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Kehakeele survey

Olen hakanud tundma, et nii intensiivselt võõrkeeles lugedes-kirjutades läheb emakeel justkui kaduma. Mul ei ole aega ega tahtmist, et pöörduda tagasi eestikeelse kirjanduse ja kommenteerimise juurde, aga argivajaduste rahuldamiseks on võibolla kasulik teha uuring/vaatlus/mõõdistus (survey) sellest mida võib leida kui googeldada sõna "kehakeel". See võib olla ka ajalooliselt huvitav ülevaade, sest päringutulemused kahtlemata muutuvad ajas ja siis saab hiljem järele vaadata millist informatsiooni varem saadaval oli. Hea oleks kui see oleks korduv ülesanne, ehk teeksin aeg-ajalt uuesti sellise survey ja vaatan mis on lisandunud. On ka väga tõenäoline, et kui ma märksõnu "kehakeel" ja "mitteverbaalne suhtlemine" siin tihedasti kasutan, siis jõuab ka see postitus aktuaalsete päringute hulka ja kehakeelest huvi tundvad inimesed leiavad üles kogu selle kirjanduse mida see blogi kehakeele kohta sisaldab.

Hoiatan ette ära, et selline uuring pole mitte mingis mõttes objektiivne. Kommentaarid ja arvamused on subjektiivsed - minule ainuomased - ja neid ei tasuks võtta liiga tõsiselt. Teen seda esmatähtsalt enda jaoks.

Neile, kes sattusid siia selle tõttu, et otsivad kehakeelt käsitlevat kirjandust, siis siia nupule vajutades leiate nimekirja sellest mis on Eestis või Internetis saadaval:



PealkiriKehakeel | Facebook
Linkhttps://www.facebook.com/pages/Kehakeel/156239954415747
LühiväljavõteKehakeel. 189 likes · 5 talking about this. ... December · November · October. Kehakeel is on Facebook. To connect with Kehakeel, sign up for Facebook today.

"Kehakeel" on siin metafoorilises kasutuses. Tegu on joogaharrastajatest taimetoitlaste arusaamaga, et keha... kõneleb? Kirjeldus kõlab: "Keha on hinge kodu, koosnedes sõna otsese mõttes sellest, mida sa sööd! Et oma keha eest paremini hoolitseda ning olla tasakaalus oma keha hinge ja meelega." Samad tegelased on ära registreerinud domeeni www.kehakeel.com - alateemad selles blogis on Kehakeelest, Toitumisest, Taimetoitlusest, Toitumisnõustamine, Joogast, Sündmused, Endast ja Kokkamine. Viimane sissekanne on teemal "Kõhnade inimeste diskrimineerimine". Klikkides alateemale "Kehakeelest", avanab Aadama ja Eeva pildiga tekst mis algab nii: "Univesum on tekkinud miljardeid aastaid tagasi ning meie maa, inimesed, loomad, linnud, puud ja putukad on üks osa sellest. Meie keha koosneb samadest elementidest nagu tähed taevas-kaltsium, magneesium jne. Iga süsteem, millele me igapäevaselt tähelepanu ei pööra nagu uue elu loomine, sündimine, söömine, seedimine, suremine on osake keerulisest mehanismist..." Kehakeele kui mitteverbaalse suhtlemisega pole siin mingit pistmist. Egle Koppel, selle värgi eestvedaja, võibolla arvas, et "kehakeel" on selline tühja tähistaja moodi sõna mida võib kasutada nagu Humpty Dumpty. Ma ei saa seda talle pahaks panna. Kahju vaid sellest, et taoline käitumine veel enam süvendam argiteadmuslikku eelarvamust, et "kehakeel" on midagi müstilist, spirituaalset, või "midagi millega eided tegelevad" (if you excuse my french). Joogat annab küll mitteverbaalse suhtlemisega siduda, läbi selle, et kindlasti on harjutusi mis parandavad kehalist väljendusvõimekust... Aga muu poolest on ettevõtmine minu silmis mööda pannud. Ma eeldan, et selliseid me-ei-tea-mis-kehakeel-on-aga-kasutame-seda-sõna-ikkagi ettevõtmisi on veel.


PealkiriKehakeel - Vikipeedia, vaba entsüklopeedia
Linkhttp://et.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kehakeel
LühiväljavõteMitteverbaalne kommunikatsioon ehk kehakeel hõlmab nii inimese liikumist (hoiak, žestid, naeratus, silmakontakt ja füüsikalise ruumi kasutamine) kui ka ...

Selle lehekülje kohta on juba midagi asjalikku öelda. Artikli alguses on suur hoiatusmärk: "Võimalik autoriõiguste rikkumine!" See on põhjustatud tõsiasjast, et tegu on Saaremaa Ühisgümnaasiumi lõpetaja uurimistööga Kehakeelest. Selle uurimustöö kasutatud kirjanduse hulgas on Tuurannu kriminoloogiline juhend, kellegi D. Glošin'i 2008. aasta uurimustöö (dunno), Kevin Hogani "The Secrets of Body Language" (rämps), kellegi J. Nowakowsky artikkel "Constructivist Model for Learning" (pole töös sees vist isegi kasutatud), eestikeelne Nierenberg (1997), eestikeelne Pease (1994), kellegi L. Plonka 2007. Keha Kõneleb, kellegi C. Topf 1998. Kehakeel ja edukas karjäär, ja paar internetilehekülge. Lühidalt, materjal mida on võimalik leida kohalikust raamatukogust või internetist. Mingil hetkel tuleks mul endal ka need allikad üle lugeda, aga see oleks ikka väga kriitline ettevõtmine niiet pean ennast veel koguma. Samas, loogiline järjestus olekski eestikeelsete raamatute lugemine enne kui eestikeelset veebi analüüsin, sest esimene paratamatult mõjutab teist. Esialgu proovin ilma, ehk on põnevam kui kohe autoreid ära ei taba.
Artiklit/uurimustööd ennast väga kommenteerida ei taha, sest see on sisuliselt refereering ja midagi uut see ei ütle. Pigem karjub see wiki-lehekülg hädasti toimetamise järele. Ilmselt mina ise olen kõige asisem inimene seda toimetama, aga see jällegi eeldab, et ma oskaksin eesti keelt piisavalt, et enne ingliskeelne eestikeelseks tõlkida ja siis oma teadmised-parandused sellele lisada. Tülikas juba suuruste tõttu: praegune uurimustöö on (wiki PDF-ina) 15 lehekülge; ingliskeelne artikkel Body Language on kõigest 5 lehekülge, aga Nonverbal Communication on 13 lehekülge ja täis väga asist teksti mida on raske toimetada. Kunagi peaksin paratamatult selle töö ära tegema, aga selle poole tuleb ehitada. Praegu alustan sellest, et uurin oma Survey-ga välja mida eestlased üldse kehakeelest teavad või teada tahavad.
See uurimustöö võib isegi olla väga sümptomaatiline selle suhtes mida peaks korralik wikiartikkel käsitlema. Mul on nende aspektide kohta siin blogis rohkemal või vähemal määral igaühe kohta informatsiooni mis tuleks vaid läbi töödata ja eesti keeles õigesti esitada. Need alapealkirjad uurimustööst võivad seega isegi kasulikuks osutuda:
Kommunikatsioonisüsteemid; Kehakeele liigitamine; Põhilised suhtlemisžestid ja nende päritolu; Kehakeel; Žestide tähtsus; Ühiskondlik seisund ja žestide rohkus; Kehakeele võltsimine; Näoilme; Pilkkontakt; Signaalid silmadega; Naeratus; Kurameerimisliigutused ja signaalid; Kõnnak ja kehahoid; Peahoiak; Käesurumine; Avatud peopesad; Näo puudutamine; Kuulamine; Käed kui tõkked; Jalgadest kaitsetõke; Vastuvõtlikkus, intuitsioon kehakeele lugemisel; Avatus, kaitseseisund, hindamine, kahtlustamine; Avatus; Kaitseseisund; Kahtlustamine ja salatsemine; Hindamine; Ruumivöönd; Ruumivööndid; Peegelpilt. Alateadlik kopeerimine; Enesekindlus, ärevus, kontroll; Ärevus; Allasurutud emotsioonid; Leke; Laps ja täiskasvanu.


PealkiriKehakeel
Linkhttp://www.kehakeel.ee/
Lühiväljavõte10 okt. 2012 – Inimese kaalust ehk sellest kui palju keegi on juurde või alla võtnud räägitakse pea iga päev. Ülekaalulisus on saanud epideemiaks terves ...

Jälle see, Jeebus. Ühest käest tahaks pahandada, et kehakeelel (nagu mina seda mõistan) ei ole mingit pistmist nende tegelaste Kehakeelega. Teisest käest on ka www.bodylanguage.com vaba (osta domeen), www.bodylanguage.net on "The UK & International Journal of Medical Aesthetics and Anti-Ageing" koduleht ja www.bodylanguage.org ütleb "Body Language ® is a medically-based program featuring women’s and children’s health and wellness issues". Võibolla hoopis mina eksin? Näib, et kehakeel ongi mitte ainult nende üksikute eestlaste vaid ka ülejäänud maailma silmis midagi mis on seotud tervise ja iluga. Või kas lugu võib olla selline, et teaduslikult kõlav nonverbal communication on meeste mängumaa ja lihtsameelne body language on siis see millega naised tegelevad? A la üks käsitleb kehalist suhtlemist, teine keha kui ilueset? Eks järgmiste lehekülgedega paljastub rohkem, sest juba ette näen, et paljud on saitidelt naistekas.delfi.ee ja naine24.ee - Oh lawd what have I gotten myself into.

[sardooniline märkus: nende ettevõtmine peaks olema pigem Kehakaal, amirite?]


PealkiriKehakeel - Miksike
Linkhttp://www.miksike.ee/docs/referaadid2006/kehakeel_kullikorol.htm
LühiväljavõteKehakeel. Sissejuhatus. Sõnade abil anname edasi vaid 7% teabest, hääle abil 38 %, mittesõnaliste vahendite kaudu 55%. Sõnade abil väljendame teavet, ...

