Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972a. Introduction. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 11-15.

To apply the notion of cybernetics to the human situation, we have to draw from theories that derive from social anthropology, sociology, linguistics, and related disciplines. All of these fields are concerned with semiotics - that is, the phenomenology of signs and their relationships to one another and to their human users. (Ruesch 1972a: 11-12)

I'm kinda glad he mentions linguistics (because of Jakobson), but defining semiotics as "the phenomenology of signs" seems kind of weird, for some reason (maybe because phenomenology and semiotics are so often opposed to each other).

Information processing - both by the human mind and in the computer - is based on scanning, encoding, decoding, storage of information, decision-making, and similar procedures. The output of an organism or a machine is judged in terms of the effect it produces. The output of the body is made up of a variety of movements summarized under the term "action". All actions have a physical impact upon people and upon the material surroundings, and when this impact is perceived by an individual, it is fed back and incorporated into his body of information where it leads to corrections of his knowledge. Feedback links the impact of action in the physical world with information about action in the symbolic world. Information thus controls action, and action changes information. With this linkage, the mind-body dicotomy became obsolete. (Ruesch 1972a: 12)

That is a very cogent definition of action. The solution of the dichotomy between the physical world and the symbolic world (e.g. Umwelt) is quite Uexküllian.

In the section entitled "Communication, Social System, and Culture", the reader will find a description of the social filed, or the context, in which a message exchange takes place. The social field determines the parameters of the system that are significant for both the scientific observer and the participants. For the scientist, the social setting provides the more time-enduring structure in which an exchange takes place; for the participant, it provides the instructions necessary for coding and decoding the message. This has been described as metacommunication. (Ruesch 1972a: 13)

Here the context (the social field) is much more active than in Jakobson's scheme, where objects or persons in the context are merely referred to.

In the third section, entitled "Communication and Interaction", the papers are concerned with the relationships of information to action and of the action of one person to the reaction of another. Emphasis is laid upon the two principal modes of evaluating meaning. The first, or the traditional evaluation of the referential property of signals and signs, is concerned with the agreed upon meaning, reflecting the normative property of universal signs and symbols. The second, or personal evaluation, is concerned with the impact signals, signs, or actions have upon self and others. (Ruesch 1972a: 13)

Because Jakobson is mainly concerned with the code (language), he pays almost no attention to the second type of evaluation.

By neglecting the individual and focusing upon the message, scientist are able to trace it from its place of origin to its destination. In the process, the message travels through diversified networks and usually gets transformed as it passes from one organization to another. At each station of transformation it loses some information because of the recoding process, and at its destination it may have a totally different meaning and impact than the intended one. (Ruesch 1972a: 14)

Compare this to Jakobson's illustration of hearing about "The Raven" in a train-car (e.g. Jakobson 1981[1964e]: 7).

To put it even more broadly, communication is the tool of all social procedures; and failure in communication usually spells doom for human relations and social enterprises. (Ruesch 1972a: 14)

Jakobson has a similar functional ("tool"-ish) view of language.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972b. Introduction. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 19-20.

The scientific theories of the communication engineers had to be somewhat modified to be of use in the study of face-to-face situations. Therefore the term "social communication" refers to these modifications, indicating that the theory is concerned with the exchange of messages mediated by vocal sounds, written signs, or gestures and other movements without the intermediary of machines. In social situations, the channels that connect sender and receiver are not discrete, and the intended message often cannot be separated from accessory messages originating in the environment. Therefore, the interpretation of messages exchanged in a social setting is dependent upon a knowledge of situational factors which are conceptualized best with the help of theories borrowed from the social sciences. (Ruesch 1972b: 19)

Accessory messages (e.g. "noise") - another aspect neglected by Jakobson. // I'll note that there are several introductions in this book. The first was the introduction to the whole book; this one is an introduction to Part 1.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1966]. Social Process. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 21-46.

The actual events - that is, those that stand for themselves - can be divided into: (1) behavior, or teh functioning of whole organisms or machines and (2) field, or the environmental or situational structure in which this behavior takes place.
The symbolic events - those that stand for other events - can be divided into: (3) communication, or the symbolic functioning of the whole organism or machines and (4) organization, or the social order (context) in which communication takes place. (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 21)

In this light Jakobson's "verbal persons" are "symbolic persons" standing for actual persons. (The symbolic addresser and addressee are not equivalent to actual sender and receiver.)

Communication experts are message oriented rather than people oriented. This emphasis enables the observer to trace a message from its source to its destination, regardless of how many times it may be transformed or recoded and regardless of how many machines or people are traversed. (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 27)

In this light Jakobson is code oriented.

In order to communicate, the individual entities must share a code or language (Saporta 1961: 551). The path that signals take is referred to as a network (Ruesch & Bateson 1951: 314). When effects achieved through communication or action are taken into consideration at the source, we talk about feedback (Winner 1961: 212). Whatever referential property is attributed to a language or code is commonly known as content (Berelson & Steiner 1965: 296). (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 27-28)

Content, thus, belongs to the cognitive-referential function.

The distinction as to when an action is intended as a message and when it is used for need satisfaction has always remained a puzzle for the communication experts. The simple way to handle this perplexing problem is to assign a dual function to any action. In the first instance, the action serves need satisfaction; in the second instance, it may be perceived by self or by others, and at that moment it becomes a message. Intention, therefore, which plays such a role in legal procedures, cannot be used in communication, because unintentional messages may have as much impact as intentional messages (Ruesch & Kees 1956: 205). (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 28)

I wonder if this distinction can be compared to the intraversive/extroversive distinction in Jakobson. The would be "intrinsic coding" (in Ekman and Friesen's (1969) terminology) or "actonic" (in Harris, Marvin 1964. The Nature of Cultural Things).

What formerly was the domain of individual or small group - economic support, health, education - now is the responsibilityof the government. With the passage of the Medicare Bill, for example, medical care became a human right, and with the transformation of a privilege into a right, the social view of health and disease becomes a dominant concern of our time (Simmons 1963). (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 31)

Half a century later, medical care in the US is still an issue (e.g. Obamacare).

But order can only be understood, explained, and implemented through use of the symbolic process which enables a person or a group to represent events that have already occurred or will occur ot another time or place. (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 32-34)

An addition to the "distanciation" aspect of the context or referential function.

But a general theory of human beavior has to encompass the psychological, the physical, and the social universes. Only with a general theory of behavior can we avoid the inside-outside, the mind-body, the thought-action dichotomies, and many others that are equally undesirable. (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 34)

Some additions to the universe of discourse (the linguistic universe).

In order to illustrate how psychological, social, and physical notions can be combined by means of these three concepts into a workable theory of individual or group behavior, a series of questions has been listed, the answers to which will yield information pertaining to almost any behavioral situation:

Who does or says ... ?	(group membership, position, identity, role, status)
What ... ?	(type of action or content of message)
For which reasons ... ?	(motivation, rewards)
With what intent ... ?	(anticipated response or effect)
Under what rules ... ?	(formal, informal, emergency, regular)
To whom ... ?	(group membership, position, identity, role, status)
By what means ... ?	(face-to-face, written, telegram, telephone, television, public address system)
Where ... ?	(context or situation)
When ... ?	(in the past, now, or later)
For how long and how often ... ?	(time duration, repetitiveness)
To what extent ... ?	(introducing reversible or irreversible canges)
With what effect ... ?	(changes, effectiveness)

(Ruesch 1972[1966]: 35-36)

An elaborated version of the 7 questions in "The Communication Model in Operation" (1953).

Agreeing implies the isolation of a certain aspect within the universe of discourse, and the establishing of corresponding views or opinions between two or more people with respect to that aspect. (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 36)

The referential function does isolate an item (someone or something) in the universe of discourse.

Equalization of information is achieved through: (a) exposure of people to similar things, persons, and situations, resulting in equivalent experiences (understanding achieved through similarity of exposure); (b) promotion of social interaction, which contributes to a leveling of information or beavior (communicative exchange); (c) sharing of explanations to justify existing differences (interpretation); and (d) introduction of coercive action or threat of coercive action, particularly in case of deviance (discharge, imprisonment, hospitalization). (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 37)

Thus common code and common context must be achieved through equalization.

Underlying all of the approaches to the study of man is his ability to interact and relate to others - a faculty which has been described as "social process". (Ruesch 1972[1966]: 39)

Is Ruesch keen on faculty psychology? For Jakobson, this faculty is reduced mainly to the ability to operate language.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1953a]. Synopsis of the Theory of Human Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 47-94.

Human behavior is obviously influenced by what people think and feel, and it is evident that their transactions and interactions are guided by information acquired in the course of social contact. The scientific model of communication is especially applicable to the study of human relations. Data pertaining to the ways and means by which people exchange messages, to the correction of information through social contact, and to action untertaken as an outgrowth of communication are handled successfully within the scientific model of communication. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 47)

I agree with this statement. Lotman and others also found that the scientific model of communication is especially applicable to the study of human culture.

Though it is granted that all events in nature are somewhat related, it is the task of the scientific observer to limit his field of observation. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 48)

Jakobson has limited his field of observation to verbal behaviour.

Human beings who have observed some complex events in nature have to simplify and condense their data for purpose of recording, thinking, and communicating, in spite of the fact that such an operation introduces new distortions. Therofer, one must assume that all models constructed for the understanding of nature are somewhat simpler than the real events and that only a few functions will be appropriately represented in the system, while others will be highly distorted. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 49)

This describes Jakobson's scheme of language functions (his so-called communication model) well. An especially prevalent example is the exclusion of the "informative" or "communicative" function from his "communication model".

In the nineteenth century, scientists used linear systems to analyze their observations. Events were linked to events by spacing them in time or by patterning them in space, and in the prevailing theories of causality that which preceded was thought to determine completely that which followed. Though today scientists still have to maintain that cause and effect have to follow each other in time, they have become careful in making statements about causality (Bellak 1964: 465). (Born 1948)

I should keep this in mind next time I suspect one scientist of "borrowing" something from another scientist who wrote something similar earlier.

The author believes, however, that the operational approach as set forth in a model of communication can be applied to the study of intrapersonal, interpersonal, and group phenomena and to large scale social events (50). (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 52)

And operationalism is defined thusly: "only those propositions which are based upon public and repeatable operations lend themselves for discussion or agreement and disagreement, and only that type of operation can be admitted to the body of science" (ibid, 51). At the moment I don't see how this is different from positivism or behaviourism.

In communication theory, therefore, the unit of study is the social situation which is defined by the network of communication in which the individual is participating. Without an observer there is no scientific information. Therefore information as to social events can only be gathered in a social situation in which at least two people participate. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 54)

One has to add that the social situation is not always face-to-face interaction but any type of communicative interaction (by means of telegram or telephone, for example).

Language is full of terms which describe status and roles. Terms such as king, slave, notable, and general refer to the position in the prestige scale of society, while terms such as husband, friend, son, lawyer, or physician refer to specialized behavior of individuals within a group. To be precise, the term "role" labels an individual as a participant in an intricate network of human relations. Roles are multipolar phenomena denoting the relationship of one person to one or more other people, or expressing the relatedness of many people to many other people. There is no husband without a wife, no father without a son or daughter, and no tax collector without taxpayers. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 60)

This concerns the vocative function of language. Also, there is no addresser without the addressee because of the same reason - these terms signify relationships.

In communication theory, therefore, roles have a double function: they identify the participants; and they represent silent messages about communication which constitutes instructions of the receiver to the sender about the way he should be addressed and from the sender to the receiver about the way his message ought to be interpreted. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 61)

Similar metacommunicative function is actually fulfilled by the vocative function in Jakobson's scheme (I'm pretty sure vocatives include both the addresser and the addressee).

