidesse ja mis muutub nähtavaks sõnades, või vastupidi - diskursus oleks vaid tööle rakendatud keelestruktuur, mis toodab tähendusefekti. (Foucault 2005: 37)

...milliste sundussüsteemide kaudu, kiuste või toel on diskursuste seeriad formuleerunud, milline on nende igaühe eripärane norm ja millised on nende ilmnemise, kasvamise ja varieerumise tingimused. (Foucault 2005: 48)

...Husserl seoses filosoofia kui lõpmatu ülesande teemaga, mis on ühenduses meie ratsionaalsusega. (Foucault 2005: 60)

On Aggression

Lorenz, Konrad 1966 [1963]. On Aggression. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

Unfortunately the working structure of the instinctive and culturally acquired patterns of behavior which make up the social life of man seems to be one of the most complicated systems we know on this earth. (Lorenz 1966: xi)

With H. Hediger, we call this third behavior pattern the critical reaction. The expression "fight like a cornered rat" has become symbolic of the desperate struggle in which the fighter stakes his all, because he cannot escape and can expect no mercy. This most violent form of fighting behavior is motivated by fear, the most intense flight impulses whose natural outlet is prevented by the fact that the danger is too near; so the animal, not daring to turn its back on it, fights with the proverbial courage of desperation. (Lorenz 1966: 28)

It is essential to consider the fact that all these opportunities for special careers, known as ecological niches, are often provided by the same cubic yard of ocean water. (Lorenz 1966: 33)

My teacher, Oskar Heinroth, used to say jokingly, "Next to the wings of the Argus pheasant, the hectic life of Western civilized man is the most stupid product of intra-specific selection!" The rushed existence into which industrialized, commercialized man has precipitated himself is actually a good example of an inexpedient development caused entirely by competition between members of the same species. Human beings of today are attacked by so-called manager diseases, high blood pressure, renal atrophy, gastric ulcers, and torturing neuroses; they succumb to barbarism because they have no more time for cultural interest. (Lorenz 1966: 41)

We can, however, here describe the part played by aggression in the structure of society among highly developed animals. Though many individuals interact in a social system, its inner workings are often easier to understand than the interaction of drives within the individual. A principle of organization without which a more advanced social life cannot develop in higher vertebrates is the so-called ranking order. Under this rule every individual in the society knows which one is stronger and which weaker than itself, so that everyone can retreat from the stronger and expect submission from the weaker, if they should get in each other's way. (Lorenz 1966: 44)

All social animals are "status seekers,", hence there is always particularly high tension between individuals who hold immediately adjoining positions in the ranking order; conversely, this tension diminishes the further apart the two animals are in rank. Since high-ranking jackdaws, particularly males, interfere in every quarrel between two inferiors, this graduation of social tension has the desirable effect that the higher-ranking birds always intervene in favor of the losing party. (Lorenz 1966: 45)

Some time ago, collaborators of Robert M. Yerkes made the extraordinarily interesting observation that chimpanzees, animals well known to be capable of learning by imitation, copy only higher-ranking members of their species. From a group of these apes, a low-ranking individual was taken and taught to remove bananas from a specially constructed feeding apparatus by very complicated manipulations. When this ape, together with his feeding apparatus, was brought back to the group, the higher-ranking animals tried to take away the bananas which he had acquired for himself, but none of them thought of watching their inferior at work and learning something from him. Then the highest-ranking chimpanzee was removed and taught to use the apparatus in the same way, and when he was put back in the group the other members watched him with great interest and soon learned to imitate him. (Lorenz 1966: 46)

Aggression elicited by any deviation from a group's characteristic manners and mannerisms forces all its members into a strictly uniform observance of these norms of social behavior. The nonconformist is discriminated against as an "outsider" and, in primitive groups, for which school classes or small military units serve as good examples, he is mobbed in the most cruel manner. (Lorenz 1966: 79)