Kui ma väike olin siis näis Miksike olevat väga tõsiseltvõetav allikas internetis. Seepärast kavatsen seda lehekülge tegelikult ka lugeda.
Referaat on koostatud http://www.cs.ut.ee/~karinr/KEHAK.html põhjal.
Link enam ei tööta. Vb isegi hea, sest see tekst alustab Mehrabiani müüdi kordamisest.
Sõnade abil väljendame teavet, keha abil aga isikutevahelisi suhteid.
See pole niivõrd müüt kuiet lihtsalt vale. Verbaalse suhtlemise kaudu väljendame ka teavet inimestevaheliste suhete kohta. Seesamune Mehrabian uuris ka lähedust (immediacy) keeles. Rääkimata sellest, et keha abil saab igasugust teavet - vb isegi kõige tähtsamat teavet oma isikute kohta - väljendada.
Väljend “kuues meel” tuleneb sellest, et me tunnetame eelaimust vestluskaaslase valelikkuse suhtes, kuna me märkasime vastuolu kaaslase sõnade ja kehakeele vahel. Tavaliselt on naised selliste juhtude puhul tundlikumad, sellest ka “naiselik vaist”.
Ei, ma olen päris kindel, et kuues meel ei pärine mitteverbaalse suhtlemise diskursusest vaid, et sellel on midagi pistmist spirituaalsusega. Kuues meel on extrasensory, meeleväline; mitteverbaalne suhtlemine on seotud meeltega. Ja naised ei ole tavaliselt tundlikumad ja "naiselik vaist" ei ole sellega nii lihtsalt seotud. Juba 70ndatel tehti kindlaks, et meeste ja naiste võimed emotsiooniväljenduste tõlgendamisel on enam-vähem samavõrd pädevad.
Nagu iga keel, nii koosneb ka kehakeel lausetest ja kirjavahemärkidest.
Kineesika - lingvistika analoog on siin läinud nässu: kehakeele vaatlemine keelena on metodoloogiline vahend, mitte ontoloogiline tõde (see on viis kuidas sellest mõelda, mitte nii nagu asjad on).
Igal inimesel on oma keha ümbritsev õhuruum, mille suurus erineb meie elukohast ning sealsest inimeste arvust.
Ma pole kunagi täheldanud, et personal space oleks kuidagi seotud õhuga. "Õhuruum" kõlab nagu inimesed on lennukid. Aga õhk on tõepoolest see milles me elame.
Avameelne inimene sirutab teiega vesteldes oma käed ettepoole ning jätab peopesad avatuks. Inimene, kelle peopesad on avatud, valetab vähem. Samuti saame sel kombel teisi inimesi mõjutada vähem valetama, kuna meie avatud peopesad innustavad partnerit meisse siiralt suhtuma.
Tegelikult on asi pisut teistmoodi (vastupidi): kui inimene valetab siis näitab ta avatud peopesasid vähem. Kui ma ei eksi siis pärineb see tähelepanek Ekmani ja Frieseni artiklist "Hand Movements" ajakirjast Journal of Communication (Vol. 22(4), December 1972). Seda aga, et teistele avatud peopesade näitamine mõjutab teisi vähem valetama, selle suhtes pole ma üldse kindel.
Pettusest märkuandvate žestide äratundmine aitab meil aimata, et inimene valetab. Valetaja puudutab tihtipeale kätega nägu, püüdes katta suud, silmi või kõrvu. Samuti võivad need liigutused tähendada kahtlust, ebakindlust või liialdamist
See oli Allan Pease'i tõlgendus, et automanipulaatorite funktsioon on "katta" ehk sulgeda kanal - nt "katan silmad, ei taha näha". Tegelikkuses on sel rohkem pistmist tundlike nahakudedega mis hakkavad sügelema ebamugavustunde puhul. See on endokrinoloogia valdkond kus metafooridega saab vähe teha.
Suu juurde pannakse käsi seetõttu, kuna aju annab alateadvuses märku keelele tulevaid luiskesõnu takistada.
Võibolla eelmise sajandi alguse mustvalgetes komöödiates, aga Charlie Chaplin tõepoolest ei ole autoriteet inimese loomuliku käitumise suhtes.
Prille kandev inimene ei tarvitse otsuse langetamisel lõuga silitada, selle asemel võtab ta prillid eest ning pistab sangaotsa endale suhu.
Jällegi, tegevused mida võib näha müügikonsultantide koosolekul ei ole hea indikaator loomulikust käitumisest.
Ristates käed rinnale, tekitame tõkke. Kui kuulaja nõnda käitub, siis tähendab see tema eitavat seisukohta ning tähelepanu hajumist. Sellist poosi sunnib võtma tema sisemine pingeseisund ja vastuolu. Et sellise inimese suhtumist muuta, tuleks tema käed ristiasendist lahti harutada. Talle võib näiteks ulatada mingisuguse eseme. Nõnda asub kuulaja avatumasse poosi ning ka tema suhtumine muutub.
Klassikaline Pease, aga äärmiselt kummaline. Meenub The Simpsonitest moment mil Homer üritab Marge'i ristatud käsi vägisi lahti harutada, edutult. Ja huvitav kui palju eestlasi ongi sellise soovituse ajendil ristatud kätega isikutele midagi hoida ulatanud ja siis seeläbi ebamugavat olukorda veel ebamugavamaks muutnud.
Oma sõjakust väljendame käsi puusa pannes. Selle poosi võtab sisse inimene, kes on valmis oma eesmärke saavutama.
Meenuvad pildid koolikiusamisest millel ohver on maas põlvili, üks kiusaja peksab ja teised seisavad ümber käsi puusas.
Eks iga inimene ole kord soovinud endale võimet teiste mõtteid lugeda. Seda iha on peetud müstiliseks. Tegelikult on see aga võimalik – kehakeele abil. Selleks, et mõista inimeste käitumist, peame õppima mõistma nende kehakeelt, millega on tihtipeale väga raske oma mõtteid saladuses hoida, kuna vastavad žestid ja poosid on meile harjumuseks saanud. Lugenud läbi käesoleva referaadi, oskate paremini mõista inimese mõtteid.
Nõup. Mitte mõtteid kui selliseid. Käežestid võivad verbaalset informatsiooni täiendada ning seeläbi mingeid mõttemustreid ära tunda... Aga üldiselt aitab kehakeele jälgimine aimata - nagu teksti alguses on tegelikult selgelt öeldud - meeleolu, seisundit või suhtumist. Ehk siis (gross) mood, emotion and attitude. Sellele tekstile annan hindeks kolme.


PealkiriMillest räägib mehe kehakeel? - Suhted & seks - naine24.ee
Linkhttp://www.naine24.ee/804622/millest-raagib-mehe-kehakeel/
Lühiväljavõte11 apr. 2012 – Osa teabest edastame me pigem kehakeele abil kui sõnadega. Seetõttu vaata ja jälgi teda ja sa või...

Veebileht Datingtipps.at paljastas mõned olulisemad märgid, kuidas mõista flirtiva mehe kehakeelt.
Okei, ma natuke loodan, et kuna allikas on mingisugune saksakeelne sait siis siin on midagi mida ma veel ei pruugi teada.
Ta naeratab sulle.
Ja see on märk, et mees flirdib sinuga? Brilliant.
Ta pingutab oma lihaseid, et demonstreerida oma lihaste jõudu ja näidata kaitsevõimet.
Yes, wooing women with le muscles. ofc
Ta üritab saada sinuga silmsidet ja hoiab seda kauem kui sina.
See on isegi huvitav, sest kauem silmsidet hoidev osapool justkui "domineerib". Niiet selle juhendi järgi on see hea kui mees domineerib.
Ta kallutab oma ülakeha sinu poole.
Sellest ma ei saa aru. Millises olukorras on see normaalne, et ülakeha kallutatakse naisterahva poole?
Ta puudutab ennast (manipuleerib), näiteks kohendab juukseid, hõõrub nimetissõrmega kergelt oma ninasõõrmeid, mängib lipsuga. Sellised füüsilised liigutused on märgid sellest, et tal on läheduse vajadus.
Haha, lol. Ninasõõrmete hõõrumine nimetissõrmega on üldiselt märk ebamugavusest. Siinne soovitus naistele on tõlgendada seda kui lähedusvajadust ja muuta ebamugav olukord... seksikalt ebamugavaks.
Ta pöörab oma pea järsult sinu poole, kui sa naeratad.
Hmm... Tahaks isegi lugeda seda uurimistööd mis selle välja selgitas.
Signaalid, mis annavad märku: «Hoia eemale!»
• Ta väldib sinuga silmsidet.
• Tema pilk on suunatud kellelegi teisele.
• Tema kehahoiak on suletud või sinust eemale suunatud. Näiteks ta hoiab oma käsi risti rinna peal või keerab oma pea vestluse ajal mujale.
• Ta on lodevas asendis ja laseb näiteks kõhul vabalt välja rippuda.
Huvitav, et mille kohta mina ütleksin lihtsalt "Ta ei ole huvitatud", on siin käskivalt "Hoia eemale!" Run, bitch, run! Selle nimekirja tõlkinud naisterahvas nimetab end "reporteriks" ja ütleb, et ta "toimetas". Küll on uhked tiitlid tõlkimistegevusele. Kolm inimest on FB-s seda artiklit laikinud ja see ei ole pälvinud mitte ühtegi kommentaari. Muuseas, ka pealkiri on väär, sest selle küsimusele ei esitata vastust. Seda muidugi juhul kui kõik millest meeste kehakeel räägib ongi ainult kahetine: sümpaatia ja "Hoia eemale!" Hindeks annan kahe.


PealkiriBuduaar - Frederico: Kehakeel ehk armastuse märgid
Linkhttp://buduaar.ee/Article/article/frederico-kehakeel-ehk-armastuse-margid
Lühiväljavõte7 aug. 2009 – Frederico: Kehakeel ehk armastuse märgid. Pilt: Sxc. Miks selline teema päevakorral on? Sest ma olen korduvalt täheldanud erinevaid märke ...

Juba ette aiman ära, et siit tuleb veel mingit jama. Kehakeel EHK armastuse märgid? Kas mitteverbaalselt väljendatakse AINULT armastust? "Suhted ja seks" rubriigis võibolla tõesti.
Kuid kahjuks on tihtipeale nii, et mees kas ei näe või teeb sellise näo, et ei näe, või lihtsalt muutub häbelikuks padakonnaks, kes ei saa aru, et temaga soovitakse suhelda. Ennekõike on see probleem tingitud sellest, et me elame Põhjamaal, meie mehed pole kuumaverelised italjaanod, kes kasvõi ühe naise poolt lendu saadetud naeratuse peale ta tähelepanuga jalust rabavad.
Hmm... Eesti mehed ei vasta igale seksuaalsignaalile suhtlemisalgatusega sest... 1) nad on häbelikud, 2) ei saa aru, 3) nad on külmaverelised (wtf), 4) nad ei raba naisi tähelepanuga. Kuidas sellised vastuväited sobiksid: 1) häbelikkus ei pruugi olla sisemine atribuut vaid olukord ise tekitab võimaluse kergesti häbisse sattuda, 2) kui me püüaksime iga kehalise signaali kinni mida inimesed välja saadavad tahtmatult, siis ei suudaks me üldse ühiskonnas toimida, 3) vere temperatuurist ei saa ma aru, ei oska ka midagi vastata, 4) meie kultuuriruumis ei ole viisakas nt tänaval ilusate tüdrukute suunas ilusaid sõnu karjuda ja selline tähelepanu nagu siin silmas peetakse võib ilmneda kui ahistamine.
Enne seda, kui räägin teile üksikasjalikult oma huvitavamatest seiklustest selles vallas ja käin välja omapoolse teooria, soovin ära märkida ühe äärmiselt huvitava raamatu nimega „Armastuse märgid“, mille autor on filosoofiadoktor David Givens. See raamat avas mu silmad paljudes huvitavates küsimustes. Raamatu autor on uurinud väga üksikasjalikult mehe ja naise käitumist erinevates olukordades, mis puudutavad kurameerimist vastassugupoolega. Raamatus tulevad vaatluse alla sõnatud märgid, signaalid ja liigutused, mida inimesed kasutavad, et kaaslast kütkestada, endale hoida ja võita. Fakt on ka see, et kehakeelt valdasid inimesed juba miljoneid aastaid tagasi, enne seda, kui ei osatud veel tänapäevaselt suhelda.
"Tänapäevaselt suhtlemine" kõlab ulmeliselt. Givens on anthropoloogilise haridusega, mitte "filosoof". Tema Armastuse märgid ei ole kokkuvõte tema üksikasjalikust mehe ja naise käitumise uurimisest. Givens tegi seda mida enamus autoreid kes raamatu kaanele panevad oma nime järele "Ph.D" - sünteesis teisi populaarteaduslikke raamatuid ja kirjutas juurde seda mida aknast nägi.
Seda raamatut lugedes saab selgeks, kui palju tagamõtteid, tundeid ja hirme paljastab meie keha sõnatu keel. Arvatakse, et 60 kuni 93 protsenti inimese suhtlusest põhineb sõnadeta väljendataval osal. Intiimsuhetes toimub üle 99 protsendi emotsionaalsest suhtluselt sõnatult. Emotsioonide puhul inimesed mitte ei kõnele oma tunnetest, vaid lasevad oma kehal rääkida.
Valed. Protsendid ei pea kunagi paika, veel enam kui "arvatakse", et nii ja nii palju protsente - protsente ei arvata! Tule mõistus koju, arvamused esitatakse sõnades, protsendid on kvantitatiivsete mõõtmistulemuste esitamiseks. Ja ma tahaks teada kuidas see 99 protsenti emotsionaalsest suhtlemisest paika peab kui igal sammul küsime üksteiselt "Mis sul viga on?" ja tihti ei saa ühest vastust, sest emotsioone on raske kirjeldada. Mõni ütleb vastupidi, et emotsioonidest tuleb kõneleda ja ühises keeles. Ainus viis see natukenegi senssi meikib on see, et Frederico ei saanud päris täpselt aru mida Givens silmas peas kui väitis, et armatsedes kasutame peaaegu eranditult ainult kehakeelt, aga otsustas ikkagi midagi "sarnast" oma artiklis öelda.
Raamatu autor usub, et nende etappidega ei tohi kiirustada ja igal etapil on oma aeg.
Eksid jälle. Desmond Morris uskus, et etappidel on kindel (12-sammuline) järjestus ja tähtis on iga etapi läbimine, mitte ilmtingimata etappide kestus. Morrise tõlgendamine ei ole teadus. Ülejäänud artikkel seisneb Frederico heietusest kuidas ta ise ei ole suutnud naistele läheneda. Hinne: üks. Artikliga kaasneval pildil võiks olla see kiisu kes paneb käpa käe peale ja ütleb: "It's time to stop posting."
[lucy 09-08-2009 00:12] Ma pole kunagi oma elus mingeid märke lugenud või kehakeelt mõistatama pidanud, ometigi leidsin oma armastuse. Paljud inimesed mõtlevad lihtsalt liiga palju ja hakkavad otsima midagi, mida pole vaja, sest kõik on niigi iseenesestmõistetav. Seega sinu tekstil, Frederico, ei näe ma väga erilist mõtet. See pole aga solvang, vaid minu arvamus. Võiksid suunata oma energia mujale, õigele poole, kui nii väga endale naist otsid.
Kõige kainem ja asjalikum kommentaar nende 49 hulgast mida see artikkel on pälvinud. Ma ei nõustu ainult selle väitega, et lucy "pole kunagi oma elus mingeid märke lugenud või kehakeelt mõistatama pidanud", sest märkide tõlgendamine ja kehakeele mõistmine (vb mitte "mõistatamine") on paratamatu.


