The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages

Malinowski, Bronislaw 1946[1923]. The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages. In: Ogden, C. K. & I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. Eighth edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 296-336.

IV. Language, in its primitive function, to be regarded as a mode of action, rather than as a countersign of thougt. Analysis of a complex speech-situation among savages. The essential primitive uses of speech: speech-in-action, ritual handling of words, the narrative, 'phatic communion' (speech in social intercourse). (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 296)
Already from this introductory note it seems that it is appropriate to draw a connection between phatic communion and the as of yet still ambiguous "social function". It would, in short, constitute the linguistic aspect of social action. That is, the use of language is only one mode of action among others.
But the object of a scientific translation of a word is not to give its rought equivalent, sufficient for practical purposes, but to state exactly whether a native word corresponds to an idea at least partially existing for English speakers, or whether it covers an entirely foreign conception. That such foreign conceptions do exist for native languages and in great number, is clear. All words which describe the native social order, all expressions referring to native beliefs, to specific customs, ceremonies, magical rites - all such words are obviously absent from English as from any European language. Such words can only be translated into English, not by giving their imaginary equivalent - a real one obviously cannot be found - but by explaining the meaning of each of them through an exact Ethnographic account of the sociology, culture and tradition of that native community. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 299-300)
This is relevant for concourse. If I were to explore native Estonian concepts of behaviour then this is a good approximation of what needs to be done.
The metaphorical use of wood for canoe would lead us into another field of language psychology, but for the present it is enough to emphasize that 'front' or 'leading canoe' and 'rear canoe' are important terms for a people whose attention is so highly occupied with competitive activities for their own sake. To the meaning of such words is added a specific emotional tinge, comprehensible only against the background of their tribal psychology in ceremonial life, commerce and enterprise. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 301)
I'll note that Jakobson uses the term "emotional tinge" in a slightly different way. As I see it at the moment he means the intonation of words while this emotional tinge here is related to the whole culture. In other words, it is not the emotional tinge of the utterance but the emotional tinge of the type of utterance. Phrase this way it sounds a bit like "emotional connotation".
This latter again, becomes only intelligible when it is placed within its context of situation, if I may be allowed to coin an expression which indicates on the one hand that the conception of context has to be broadened and on the other that the situation in which words are uttered can never be passed over as irrelevant to the linguistic expression. We see how the conception of context must be substantially widened, if it is to furnish us with its full utility. In fact it must burst the bonds of mere linguistics and be carried over into the analysis of the general conditions under which a language is spoken. Thus, starting from the wider idea of context, we arrive once more at the results of the foregoing section, namely that the study of any language, spoken by a people who live under conditions different from our own and possess a different culture, must be carried out in conjunction with the study of their culture and of their environment. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 306)
I'm beginning to understand why Birdwhistell attributed the "context" in the title of his Kinesics and Context to Malinowski.
A statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered. For each verbal statement by a human being has the aim and function of expressing some thought or feeling actual at that moment and in that situation, and necessary for some reason or other to be made known to another person or persons - in order either to serve purposes of common cation, or to establish ties of purely social communion, or else to deliver the speaker of violent feelings or passions. Without some imperative stimulus of the moment, there can be no spoken statement. In each case, therefore, utterance and situation are bound up inextricably with each other and the context of situation is indispensable for the understanding of the words. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 307)
This sounds a lot like Bühler's organon model of language. This phrase, "establishing ties of purely social communion" is most likely the source of Jakobson's interpretation of the phatic function. My aim is to show that these "ties of purely social commuion" extend beyond the speech event and form a is very important for social beings such as ourselves. The last bit is quite likely the source of the term "context-bound" in yet another anthropologist, Edward T. Hall.
But it is obvious that the context of situation, on which such a stress is laid here, is nothing else but the sign-situation of the Authors [Ogden & Richards]. Their contention, which is fundamental to all the arguments of their book, that no theory of meaning can be given without the study of the mechanism of reference, is also the main gist of my reasoning in the foregoing paragraphs. The opening chapters of their work show how erroneous it is to consider Meaning as a real entity, contained in a word or utterance. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 308)
In other words, meaning is not a substance but a relation. And contrary to de Saussure, in whose work it would appear that the meaning of a sign consists in its relation with the abstract system of signs, this approach here appears to emphasize that the sign's relation to it's context of situation or sign-situation is in fact the relation we should be studying.