In modern communication theory, then, such social approaches are described as multipolar phenomena determined by at least two, if not more, people. I have labeled the network of these subtle, essentially nonverbal social actions between people as "social techniques" (Ruesch 1953). Though the term "social technique" to my knowledge was coined only recently, by Tolman (1942), the evolution of the concept of social technique dates back to ancient poets and philosophers. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 63)

Also, Marcel Mauss and his "Techniques of the body".

The methods of manipulation, operation, social engineering, and social tehnique can only be reported by a person who is a participant. The manifest content of the messages contains few if any clues about the nature of such techniques so that only an actual participant can gauge, from the wear and tear which he experiences, the influences to which he has been subjected. Frequently a person may be unaware of his own manipulative tendences, and only after another person calls attention to what is geing on can the full extent of the operation be assessed. Social transactions frequently make use of nonverbal means of communication, and a variety of action signals are combined into intricate patterns of social action (Ruesch & Prestwood 1950). Context, action sequence, timing, and intensity are skillfully used by the participants to influence each other. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 64)

This concerns #nonverbal ethics.

So far, I have pointed to some of the characteristics of social techniques. Now I should like to discuss the denotative devices that are used to describe actions and techniques in terms of verbal language. Language cannot do justice to the subtle differences in social techniques; although the English language is particularly rich in verbs and terms referring to action (de Madariaga 1928), it cannot encompass fully that which is actually experienced. But the study of verbs reflects somewhat the variety of social techniques which have been observed. Not all of these verbs denote interpersonal transactions; some terms denote the actions of single individuals irrespective of others, and other terms refer to the interaction of two or more people. It is well to remember that interaction verbs silently imply the presence of several people, even if grammatically the verb is related to one subject only. The peculiarities of language often necessitate a discrepancy between strict semantic meaning and pragmatic interpretation. But a review of the words suggesting the various modes of participation will give the reader an impression of the varieties of social transactions. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 65)

Jakobson's scheme considers nouns (referential), pronouns (conative), etc. but it handles verbs only in terms of imperatives (e.g. "do!"). I think that besides an "actonic function" one should try introducing something like "(communicative) action function" as well. But this is surely very complicated.

Rules determine what language is to be spoken, what messages have priority, and who can talk to whom. Status and role identify the human participants engaged in communication and serve as explanatory - that is, metacommunicative - messages; as in the denotation of music, they are the keys which instruct the participants in how to interpret the message. Social techniques, finally, are a way to describe the intentions of people and the effects they have achieved with social action when action itself is the language in which the messages are coded. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 67)

Ruesch has a very liberal understanding of the term "language" (despite being familiar with Morris's work).

Information may be coded outside of the human organism in terms of verbal symbols, objects, drawings and sketches, full- or small-scale models, and in many other forms. Inside the human organism, information is coded probably in terms of nervous and chemical signals. Information held by human beings is made accessible to self by feeling and thinking and to others by means of expressive movements - that is, action, including speech. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 67)

To do justice to Ruesch's understanding of signs, messages and actions, one most likely has to re-introduce the "transmitter" ("sender") and "receiver" into the model and designate the addresser as "information source" and the addressee as "destination".

In exterotransmission, conversely, the message is directed at external destinations, and the transmission is mediated principally through contractions of the striated muscles. It manifests itself in speech, gesture, and in other instrumental actions. Proprioevaluation is undertaken solely for the purpose of internal consumption so that the individual can evaluate feelings of gratification or frustration, make choices, and consider the need for restraining his desire for action. In exteroevaluation, it is the consideration of external events that matters, here the individual can evaluate his impact upon others, his roles, the social situation, and other pertinent factors. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 69)

Jakobson's scheme doesn't necessarily addresse only exterotransmission - propriotransmission is introduced as "intrapersonal communication". But speech, gesture and other instrumental actions are the there dimensions that need to be considered anew. Jakobson makes a case for speech (and, in the form of poems, writing), but he neglects gesture and facial expressions (e.g. nonverbal communication, generally) and instrumental actions (actonic behaviour).

While the concept of information refers to the inside representation of outside events, the concept of language and codification refer to the technical aspects of the recording of such information. Retention of information necessitates some imprints or traces which, when they are known to several people or to the same person at various dates, are referred to as a code.
All action can function as language. Any action undertaken by an organism is a statement which, when perceived and understood by other organisms, becomes a message. Messages are conveyed by signals which as they travel along certain pathways can be conceived of as signs (Von Foerster 1950). A sign possesses problem-solving properties or cue value for an observer by force of its own structure and because of the attention which is paid to it. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 72)

The referential function, a definition of code and then Ruesch's weird view of action, language, signs and messages.

Codification at the interpersonal level is accessible to observation and experimentation. In its simplest form, a person may point to a thing, an organ, or an action and let it speak for itself. This process may be referred to as ostensive communication. Next in complexity are the action symbols, which can vary from universally understood gestures to highly individualized forms of expression. Finally we have the spoken or written word, mathematics, and all other types of essentially verbal forms of codificaton. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 73-74)

A definition of (ostinsive) reference, and naming nonverbal signs as "action symbols".

While verbal language is generally accepted as a common code system in communication, the concept of silent action as codification seems to present some particular difficulties. People commonly assume that information is transmitted in terms of words or gestures; they tend to forget that the direct observation of action, for example, of a man tying his shoelaces or offering his girl friend a cigarette, is perhaps the most important system of interpersonal codification. Words and gestures stand primarily for other events; they have little intrinsic value of their own and therefore are readily regarded as symbols. IN contrast, silent actions (exclusive of gestures) always have a potentially twofold function: they are an implementation in their own right, or they may stand for something else, or both. This double meaning of action introduces great difficulties into the evaluation of nonverbal communication inasmuch as a perceiver can never be quite sure when an action is intended to convey a message and when it is intended for other purposes. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 74-75)

I'm pretty sure this is where Ekman and Friesen got the term "intrinsic coding". Basically, this enables me to differentiate nonverbal behaviour from nonverbal communication on the same basis that Jakobson distinguishes poetic and emotive function from the referential function: the gradation of intraversiveness and extroversiveness.

Even at the personal level some information seems to be coded in terms of action. A person cannot learn to play the piano, for example, by reading a book; instead, he has to move his muscles if he wishes to get the feeling of it. The same is true of athletes, who actually practice the motions of golf or tennis prior to a competition in order to recall the actions that they are going to need. Apparently some signs are coded in the organism by a network which includes, in addition to the central nervous system component, the effector organs in action. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 75)

The effector organs? It suddenly seems much more reasonable that Thomas A. Sebeok should edit this volume.

A person who perceives a message divides it into two parts: one part might be labeled the content of the message; and the other, the instructions. There instructions which refer to the interpretation of the message constitute communications about communication, or "metacommunication" (Ruesch & Bateson 1951). (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 76)

An explanation of metacommunication. Note that one needs to distinguish "communication about communication" (metacommunication) and "communication about relationships" (the μ-function).

In person-to-person communication, a gesture may contain the explanation and the instructions for the interpretation of the words that are being said; or, conversely, words may contain the explanations for a diagram which represents the content. Be that as it may, consciously or unconsciously every sender and every receiver divides the message into two parts - the content, and the instructions. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 77)

I have no idea how to fit this into Jakobson's scheme (without completely reinventing it).

In many situations, instructions are not given explicitly by the speakers because the assumption is made that the other persons know what they are. These implicit instructions, which people assume need not be expressed because they are shared by all, are termed "values". (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 77)

In the same collection, in Part 2, there is a whole paper about values.

Posture, facial expression, and gesture, as well as movement of the body, convey another set of instructions. An erect or submissive posture, the deliberate formal or informal posture, the military bearing, or the stiff-necked attitude convey distinct instructions. Facial expressions and gestures refer primarily to the emotional state of the person, and these, combined with the posture, may transmit to the receiver the pompous, grave, and solemn attitude of a judge or the pugnaciousness of a prize fighter. The hurried movements of the person who is trying to catch a train, the relaxed movements of a person sunning himself on the bench in the park, the threatening movements of an angry person, the signs of greeting and farewell, and the gestures of seduction and insistence all accompany verbal or nonverbal messages in forms of instructions. Sometimes the metacommunicative messages are contained in the structure of a statement which enables the perceiver to identify from the way things are said that the speaker is a salesman or a psychiatrist, a policeman or a delivery boy. The structure of a sentence, the emphasis and the twist given, may thus betray purposely or unconsciously the intentions of the speaker. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 78)

Jakobson actually makes room for status and role identificators (e.g. at least some metacommunicative instructions) in the emotive and conative functions, but I now wonder whether I could implement George Herbert Mead's conversation of gestures (informative, communicative, referential function) and especially conversation of attitude (emotive function) into this new model I'm about to construct.

Upon initial contact in a new situation with strange people, the first thing that happens is a mutual exploration of each other's methods of metacommunication. An astute person explores another person in order to find out what sort of codes, rules, and roles the other person embraces so that forthcoming messages may be correctly transmitted as well as interpreted. Meeting new people means learning new ways of metacommunication, while meeting old friends usually means adhering to a more stabilized form of metacommunication (Ruesch & Bateson 1951). (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 79)

And Jakobson also, beginning (suspiciously) in 1952, draws attention to the fact that when speaking to a new person, people instinctively learn their code to reach mutual understanding (e.g. centrifugal and centripetal forces in language).

In describing the functions of communication, a simplified version of a two-person communication system may be used as an example. Starting with the description of the processes of exteroception of person A, three sets of stimuli can be distinguished: the first set derives from objects and events other than persons; the second set derives from actions of any other person; and the third set derives from actions of A which are seen or heard by him through his own exteroceptors. These three sets of stimuli reach A's sense organs; there, the acoustic, visual, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, thermal, pain, and vibratory stimuli are transformed into nervous and perhaps chemical impulses which then travel within the organism along nervous and humoral pathways. (Ruesch 1972[1953a]: 85)

This is what I commonly call "Goffman's triad". In fact it is more like "Ruesch's triad". In Jakobson's terms these are the third person referential function, the second person conative function and the first person emotive function.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1954]. Psychiatry and the Challenge of Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 95-124.

These nonverbal forms of action codification are more flexible, more universally understood, and less institutionalized than their material and verbal counterparts. Unfortunately for art and science, records of movements have been obtained only in the last hundred years, with the emergence of photography and moving pictures. Today, then, the expressive arts such as the dance (Sachs 1937), pantomime, and acting (Hughes 1928) stand side by side with the material and verbal arts in furnishing later periods with records of man's contemporary activities. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 98)

Ruesch gets the problems of studying nonverbal communication.

The transmission or output specialists deal with problems of expression. This field, perhaps the oldest of the scientific disciplines dealing with communication, with the exception of language, is governed by two groups: the language and expression psychologists; and the muscle physiologists. Although the literature on emotion (Cherry 1952, Darwin 1905), movement (Allport & Vernon 1933), gesture (Bacon 1875), and speech and speech correction (Anderson 1953) is full of valuable information from the psychiatrist, the dynamic application of this type of information to diagnostic and therapeutic operations leaves much to be desired. Engrossed both in the verbal accounts of patients and in their nonconformist behavior, we as psychiatrists have grossly neglected the technological aspects of expression. By being concerned with the signifying aspects of the patient's production, we have forgotten to study the "how" of transmission. Little is known about the use of smooth muscles of the intestinal tract and of the blood vessels for purposes of communication (Ruesch & Prestwood 1950); we tend to underestimate the communicative aspects of gesture, and the exploration of nonverbal elements in speech and writing is only beginning. For future research, the field of nonverbal expression is rich indeed. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 106)

Some of these references are actually new for me. I think I have to take note of all of Ruesch's references at some point.