PealkiriTeadvusehuvi: Kehakeel, valetamine ja näitlemine
Linkhttp://teadvusehuvi.blogspot.com/2010/07/kehakeel-valetamine-ja-naitlemine.html
Lühiväljavõte5 juuli 2010 – Kehakeel Kehakeele ja emotsioonide juures arvestada emotsioonide väsimisega. Näiteks kui tund aega on mõni lõbusa olekuga naernud ...

Teadvusehuvi on üks asisemaid blogisid mida eestlane on üldse pidanud. Ma võin ainult oletada, et Tartu tudeng Märt kes Teadvusehuvi pidas on multitalentne neuroloogiatudeng. Nii palju kui ma olen Teadvusehuvi ka kaugelt imetlenud, ei ole ma seni tõepoolest ühtegi postitust suutnud lugeda - isegi mitte käesolevat mis kõneleb kehakeelest. Olen aus, neuroloogiliste terminite Eesti keelde tõlkimine on küll tänuväärne, aga asjatundmatule ikkagi mõistmatu. Kiire ülevaade ütleb aga, et siin väga neuroteaduslikke termineid ei olegi niiet asun hea meelega nüüd lugema.
Teadvuse uurimisel on üheks ilmselt kasulikuks oskuseks võime teisi mõista. Kehakeele tundmine võimaldab näha närvisüsteemi eri osade aktiivsust ning teha nendest järeldusi isegi kui teine ei oska või julge ennast väljendada. Näiteks olukordades, kus aetakse emotsioone reaalsusega sassi või püütakse elada standardite/normide/traditsioonide järgi, mida pole bioloogiliste taluvuspiiride tõttu võimalik kaua järgida. Enesepettuseid saaks ka omaette valetamise vormiks pidada.
Erinevalt eelnevatest lehekülgedes mis sisaldasid põhiliselt väiteid millega ei saa nõus olla, siis siin on Märt kohe alguses right on the money: 1) närvisüsteemi "erutusi" (excitement) on kõige ilmsel jälgida kehakeeles (Navarro ja teised ütleksid, et peaksime jälgima mugavust ja ebamugavust, aga närvisüsteem ilmselgelt sellega ei piirdu); 2) emotsioonide ja reaalsuse sassiajamine on pertinent: tõlgendaja närviseisund on samamoodi tähtis, sest võib piirata seda mis nö pääseb läbi filtri; 3) enesepettus ehk self-deception on sotsiaapsühholoogilise mina-kontseptsiooni juures tähtis; olgugi, et pettuseteooriad millega mina tuttav olen ei ole sellega väga tegelenud (peaksin sellesse rohkem süvenema, sest mulle meeldivad igasugused erinevad self-communication'i vormid).
Kehakeele ja emotsioonide juures arvestada emotsioonide väsimisega. Näiteks kui tund aega on mõni lõbusa olekuga naernud sama tugevuse ja sagedusega, on see tõenäoliselt sunnitud. Sunnitud naeru ja teiste emotsioonide korral on vähemad näolihased aktiivsed. Näiteks loomuliku naeratuse korral lähevad silmad veidi pilukile, kuid pikaajalise sunnitud naeratuse korral jäävad silma ümbruse lihased jälle lõdvemaks. Emotsioonide möödumistempot ning nendega kaasnevaid sümptomeid saab lihtsalt uurida enda peal eeldusel, et on varem ära õpitud emotsioonide esile kutsumine.
See on üks viise kuidas tuvastada teeseldud (või "sotsiaalset") naeratust: siiras naeratus tuleb esile progressiivselt ja vaibub loomulikul kombel. Ebasiira naeratuse iseloom on sunnituses - tekib järsku ja "väsib" ebakorrapäraselt (nt silmade ümbrus ja kulnud võtavad õige emotsiooni kuju, aga suu irvitab edasi). Kummaline, et nii palju kui ma emotsioonidest ja nendega seotud näoilmetest ka tean ei ole ma ikka veel võtnud kätte ja ära õppinud emotsioone esile kutsuma ning näolihaseid treenima. Seda viimast aspekti taipasin alles hiljuti - näolihased on lihased nagu lihased ikka - neid tuleb ka treenida, venitada, pingutada jne. Meelespea endale: otsi näolihaste treenimise kohta infot!
Noradrenaliini vabanemine vähendab raskus- ja väsimustunnet kehas ning tekitab jõulisemat poosi. Hirmu ja teiste tugevamalt ebameeldivate tunnete korral väheneb nihelemine (atsetüülkoliin inhibeerib striaatiumis dopamiini toimet).
Siin seisneb Märdi oluline panus: selliseid termineid näib olevat väga raske Eesti keelde tõlkida. Pean meeles nende ainete kohta rohkem uurida.
Punastamine näitab palavustunnet või osade intentsiivsemate emotsioonide olemasolud. Näiteks viha, kurbus, esinemisärevus, seksuaalne erutus, naer või häbi. Hirmu korral võib ka kahvatuks minna, sest adrenaliin kitsendab nahalähedasi veresooni. Olukorra järgi peaks enamasti kergesti aru saama mis põhjusel naha toon muutub.
Punastamine on üks nendest aspektidest mida täheldas ja arutas juba Charles Darwin. Adrenaliini veresooni kitsendavast mõjust ei olnud ma teadlik.
Püsti seistes võib pea liikumisest näha pulssi. See võib ilmsem olla lõdvema poosi korral ning kui süda hakkab jõulisemalt tööle ärevuse või elevuse korral.
Ka ei teadnud. Mingid ebausaldusväärsed allikad soovitavad interaktsioonis sünkroonsuse saavutamiseks teadlikult jälgida vestluspartneri õlgade üles-alla liikumist, et siis oma hingamisrütmi samaajastada (sünkroniseerida). Pealiikumisest pulssi järeldada näib ka pisut raske, sest selle jaoks peab erakordselt tähelepanelik olema. Lie To Me-s tehti seda nii, et peategelane jälgis uuritava kaelaveresoonte tukslemist ja arvutas käekellaga pulsi kiirenemist. Selleks peab muidugi väga võimekas olema.
Ärevuse korral kiireneb pilgutamine, keha jääb jäigemaks ka ebameeldivas poosis püsides ja higi saab stressile omase tugevama lõhna. Samuti tekib vajadus sagedamini juua, mis vähendab katseloomadel tehtud vaatlustes noradrenaliini vabanemist. Kui joogid on saadaval siis võib sellist käitumist paista neil, kes ennast ebamugavalt tunnevad.
Silmade pilgutamise kohta on minu teada ikka päris palju uurimusi tehtud (meenub üks mis isegi uuris silmapilgutuste ja rassismi seost). Keha jäigenemise kohta me ei tea - oletan, et sel on midagi pistmist lihastoonuse või närvisüsteemi erutusega? Higi lõhnade kohta öeldi aines "inimese keha kultuuriloos", et higil on päris mitu erinevat lõhnarežiimi sõltuvalt emotsionaalsest seisundist või tegevusest (ärevushigi on erinev sportimishigist). Noradrenaliini ja joomise seos seisneb dehüdraliseerumises? Märkasin ise, et võõraste inimeste seltskonnas Zawwis haarasin mina kõige tihemini joogi järele (teised tundsid üksteist, mina tundsin ainult ühte).
Vabalt tundes liigutakse rohkem, poose ei säilitata väga kaua ning käed on täenäolisemalt kehast kaugemal, kui ärevuse korral.
Selle kohta kirjutas antropoloog Edward T. Hall 1959. aastal tabavalt: "Frozen style is for people who are to remain strangers."
Atraktsiooni või lõbusa sõbralikkuse korral on rohkem nihelemist ja jõulisust meeldiva isiku märkamisel. Näost paistab unelevat rõõmu läbisegi ärevusega, mis võib tuleneda võib-olla lihtsalt kahtlustest, kas sellest saab midagi enamat.
Sõnastus on küll pisut populistlik, aga tähelepanek ise näib täitsa õige. Kogemus ütleb, et juhututtavaid kohates peab pingutama, et neile naeratada või kätt tõsta; aga kui vastu tuleb meeldiv sõber-tuttav "vanadest aegadest" siis nägu kisub tahtmatult naerule ja keha läbib "energiahoog" (mul pole paremat sõna selle jaoks).
Sümptomeid, mis alati valedega või ainult tõega kaasnevad, pole leitud.
Tõsi. See ei tähenda muidugi, et otsingud usaldusväärse valetamismärgi järele lakkaksid.
Ekman on uurinud ka nn. mikroekspressioone, mille puhul näoilmest paistab korraks läbi mõni teine näoilme ning need võivad näidata samaaegselt kogetud kuid rohkem varjatud emotsioone. Näoilme lühiajalisel muutusel võib põhjuseks olla ka mõttekäigus meenunud emotsioone tekitav mälestus, mis teeb nende kasutamise ebausaldusväärseks, kuid olukorda arvestades võib see midagi anda.
Olen ise olnud hädas kuidas seda sõna tõlkida. Mõnikord on see "mikromiimika" - kõlab hästi, aga "miimika" on kahtlustäratav sõna (selle täpne tähendus on mulle tundmatu); mõnikord aga "mikroväljendused" - keeleliselt korrektne, aga umbmäärasuse maiguga. Päris eestindades võib välja mõelda ka muid variante: "viivuväljendused" - keegi pole seda nii kasutanud, aga see kõlab täishäälikute tõttu sujuvalt; või kui täitsa leiutama hakata, siis "hetkeilmed" - õige selles mõttes, et need on näoilmed mis kestavad vaid hetke. Mingis mõttes kõlavad need variandid nagu "hetkeilme" oleks täielikult moodustunud näoilme mis kestab hetke ja "viivuväljendus" üksikute lihaste tõmblus mis ei kujune päris täielikult hetkeilmeks. Kui keegi kunagi hakkab Paul Ekmani raamatuid Eesti keelde tõlkima siis võiks neid variante vähemasti kaaluda.
Valetamisel võib vahele jäämise eest kaitsta vale sellises kohas, kus teine ei oska seda oodata või jääb liiga suurte kahtlustega.
Esimene osa tundub arusaadav - kui teine ootab sinult tõde, siis kahtlustab ta valet. Kui vestlus on aga neutraalne ja tõeküsitavus ei kerki üles siis võib valetada nii, et suu suitseb. Liiga suurte kahtluste osast aga ei saa ma hästi aru.
Ettevaatlikuks teeb mind kui näen jäiga enesekontrolliga tegelasi, kes suudavad ka vahelesegamisel jäiga (teeseldud?) rahuga jätkata. Nende keha näitab minimaalselt välja ning kergesti segatakse vahele neile ebameeldiva jutu ajamisel. Unepealt öeldakse vabandusi välja ja püütakse jutuga edasi minna, et teistel ei jääks järele mõtlemiseks aega.
Sellises olukorras peakski olema ettevaatlik, sest siis ei ole tegu mitte dialoogi või vahetusega, vaid see tegelane peab monoloogi milles ei ole enam tarvidust midagi muuta või üle mõelda - see on lõplik tõde ja midagi muud ei saagi olla. Samas vastupidine - minu juhtum - ei ole ka väga hea, sest kui keegi midagi vahele ütleb, siis kaldub see saama osa minu enda kõnest. Nii juhtub tihtipeale loengutes, et kui loengu alguses juhtun õppejõu käest mingi ähmasena näiva asja kohta selgitust küsima, siis juhul kui neil on endal ka ähmane selgitus võib juhtuda, et kogu ülejäänud loeng tegelevad nad tavapärast materjali ette kandes selle sama küsimusega. Tähendab, vahelesekkumine - interferents - on kogu nende kõne ümber kodeerinud ja võib juhtuda, et ülejäänud loeng pole enam niiväga arusaadav, sest õppejõud on selle ühe küsimusega vaevatud. See on põhjus miks loengute puhul tasub jätta küsimused viimaseks asjaks. Igapäevavestlustes aga peakski toimuma üksteise kõnede ümberkodeerimine - ühesõnaga, vahetus. Muidu ei sünni sellest midagi uut vaid jäiga enesekontrolliga tegelane annab sulle informatsiooni mis taotleb loengu-tõe staatust alusetult.
Ainuke moodus, millega ma ise suutsin naeru ja teisi emotsioone (kurbust, viha, elevust, häbi, ärevust, hirmu jne.) soovi korral esile kutsuda oli enesekontrolli all mainitud korduva meenutamisega. Esmalt peab oskama soovitud emotsiooni või seda tekitavat tunnet selgelt meenutada. Meenutamine mõjutab emotsioone ja selgelt uuesti meenutades see effekt kuhjub. Kui mõnu või naerueelset tunnet kiiresti meenutada (ise oskan kuni ~2-3 korda sekundis) võib sekunditega väga hea tuju saada.
Jah, see näib efektiivne, aga eeldab ka põhjalikku ettevalmistust. Minu hirm on, et kui emotsionaalsete mälestuste kinnistamist sellisel kombel harjutada, siis võib see kinnistamine olla liiga võimas. Tahan ma elu lõpuni mäletada neid emotsioone? Püsimälu tekitab minus aukartust.
Valetamine ei ole vajalik, kui tõde suudetakse vastuvõetavalt (usutavalt ja/või sümpaatselt) väljendada. See võib toimida juhul, kui seni on vastava omaduse puhul avalikkuses harjutud avaldama peamiselt kriitilist suhtumist ning mida vähem konkreetset või usutavat suudavad kriitikud välja tuua seda lihtsam peaks see olema. Sellist julgemat ausust tuleb harjutada, sest näiteks juba poliitikas ja skandaale kuulutavas meediaväljaandes esineb rutiinselt katseid konkurentide/teisitimõtlejate ideedele skandaalseid seoseid külge saada.
Jap, see on minu tehnika. Ma valetan väga vähe, sest lihtsam on tõde esitada vastuvõetaval kombel. Siirust ei pea teesklema, see ei vaja nii palju pingutamist. Ainult, et poliitikasse või meediasse minusugune ei kõlbaks, sest nendes valdkondades on valetamine ainus viis kuidas pinnal püsida.
Kuna paljud pole teaduses toimuvat realistllikult ära õppida saab õpetada veidi reaalselt toimivaid soovitusi, mida võib kombineerida teadusest pärinevate sõnade suvalise kasutamisega. Kergeusklik võib saada aru elulisest kasulikke soovitusest ning oletada, et segaseks jäänud teaduslike terminite segus on ka midagi sisukat.
Täpselt see kriitika mida osutan nö "postmodernsele teadusele": sellised autorid (eriti kirjanduskriitikud nagu Pechey või Blau) žongleerivad teaduslikult kõlavate terminitega, aga kasutavad neid suvaliselt; jätavad mulje, et nad ütlevad midagi mis peaks meikima senssi, aga ei meiki üldse - point on rohkem "teaduslikkuse tunde" tekitamine, keelemängu kaudu lugejale tarkuse fiiling anda. Kui selliseid tekste kriitiliselt lugeda võib hulluks minna.
Vaidlusest mitte aru saavad pealiskaudsed kõrvalvaatajad võivad paremini suhtuda sellesse, kes emotsioone paremini kontrollib ning selle ära kasutamiseks saab kergelt agressiivse solvamise või absurdse kriitika kasutamisel jutukaaslase vihaseks ajada.
Meenub ütlus filmist Thank You For Smoking: ma ei pea veenma sind [kellega ma väitlen], vaid neid [kes vaatavad pealt]. See artikkel kaldus väga tugevasti valetamis- ja mõjutamisdiskursusesse, aga kokkuvõttes väga hea. Hinne: viis!