This attitude in which the word is regarded as a real entity, containing its meaning as a Soul-box contains the spiritual part of a person or thing, is shown to be derived from the primitive, magical uses of language and to reach right into the most important and influential systems of metaphysics. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 308)
A similar tendency is present in my contemporaries when they discuss texts as something like boxes of consciousness. It's the same type of magical thinking but with Soul replaced with Consciousness.
Since the whole world of 'things-to-be-experienced' changes with the level of culture, with geographical, social and economic conditions, the consequence is that the meaning of a word must be always gathered, not from a passive contemplation of this word, but from an analysis of its functions, with reference to the given culture. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 309)
Compare this to Mukarovsky and Lotman and especially the latter's definition of the culture text.
The study of the above-quetode native text has demonstrated that an utterance becomes comprehensive only when we interpret it by its contxt of situation. The analysis of this context should give us a glimpse of a group of savages bound by reciprocal ties of interest and ambitions, of emotional appeal and response. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 310)
According to Kulkarni, these reciprocal ties of interest (and ambitions, to a lesser degree, one imagines) is (are) exactly what phatic communion is about.
There was boastful reference to competitive trading activities, to ceremonial overseas expeditions, to a complex of sentiments, ambitions and ideas known to the group of speakers and hearers through their being steeped in tribal tradition and having been themselves actors in such events as those described in the narrative. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 310)
Sentiments, ambitions and ideas generally fall into the category of "common experience" in Ruesch's treatment of communization.
In this, Speech is the necessary means of communion; it is the one indispensable instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 310)
Speech also underlies common experience: it is the means by which rules of conduct, dogma and other neat stuff are shared.
But, of course, the men, as they act, utter now and then a sound expressing keenness in the pursuit or impatience at some technical difficulty, joy of achievement or disappointment at failure. Again, a word of command is passed here and there, a technical expression or explanation which servess to harmonise their behaviour towards other men. The whole group act in a concerted manner, determined by old tribal tradition and perfectly familiar to the actors through lifelong experience. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 311)
These phrases concern the conative function.
We have to realize that language originally, among primitive, non-civilized peoples was never used as a mere mirror of reflected thought. The manner in which I am using it now, in writing these words, the manner in which the author of a book, or a papyrus or a hewn inscription has to use it, is a very far-fetched and derivative function of language. In this, language becomes a condensed piece of reflection, a record of fact or thought. In its primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behaviour. It is a mode of action and not an instrument of reflection. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 312)
When speaking of language(ing) as a form of human behaviour, e.g. "verbal behaviour", this difference should be kept in mind. Compare this to Bühler and his organon model.
Are our conclusions about the nature of language correct, when faced with this use of speech; can our views remain unaltered when, from speech in action, we turn our attention to free narrative or to the use of language in pure social intercourse; when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end in itself? (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 312)
We're slowly inching towards the definition of phatic communion.
When incidents are told or discussed among a group of listeners, there is, first, the situation of that moment made up of the respective social, intellectual and emotional attitudes of those present. Within this situation, the narrative creates now bonds and sentiments by the emotional appeal of the words. In the narrative quoted, the boasting of a man to a mixed audience of several visitors and strangers produces feelings of pride or mortification, of triumph or envy. In every case, narrative speech as found in primitive communities is primarily a mode of social action rather than a mere reflection of thought. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 312-313)
E.g. phatic utterances are characterized by their dominant phatic function but other functions (e.g. the referential/intellectual, emotive/emotional and conative/appelative) are subordinate to it.
A narrative is associated also indirectly with one situation to which it refers - in our text with a performance of competitive sailing. In this relation, the words of a tale are significant because of previous experiences of the listeners; and their meaning depends on the context of the situation referred to, not to the same degree but in the same manner as in the speech of action. The difference in degree is important; narrative speech is derived in its function, and it refers to action only indirectly, but the way in which in acquires its meaning can only be understood from the direct function of speech in action. To use the terminology of this work: the referential function of a narrative is subordinated to its social and emotive function, as classified by the Authors in Chapter X. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 313)
Previous experience = communization. And Ogden and Richards call it the social function?! Now I have to read Chapter X.