The study of language, the oldest scientific approach to communication, is carried on by three different groups of scientists. The linguist and philologist, who are concerned with research into the origins and development of living and dead languages (Caroll 1953), are engrossed in problems of sound, form, and syntactical rules, so that they are essentially verbal code experts. The second group, composed of semanticists and sign specialists, is interested in meaning, the relationship between signs used and human behavior, and the relationship between human logic and language (Korzybski 1948, Hayakawa 1952). The third group is concerned wit hnonverbal forms of codification, a field which up to now has been left almost entirely to artists. That this area is perhaps the most relevant for the psychiatrist can be seen in the steadily increasing efforts to systematize individual and group action as a form of codification (Bales 1950, Cartwright & Zander 1953). But the resistance of psychiatrists to dealing with nonverbal forms of codification is great. No one doubts that the sign language of the deaf and dumb and the universal Indian sign language are nonverbal systems of denotation. Nor is there any question that gestures and facial expressions can substitute for words, a subject whic hhas fascinated scientists from Aristotle on down to Wundt and Darwin (1905). However, there still exists widespread indifference to the fact that simple, nonverbal action constitutes a form of language. It is used as such in childhood certainly, but scientists are all too ready to forget that such forms of communication persist and are employed by adults. The giving of presents, the rendering of service, the blocking of other people's efforts, and human mating and love-making all fall into this category. Particularly those patients who have difficulty in higher symbolic expression - that is, gesture and word - use ordinary actions to convey messages. Not only does many a mother bake a cake to let her son know that she likes him, but many a criminal gets caught because he cannot abstain from throwing money around to inform people of his success. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 107)

Roman Jakobson is essentially a "verbal code expert", although he dabbled semantics and semiotics. I cannot concur with the statement that nonverbal action constitutes a form of language, because the term language is loaded for me. "System of denotation," perhaps, but the matters at hand seem to go far beyond simple denotation.

In psychiatry, the problem of language and codification can be systematically encompassed under three headings: body language as exemplified by skin eruptions, blushing, or tics; action language as exemplified by deeds intended to please or offend another person; and verbal or gestural language as used in ordinary communication (Ruesch 1948). Body language predominates in the first eighteen months of life; action language from the second to the sixth year of life; verbal language from then on. Each adult person is characterized by a combination of all three types of codification, and his patterns of expression differ from situation to situation. Unfortunately, we know little about body and action language, although recently the field of psychosomatic medicine (Alexander 1950) and the rehabilitation of psychopaths (Redl & Wineman 1952) have made significant contributions towards the appreciation of nonverbal language. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 107-108)

Oh great! Both I and Sebeok missed Ruesch's fault at introducing the notion of "body language" into wider circulation. Now I have to rewrite my wikipedia article about body language (in Estonian). Latif's whole-body language is not even "body language" by Ruesch's merit, but rather "action language". Language is an awful term. If only Ruesch had used the concept of sign system instead...

When the psychiatrist wishes to report about human behavior, he obviously is faced with a dilemma: to use digital denotation to talk about digital phenomena is easy, and the psychiatrist is known to prefer to talk about the verbal behavior of patients rather than about their nonverbal actions; but when the psychiatrist uses words to talk about nonverbal behavior, he introduces complications. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 110)

Concourse! Is difficult!

What is the interspecies animal language of recognition, and do the emotional expressions of human beings simply serve the purpose of a universal transcultural language of communication? (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 111)

This question formed the backbone of the following decade's universalists vs relativists debate, which Ekman and Friesen reportedly won by answering "Yes!".

Of particular interest to the psychiatrist, of course, is expression through action. Gifted actors are capable of achieving just the effects they desire, and this success is in part due to the insight of theorists who have devised metods for learning the art of acting (Stanislavsky 1950). Not only timing and distinctiveness of action and words, but the availability of a whole set of past experiences characterize the great actor. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 116)

Some day I do have to read Stanislavsky, it appears.

Schizophrenic children with their solipsistic movements [Ruesch, J. and W. Kees: "Children in Groups", 16 mm motion picture] indicate that they do notexpect response to their expressive actions. Their interpersonal experience begins with verbal communication at the late age of two or three years, at a time when the normal child has long since established nonverbal interpersonal feedback patterns. Because of this lack of early interpersonal exchange, schizophrenics tend to be handicapped in nonverbal expression, ad because of relative paucity of interpersonal feedback patterns they cannot correct their responses. Through a variety of interactions with the therapist, the solipsistic expressions can be converted into interpersonal statements, and eventually the patient may even learn to correct his own performances. (Ruesch 1972[1954]: 117)

So "solipsistic" is Ruesch's term for "autistic" (e.g. autistic movements), or adaptors or automanipulators (or just nonverbal self-communication).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1957a]. Principles of Human Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 125-137.

Biological and social entities are characterized by:

1. The exstence of boundaries.
2. An internal structure and function of the organization that is surrounded by a boundary.
3. Maintenance processes involving reversible changes in support of the existing structures and functions.
4. Irreversible changes which alter existing structures.
5. Growth and evolution in time.
6. Relationship of the existing system to other systems of the same order.
7. Relationship of system to systems of a different order.

Any properties attributed to a naturally existing system stand in relation of complementarity to the properties attributed to the human observer. The more is known about the one, the less is known about the other. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 126)

This is almost a description of the semiosphere.

The communication apparatus of man is composed of:

1. His sense organs, the receiver.
2. His effector organs, the sender.
3. His evaluative apparatus, including the functions of memory and decision-making.
4. His body, the shelter of the communication apparatus.

(Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 128)

Uexküll, again!

For practical reasons, however, the study of the network may be confined to a social situation, to an association, or to the intrapsychic events of an individual. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 128)

Apparently not all levels of communication are practically investigatable.

Communication within the self is a special case of interpersonal communication. When traces of past experiences are organized into entities - ideas, images, fantasies, or sentiments - the internal organization of the individual is experienced as consisting of several components. Communication can then be carried on between these various entities and is referred to as thinking and feeling. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 129)

Autocommunication - Ruesch's "fantastical communication" pedigree.

Transformations alos occur within the organism, particularly when central nervous system impulses are transformed into muscular contractions. Stations of transformation thus are located at the boundaries of organisms; their signals are decoded and encoded for transmission through different media and channels. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 130)

Cf. the "bifurcation points" or "translation blocks" of the semiosphere.

Information controls all action and refers to the knowledge of relationships. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 131)

Compare this to Edward Sapir's understanding of intuition a the feeling for relations.

When two or more interpreters of signs can agree with each other as to the events to which the exchange of signals refers, the message can be said to have content. Because content is dependent upon exchange of messages, any shift in content is usually accompanied by a change in feedback and language characteristics. (Ruesch 1972[1957a]: 131)

For some reason this view of content seems weird (and/or out of place).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1957b]. Values and the Process of Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 143-157.

However, the term "value" is not used only to qualify certain aspects of social or physical behavior; it frequnetly is employed to refer to anticipatory behavior (Dewey 1950) - that is, to what is desired, valued and esteemed. These conceptual values are studied by examining the individual's choice of symbols. Inasmuch as all symbolic behavior influences action, conceptual values control the course of events in an indirect way. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 143)

Later it becomes clear that values are related to "cultural orientation" and this is tantamount to saying that culture influences action.

Some of the values held by a group require that these be accepted by the individual as premade decisions. Not only taboos but all laws, regulations and traditions fall into this category. Conventions about primogeniture, certain crimes, pregnancy and polygamy, for example, are not to be broken, and the individual is not allowed to make his own decision in these matters. In military, aristocratic, or gangster circles, the honor code often forces the individual and the group to act in certain ways even if it be against their better judgment. The decision, as it were, is made before the question even arises. This peculiar situation is frequently exploited in diplomacy, in warfare and in psychotherapy. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 145)

This makes a lot of sense in terms of "family values", the topic "pro-choice" and homosexuality when it comes to religious moralists.

Intimacy is being repl/aced by parapsychological relations (Horton & Wohl 1956) - the actor on the television screen walks into the living room, shares the family life, and sets standards as if he were really there. Urban as well as suburban living has become somewhat impersonal - families and faces quickly come and go, and real friendship or kinship groups are being replaced by casual, opportunistic neighbourhood or pleasure-seeking groups. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 148)

I think he meant "para-social", not "parapsychological" (which is related to precognition, telepathy, etc.). What he seems to mean is what some call "interfunctional contacts" (as opposed to "interpersonal contacts"). The part about television personalities (walking into the living room and) influencing our values (setting standards) sounds like the stuff of Ray Bradbury's Fahrenheit 451 (1953).

Because of the characteristics of the learning process, one perception paves the way for future similar perceptions, and an action that has been carried out successfully once is easier to repeat (Stevens 1951). Habitual perception and expression therefore are synonymous with preferential perception and expression. From the way in which a person formulates and reports the events which he has observed and from the repetitiosness and intensity of his actions, we infer the values which govern his reactions. Since man can only observe behavior - that is, the contraction of muscles - such factors as timing, direction, points of origin and destination, appropriateness, and impact of the action are the foundations upon which conclusions are built (Ruesch & Kees 1956). In observing actions or statements, the observer relies upon his knowledge of what is optimally possible under the given conditions, comparing the chosen action against the alternative solutions available. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 149)

Cf. Peirce on the growth of symbols or James on habit.

When a human experience is represented by a word or a gesture, the multidimensional quality of the experience and its far-flung ramifications are lost. The experience is compressed, as it were, into a symbol, and the condensation seriously limits the amount of information transmitted. But in spite of this handicap, communication can take place, provided that the missing information is filled in. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 150)

Later he relates this "Filling in Background Information" to something like Jakobson's metalingual function. Here it rather seems like an issue of common context.

It is obvious that correct appraisal of another person's message is contingent upon the receiver's scanning through the same universe of stimuli, memories and possible implementations as the sender did. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 151)

Instead of the universe of discourse we have here the universe of stimuli.

The process of filling in is the better the more all the participants have been trained alike, have been exposed to the same experiences, and have been conditioned in the same normative values. But since identical training is hardly ever achieved, the technical question has to be raised as to how people who possess different backgrounds of experience and association can understand one another at all. The answer is that understanding hinges upon the exploration of the other person. If one has time to observe or listen to people over a period of time, one can observe the range of their activities and statements. The observer now bundles his observations into a universe which he tentatively labels the "scanning universe" of the other person. By trial and error. he eventually gets a pretty good fascimile of the other person's way of proceeding. This technic has been used for millenia in the understanding of animals in the hunting field. The hunter or fisherman knows exactly what the range of possibilities of a species - or even of an individual animal - is, and by understanding the scanning universe of the animal the outdoor man eventually gets his prey. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 151)

Notice that Ruesch's "scanning universe" is essentially Uexküll's Umwelt! If one ever wondered how to apply the Umwelt theory on human communication, Ruesch's attempts towards it seem like a pretty good place to start from.

In advertising and propaganda an almost universally understood language is used, which through the medium of cartoons, slogans and billboards denotes values in an attempt to influence the choice of prospective customers. The language of advertising is so well known that most listeners have learned to disregard "commercials" automatically. Recently, however, the symbol manipulators have begun to camouflage their statements in such a way that their advertising is taken for a cartoon, news report, or a movie. The identification of a "commercial" occurs usually by means of its nonverbal components - that is, context, configuration and intensity. Likewise, the transmission of values in ordinary communication is bound to nonverbal signals. The appreciation of regularity, repetition, patterning, direction, selectivity, omission, and intensity is not bound to verbal signals but is tied to the anologic codification system of man (Ruesch 1955; Ruesch & Kees 1956). The transmission of values in the nonverbal mode, therefore, is one of the foremost processes in crosscultural communication where people have to convey to another both their system of preferences and their actual choices. (Ruesch 1972[1957b]: 153)

Over haly a century later this is still true. I liked 9gag.tv for a minute until I realized that at least every third video is a commercial disguised as something other than commercial (a cartoon, a funny or interesting video, etc.).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1948a]. Social Technique, Social Status, and Social Change in Illness. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 158-172.