PealkiriKehakeel reedab, kas teie suhtel on tulevikku | Õhtuleht
Linkhttp://www.ohtuleht.ee/211647
Lühiväljavõte29 nov. 2006 – Ninadega nahistamine, kallima teksade tagataskus puhkav käsi, sagedased kallistused – need on kindlad märgid, et paarikese armuasjad ...

Kohe esmapilgul jätab see artikkel tagurdlase mulje. Umbes nagu "mu käsi on ta pepu peale - OO! - ta vist meeldib mulle!". Kuna see on ikkagi Õhtuleht, siis I'll give it the benefit of the doubt ja loen selle ikkagi läbi.
Tracey Cox (born 1961) is a British non fiction author who specializes in books on dating, sex and relationships. She is the author of many best selling titles.
Kuna artikkel alustab sellest, et nimetab "seksieksperti" Tracey Cox, vaevusin kontrollima wikipediat. Seksiekspert võibolla tõesti, vähemasti on mingisugune psühholoogia-haridus olemas. Austraalia Cosmopolitani toimetanud, inimeste magamistubades kaameratega nende seksielu analüüsinud... mmm... I don't know man, kisub aimeliseks.
Mida lähemal on õrnutsedes alakõhud teineteisele, seda suurem on paari seksuaalne rahuldatus. Kui kokku puutuvad ka rindkered, on suhe lausa õnnelik. Hoiavad aga ülakehad armatsedes eemale, võib järeldada, et südamega asja juures ei olda.
Okei, mehhaaniliselt tundub see keeruline: täiuslik seks on siis üksteise peal lamamine, mis välistab päris paljud ägedad poosid.
Kui tema käsi on vajutatud sinu südame kohale, on see märk tundeaususest. Kui kuulsad Hollywoodi paarid tahavad kinnitada oma vahekorra ehtsust, kasutavad nad just seda sümboolikat.
Jällegi, see eeldab, et partnerite kehad on piisavalt vormis, et mehel pole nt manboobs'e. Jääb mulje, et täiuslik suhe eeldab täiuslikke kehasid. Sama kriitika mida ühe eelneva artikli suhtes sai kasutatud: Hollywood ei ole usaldusväärne allikas inimese loomuliku käitumise suhtes.
Käest kinni hoidmisel ei puutu teie kehad kokku, kuid jalutades kaaslast piha ümbert kallistades võite end teineteise vastu suruda. Veelgi tähendusrikkam on asend, kus partneril hoitakse ümbert kinni sõrmseongus kätega. Nii on kallike võimalikult lähedal. Partner annab märku, et ta ei taha sind lahti lasta ning kaitseb sind kõige kurja eest.
Veel kord: romantiline, aga mitte-praktiline.
Kehvas seksisuhtes kaovad kallistused tavaliselt esimesena. Kui soovite suhet päästa, pugege teineteisele kaissu. Kallistamisel vallanduv oksü­tot­siin on hormoon, mis tekitab lähedustunnet ja seksiisu.
Vähemasti see tundub olevat usaldusväärne indeks, et kallistamine väheneb suhte jahenedes. Nimekiri "Suhtel on tulevikku" märkidest:
  • Te suudlete nagu eskimod
  • Partner surub puusad sinu puusade vastu
  • Laubad puutuvad kokku
  • Partner pöördub kõndides sinu poole
  • Partner paneb peopesa vastu sinu rinda
  • Partner paneb käe sinu alakõhule
  • Partner paneb käe sinu tagumikule
  • Partner hoiab kinni su pihast, mitte käest
  • Te kallistate soojalt ja sageli
Labajalgade asend on oivaline viide suhte tulevikule. Kui seisad partneriga koos, kuid tema varbad piiluvad eemale, loodab ta võimalikult kähku sinu juurest vehkat teha.
Ma tean, et labajalgade suund näib olevat usaldusväärne indeks, sest nagu Navarro väidab, me pöörame rohkem tähelepanu peale ja kätele ning vähem tähelepanu sellele mida meie kehad teevad allpool vööd... Aga igas olukorras ei tasu ikka labajalgade suunda võtta kui suhtestaatuse märki.
Eriti valvas tasub olla siis, kui kallim sügab kõrva, väldib silmsidet või ei puuduta sind. Kõrvasügaja ei taha end valetamas kuulda. Teisele otsa vaadates on väga raske valetada. Ja peaaegu võimatu on see vestluskaaslast puudutades.
Veel tinglikuid asju. Esiteks on "Kõrvasügaja ei taha end valetamas kuulda" liiga Pease. Teiseks pidavat lugu olema hoopis selline, et valetades vaatame rohkem silma, et jälgida seda kuidas valet vastu võetakse. Ja kolmandaks võib vabalt arvata, et parimad valetajad kasutavad puudutamist teadlikult usaldustunde tekitamiseks. Nimekiri "Suhe on hääbumas" märkidest:
  • Partneri varbad on suunatud sinust eemale
  • Seisate teineteisest lahus
  • Ta kallistab sind kõrgelt või kaela ümbert
  • Te kõnnite eri tempos
  • Oled veendunud, et partner ei peta sind iialgi
Kõiki neid märke võib veel lõputult kritiseerida, aga suhteasjad tõepoolest ei ole minu ekspertiis niiet seda oleks vara teha. Kokkuvõttes palju ilmselgeid (obvious) tähelepanekuid millega võib ja võib mitte nõustuda, vahet eriti pole. Vähemasti ei olnud midagi liiga väära. Hinne: neli.
[Ef, 09:15, 29. november 2006] Ei ole midagi erilist. Ammu teada faktid
Kohe esimene kommentaar kuuest ütleb täpselt seda mida mina arvan.
[täitsa lõpp lugu, 20:03, 29. november 2006] ma pole oma vanavanemaid kunagi selliselt üksteise küljes rippumas näinud, aga ikkagi on nad 50+ aastat koos olnud. samas näen ma pidevalt kuidas noored üksteise küljes ripuvad, aga täna ripub ta ühes taskus, homme teises. täna hoiab ühe kõhtu ja tissi, homme aga teise kõhtu ja tissi, ning ülehomme on juba kaks esimest unustatud... kas ikka on see suhte tunnus?
See kommenteerija laksas ka biiti, et Tracey Cox-i kujutatud täiuslik suhe on sisuliselt värske armumise kiimlus. Tegelikud suhted, veel enam pikaajalised, ei ole sellised: mingil hetkel muutub üksteise küljes rippumine vanaks ja hakatakse oma ruumi otsima ning aktsepteeritavaid piire seadma.


PealkiriKehakeel
Linkhttp://www.hkhk.edu.ee/vanker/suhtlemine2/kehakeel.html
LühiväljavõteSõnaline e. verbaalne suhtlemine moodustab vaid osa meie igapäevasest suhtlemisest. Teine osa, mis ei ole sugugi vähemoluline suhtlemisel, ...

Siin näib olevat mingisugune [Haapsalu Kutsehariduskeskuse] õpilaste koostatud koduleht suhtlemisest. Nad on isegi teinud endist pilte ja riputanud siia üles. Viivuks mõtlesin, et riputan siia illustreerivaks pildiks mõne neist, aga see võib jällegi neid mingil kombel solvata.
Sissejuhatus ütleb, et "Õppematerjal on loodud suhtlemispsühholoogia tunni rikastamiseks ja mitmekülgsemaks muutmiseks." Keelekasutus juba annab aimu, et põhjuks miks nad "rikastavad" ja "muudavad mitmekülgsemaks" on kuidagi seotud Euroopa Liidu Sotsiaalfondi ja "Eesti tuleviku heaks" logodega mis on ühel nende lehekülgedest. Kasutatud kirjanduse hulgas on kuus eestikeelset tõlget:
  • Bolton, R. Igapäevaoskused 2006
  • Goleman, D. Sotsiaalne intelligentsus 2007
  • Kidron, A. Suhtlemine 2004
  • McKay, M.; Davis,M.; Fanning, P. Suhtlemisoskused 2004
  • Navarro, J. Kehakeelest 2010
  • White, V.; Demarais, A. Esmamuljed 2005
Mul on küll tunne, et käesoleval aastakümnel oleks juba hädasti vaja mõne eestlase kirjutatud suhtlemisõpikut. Oma kutsekooli kirjandusõpetaja kujul on mul ehk tutvus olemas, et kunagi see nali ära teha ja korraliku kirjaduse kaudu avaldada. Selle jaoks pole ma praegu veel valmis, aga varsti juba pruugin olla.
Selle õpiobjekti menüüs on järgnevad alateemad: Esmamulje, Enesetutvustus, Kehakeel, Erinevad Käitumisstiilid. Mind huvitab praegu ainult see mida nad kujutavad kehakeelena.
Mitteverbaalse suhtluse võib jagada kaheks:
  • Liigutused: näoilme, žestid, kehahoiak
  • Ruumisuhted: kui kaugele te vestluspartnerist hoiate.
Noh, ma tahtsin teada mis on nende arusaam. Ma ei saa neile pahaks panna, et nende arusaam on väga piiratud (aluseks oleva kirjanduse põhjal ma ei imesta). Lühidalt, siin eristatakse ainult kineesikat ja prokseemikat. Jääb isegi mulje, et kehahoiaku ja kehadevahelise kauguse vahel on ületamatu kuristik kuhu keha ringiliikumine (locomotion) on sisse kukkunud. Niisama naljaviluks võin taaskord rivistada nii palju muid alavaldkondi kui praegu pähe hüppab: haptika (puudutamine), taktileesika (kokkupuudete tundmine), okuleesika (vaatamine), kroneemika (ajakasutus), koeneesika (sünkroonsus). Peaaegu soovin, et proprioseptsioonil oleks ka mingi foneetika-analoog, nt proprioneemika. Tõsiasjaks jääb ikkagi see, et need eemilised ja eetilised (Pike'i emic ja etic) klassid on justkui "surnud teadusharud" - nad hüüti välja, aga midagi põhjalikku nendega kunagi ei tehtud - kineesika ja prokseemikaga sama lugu, sest lihtsam on nimetada kogu kupatust mitteverbaalseks suhtlemiseks kuiet hakata meelevaldselt eristama mis kuulub ühe või teise alla. Ja parakeel on üldse ära unustatud - seda mainitakse alles Mehrabiani müüdi kordamisel ("vokaalne" mõju).
Nägu on inimese kõige väljendusrikkam kehaosa. Miimilised näolihased reageerivad väga kiiresti inimeses toimuvatele mõtlemisprotsessidele, tundevarjunditele ja emotsionaalsele seisundile.
Mind pisut huvitab kuidas nad eristavad miimilisi ja mittemiimilisi näolihaseid. Teatavasti Duchenne ja Darwin kes esimesena näo väljendusrikkust uurisid olid hädas, et lihaseid üldse näos eristada, sest nad on üksjagu kattuvad ja risti-rästi.
Avatud pihuga väljasirutatud käed viitavad siirusele. Kui samas asendis kehitatakse õlgu, öeldakse kehakeeles:"Kust mina pean seda teadma?" või "Ma ei saanud sinna midagi parata." Rinnal ristatud käsi tõlgendatakse kaitsepositsiooni või salatsemissooviga.
Tsau, Allan Pease! Your very obvious misinterpretations still keep on getting misinterpreted, good for you! Ülejäänud tekst siin ongi Pease'i kordamine. Teda ei ole küll kasutatud kirjanduse hulgas, aga tema jampsi on ilmselt korratud neis raamatutes mis on kasutatud kirjanduse hulgas. Üle kolme ma hindeks anda ei saa.