The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration. When a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing - it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation. The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 313)
Wow. If the phatic function is removed from the referential function then does it equally mean that in the Bühler/Jakobson triangular combo model the code is equally removed from the receiver and the message removed from the sender? In the sense that the receiver's code must be that of the sender's in order to comprehend the message (and in this sense removed from the receiver) and the message must be removed from the sender to gain some sort of autonomy this does seem to fit. But then again that triangular combo model is very contingent and not very important. // Notice, rather, that the phatic function cannot be identified with metacommunication as Christiane Nord does because phatic utterances are not supposed to be about what is going on at the moment of communication.
A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing-room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things - all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought. It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing a common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side. What is the raison d'être, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are', 'Where do you come from?' 'Nice day to-day' - all of which serve in one society or another as formulaæ of greeting or approach? (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 313-314)
E.g. the assumption that phatic utterances are almost asemantic.
I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society. There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company. Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314)
This tendency transcends linguistic niceties (those mere sociabilities) and concerns nonverbal behaviour as well.
Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule. The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food. The modern English expression, 'Nice day to-day' or the Melanesian phrase, 'Whence comest thou?' are needed to get over the stange and unpleasant tension which men feel when facing each other in silence. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314)
Along with the tendency to speak mere sociabilities there is a tendency to smile and establish eye contact as a means to lower social tensions. Also, notice that "the communion of words" is only the first step and the final step is what? Communization! That is, sharing something - be it food or other commodities (e.g. sharing a cigarette or a sip of beer at a musical venue).
After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts or irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious. Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own. Always the same emphasis of affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy. Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak. For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enchancement. But though the hearing given to such utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 314-315)
This closest to Jakobson's definition of the phatic function. Emphasis on affirmation and consent, on the other hand, is closer to Ruesch's version of communization.
There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use - phatic communion I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention - a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which so symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arous reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)
A social function it is indeed! The last sentence is especially on par with Morris's communization and perhaps even with Mead's identification.
But can we regard it as a mode of action? And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation? It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking. But what can be considered as situation when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving to direct aim of binding hearer and speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)
Here I would argue against Malinowski in that what happens linguistically is by no means all that constitutes the whole situation. The atmosphere of sociability is also dependent upon nonverbal behaviour - be it a kind disposition (pleasant face), smiling (or any other type of positive feedback), isopraxism (motor mimicry), etc. On another level the establishment of ties of social communion are contingent upon common life experiences, similar ideas and ideology, etc.
The binding tissue of words which unites the crew of a ship in bad weather, the verbal concomitants of a company of soldiers in action, the technical language running parallel to some practical work or sporting pursuit - all these resemble essentially the primitive uses of speech by man in action and our discussion could have been equally well conducted on a modern example. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315)
But here the phatic communion is not wholly devoid of a referential component. For there to occur speech about bad weather there first has to be bad weather as experienced by all speakers involved. To Kulkarni's interesting discussion of the phatic function in instant messages I would now add that the nature of phatic utterances in instant messages are somewhat different from phatic utterances in face-to-face interaction, because the conditions (the context of the situation) is different in each. Talking about bad weather, for example, does not achieve the same effect when one is in Southern California and the other in Lapland.
Again in pure sociabilities and gossip we use language exactly as savages do and our talk becomes the 'phatic communion' analysed above, which serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas. (Malinowski 1946[1923]: 315-316)
Here my point about connecting phatic communion with communization becomes apparent: sometimes we engage in phatic communion not because we don't intend to communicate to ideas but because we already share some ideas and communicating about them would be superfluous. This is why communicating with a comrade, a co-patriot, a co-worker, etc. is markedly different from communicating with a stranger who does not share your life-experiences and sentiments, ambitions, etc. With a complete stranger one's phatic utterances may indeed be about weather or other immediately available matters, but with a fellow the phatic utterances may be about much more specific matters - about mutual contacts, occurrences not in the immediate situation, shared commodities, knowledge, etc. When I know a lot about Jakobson and you know a lot about Jakobson then we're not really exchanging ideas about Jakobson - we already possess those ideas; rather, we're making small talk about lofty ideas. Oh, you took that course? I took that course too last semester, it was okay. Was the test as difficult? It was for me... and so on.