It is perfectly right and legitimate that we should consider as "good" the manners which our parents have taught us, that we should hold sacred the social norms and rites handed down to us by the tradition of our culture. What we must guard against, with all the power of rational responsibility, is our natural incliation to regard the social rites and norms of other cultures as inferior. The dark side of pseudo-speciation is that it makes us consider the members of pseudo-species other than our own as not human, as many primitive tribes are demonstrably doing, in whose language the word for their own particular tribe is synonymous with "Man." (Lorenz 1966: 83)

Converesely, aggression and sexuality are quite compatible in the male; he can treat his partner roughly, chase her all around the tank, and betweenwhiles perform sexual movements and all possible mixed forms of motor patterns. The female may fear the male considerably without suppression of sexually motivated behavior pattern. The bride-to-be may flee before the male and at the same time make use of every breathing space to perform sexually motivated courtship movements. These mixed forms of behavior patterns of flight and sexuality have become, by ritualization, widespread ceremonies which are often called "coyness behavior" and which possess a very definite expression value. (Lorenz 1966: 104)

By "flock" or "herd" we do not mean that chance gathering of like individuals such as occurs when many flies or cultures crowd around a carcass, or when many winkles or sea anemones settle on a particularly favorable place in the tidal zone. The concept of the flock is determined by the fact that individuals of a species reacts to each other by attraction and are held together by behavior patterns which one or more individuals elicit in the others. Thus it is typical of flock formation when many individuals travel in close formation in the same direction. (Lorenz 1966: 139)

Generally, other conditions being equal, mere acquaintanceship with a fellow member of the species exerts a remarkably strong inhibitory effect on aggressive behavior. In human beings, this phenomenon can regularly be observed in railway carriages, incidentally an excellent place in which to study the function of aggression in the spacing out of territories. All the rude behavior patterns serving for the repulsion of seat competitors and intruders, such as covering empty places with coats or bags, putting up one's feet, or pretending to be asleep, are brought into action against the unknown individual only. As soon as the newcomer turns out to be even the merest acquaintance, they dissapear and are replaced by rather shamefaced politeness. (Lorenz 1966: 156)

This is a classical example of the process by which we call, with Tinberen, a redirected activity. It is characterized by the fact that an activity is released by one object but discharged at another, because the first one, while presenting stimuli specifically eliciting the response, simultaneously emits others which inhibit its discharge. A human example is furnished by the man who is very angry with someone and hits the table instead of the other man's jaw because inhibition prevents him from doing so, although his pent-up anger, like the pressure within a volcano, demands outlet. Most of the known cases of redirected activity concern aggressive behavior elicited by an object which simultaneously evokes fear. In this special case, which he called "bicycling," B. Grzimek first recognized and described the principle of redirection. The "bicyclist" in this case is the man who bows to his superior and threads on his inferior. The mechanism effecting this behavior is particularly clear when an animal approaches its opponent from some distance, then, on drawing near, notices how terrifying the latter really is, and now, since it cannot check the already started attack, vents its anger on some innocent bystander or even on some inanimate substitute object. (Lorenz 1966: 170)

It would seem that the partners to a triumph-ceremony group have to reassure each other all day long and at every opportunity that they do indeed belong together, forming an independent social entity. In reality the relationship of cause and effect is the other way around. The triumph ceremony is not caused by love and friendship between certain individuals, it is not "the expression of" these feelings, quite the contrary, the ceremony itself is instrumental in keeping the group members together. (Lorenz 1966: 206)

The second obstacle to self-knowledge is our reluctance to accept the fact that our own behavior obeys the laws of natural causation. Bernard Hassenstein has called this attitude the "anticausal value judgement." The reluctance of many people to recognize the causal determination of all natural phenomena, human behavior included, undoubtedly stems from the justifiable wish to possess a free will and to feel that our actions are determined not by fortuitous causes but by higher aims. (Lorenz 1966: 222)

The scientist who considers himself absolutely "objective" and believes that he can free himself from the compulsion of the "merely" subjective should try - only in imagination, of course - to kill in succession a lettuce, a fly, a frog, a guinea pig, a cat, a dog, and finally a chimpanzee. He will then be aware how increasingly difficult murder becomes as the victim's level of organization rises. The degree of inhibition against killing each one of these beings is a very precise measure for the considerably different values that we cannot help attributing to lower and higher forms of life. To any man who finds it equally easy to chop up a live dog and a live lettuce I would recommend suicide at his earliest convenience!(Lorenz 1966: 226)