Ja ongi tulnud aeg kokku võtta mida google-otsingu "kehakeel" esimene lehekülg otsijale annab. Mitte palju, sugugi mitte palju. Põhiliselt lehekülgi mis kasutavad sõna "kehakeel" nii nagu jumal juhatab; kehva eeltöö teinud kokkuvõtteid kogu valdkonnast mis kordavad vaid seda mida keskmine Jüri niigi teab; ja uudislugusid naisteajakirjades mis üritavad kehakeele abil avada seksuaalsuse müsteeriumit, enamasti poolikult ja edutult. Teadvusehuvi artikkel kehakeelest on siin silmapaistev erand, sest see on ainus mis ei korda ühtegi müüti ega kližeed ja paljastab kehalise käitumise kohta midagi mida tõepoolest tuleb erialakirjandusest näpuga taga otsida. Kiitus Märdile ja julgustus, et ta tänavu aprillis pooleli jäetud blogi ikka edasi kirjutaks.

Kuna selle survey tegemine oli suhteliselt lõbus ja huvitav siis tõenäoliselt teen seda veel. Otsing "kehakeel" annab ikkagi 210 tuhat otsingutulemust niiet materjali millega tegeleda on sisuliselt lõputult. Usun, et kui piisavalt kaugele minna sellise tööga siis jõuaks kehakeele-ainelistest artiklitest ka selle juurde kuidas eestlased seda sõna oma igapäevastes internetipostitustes kasutavad ja mida nad sellest teavad.

Ja lõpetuseks uitmõte mis tekkis seda survey-d tehes. Nimelt: mis teeb inimesest kehakeele-eksperdi? Minu arvates piisab loetud raamatute hulga arvestamisest. Kui sa loed ühe raamatu - nagu Frederico tegi - ja kirjutad sellest kirjatüki, oled sa "poseerija" ja väärid kriitikat. Kui sa loed kümme raamatut siis oled sa juba "teadlik" - ise lugesin oma esimese kuuga 15 populaarteaduslikku raamatut läbi ja sain maitse suhu. Kui sa loed sada raamatut - mina olen selle blogi andmetel 77 juures - oled sa tõeline "huviline" ja sinu arvamust võib juba arvestada. Ja viimaks, kui sa oled lugenud tuhat raamatut, siis oled sa täieõiguslik asjatundja. With any kind of luck saab minust lähema dekaadi jooksul asjatundja ja internetis ringlevate pooltõdede kritiseerimise asemel konstrueerin eestlase jaoks Eesti keeles arusaadava pildi inimese kehalise käitumise mõistmisest.

Various Seminar Texts (4)