Ogden, Charles Kay and Ivor Armstrong Richards 1946[1923]. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. Eighth edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

Besides symbolizing a reference, our words also are signs of emotions, attitudes, moods, the temper, interest or set of the mind in which the references occur. They are signs in this fashion because they are grounded with these attitudes and interests in certain looser and tighter contexts. Thus, in speaking a sentence we are giving rise to, as in hearing it we are confronted by, at least two sign-situations. One is interpreted from the symbols to reference and so to referent; the other is interpreted from verbal signs to the attitude, mood, interest, purpose, desire, and so forth of the speaker, and thence to the situation, circumstances and conditions in which the utterance in made. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 223)
At this time (first published 1923) these were the main semantic functions: referential and emotive (also discussed as cognitive and expressive; even today as cognitive and affective).
(ii) There are the situations which derive from attitudes, such as amity or hostility, of the speaker to his audience. In written language many of the most obvious signs of these attitudes are necessarily lost. Manner and tone of voice have to be replaced by the various devices, conventional formulæ, exaggerations, under-statements, figures of speech, underlining, and the rest familiar in the technique of letter-writing. Word order is plainly of especial importance in this connection, but, as we shall see, no general literary device can be appropriated by any one of the functions of speech, it is sure to be borrowed on occasion by the others. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 224)
The emotive function in written language.
(iv) The structure of our symbols is often determined by our Intention, the effects which we endeavour to promote by our utterance. If we desire a hearer to commit suicide we may, on occasion, make the same remarks to him whether our reason for desiring such action is benevolent interest in his career or a dislike of his personal characteristics. Thus the symbol modification due to the effect intended must not be confused with that due to the attitude assumed towards an interlocutor, although often, of course, they will coincide. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 225)
Hardcore! This passage suggests that one should not confuse the emotive function with the conative function. // This chapter seems to outline the progenitors of Jakobson's language functions: (i) is referential, (ii) is emotive, (iii) is poetic/aesthetic, (iv) is conative and (v) could be likened to the metalingual. The only one missing is phatic, which probably comes along a little later on.
The functions we are examining are those necessarily operative in all communication, the ways in which the work of speech is performed, the essential uses which speech serves. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 228)
Similarly, Jakobson's six factors are "inalienably involved in verbal communication" (Jakobson 1981[1960c]: 21)
In translation, for example, the lack of such an analysis of the ways in which words are used has led to much confusion. Faced by the unaccountable failure of apparently accurate renderings, linguists have been too ready to accept the dicta of philosophers on this point, as well as their vague vocabulary. Thus, according to Sapir, "all the effects of the literary artist have been calculated, or intuitively felt, with reference to the formal 'genius' of his own language; they cannot be carried over without loss or modification. Croce is therefore perfectly right in saying that a work of literary art can never be translated. Nevertheless, literature does get itself translated, sometimes with ashonishing adequacy." [Sapir, Language, pp. 237-239.] So a problem appears to arise, and as a solution it is suggested that "in literature there are intertwined two distinct kinds or levels of art - a generalized, non-linguistic art, which can be transferred without loss into an alien linguistic medium, and a specifically linguistic art that is not transferable. I believe the distinction is entirely valid, though we never get the two levels pure in practice. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 228)
Haha. Language as a primary modelling system and literature as a secondary modelling system. Or how transposition involves the "translation" of some extralinguistic characteristics into another medium (e.g. "translating" the "gloom" in Orwell's book, Nineteen Eighty-Four, into the movie, 1984).
On the other hand the more the emotive functions are involved the less easy will be the task of blending several of these in two vocabularies. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 230)
The emotive functions as in plural? Is that why above there is a distinction between "The expression of attitude to listener" and "The expression of attitude to referent"? E.g. is there a difference between the attitude towards the addressee and the attitude towards the referent? This is an extremely suggestive point, because it would enable one to break the emotive function down into distinct categories.