Interaction between human beings can be conceived as being the result of social techniques of the individuals involved. The term social technique, therefore, would include all the methods used by an individual in approaching, managing, and handling other persons. Among the various interpersonal approaches known to be used in adulthood, we can distinguish between the long term techniques on the one hand, and those used as interpersonal tactics or the shart term techniques on the other. Under long term techniques, one might mention social climbing or prestige seeking, maintenance of superiority and dominance, nurturance (mothering or fathering), conformance, co-operation, competition, rivalry, dependence, social decline, self-abasive, avoidant, isolating, aggressive-destructive techniques, and acquisition or use of others. Among the short term techniques one might mention testing out, unthawing, startling, joking, teasing, flattering, offending, seducing, threatening, bribing, and pitying. Though space precludes in this article to describe techniques in any detail, there are a few common factors worth of considering. (Ruesch 1972[1948a]: 158-159)

Yeah, Jakobson doesn't have anything like this. It is by all means larger than the issue of "code". Even the relation with Mauss's techniques of the body is very tangential, if not non-existent.

The observation, the nature, and the management of cues is largely a social and cultural function. The cue, so to speak, constitutes the link between culture and individual. What makes persons of one and the same culture alike is the awareness, observation, and response to the same cues. A cue can be defined as a symbol or signal perceived in a complex situation which is helpful in solving the problem for the individual. It serves the purpose to reinforce or attenuate drives. Thus any stimulus may be thought of as having a certain drive value depending upon its outside strength, and a certain cue value depending upon its distinctiveness. (Ruesch 1972[1948a]: 159)

Somehow this, too, feels Uexküllian - the "cue" would be comparable to the latter's Ton. And I have to correct myself - this actually seems very much related to cues. Admitted, cues are only 1/4 of Ruesch's social technique (along with drive, response and reward - wow that's some behavioristic stuff), but here he basically defines culture as a collection of individuals who use the same or at least similar sign systems ("codes").

Ruesch, Jurgen; Annemarie Jacobson and Martin B. Loeb 1972[1948b]. Acculturation and Illness. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 173-226.

Paranoia is obviously the result of the projection of own desires and activities upon the outside world, while alcoholism reflects the escape mechanism used in the management of stress and strain. Traumatic psychoses are usually associated with chronic alcoholism and are in part the result of the emotional problems leading up to the accident and persisting in the ensuing post-dramatic syndromes (Moore & Ruesch 1944, Ruesch & Bowman 1945). Foreign borns do not tend to have the temporary forms of mental disorder with short hospital residence, but if they are sick they appear to suffer from more severe psychoses (Dayton 1940). (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 183)

Is it obviously that, though? It seems to be missing the factor of fear as in here: "[Paranoia is] a mental condition characterized by delusions of persecution, unwarranted jealousy, or exaggerated self-importance, typically elaborated into an organized system."

Preferred values	Non-Preferred or Rejected Values
Equality by birth	Inequality by birth
Inequality of achievement	Equality of achievement
Everybody can do and learn everything	Everybody is limited in what he can do
Success before security	Security before success
Success in terms of money and status	Failure in terms of money and status
Success more important than method used to achieve it	Skill, integrity, and method used for achievement more important than success itself
Pursuit of power and prestige sanctioned	Pursuit of perfection sanctioned
Individual freedom in acquisition of wealth and power	Individual freedom in development of personality
Wish to be independent, not work for others	Work for a cause or institution
Effort and optimism	Laziness and fatalism
Conformance to majority opinion, rather than persistence in personal opinion	Ahderence to personal, expert, or leaders' opinion
Freedom of speech	Restriction of free verbal expression
Tendency to join formal associations	Informal organizations and selection of individual friends
Need for sex gratification not acknowledged	Sex matters publicly acknowledged
Frankness in matters of crime	Crime and murder not talked about
Emotional control	Expression of emotions
Cleanliness and good manners	Neglectfulness and poor manners
Romantic belief in great love	Love as art and based on experience
Romantic belief in success (luck, gambling)	Success due to skill
Gratification in terms of accumulation and production	Gratification in terms of sensory stimulation
Moral and ethical goals, good citizenship	Experience and living as goal
Waste	Preservation
Externalization of conflicts and blame of the environment	Internalization of conflicts and blame on fate or self
Relaxation as health measure	Relaxation as such is idleness
Rational, scientific approach	Irrational, intuitive, or artistic approach
Standardization and mass production	Uniqueness of individual product
Size and practicability	Quality and beauty
Machines and gadgets	Ideas and movements
Change	Stability
Belief in future and opportunity	Belief in present
Belief in education and health measures	Life as school of education
Children first, parents second	Parents first, children second
Women first, men second	Men first, women second

(Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 186)

The left column represent the American core culture of the 1940s, I guess. Some of these oppositions are weird, though. For example, the opposition of "Success in terms of money and status" to "Failure in terms of money and status" seems to imply that there is no other kind of success or achivement than that of money and status. (How about honor, recognition, feeling of self-worth for achievement, etc.)

The migrant is either dissatisfied with his home conditions and blames economic, social, religious, or racial reasons, or he is dissatisfied because of intangible internal difficulties. A solution of these external or internal difficulties is then attempted by migration. People who seek migration as a solution of their conflicts believe that all frustrations endured will be compensated for in the country of adoption. Such an ideology develops in early childhood and matures during adolescence, and was responsible to a large extent for European and American mass migrations of the past. The migrant brings with him a number of unsolved conflicts which may or may not persist in the new environment. While on the one hand he may be a better individual than the native because he brings with him the will and the urge to make good, the external or internal conflicts endured in the past may, on the other hand, have made him an odd personality with difficulties in adaptive behavior. (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 198)

If I ever migrate it will most likely be due to economic and/or social reasons. Economic because there may not be a way to make a decent living in Estonia for me. Social because Estonia neighbours Russia and the latter is known to invade its neighbours with tanks and helicopters. If I had a choice, I would not choose whatever modern version of Gulag Russia has in store for "enemy intellectuals".

An exception among the adults is found in the migrant who marries a native partner; it is striking to see how in mixed marriages the foreign partner acculturates much faster than other fellow migrants who are not mated with natives. Constant exposure to a model, and reward in terms of affection, apparently accelecates the acculturation process. (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 201)

This is good to know.

Acculturation is easy if learning involves entirely new external symbols with no corresponding internal values. For example, a migrant from a rural part of Eastern Europe may never have encountered electricity. If he is at an age where learning is feasible he will learn the technical mastery of electricity as well as the American. (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 201)

Conversely, today's American foreign exchange students in Estonia may never have encountered electronic voting, free public wifi and unrestricted internet. (The only exception to our "unrestricted" internet seems to be that all but some 20 online gambling sites are banned.)

The type of trait which favors acculturation deals with a kind of cluster which neither upsets the standards of the new group nor is skewed in any direction, so that hostility of the local group cannot be directed against a migrant because of his being different. Traits favoring acculturation are related to being: cautious, charming, cheerful, clever, constructive, conventional, cooperative, curious, enterprising, enthusiastic, friendly, generous, grateful, imaginative, kind, playful, practical, responsive, self-confident, self-respecting, self-controlling, shrewd, tactful, and thoughtful.
Traits which retard acculturation are those which reduce the number of social contacts either through isolation, nonconformance, hostility, or competition. They are: acquisitive, arrogant, assertive, autocratic, boastful, gloomy, incoherent, dissatisfied, obstructive, short-tempered, inarticulate, evasive, coarse, hostile, thankless, headstrong, dishonest, dull, jealous, mischevous, opinionated, quitting, rebellious, self-pityin, self-distrustful, sensitive, exclusive, tactless, and vindictive. (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 206)

Some of these personality traits are set in weird oppositions, again. For example, if it's bad to be sensitive, does it mean that it's good to be insensitive? Interesting stuff in any case.

Schilder (1940) holds that neurotics and psychopathic personalities stop experimentation in social adjustment; the neurotic person being primarily self-concerned; the psychopath being busy rebelling against the existing order - and we might add here that schizophrenic, who through isolation, does not participate in group organization at all. Culture change then precipitates and reinforces pre-existing personality difficulties, because the lack of adaptive behavior is brought to the foreground. (Ruesch, Jacobson & Loeb 1972[1948]: 207)

This just makes me feel bad because I like solitude.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1963]. The Healing Traditions. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 227-241.

While the Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian medical systems were still dominated by magic and religion, the Egyptians attempted to become more rational and technological; and at the time of the Greeks and the Romans, a distinct separation between the technological and the spiritual aspects of medicine took place. The vitalists - among them Aristotle and Galen (Clendening 1942) - believed that living bodies were fundamentally different from bodies that living bodies were fundamentally different from bodies that were lifeless; thus organisms that possessed life, nourished themselves, grew, and decayed were assumed to be endowed with a principle called the soul - better known as the psyche (Ackerknecht 1959). The enlightenede Greco-Roman period was followed in the Middle Ages by hundreds of years in which medicine once more was dominated by mysticism and religion, until, finally, at the time of the Renaissance, medical science began to develop along more biological lines. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 229)

A definition of vitalism that likens it to modern semiotics - that life and semiosis are coextensive and the treshold of life is simultaneously the semiotic treshold.

Concepts of disease and attitudes towards treatment are complementary, but not identical. The history of the Western physician's attitude towards healing begins with the Old Testament. The ancient Jews believed that the sick man was making atonement for his sin. He accepted disease as punishment and as a means of redemption. The early Christians refined this idea by equating illness with suffering; they believed that suffering perfects the sufferer: suffering develops spiritual capacities; it means purification and becomes grace. Through sympathy, the healthy can share in it. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 231)

Thus Mother Theresa built and collected donations for hospices where sick people went to suffer and die for sake of grace and spirituality, while she herself preferred California clinics when she got sick.

Beginning with the Judeo-Christian tradition, it becomes apparent that, in the thousands of years of Jewish history, contributions which require analogic codification have been few and far between, and those that require difital or verbal codification have been plentiful. As a matter of fact, in the Jewish culture analogic representation was prohibited (Exodus XX). Hence, the Judeo-Christian tradition is characterized by an emphasis on moral and abstract principles. The Jewish culture contributed to Western civilization the Ten Commandments at the time of Moses; the turning of the cheek at the time of Christ; socialistic theories at the time of Marx; and the knowledge of the unconscious at the time of Freud. All of these contributions have in common that the individual has to master a moral principle which may go against his nature. The Ten Commandments are anti-instinctual; the turning of the cheek is anti-aggressive; the Marxian idea is anti-retentive; and the Freudian idea is anti-conscious. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 235)

Now I wonder if Juri Lotman's work is so abstract (and at times moralistic) because he was of Jewish ancestry.

Unlike the Semitic tradition, which prohibited the reproduction of pictures of God, the Mediterranean tradition emphasized imagery. In the Greco-Roman cultrues, two- and three-dimensional models of deities and of men are embodied in countless temples, statues and murals. Beauty, enjoyment and balance were the goals of the enlightened Greek, while the Roman's soluton to human problems was the creation of a man-made social order, which culminated in the dominance of Latin as the universal language and in the codification of Roman Law. From the days of Justinian on, the nations of western Europe attempted to establish an order administered by the state which would transcend individual morality. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 236)

And parts of this social order are still in work today.