Ökoloogiliste süsteemide teooria
Odum, Eugene P. 1968. Energy Flow in Ecosystems: A Histprocal Review. American Zoologist 8(1): 11-18.
In a recent article (Odum, 1962) I suggested that ecology could best be defines as the strudy of relationships between structure and function in nature, and that the following breakdown might provide a simplification of the first order for purposes of study.
  • Structure
    1. Composition of the biologicl community (species, numbers, biomass, life-history, dispersion, etc.).
    2. Quantity and distribution of abiotic materials (nutrients, water, etc.).
    3. Range of gradient of conditions of existence (temperature, light, etc.).
  • Function
    1. Range of energy flow through the system (eco-energetics).
    2. Rate of material cycling (eco-cycling).
    3. Regulation by physical environment and by organism (eco-regulation).
(Odum 1968: 11)
It starts to look as if Odum is a structuralist ecologist - the terms (structure and function) and era (1960s) fits. Not that there's anything wrong with that, just mentioning. The structure and function distinction is sensible; analogies can be found even in medicine: structure = anatomy; function = physiology. In this case the structure or "anatomy" of the ecosystem consists mainly of materia (and it's composition, quantity and gradient of conditions); the function or "physiology" of the ecosystem consists mainly of energy (it's range of flow, rate of cycling and regulation). Very sensible.
The behavior of energy in ecosystems can be conveniently shorthanded as "energy flow" because energy transformations are directly in contrast to the cyclic behavior of materials. The potential and kinetic components of neergy flow through an ecological system are lumped under the designations, production (P) and respiration (R), respectively. Consequently, energy flow (E) can be very broadly defined as the sum of P and R, or E = P + R. We need, of course, to further subdivide P and R into their ecologically significant subcompartments. (Odum 1968: 11)
I don't yet grasp the significance or implications of production and respiration; other that both transform energy somehow. I noticed the notion of subcompartments here, as I didn't make note of it when I read Patten and Odum (1981). I'm guessing the factors outlined under stucture and function are these subcompartments, no?
Not all the biomass is transformed; some of it may simply pass through the biological structure, as occurs when food is egested from the digestive tract without being metabolized, or when light passes through vegetation without being fixed. This energy component is indicated by "NU" ("not utilized"). That portion which is utilized or assimilated is indicated by "A" in the diagram. The ratio between these two components, i.e., the efficiency of assimilation, varies widely. It may be very low, as in light-fixation by plants or food-assimilation in detritus-feeding animals or bacteria feeding on high energy food such as sugars and amino acids.
In autotrophs the assimilated energy ("A") is known as "gross production" or "gross photosynthesis." Historically, the term, "gross production," has been used by some authors for the analogous component in heterotrophs. However, since the "A" component in heterotrophs represent food already "produced" somewhere else, the term "gross production" should be restricted to primary or autotrophic production. In higher animals, the term, "metabolized energy," is often used for the "A" component.
A key feature of the model is the separation of assimilated energy into the "P" and "R" components as previously described. That part of the fixed energy ("A") which is burned and lost as heat is designated as respiration ("R"), while that portion which is transformed to new or different organic matter is designated as production ("P"). This is the "net production" or "net photosynthesis" in green plants and simply "production" or "secondary production" in animals. It is important to point out that the "P" component is energy available to the next trophic level, as opposed to the "NU" component which is still available at the same trophic level. (Odum 1968: 13)
The diagram itself is incomprehensible (for me), but these shorthands are neat: energy that is not utilized is NU, energy which is utilized is A; autothropic photosynthesis "produces" energy, heterothropic consumption "metabolyzes" energy. The "subcompartments" here seem to be only energetic: burned and lost energy is "respiration" and transformation of organic matter is "production". On the next page it is pointed out that in populations of large organisms (like men and trees) energy is mainly used for respiration, and in in populations of small organisms such as bacteria and algae energy is mainly used for production. In a metaphorical sense this relates to the general difference between Western exercises and Eastern yoga: one is set on quantity or production of muscle mass; the other is set on quality or respiration which will induce elasticity of muscles and tendons.
The idea of looking at nature as an energy-flow system is deeply rooted in the early history of science. Interest in the "fires of life" goes back to antiquity. Many of the concepts that we now apply to the population and community level had their origin in the physical sicneces and in the early history of physiology and medicine. (Odum 1968: 15)
So my earlier arbitrary conflation of structure with anatomy and function with physiology wasn't that incorrect. As a sidenote, the term "energy budget" is also suitable for speaking about the relationship of mental and physical development (studying and exercising).
Odum, Eugene P. 1976. Energy, Ecosystem Development and Environmental Risk. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 43(1): 1-16.
The term feedback refers to that part of the output (energy or money, for example) "fed back" into the system to accelerate (positive) or decelerate (negative) a rate function. Positive feedback that accelerates growth is necessary and desirable in a socieyt that has not yet fully utilized its available resources, but to maintain control, energy and money have to be diverted from growth to maintenance. Thr process is painful in a country such as the United States where growth is nearly an "ethic" or "cult" of exciting, as opposed to maintenance which is considered dull and uninteresting. (Odum 1976: 1)
To draw (perhaps unsuitable, but possible) analogies between this and the last article, it would seem that positive feedback (increase of energy-flow) produces growth; while negative feedback (maintenance of energy-flow) creates steady states, metaphorically, respiration (instead of producing more, let's lay back and take a breath). The social ethic or cult of producing more for the sake of producing more has been pointed out many times and has sparked a whole discourse in the philosophy of ecology (e.g. capitalist mindstate of infinite increase of production).
The greatest of all challenges is how to make the transition from growth to maturity so as to avoid the third possible state, the negative transit state that leads to aging and death. Individuals experience all three states: youth, maturity and aging. However, it is important to emphasize that large complex systems can on the level of ecological ones, such as an ocean or a city, do not necessarily have to age and die after cessation of growth and achievement of a mature state. Individuals come and go, speciees evolve and become extinct, societies rise and fall, but, at least up to now, large natural systems and civilizations have continued. No theoretical reason exists why a well-ordered system of man and nature cannot maintain an equilibrium state and continue to improve the quality of human life. (Odum 1976: 1-2)
This third state is aptly described as "negative transit state" - in humans this takes the form of loss of suppleness, muscle tone, cellular reproduction, etc. In ecological terms, however, it most likely designates such affairs as erosion and drying up or salination of fresh water sources. Generally, Odum seems optimistic here: while small things perish, large (natural systems and civilizations) remain.
In broad, non-technical terms, an ecosystem consists of living components (organisms, including humans) and non-living components (the physical environment) functioning together as a whole according to well-defined natural laws. The fact that human beings alter nature, and introduce new power flows (chiefly fossil fuels at the present time) to supplement the energy input of the sun, does not in any way change this basic concept since people-developed ecosystems, such as cities, also function as wholes according to the same thermodynamic and other natural laws. (Odum 1976: 4)
It is starting to seem that Odum is preoccupied with energy, no wonder that his concept of information is very closely tied to the flow of energy.
Natural environment refers to any area of the biosphere essentially self-maintaining in that little or no energy or money input from the power flows controlled by people are required for continuous and orderly operation. In terms of energy, this environment is occupied by natural solad-powered ecosystems which provide the basic life support for civilization. A large natural forest, the sea or a river are examples.
A developed environment is structured and maintained by large man-controlled power inputs which increase with the intensity of development. In terms of energy, this environment is the habitat of fuel-powered or fuel-assised ecosystems that run on concentrated energy stored in the earth's crust. A city is the ultimate example of a highly developed fuel-powered ecosystem, but a golf course, a suburban development, or a corn field also are developed environments because large amounts of fuel and money are required to maintain them in the developed state, even though they contain certain natural elements such as trees and grass. (Odum 1976: 5-6)
Here the distinction is fairly simple and hinges on energy input. In Kalevi Kull's ecosemiotics we find a more elaborate version of this, where the distinctions hinge on any kind of man-made changes. I also like the contention that a city is the ultimate example of a highly developed (and fuel-powered) ecosystem. This almost links up with landscape semiotics.
Argikultuuri teooriad: Independent Work (Week 3)
Fuchs, Stephan 1989. On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology: A Critique of Microsociological Reductionism. Sociological Perspectives 32(2): 169-182.
Methodological versions of microsociological individualism (Watkins 1955; O'Neill 1973) argue that although macrostructures "really exist," we must scientifically explain them in terms of individual behaviors ("methodological individualism"). Ontological version of individualism, on the other hand, argue that macroconcepts represent reifications beause only individuals "really exist" ("ontological individualism"). [...] The behaviorist paradigm (Watson 1924) claim that macrosocial units should be reduced to psychological mechanisms formalized in stimulus-response models of individual behavior. (Fuchs 1989: 169)
These are three (the fourth is rational choice or economic paradigm) reductionist microsociologies. Also, check out "Methodological Individualism: A Reply" (Watkins 1955) and "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered" (Lukes 1968 [1977]).
However, more recent and more sophisticated microsociological reductionisms draw upon nonindividualistic and nonpsychological sociological traditions, such as cognitive sociology, sociolinguistics, symbolic interactionism, and ethnomethodology. They focus on interactions, situations, and contexts of interaction to explain macrostructures; rather than on individual behaviors (Knoww-Cetina 1981; Alexander & Giesen 1987). That is, more recent microsociology acknowledges the "emergent" and "irreducible" character of interaction systems but, at the same time - and, as we shall see, paradoxically - claims that interaction systems (situated encounters, interaction rituals, interactions-in-context) constitute the only social reality "sui generis." Therefore, the argument continues, macrodynamics and macrostructures should be "reduced to," "explained in terms of," or "translated into" the situational and contextual dynamics of interaction. (Fuchs 1989: 170)
Wow. This just blew my mind. So concise! (short, to the point) - I've been thinking along these lines for a while now, it's kind of baffling to see these ideas presented in so few words.
Society, on the other hand, is the "comprehensive system of all reciprocally accessible communicative actions" (Luhmann 1982: 73). Unlike organizations, society does not institutionalize formal and voluntary membership. Unlike interactions, society does not depend on copresence. The boundaries of society (today: of world society) are the boundaries of meaningful communication. Even revolutionaries can only change, but not "leave" society. Therefore, unlike interactions, society cannot be "interrupted" and resumed again. (Fuchs 1989: 171)
In this sense society as a total concept can be viewed as a "semiosphere" - or the total sphere of meaningful communication; and not only, any kind of signification. That is, even those forms of behaviours that do not "communicate" can "signify", and later be made to communicate (a text can be read whenever and wherever). Hmm. This is where I disagree with Fuchs: he claims that in interaction you cannot not communicate, but I would say the same for society. Every action, be it social or personal, can be ground for social activity.
All participants in interaction systems know that they are being perceived, know that others know this, and thus must mutually adjust communicative suggestions [sociosemiocoenesis]. In interaction systems, it is impossible not to communicate; and even the refusal to communicate is communicated and interpreted as conflict. Copresence is the constitutive self-selection and boundary maintenance principle of interaction systems: only those who are copresent can decide who counts as being copresent [#avoidance], who belongs to the system, and who (or what) is being perceived as part of the environment. Copresence accounts for the duality of sensory perception and meaningful communication that is specifically characteristic of interaction (but not: of organizational and societal) systems. (Fuchs 1989: 171)
Copresence is the measuring pole for who participates in the goffmanian play.
Participants in interaction can perceive the world simultaneously, but they can talk only one at a time. Moreover, perception allows for the indirect and nonverbal communication of gestures that can interpret, modify, emphasize, or even substitute explicit talk. Being together, lovers can sometimes understand each other (especially: when simultaneously looking at the moon!) without talking. Copresent interactants can pause to observe, and then resume communication about what was being observed. Perception provides a pool of information about what was being observed. Perception provides a pool of information from which communications can be selected while presupposing the communality of perception. (Fuchs 1989: 172)
Yeah, okay, but! But! This author doesn't (rather, couldn't) take into account modern technologies: copresence and perception are no longer the prime "environments of reference" (pools of information) available to interactants. There is now also the internet and the vast amount of information (and memes, codes for interpreting and communicating this information) that must be taken account of. That is, we no longer admire the moonlight and feel a deep understanding, but rather name a meme and precommunicate a funny joke; breaking social tension as well as establishing common understanding about something.
As realities sui generis, itneraction systems must demarcate themselves from personal systems or individuals, from other interaction systems, and from other types of social systems. A model of boundary maintenance operations in interaction systems not only suggests that reductionist strategies fail to realize the emergent differences between various types of social and nonsocial systems. Such a model might also be helpful in organizing and explaining thich microsociological descriptions of subtleties in ongoing interaction processes. I believe that without such theoretically driven systematization, microsociology just accumulates details. (Fuchs 1989: 173)
Ah, finally a sensible voice amid all this cacophony. And indeed, all my work thus far has been a mere accumulation of details which fit together badly, like a puzzle with contorted pieces. This is the model Fuchs proposes [ibid]:
According to Luhmann (1984), personal systems use consciousness to constitute individuality in a self-referential way. That is, "individuality" denotes the ability of personal systems to distinguish themselves from other individuals; and these distinctions can only be accomplished by internal autopoietic operations. This self-referential constitution of personal systems accounts for the "spontaneity" frequently ascribed to individuals. Individuals can disrupt interactions through surprising innovations, misplaced and "inappropriate" behaviors, through remarks that are simply "our of place." To suppress such possible disruptions, interaction systems use embarrassment, but once embarrassing gestues or remarks have been emitted, tact is employed to treat embarrassing remarks as if they had not occurred at all. Tact and embarrassment thus demarcate interaction from personal systems by protecting interaction from being disrupted by the unpredictability of consciousness. If tact and embarrassment repeatedly and systematically fail to suppress and repair disruptive individual gestures or remarks, these individuals are "avoided" by others, in extreme cases possibly even declared "insane." Insanity may be understood as a protective label by means of which interaction systems exclude "disruptive" individuals. Being "weird" and "strange" means being perceived as someone who is unable to adjust to the emergent properties of interaction systems, as someone who violates the boundary maintenance operations established by interaction systems to demarcate themselves from personal systems. "Weird" people are unashamed and tacless. (Fuchs 1989: 174)
At first sight this "distinction through autopoiesis" seems to be in line with Lotman's "personality as a selection of code" - autopoiesis constituing this selection. On the other hand this author seems to follow suit with those who identify individuality with error. Thus it becomes inevitable that Fuchs views #avoidance as a means for equilibrium in interaction systems. There seem to be goffmanian stigmatization overtones here.
A focal interaction system also demarcates itself from other interaction systems. It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of interaction systems: ephemeral interaction systems, and more enduring groups. Although these two kinds of interaction systems are both based on copresence, and hence belong to the same generic class of social systems, ephemeral interaction systems face different and less difficult problems of self-maintenance. (Fuchs 1989: 174)
At first sight this distinction coincides with Rom & Harre's distinction between enigmatic and paradigmatic situations, but this approach is not rule-based, but rather relies on boundaries. In a sense they are the same, as in ephemeral interactions, "boundaries are very transparent" (ibid, 175).
In sum, the dynamics of interaction systems serve to demarcate interactions from precisely those types of social systems that microsociological reductionisms want to reduce to interactions. Older individualistic reductionist strategies fail to see that individuals or personal systems are best understood as parts of the contingent environments of social systems (Parsons 1951). On the other hand, recent interactionist reductionism fails to realize that copresence is characteristic of interaction systems, but not of organizational and societal "macrostructures." The very emergent structures of different types of social systems suggest that these recent microsociological strategies to "reduce" or "translate" macro- into microsocial realities (Knorr-Cetina & Cicourel 1981; Alexander, et al. 1987) rest upon a conceptual confusion between distinct levels of system-building. The duality of sensory perception and communication typical of interaction systems implies that explaining macrolevels of social reality (e.g., organizations or society) in terms of microevents (i.e., interaction episodes) amounts to ignoring the constitutive difference between emergent types of social systems. This conceptual confusion generates serious theoretical problems. (Fuchs 1989: 175-176)
The essence of the argument seems to be that interaction systems are bounded or demarcated by it's dynamics (it's relationship to other social systems). Then, interaction systems are different from other social systems in that it involves copresence and copresence initself is bounded/demarcated by other (ephemeral, personal, group, etc.) systems. And we cannot reduce or "translate" macrostructures directly to interaction system because there then emerge various conceptual confusions, which Fuchs goes on to explain...
First, because interaction systems are based on copresence, they face rather narrow restrictions on structure and function imposed by limited size, space, and time. Copresent interactants must sooner or later leave their interaction to fulfill other obligations. Members of organizations leave their organizations, too; but it can be expected more safely that they will be back the next day. If not, other individuals will be employed to perform the same task. Because copresence involves mutual perception, the number of participating actors and the spatial extension of encounters must be very small. One can interact only with those that one can see and listen to. For this very reason alone, it appears rather implausible to say that multinational corporations, for exmaple, can be "reduced to" or "explained in terms of" interactions. (Fuchs 1989: 176)
That is, copresence sets contingencies on interaction systems. Size - the amount of participants; space - the distribution of participants; and time - the temporal sequencing and availability (presence in time) of participants. Copresence is a limited affair (other obligations or necessities impinge on it). Ephemeral interactions can be very fluid and last for fractions of time; organizations and institutions on the other hand last in time (and one could even say, expand in space). I do think that multinational corporations can be reduced to and explained in terms of interactions - in sequences of interactions, that is. Organizations set order to interactions - i.e., organize them.
Second, unlike organizations and society, interaction systems must organize communicative contributions sequentially, which dramatically cosntraints their capacity to process meaning and deal with their environments. If we conceptualize organizations or even society as macrinteractions (or as "aggregates" or "representations" of microinteractions) (Collins 1981a, b; Cicourel 1981), we ignore the crucial complexity differentials between these systems. Organizations, for example, are not based on copresence, hence do not have to process communications sequentially, and thus need less time to perform more complex tasks, adapt more flexibly to more diverse environments, and allocate various functions to different organizational positions. (Fuchs 1989: 176)
Firstly, yes "society as a macrointeraction" is metaphorical - they may be in some abstract sense similar, but by no measure the same. Secondly, I have a feeling that Fuchs sets too much emphasis on copresence and dismisses less bodily forms of interaction.
Third, as opposed to organizations and society, interaction systems are not complex enough to draw internal systemic boundaries; that is, to build subsystems specializing in particular tasks. Of course, more enduring interaction systems such as groups or families usually based on copresence, interaction systems cannot institutionalize permanent subsystems that operate simultaneously. For example, societies may institutionalize legal systems specializing in conflict resolution, whereas interaction systems can either avoid conflicts or be conflicts themselves. If communicative suggestions are rejected, interactions cannot delegate conflict resolution to a permanent subsystem. To "reduce" macrounits of analysis to microevents and microinteractions means to be unable to explain why organizations and society manage to monitor diverse systemic processes at the same time. (Fuchs 1989: 176)
Yet again, I am left with the feeling that Fuchs has a weird understanding of interaction. But this, in hindsight, seems inevitable - systems approach to behaviour is bound to run into these kinds of misdefinitions. It is nevertheless very interesting how these arguments pan out.
Fourth, the duality of perception and communication typical of interaction system makes possible "personal" and "contextual" modes of communication not found on emergent levels of organization or societal systems. To conceptualize organizations or society as macroaggregates of encounters is to misunderstand and romanticize them - as Jonathan Turner (personal communication) formulates it - as macroscopic "cocktail parties." To be sure, organizations and society always "employ" interactions and always use sensory perception, but neither organizations nor society are interaction systems. Similarly, all interaction systems "use" individual minds to process meaning, but interactions do not "consist" of individuals and - as recent microsociology paradoxically admits (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 9) - cannot be "reduced" to them. It would be just as inappropriate to say that because individuals "consist of" cells, we can "reduce" the meaning of "individuality" to associations among cells. Ontologically, interactions are not "more real" than individuals or organizations; and methodologically, "consisting of" does not imply "being reducible to." In sum, then, reductionist microsociological strategies mistake one type of social systems (interaction) for the model or basic (aggregated) element of other types of social systems (organization, society), and thus fail to account for the constitutive differences between these emergent types. (Fuchs 1989: 177)
I still retain an incling that organizations and society can at some level or in some dimension be explained in terms of interactions - or at least this is what goffmanian dramaturgy would tell us. I have yet to make up my mind, as I am a novice.
Epistemologically, radical microsociology [Collins 1981] advocates the empiricism of primary observational data about microsocial events and situations. Microsocial reality is held to be somehow "more real" and "more empirical" than macrosocial reality; and thus all sociological knowledge depends on microsociological observations for its "ultimate empirical validation" (Collins 1981b: 265). In fact, while macrosociological concepts such as "state" or "organization" are only reified constructs lacking true empirical referents, microsociological concepts such as "interaction" and "situation" have privileged experiential access to the only objective reality there is; that is, the reality of microsociology... (Fuchs 1989: 177)
And he goes on citing Collins about there are no state, economy or culture and social class as such, only collections of individual people acting in particular kinds of microsituations which are characterized by these macrosociological terms by a kind of shorthand.
Strictly speaking, however, there are no such things as "individuals," "interactions," or "situations" either. The constructs of "situation" or "interaction" are in no sense less "reified" and "more empirical" than, say, the constructs of "state," "revolution," or the Watson-Crick model of DNA. Our answer to "What is a situation?" would not be less abstract and more verified than our answer to "What is a revolution?". The idea that microphenomena are somehow "more real" or "more empirical" than macrophenomena rests on the deeply flawed and long-abandoned logical positivist project to ground all knowledge in the absolute certainty of sensory perceptions that once and for all tell us what objective reality really looks like (Fuchs 1986). But sheer microsociological perception does not tell us what interactions and situations relaly are; just as it does not tell us what states, economies, or molecules really are. (Fuchs 1989: 177-178)
Firstly, Fuchs is trying to point out that social constructionist notions are themselves socially constructed. Secondly, I cannot help believing that bodily behaviour - or in more eloquent terms, the flow of material and energy - is somehow more real than the informational content we ascribe to these. That is, macrostructures exist only as far as human interaction reifies them.
Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet" does not become more real if we translate the semantics of love and passion into statements about hormonal processes; instead, we would erase one language game and make the world a lot less interesting place to live in. (Fuchs 1989: 178)
Haha. Well that is just like your opinion man.


