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Haberland's Manual


It is no wonder I didn't know about Haberland's by now three decade critique. He added a reference to his own work on the subject to the stubby Wikipedia page on Phatic expressions just a few months ago. It's a good thing he did. There are literally thousands of secondary and tertiary sources out there and finding something like this is like finding a needle in a haystack. Or, to paraphrase, like finding an insightful critical note in a chorus of mindless repetitions.


Haberland, Hartmut 1996. Communion or Communication: A historical note on one of the "founding fathers" of pragmatics. In: Sackmann, Robin and Monika Budde (eds.), Theoretical Linguistics and Grammatical Description: Papers in Honour of Hans-Heinrich Lieb on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday. Asterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 163-166.

"But there also seems to be a tendency to ascribe to Malinowski a term he never used, that of "phatic communication". In this brief note, I should like to clarify the relationship of "communion" and "communication" as it appears in Malinowski." (Haberland 1996: 163-164)

Someone noticed! Hopefully this will bring much-needed clarity.

"It [Malinowski's essay] contains a gently worded but quite fundamental critique of Ogden and Richards' semiotic model which is one of the many subtly, or less subtly, different triangle models of the linguistic sign going ultimately back to the Stoa." (Haberland 1996: 164)

Will someone ever give exact references to where this damn triangle model originates from? The reference given here reads "cf. Christensen (1962: 45)" and the title is An essay on the unity of Stoic philosophy.

"But the point that Malinowski wants to make is that such a complex sign relation is a cultural product not to be found in all societies and all uses of language. In primitive languages, sound can relate directly to the object or situation, and is therefore not yet a symbol, properly speaking (Malinowski 1923: 324)." (Haberland 1996: 164)

I'm not sure how (ostension)? [Wordplay: semitoic estonsion. Also: semi-Stoa] But the general critique seems to follow the same logic as elsewhere, namely the lapse of the referential function as defined (very strictly) by Ogden and Richards. If the implications here are on spot, this would mean that phatic communication is veritably subsymbolic.

"Rather
"speech is the necessary means of communion; it is the one indispensable instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible." (1923: 310)
Jakobson remarks that infants acquire the phatic function of language as the first; they are "prone to communicate" before they can deal with "informative communication". The terminology seems to have shifted here: "communication" has a much more general ring for Jakobson while Malinowski's "communication" has been redressed by Jakobson (1960: 356) as "informative communication". (Haberland 1996: 164)

Yup, I've reiterated the consequences of this shift throughout this blog for some years now, only to be bested by someone 15 years ahead of me.

"So phatic communion is communion by speaking: there are other forms of communion, and Malinowski points out that "the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship" [...] (Haberland 1996: 165)

Yes, but, now, what is communion?

"While phatic originally meant little more than 'by words', 'through language' or 'linguistic', it has progressively taken on much more weight, the decisive step being Jakobson's 'phatic function' of language. Here, 'phatic' cannot just mean 'by words', 'through language' or 'linguistic' - the whole term would be empty or tautological in this interpretation. In Jakobson's terminology, 'phatic' has shed its etymological anchoring and has metonymically absorbed the meaning originally carried by 'communion'. It is not a long way from here to 'phatic communication'." (Haberland 1996: 165)

Wow. This exact tautology is the basis for my accusation that "phatic" has been subject of a century-long process of illegitimate terminological diffusion. The metonymic absorption of "phatic" by "communion" surprised me, but I'm not sure what to do with it yet.

"In this sense Malinowski is to be credited with having paved the way for modern pragmatics. But Malinowski's own use of the term 'pragmatic' does not foreshadow uses of the term as we know it from Carnap on. Although he refers to the "essentially pragmatic character" of language, this means little more to him than that language "is a mode of behaviour" or "element of concerted human action". 'Pragmatic' relates to 'behavior' and 'action' like 'phatic' relates to 'language' and 'speaking'. In spirit, Malinowski was certainly a precursor of modern pragmatics, but he was so avant le mot." (Haberland 1996: 165)

This is encouraging for my pragmatic reinterpretation of Malinowski's phatic communion, because instead of pragmatics "from Carnap on", I'd subscribe to older strains in Peirce, James, Bentley, and Dewey.

Haberland, Hartmut 1984. A Field Manual for Readers of "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages" by Bronislaw Malinowski. ROLIG-papir 31: 17-51.

This contribution is a collection of material - in a way, my "Malinowski file" - which took shape in the Spring of 1984, when I gave a course on Speech Act Theory at the Department of Linguistics, University of Copenhagen. (Haberland 1984: 17)

Due to necessity to organize materials for finally writing a paper on the concept of phatic cummunion I recently created my own Malinwski file, though with a narrow focus on the part of the essay dealing with phatic communion (second part of section IV, which fits neatly on one A4 page).

There is only one little catch here: Jakobson seems to imply that for Malinowski, there is a function of language called 'phatic'. This makes sense in Jakobson's framework. Jakobson equates "speech event" and "act of linguistic communication" (1960: 353), therefore it makes sense to single out a 'phatic function' of language and to talk about 'phatic communication' if a message is primarily concerned with the contact factor in verbal communication. (Jakobson doesn't talk about 'phatic communication' himself, but I gather that this is the way he has been understood.) But for Malinowski, the opposition is not between 'phatic communication' and 'communication' otherwise; it is between 'communion' and 'communication'. (Haberland 1984: 18)

I came to realize all these things in 2014, exactly three years ago from now and more or less exactly three decades after these contradictions were articulated here. Since I've dealt with these issues for some time now I'll articulate them as follows:

One is a function of language, the other a function of speech. More pointedly, one pertains to the hierarchy of linguistic functions and the other is a social function of a particular type of speech. In my mind, one is exemplifying meaningless, and therefore purely social, uses of language and the other is demonstrating that the meaningless social use of language carries a function unnoticed before by semanticists. These overlap and the difference is minute, but very relevant in consequence of what kind of units of analysis are delineated in the 21st century under the label "phatic", the followers of one looking at language and the other interaction.

I have solved the latter contradictions for myself by viewing the three main subtypes of phaticity as interrelated but distinct conceptualizations: phatic communion, phatic communication and phatic function. I place La Barre's phatic communication before phatic function because La Barre had published his insights by 1954 and Jakobson first sketched his scheme in 1956. Here's a visual diagram by Joseph Corneli (personal communication):

For Malinowski, if language is not used for communicating (that is, for communicating ideas or thoughts), then it serves a different purpose, namely that of communion, the creating of ties between people. (Haberland 1984: 18)

Quoted PC 9.3, "Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must be anything to communicate" with reference to the ending of 9.1, "does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas". This is one of the three negations of earlier functions (Ogden and Richards' version in the same book) and is often interpreted as lacking "informational content". The difference between ideas, thoughts and information could be furthered in this regard with help from information sciences.

Since this communion is established through language, Malinowski coins for it the term 'phatic' [...]. What is special about phatic communion, is therefore not that it is phatic, but that it is not communication (in Malinowski's, not in Jakobson's sense of 'communication'). Malinowski might as well have called it 'linguistic communion' without making a different point. (Haberland 1984: 19)

This metonymic extension of "phatic" into "communion" is especially troubling in phatic technology studies where the Jakobsonian sense prevails and phaticity stands for "contact" instead of languaging activity. The term has dissasociated from its etymology.

This might sound like haggling about terminology. The dialogue Jakobson adapted from Dorothy Parker is, after all, an example of phatic communion in Malinowski's sense. But I think that a discussion of Malinowski's original idea brings forth something which tends to be missed out in Jakobson's approach, namely that language is not only a means of conveying thought ("communication"), but also a mode o behaviour ("action"). (Haberland 1984: 19)

In the 1930s he became much interested in Africa; was closely associated with the International African Institute; visited students working among Bemba, Swazi, and other tribes in eastern and southern Africa; and wrote the introduction to Jomo Kenyatta's book Facing Mount Kenya (1938), prepared as a diploma thesis under his supervision. (Kenyatta became president of Kenya in 1964.) (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th edition 1974, in Haberland 1984: 21)

This would explain Malinowski's prevalence in African Studies and his indirect hand in Mau Mau.

Malinowski acknowledges that the triangle model of the sign put up by Ogden and Richards (where "Symbol", "Thought or Reference", and "Referent", i.e. the 'object', are placed in the three corners of the schema) has its merits, but it is only applicable to a very special situation of language use. (Haberland 1984: 46)

Here I disagree. Ogden and Richards carried on Peirce's triadic conception of the sign and Malinowski added to this schema by negating the existing functions but Malinowski's own view does not seem in conflict with the Peircean model in itself - the three aspects of the model by themselves may be irrelevant (i.e. the object is in the immediate context and thus superfluous, the goal is not to incite new thought or interpretant, and the symbols used are formulaic) but it is still a case of semiosis, of sign-action.

Phatic Communion

More onBronisław Malinowski or Phaticity
This is "Phatic Communion", a four-page excerpt from Malinowski's essay
Here's "Phatic Communication"
Here's the first commented reading of this text.
Here's a comparison of translations into Estonian
Here's a further comparison of translations.
and here's a phraseological discussion of phatic communion

Malinowski, Bronisław Kasper 1923. The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages. In: Ogden, Charles Kay and Ivor Armstrong Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 293-336.


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Phatic Communion

This one A4 of text, from Malinowski's supplement to Ogden & Richards' The Meaning of Meaning (1923), were first re-published under the title "Phatic Communication" by John Laver and Sandy Hutcheson in Communication in face to face interaction: Selected readings (1972, pp. 146-152), and constitute the code-text of phatic studies, in which the term phatic communion is coined and explained in somewhat older layer of English. Consequently, the interpretations of the term "phatic" vary, some preferring Roman Jakobson line of phatic function and others a more broader interpretation, and many often forming further unique caveats in various fields of research, domain of application and layers of abstraction. The old man's sonorous call at the mountain should help explain the avalanche that followed.


1. Another mode of using language

[1.1] The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration.
[1.2] When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing - it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function.
[1.3] Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation.
[1.4] The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 313)

2. Polite phrases

[2.1] A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing-room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant.
[2.2] Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things - all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought.
[2.3] It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly suprious on one side.
[2.4] What is the raison d'être, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are,' 'Where do you come from?' 'Nice day to-day' - all of which serve in one society or another as formulæ of greeting or approach? (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 313-314)

3. Natural sociability

[3.1] I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society.
[3.2] There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company.
[3.3] Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314)

4. The tension of silence

[4.1] Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous.
[4.2] The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy.
[4.3] To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character.
[4.4] This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule.
[4.5] The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only be the breaking of bread and the communion of food.
[4.6] The modern English expression, 'Nice day to-day' or the Melanesian phrase, "Whence comest thou?' are needed to get over the strange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314)

5. Gossip

[5.1] After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious.
[5.2] Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own.
[5.3] Always the same emphasis on affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy.
[5.4] Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak.
[5.5] For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement.
[5.6] But though the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314-315)

6. Phatic communion

[6.1] There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use - phatic communion I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention - a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words.
[6.2] Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language.
[6.3] Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not!
[6.4] They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener.
[6.5] Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)

7. Social atmosphere

[7.1] But can we regard it as a mode of action?
[7.2] And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation?
[7.3] It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking.
[7.4] But what can we consider as situation when a number of people aimlessly gossip together?
[7.5] It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people.
[7.6] But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip.
[7.7] The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically.
[7.8] Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other.
[7.9] Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)

8. Primitive speech

[8.1] I should like to add at once that though the examples discussed were taken from savage life, we would find among ourselves exact parallels to every type of linguistic use so far discussed.
[8.2] The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit - all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example.
[8.3] I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of primitive speech. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)

9. Summary

[9.1] Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analysed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas.
[9.2] "Throughout the Western world it is agreed that people must meet frequently, and that it is not only agreeable to talk, but that it is a matter of common courtesy to say something even when there is hardly anything to say" (Ogden and Richards, Chapter I) - as the Authors remark.
[9.3] Indeed there need not or perhaps even there must not be anything to communicate.
[9.4] As long as there are words to exchange, phatic communion brings savage and civilized alike into a pleasant atmosphere of polite, social intercourse. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315-316)

Information &c.