Finally, we have in the far north the Anglo-Saxon tradition, which is neither moralistic nor legal. The common law is a history of past decisions, made by human beings about human beings, in which few abstract principles are involved, and expediency predominates. The Anglo-Saxon belief is that man triumpts over nature by daring, exploitation, resourcefulness and industrial production. It is the extrovert's solution to life. He believes that as long as he does - and does right - nothing can happen to him. The Anglo-Saxon's solution to human affairs is to meet in groups, talk about the issues involved, and find a compromise; or, if this is impossible, to fight. Dependence upon the support of peers is paramount; as a result of this attitude, group therapy, interpersonal schools of psychiatry, and the study of communicatian have emerged. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 236-237)

Interesting stuff. Did the Anglo-Saxons start studying communication? At the moment only the Renaissance communicationalist, John Bulwer, comes to mind as an example.

The much-praised freedom of choice in action is only an apparent freedom: choice is usually the lack of information, for as information becomes more complete, the apparent choices evaporate until only one, or few, possibilities remain, to best solve a given problem. Therefore, if, for whatever reason, an individual has incomplete information, he is faced with a multitude of apparent choices, which he has to sift through in order to arrive at a probable solution. In the legal, medical and military professions, people are trained to cope with situations in which incomplete or contradictory information prevails. In case of doubt, all professionals revert to premade decisions - that is, propositions that proved helpful in similar situations in the past. (Ruesch 1972[1963]: 237)

The case with Jakobson's "communication model" seems to be exactly this - people who have read only "Linguistics and Poetics" or some other few papers by Jakobson don't have the full information about language functions and how they are applied in speech or poetic analysis. Thus you can use your imagination and view his scheme as a working model of communication. But as soon as you read the corpus of his works, it becomes clear that there are fewer options available to actually is his scheme. (That is, it is suitable for the study of code, but not for the study of communication.)

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1967a]. Technological Civilization and Human Affairs. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 242-259.

The traditional specialization of the social classes - warfare and symbolic systems for the upper class; trade, administration, and supervision for the middle classes; and manual labor for the lower classes - came to an end at the time of the American and French revolutions (Hoselitz & Moore 1963). Until then, politican control was exercised through interpersonal communication between leaders who exhorted or coerced the masses to follow them. But compulsory education and dissemination of information through the printed word and the air waves opened up new methods of control. As nearly everyone acquired a receiver, directing control of people's action gave way to the subtler method of steering people through advertising and propaganda (Packard 1957). (Ruesch 1972[1967a]: 247)

This is pretty much the stuff Michel Foucault goes on about when he writes that power in no longer in the hands of select group of people but dispersed and diffused in discourse (e.g. the power of discourse).

The new world is structured around systems, and people are subordinated to the characteristics of these systems. Territoriality is collective and discontinuous in time and space; technology is largely subservient to the requirements of machines; laws have been replaced by regulations defining collective responsibility; and control is oriented towards keeping the whole system working, whereby both those in control and those who are being controlled are subjugated to the characteristics of the system (Boguslaw 1965). (Ruesch 1972[1967a]: 247)

And to think that this was written before the internet (ARPANET was established in 1969).

The technical innovation that governs modern communication systems is the separation of the message from the participants. Before the invention of writing, man and his message were inseparable (Ruesch 1967). The human voice carried a few hundred feet and could not be preserved. With the advent of writing, a manuscript could be separated from the scribe, but it still retained the personal imprint of its author. With the invention of electronic tape, the spatial and temporal separation of man from message became complete. Once information was separated from its human source of origin and its destination, it became possible to treat it like a product and to manipulate it at will. As a result, the integrity of information no longer could be checked by tracing it to the person from whom it originated. Therefore it is not surprising that there is distrust of statements emanating from government or corporations that have advertising and propaganda resources at their disposal (McLuhan 1964). The credibility gap is based upon a shared awareness that messages are being used for manipulative purposes (Packard 1957). (Ruesch 1972[1967a]: 248)

The internet has greatly helped along with this separation, for net neutrality stipulates that unless an effort is intentionally made to identify oneself as a source of the message, every net user is in principle anonymous.

At this point in history, one thing becomes clear. The creation of "one world" based on a technological culture is a utopian dream. The symbolic systems and the gadgets of the technological civilization are too difficult to master for 75 per cent of the population. If we do not provide for nontechnical alternatives, a new class system will emerge in which the machine people representing the minority will be in control of the disfranchised masses who face a culture that is beyond their comprehension. This type of social structure will lead to inevitable large-scale social conflict. Therefore a non-technical orientation suitable for the majority of the population has to be developed, one that can honorably coexist with the technical orientation of the minority. Modern societies need multiple orientations to accommodate human diversity. The danger of centralized government control of science, of technology, and of education lies in the one-sided support and over-emphasis that certain programs enjoy (Page 1967). Survival of the human race is more likely if we support the humanities as well as the sciences. The older person orinetation fostered human development and integration; the newer system orientation favors human fragmentation and reduces self respect. Unless we once again turn our attention to human experience and human needs and assign these the highest priority we are likely to suffocate in the material culture and to be enslaved by the machines we have created. To save the human being is the task of our time. (Ruesch 1972[1967a]: 256)

Currently the situation is a bit different. Most anyone can learn to use computers and to use computers to a very technical extent (learn programming languages for free online, for example), and more and more people have access to the internet. The downside is that the cheapest option is a tablet or smartphone, which is more of a receiver than a transmitter. If this trend continues we will indeed have something like telescreens with no keyboard to input lengthier texts.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1967b]. Technology and Social Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 160-176.

In the typical class society, there existed two types of communication - the vertical (interclass) and the horizontal (intraclass) communication. Vertical communication was characterized by a strict definition of who could talk to whom, how, in what manner, for how long and where. It was governed by a limited but well defined code, reduction of the number of possible interpretations, standardization of the roles of the participants, and rules governing place and time of the exchange. Interclass communication was highly stylized, and the force that got the message through was the social power differential between the classes (Collins & Guetzkow 1954). Personal acquaintance, except for knowledge of the other person's status, was not necessary.
In horizontal or intraclass communication, the codes were more flexible, the number of possible interpretations was greater, the rules governing communication often were made up as the exchange proceeded, and the roles of the participants were subjected to change. The force that got the message through was the appeal of the message itself or of the participants for each other (Ruesch & Kees 1956). Usually some familiarity with the other person was necessary so that the appeal would be effective and the appropriate interpretative scheme could be chosen. (Ruesch 1972[1967b]: 261)

Ruesc doesn't seem to do it often but here he is seemingly using the Jakobsonian method opposition, e.g. interclass communication is orineted towards code and intraclass communication towards message.

Up to the nineteenth century, the social structure was a pyramid; now, in the twentieth century, the pyramid has lost its peak. In the older pyramidal structure, the free flow of communication was both horizontal and vertical. In the modern structure, communication is neither vertical nor horizontal but global and task-oriented. No longer do people limit their communication to face-to-face encounters. Instead, they telephone, telegraph, talk by walkie-talkie or write to contact people on far away sites. Because errors cannot be spotted as easily as in face-to-face communication, very elaborate codes have been introduced with the purpose of eliminating ambiguous interpretative schemes. For example, spare parts for machines are ordered by number, code name and description. Communication in technical societies is rather devoid of personal connotation and the referential property of symbols points mostly to things and technical processes. Even in social organizations, people treat one another as if they were replaceable parts of a machine. The force that gets the message through today is neither status nor appeal; it is the anticipation of profit. People communicate because they are paid to do so, and for remuneration they process information. (Ruesch 1972[1967b]: 263-264)

This sounds a lot like Karl Marx's false prediction that in capitalistic society family affection is replaced by monetary exchanges.

Culture can be described in terms of value orientations - that is, in terms of preferences expressed in action, thinking and feeling. These preferred ways of looking at the world and of acting in it are paralleled by a consistent usage of symbols that represent these values. Symbolic behavior thus is linked to value orientation (Morris 1964; Ruesch 1958). While all people in a given geographical area share certain of the values and symbols - particularly the prevailing language - fewer people exert significant control over these systems. Persons who control value and symbolic systems engage in the following operations:

• They facilitate the pursuit of established goals by eliminating goals that might interfere (goal-seeking behavior).
• They allow the search for new goals if the old ones have become obsolete (goal-changing behavior).
• They implement goal-seeking nad goal-changing behavior by selectively influencinc the symbolic structures that represent these goals (control of symbolic systems).
• They organize and support human organizations that reinforce the values and symbolic systems (control of social organizations).

Among these four operations, the control of symbolic systems has perhaps become the most important. (Ruesch 1972[1967b]: 265-266)

Today, I imagine, the anonymous mass of internet users are in some measure in control of the symbolic systems (I'm looking at you, reddit!).

The introduction of communication machines, the spread of bureaucracy and the abundance of consumer goods have been associated with radical changes in man's use of symbolic systems. Through machine communication, messages have been detached from tehir originators and the truthfulness of the speaker no longer can be assessed. The erstwhile tightly controlled relationship between symbols and what they stood for has given way to a loose relationship whereby the number of possible interpretations have greatly increased. In a culture where messages are manipulated for advertising and propaganda purposes, the receiver is not quite sure of the sender's intentions and does not know whether he is dealing with a denotative or a connotative, a reality-oriented or a manipulative, a public or a personal, statement. AS a result, symbols are no longer trusted and therefore their informative value has been greatly reduced. (Ruesch 1972[1967b]: 268)

I'm not so sure about this. The internet has spawned its own codes of conduct, methods of verification, etc.

Social communication can be satisfied if:

1. There exists a body of people who steer the value system of a nation and put human needs into the center of their considerations.
2. There exists a body of people who steer the symbolic systems of a nation to create an internally consistent style.
3. There exists a social organization which implements effective feedback so that communication is not interfered with by time delay, excessive numbers of people, or input and output overload.
4. There exists and educational setting in which people can master effective social communication without one-sided emphasis upon analytic thinking, retention of information or image manipulation.
5. There exists the opportunity for all people to use their functions of perception, evaluation and expression without undue inhibition or specialization.
6. There exists a relatively close relationship between symbol and what it stands for.
7. There exists heterogeneity of opinion which is accompanied by homogeneous schemes of interpretation so that the differences represent divergent choices rather than accidents in the process of interpretation.

(Ruesch 1972[1967b]: 274-275)

Very... Cybernetic.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1967c]. The Social Control of Symbolic Systems. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 177-300.

Man created symbols in order to communicate. To make the process more efficient he organized a variety of institutions and charged them with the task of controlling symbolic systems used by individuals and groups. Among the systems used, speech, gesture, mannerisms, and attire are symbolic expressions of a more individual nature, while interior and industrial design, architecture, and fashion are examples of symbolic expressions of a more collective nature. But both individual and collective expressions have to be steered, directed, censored, and controlled if people are to understand one another. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 277)

Do they really have to? By whom, when and how? And what about autopoiesis or the self-regulation that we see going on all the time? Language seems to be working quite well without anyone explicitly steering it.

The terms signal, sign, and symbol often are used interchangeably, although their meanings are quite specific. The term "signal" refers to an impulse in transit and indicates a sender's deliberate or intentional effort to communicate, regardless of whether the signal be a nervous impulse, an electric current, a vocal sound, or a smoke signal. The term "sign", in turn, refers to a human precept that has informative or problem-solving properties, irrespective of whether the sign is a poster, a woman's hairdo, or pebbles in a brook. A sign does not imply an intentional effort at communicating; clouds, for example, if perceived by a human being, can be asign of an approaching storm. Therefore the word "signal" implicitly refers to an activity of the sender and the term "sign" refers to a perception of the receiver. A "symbol", finally, is defined by J. R. Pierce (1961) as "a letter, digit, or one of a group of agreed upon marks". Usually such symbols are found in company with other symbols to combine into sets generally referred to as codes. People who wish to use these marks or symbols for purposes of communication have to see to it that tehy retain their agreed upon significance. To prevent randomization of menaing, symbols or marks have to be appropriately controlled. Symbolic representation is characterized by three interrelated aspects which are exemplified by the words "symbol", "system", and "control": or, more precively defined, the term "symbolic system" refers to signs, symbols, or marks that stand for other events, whereby the shape and appearance of the symbols, their mutual interrelationship, and their referential properties are formally and informally controlled. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 277-278)

This in itself is a good illustration for how "steering" is not always a good idea or effective - no matter how many people have tried to give cogent definitions of sign, signal and symbol, there is by no means still a fully-formed consensus.