Lukes, Steven 1968. Methodological Individualism Reconsidered. The British Journal of Sociology 19(2): 119-129.
Let us begin with a set of truisms. Society consists of people. Groups consist of people. Institutions consist of people plus rules and roles. Rules are followed (or alternatively not followed) by people and roles are filled by people. Also there are traditions, customs, ideologies, kinship systems, languages: these are ways people act, think and talk. At the risk of pomposity, these truisms may be said to constitute a theory (let us call it 'Truistic Social Atomism') made up of banal propositions about the world that are analytically true, i.e. in virtue of the meaning of words. (Lukes 1968: 120)
One of these truisms touched me deeply: roles and rules are for people in institutions. Of couse! Rom & Harre's role-rule theory tries to break out of the institutional base and apply roles and rules to all groups and interactions, which is fallacious.
Somethinkers have helf it to be equally truistic (indeed, sometimes, to amount to the same thing) to say that facts about society and social phenomena are to be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals. This is the doctrine of methodological individualism. For exaple, Hayek writers:
there is no other way towards an understanding of social phenomena but through our understanding of individual actions directed toward other people and guided by their expected behaviour.
Similarly, according to Popper,
...all social phenomena, and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human individuals, and ... we should never be satisfied by an explanation in terms of so-called 'collectives'...
Finally, we may quote Watkins's account of 'the principle of methodological individualism':
According to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understandings of their situation. Every complex social situation, institution of event is the result of a particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations, beliefs, and physical resources and environment.
It is worth noticing, incidentally, that the first sentence here is simply a (refined) statement of Truistic Social Atomism. (Lukes 1968: 120)
I like these quotes. At this point still Truistic Social Atomism seems common-sense.
...A theory of meaning to the effect that every statement about social phenomena is either a statement about individual human beings or else it is unintelligible and therefore not a statement at all. This theory entails that all predicates which range over social phenomena are definable in terms of predicates which range only over individual phenomena and that all statements about social phenomena are wholly about individuals. As Jarvie has put it, '"Army" is merely a plural of soldiers and all statements about the Army can be reduced to statements about the particular soldiers comprising the Army'. (Lukes 1968: 121)
This is what previous author called radical microsociology.
What is a fact about an individual? Or, more clearly, what predicates may be applied to individuals? Consider the following examples:
  1. genetic make-up; brain states
  2. aggression; gratification; stimulus-response
  3. co-operation; power; esteem
  4. cashing cheques; saluting; voting
(Lukes 1968: 123)
Lukes goes on to argue how any one of these is insufficient. I am content with the classification itself.
To explain something is (at least) to overcome an obstacle - to make what was unintelligible intelligible. There is more than one way of doing this.
It is important to see, and it is often forgotten, that to identify a piece of behaviour, a set of beliefs, etc., is sometimes to explain it. This may involve seeing it in a new way, picking out hidden structural features. Consider an anthropologist's interpretation of sacrifice or a sociological study of bureaucracy. Often explanation resides precisely in a successful and sufficiently wide-ranging identification of behaviour or types of behaviour (often in terms of a set of beliefs). (Lukes 1968: 125)
Identification is only one technique of explanation; there is also description; and here Lukes identifies description - in actuality - with schkovskian deautomatization.
Watkins, J. W. N. 1955. Methodological Individualism: A Reply. Philosophy of Science 22(1): 58-62.
I will begin by reformulating the principle. It is based on the metaphysical commonplace that social events are brought about by people. Speaking loosely, one cay say that climate, famine, the location of minerals, and other physical factors help to determine history, just as one can say tha alcohol causes road accidents. But speaking strictly, one should say that alcohol induces changes in people who rink it, and that it is the behavior of some of these affected people, rather than alcohol itslef, which results in road accidents. Alcohol may indirectly affect society in another way, through the ideas which people entertain about alcohol. People who believe that it is evil, or profitable to manufacture, or that it can bear a heavy tax, may behave very differently because of their different ideas; and their behavior may, as Prohibition showed, have all sorts of unintended consequences. (Watkins 1955: 58)
The methodological individualism thus states that people are at the center of social events. Put in neater terms:
in short, large-scale social phenomena must be accounter for by the situations, dispositions and beliefs of individuals. This I call methodological individualism. (Watkins 1955: 58)
Situations = social interactions; dispotisions = patterns of behaviour; beliefs = ...beliefs. I have little to say about the latter, but the first two hook up with my own stuff neatly.
What I did say was that they were not surprising in the same way that explanations in natural science, which explain the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar, are surprising. Explanations in social science, I said, explain the familiar in terms of the familiar, but the connection may be very surprising. (Watkins 1955: 59)
Comparing the natural and social sciences and their methods of explanation.
I think the distinction between an anonymous individualistic explanation and a holistic explanation is pretty obvious, but let me drive it home with another example. Suppose an election-results is explained in terms of a "swing of the pendulum". According to the principle of methodological individualism, such an explanation is permissible if it is no more than a short-hand way of saying that an increasing number of (anonymous) electors grow increasingly dissatisfied with any party the longer it remains in office. But it is an impermissible holistic explanation if it reallt intends to assert that there is a social law, which cannot be derived from individualistic principles, which requires an oscillating pattern of electoral behavior. (Watkins 1955: 60)
This is where the "shorthand" notion in latter radial microsociologists / methodological individualists seems to originate.
If "The Great Depression caused the defeat of the Labor Government in 1931" is short-hand for something like "Most electors blamed the Government for the unemployment and poverty and voted anti-Labor" then it is permissible; but if it were really meant to suggest that the behavior of votres is controlled by an economic cycle, then it is macroscopic and impermissible. (Watkins 1955: 60)
An example.
I do not see how such concepts ["group climate" or "cohesiveness"] can be meaningful and yet involve no reference to individuals. If "The Jewish race is cohesive" does not mean that, for instance, Jews usually marry Jews, live in close communities, share religious rituals, etc., if it does not refer to Jewish people (whose behavior can be observed) but only to the Jewish race (which cannot be observed), then I do not see how it can be tested or have any empirical content. (Watkins 1955: 61)
That is, reference to individuals is necessary for a theory to be empirical; an anytical theory could probably speak about "The Jewish race" in abstract and idealistic terms, but it would be totally divorced from actual Jewish people.
If you become persuaded that the metaphysical assumption on which methodological holism is based is true, then your whole view of yourself and other people, of the social world in which you live, would be transformed. You would believe that the things we think we do because we want to do them are really done because our society requires us to fulfil its purposes; you would believe that we are like actors unaware that Society is a sort of superintending playwright-cum-producer which devises our parts and induces us to perform them. This is not the sort of belief with which one can come to a comfortable compromise. (Watkins 1955: 62)
This sounds very dystopic.
Miller, Richard W. 1978. Methodological Individualism and Social Explanation. Philosophy of Science 45(3): 387-414.
For over twenty years, Karl Popper, J.W.N. Watkins and others have argued for methodological individualism, the doctrine that social phenomena must be explainable in terms of the psychologies and situations of the participants in those phenomena. This statement of methodological individualism is vague, because the claims put forward in the name of that doctrine have seemed to many readers to be extremely diverse. (Miller 1978: 387)
Another account of Watkins's methodological individualism.
Thus, at one point, Watkins says that no statements compatible with methodological individualism can explain reflex-like group behavior in which "some kind of physical connection between people's nervous systems ... cause automatic, and perhaps in some sense appropriate, bodily responses." But he remaks that such actions are not a sufficient basis for "typical long-lived institutions, like a bank, or a legal system or a church" and do not "endure ... through generations of men" ([13], pp. 273f). (Miller 1978: 389)
Thus, Watkins pointed out already in 1953 that interaction systems cannot fully explain social systems (institutions last longer than interactions).
While the realm of subjective meaning is extremely broad, it has its limits. One obvious limit is suggested by Weber's distinction between "meanigful action and merely reactive behavior to which no subjective meaning is attached" ([17], p. 90). Actions performed purely out of habit are not subjectively meaningful. (Miller 1978: 392-393)
Max Weber: meaningful action vs reactive behaviour [intentional vs routine].
In any case, our discussion suggests that moderate individualism, plausible as it sounds, lacks an a priori justification. Social phenomena are brought about by acts which are the result, in turn, of the psychological characteristics of the agents. But a description of those characteristics need not explain the social phenomenon in question. (Miller 1978: 413)
As I'm not at all sure what is or is not a priori justified, I guess I can take the trivial moderate individualism route - for nonverbalism, this seems prudent.
Arrow, Kenneth J. 1994. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. The American Economic Review 82(2): 1-9.
In the usual versions of economic theory, each individual makes decisions to consume different commodities<, to work at one job or another, to choose production methods, to save, and to invest. In one way or another, these decisions interact to produce an outcome which determines the workings of the economy, the allocation of resources in short. It seems commonly to be assumed that the individual decisions then form a complete set of explanatory variables. A name is given to this point of view, that of methodological individualism, that it is necessary to base all accounts of economic interaction on individual behavior. (Arrow 1994: 1)
Watkins seemed to base his theory on Weber and historicism. Fuchs and others based it in social systems theory. This one is based on economic theory and more specifically, the rational-actor model.
The starting point for the individualist paradigm is the simple fact that all social interactions are after all interactions among individuals. The individual in the economy or in the society is like the atom in chemistry; whatever happens can ultimately be described exhaustively in terms of the individuals involved. Of course, the individuals do not act separately. They respond to each other, but each acts within a range limited by the behavior of others as well as by constraints personal to the individual, such as his ability or wealth. (Arrow 1994: 3)
The analogy with chemistry is neat. Responding to each other is what is meant by "interaction". Limits have here to do with economic notions (ability or wealth), but in other fields of inquiry may take other forms (such as Power, or Knowledge, or Cultural know-how, etc.).
But an army is equally composed of individuals, and no analysis of its workings can ignore how individuals give orders or react to them. (Arrow 1994: 3)
This is important for me, as giving orders and reacting to orders have observable nonverbal components.
Social and historical determinism is not as popular a viewpoint as it used to be, and an individualistic perspective is a guard against such theories. Whether in Marxist or other forms, such theories relied heavily on disembodied actors such as classes or national spirits, rather than on the actual persons. (Arrow 1994: 4)
This is important because cultural semiotics seems to rely on a disembodied reader (a reader as such, not a specific person).
Among the externalitites that Marshall was concerned with, a prime example was information, especially technical knowledge. The caustic dissenter, Thornstein Veblen (1919 pp. 180-230; originally appearing in 1908), in reviewing John Bates Clark's textbook, identified socially held technical knolwedge as a main determinant of economic activity in every economy. (Arrow 1994: 6)
Something along the lines of "knowledge is power".
He [Hayek 1945/1948] does acknowledge (pp. 79-80) that scientific knowledge differs from the tacit knowledge held by individuals and not easily transmitted to others. In scientific knowledge, expert opinion may indeed count for more than the knowledge disperse throughout economy. However, Hayek tends to minimize the role of scientific knowledge and does not really discuss technological knowledge at all, a good deal of which is transmittable to others. Let me call scientific knowledge and the more transmittable part of technological knowlede together "reproducible knowlede." (Of course, a fuller account would have to recognize varying degrees of reproducibility.) In many ways, the distinction between reproducible and tacit knowledge is parallel to that between evolutionary and conscious changes in social organization that I referred to earlier. (Arrow 1994: 6)
This made me think how semiotics is scientific knowledge about tacit knowledge.
New knowledge is acquired in two different ways: (1) acquisition from observing nature (whether by research or by less formal procedures); and (2) learning from other individuals, which in turn can be subdivided into (a) intended learning (communication, education), and (b) inferring the knowledge of others by observing their behavior. (Arrow 1994: 7)
Hmm... The central part here is played by the interpreter and whether it's sign-giving is intentional or not.
As the late 19th century writer, Samuel Butler, said: "A chicken is an egg's way of making an egg." (Arrow 1994: 7)
Hmm... since this quote is often used without reference to Samuel Butler, it seemed to me before that it comes from some older philosophy.
Information privately produced for private gain contributes as an unintended byproduct of the social pool of information. (Arrow 1994: 8)
Thus, while I blog for the sake of my own academic work, anyone crafty enough to find it and witty enough to understand it, can profit from it.
Kunstisemiootika ja kunstiteooriad: Independent Work (Week 3)
Burnham, Linda Rye 1986. "High Performance," Performance Art, and Me. The Drama Review: TDR 30(1): 15-51.
