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Fragments of phatics

Lyons, John 1977. Semantics Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Two of Bühler's functions, for which he employed the German terms 'Darstellung' ("representation") and 'Ausdruck' ("expression"), correspond closely with what we are calling the descriptive and the expressive functions, respectively. The third, for which Bühler used the term 'Appell', is what we will call the vocative function. Bühler's classification is based upon his analysis of the typical speech-act (Sprechakt) in terms of three essential components: the speaker, the addressee and the external situation to which reference may be made in the utterance. According to whether reference is made primarily to one rather than the other two of these three components, so the utterance will be primarily expressive, vocative or descriptive in function. (Lyons 1977: 52)
If functions are references the components they are tied to - like the metalingual function refers to the code - then the phatic function should refer to the contact or channel and in this sense it should be the metacommunicative function. What here is "primary" is "dominant" for Jakobson.
There is an obvious connexion between Bühler's analysis and the traditional analysis of the typical situation of utterance as a drama in which three poles are given grammatical recognition by means of the category of person (cf. 15.1); and Bühler and his followers have explicitly mentioned this connexion. (Lyons 1977: 52)
If the original three functions outlined by Bühler are connected to grammatical functions (first, second and third person), then the phatic function should be about something that is "between persons". That is, the code is inside persons, the message is outside persons and the channel is between persons.
They have emphasized, however, that it is not only utterances with a first-person subject that are expressive and not only utterances whose subject is a second-person pronoun that have a vocative function. They have also stressed the fact, as we are doing here, that few, if any, utterances have one function to the exclusion of the others. (Lyons 1977: 52)
"The verbal structure of a message depends primarily on the predominant function." (Jakobson 1985[1976c]: 113) And: "Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfill only one function. The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several functions but in a different hierarchical order of functions." (Jakobson 1981[1960c]: 21-22)
As we shall see later, Bühler's tripartite classification is also relevant to his distinction of symptomps, symbols and signals: every utterance is, in general and regardless of its more specific function, an expressive symptom of what is in the speaker's mind, a symbol descriptive of what is signified and a vocative signal is addressed to the receiver (cf. 4.1). (Lyons 1977: 52)
Do Sebeok's six types of signs accord to Jakobson's six functions, then?
The second additional factor is the channel of communication (cf. 2.2). Many utterances of everyday conversation have as their primary communicative function that of opening up or keeping open the channel. For example, there are all sorts of conventional greetings (Good morining!, etc.) or ritualized gambits (Wonderful weather we are having!, etc.) with which we can initiate a conversation. There are others with which we can initiate a conversation. There are others with which we can bring a conversation to a mutually acceptable conclusion (It's been lovely to see you again!, Give my regards to your wife, etc.); and others that serve to prolong the conversation or to indicate to the speaker that the addressee is still in contact and following what is being said. (Lyons 1977: 53)
Jakobson's interpretation is limited because he only pays attention to this last part. Also, Say hi to your mothor for me!
Much of this interaction-management information, as it has been called (i.e "the information that the participants exchange in order to collaborate with each other in ordering the temporal progress of the interaction": Laver & Hutcheson, 1972: 12), is transmitted by means of paralinguistic signals (eye-movements, gestures, postures, etc.: cf. 3.2). But some of it is encoded in the verbal component of language-utterances. (Lyons 1977: 53)
This is what Dipti Kulkarni referred to.
Malinowski (1930) had coined the term 'phatic communion' for that kind of speech "in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words" - a kind of speech which, he says, "serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas"; and Jakobson borrows the term phatic in order to refer, more particularly, to that function of language which is channel-oriented in that it contributes to the establishement and maintenance of communicative contact. Thus interpreted, the phatic function is very close to, or at least is very important part of, what we have been calling the social function of language. (Lyons 1977: 53)
Damn. Lyons made this connection so much earlier than me, though I still feel that no-one has yet channeled phatics from Malinowski's phatic communion and Jakobson's phatic function to Morris's and Ruesch's communization. Ultimately, "bonds of personal union" is at the core of the matter. This involves Morris's communization, which goes to show that these "bonds of personal union" can be established by means other than communication; and then Ruesch clarifies that this is best understood in terms of common experience. In the end it all clicks together.

Burke, Kenneth and James P. Zappen 2006. On Persuasion, Identification, and Dialectical Symmetry. Philosophy & Rhetoric 39(4): 333-339.