By virtue of the molecular structure of the living matter in which they take place, the processes of life fulfill a great number of very particular functions, such as self-regulation, self-preservation, acquisition and storage of information, and, above all, reproduction of the structures essential for these functions. These, though in principle causally explicable, cannot take place in other, structurally less complex matter. (Lorenz 1966: 228)

In human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden manslaughter were necessary, because quickly killing was impossibe anyhow; the potential victim had plenty of opportunity to elicit the pity of the aggressor by submissive gestures and appeasing attitudes. No selection pressure arose in the prehistory or mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing of conspecifics until, all of a sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium of killing potential and social inhibition. When it did, man's position was very nearly that of a dove which, by some unnatural trick of nature, had suddenly acquired the beak of a raven. (Lorenz 1966: 241)

I have already said that the dynamics of instinctive drives, of phyletically and culturally ritualized behavior patterns, together with the controlling force of responsible morality, form a very complicated systemic whole which is not easy to analyze. However, the recognition of the mutual functional interdependence of its parts, even at the present incomplete stage of our knowledge, helps us to understand a number of phenomena which otherwise would remain completely unintelligible. (Lorenz 1966: 254)

Even in the less tragic case of rather closely related and roughly equivalent cultures mixing, there usually are some undesirable results, because each finds it easy to imitate the most superficial, least valuable customs of each other. The first items of American culture imitated by German youth immediately after the war were gum chewing, Coca-Cola drinking, the crew cut, and the reading of color comic strips. More valuable social norms characteristic of American culture were obviously less easy to imitate. (Lorenz 1966: 262)

As it is, we do not know enough about the function of any system of culturally ritualized norms of behavior to give a rational answer to the perfectly rational question of what some particular custom is good for, in other words wherein lies its survival value. When an innovaor rebels against established norms of social behavior and asks why he should conform with them, we are usually at a loss for an answer. (Lorenz 1966: 264)

A fourth, and perhaps the most important, prerequisite for the full eliciting of militant enthusiasm is the presence of many other individuals, all agitated by the same emotion. Their absolute number has a certain influence on the quality of the response. Smaller number at issue with a large majority tend to obstinate defense with the emotional value of "making a last stand," while very large numbers inspired by the same enthusiasm feel the urge to conquer the whole world in the name of their sacred cause. Hence the laws of mass enthusiasm are strictly analogous to those of flock formation described in Chapter Eight; here, too, the excitation grows in proportion, perhaps even in geometrical progression, with the increasing number of individuals. This is exactly what makes militant mass enthusiasm so dangerous. (Lorenz 1966: 273)

The first, the most obvious, and the most important percept is the old [...heatou], "Know thyself": we must deepen our insight into the causal concatenations governing our own behavior. The lines along which an applied science of human behavior will probably develop are just beginning to appear. (Lorenz 1966: 276)

If laughter is in fact directed at an outsider, as in scornful derision, the component of aggressive motivation and, at the same time, the analogy of certain forms of the triumph ceremony become greatly enhanced. In this case, laughter can turn into a very cruel weapon, causing injury if it strikes a defenseless human being undeservedly: it is criminal to laugh at a child. (Lorenz 1966: 294)

Pride is one of the chief obstacles to seeing ourselves as we really are, and self-deceit is the obliging servant of pride. (Lorenz 1966: 296)

The expression of the emotions in man and animals

Darwin, Charles 1998 [1872]. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. With an introduction, afterword, and commentaries by Paul Ekman. 3rd ed. New York : Oxford University Press, Inc.

Introduction to the Third Edition by Paul Ekman. pp. xxi--xxxvi

We want to touch with our faces those we love; we can bite affectionately - not only humans do this; so do dogs and cats. Pleasure is demonstrated in quite different ways in our domesticated animals, Darwin reminds us: cats purr and rub against us, while dogs lick us and wag their tails. In anger that tail acts quite differently in dogs, cats and horses. These are just a small sample of the fascinating observations Darwin describes in each chapere. (Ekman 1998: xxi)

to bite affectionately - seda kuulutab ka raamatu sleeve ja Ekman vihjab, et sellistele küsimustele leiab siit raamatust "miks?" stiilis vastuseid, kuigi minul sellele vastust leida ei õnnestunud.