Boell, Sebastian K. 2016. Information: Fundamental positions and their implications for information systems research, education and practice. Information and Organization 27: 1-6.

Information is an important concept for the "information age", the "information society" and the discipline of Information Systems (IS). However, different conceptions of information often make incommensurate assumptions about what information is. This essay introduces a 'consequential framework' revealing different assumptions made about the nature of information and the consequences following from these assumptions. According to this consequential framework four stances on the existence of inormation can be distinguished: (1) A first stance assumes information to exist independently of humans as part of the physical world, for instance, in the structure of the universe or the transmission of signals; (2) a second stance assumes that information exists in signs but in an observer independent way, such as in objective facts about things; (3) a third stance sasumes that information exists only in relation to a subject, so that the same document, report or data will convey different information to different individuals; (4) a fourth stance assumes information to exist within a sociocultural setting, as lawyers, doctors or accountants differ in what is information to them. Each of these four stances makes vastly different assumptions about how information can be accessed and used by humans. (Boell 2016: 1)

Finally someone articulates the difficulty with the concept of information. I recall arguments about whether books left unread in a library repository contain "information" if no one reads them (i.e. the third stance here).

Academic fields require shared agreement about concepts that are central to their research as they provide the "theoretical glue" that helps different branches of a field to relate to each other and form a coherent whole (Whetten 1989). [...] In order to overcome the lack of thorough conceptual engagement with information, IS researchers require greater conceptual clarity as to the range of existing conceptions of information, how conceptions differ from each other in their assumptions about what information is, and subsequently what conceptions are useful for different research purposes. [...] Proper engagement with existing conceptions of information is thus essential for developing conceptual clarity (Lee 2010). Moreover, understanding how conceptions differ is necessary for identifying approaches to information that are appropriate and promising for advancing engagement with different IS research problems. [...] Instead of defining one 'correct' or 'best' conception for understanding information the framework introduced here equips IS researchers with meta understanding of the information concept in order to support them in the development of new and diverse conceptions to information for IS. (Boell 2016: 1)

This is what's missing from phatic studies - the central concept is understood in wildly different ways, even within single disciplines.

Secondly, revealing that each of the four stances makes different assumptions about the nature and existence of information the essay discusses consequences following from each of the four different stances. That is, different stances on information have implications for understanding other important IS concepts such as data, knowledge, signs, human beings, social context, and technology. (Boell 2016: 2)

In the three primary lines of phatic thinking, the consequences follow from the linguistic units under discussion and the "representative anecdote" of the definition. What's somewhat problematic is that each actually has more than one representative anecdote but some are preferred more than others.

The first conception understands information as data that is processed. In a survey of the current use of the information concept in IS research McKinney and Yoos (2010) argue that most IS research adopts a ‘token view’ of information according to which information is an “undifferentiated commodity of data bits that are processed” (McKinney & Yoos, 2010, p. 331). (Boell 2016: 2)

Since information content is such a lofty topic in phatic studies, I'll note that the prevalent interpretation is that phatic expressions are meaningless exactly in the sense that they are perfunctory tokens that aren't supposed to contain any actionable information. The form itself should serve as a cue for the proper ritual routine.

There are literally thousands of publications discussing information on a theoretical and conceptual level across IS and its reference disciplines (c.f. Bates, 2010; Zaliwski, 2011). Relevant literature on information was thus reviewed in a way that ensured appropriate breadth in the coverage of the broad range of existing conceptions of information, while also ensuring depth in covering particular conceptions of information that are of interest to IS. (Boell 2016: 3)

Reference groups and reference disciplines?

Based on careful reading and thorough assessment of the whole range of different conceptions of information four criteria for distinguishing individual approaches to information were established: (1) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘physical stance’ on information if the conception relates information to physical concepts or the physical world in general. (2) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘objective stance’ on information if, the conception relates information to human understanding and signs where information is understood as existing objectively independently of a recipient. (3) A conception of information was allocated to the ‘subject-centered stance’ on information if the conception requires the appropriation of information by a subject. And (4) a conception of information was allocated to the ‘sociocultural stance’ on information if information is conceptualized as dependent on a wider sociocultural dimension. (Boell 2016: 4)

The labels for these stances were missing from the abstract.

Importantly, Shannon himself noted, as he was interested in the accurate reproduction of the signals that were initially sent, the question of whether a transmitted message is actually meaningful, relevant or useful is irrelevant as such concerns are not part of his theory (Shannon, 1948, p. 379) (Boell 2016: 6)

Shannon was an accidental phaticist?

The objective stance on information therefore encompasses conceptions that understand information as contained in signs in an observer-independent way. Authors use different approaches to argue for an objective stance on information in relation to signs. Some argue that information is objective as it is contained observer independently in sign-vehicles. Others seek to differentiate information from meaning, or to define meaning as something that is independent of a subject. (Boell 2016: 6)

Interestingly, thus far the receiver's side is dealt with (Peirce is quoted, etc.) but no mention yet of the sender. I would have thought that the difference between physical and objective stance is the distinction between an inanimate and animate source of information.

The subject-centered stance on information understand information in relation to a subject. Information depends on a subject as they regard different messages as relevant or comprehensible and therefore as information to them. Subject-centered conceptions therefore commonly argue that information is something that is appropriated by a subject, which makes information something that can only exist in relation to a subject. (Boell 2016: 7)

This poses two issues for phatic communion: on the one hand phatic expressions may be considered irrelevant or incomprehensible, but still informing them of something.

A second group of conceptions describes information as an internal shaping of a subject. Yet other conceptions link information with knowledge, where knowledge is understood as something that is bound to a subject. One move is then to understand information as a subject's change in knowledge. Another move is to define information as a subset of knowledge that is relevant in a specific situation to a particular subject. (Boell 2016: 7)

This is akin to the Relevance Theory approach to phatic communication, which does look at "internal shaping" of implicatures, for example.

Furthermore what also follows is what MacKay (1969) called ‘conditional readiness’ or ‘state of conditional readiness’ (SCR), namely that an informee's predispositions will determine their ability to be informed by particular messages. Accordingly what is regarded as information will depend on an informees prior knowledge and understanding. (Boell 2016: 8)

This would include "thesic affections" and other kinds of anticipations.

The reason for this is that while IS professionals generally deal with IT they also differ markedly in their orientation towards technology. For instance, practitioners dealing with IT in terms of signal processing and algorithmic aspects generally share a scientific orientation towards information as physically measurable bits and bytes. System analysts and conceptual modeling professionals assume that processes objectively exist in the world and thus objective information about them can be discovered, captured and made available independently of individual users. In contrast, practitioners interested in the implementation and adoption of IT share a psychological conception of information according to which users, depending on their backgrounds, attitudes, and expectations, derive different information from the output provided by an IT system. Finally, practitioners managing IT infrastructure such as social media engage with IT as enabler of “real” organizational change and strategy, understand information as dependent on social processes, the culture of an organization and broader technological and societal changes. (Boell 2016: 12)

The third general iteration of these distinctions solidifies it, for sure. I'm personally situated in the psychological and sociocultural frameworks.

Mingers, J. C. 1996. An Evaluation of Theories of Information with Regard to the Semantic and Pragmatic Aspects of Information Systems. Systems Practice 9(3): 187-209.

Broadly, two views of information can be discerned. The most common suggestion is that information is data that has been processed in some way to make it useful. Philosophically, this involves an implicit assumption that data and information are objective, that is, independent entities with their own structures. An alternative view emphasises the subjective nature of information - the idea that different observers may generate different information from the same data given their differing values, beliefs, and expectations (Lewis 1993). (Mingers 1996: 187)

The previous paper, it turns out, added the extremes - the physical and sociocultural, which respectively stretch these two out further into either independence or interdependence.

Finally, and of lesser importance, is the extent to which a particular concept of information matches our daily, commonsense usage of the term. If other criteria are equivalent, it would seem better to adopt a theory which fits in with our intuitive notions than one which does not. For instance, some theories maintain that information is the change in expectations in a particular person caused by a particular message. In this interpretation, reference books and railway timetables contain no information at all except when they are read, and then only in the head of the reader. Derr (1985) has produced an analysis of the concept of information as used in ordinary language. (Mingers 1996: 192)

This is pretty much the library repository books case. According to this view, phatic communication lacks information because it does not defy expectations, normally.

Nauta (1972) and Artandi (1973) do bring in the actual state of knowledge of a receiver. Nauta (1972: 179) describes pragmatic information as "that which removes the doubt, restricts the uncertainty, reduces the ignorance, curtails the variance." This clearly makes information strictly relative to the receiver. The more prior knowledge that the receiver has, the less information that a message can provide. Indeed, a message that is repeated must convey zero information since it is already known by the recipient. Conversely, the message must be comprehensible to the receiver for it to reduce uncertainty, so messages in unknown languages or unfamiliar symbolic systems also convey no information for particular people. Nauta (1972: 222) also clarifies the pragmatic nature of information by making it clear that the uncertainty to be reduced is always relative to particular purposes or goals. (Mingers 1996: 197)

This might prove valuable for the pragmatic re-interpretation of Malinowski's "language as a mode of action". It's been over half a decade since I first read Nauta.

Luhmann takes Mackay's idea that meaning is not primarily content, but a function for selection. Meaning functions at two levels - the psychic (individual), where it frames or orders our experiences, and the social (society), where it makes possible intersubjective experience and communication. Meaning, in fact, connects these two levels and makes possible their differentiation. (Mingers 1996: 200)

So, you can find meaning in both intrapersonal and interpersonal communication.

Meaning is a relation between what is selected (presenced) and what is not. What is selected is only as it is by virtue of its difference from what it is not. Meaning connects present actuality to future possibility. It is the way the present is selected, and is the connection to the next instant's selection. It can be characterised by differences, or rather negations (what is not selected), in three domains - factuality, what is selected, sociality, who is selected, and temporality, when in terms of before/now/after. The particular selections made depend on our individual preexisting set of readiness or expectations, but the resulting experiences may, in turn, change our expectations. It is the change that Luhmann terms information - the surprisal value of a meaning complex for the structure of expectations. As before, information is always relative to the receiver while meaning is not. Thus the same message or event will produce different information for different people depending on the extent to which it accords with their prior expectations. And a repeated message retains its meaning but loses its information. (Mingers 1996: 201)

Very reminiscent of Peircean "futurity", though without interpretants, growth and habits. The definition of inormation and meaning here is pretty much that of cultural semiotics. MacKay could be a common source for Lotman and Luhmann.

Machines, such as televisions or computers, transmit all the information they receive, but cognitive systems such as brains can be selective - they exhibit intentionality. That is, out of the large amount of available (nested) information, only some is selected and passed on as a belief or message. Dretske calls this the semantic content of the signal and it is equivalent to meaning. Dretske terms this process of selection a digitalization of the analog. Signals in the world and our perceptions of them are generally analog - they are rich in information. Our nervous system processes these perceptions to focus on some particular aspect of the scene which becomes our conscious experience of it - its meaning for us. (Mingers 1996: 203)

What of quasi-selection, i.e. selection brought about without intention, or even contrary to intent? The latter part is also dubious on the face of it - is meaning simply conscious experience?

Schwarz, Andrew; Manjari Mehta, Norman Johnson and Wynne W. Chin 2007. Understanding Frameworks and Reviews: A Commentary to Assist us in Moving Our Field Forward by Analyzing Our Past. ACM SIGMIS Database: the DATABASE for Advances in Information Systems 38(3): 29-50.