One may appeal to reason, to the emotions, or in terms of character (logos, pathos, ethos) - hence Aristotle offers topics reviewing these resources (including ways of transforming an opponent's argument for your purposes). (Burke & Zappen 2006: 334)
I knew that logos could be identified with "reason" (instead of merely "word"), but I wasn't aware that pathos is "emotion" (wikipedia says something like "passion"). Also, this is almost like Bühler's tripartide model: logos/Darstellung; pathos/Ausdruck; ethos/Appell.
Burke, moreover, evidently developed a concept of identification very similar to Mead's. Mead (1938, 246-49), found a solution to the problem of the relativity of ordinary human experience in people's ability to correlate their experiences with those of others: "In the common world we find the individual not only reducing all his [or her] visual perspectives to the congruences of contact but also identifying his [or her] own congruences with those of others" (347). Such identifications are the cornerstone of human communication and human communities. In Mind, Self, and Society (1934, 253), Mead writes: "The principle which I have suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self-consciousness through the other." (Burke & Zappen 2006: 338; note 10)
Reading this otherwise abstruse paper and its notes was worth while for this part alone. This is exactly what I came here for - to find out if Burke and Mead have discussed something like phatic communion. They have, it turns out: this is exactly the stuff that I wish to discuss in joining Malinowski's phatic communion to Morris's communization through Jakobson and Ruesch. (The first two had original ideas, the second two had more accessible terminology and point of view.) Also, since Morris edited Mead's 1938. The Philosophy of the Act, it's not surprising in the least that he comes to talk about communization.

Fiordo, Richard A. 1977. Charles Morris and the Criticism of Discourse. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.

Morris differentiates between communication and communization. Broadly speaking, the word communication "covers any instance of the establishment of a commonage, that is, the making common of some property to a number of things". Thus "a radiator 'communicates' its heat to surrounding bodies, and whatever medium serves this process of making common is a means of communication..." Subsequently "the air, a road, a telegraph system, a language" all exemplify means of communication. Morris, however, limits communication "to the use of signs to establish a commonage of signification..." He employs the word communization to cover "the establishment of a commonage other than that of signification - whether by signs or other means..." (1955: 118). (Fiordo 1977: 70)
Whom is he citing in the first quote? It is relevant that communization can occur by means of signs. That is, it fits the description of phatic communion. Also, communization is opposed to differentiation (Morris 1949: 119) and can thus compared to force particulatrice and force unifiante in de Saussure, Baudouin and Kruszewski (cf. Jakobson 1971[1960b]: 421).
Communication occurs when a person who verbalizes or signifies in some manner, for example, anger, causes through the use of signs another person to verbalize or signify anger without that person's growing angry. Communization occurs when an angry person causes another person to become angry, and it establishes such a commonage with or without the use of signs ([Morris 1955:] 118). An angry person may communicate his anger by directing it at something in order to arouse another person's anger toward the same thing (and so communize anger), or he may equally well communicate his anger in order to arouse another person's fear of or respect for him. (Fiordo 1977: 70)
Score for the interpretation of "phatic" as em-phatic (e.g. related to empathy or fellow-feeling, Einstellung). The last part about emotion being directed either at the referent or the subject is accounted for by Ogden & Richards's "emotive functions" in the plural (1946[1923]: 230).
Moreover, Morris asserts that one may use communication "to make people different as well as to make them similar, and communization or differentiation between persons may be established by other means than communication" ([Morris 1955:] 119). Thus a person may unite or separate from other people by establishing shared significations with them; or a person may make himself common with or different from other people by sharing with other people something other than signification such as an activity or a disposition toward that activity. (Fiordo 1977: 70)
Here it really depends on how you define signification. A precedent can be found, again, in Ogden & Richards who write that since phatic utterances like "Good morningi!" and "Goodbye!" have very little reference to speak of, these are by definition not symbols (1946[1923]: 234). Uniting with other people, on the other hand, is at the heart of phatic communion and separating from other people (terminating the interaction) is how the phatic function is put to good use in pragmatics.
Although Morris does not define language in terms of communication, he does affirm a close relationship between language and communication. While restricting communication to signs, Morris does not restrict it to language signs ([Morris 1955:] 38). Since signs other than language signs occur in communication, not all communication is language communication. The latter occurs when language signs are present in communication ([Morris 1955:] 346-347). In other words, "whenever a language sign produced by one organism is a stimulus to another organism in social behavior communication does occur", and since language signs produce such communication, it is language communication ([Morris 1955:] 38). (Fiordo 1977: 71)
This would pose some problems, as phatic communion - as Malinowski puts it - "happens linguistically" (1946[1923]: 315) and is thus indeed language communication. This is why I would prefer Ruesch's elaboration wherein communization is the process that "exposes people to similar experiences" (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 327). But this problem can be overcome by pointing out that in the phatic function is merely the dominant function in phatic communion. That is, communication and communization can be complementary - in fact they would seem to be primarily complementary. Ruesch himself adds: "Communization cannot wholly substitute for communication." (ibid, 327).
The fifith section of the chapter began with a definition of communication and its related concepts of communicator, communicatee, and the means and content of communication. A distinction between communication as the establishment of an individually or interpersonally common signification and communization as the establishment of something other than signification that is individually or interpersonally followed. The rast item treated was Morris' differentiation between the achievement of communication as an end in itself and the use of communication as a means to attain its further purposes. (Fiordo 1977: 178-179)
Further purposes? What further purposes. It is a bit disappointing that a whole book about Morris's thought touches communization so briefly and does little noteworthy with it and when it ultimately suggests something novel it is left ambiguous.