What is performance art? I have been asked so many times to define the term, and I find that it can be done only in a most general, non-specific way. We may call it time-based and non-statid and intermedia art, but what we have is a definition so broad that it includes work at the opposite ends of any spectrum you care to name. I might as well be asked to define art itself. (Burnham 1986: 15)
The difficulty in defining performance art. This one is pretty good, though, as it takes note of the time constraints involved (it is temporary) and its non-static, e.g., moving, nature (bodies are in action). Intermedia is also good, but the notion of media itself is kinda of problematic.
The more we try to document and historify performance, the more wily and slippery and broad it becomes. Sometimes an artist will express her/his displeasure with "the system" by specifically designing a work which foils the sponsor's expectations. (Burnham 1986: 15)
Taking anti-estbalishment to the level of self-injury (in economic and institutional sense, not bodily harm).
On another axis, the ephemeral base of performance art can link it closely to the most transitory and issue-oriented kinds of art, work that is so tied to the crusade of the moment that it writes itself out of a possible place among "great timeless works of art." This sacrificial commitment makes it particularly useful to political activism, especially the issues that are local or peculiar to a small public. However, on the same program about the same issue, there might be included a live work that can speak to any number of issues eloquently and which is issue-oriented only by context. (Burnham 1986: 16)
The political dimension in performance art makes it transitory (impermanent, momentary, temporal; brief and fleeting event).
In another ironic twist, certain producers seek to ally themselves with performance art for the purpose of acquiring not only its audience but also its sponsors, funding sources, and publicity outlets. Thus, certain theater groups garner more of the spotlight by entering their activities under the relatively spare category of "performance art", in newspaper calendars than they would under "theater." (Burnham 1986: 18)
This seems to be exactly what a local "train theater" [rongiteater] group was doing. At least they made it to newspapers.
However you define it, there are traces of performance throughout art history, and historians are having fun mining as far back as the Renaissance for performance art by Bernini and da Vinci. While performance art is actually the oldest form of communication, probably pre-dating language itself, its contemporary phrase is usually traced back to the turn of the turn of the century in Europe, in works by the Dada artists and the Futurists. Indeed, the ideas of these movements - eloquent responses to the birth of the 20th century: the age of machines, world wars, and mass communication - are still being exercised today. (Burnham 1986: 20)
"...historians are having fun mining..." - I bet they are :D
I don't mean that Burden's pieces necessarily operate on the same wave lenght as these feminist works, but there is something they have in common, something that can be found in all work by visual artists - a distillation of thought and feeling into a cohesive visual form and a reliance on that visual communication. The transmutation of art from the static into performance added the element of time and the human body, the very idea of which produced an electrifying effect on my imagination. The possibilities for communication were mind-boggling. (Burnham 1986: 21-22)
I can fully understand this last sentence - the transmutation from visual to bodily art brought about a widening move from projecting something on a canvas to doing something with your body, expressing much more in both time and space than a canvas could ever mediate.
The peculiar nature of performance art attracted my interest in the first place. Here was an "art form" that was literally open to anybody. Anyone, even a person who had no art education, could announce a piece and perform it, photograph it, publish it, place it in a resume and use the printed account as credentials, thereby proving her/himself a performance artist. The performance could take place literally any place, indoors or out, or it could be entirely conceptual and never exist at all. It could mimic, parody or comment on existing phenomena in such a way that it might even be mistaken for that which it was commenting on. it defied description and classification. This work, then, reported in a magazmine, took on a ring of something "real." (Burnham 1986: 29)
Making performance art world sound awfully awesome.
For most people who have only recently become acquainted with performance art, the piece is on the stage and the audience planted firmly and safely in the seats, observing the action as if in an orthodox theater. Far less emotional risk, no shocks to the psyche, no danger of actual contact with the art or of getting it on your clothes. For this lopsided view we can thank the notorious successes of Laurie Anderson and Robert Wilson and Robert Longo and Ping Chong and the flock of prominent artists who have taken to the stage in the last ten years. (Burnham 1986: 33)
A description of what non-theatrical performance art could or must do.
Performance art critics guard against seduction by technique and can actually become bored by a reliance on great acting, whereas theater critics are driven to the wall by what they perceive as bad timing or mechanical devices that don't work. If performers speak in their own voices, revealing their own vulnerabilities, some theater critics recoil from the "bad acting," expecting a good actor to dissapear into the role. (Burnham 1986: 34)
Debaser put it well in "Crown Control", saying: "Now it's time to earn your trust, all heads to the front, gather 'round to watch me and Ethic do impressions of us".
Performance artist Paul McCarthy said, "It is my belief that our culture has lost a true perception of existence. It is veiled. We are only fumbling in what we perceive to be reality. For the most part we do not know we are alive" (LAICA Journal, January-Fabruary 1979). In his performances he takes his witnesses on a journey in which he exhibits beastly characters, wearing their twisted psyches on the outside, displaying for us what humanity has actually become. His performances are called disgusting and impossible for some people to watch. McCarthy and others who make shocking images of human existence might be regarded as the soul of man crying out for help, in a state of extreme emergency. Maybe we are using performance art to snap us out of it. As the Rev. Ivan Stang said, "You're still looking where They're pointing, when you ought to be looking all around" ("Quit Your Job and Praise Bob," HP Issue #24, 1983). (Burnham 1986: 50)
Ah, this is exactly how I feel about institutional education. I may look where they are pointing, but I also want to look all around.
Blau, Herbert 1991. The Surpassing Body. TDR 35(2): 74-98.
While the breaking and tearing continued, through the anatomy of modernism, as the structural principle of artistic forms, there were as a preface to postmodern performance various notions of body consciousness or disciplines of the thinking body or the signifying body or, amidst the baffling semurgy of exchangeable signs, regimens of the body and its authority in the rhetorical struggle to assure a future. One might have thought that Meyerhold's biomechanics was, in its articulartion of signs, an important part of that struggle, but about that particular system in the theatre of his time Trotsky is not at all sanguine. And as he questions the historical necessity of this apparent innovation - which impressed both Brecht and Eisenstein - it's as if he were writing off in advance the body language of the American theatre of the '60s, when it was under the spell of Artaud and Grotowsky and, in a more populist mode, the messianism of the Living Theatre. (Blau 1991: 74)
I don't comprehend all of this, but I do draw a connection between Roland Barthes (in Image, Music, Text) having pains at describing what we know as body language, in Eisenstein's work, and with avant garde semiologese, a third in the signifier and signified relationship.
As with the psychophysical exercises of a generation ago, the model and motive power is the liberated economy of the unconscious, the seeds of the psyche's history spilling over the stage, confounding representation and, in the play of body parts, disrupting the hegemony of the specular with oral drives, anal drives, labial, olfactory, epidermal, duodenal. (Blau 1991: 77)
I suspect Blau is trying to pull off a bodily Sokal hoax. That is, he has written "...a pastiche of Left-wing cant, fawning references, grandiose quotations, and outright nonsense ... structured around the silliest quotations..." This text feels like it's merely stuffing together tantalizing jargon from extremely different discourses and leaving the impression that it somehow must make sense. Sentences like "That is not exactly the millennium of the desiring-machine in the rhizomatic space of a thousand plateaus." leave me wondering if Blau is the Lil B of the surpassing body, excreting thought constructs with no hinderance from semantics. Fuck this article, let's read something more intelligible.
Novakov, Anna 2003. Point of Access: Marina Abramovic's 1975 Performance "Role Exchange". Woman's Art Journal 24(2): 31-35.
In 1973 she [Marina Abramoviç] began working with the innovative Body Art Movement, which included Serbs Nesa Paripovic and Zoran Popovic and involved many of the same corporal issues addressed by the American Artists Vito Acconci (Seed Bed, 1971), Chris Burden (Shoot, 1971), Bruce Nauman (Corridor, 1972), and Dennis Oppenheim (Parallel Stress, 1970). (Novakov 2003: 31)
As I am already or going to be soon familiar with some of these (Burden's Shoot is on youtube, for example), I thought I'd make note of these acts. I think since I like this era (beginning of the 1970s) in science, why not also in art.
Also important to Abramovic are the psychological consequences of personal space. During their early years together Abramovic and Ulay led a nomadic existence, often sleeping in their Citroen van, while performing and traveling from one city to the next. They were interested in the idea of displacement, including their own lack of a fixed address. Their projects, generally performed for a small audience of ten or less, spanned twelve years and were captured in videos, films, and photographs. Their collaboration ended in 1988 with The Great Wall Walk, a three-month, 2000 kilometer journey in which Abramovic and Ulay walked toward each other from opposite ends of the Great Wall of China - Ulay fell in love with his Chinese guide. (Novakov 2003: 31)
Hmm... I knew from Abramovic's interview that she and Ulay did something on the Great Wall of China and that it was their last piece together... I did not know that they walked towards each other from the opposite ends. As I read this, I though "damn, three months to walk toward someone whom you have been - even braided - together must be tough", and then came the last sentence, which makes perfect sense. Of course you're going to fall in love with your Chinese guide, Ulay, of course.
Employed as a framing device for the desire of the spectator and the spectacle and seen as a frame around a painting, the picture window acts to isolate and delimit the erotic arena or the space of sexual fantasy. Similarly, the picture window of the gallery emphasizes the space of aesthetic containment, the venue for the playing out of visceral experiences. According to the architect Le Corbusier, "a window is man himself... The porte-fenetre provides with a frame, it accords with his outlines... The vertical is the line of the upright human being, it is the line of life itsself." (Novakov 2003: 32)
Firstly, I considered this paragraph significant because I thought about writing about the view from my window for the landscape semiotics course. Secondly, I really should some day read Le Corbusier and other influential architects, even for the sake of finding out their rational or not-so-rational explanations for why our buildings are the way they are.
Baudelaire described the 19th-century Parisian flaneur as a kind of urban nomad who walked the teeming streets with a keen sense of sight and smell. The modern street became to him a sensory text that needed to be deciphered, read, and interpreted from an objective and privileged position. In other words, the flaneur saw all but was consumed by nothing. (Novakov 2003: 33)
In short, what Baudelaire described as a 19th-centuyry Parisian flaneur is very close to what I consider a nonverbalist, e.g., Clarisse, taking long rides on the Metro to go nowhere, but to investigate the people, guess their personalities, their aims, their destinations; seeing all but herself remaining innocuous to the gaze of others.
Rush, Michael 1999. A Noisy Silence. PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art 21(1): 2-10.
"Museums," they [Kelley and McCarthy] go on to say in a printed statement available in the gallery, "continue to find it difficult to present work whose ... form and subject are time, memory, perception, spoken language, sound, human action, and interaction. ... This prejudice creates an object-oriented history of contemporary art. Many significant works of art do not reference the genres of sculpture or painting and are not meant to be seen within the physical framework of the museum." Touché. (Rush 1999: 2-3)
Upon first reading the last word of this paragraph, I misinterpreted it as the author exasperating "Douche!" But yeah, Kelley and McCarthy have a point there.
It is in exposing the "destructive" aspect of this performative art that Schimmel makes his strongest point. This is in no small part due to the visual impression (from graphic photographs, videos, articles of clothing) that artists of the 60s and 70s had an unusual preoccupation with biolence and bloodied body parts. From images of Chris Burden forcing his torso along a street littered with cracked glass to Gina Pane slashing her toes (a "psychovisual gesture," she called it) to Marina Abramovic submitting her body to audience members who cut her skin and sucked her blood, artists were enacting extreme gestures to awaken art from its painterly sleep. (Rush 1999: 4)
Burden's actions kind of remind me of a person I know in real life. I like Gina Pane's notion, and did now know that people sucked Abramovic's blood in Rhythm 2.

For Muehl, acts normally seen as perverse or degrading, were actually means of escaping the confines of social mores. By 1971 he, in fact, abandoned art and actions to form a commune [the Friedrichshof Commune], which exists to this day [with now 50yo inhabitants], in which free sexual expression and uninhibited interactions are expected of all inhabitants. When some of these behaviors were discovered to include children, Muehl was imprisoned for seven years, from 1991-1998. His utopian practices had collided with the law, making transgression intolerable to the society he saw himself as trying to liberate. (Rush 1999: 5)
There is an interesting article about this published in The Guardian titled "The price of free love". It discusses how Otto Muehl's commune became authoritarian very quickly, and even sent the brightest - indeed, successfully - to earn millions of dollars in stockbroking. He got in trouble with the law because at some point he "began telling women of 35 they were too old for him to want to have sex with and that he preferred young flesh. Brought up by their mothers to regard sex with Otto as a privilege, the 14 year olds began swarming round him even in his shower." As 14 was the age of consent in Austria, he must have preferred even younger flesh than that to be arrested.