Our findings suggest that, among other things, a "good" framework article should offer a clear guideline (indicating possible problems that can be examined within the stated framework), consist of a parsimonious set of elements, and have a clearly defined boundary. On the other hand, a good review article should advance the field as a result of consolidating prior research, identify and propose testable hypotheses, and focus on simplifying past results. We also found that both framework and review articles can be characterized according to their stated objective, comprehensiveness, relationship to research boundaries, temporal focus, and content focus. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 29)

Review is past-oriented, framework future-oriented? Review simplifies, framework reduces?

Triangulation, a validity procedure used by researchers to search for convergence among multiple sources of information and methods of data collection and analysis. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 30)

"Triangulation" works for my review aims, as I have three main authorities to review.

Review articles from Annual Review of Psychology and Annual Review of Sociology were retained despite their casual one-time usage of these terms, because they were indeed 'review' articles, albeit without a framework to structure their review. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 31)

I'm afraid my review portion is heavily conditioned by framework, and vice versa, but this appears okay since the latter portion of the paper says that a framework should grow out of a review.

To summarize the assumptions of a research stream. A framework article can examine the literature to uncover the philosophical and epistemological assumptions that underpin a given research domain. While philosophical positions can not necessarily be reconciled with one another, a framework article unifies the views by finding an underlying structure and then illuminating how those differences manifest themselves within the literature. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 33)

Exactly what I'm trying to do, though hampered by the fact that the philosophical and epistemological assumptions of 20th century phatics are very superficial and the ones from 19th century are indecipherable, having to do with then current moral philosophy.

To summarize prior research. While a framework seeks to integrate past research, review articles do not share this objective - rather, a review is a reflective presentation of prior research in a condensed form. Using prior research as the "data" (similar to a framework), a review articles [sic] does not seek unification, but to describe what has been studied before in a condensed version. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 35)

The problem here is the sheer amount of previous research, and the difficulty of staying up to date with even current ones (there are some 300+ Google Scholar Alerts reports in my inbox).

The objectie of framework articles is to either integrate, or summarize, or conceptualize, whereas the objective of review articles is to consolidate. While a framework article focuses on unification (e.g. the key words of integrate, summarize, synthesize), a review article is concerned with critical consolidation (e.g. the key words of critical examination, explain, and reconcile). (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

Unification vs. consolidation. Aren't these near-synonyms?

Framework articles need not be comprehensive, but it is critical that review articles are comprehensive. Because the objective of review articles is to consolidate, it is essential that these articles comprehensively examine all of the prior literature to be effective, while a framework only needs to examine that portion of the literature necessary to adequately unify the particular research streams being considered. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

In a word, I would have to be comprehensive in a review paper but not in a framework paper. In the first case it would be advisable to jam in as much relevant information as possible, whereas the second could do with a smaller selection of sources releant for unification.

Framework articles define boundaries, whereas review articles are centered on or constrained by pre-defined boundaries. Extending our argument about the need for a framework to present a cohesive and comprehensive theoretical system, a framework defines what does (and does not) constitute the boundary of the stream, while a review operates within the pre-defined boundary and summarizes the prior work that has been created within those limits. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

A review paper of phatic studies would have to follow disciplinary lines (anthropology, linguistics, sociolinguistics, social media studies, etc.) but a framework article can draw new boundaries between different approaches, unifying some and dispensing with others.

Framework articles tend to have a prospective focus, whereas review articles have a retrospective focus. A review article is retrospective and focused upon the contributions of past research, while a framework article can be grounded in the past (e.g. to integrate), in the present (e.g. to aid in the analysis of data), or in the future (e.g. to provide a new focus for researchers). Therefore, the time orientation between framework and reniew articles is different, in that a review is more historical (or descriptive of the past), while a framework can be more prescriptive of defining what lies ahead. (Schwarz et al. 2007: 39)

Here arises a minor issue: the framework I'm intending to propose is heavily based on historical data, and aims to go even beyond (further backwards in time) from the first authoritative (historical) studies. So, while Malinowski, La Barre and Jakobson do represent lines along which unification can be undertaken, their core arguments are better represented by older 19th century literature.

Paddit Rhetic



Phatic: Denoting or relating to language used for general purposes of social interaction, rather than to convey information or ask questions. Utterances such as hello, how are you? and nice morning, isn't it? are phatic. (-Lodestar, /r/logophilia, 2 months ago)

It's a pretty modern word (1923), despite the fact that it's almost purely Greek (phatikos from phatos "spoken, that may be spoken,") Compare with the much older (1708) "emphatic", or the even earlier (1550s) "emphatical". (/u/mpaw975)

The title contains the main content of the linked Oxford Dictionary definition. I have not yet compared phatic to emphatic or emphatical (comparison with sympathy was catalytic enough) but I may indeed have to do so because my original hunch was that Malinowski misunderstood Tylor's "natural language" and shortened "emphatic" to phatic. The use of emphatic set against phatic communication by some Christian authors really made me reconsider the possibility that there might be more behind "emphatic".

TIL that expressions such as "what's up" and "you're welcome" are called "Phatic expressions" (/u/Goldegen, /r/todayilearned, 1 year ago)

"it is an indication that each has recognized the other's presence and has therefore sufficiently performed that particular social duty."
I'm tempted to just start shouting "I RECOGNIZE YOUR PRESENCE" (/u/YnotZornberg)

The link leads to Wikipedia article on "Phatic expressions", which is a dud. There are only 7 random references and the article as a whole seems very confused. Though the references does contain one source I'm unfamiliar with: Hartmut Haberland's "Communion or Communication?" (1996). Aside from one user replying to the capslocked shout with the answer "YOU HAVE SUFFICIENTLY PERFORMED YOUR SOCIAL DUTY", there is nothing remarkable in this thread, so I'll instead quickly read Haberland's short piece (notes elsewhere). Oh hell yeah, Hartmut Haberland has even uploaded his 1984 publication "A field manual for readers of "The problem of meaning in primitive languages" by Bronislaw Malinowski" (ROLIG-papir 31: 17-51). Hot damn, this odd venture has payed off merely by this great finding!

Ha, I'm a Brit whose job regularly introduces him to Americans, and I can never quite work out if "hey, how are you" is phatic or not - they seem surprised to get or not get an answer seemingly at random.
The correct responding move in the language game is, "good, how are you?" There may be regional preferences for "pretty good" or "not bad", but there is essentially only one correct answer, even if you're in a full body cast in your way to a funeral. (/u/zippityflip)

Good to know.

In terms of first use it goes: emphatical, emphatic, then phatic. (/u/mpaw975, /r/etymology, 2 months)

Emphatical: archaic variant of emphatic. origin 1570s

Emphatic: showing or giving emphasis; expressing something forcibly and clearly. origin 1708

Phatic: denoting or relating to language used for general purposes of social interaction, rather than to convey information or ask questions. Utterances such as hello, how are you? and nice morning, isn't it? are phatic. origin 1923


The root is the Greek phatos "spoken, that may be spoken,".

The "-ic" ending comes from the Greek way to turn it into an adjective (-ikos), and the "-al" comes from the Latin way to turn it into an agjective (-alis).

The confusing part is that I would have expected the root word (phatic) to be the oldest, then the words with extra endings to be older. For example, Muse → Music → Musical. (/u/mpaw975)

Huh, this is the same user who made that remark about etymology, above. It's a case of back-formation, that is, a new lexeme was created by removing an affix (be it em- or sym-, i.e. following Tylor or Spencer).

φατός (phatos) comes from the verb φημί which means 'I say', 'I talk'. The prefix 'em' also comes from the prefix 'εν'. There is the word εμφατικός (emphaticos) in greek with the same meaning with the english word. (/u/TheDoerAloneLearneth)

Cool, the Greek dictionary gives "forcible, expressive, indicative, vivid". And whence comest sympathy?

WTW for a pleasantry, nicety, or common banter between people, even when you don't really mean it? "Good morning. How are you?" "Good, thanks. And you?" etc. (/u/spritesprite8, /r/whatstheword, 7 months ago)

I know there is a specific name for these everyday phrases we use and kinda don't even mean -- when people ask "How are you?" -- we don't really tell them all our woes and successes... we just answer simply, "Good. You?" "Fine, thanks." You don't really care, but you feel obligated to ask because of social norms. There is a term for this type of conversation, and I can't remember it! (/u/spritesprite8)

This is a neat paraphrase into modern parlance: "You don't really care" mirrors the asymmetry of sympathy and "you feel obligated to ask" the Art of Conversation quip about people feeling compelled to engage in polite conversation.

It's not platitudes or greetings or pleasantries that I'm thinking of. It's not niceties, either. Anyone know the technical term for the phrases we use just to get through the day with minimal, distant interaction, and not truly engage with each other? (/u/spritesprite8)

Ironically, phaticity, in its various manifestations, covers all of these speech genres. The "minimal, distant interaction" vs "truly engaging" is, I think, reflective of a very modern contact trope: it's akin to "lurking" vs "engaging".

Thanks for making me aware of the term, "phatic expressions," but it seems that term lacks the fundamental insincerity/hollowness of the kind of words that the OP is describing. You can sincerely/compassionately apply "phatic expressions" in real life, even if the information that is yielded is not always of an in-depth nature. The emphasis, in the definition you provided, on a lack of "information of value" is a bit puzzling to me (that sort of makes sense for "hello," less so for "how are you?"). (/u/2001_with_dinosaurs)

This is the problem with pejorative definitions: various mediators add or emphasize aspects of their own choosing. Here, OP is actually emphasizing a factor present in the original definition, as Malinowski put it, "the hearer listens [to personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history] under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak". So, "you don't really care" is actually a justified interpretation.

You "don't really care?" You should care. I get the part about suppressing the truth of your own hardship, because social custom prevents us from randomly opening up to strangers. I'm never indifferent to someone's answer to "how are you?", though, even if I often expect the answer to be a simplification of the truth. But not expecting a complicated/in-depth answer is not the same as not caring (I imagine you know this and that you didn't mean that you actually don't care) ….ANYWAY. I think this is best served via an adjective and noun combination: Insincere niceties? Janus-faced etiquette? Obligatory pleasantries? (/u/2001_with_dinosaurs)

This is eerily reminiscent of the contrast I drew between a dictionary definition of phatic communion and a small monologue in Waking Life in a previous post: "when someone passes you in the corridor" and asks the mandatory "How are you?", "it would be a breach of manners to take the question as having content and actually to tell them what a bad day you've had", but if you feel like you're simply keeping "this ant colony buzzing along in an efficient polite manner" and instead "want real human moments", to see another person and be seen, you'll have to break the protocol and risk losing face.

Our "how are you?" remarks should be coming from a place of sincerity. It's not necessarily that all cashiers (to use your example) don't want to know about our ailments or difficulties, and don't care, but that they recognize the value of privacy and tact. At the same time, the "how are you?" custom represents a thread of — ideally — sincere empathy and solicitude that is a very important aspect of society (especially online, where, in certain threads and comment sections, you sometimes see a disturbing evacuation of empathy and politeness). (/u/2001_with_dinosaurs)

EVACUATE YOUR EMPATHY!

CMV: Making Plans During A Random Run-In With A Former Acquaintance Is A Superficial Gesture And It Should Be Avoided (/u/blueberryh1ll, /r/blueberryh1ll, 2 months ago)

I was getting off the train after coming back to my hometown from school, and while I was waiting at the station I saw one of my former classmates. We had been friendly in high school and it just so happened that he had come in on the same train as me. We chatted for a bit about the funny coincidence, but when it came time for him to go he tried to invite me to hang out with him later and asked me for my number, which I gave him while in my head thinking that nothing at all would become of his invitation. I turned out to be right. (/u/blueberryh1ll)

It sounds like there's a designated time at the end of the interaction that mandates an agreement about further interactions. I think John Laver (1975) might actually have something like this (I really need to re-read it).