Graffi, Giorgio 2001. 200 Years of Syntax: A critical survey. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

As is well known, Bühler viewed three functions (Leistung) within language: the 'expression' (Ausdruck) of the speaker's experiences (Erlebnisse), the 'representation' (Darstellung) of objects and state of affairs, and the 'appeal' (Appell) to the hearer to gain her/his attention and to guide her/his behavior. (Graffi 2001: 71)
I was not aware that ausdrucking involved the speaker's experience. This reinforces the connection between the emotive and phatic functions in the latter's interpretation as em-phatics (e.g. that the phatic function is almost like a collective emotive function).
As a consequence, the linguistic sign functions at the same time as a 'symptom' of the speaker's experience, as a 'symbol' of extralinguistic reality and as a 'signal' for the hearer (Bühler 1934:28). Trubeckoj (1939a:17-18) ascribed to Bühler "the great merit" of "having brought to light a fact so important and nevertheless so long unnoticed". Two decades later, Jakobson (1963:216) deemed Bühler's model a simple "elucidation" of the traditional one. Trubeckoj's assessment was surely more correct than Jakobson's which is however historically understandable: in the sixties, the set of problems which gave rise to Bühler's triad of concepts appeared extremely remote, relegated to an age considered prehistoric - 'traditional' - by a structural linguist like Jakobson. (Graffi 2001: 71)
In all the talk about how one function is dominant and the other functions are subordinated but present it seems to get lost (for me, at least) that all the functions operate simultaneously. In a similar vain it could be argued that communication and communization are simultaneous processes, with either tendency dominating in a given context.
Bühler based his recognition of the three fundamental functions of language on a critical examination of the main linguistic theories of his time. They appeared to him irreparably one-sided. Wundt considered language only as expression (cf. Bühler 1918:3-4); "in extreme opposition to him" (p.8), Husserl saw in language only the function of representation; Marty, for his part, recognized only the function of appeal (cf. Bühler 1922:62). Plainly, these topics appeared exceedingly remote to Jakobson in the sixties. (Graffi 2001: 71-72)
Yet another reason for turning to Anton Marty. How great would it be to compare the conative function in Baldwin and Marty!
On the basis of his own conception of language as a sign system, Saussure had already succeeded in recognizing its particular features: however, he had not pushed himself so far as to explicitly acknowledge that the primary data of linguistics are simply linguistic facts, not physical, physiological, psychological facts, etc. (p.9). These considerations are based on what Bühler (p.42) names Prinzip der abstraktiven Relevanz ('Principle of abstractive relevance'): linguistic signs get their value not on the basis of their material nature but of the features which distinguish them from the other signs of the system (Graffi 2001: 72)
De Saussure's version of this principle is more famous. E.g. Derrida and his difference vs différence.