A word is an articulate sound symbol in its aspect of denoting something which is spoken about.

A sentence is an articulate sound symbol in its aspect of embodying some volitional attitude of the speaker to the listener.

Dr Gardiner's 'volitional attitude' would appear to be included in No. IV of our list of functions. It will be generally agreed that no use of speech can be admitted to be an attempt at communication unless this function is concerned. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 230)
Huh. So it's advisable to turn to Alan H. Gardiner's The Theory of Speech and Language for an exposition of the conative function? The footnote here even gives a page number: p. 98.
It is certainly true that preoccupation with 'expression' as the chief function of language has been disastrous. But this is not so much because of the neglect of the listener thereby induced as because of the curiously narcotic effect of the word 'expression' itself. There are certain terms in scientific discussion which seem to make any advance impossible. They stupefy and bewilder, yet in a way satisfy, the inquiring mind, and though the despair of those who like to know what they have said, are the delight of all whose main concern with words is the avoidance of trouble. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 231)
This may in fact be the reason why Jakobson prefers Marty's term, emotive, instead of the more common "expressive".
Thus Dittrich, the holder of one of the few recognized Chairs of the subject, wrote in 1900: "For linguistic science it is fundamental that language is an affair not merely of expression but also of impression, that communication is of its essence, and that in its definition this must not be overlooked." (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 231)
Note that "impress" is the original meaning of appellatio, e.g. the conative function. Citation: O. Dittrich, Die Probleme der Sprachpsychologie, pp. 11-12.
What such additional words contribute to a science may be doubted; but it is certain that von Humboldt went too far in this direction when he said: "Man only understands himself when he has experimentally tested the intelligibility of his words on others." (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 231)
The Authors of this piece may think Humboldt going too far but this is certainly in line with the thought of George Herbert Mead and by proxy with that of Charles Morris.
A similar circuit for volitional signs is diagrammatically completed by Martinak through the fulfilment of the wish by the listener; while Baldwin devotes over seventy pages of the second volume of his Thought and Things to language as affected by its functions in intercourse, and the relations of speaker and listener in what he calls "predication as elucidation" and "predication as proposal." (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 232)
Wow. The conative function reaches farther than I can probably go. Thought and Things, Vol. II., p. 152.
In 'good morning' and 'good-bye' the referential function lapses, i.e., these verbal signs are not symbols, it is enough if they are suitable. Exclamations and oaths similarly are not symbols; they have only to satisfy the condition of appropriateness, one of the easiest of conditions at the low-level of subtlety to which these emotional signs are developed. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 234)
Oh wow. This is the harshest statement about phatic utterances being asemantic that I've seen thus far.
Orders or commands must satisfy reference and purpose conditions, but may, indeed often must, avoid both suitability and appropriateness in the sense used above, as for instance in many military orders. Threats on the other hand can easily dispense with reference, i.e., be meaningless, and may be governed only by the purpose intended. Questions and requests are similar to commands in the respects above mentioned and differ from them merely in the means through which the effects desired are sought. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 235)
Both imperative and inquisitive are included in the conative function.
So far we have confined our attention to verbal languages, but the same distinction and the same diversity of function arise with non-verbal languages. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 236)
In other words, the semantic functions of language can be elucidated in nonverbal communication as well.
The difference between the two uses may be more exactly characterized as follows: In symbolic speech the essential considerations are the correctness of the symbolization and the truth of the references. In evocative speech the essential consideration is the character of the attitude aroused. Symbolic statements may indeed be used as a means of evoking attitudes, but when this use is occurring it will be noticed that the truth or falsity of the statements is of no consequence provided that they are accepted by the hearer. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 239)
"It tends to produce an impression of a certain emotion whether true or feigned" (Jakobson 1985[1976c]: 114).
What is required is not only strictness of definition and rigidity of expression, but also plasticity, ease and freedom in rapid expansion when expansion is needed. (Ogden & Richards 1946[1923]: 242)


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