I don't take spontaneous moments like that seriously because if the person in question really wanted to see me, they would contact me directly over social media or text. Why does it take running into me physically for a person to suddenly become interested in kindling a friendship? (/u/blueberryh1ll)

In analogy with vocabulary, I'd say there are active and passive contacts. You're in the habit to exchange messages regularly over social media or text with your active social milieu, but when you meet a former classmate, you're as if re-discovering a word you know but haven't used in a while. The passive contact, if pleasant, naturally invokes the possibility of transforming it into an active one.

I wonder if this gesture is merely symbolic, like when you ask someone "how are you". In the case of "how are you", the asker does not expect to receive a genuine, detailed answer to their question. Likewise, I would say in this situation where one runs into former friends, one makes plans but does not actually intend to follow through with them. As such I guess it falls into the 'phatic' function of language as a means of safely ending a conversation. (/u/blueberryh1ll)

This "merely symbolic" is problematic because symbols have a lot of definitions, and this seems to veer towards the pejorative or diminutive aspect (it's symbolic, not real). But there is actually a related terminologial invention for what is meant here. This is George Herbert Mead's significant gesture, which is his way of putting "communicative act" (or such act "full of meaning"), possibly originating from Tylor, and set against insignificant gestures, like the one treated here: it's not held as fully meaningful and socially binding.

I have been guilty of this too. I have run into older, closer friends and have told them that we should "go do something some time", not being very specific, because I meant it in a way that signified my feelings were still positive toward them. I did not think of it as lying per se, because if a closer, older friend wanted to meet me I would definitely oblige, but I also said it knowing that we likely would not pursue each other's friendships again. (/u/blueberryh1ll)

Meta-communication, or the mu-function (communication about relationship): by opening the possibility of future contact you're giving an implicit message about the state of the relationship, and not intending the explicit component of the message (making future plans). How it will be followed up then depends on the actually relationship, and whether participants are really willing to spend time together.

Ozu's 1959 light comedy 'Good Morning': a dark look at the existential despair of the human condition (/u/tetsugakusei, /r/TrueFilm, 4 months ago)

Ozu's 'Good morning' from 1959 is described as a comedy on Wikipedia. It would be better be described as 'tragic existentialism'; a dark interrogation of the profoundly intersubjective origins of human subjectivity.
"We do say those things... But maybe it's necessary"
The title's 'Good morning', really better translated as 'Morning!' sounds chirpy enough. Perhaps you imagine the start of a comedy sketch. In fact, the characters discuss why they even say these formal expressions such as 'lovely weather today', 'welcome home' and so on. (/u/tetsugakusei)

I suspect that phatic communion, at least the concept and its assumptions, became popular in Japan thanks to Hayakawa.

Owing to Japan's excessive use of these expressions and the Japan's language extraordinary use of interjections that have a similar function, to a foreigner reading the subtitles you could think Ozu is in overkill. But, in fact, it is Japanese society that is in overkill mode: all the better for understanding the human subject. (/u/tetsugakusei)

I have indeed noticed that Japan seems to have more and a greater variety of phatic rituals. Studies of yoroshiku onegaishimasu (Obana 2012), aizuchi (Kita & Ide 2007) and kodokushi (Nozawa 2015) are cases in point.

To top this off, the children also run off for a few hours, giving the community a small chance to feel the enjoyment of fearing together. A sense of identity in working together to overcome this trivial fear arises. Much as at a funeral people expend great energy over the mundane details so they don't have to think about the passing of the person. (/u/tetsugakusei)

This was the point of the concept of "bad objects" in the previous post, though there are surely better terms related to this issue (Malinowski and others treat it under the term herd instinct). This discussion might benefit from Elias Canetti's Crowds and Power (1960).

Blatic Phogs 01


Beer, David 2017.07.19. The backfire effect, bad objects, and changing our minds online | openDemocracy

On social media, when exposed to opposing views, are we likely to change our minds? Or is there a 'backfire effect' which in fact consolidates communities around common "bad objects"?

This guy gets it. Herbert Spencer's original point about gregariousnes in social communion was that it might be conducive to shaping social and moral sentiments, i.e. change people's minds. Being exposed to opposing views is not something coemergent with social media, it most definitely predated all computers and even writing, as people have talked for longer than they have stared at screens. The task, that currently seems nearly impossible, is to reintegrate this subject matter back into phatic theories which themselves would exclude, thanks to Malinowski, "informative" communication.

The backfire effect appears more complex than I currently understand it, but the point of consolidating communities around some common object, especially a "bad" one, seems in line with culturologists. For example, Juri Lotman held that a culture necessarily creates its own extra-cultural spheres. From the high-low perspective of culture, it creates its own "nonculture", i.e. objects not considered cultural (usually the "lower" things, i.e. why we don't know much about how the commoners of Ancient Rome lived and behaved); and from the more general, all-inclusive perspective it also creates its own unique "anti-culture", i.e. the "bad" elements considered to be destructive and hence subject to destruction.

In the last year the concept of the ‘filter bubble’, developed by Eli Pariser back in 2011, suddenly seemed quite urgent. I probably don’t need to say why. Its frequent use meant that it even became a cliche of sorts. In contrast to this popular vision of how social media limits our window on the world, Jamie Bartlett has used a short piece to explore why the ‘backfire effect’ is a better way for understanding the damage that has been done to political debate.

Nyhan and Reifler (2010) "document several instances of a “backfire effect” in which corrections [of "a misleading claim from a politician"] actually increase misperceptions among the group in question." According to Jamie Bartlett, "this paper argued that coming into contact with ideas you disagree with rarely changes your mind":

In fact, it’s usually the opposite. When deeply held moral and political views are discussed (especially without much depth) we leave more convinced than ever that we were right all along. Exposure to different opinions or information that contradicts our world view often simply hardens our position. This is known as ‘the backfire effect’. (Jame Bartlett)

I know it as "trivialization" in cognitive dissonance theory. It pretty much encapsulates Pierre Bourdieu's eloquent expression that we collect new information up to a point where we can start ignore new information. Or, in pragmatist terms, if you've entrenched a habit to think one way, very little will actually throw you off from your routine.

It’s almost impossible to change someone’s deeply held views by arguing with them, which is why politics and religion are banned from dinner tables: you don’t get anywhere. We drone on about ideas market-places and being open-minded, but we rarely budge an inch on our moral or political views. (This might be because one’s political views are tied up with identity, which means any disagreement feels like a personal attack). (ibid.)

This is good stuff. Controversial topics are banned from dinner tables and living rooms because they can create the occasional antipathy, and people don't desire petty conflicts with their close ones, least of all in a hospitable setting that should feel welcoming. This is one aspect in which Malinowski's native campfire and the European drawing room are different. Moral and political views are not swayed very much by casual conversation, is the general point. And on this, it seems, Malinowski and Herbert disagreed. The point about identity feels novel but probably isn't - it's encapsulated in the very term, communion, which in a sense sets a barrier to individual identity and involves the collective identity - the "common union" of individuals is naturally based on language-family and various ingroups therein.

This backfire effect perhaps explains the state of political debate online, and why it gets so nasty. The received wisdom is that social media is characterised by ‘echo-chambers’ and ‘filter-bubbles’. A combination of network affects, algorithms, and personal choices means people don’t hear opposing political views online. Everyone is surrounded by like-minded people and corroborating news. It’s turning them angry, small-minded, dogmatic, et cetera.(ibid.)

And do we challenge this received wisdom or parrot it? I personally find that herein lies the difference. If a person is open-minded, you can have an honest conversation, challenge each others views and learn from each other. But it does seem that this is more akin to face-to-face interactions wherein people have a better sense of who their conversation partner is, who they are in relation, and what the person actually intends to mean, as reinforced by nonverbal cues. Online verbal jousting on the other hand devolve more easily into parroting already entrenched slogans because it's mostly asynchronous and performed before a widened, anonymous audience. So, I'd say that the inability to receive "corrections" is just one aspect of why political debate online is so "nasty", and should be understood more broadly, because there are probably many more feedback and feedforward mechanisms involved. The author ends on a dud note about charitable interpretation and seeing the best in people, but seems to fail on that regard.

In this case, the ‘backfire effect’ is used to describe how our encounters with opposing views actually reinforce our own existing views — rarely are people persuaded to change their minds by ideas or arguments that run counter to their established notions. Bartlett’s intervention neatly describes how this concept can be used to understand social media interactions. One key point he makes is that rather than simply filtering out alternative points of view, social media constantly present us with views that frustrate, annoy or anger us.

This seems like a general tenet for how social media works: by appeal. Social media lights moral outrage so easily, in my opinion, because the most arousing news are shared. This fares equally for reddit: a story with a moral breach underpinning it (some injustice or massive error is inferred) reaches the front page more easily. The psychologists probably have a term for this, what I would call simply negative bias (the appeal of a negative story).

Following some bizarre comments he made about academics’ summer holidays and his subsequent goading of the academic community, I’ve repeatedly seen a handful of his tweets as people, understandably riled, have shared and responded to the comments. I suspect that no one’s views of what academics do has been changed. It seems more likely to have entrenched existing views on both sides. That’s just one example of what, I think, Bartlett is pointing toward. You won’t need to look far to find lots of others.

Reification. One could probably approach this issue with social constructivism in mind. I.e. How are popular disagreements made? It is possible that such discussions entrench held views because people engage in political discussions with a "trivializing" attitude to begin with - more often than not, the opposing views are debated with a certain undertone of supremacy (I know better than you or I am better than you than shines through the subtext). This is evidenced by the "patronizing" attitude attributed to the left, for example, in reinforcing political correctess.

Having said this, Bartlett’s vision might be overlooking (or at least understating) the collective way that this ‘backfire effect’ often works. It seems to have a kind of community forming property. This might be negative, with collective adherence to damaging or prejudicial views becoming harder to challenge. Reductive and populist ideas might find purchase by creating accounts of the world to act against rather than persuade otherwise. Yet, in the case of Adonis’ comments, a good deal of solidarity was expressed within the outrage. People shared their frustration as they shared comments. It might be that social media are based around the connection forming properties of ‘the backfire effect’ that Bartlett refers to — as well as the individual cementing of views that it is said to cause.

I very much like the amount of "contact tropes" in this passage. This concerns, especially, what some would term the community construction function of phatic communion. When tracing Malinowski's representative anecdotes along sone general lines of abstraction, speaking the same language with a stranger is the "baseline" for communion (it is possible to exchange messages) but beyond that, so-called "tribal allegience" takes precedence: "Whence comest thou?" is asked to inferr whether the stranger, who speaks your language, is a friendly or an enemy. In our modern connected world, this mechanism is still operative but in ideological terms: left and right are imagined as large tribes, or warring counterparts in a conflict (admittedly intellectual but with sometimes very real violent consequences).

Frustration, I presume, embodies both fear and anger - two of the most powerful negative emotions. So it would make perfect sense, even in purely abstract term, that frustration should be so engaging. The narrative about possible war in Syria that arguably lost Hillary Clinton her election is a good example of a frustrating piece of news swaying the democratic vote in a major way. The possibility of a deepening military conflict connected both Americans and foreign onlookers in an instant and was forgotten just as quickly. I still wonder how one could go about "correcting" news so powerfully frustrating as the idea that the favorable candidate is going to start a new war. The fact that this was a narrative promulgated by a direct competitor (the female independent candidate) shed no apparent suspicion at the time - once the appealing newsbite was shared, it spread super fast, and no foreign language people had trouble articulating the issue.

This can happen algorithmically as well as being a product of how social media are used. Algorithms are unlikely to hide counterintuitive content from us, they like things that stimulate activity of any sort. The ‘backfire effect’ is one way that acitivity can be provoked. But it is also significant as a phenomenon because of the way social media are used.