Morris, Charles 1949. Signs, Language and Behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

The term 'communication,' when widely used, covers any instance of the establishment of a commonage, that is, the making common of some property to a number of things. In this sense a radiator "communicates" its heat to surrounding bodies, and whatever medium serves this process of making common is a means of communication (the air, a road, a telegraph system, a language). (Morris 1949: 118)
It is noteworthy that "medium" is Morris's term for "channel".
For our purposes 'communication' will be limited to the use of signs to establish a commonage of signification; the establishment of commonage oter than that of signification - whether by signs or other means - will be called communization. (Morris 1949: 118)
Communization is the process of making common. Communization may use communication as its means - as in the use of language - but there are other means of making some property common - air and road for example.
A person who is angry may be the occasion for another person becoming angry, and signs may or may not be the means of establishing the commonage: this is a case of communication. Or a person who signifies anger may by the use of signs cause another person to signify anger without necessarily becoming angry: this is a case of communication. (Morris 1949: 118)
Communization may proceed without the use of signs and communication may proceed without simultaneous communization.
The user of signs who effects communication is the communicator and the organism in which the sign-process is aroused by the signs of the communicator is the communicatee. (Morris 1949: 118)
The communicator expresses (Ausdruck) and the communicatee is impressed upon (Appell). I think these terms are an improvement from Jakobson's addresser and addressee, although they are kind of clumsy. One could just as well appropriate the very technical terms (presently seemingly used only in molecular biology) of effector and effectee. Note also that effecting communication is intentional and arousing sign-process in the communicatee is tantamount to appeal to the communicatee to engage in interpretation.
The communicatee may be the same organism which is the communicator, as when he writes a note to oneself to be read at a later time. The signs used are the means of communication and the signification made common by these means in [sic] the content of communication. (Morris 1949: 118)
In trying to tie communization with Malinowski's phatic communion, I imagine in communization the signification or content being superfluous, since phatic utterances, for example, are ideally asemantic or without referenece. We know that signs are not the only means of communization, although in Ruesch's version wherein communization is related to common experience: "The process called communization exposes people to similar experiences and although they do not transmit to each other feelings or thoughts, they know that the other person has some understanding because of the common experience." (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 327) Phatic communion, then, becomes almost like a means to gauge, determine or ascertain "points of contact" - that is, shared understandings of something.
Communication, in this restricted sense, is not a new use of signs but a special case of the incitive use, namely, the use of signs to incite in the communicatee sign-behavior similar to that of the communicator (that is, of the same family of sign-behavior). Communication is designative, appraisive, prescriptive, or formative according to the mode of signifying of the content of communication. (Morris 1949: 118)
Communization, on the other and, may be thought of as the process of establishing similar sign-behavior.
The establishment of communication may in some cases be the sole purpose for which signs are used. (Morris 1949: 118)
Hmm... This fits the discription of the phatic function (in the sense of interaction management).
But normally communication is desired in order that some further purpose be realized, whether this purpose be informative, valuative, incitive, or systemic. All of these purposes involve communication as a state in their realization. The goal intended may or may not be that of communization. An angry person may communicate his anger at something in order to cause the communicatee to be angry at the same thing (and so to communize anger), but equally well a person who is angry may communicate his anger in order to cause the communicatee to fear or respect him. (Morris 1949: 118-119)
There is a distinct hint of conation in all of this. And I feel like I cannot avoid going into Mead's conversation of attitudes.
Communication may be used to make people different as well as to make them similar, and communization or differentiation between persons may be established by other means than communication. Since sign-behavior is itself a phase of behavior, to control the sign-behavior of other persons is a powerful means of controlling their total behavior, but the control intended may be for any purpose, moral or immoral, divisive or unificative, differentiative or communizative. (Morris 1949: 119)
This definitely involves "the appellative or operative functions" (Nord 2007: 171). The force unifiante of 19th century European linguists is presumably about code, but "unificative purpose" here is social. In Jakobson's scheme, "differentiating" signs would be an aspect of metalingual operations while being "divisive" would be an aspect of the phatic function (e.g. terminating contact). All of this has gotten so complex that I think I have to draw diagrams or make lists in order to untangle what I want to do in my forthcoming paper ("Channeling Phatics").
The child learns by various social rewards and punishments that in the community of English speaking persons the term 'good' is, among other things, a positive appraisor, that 'three' denotes certain objects and not others, that 'Come here!' signifies that a certain action is demanded, that paretheses show what signs are to be combined. (Morris 1949: 120)
Did Morris just outline Büdler's three functions with a surplus of something like an aspect of the metalingual operation in writing? It may turn out that I need to re-read Morris's Signs, Language and Behavior in total before writing my bachelor's thesis.

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