The distinction between emotional expressions and gestures has been incorporated in current work on non-verbal communication. While gestures can refer to nearly anything - thoughts, plans, actions, wishes, fantasies, and so forth - the expressions pertain simply to the emotions. Expressions typically involve the face and the voice and, to a much lesser extentm body movement or posture. Darwin focuses most on facial expressions, although he gave some attention to other expressions. (Ekman 1998: xxii)

Väljenduste ja žestide vahel seega selge eristus (esimene seotud emotsioonidega, teine ka kõige muuga). Ma ei ole veel valmis seda eristust rangelt omaks võtma.

There is disagreement today among those who study animal behavior about whether expressions should be considered signs of emotion, related to internal physiological changes. Some maintain that it is more useful to consider the expressions as simply communicative signals, and many studies have done that, describing only what animals do. (In the Afterword I explain why this is a false dichotomy. We don't have to choose whether an expression is part of an emotion or a communicative signal. In reality, it is both.) (Ekman 1998: xxx)

This was Darwin's evidence that expressions are innate, that these signs of our emotions are the product of our evolution and are therefore part of our biology. This was completely incompatible with the reigning dogmas. Watson, the founder of behaviorism, rejected the notion that inheritance played nay part in explaining our social behavior. He claimed that we need only consider what is learned to understand man. Learning, he said, is the only proper focus for psychology. (Ekman 1998: xxxiv)

Today most scientists reject such absolute relativism: nature and nurture both play a role in all human behavior. Emotions are both the product of our evolution, particularly their physiology and expression, and of what we have learned, especially our attempts to manage our emotions, out attitudes about our emotions and our representations of them verbally. THere are still some who disagree - cultural relativist or social constructionists - but they no longer dominate scientific thinking. The intellectual climate has changed; it is now much more hospitable to Darwin's Expressions. (Ekman 1998: xxxv)

The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals

The study of expression is difficult, owing to the movements being often extremely slight, and of a fleeting nature. A difference may be clearly perceived, and yet it may be impossible, at least I have found it so, to state in what the difference consists. When we witness any deep emotion, our sympathy is so strongly excited, that close observation is forgotten or rendered almost impossible; of which fact I have had many curious proofs. Our imagination is another and still more serious source of error; for if from the nature of the circumstances we excpect to see any expression, we readily imagine its presence. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: )

The power of association is admitted by everyone. Mr Bain remarks, that 'actions, sensations, and states of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that when any one of them is afterward presented t the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea'. It is so important for our purpose fully to recognize that actions readily become associated with other actions and with various states of mind, that I will give a good many instances, in the first place relating to man, and afterwards to the lower animals. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 36-37)

A man when going out of doors puts on his gloves quite unconsciously; and this may seem an extremely simple operation, but he who has taught a child to put on gloves, knows that thisis by no means the case. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 37)

Professor Beer, of Bonn, is said by Lewes (Physical Basis of Mind, 1877, p. 377) to have had the power of contracting or dilating the pupils at will. 'Here ideas act as motors. When he thinks of a very dark space the pupil dilates, when of a very bright spot the pupil contracts.' (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 47)

Man not only uses inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language; if, indeed, the word invented can be applies to a process, completed by innumerable steps, half-consciously made.(Darwin 1998 [1872]: 63)

Many signs, moreover, which plainly stand in opposition to each other, appear to have had on both sides a significant origin. This seems to hold good with the signs used by the deaf and dumb for light and dark, for strenght and weakness, etc. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 65)

I have described, in the second chapter, the gait and appearance of a dog when cheerful, and the marked antithesis presented by the same animal when dejected and disappointed, with his head, ears, body, tail, and chops drooping, and eyes dull. Under the expectation of any great pleasure, dogs bound and jump about in an extravagant manner, and bark for joy. The tendency to bark under this state of mind is inherited, or runs in the breed; greyhounds rarely bark, whilst the spitx-dog barks so incessantly on starting for a walk with his master that he becomes a nuisance. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 121)