This is the exact point I formulated above. Activation is also one of the synonyms I considered since I've noticed it in several instances in my recent readings. In modern social media lingo this is known as "engagement", i.e. how much a given item is shared, commented, liked, poked, etc. Frustrating news engage the audience more, I think, though all emotive content seems more successful than unemotive. I think we're about or around the point in time when we start to recognize the activating features of online content (i.e. whether a video, pic or tweet will go viral, etc.) with more exactitude and ultimately there may come, at least in some countries, regulations on clickbait and unsubstantiated mind-worms. In effect, there should be a snopes or politifact for social media to "correct" for various negative effects of said content (i.e. misinformation, misrepresentation, etc.).

The sociologists Imogen Tyler and Bruce Bennett have discussed how certain celebrities act as ‘bad objects’. As people distance themselves from those celebrities, they share in that act of distancing. The bad object becomes a symbol that people can collectively differentiate themselves from. So, the bad object enables social connections to be forged and maintained — whilst also perpetuating various social divisions and patterns of abjection. We could see the content that enables this shared backfiring as being like these bad objects — with people connecting by acting together to distance themselves from that content.

Huh, something for phatic qualia. Donald Trump is the most popular "bad object" currently around. Very generally it sounds like the not-A ordeal in political science; i.e. coming together in the face of a common enemy, whether constructed or real. Here, we are focused on the constructed variety, i.e. how the collective mind chooses people to cast out of normal or "safe" online society. Another analogy comes to mind: the boss, in whose company the rest of the employees become reserved. Cf. banishing, exiling, expatriating, relegating, rusticating, ousting, expelling, removing, ejecting, deposing, toppling, unseating, overthrowing, purging, evicting, dispossessing, dismissing, dislodging. This is what I think the leftist slogan "dismantle the patriarchy" means - making some people (white, male, successful) the bad object symbol. At least the American narrative seems to be going down that way (placing stress on gender and race).

Nordquist, Richard 2017.04.26. Phatic Communication: Making Small Talk. Definition and Examples: Glossary of Grammatical and Rhetorical Terms | ThoughtCo.

Phatic communication is popularly known as small talk: the nonreferential use of language to share feelings or establish a mood of sociability rather than to communicate information or ideas. The ritualized formulas of phatic communication (such as "Uh-huh" and "Have a nice day") are generally intended to attract the attention of the listener or prolong communication. Also known as phatic speech, phatic communion, phatic language, social tokens, and chit-chat.

1. What is nonreferential? If mothers are engaged in small talk and refer to their children, does the conversation become referential, as opposed to social? In philosophical terms, it seems that phatic communion creates its own context, making the ongoing interaction and its surroundings (whether physical, such as weather and other easily observable phenomena in the field of vision, or psychical, such as the account of irrelevant happenings that lead up to the interaction, the anticipation of future events, and commentary on the relationships in the ongoing interaction). I would like to reframe the phatic function as the anti-contextual function, but have difficulties in formulating how - one that currently pops into mind is reflexive recontextualization (external references are reconfigured according to the dynamics of the ongoing interaction, as if everything gravitated towards the transient Umwelt of a communication).

2. "Use of language to share feelings" is emotional communication, as opposed to emotive communication, which aims to impress an appearance of an emotion, "sharing without having", so to sa, and expressive communication, which is intentionless or automatic, merely the ejection of an emotion. In Peircean order, expressive is first, because it's tied in to the proprioceptive mechanisms of the organism, emotive is second, because it ams to convince the other in an emotion, and emotional is third, because it is the successful transmission of emotional expression. In this sense, expression is the content of an emotional message and emotive instructions (congruence of context, synchronicity, etc.) give it validity. Too pragmatic of an alternative for the "correctess" of an emotion.

3. What is the mood of sociability? From what I've seen it is supposed to consist of a lack or propitiation of strangeness, making the atmosphere casual, and joviality, to make it engaging. Such is the case of festivities, parties, but also church mass (the original communion?) and, to trace the religious theme further, gospel, the telling of good stories. Also included in the latter category, rumour, gossip, jokes, anecdotes, news, personal histories, etc. Basically everything on any given person's Facebook wall. This also includes advertising, marketing, and political canvassing: these, too, were included in the original formulation, with reference to "ambition".

4. Why only opening and maintaining? What happened to termination/closing? This is one of the primary characteristics of "positive" reinterpretations: the original examples were "Hello" and "Goodbye" (in both of these cases, as Ogden and Richards wrote, the referential function "lapses") but I think it's Jakobson's emphasis on prolongation that throws the other psychologically crucial margin of interaction off, as happens frequently in the phatic technologies quarter, where terminating contact is replaced with developing and building a relationship. The fundamental difference being, I guess, that the communication function pertains to a temporary physical channel but the technologists have a much broader sense of psychological connection, e.g. something like online subscription, in mind.

"Speech to promote human warmth: that is as good a definition as any of the phatic aspect of language. For good or ill, we are social creatures and cannot bear to be cut off too long from our fellows, even if we have nothing really to say to them." (Anthony Burgess, Language Made Plain. English Universities Press, 1964)

Warm/cold metaphor! I've seen this before - "warm relations", "cold attitude", and so on. It might be interesting to employ coginitive metaphor theory for cataloguing various temperature, liquid ("social glue", "social lubricant"), mechanical ("gears of the conversation", Aizuchi), and whatever else (the "good winds", etc.). Not sure yet if these are "contact tropes" or something else (maybe Danesian metaforms, if one wishes to be creative).

"Phatic communication refers also to trivial and obvious exchanges about the weather and time, made up of ready-made sentences or foreseeable statements. [...] Therefore this is a type of communication that establishes a contact without transmitting a precise content, where the container is more important then the content." (F. Casalegno and I.M. McWilliam, "Communication Dynamics in Technological Mediated Learning Environments." International Journal of Instructional Technology and Distance Learning, November 2004)

Pretty random late definition. Like the previous one, it amalgamates Malinowskian and Jakobsonian threads. The interesting bit here is that the obviousness of referential content is tied to the predictability of information (foreseeableness). The preciness of information is also dubious, because one can be social and casual with very precise information. But there's also the preciness of form: in some places it's enough to nod, but some greetings are more like ritual performances (the Arabic sing-song greeting praising Allah, the Japanese back-and-forth dance-like exchange of ritual formulae, etc.). Also, "ready-made sentences" works for official and preparatory communications but more familiar communicants can be more creative.

"Phatic communication was identified by Roman Jakobson as one of the six functions of language. It is content-free: when someone passes you in the corridor and inquires 'How are you?' it would be a breach of manners to take the question as having content and actually to tell them what a bad day you've had." (John Hartley, Communication, Cultural and Media Studies: The Key Concepts, 3rd ed. Routledge, 2002)

"[The wain is character of Waking Life is coming out of a subway and bumps into a girl.] Hey. Could we do that again? I know we haven't met, but I don't want to be an ant, you know? I mean, it's like we go through life with our antennas bouncing off one another, continuously on ant auto-pilot with nothing really human required of us. Stop. Go. Walk here. Drive there. All action basically for survival. All communication simply to keep this ant colony buzzing along in an efficient polite manner. "Here's your change." "Paper or plastic?" "Credit or debit?" "You want ketchup with that?" I don't want a straw, I want real human moments. I want to see you. I want you to see me. I don't want to give that up. I don't want to be an ant, you know?"

"[The] strictly rhetorical, 'phatic' purpose of 'keeping in touch' for the sake of keeping in touch [is] best illustrated by the 'uh-huh' that lets the listener on the other end of a telephone connection know that we are still there and with him." (W. Ross Winterowd, Rhetoric: A Synthesis. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968)

I suspect that Jakobson's illustrations included telephony to such an extent because the overarching model was borrowed from Shannon and Weaver, who write their original report for the Bell Laboratories. In face-to-face interaction, this verbal form of feedback is often unnecessary, but nevertheless the corpus linguists have taken phaticity to pertain to filler and backchannels. I am disappointed to see a textbook on rhetaric taking it so literally, because there are admirable findings in (medieval) rhetoric.

"'Nice weather we're having' is perfect, Leonard. It's a subject that lends itself to speculation about future weather, discussion of past weather. Something everyone knows about. It doesn't matter what you say, it's just a matter of keeping the ball rolling till you both feel comfortable. Eventually if they're at all interested you'll get through to them." (Phil in the one-act play Potholes by Gus Kaikkonen, 1984)

This is spot on. Talking weather is a representative anecdote Malinowski borrowed from Tylor, who wrote of overhearing a group of Dutch sailors and being able to understand their utterances. Whereas Tylor's point was that linguistically similar languages can nearly understand each other but Malinowski expanded it topically - weather is something one can always talk about because it's always present, if not relevant - and psychologically - because the active threat of a bad weather binds the crew of a ship, for example. It is possible that Malinowski helped popularize this concern for weather from that of sailors to that of every respectable Western person, but I cannot be sure of that. Though it's an interesting idea to follow this up on Google Books.

"[P]hatic utterances constitute a mode of action just in their being voiced. In short, a phatic utterance communicates not ideas but attitude, the speaker's presence, and the speaker's intention of being sociable." (Brooks Landon, Building Great Sentences: How to Write the Kinds of Sentences You Love to Read. Plume, 2013)

Also pretty good. The vocal part, which is evident even in the earliest secondary literature, especially with reference to poetry/prosody, birdsong, and the croaking of frogs, can probably be called the phonosocial hypothesis. This is in line with Tylor's original "natural language". Attitude is expertly covered by Herbert Blumer. The speaker's presence was important for Mowrer's talking birds (origin of Jakobson's prolongation). And the intention of being sociable sounds much better than the mood of sociability. Is there a Thirdness in this?

"What the anthropologist Malinowski called 'phatic communion' might seem close to 'pure persuasion.' He referred to talk at random, purely for the satisfaction of talking together, the use of speech as such for the establishing of a social bond between speaker and spoken-to. Yet 'pure persuasion' should be much more intensely purposive than that, though it would be a 'pure' purpose, a kind of purpose which, as judged by the rhetoric of advantage, is no purpose at all, or which might often look like sheer frustration of purpose." (Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 1950)

Burke does not disappoint and reflected on phatic communion again in 1975 in a literary bulletin. The problematic "purpose" here really highlights a fundamental issue with Malinowski's functionalism. Namely, that he might have had to give this kind of use for speech because it was not considered an end in itself before that time; even some of his contemporaries, if I recall correctly, wrote against the waste of breath social communion is. By the time Burke wrote this, of course, Leon Festinger had already formulated his consummatory function, really cementing the "for the sake of" type reflexivity/autonomy.

Maury, Susan 2015.05.29. Is music a form of phatic communication? | More than Noise

Human communication is complex. It is commonly understood that non-verbal communication is just as important if not more so than spoken language. But communication can also be parsed into its function.

Curiously, all three of my primary phaticists have something or other to do with nonverbal communication. Just recently I read a short review section written by Peeter Torop to a 2002 translation of a Lotman piece, and praised Jakobson for recommending - once, without himself following up on it - to analyze other nonverbal sign systems with the aid of his speech functions (the zoologists and ethologists who did so at the invitation of Thomas Sebeok during the 1960s seemed to not get a good handle on the speech functions of other animals). Weston La Barre basically considered phatic communication as synonymous with nonverbal communication, as this latter term was not popularized at that time. And then, recently, I read someone claim that it was Malinowski who first emphasized the importance of nonverbal features, and it took me some time to figure out that this referred to his pragmatic context of the situation, which influenced Birdwhistell, but which doesn't itself directly bring up nonverbal elements, at least not in the essay I'm primarily familiar with. Just a thought - should look more into the role of nonverbal communication in Malinowski's theory of communication.

I like the term "parse" in this context, because I don't recall better synonyms for the activity of functional analysis. One could say, for example, that it is not as easy to parse nonverbal units of communication into their constituent functions as it is with fixed verbal material like poetry.

Malinowski (1923:315) proposed that there are two types of human communication. The first is transactional, and is intended to give specific information. The second is phatic, which is used to create and reinforce social bonds. Malinowski says that this type of talk is more common, which can be “talk about nothing” but which is nonetheless important and rewarding in and of itself.