The division of labor at present is as follows: the humanists study verbal and nonverbal symbols; the engineers build the communication machines; the social scientist investigates the effects of mass communication and the context in which communication takes place; the behavioral scientists focus upon the communication organs of the body and how these are used (Matson & Montagu 1967; Snow 1956); and interdisciplinary groups attempt to develop better theories. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 280)

Hmm. I am a humanist, then.

If the signals and symbols used in the course of human interaction were always deliberately chosen to convey an intentional message, the study of human communication would not be more difficult than the study of machine communication. But unfortunately any kind of movement or action, regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, may serve as a signal or a sign; for example, when someone coughs, fires a gun, or walks in a certain direction his actions may become messages. The study of human behavior, therefore, always involves a twofold observation of intentional or inadvertent bodily action on the one hand and of purposeful vocal behavior on the other. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 280)

In other terms: 1(A) nonverbal communication or 1(B) nonverbal behaviour and 2 verbal communication. For some reason "verbal behavior" in itself gets lost - it is as if assumed that all language use has a communicative or self-communicative aim.

The information conveyed through a symbol is intelligible only if sender and receiver silently or explicitly share the same set of symbols at any given moment. Much of the time used in two-person and group discussions is dovetod to the task of clarifying the background information - that is, the set to which certain pertinent symbols belong. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 281)

Metalingual operations! A very limited definition but nevertheless - metalingual operations!

Any action (vocal sound, gesture, bodily movement) is a signal that triggers in self and in others a twofold reaction - a physical and symbolic one. The physical reaction involves voluntary or involuntary muscular contraction which may result in a skeletal movement; the symbolic response consists of invisible thoughts and feeling, of visible gestures, or of audible spoken words. A circular relationship pertains at this moment in that the physical reaction is dependent upon the symbolic response and the symbolic response is dependent upon the physical reaction. For this reason, all modern theories in the behavioral sciences have provisions for both action behavior that stands for itself and symbolic behavior that stands for other events (Ruesch 1968). (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 281)

Funktionkreis! It is beginning to look like the mind-body dualism is merely replaced with symbolic-physical dualism, though. And "action behavior that stands for itself" is actonic, intrinsically coded, instrumental, etc. and "symbolic behavior that stands for other events" is ... semiotic.

Words, of course, are the principal tools of the opinion molders, who divide the vocabulary into categories such as good and bad, strong and weak, or highbrow and lowbrow. For purposes of establishing public relations, words are selected according to these general characteristics, whereby denotation is minimized and connotation becomes the guiding principle. The former prerogative of the poet to disregard truth and to play with words on the listener has now become an accepted technical and political tool ["Toward fragmenting the language..."]. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 285)

Acknowledgement of the emotive and poetic function in advertising and propaganda.

The former educational monopoly of the higher classes, which was expressed in symbolic refinement, no longer exists. But now a new monopoly is in the making, concerned with the technical and financial control of the computers. These machine - the future auxiliary brains - will enable the ruling class to control political, military, and commercial endeavors even more effectively than up to now. There will be the non-technical people - the have-nots, know-nothings, and be-nothings - who will be essentially consumers and the technical people - the haves, in-theknow, and holders of organizational positions - who will control the world. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 294)

A few years ago when I stumbled upon this page I immediately labeled this a false prediction. Now, if one considers NSA's data collecting, international cyberwarfare and High-Frequency Trading on Wall Street, this prediction seems to live up to our modern day. Moreover, if Comcast and Verizon have their way and net neutrality is abolished through cable company fuckery, Ruesch's grim prediction will become more true.

The third example of the decline of humanistic values has to do with Latin as a prerequisite for admission to the study of law, theology, philosophy, and medicine. This universal requirement has been gradually dropped since World War II, and few are the universities that still require classical languages as a condition for admission. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 297)

It's weird to think that less than a century ago, even Tartu University probably had this prerequisite (probably, because I can't be sure but in Jaan Pert's novel the students did write essays in latin).

The fragmentation of human symbols and the lack of centralized control are at present accompanied by a multifariousness of human behavior. Beatniks, teeny boppers, hippes, mods, rocks, swingers, and similar groups express some opposition to technical and organization man, or the "establishment", as they call it (Keniston 1965, Sykes 1964). However, in contrast to former centuries, neither the participants nor the onlookers fully understand what each group stands for or what the symbols are that express their ideas. (Ruesch 1972[1967c]: 297)

The situation is similar today, especially when it comes to the emo subculture.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972d. Introduction. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 303-304.

One of the basic maxims of communication theory indicates that information steers action and action changes information. Such a change can be brought about in either of two ways: The first way consists of corrections introduced by comparison of information held by one person with the information held by another person - a process that is mediated through interpersonal communication. The second way consists of observing the impact a message or an action has upon people and things in the environment and of seeing whether the effect and the desired effect achieved coincide. If they do, then no correction in the body of information is necessary; but if an effect other than the anticipated one was produced, additional trials with the modified body of information are needed until the goal is reached. This process is known as learning by trial and error. The difference between the first method - comparison between people of information pertaining to a given action - and the second method - comparison of information pertaining to different stages of action - is not fundamental. In both instances, two sets of information are compared. In the first example, the information refers to the same period but is held by different period; in the second, the information refers to successive periods but is held by the same person. (Ruesch 1972d: 303)

This sounds a lot like Jakobson's distinction between bridging space (intercommunication) and bridging time (autocommunication).

Ruesch, Jurgen and A. Rodney Prestwood 1972[1950a]. Interaction Process and Personal Codification. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 305-344.

The authors have approached the study of interpersonal relations by focusing upon problems of communication. The unit of study, the social situation, is a context of communication. Any behavioral act when perceived contains a message. Therefore, when two persons, A and B, enter into each other's perceptual range, they begin to exert an influence upon each other. A's universe is modified when he notes that his actions are perceived by B; and B's universe is modified when he notes that A's action is medified by A's awareness of his (B's) perception. A social situation becomes real, i.e., begins to determine the actions of the participants, when they perceive each other's perception. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 305)

This made it into the book Communication co-written with Bateson. It concerns metacommunication, but through the mu-function (it is the relationship between A and B that influences their further action).

The necessity for establishing a relationship between personal and interpersonal processes governed selection and arrangement of variables used in this paper. The authors found that the minimum information necessary to understand interaction processes at any one time involved at least 30 variables. These were conceived as the impressions of one participating individual regarding the events which take place. In Table 1 five variables were arranged along a vertical co-ordinate, comprising (A) the social situation, or the "it"; (B) the self, or the "me"; (C) the other person, or the "you"; (D) the group, or the "us"; (E) the out-group or the "they" (1). Along a horizontal co-ordinate have been arranged: (1) the needs or appetites of an individual; (2) goals, ideas, and premises; (3) the emotional reaction of an individual, which includes all responses arising in conjunction with gratification or interference. These combined aspects constitute what one might call the internal facet of an individual, while the external facet is represented by (4) roles, and (5) interpersonal implementations and techniques. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 307)

In Jakobson's scheme, the "third person" (referent or context) is similarly either a person or a nonperson ("it"). It may be possible to mesh this with Jakobson's model, but it is unpredictable as of yet in what it would result.

In the preliminary phase, before communization and communication (Morris 1946), several aspects of the social situation are assessed by any one person. First a general survey of the sphere of action is made; questions are raised pertaining to whether or not the events which are going to take place will involve the self, and to what degree. Furthermore, any person will attempt to ascertain whether coming events will require active participation or whether they are likely to fade out and will require observation only. Expressed in more abstract terms, one might say that initially a directional factor is assessed dealing with proximity and distance of events in space and time, predicting approach and withdrawal of persons and likely influence of their actions. A second set of observations deals with information related to self-preservation or violation or bodily integrity or its social extensions. Assessment will determine whether or not the other person is apt to trespass onto one's own body or territory or whether interference processes are necessary to cope with the situation. Only when interference processes have been ruled out are processes of communication likely to proceed. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 326-327)

Self-involvement is an aspect completely untouched in the Jakobsonian strand.

The process called communization exposes people to similar experiences and although they do not transmit to each other feelings or thoughts, they know that the other person has some understanding because of the common experience. This establishes certain bonds of good feeling, bringing people together into a group. Communization is experienced by soldiers in wartime, by children in school, by people involved in emergencies, by people who associate together in common pursuit of sports such as tennis, golf, or baseball. It may be seen in the banding together in parents, sweethearts, and people who have the same hobbies. Communization cannot wholly substitute for communication. But it does establish a common, though incomplete, frame of reference under which premises interaction can proceed. For example, members of the platoon will without much communication proceed in combat to do the appropriate thing, because they have all been similarly indoctrinated. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 327)

Common experience can be "separated" into common code and common context in Jakobson's scheme, but it touches upon a much deeper issue - equalization.

Following interaction human beings tend to ruminate about what has happened, and this holds for single as well as repetitious or interruptive events. The process involved consists of comparing the social situation, or the "it", the "me", the "you", the "us", and the "they", in their chronological development in time. A kinesthetic impression, similar to the effect achieved by movies, is gained, which yields information about the velocity of development, the changes that occurred, and the rate of change which prevailed. Individuals, situations, and the self then remain characterized in the memory of a participant by social cues, on the one hand, and the time factors on the other. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 329)

Just like in Jakobson's case when he presumes that upon learning a new word the child compares it to the words it already knows, I'm afraid that Ruesch is describing a process that is by no means universal.

Once a certain action has taken place, months of years later an individual may remember such an event. At this late stage simple recollection in terms of memory images and impressions related to feelings prevail over critical re-evaluation. In the recollected stage of past events the individual acts more as an observer to his own past participation, inasmuch as in the course of time apparently the participant-gained cues gradually lose distinctness and only the observer-gained information remains relatively clear (Ruesch & Prestwood 1949). Participants tend to give an individual a feeling of freedom of action inasmuch as through his presence he is able to experience the impact of the situation as well as to influence it. In becoming more the observer he is no longer present in the situation and cannot influence the events, and at this stage recollections are frequently felt as bearing down upon an individual. The gradual fading of the participant-gained information to the advantage of the observer-gained information thus is a process which might give rise to depression, anxiety, guilt, shame, or fear. The feelings arising with memory traces appear unalterable to the individual and constitute retrospective falsification, while daily events under usual circumstances may in some ways still be alterable. The recollection stage is an attempt to stabilize the memory of past events in order to achieve in the present a more definitie point for departure in anticipating future events. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 330)

I recall grandma's note about terrible memories "foaming up" (üles vahutama) in the consciousness.

In a previous publication (Ruesch 1949) it was mentioned that the combination of responses with roles leads to what was called a social technique. Whenever action is appropriately matched to roles and emotions, the term technique is not quite applicable. In this case all processes seem to be entirely spontaneous and appropriate so that they do not have the qualities of a technique. However, when there exist incongruities the word technique becomes more and more applicable because other participants get the feeling that the person, exhibiting incongruities, uses a trick and that something learned is applied without having been mastered. Victims of such approaches feel uneasy because they feel there is something artificial. It follows that the term technique is more applicable to and perceptible in situations where roles and responses are incongruous and where a certain amount of coercion is necessary to perpetuate such a technique. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 333)

There is no such problem with Mauss's term the techniques of the body. Though it does make sense that a social technique is necessary because social interaction hasn't been mastered.