Music has a wonderful power, as I have elsewhere attempted to show, of recalling in a vague and indefinite manner, those strong emotions which were felt during long-past ages, when, as is probable, our early progenitors courted each other by the aid of vocal tones. And as several of our strongest emotions - grief, great joy, love, and sympathy - lead to the free secretion of tears, it is not surprising that music should be apt to cause our eyes to become suffused with tears, especially when we are already softened by any of the tenderer feelings. Music often produces another peculiar effect. We know that every strong sensation, emotion, or excitement - extreme pain, rage, terror, joy, or the passion of love - all have a special tendency to cause the muscles to tremble; and the thrill or slight shiver which runs down the backbone and liombs of many persons when they are powerfully affected by music, seems to bear the same relation to the above trembling of the body, as a slight suffusion of tears the power of music does to weeping from any strong and real emotion. (Darwin 1998 [1872]:216 )

A man may be absorbed in the deepest thought, and his brow will remain smooth until he encounters some obstacles in his train of reasoning, or is interrupted by some disturbance, and then a frown passes like a shadow over his brow. A half-starved man may think intently how to obtain food, but he probably will not frown unless he encounters either in thought or action some difficulty, or finds the food when obtained nauseous. I have noticed that almost everyone instantly frowns if he perceives a strange or bad taste in what he is eating. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 220)

If we have suffered or expected to suffer some wilful injury from a man, or if he is in any way offensive to us, we dislike him; and dislike easily rises into hatred. Such feelings, if experienced in a moderate degree, are not clearly expressed by any movement of the body or features, excepting perhaps by a certain gravity of behaviour, or by some ill-temper. Few individuals, however, can long reflect about a hated person, without feeling and exhibiting signs of indignation or rage. But if the offending person be quire insignificant, we experience merely disdain or contempt. If, on the other hand, he is all-pwerful, then hatred passes into terror, as when a slave thinks about a cruel master, or a savage about a bloodthirsty malignant deity. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 234)

The partial closure of the eyelids, ad Duchenne insists, or the turning away of the eyes or of the whole body, are likewise highly expressive of distain. These actions seem to declare that the despised person is not worth looking at, or is disagreeable to behold. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 251)

Professor Cleland (Evolution, Expression and Sensation, 1881, p. 55) points out that concealment or deceit is expressed by the face being directed downwards, while the eyes are turned upwards. 'The culprit sheltering himself by a lie ... hangs his head over his secret, while he steals upwards glances to see the effect which he distrusts'. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 262)

THe nature of the mental states which include blushing. These consist of shyness, shame, and modesty; the essential element in all being self-attention. Many reasons can be assigned for believing that originally self-attention directed at personal appearance, in relation to the opinion of others, was the exciting cause; the same effect being subsequently produced, through the force of association, by self-attention in relation to moral conduct. It is not the simple act of reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinkning what others think of us, which excites a blush. In absolute solitude the most sensitive person would be quite indifferent about his appearance. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 324)

Strangers neither know nor care anything about our conduct or character, but they may, and often do, criticize our appearance; hence shy persons are particularly apt to be shy and to blush in the presence of strangers. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 327)

If, then, great ignorance of details does not prevent our recognizing with certainty and promtitude various expressions, I do not see how this ignorance can be advanced as an argument that our knowledge, though vague and general, is not innate. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 355)

The relaxation of the small arteries of the surface, on which blushing depends, seems to have primarilt resulted from earnest attention directed to the appearance of our own persons, especially of our faces, aided by habit, inheritance, and the ready flow of nerve-force along accustomed channels; and afterwards to have been extended by the power of association to self-attention directed to moral conduct. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 358)

The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns dissaproval. We readily perceive sympathy in other by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strenghtened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 359)