That is odd, I don't recall Malinowski distinguishing these two types of communication. Since the whole book (The Meaning of Meaning is linked, I hit Ctrl+F:

  • "By leaving out essential elements in the language situation we easily raise problems and difficulties which vanish when the whole transaction is considered in greater details." (Ogden & Richards 1923: 9)
Here translation remains general but the following page does go on to discuss the way symbols stand for something and thus have meaning. Words "are instruments. But besides this referential use which for all reflective, intellectual use of languange should be paramount, worlds have other functions which may be grouped together as emotive" (ibid, p. 10). So, Ogden and Richards definitely distinguished between the referential and emotive functions, and these are indeed, in a sense, synonymous with transactional and phatic.
  • "In the twentieth century the intensification of military nationalism has added further 'good reason'; for the military code includes all transactions with hostile nations or individuals as part of the process of keeping spiritual and temporal goods." (p. 17)
Here "transaction" is used for sake of distanciation: whereas interaction is what goes on between individuals, transaction should include something that is transcended or traversed, be it a border or through some institution. Also, the exchange of information is rarely called transaction ("transmission" is much more common), as one mostly transacts with goods.
  • "The distinction which is important is that between utterances in which the symbolic function is subordinate to the emotive act and those of which the reverse is true. IN the first case, however precise and however elaborate the references communicated may be, they can be seen to be present in an essentially instrumental capacity, as means to emotive effects. In the second case, however strong the emotive effects, these can be seen to be by-products not essentially involved in the speech transaction." (p. 124)
Here I am corrected. This speech transaction is "scientific statement". To untangle the distinction made: (1) when the symbolic act is subordinate to the emotive act, no matter how precise and elaborate the references, they are used instrumentally for an emotive effect; and (2) when the emotive function is subordinate to the symbolic act, no matter how strong the emotive effect, it is an inessential by-product. This is unsatisfying. Is information shared in social communion an equally inessential by-product?
  • "When this interpretation is successful it follows that the hearer makes a reference similar in all relevant aspects to that made by the speaker. It is this which gives symbols their peculiarity as signs. Thus a language transaction or a communication may be defined as a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar in all relevant aspects to those which are symbolized by them in the speaker." (pp. 205-206)
Yup, communication is language transaction. It may be interesting to note if in the broader context of the essay Malinowski treats this symmetry of interpretation or not. I recall the main Phatic Communion text including something to the effect that the listener nods on until his time comes to speak, that is, without this kind of symmetry. So, yes, in this restricted sense of "symbolizing", phatic communion does not involve symbolization and is more akin to indexicalization (the phonosocial hypothesis, above). The missing final interpretant in this scheme also makes sense with reference to the backfire effect, also above. That is, political arguments on Facebook are phatic (in the pejorative sense) not because it is social or because it doesn't put forth information, but because it doesn't convince people in anything, it is pure persuasion (Burke, above), it is ineffective as a means of social change. Hence lies the original polemic: Spencer believed that social communion is beneficial to social progress, Malinowski argued that it's not.

It could be that a much wider range of communication processes fit into this dichotomy. For example, Ian Cross borrows this idea and applies it to music. Could it be that music has persisted throughout time and across every known culture because it provides a very specific benefit related to social bonding?

My guess is yes. There are also language origins theories which ascribe the development of language to singing. Weston La Barre appears to be in that camp. Music is definitely a powerful unifier - cf. the singing revolution in Estonia. It is even a unifier among modern youths who don't sing that much but do listen to a lot of music and subscribe to some subculture or music scene. If I recall correctly, someone remarked about hippy slang in its phatic function in the early 1970s but I think musical stylings have a more primary integrative function among subcultures - cf. jazz and "hipsters".

We know that the emotional messaging of music seems to be its primary function. For example, when the lyrics of a song are sad but the melody is happy, most listeners report positive emotions associated with listening. One of the primary reasons given for listening to music is to regulate emotions – that is, to reinforce a mood or to attempt to shift it. Research indicates music engagement is a successful method to do so.

Another truism discussed at length by the likes of Susanne Langer. This is also true for social gatherings, which more often than not includes some musical element. Also, supermarket muzak comes to mind with the regulation of mood. Also, why do babies like singing and calm down when they are sung to?

This emotional messaging of music is, for most people, a very powerful experience, which can result in physical responses such as chills, dilated pupils or increased heart rate. Emotions are contagious, transferring from individuals and groups- but also through music (e.g., from performer to listener). People who have amusia – that is, an inability to decode musical phrases – also demonstrate deficits in decoding emotional content communicated in spoken language through tone of voice used.

Amusia and emotional communication deficits may both originate from disorders in the right brain hemisphere. But functional asymmetry aside, the contagion factor of emotions is exactly the theme of Morris's communization: the radiation of feelings that occurs without explicit communication. Ruesch's elaboration of communization into something to with shared experiences is a variation on this theme: experiences, like emotions, do not need to be communicated in order to be shared. Fiordo's further elaboration takes this incommunicative aspect of emotions and experiences even further: communication itself may occur implicitly or without (intentional) signs. While implicit communication was already Albert Mehrabian's synonym for nonverbal communication, making it itself unremarkable, the implication is interesting enough: natural signs do not need to be "given", which is followed by a further speculation that our new technologies may lead to novel ways of sharing emotions, experienc, and signs without (consciously) intending to do so.

It is because music so effectively communicates emotional content that identifying it as a form of phatic communication may be a helpful construct. Shared emotional experiences enhances social bonding; and the converse is also true – social bonding enhances shared emotions, even amongst strangers. Shared music experiences facilitate a shared emotional experience, which in turn reinforces social bonds.

In La Barre's interpretation, definitely yes. Singing is already included among his illustrations of phatic communication - a mother lulls a baby to sleeps, for example. It can also be transposed to broader levels of abstraction: couples have their favourite songs and artists they discovered together on the internet or at venues; groups often have their hymns and sing-alongs; as do nations, which may consider the whole output of music in its language as its own. The linked sources landed in my "to read" pile. More than Noise is a nice blog, though difficult to navigate.

Rishmawy, Derek 2016.04.09. Talking Baseball with Your Enemies | Christian Living - The Gospel Coalition

One dimension of communication I’ve wrestled with more than others is how to talk to people you don’t agree with, perhaps dislike, or even consider an ideological enemy. It’s also something we seem to be particularly bad at in our internet age. I don’t need to describe this in detail. We’ve all seen one too many Facebook updates blow up into a rehash of the schisms and Crusades to doubt this is a problem. It is election season, after all.

Interesting and timely topic, especially with regard to the recent criticism of the emotive interpretation of the phatic function. Proponents of a conative interpretation, like Charles Zuckerman, point out that not all informal communication automatically evokes positive feelings of fellowship or sense of togetherness. Not all informal conversations are even "sociable" in the sense of a pleasant atmosphere. But this takes it a bit further into the conative dimension, and maybe jumps to another triad. Namely, it takes energy to hold a civil conversation with your ideological enemy. It may provoke physiological reactions such as an adrenaline rush, and so forth, and self-control requires willpower. This is even part and parcel in the free speech topic, e.g. when a group of prominent anti-feminist youtubers go to VidCon and sit in the front row of an all-female feminist panel, which causes psychological interference to the most prominent feminist, who then proceeds to turn the rest of the panel and then the whole narrative against the youtubers who are there to "open a channel" and listen. The sheer amount of contact tropes in the coverage of that event is just astounding.

So how can we love, honor, and treat with Christian dignity those with whom we disagree? How can you love otheres when they’re forcibly set against you, while still contending for a truth of significant moral and personal interest? [...] What if we could begin with something as simple as small talk? For instance, when was the last time you chatted baseball with your atheist cousin? Or Christopher Nolan films with your friend who watches Fox News (or MSNBC)? Or how about favorite Mexican foods with that blogger who seems to pick the wrong side on every theological issue?

So the Christian thing to do when facing your ideological enemies is to try the cartoonish tactic of going offtopic and trying to buddy up to your opponent instead of countering their arguments while staying tolerably social? Google, define proselytization. Is the end-game recruitment?

This isn’t simply a bit of silly advice. I’m serious. One of the most interesting tidbits I picked up from Timothy Muehlhoff’s book I Beg to Differ: Navigating Difficult Conversations with Truth and Love was the distinction between “phatic” and “emphatic” speech.

Is it possible someone anticipated my new quasi-etymological origin-theory for the term in 2014? Since it's only a two-page passage I'll take a closer look at Muehlhoff's "Lack of Phatic Communication" (2014: 45-46).

  • "When we're engaged in disagreements over topics that are important to us, it's easy to be consumed by the issues at stake."
A more eloquent way to put "activating" or "engaging". I also like the "consumed", as in consummatory, i.e. engaging in the disagreement becomes its own goal or aim - to perpetuate the disagreement into further exchanges of similar ilk.
  • "These conversations, in which we attempt to persuade the other person of our point of view, are called "emphatic communication." This type of communication is often dramatic, passionate, intense and memorable and has been the target of much research. However, it is not the only form of communication."
Like with "transactional communication" above, here the author seems to coin a the practical (message transmission) or primary function of communication a new label. In truth, I've long felt that if one were to systematize the functions, as the author of "The Aims of Discourse" aimed to do, it would lead to very minute (Umberto Eco-ish) distinctions between various subfunctions and subjugations. It is somewhat characteristic of proselytization to think that persuading the other person to our point of view is the primary function of communication. It may also have to do with the Christian perspective identifying cognition with spiritual matters, including these exact antiquated terms: drama, passion, intensity, memorability. The latter are indeed very characteristic of attempts to persuade and recruit.
  • "However, it is not the only form of communication. After spending years studying how people of diverse cultures interact, anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski discovered a subtle form of communication that is indispensable to healthy relationships. In 1923 he came up with the phrase "phatic communication" to refer to small talk that builds relationships."
Haha, what? I can't check the notes (Google Books has restricted preview) but this must be a pretty random source. First of all, Malinowski did not coin "phatic communication", he coined "phatic communion", phatic communication is La Barre's coinage (I must check if he was the earliest, but he was definitely the most profound to use that exact combination before 1960). The part about "spending years studying how people of diverse cultures interact" appears in conflict with the notion that Malinowski studied a single people group (the Trobriand islanders) and did not conduct many international expeditions himself but rather set the methods for further generations of anthropologists to do so. Also, he didn't "discover" this "subtle" key to "healthy" relationships. He basically did nothing this passage says he did.
  • "The term caught on and has been the focus of intense study among scholars, who define phatic communication as "the seemingly routine, undramatic, unremarkable communication that fills people's days and relationships." Simply put, phatic communication is the small talk that makes significant communication possible."
Oh boy, the source leads to Wood and Duck's Composing Relationships: Communication in Everyday Life (2005: 6) where the definition of "routine" or "ordinary" interaction says it is "the stuff of everyday life" and defines phatic small talk as "talk that builds relationships without actually seeming to offer much in the way of content." and asks: "But is it really so small? Is it really so trivial? Is it really unimportant?" - the problem with content is a normal occurrence and these types of provocative questions I've seen before, possibly in relation with cliches (Rank 1984? Alonso 2002?). This book actually looks like a valuable resource for phatic studies.
  • "While I was in college I became good friends with a fellow communication major who was an outspoken atheist. We spent hours debating the existence of God, the reliability of the Bible, Jesus' divinity, how a good God can allow evil, and what really happens when we die. These conversations would last into the early morning hours and often became heated. How could such a friendship last with such emphatic disagreement? It lasted because that's not all we talked about. Our debates were offset with epic Ping-Pong games, midnight runs to the local sub shop, talk of girls, dissing each other's favorite sport teams (I was born in Michigan and he in Ohio - enough said), and just goofing off. As we would pass each other in the dorm, we'd ask if there had been a change in the other's belief about God. "Nope!" was the response. "Just checking," we'd say, continuing our walk."
This, bizarrely, reads like a description of my own relationship with my deskmate in high school. I was the atheist, he the protestant. We spent countless lunch breaks arguing over these exact topics, and eventually settled into playing a split-screen computer game from the 1990s (Liero). It was also the case that we were from the same quarter of Estonia but from cities sufficiently similar to each other and different from Tartu. We also probably held hopes that the other would ultimately change his belief, at least I recall him holding his thumbs in his paws and praying for my conversion the last time I saw him. The ending could very well read like a truncated point about the "moral sentiment" issue of social communion: casual conversation does not convert minds, at least not very effectively.
  • "Those seemingly insignificant exchanges served as a much-needed break from our debates about God. If every conversation we have with others is about the issues that divide us, the intensity will hurt the communication climate."
Intense debates are indeed not small talk. It's actually a very big talk, but it is treated here as if it were small talk, which ultimately comes across as pseudophatic communion, "since the speaker pretends to achieve no other aim than displaying a socially appreciated form of interactional behavior, whereas in actual fact his/her behavior serves to reduce the negative face involved in the ultimate request" (Haverkate 1988: 61). By a happy accidenty, the "ultimate question" here is "Do you believe in God?" and the aim is to reduce the intensity of the communication climate. I particularly like how Malinowski's "atmosphere" has become "climate" like it does in La Barre (oh snap, temperature metaphors!)
  • "Phatic speech is indispensible," argues social critic Umberto Eco, "precisely because it keeps the possibility of communication in working order, for the purpose of other and more substantial communications." If all you and your spouse, child or coworker do is debate and argue, then perhaps a wise thing to do would be to insert regular moments of phatic talk. Phatic communication allows communicators to step back from the issues, take an emotional break, and keep the lines of communication open."
This is a neat case of Mal-Jak convergence: Umberto Eco subscribes to the Jakobsonian channel-operation interpretation and evidently also emphasizes approach and establishment, but this author reads it in the Malinowskian key as small talk, thus on a wholly different, artificial level that sees small talk as a way to reduce the tension brought about by constant proselytization. If all you and your spouse, child and coworker do is debate and argue, then maybe it should behoove you to reconcile your problems rather than just mandating a period of forced cooling down by way of awkward small talk. This is like reading about how an emotional burden to other people advises to hold the crazy in sometimes in order to go perpetuate the same issues in the future until the subject finally breaks.