Both the schizophrenic and the neurotic had similar childhood patterns; they encountered people, primarily the mothen, in whom what was done did not coincide with what was said. The person who later became a schizophrenic then started to pay attention to what was done rather than to what was said, being on the alert for coercion and attempting to maintain freedom of choice by avoiding human contact. The future neurotic proceeded to retaliate in kind for the coercion suffered; he learned to coerce himself and others at the expense of freedom of choice. Because of these peculiarities in velocity and the rate of change, both the neurotic and psychotic patient are out of step with the world and with reality (Rank 1945). (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 335)

Cf. the double bind theory of schizophrenia. It's logical but I doubt if it stands up to verification.

Mutual understanding and the feeling of well-being are essentially based upon a similar rate of change involving the transition from topic to topic, from role to role, and from technique to technique. Strangeness, then, is inferred to exist when the rate of change is different. It is quite obvious that in daily life there is an optimum rate of change for any individual. It has to be fast enoug to encompass new experiences but slow enough to enable mastery. The same holds true not only of social interaction processes, but of the culture as a whole. There are cultures which at certain periods develop dynamically with a fast rate of change, while other cultures have been stabilized and change little. There is apparently an optimum which is related to tolerance for change in the individual. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 336)

"Keeping in step" is a good idiom, as the rate of change is very much involved with chronemics and how people organize their time.

By being an unherstanding listener the therapist will attempt to help the patient acquire means for communication. He will help him to express thoughts and feelings, and through verbalization of nonverbal elements he will familiarize the patient with what is going on. The aim is to render the patient able to express himself in unison (Ruesch 1948) such that thought, action, and feelings correspond to each other. Once this level has been reached, the prerequisite to further growth have been established. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950a]: 341)

In the psychiatric context this is easily understandable, but what, still, is that "nonverbalized but verbalizable" in Jakobson's mind?

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1960]. Mass Communication and Mass Motivation. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 345-353.

In order to avoid the stress imposed by advertisinng, people have begun to ignore these ill-timed, ill-placed, and repetitive messages. To survive, they have to practice selective inattention and thereby they easily get into the habit of overlooking the few messages that make sense. As a result, modern children are taught to disregard information instead of seeking it; and because of overstimulation their curiosity is quickly satiated. (Ruesch 1972[1960]: 348)

Solution: quit radio and television; get Adblock.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1958]. The Tangential Response. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 354-365.

The notions of control of behavior through information and feedback, which have been so brilliantly summarized by Wiener (1948), shifted the emphasis from behavior per se to the forces which control behavior. But in contrast to the older schools of psychology and psychoanalysis which assume that behavior is controlled by forces within the organism - by instincts, habit, the id, or the superego - modern communication theory does not limit these controlling forces to the organism. Instead, messages are thought to flow in large networks of communication which involve many people and even material structures. Whether these messages are coded in terms of electronic signals, speech or nervous impulses is not particularly relevant. What does matter is that the information contained in the messages steer human behavior. The switch in emphasis from behavior to the message as the unit of obselvation was a boon to the social scientist, for it enabled him to throw overboard the shackles that bound his thinking to the individual (Ruesch 1953). (Ruesch 1972[1958]: 354)

In semioticn, these forces are related to sociocultural codes.

TABLE 1: Varieties of Part Functions Selected for Reply
Function emphasized in Reply	Examples of Reply
	Nonverbal Comments	Verbal Comments
SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION
Being alone	Pointing and directing child to his room after some misbehavior	"This you will have to think over by yourself"
Two-Person situations	Crossed fingers indicating "just like that"	"Just the two of you"
Group situations	Cooperative preparations for family picnic	"Let's all join forces"
PERCEPTION
Proximity receivers and proprioception	Taking an object out of a child's hand and mouth	"Do not put that in your mouth"
Distance receivers and exteroception	Pointing to a flock of geese in flight	"Take a look with the binoculars
EVALUATION
Memory	Puts palm to forehead (gesture of having forgotten)	"I forgot our appointment"
Thinking	Points index finger to temple to indicate poor thinking	"He sounds cracked"
Feeling	Puts hand on chest	"You must have felt awful"
Decision-making	Looking determined after having looked doubtful	"I have made up my mind"
ACTION AND EXPRESSION
Motivation	Looking questioningly	"What made you do that?"
Implementation	Applause by clapping hands	"Superbly played"
Effect	Bull's-eye sign	"You really hit the jack-pot"
LANGUAGE
Organ language	Blushes, pales, trembles	"I am scared"
Action language	Signals to come over	"Tell me what happened"
Verbal and gestural language	Waiting for report	"Tell me what happened"
SEMIOTICS
Pragmatics	Looks at trophies on the mantelpiece	"You really must have been good to win all those competitions"
Semantics	Points to a mysterious sign	"Let us consult the dictionary"
Syntactics	Recovers furniture in daughter's room	"I want your chair to match the curtains"
UNIVERSES OF ENDEAVOR
Knowledge	Nodding head	"You really know your stuff"
Skill	Catching ball	"You are a good pitcher"
Topic of Discourse	Shuffling deck of cards	"We'd better stick to card playing"
INSTRUCTION
Roles	Pointing to badge	"I am the captain"
Rules	Pointing to a notice: "It is forbiden to..."	"You should not trespass"
Explanations	Getting somebody a set of instruction sheets	"I had better tell you how to do it"
CORRECTION AND LEARNING
Problem-solving	Exploring an unassembled kit	"Have you found the solution?"
Learning by imitation	Demonstrating the technique of pointing the shotgun	"You have to swing the shotgun with the birds"
GRATIFICATION AND FRUSTRATION
Pleasure	Grunts and looks pleased	"I get a kick out of..."
Frustration	Groans, mutters, look exhausted, ready to collapse	"It does not pay to go up there"

(Ruesch 1972[1958]: 358-359)

These nonverbal examples are very useful.

Both the tangential and the jumping response are observed not only in verbal discourse but in nonverbal communication through gesture, action, or object as well (Ruesch & Bateson 1951). In the first few years of life, before the child has mastered symbolic expression, the mother has to respond through facial expression (Spitz 1946), voice modulation, and action to the bodily and autonomic manifestations of the child. Her response to vomiting, diarrhea, constipation, sneezing, wheezing, coughing, flushing, or crying, if selective and out of proportion, can become the nucleus around which the interaction with the child becomes organized. In such a case, the parent initially may have responded to the expressions of the child quite appropriately; but this healthy response may later assume tangential characteristics if it is not modified in accordance with the biological and social maturation of the child. Particularly among bearers of psychosomatic conditions one encounters patients whose mother could not express their feelings vis-à-vis their children in verbal or gestural terms. Instead, such mothers continued to treat their children as if they were babies; they attended to the body hygiene of their growing children by giving enemas, brushing hair, or powdering the skin - a care which did not match the concern of a sixth- or eight-grader. (Ruesch 1972[1958]: 361)

This is a jewish mother stereotype (rubbing the child's cheek with her own spit, for example - see The Addams Family Values (1993), for a visual illustration).

Verbal replies can becomes tangential when the nonverbal manifestation of the child are neglected. If parents ignore the somatic manifestations of their children, if they fail to stimulate the proximity receivers mediating the sensations of touch, temperature, pain, smell, or taste, if they do not provide opportunities for exercise but selectively react to the children's verbal expressions, then the child becomes nonverbally retarded. Under these circumstances the child is not encouraged to drape his body over his mother's shoulder or to fit himself within her arms, nor does he learn to wear his clothing gracefully as if it were an extension of his skin. As a result, his appreciation of space, beauty and movement lags behind the skill displayed with verbal or digital symbols. Such a child may become a verbal genius while he remains nonverbally feebleminded. (Ruesch 1972[1958]: 362)

I believe the modern term is Nonverbal Learning Disorder. The nonverbally feebleminded verbal genius is, in modern parlance, a high-functioning autist or autistic savant.

Some people specialize in reacting to the decisions made by others, either opposing, criticizing, or supporting. In tangential responses to decisions made by others, the person, situation, or decision itself is ignored. Instead, the fact that a decision is made is reacted to, or some of the inevitable flaws in the decision are picked upon. (Ruesch 1972[1958]: 363)

It almost sounds like what I constantly do in this blog: I react to others' thoughts without much effect on myself. #metablog

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1956a]. Creation of a Multidisciplinary team. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 365-377.

Curiously enough, managers and coaches of athletic teams as well as the military seem to posses an unverbalized knowledge in these matters [the group process which welds individuals into a team] that is rarely equaled in the scientific world. (Ruesch 1972[1956a]: 365)

And that is what I wanted to study had I gone to basic training.

However, some generalizations can be made about the human ingredient that are necessary for a successful research team:

1. A person who is capable of making strategic decisions - the administrator. He ought to be the same person who conceived the original idea, posed the pertinent questions, and strives for an answer.
2. An integrative person who can translate the language of one discipline into that of another and can discover analogous and homologous findings and operations.
3. A theoretically minded person with a knowledge of philosophical assumptions, a knack for research design, and knowledge of the problems of control and statistical evaluation.
4. A personnel manager, versed in interpersonal and group processes, to iron out the human difficulties of the group.
5. Technical expert in the specialty fields, ready to cooperate and collaborate.

(Ruesch 1972[1956a]: 366)

This may become useful in the future, if I should ever pull off a team research effort. (In small groups one person takes more than one role in this list.)

The moderator needs to be aware of interpersonal and group functioning; his foremost task is to be constantly on the alert for signs of frustration which arise in the various participants. Restlessness, attempts to speak, changes in the facial expression, and many other little signs betray the build-up of tension and a developing disruption of communication. An experienced moderator will forestall such a disruption by encouraging the person in question to speak. Accordingly, the interrupter will take less time and will be less aggressive than if his comments are postponed until he is nearly ready to explode. (Ruesch 1972[1956a]: 370)

A wise suggestion.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1956b]. Communication Difficulties among Psychiatrists. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 378-392.

Failure to communicate successfully is in part due to the distortions which are introduced through the peculiarities of language. When psychiatrists meet they employ verbal language to refer to behavior. But action and movement are continuous functions which the word slices into discrete elements as if they were replaceable parts of a machine. The continuity of existence thus is split into arbitrary entities which are not so much a function of a particular patient's behavior but rather the result of language structure (Whorf 1952). After repetitious use, these verbal elements eventually tend to be accepted as if they had a real counterpart in nature. (Ruesch 1972[1956b]: 378)

We all know the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. What is awesome about this is that Ruesch touches upon concourse.

The belief in the magic of words induces many experts to become symbol manipulators. In the age of mass communication and at times of political and ideological crisis, one frequently hears expressed the naive belief that thought can be brought under external control. But even though books can be burned, the use of certain words outlawed, and the act of listening to a broadcast or participation in a meeting marked as an offense, the indomitable spirit of people continues to find its expression. At such times, concern with nonverbla forms of communication and with the verbal largely in its pragmatic aspects begins to predominate. Such a reaction against the overvaluation of the word, against abuse for purposes of control and commercialization, can be interpreted as a move towards safety. But since poetry, architecture, dance, and music are hardly the domain of the psychiatrist, his reaction against control through words has been to focus upon aspects of living such as relationship, interaction, and expression. By turning away from words, associations, and content, many psochitherapists have acknowledged the fact that the signifying property of words depends upon prior agreement, and its validity upon belief in these agreements (Ruesch & Bateson 1951). Nonverbal communication is much less dependent upon prior agreements and therefore is not the principal objective of centralized, authoritarian control. (Ruesch 1972[1956b]: 379-380)

Cf. "The totalitarian society will give no widespread attention to semiotic in its educational plans for the total population, for knowledge of sign phenomena makes it less easy to manipulate by signs those who have this knowledge." (Morris 1949: 244)

The therapies that are built upon the process of communication rely upon immediacy. When the patient makes a statement - be it in word, gesture, or action - the reply or lack of reply on the part of the doctor acklowledges, amplifies, contrasts, or contradicts. The effectiveness of the therapist's operations is based upon the fact that statement is tied to statement within the mind of the patient and from person to person. To achieve such connection, split-second observation and, if deemed necessary, reactions are of the essence. (Ruesch 1972[1956b]: 383)

The zero-sign game.