• Margaret Mead's review of Ekman's Darwin book (Journal of Communication, 25, 1975, 205-13)
• Sight, Sound and Sense, T. Sebeok (ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978
• The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression by G.-B. Duchenne de Boulogne, translated and edited by R. A. Cuthbertson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990

The Swiss Pioneer in NVCS Heini Hediger

Sebeok, Thomas A. 2001. The Swiss Pioneer in Nonverbal Communication Studies, Heini Hediger (1908-1992). New York ; Ottawa : Legas

Kena lugemine, paeluvad pildid ja huvitavad allmärkused, aga Sebeoki enda tekstist midagi märkimisväärset tsiteerimiseks ei leidnudki. Liiga lühike ja argine. Danesi eessõnast leidsin aga kaks kasulikku katkendit. Muu hulgas sain teada, et Danesi jaoks on PMS (Primary Modeling System), SMS ja TSM samaväärsed Perice'i esmasuse, teisesuse ja kolmasusega. Igatahes, modelleerimisest:
Danesi, Marcel 2001. Hediger through Sebeok: An Introduction to the Biosemiotic Paradigm

In this framework, the notion of modeling is pivotal. This is definable as the species-specific ability to produce forms to stand for referents that have some relevance to species continuity. In the human species, the form may be imagined, in which case it is called by psychologists a mental image, or it may be something externalized, in which case it is called by semioticians and philosophers, a representation. Semiotic research has identified four basic types of forms: (1) signs (words, gestures, etc.); (2) texts (stories, theories, etc.); (3) codes (language, music, etc.); and (4) figural assemblages (metaphors, metonyms, etc.). More specifically, a model can be defined as a form that has been imagined or made externally (through some physical medium) to stand for an object, event, feeling, etc., known as a referent, or for a class of similar (or related) objects, events, feelings, et.c, known as a referential domain. (Danesi 2001: 8)

The ability to make models is, actually, a derivative of semiosis. When an infant comes into contact with a new object, his or her instinctive reaction is to explore it with the senses, i.e. to handle it, taste it, smell it, listen to any sounds it makes, and visually observe its features. This exploratory phase of knowing the object constitutes a sensory modeling stage. The resulting internal model (metnal image) allows the infant to recognize the same object subsequently without having, each time, to examine it over again "from scratch" with his or her sensory system (although the infant often will examine its physical qualities for various other reasons). (Danesi 2001: 10)

Ja kasulik viide: Mitchell, W. Robert and Nicholas S Thompson, eds. Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ah, ja Desmond Morris oli 1986. aastal avaldanud raamatu nimega "Catwatching".

Nonverbal communication of aggression

Pliner, Patricia, Lester Krames, and Thomas Alloway, editors. Nonverbal communication of aggression: proceedings of the fourth annual Symposium on Communication and Affect held at Erindale College, University of Toronto, March 28-30, 1974. Symposium on Communication and Affect (1974, Erindale College). Advances in the Study of Communication and Affect, v. 2. New York: Plenum Press, c1975.
või:
Pliner, Patricia (ed) 1975. Nonverbal Communication of Aggression (Advances in the Study of Communication and Affect, Vol. 2). New York : Plenum Press

Sarles, Harvey 1975. "Language and Communication-II: The View from '74". In: . pp. 1-19.

THe field of human ethology has gained a literature, if not exactly a substance. In fact, there may be two fields splitting and emerging - one which is essentially psychological-individual, the other more anthropological-social - as they tend to approach the same apparent subject matter from two quite different perspectives. (Sarles 1975: 2)

Teachers seem to get a great deal of their feedback about what's going on in their students' heads from watching their faces. Teachers must make rapid judgements about whether a point is understood, and by whom. Their data are primarily facial expressions. So a student who either looks stupid in some static overarching sense, or whose look is interpreted as confused or stupid, will have some effect on the conduct of any class. Depending on the teacher, his or her mood, patience, etc., that stupid-looking student may get a lot more teaching energy - or more likely, apparently, he will begin to be treated differently from the bright-looking students. (Sarles 1975: 11)

Exline, Ralph V., Ellyson, Steve L., Long, Barbara 1975. "Visual Behavior as an Aspect of Power Role Relationships". In: . pp. 21-52.