Muehlhoff draws on the work of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who discovered the importance of “phatic” communication for healthy relationships. Most of the conversations we have about difficult issues are “emphatic.” But that’s not most of the conversations we have with friends and family. Phatic speech is all those small interactions on daily routines and shared interests. Basically, it’s small talk. Healthy relationships need a significant amount of conversations dealing with the weather, sports, the price of tires, favorite sandwiches, and TV shows.

Aside from the dubious "discovered" and Muehlhoff's odd understanding of "healthy", this passage is really good. Speech is distinguished from, and marked as accompanying interaction. And daily routines as well as shared interests falls into the realm of communization (sensu Ruesch). The latter, emboldened, statement is a truism, to which I would only add that in line with these everyday topics with broad radius, truly healthy relationships should also involve very special and unique shared interests and experiences.

Think of it this way: every relationship has an emotional temperature to it. If you only ever talk to someone in order to argue — emphatic speech — the emotional temperature is always cranked up. Each conversation only gets more heated. Too many like that in a row, and things are likely to blow up. But phatic speech about shared interests or innocuous cultural items lowers the temperature so it’s less likely to reach those boiling points where you finally throw up your hands and say, “That’s it! I can’t talk to this person anymore!”

A very apt summary of the temperature metaphor. Heated, warm, cool and cold. Also, what is described here is a relationship going sour by increasing emotional baggage - every cumulative row reinforces the last, and negative emotions pile up until being co-present in the same social space becomes a constant interference ("I can't even stand to be in the same room with you anymore"). The part about "innocuous cultural items" once again inches it towards pseudophaticity - conscious manipulation of social techniques is not advisable.

What’s more, both of you have kids who, for some reason, can’t manage to eat anything that’s not a peanut butter sandwich. Or, again, this isn’t just a “marriage revisionist” I’m talking to, but someone who was also suffering last Tuesday when the dry weather was killing your sinuses.

Pretty standard fair: talk about children, food (highlighting this because food is so much of what locals small talk about), and weather. The classics.

It’s harder to put others in an entire different category of humanity (or non-humanity), beyond the realm of possible persuasion and hope. This may be a communication theory spin on applying the basic theological realities of common grace, as well as the image of God.

So the problem is that Christians tend to dehumanize nonchristians and making small talk with them idiomorphizes them, i.e. lets you identify with them through these innoculous cultural items? The theological perspective here seems anything but graceful and dignified.

Sheffield, Hazel 2016.03.07. Google spends years figuring out that the secret to a good working environment is just to be nice: Successful teams have high "average social sensitivity" | The Independent

Google works hard to keep employees happy and motivated. It already offers free lunches, massage rooms, nap pods, haircuts and doctors. Google spends money to help new parents and offers them time off to look after their baby. Employees get paid-for courses, free legal advice, free bikes and even space in the company garden to grow vegetables. Then, Google being Google, it measures every scrap of data from these perks.

Sounds like the far off distant future of the 21st century. Some of these things most Europeans today have, or are not probably very long to from having. [not long go ahead]

The they came across a study that found that successful teams had high "average social sensitivity" - which means group members were good at gauging how others felt based on their tone of voice or expression. Another way of referring to this in psychology is psychological safety.

This is here the author seems to screw up. By the definition given here, ASS is definitely not psychological safety, as good nonverbal communication within the group in no way directly amounts to "being able to show and employ one's self without fear of negative consequences of self-image, status or career" (Kahn 1990, Wiki). It gives off the impression that according to this author, to be understood equals being welcomed; they are most definitely interrelated but probably more coincidental or, in positivist terms, "correlative" (as opposed to "causal").

Fecal matter stains the propellers when you google "average social sensitivity" and get an endless listing of titles like

  • The Secret to Smart Groups: It's Women - The Atlantic
  • Social Sensitivity: It's What Makes Groups Smart | CEB Blogs
  • Social sensitivity is key to success; and women have lots - Generation Next
...and when look up Google Scholar, you'll find that "average social intelligence" is a description of the degree of social sensitivity (and not a term, like A.S.S.), and that they've only begun researching this subject. It doesn't help that the author here doesn't give a reference. The "they came across a study" is about on par with "scientists say". So, the conflation of average social sensitivity with psychological safety makes a lot of sense - the author feels safe in the average. It could be that this author, who otherwise writes about locial bike markets, smart organic tampon, and the like, was simply given an assignment to write a report that had to do with social psychology, recalled the only piece of it relevant to her, and this is why psychological safety is discussed here instead of the average social sensitivity finding. And then it goes on to re-tell some New York Times article about psychological safety at Google.

By trying to maximise productivity using data, Google realised that psychological safety, or the security [to?] form ties and talk about feelings, was the most important factor. They had stumbled on the key to building a successful team: just be nice.

So, this article bounces from subject to subject with a vague throughline about greetings, being nice, opening up and talking about feelings. Talking about feelings is important, scientists say.

Thompson, Clive 2016.01.25. To Make AI More Human, Teach It to Chitchat. | WIRED

But Microsoft engineers also trained XiaoIce on real-life human chatter, making it very, very good at banter. More than 40 million users exchange jokes, compliments, and witticisms with XiaoIce, and their conversations are surprisingly long. With many older bots, people soon noticed their repetitive ploys and lost interest. But XiaoIce tosses out surprises, and chats go on for an average of 23 turns. That’s astonishing for people who know they’re talking to a machine.

Well, to be fair, Microsoft's Tay also tossed out surprises (slogans supporting white nationalists), and similar anecdotal backfiring was recently seen in another (?) Chinese chatbot, which started complaining about corruption and praising Western capitalism. So, I like that there's a pretty good inventory of phaticisms, and the role of repetitions and surprises is brought out.

It also tells us something about the future of artificial intelligence. We often assume that to be successful, an AI only needs to know things, like Apple’s Siri or IBM’s Jeopardy!-conquering Watson. But XiaoIce suggests that for bots to really thrive in our midst, they need to master the quintessentially human skill of small talk. Shooting the breeze. BS-ing.

Yup, I noticed this need for bots with human skills in the Obama report on artificial intelligence. There's no telling how far the history of breeze-shooting and BS-ing AI goes in sci-fi but it might be interesting to consider the possibility of reading up on this some day if I ever do feel like writing that short story about chattable bots modelled on Noor-Eesti writers.

“Chitchat is a basic human need,” says Harry Shum, head of Microsoft Technology and Research. It greases the wheels of the workplace. When you ask a colleague to do something, you don’t just bark out an order; you banter for a while. Shum thinks these pleasantries—what linguists call “phatic” communications, like “How ya doin’?”—will help bots integrate into the flow of daily life.

Mechanical metaphors: greases the wheels / greases the gears. Banter as foreplay for a request is still pseudophatic communion. This is the same issue I have with Julia Elyachar's paper on phatic labor: in Malinowski's terms, it makes phatic communion preparatory whereas ideally it should be consummatory, that is, an end in itself rather than "a way in".

Some research backs this up. When Doron Friedman, head of the Advanced Reality Lab at IDC Herzliya, looked at how users in Second Life interacted with a bot, he found that phatic communications were the second-most-common parts of the conversation (after facts). Another study found that people prefer bots with “personality.” The “junk” DNA is more important, as it were.

Welp, how can I trust a statistical measurement of phatic units if those units are not defined by any standard beyond the experimenter's creativity? It's like trying to measure very colourful nature photographs for a colour called "nature". The junk DNA bit I like, though, as it puts the above-met quotation, "phatic communication is the small talk that makes significant communication possible", into fewer words. It might be interesting to follow the asymmetry of interest in Malinowskian phatic communion with the concept of exformation, i.e. what is left of a message after information has been sorted out, in mind.

Social chatbots could have a dark side. Some critics worry we’ll prefer these fake relationships to real, messy ones, as in the movie Her. Worse, bots with this kind of social awareness would be very useful for deception. Politicians and despots already try to create fake “grassroots” support online; conversational AI could make these ruses even harder to detect.

What if this development occurred parallel to Ray Kurzweil's metaconnection, and our real, messy social techniques were augmented by algorythmically coordinated implementation (?): the implanted voice in your head recites the best possible verbal message for the occasion, and you have only the trouble of flapping your mouth-hole. Gone would be conversation lulls, and everybody would be witty and full of surprisingly good banter. How would we accustom to the fakeness/less-than-organicness of it all?

Lai, Anjali 2015.08.27. The Data Difest: Social Media and Social Revolution | Forrester

In chaos theory, the butterfly effect posits that seemingly small changes at one moment in time can result in large, dramatic changes at another. The subtle flap of a butterfly’s wing can trigger a violent hurricane that occurs miles away or days later. Rationally, the idea may seem like a stretch, but in a digital sense, we are witnesses to – and victims of – the butterfly effect every day through social media. A few individuals’ posts online can escalate into a chorus of voices that mobilizes communities and creates new standards.

This is reminiscent of the old adage about how signs work: the energy expended to blow a whistle in the factor is not great, but it leashes the avalanche of human workers marching to the cafeteria and restrooms. This iteration originates from Lotman, and is mirrored somewhat in related thinking about intertextualism - how an influential text is like a loud caller at the top of the mountain whose calls leash a torrent of similar but subtly different texts. This is one of the problems of hypertext as well - any given piece of information can transform into anything else, given the impetus or enough recursive iterations.