This book is concerned with the nonverbal communication of aggression, and our discussion will focus on the darker side of eye engagements, though we will deal more with power and control than with aggression pwr se. Power, control, aggression - the concepts are closely linked, for how often is one who gives little indication of interest in influencing or controlling the actions of others likely to be described ad infringing or encroaching on another's rights or territory? (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 22)

To say that the eye "takes" is to say that we use our eyes to obtain information about the other. This information is useful either in gauging his reaction to our speech and/or behavior, or in using his nonverbal behavior to better understand or to evaluate the validity of the message he provides us in words. Thus one function of looking is to obtain information from and about the speaker which cannot be derived from his words alone. Such information would seem to be relevant to our personal concerns of communication or comprehension. (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 24)

The second factor, i.e. the "norm of attention," is operative in both speaking and listening roles, for convention of courtesy would seem to require that both the speaker and listener give evidence of "paying attention" to the other. Looking at another is a conventional way of indicating such attention. (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 30)

Ellsworth, Phoebe C. 1975. "Direct Gaze as a Social Stimulus: The Example of Aggression". In: . pp. 53-75.

Some nonverbal behaviors may have reliable diagnostic significance for psychologists, although here the evidence is much less clear. Finally, there remain a great many nonverbal behaviors which do not have an invariant significance, but which may nonetheless be influential stimuli in social interactions. The "meaning" of these behaviors changes from one situation to another and from one interpersonal relationship to another. (Ellsworth 1975: 54)

Most studies that have dealt with the meaning of nonverbal behavior in social interaction have concentrated on the meanings inferred by an observer of the behavior. Similarly, in this discussion, the "meaning" which changes when the same cue occurs in different contexts refers to the observer's reaction to the cue and his interpretation of it, since as yet we have very little information about other types of social meaning. (Ellsworth 1975: 55)

Taken together, these studies provide fairly strong support for the proposition that the meaning of a look is not intrinsic to the look but derives in large meaning from the context. Thus a stare is not just a threatening signal that triggers flight, and a downcast gaze is much more complicated than a simple appeasement gesture. However, this flexibility of interpretation across contexts does not imply that visual behaviors are unimportant social stimuli. On the contrary, within each social context studied, the direct gaze had powerful and fairly consistent effects, effects which differed from those of gaze aversion. It was, as we have argued, a salient, arousing, and involving stimulus, a stimulus which demanded a response. If no appropriate response could be found, the person who was gazed at tried to escape from the demand by fleeing from the situation. (Ellsworth 1975: 69)

Between the face and the atmosphere of the situation lies a huge range of factors - posture, status relationships, degree of acquaitance, purpose, setting and formality of interaction, cultural factors, and so on, and so on. Few of these have received much empirical attention in relation to visual behavior, with the exception of Birdwhistell's observations of subcultural differences (1970), explorations of status relationships by Mehrabian (1969) and Exline (this volume), and Rubin's research on romance (1970). (Ellsworth 1975: 70)

Izard, Carroll E. 1975. "Patterns of Emotions and Emotion Communication in "Hostility" and Aggression". In:. pp. 77-101.

It is no accident that we speak of the "heat of anger"; the flushed face of the angry individual feels and looks hot. Aggression that occurs in anger is more likely to be direct result of relatively intense emotion in an individual whose enegry has been highly mobilized. On the contrary, contempt can be considered the "cool" emotion in the "hostility" triad. It seems reasonable that it is the contempt situation in which the "cold-blooded" aggressor operates, since contempt is a distancing and devaluing emotion. This description also has validity in the language of common usage, as indicated by such phrases as "murder in cold blood," or "cold-blooded killer." (Izard 1975: 84)

Menzen, E. W. Jr. 1975. "Communication and Aggression in a Group of Young Chimpanzees". In: . pp. 103-133.

Biologically speaking, thee is just as much competition within a goup as between strangers, but the rules become more subtle and shared by all, and they are less apt to entail bloodshed and useless expenditure of energy. In other words, societies (almost by definition) develop conventionalized forms of competition over resources (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). The conventions provide relatively orderly and efficient (cooperative?) means of determining who will get what, and when. (Menzen 1975: 119)

Miller, Robert E. 1975. "Nonverbal Expressions of Aggression and Submission in Social Groups of Primates". In: . pp. 135-160.

A feature of most primate groupings is a social dominance hierarchy. While the behavioral expression and the degree of control exerted by the most dominant animal shows considerable variability from species to species, close observation reveals that some individuals are accorded unusual respect by the other members of the group and that they often control movements of the troop during the foraging expedition, limit the aggressive activities within the group, and coordinate defense of the troop against predators or intrusions by other groups of the same species. The most dominant animal is generally an adult male, or, in some cases, a group of two or three adult males who cooperate and share the leadership position. It is clear from many studies and in many species of animals from the rat to primates the male hormone, testosterone, is a factor influencing aggressive behavior. (Miller 1975: 138)

We have suggested that the complete lack of nonverbal fluency in isolates is a most important factor in their inadequacy and distorted social behavior and, further, that social experiences during the first year of life are required for the monkey to acquire the essentials of nonverbal behavior. (Miller 1975: 50)

These psychoactive drugs, which altered the course and nature of group social interactions, also changed the transmission and reception of nonverbal cues in the cooperative conditioning task, lending support to the notion that effective nonverbal behavior is the sine qua non of successful group interactions. (Miller 1975: 150)

The young child must learn to be instructed by his elders to control aggression and to express assertiveness in socially acceptable ways. Inherent in this view is that the child must recognize and respond appropriately to those subtle, expressive cues that reveal hostility and rising anger in associates so that his own behavior can be modified to avert an outbreak of violence. (Miller 1975: 155)

One might anticipate that the study of nonverbal fluency in man may similarly reveal that aggression is importantly related with the failure of subjects to perceive and interpret subtle expressions of irritation and annoyance in others so that behavior can be modulated in time to prevent an escalation to anger. It would be particularly interesting to study the developmental course of the sending and receiving of nonverbal expressions so that one could relate early social experience with subsequent nonverbal performances. Since aggressive behavior almost invariantly is accompanied by highly visible nonverbal as well as verbal responses, the study of the gradations of expressions that culminate in overt hostility would seem to be important for the understanding of human aggression. (Miller 1975: 157)

Ginsburg, Benson E. 1975. "Nonverbal Communication: The Effects of Affect on Individual and Group Behavior". In: . pp. 161-173.

For us as verbal beings, there is a premium on communication by spoken language. However, at the level of affect, the verbalizations are redundant. If I have never felt whatever it is that you feel, your words will not communicate your feelings to me in the same sense that they would had I experienced them. Even if I have shared in the emotions you are expressing verbally, I must still judge whether you feel them and mean them or whether you are dissembling, and I will use other and often nonverbal cues in order to make this decision. One may say that he or she loves another, but the truth of this statement will be judged by a multitude of other cues: a glance, a smile, a touch, and certain consistencies of behavior over time. (Ginsburg 1975: 162)

The association of the signal with the mood or affect and, in turn, with the appropriate act, is established by experience in these contexts, whether the eye of the beholder belongs to a human investigator or to a conspecific. We have, for example, reared a female cub in complete visual isolation from the age of 3 weeks to 10 months. When she was first introduced to other wolves, she did not recognize their threats, greetings, or dominance posture and reacter inappopriately. Her own vocalizations and body postures contained a suitable repertoire of wolf behavior, but she did not use these in appropriate combinations or contexts and was thus not "understood" by other wolves. By being forced to interact with them under restraint from the time she emerged from isolation, she managed to put her communication system in place in 4 or 5 days. She had the genetic potential, but this way, by itself, no sufficient to insure that she would be able either to communicate or to understand. (Ginsburg 1975: 164)

Ratner, Stanley R. 1975. "Animal's Defenses: Fighting in Predator-Prey Relations". In: 175-190.

Notice that mimicries only sometimes involve postures and movements when the prey takes a posture to look like something else. Thus, only in some cases does this defense involve a signal to the predator. (Ratner 1975: 181)

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