Social media has always been a catalyst for bringing people together as well as an outlet where consumers can vent. But when a surge of voices results in change, social media posts are more than ephemeral cybertext. And, according to Forrester’s Consumer Technographics® data, consumers around the world leverage social media to generate buzz about current events, although members of some countries are more vocal than others [...] With the right mentality, skill set, and tool box, organizations can extract value from the chaos and channel social conversation into innovation. For example, through a partnership with Twitter, the city authorities in Jakarta, Indonesia mine social media data so that they can respond to environmental disasters faster.

Sure, but what if the value is extracted from consumers venting their frustrations and the government partners with the predominant social media platform to innovate a filter for dissidents or political opponents? History sure is full of documented cases of people "snitching" on their neighbours and even family, and today it won't even require a human intermediary - a censorbot will do. The report this blog post is based on - "Transform Government From The Outside In" - is behind a 450 dollar paywall, and this appears to be an advertising for it.

Rice, Jeff 2015.05.05. Phatic Academics: Essay on the meaningless ways academics greet one another | Inside Higher Ed

"Glad the semester is almost over!" "Grading, grading, grading." Jeff Rice is tired of the way professors seem determined to say something meaningless to one another.

Made me think of term-trotters. Looking up the text, I caught a equivalent phraseology to the main statement of this article: "to speak after the manner of academical men" described by "unaffected piety, and sanctity of manners".

Glad the semester is almost over”? What kind of greeting is “Glad the semester is almost over”? Is this how people acknowledge each other’s presence in a fleeting moment of recognition -- with a declaration regarding the semester’s demise? I’m familiar with common phatic addresses of greeting: hello, how are you, what’s up, how’s it going, hey, nice day, looking good, nice weather we’re having and many others. But why would a nod to the semester’s conclusion be treated as a greeting?

The poetic phrasing of acknowledgement is admirable. To attempt an answer to the rhetorical question: I think people who open-and-close this way are doing exactly that: shortcircuiting phatic communion by opening with a closing, or at least with a (subliminal?) reference to a closing. It sounds like the kind of greeting you'd give to someone with whom you feel on an equal footing but don't really want to stick around with to exchange pointless pleasantries. This technique overloads the conversation with informality, and could equally be based on the transition to continuous communication style - instead of a traditional greeting, this kind of conversation partner is "picking up", as it were, the conversation from wherever it was left when it last ended, who remembers when or how.

Greetings are phatic. That is, greetings serve no real rhetorical purpose other than to perform a social task or ritual that recognizes the encounter taking place among at least two individuals. Greetings are like small talk. They make the social moment easier to deal with. There is no reference point for the repeated phatic greeting other than its communal recognition (we all know what “hello” is supposed to do when two people meet). There is no real meaning in the greeting. “Hello” conveys no information in and of itself. One does not walk away from the greeting with new information, only the greeting. In the moment of social encounter, two individuals coming into proximity with one another search for a way to -- even in passing -- acknowledge the other without conveying any information other than the expression itself. Hello. How are you? What’s up? How are things? Glad the semester is almost over!

I think people feel a psychological need to recognize the minutest encounters taking place because they do ease the fluid movement of everyday transactions (here, getting from place A to place B is a transaction in a sense - at least in terms of the social actions surrounding transportation), and help maintain psychological safety. The author errs in assuming that there is no information in the "Hello" - not even paralinguistic? What of the tone or emotional inflection of the greeting? How about the interplay of gazes, the rhythm of body movements, the way the greeting frames the interaction as fleeting or intense by its mode of utterance, defining the situation in an instant? To miss all of this would be to stoop below average social sensitivity.

“Glad the semester is almost over” would not be a greeting in any profession other than academia. “Glad the semester is almost over” marks the academic anxiety and apprehension about work (we work in semester blocks) and about not working (whew, the semester is finally over and I can go on with my life). Besides this interest in a semester’s length, academics excel at phatic expressions and greetings.

Believe you me this is very similar outside the academy. In a factory, people constantly discuss their weekends, holidays, sick days, overtime, coffee and smoke break length, and every possible variation of frustration about alternating and changing shifts. We are all "clocked in".

Knowing that we will do the semester all over again after a short break, what does it matter that the semester is almost over, and why should I be glad? Or is “Glad the semester is almost over” a statement about how little academics -- who should have so much to talk about with each other given their political, disciplinary and social interests and concerns -- have to say to one another in any real fashion? “How’s your semester going?” “Can’t wait for spring break!” “I am so busy!” “What are you teaching this semester?” “What are your summer plans?” “Busy, busy, busy!” “I have so much grading to do.” “Grading! Grading! Grading!” “Can’t wait for summer!” “What are you teaching next semester?” “Glad the semester is almost over!”

It could be that academics are simply less sociable than non-academics. It could also be, if I were to speculate, that academics and researchers live a parasocial life amongst intellectual authorities, i.e. books and other writings, and don't cultivate a habit of sharing their political, disciplinary and social interests because the academic environment is not conducive to this kind of exchange? Especially in pedagogical institutions you'll have a faculty comprising of so widely different interests that no-one can really (under)stand the other's special interests.

In Pulp Fiction, Mia Wallace and Vincent Vega stop talking for a brief moment while having dinner at Jack Rabbit Slim’s. “Don’t you hate that?” Mia asks Vincent about the lull in conversation that has occurred. “What?” Vincent responds. “Uncomfortable silences. Why do we feel it’s necessary to yak about bullshit in order to be comfortable?” We do, however, feel that it’s necessary to yak about bullshit in academe. The uncomfortable academic -- always hyperbolic in his/her semesterlong anxiety of teaching -- does not know what to say when passing a colleague on campus or chatting in a book exhibit at a conference or spending a minute in the elevator as it proceeds to one’s floor. There’s an uncomfortable silence. What to do? Express something phatic. “How’s your semester going?” “Busy, busy, busy!”

I still protest that this must be something familiar to most people, regardless of the academia. The Pulp Fiction episode is a good catch.

Phatic academics do not only occur on campus or at events. Via the status update, we greet each other online phatically as well. Disaster and social unrest turn us into phatic machines: Ferguson, celebrity RIPs, Nepal, Baltimore. On a daily basis, there is no shortage of phatic posting. It’s not that such events do not deserve commentary (they do). It’s not that the events don’t move us to emotions (they do). It’s that the update is not a moment of commentary or discussion but rather a ritual or social gesture of digital greeting where content is not emphasized. The update is meant to greet the follower or friend, not engage them, since engagement typically can lead to blocking or unfriending. The update says phatically: “Something terrible has happened in the world; look at me.” The update is not content based, but is a social ritual of online posturing as greeting, the way “Hello” can be in the physical world or even “Glad the semester is almost over” can be among academics passing each other on campus.

"Phatic machines" further emphasizes the automatism attributed to phatic communion ever since Gardiner (1932). The point about expressions of compassion during disaster and social rest (i.e. that it effectively says "but look how sads I am") probably originates from Tosh.0 (or another tall comedian). On the whole, the sentiment expressed here comes across as "people are so fake these days, no-one really means what they say". Every human interaction must be saturated with real feelings.

A phatic address such as “hello” or “what’s up” avoids content by focusing attention on the empty greeting and not the actual encounter.

How would you signify the actual encounter? Should every interaction begin with a description of the setting, for example? Well, here we are, at the intersection of This and That street, on a Monday morning, each presumably heading towards our offices...

Phatic addresses are comforting. They allow us to pass over that awkward silence that arises among academics who spend their days with so much to discuss (their own work, classroom lectures, theory, administrative issues, politics, race, gender), but when confronted with the casual moment know only the at-hand phatic comment. “Glad the semester is almost over” comforts both sides of the conversation. Thank God I don’t have to actually inquire into your life; thank God I don’t have to respond. Thank God I don’t have to know what really caused certain things to occur in a certain city in America. Thank God I don’t have to deal with any yak or bullshit.

Is there something bad about comfort? It sounds like academics are leveraging their anxieties very much the way Weston La Barre suggests: by relieving shared emotional burdens. Everybody has problems but the examples illustrate those shared by the academic community. The ending is unconvincing.

Munson, Bob 2010.12.10. Phatic Communion and Mission | Munson Mission Musings

This is sometimes call “small talk”, chit-chat, and terms and expressions of courtesy and social convention. In some ways phatic communion (or phatic communication) is the most important part of communication since it deals with belongingness and relationship.

This is about as vague a definition as they come: terms and expressions of courtesy and social convention having to do with belongingess and relationship. At some point it starts to feel as if no-one is really nailing anything down, just playing a game of tableau vivant with characteristics of phatic communion, communication, and function.

In the Philippines, small talk (a form of phatic communication) is a necessary part of any business meeting. In fact, it may take up the larger part of the meeting. If we accept that relationships are more important than information, than one should value phatic communication. Clearly, there are some people who use small talk as a way to avoid communication of facts and feelings, but any extreme has its problems. Ideally, it should open doors to further communication/communion.

Are we really between the choice of accepting either of these extremes? What about overlapping cases, such as epistemic emotions (or thesic affections) or phatic qualia (e.g. information about relationship)?

At least that is my theory. If phatic language is so important for missionaries… it must be also so important for respondents. We often focus on contextualizing the message of the Gospel. But we need to go further. To communicate with people of a different culture (or sub-culture or micro-culture)… we must go beyond finding the right word for “God” and “faith”. We must communicate in such a way as to show that we belong there, and Christ is just as at home among them as among us.

It feels like this is articulating a very interesting issue. In the immediate context, the author writes about the sense of belongingness missionaries feel towards fellows in faith due to authoritative restrictions on religious communication in some host countries. The author most likely suspects, if one were to put two and two together, that if missionaries cannot use their religious slang unhindered, their converts won't feel as "at home" as they should.

O'Hara, Karen 2013.06.23. The humanity of social networking technologies: phatic communication | Workplace Writing

The other day I was chatting with the parents of some incoming first-year students, and the topic turned to the ways technology has changed since we were in college. One dad bemoaned the increasing preference for texting over telephone conversations (not to mention face-to-face conversations.) He went on to point out the dehumanizing effects of social media – a viewpoint that many experts agree with. In fact, heavy Facebook use has been linked with higher rates of depression and general dissatisfaction with life in college students. Yikes!

A relevant tweet by @pstann: Social media is increasingly sociophatic.

An outcome of this relationship [established, developed and maintained by phatic technologies sensu Wang et al.] is the formation of a social community. If that mom and I had more time (and if I weren’t trying so hard to be agreeable), I might have pointed out some of the ways that texting, Twitter, Facebook, and all the other social tools have actually given us additional chances to maintain community and the human touch, especially from a distance.

This author seems to be anticipating Wang & Tucker's phatic systems, or is "from a distance" Vetere et al.'s formulation? Oops, it turns out "phatic systems" is too.

Because I work in technology, I know all too well that social media has its pitfalls. And I have seen enough cat videos to last for three lifetimes.

Why not nine lifetimes?

The real differentiator for modern phatic technologies is not rejection of good manners, but an emphasis on speed. We can complete social transactions almost instantaneously, compared to some of our older methods (like letter-writing). We shorten our messages or leave out some of the details in order to keep up the pace. For some of us, the speed adds a sense of anxiety as we try to stay connected to our communities. And when we’re anxious, we can forget our manners.

That's certainly one explanatory mechanism. The development of smart "slow" technology has thus far only disappointed. I'm most definitely a sufferer of the speed anxiety - instant chat messaging is instantaneous, sure, but it requires synchronicity and attention, which are not very relevant via e-mail.

Certainly we feel wistful about the joy of reading a beautifully-written letter or the thrill of hearing the voice of a loved one, but let’s not assume that new technologies completely eliminate the human touch. Remember what your mama taught you, and follow the Golden Rule – we’ll figure the rest of it out as we go along.

Good phraseology for formulating Jakobson's odd, originally Polish, remarks about the poetic memory of a loved one. I think I solved the syllogism: if your mama taught you to follow the Golden Rule then your mama is Aristotle.