Meaning has always two aspects: a general one which is based on mutual agreement, and an idiosyncratic one based on personal experience. The latter can be made only the subject of understanding, but not the subject of discussion for purposes of reaching an agreement. (Ruesch 1972[1956b]: 390)

I don't agree. I don't think that everything individual can only be experienced and not recorded - or that meaning stemming from personal experience cannot discussed. Of course it can and we do it all the time. Despite not having access to each other's dreams, we do describe our dreams to others.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1969a]. Action Models. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 393-412.

The distinction between theory and model is significant. A theory simply is a set of statements regardless of whether these be coded in terms of words or in terms of mathematical equations (Simon & Newell 1963). A model, in contrast, is a device that enables the scientist to simulate certain events. Ackoff and associates distinguish three types of models: The iconic model has essentially the same properties as the original event it purports to represent, but with a transformation of scales; the analogue model has properties that are similar in proportion but the material body of the model need not be the same - for example, a hydraulic model may be used to represent economic events, or an electronic model may represent the flow of tidal currents; the digital model, finally, denotes processes in mathematical terms (Ackoff et al. 1962). (Ruesch 1972[1969a]: 393)

This is a weird mixture of terminology. (But it's good to know how iconic and analogue models differ.)

While the theories of the human psyche are based largely on inferences (Skinner 1963), action models, in contrast, are based on observation of the impact people have upon each other and the material world (Parsons & Shils 1951). Because effects are universally accessible to direct human experience, reconstruction of action is less dependent upon verbal sophistication and more dependent upon acuity of observation, previous experience, and common-sense interpretation (Schuetz 1953). Ideally speaking, any external model of human functioning should include provisions for accommodating information - be it in terms of words, numbers, or images - and for accommodating action - be it in terms of muscular movements, traces of motion, or impact. (Ruesch 1972[1969a]: 394)

These provisions of course include semiotic matters.

Social action is more difficult to represent, but nonetheless make use of similar principles (Panzetta 1967). The simplest social action is a physical movement directed at or involving another human being. Both humanists and behavioral scientists have been interested in the moving parts of the body and in the body as a moving object. Posture (Hewes 1957), facial expression (Andrew 1963), handwriting (Colombe 1966), gestures (Critchley 1939), skilled movements (Hartson 1939), kinesics (LaBarre 1964), and the whole field of non-verbal communication (Ekman & Friesen 1969, Ruesc & Kees 1956) are here of relevance. When movements of one person trigger movements of another person and both are considered within one system, it is referred to as interaction. (Rose 1962, Scheflen 1968). (Ruesch 1972[1969a]: 395)

A bunch of references to sources on nonverbal communication available in the late 1960s.

Although not explicitly concerned with action, Lewin (1936), in his Principles of Topological Psychology introduced the notion that behavioral events occur in a social situation. Parsons and Shils (1951) presented a sociologicla theory of action, while Bales (1950) contributed the systematic criteria for the observation of small groups. While these efforts were directed towards the development of a general theory of action, other scientists attempted to break down the complexity of action into multiple simplicities. Chapple and Lindeman (1942), for example, used the interaction chronograph to study the time duration of verbal activities; other authors analyzed aspect such as authority, social status, leadership, morale, and many more (Berger et al. 1966). However, information about one aspect of functioning is quite inadequate to predict the total impact action may have. In this sense, scientific analysis represents a form of hindsight which proves useful in the construction of theories but in itself does not constitute an operating model. (Ruesch 1972[1969a]: 399)

Citations and truisms.

Social change imposed upon primitive cultures cannot be confined to trade, agricultural innovations, and health care; it has to embrace material, symbolic, and emotional aspects of existence if it is to be successful. (Ruesch 1972[1969a]: 407)

More truisms.

Ruesch, Jurgen and Gregory Bateson 1972[1949]. Structure and Process in Social Relations. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 417-449.

These inequalities in scientific knowledge are, in themselves, a sign of the scientific difficulties encountered in the exploration of certain interpersonal events. Obviously, it is possible to investigate phenomena which either undergo a slow change as measured by the time scale of the observer, or phenomena which recur over and over again. In contrast, it is much more difficult to study either events which occur only once or events which develop a velocity which exceeds the time dimensions of the observer. With these difficulties, it becomes quite obvious that any investigation of processes of high velocity much be based upon some assumptions which, at one point or another, ignore change in time. Or to put it into different words, onem ight say that a scientist, in order to understand change, must be able to fixate his data at any given moment, assuming, of course, that during this moment no change will occur. The static fixation of data at any given time usually gives, in addition, information about the structure of events, that is, the arrangement and inter-connection of various features as represented in spatial diagrams, with omission of a time coordinate. Therefore, it is quite obvious that in the infancy of social science, the scientists went about to explore the spatial or hierarchical, rather than the temporal connections of events, and that in order to do these tasks thoroughly, they limited their systems to small units which one man could master. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 418)

In a similar vain the semiotics of space was born before semiotics of time.

In terms of this epistemology, we shall apply the word "system" to aggregates of ideas or information as well as to aggregates of more familiar kinds of object-and-events. We shall note, however, that systems of ideas and values can be effective as determinants of action only insofar as they exist inside human individuals or in the organization of still larger aggregates such as societies. "Mrs. Smith" we shall regard as an exceedingly complex aggregate of objects and events, a psychosomatic unit, about whom we, in turn, may have information of many kinds. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 421)

While the addresser and addresse of Jakobson are "verbal persons", Ruesch's sender and receiver are psychosomatic units.

6. LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIZATION
Vocabulary, grammar, syntax, script, signs and gestures, larger symbolic aggregates, and styles of art and fantasy expression. Historical symbols and monuments. Mythology. Religion. Scientific and philosophical systems. Games and recreational practices. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 423)

The field of semiotics.

In the first place, while interacting persons - including the scientist - may readily agree that the clothes of one of the persons are extensions of his body, in this agreement they are already using psychological terms which may cross-cut our categories. The observer, for example, may collect data to show that person A speaks or acts as though person B were a "body extension" of person A. A may, for example, treat B as a slave or emissary, but this does not mean thta B would agree to see himself as A's body extension. Similarly, material objects which would normally be regarded as body extensions may be substituted for persons. A "Jack" is an instrument which substitutes for a small boy; ships, machines, social groups, and even abstract entities - Good and Evil - may be personified. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 427)

Jakobson, too, touches upon personification and how the conative function "personalizes" the message and its context. Body extensions, btw, is a topic on its own, involving E. T. Hall, McLuhan and others.

In social matters the equivalent philosophy leads to systems upon which authoritarianism and coercion can be based - Machiavelly, Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Pareto, Sorel, Habbes, and the like. Considering the human creators of such theories one recognizes that many of them were extremely sensitive to problems of coercion. Some desired to coerce, others to be coerced, and others again repudiated coercion. In short, they were persons who had difficulties in their interpersonal relationships. This is the type of person who turns from the concreteness of daily life and tends toward more abstract, self-centered, and sometimes fantastic considerations. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 443)

My interest in the intersection of nonverbal communication and social power (in other words, coercion involving body movements) probably places me among this lot.

In these approaches the scientist of today has something to learn from the creative artist. The painter or the poet, even though he work alone, is within an interactive system. If his work were strictly representational it would be determined solely by the environment and by his representational code, as the image on a photographic plate is determined jointly by the objects in front of the lens and the geometry of the optical projection. But in this case he would be a craftsman rather than an artist, and what is essential is that his work - the painting or the poem - is an expression to which both the environment and the creator as a human being contribute. The difference between the camera and the artist lies in this: that the latter's representation is additionally determined by his other informations and values, that is, his self-corrective characteristics. Moreover, as the work proceeds, the brushmarks or the first words on paper become something to which the creator reacts. The finished work is an expression of this total interaction system. (Ruesch & Bateson 1972[1949]: 444)

The scientist, also, is situated in an interaction system (for example, the institution where s/he studies or teaches). The latter part about the artist reacting to his own words or brushmarks reflects this: "For in such a production [the writing of diaries and the production of a work of art] the artist throughout the process is stimulating himself by the stimuli he produces, and at the end of the process in particular he stands over against his work as a member of his audience." (Morris 1949: 213) This notion has its roots in Peirce's version of self-communication: "the self of one moment communicates with the self at another moment" (ibid, 213). In a word, autocommunication.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1969b]. A General Systems Theory Based on Human Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 450-465.

Whenever a human observer perceives an event, two distinctly different aspects are recorded (Ruesch 1966). The contractions of human muscles or the movements of physical particles in nature have a material impact that is judged by the criteria of the physical or biological sciences. Simultaneously these events, if perceived by an observer, have symbolic or representational qualities. These aspects are judged by the criteria derived from the information sciences and the humanities. (Ruesch 1972[1969b]: 453)

Or in terms of Kalevi Kull, the Φ reality is modeled by organisms in their Σ realities (Umwelten). The information scientists are too hopeful in their outlook, though, as (according to the host of Veritasium on youtube) they seem to believe that all events in the world can be "backtraced" or something like that.

The field specialists attribute statistical mass effects to the environment. But when a person interacts with another person, or a dog, this interaction becomes ultraspecific. The exchange processes between an entity and the surroundings therefore are based upon mass effects only when considered from the view of the superhuman observer. (Ruesch 1972[1969b]: 456)

I recall that (in a personal communication) Anti Randviir dismissed the concept of semiosphere because it's too philosophical and cannot be empirical unless, of course, there is a superhuman observer. The intent seems to be something like "if there aren't any scientifically cooperative extraterrestials then there's not much one can do with it", although at the moment I feel as if this "superhuman observer" could very well be something like a monitoring program that would mine data about mass effects.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1968a]. Psychoanalysis between Two Cultures. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 466-482.

Another very basic difficulty of the behavioral sciences bears on the fact that we simultaneously deal with actual and symbolic events. Atoms and molecules do not emit symbolic sounds as far as we know; but they do engage in physical action. But human beings are social creatures; they act, produce a physical impact, and at the same time engage in symbolic transactions. And very often the symbolic behavior does not coincide with the action behavior. To take account of this discrepancy, Freud introduced the concept of the unconscious, which in its day was an extremely versatile notion. In modern parlance, however, it is more useful to express this relationship as follows: When an action has an impact and the participants use terms that stand in a one-to-one or concordant relationship to the ongoing action, they are said to be aware of the events. When the terms are discrepant, they either are unaware of or they deliberately falsify the ongoing action. (Ruesch 1972[1968a]: 474)

This is an aspect of concourse that is difficult to elaborate. How much, indeed, do words and deeds concur? Are our physical movements and the representations we use to refer to these movements in a one-to-one or equivalent relationship?

At the present, then, theoretical advances are intimately tied to technical procedures. Re-enactment of events or simulation of natural phenomena by an external model is the path on which advances are currently made; and the results are tested in the construction of completely new worlds. The preciseness of the approaches does not permit fuzzy concepts to obscure the picture, and unworkable hypotheses immediately become apparent. According to this view, psychoanalytic theory should be translated into a computer program, and if this is not possible the theory should be changed until it can be done (Colby 1964). (Ruesch 1972[1968a]: 478)

Ruesch is way too trustful of computers - the naivete of his era? On another note, I notice that the newest reader on nonverbal communication contains a lot of "fuzzy", or what Charles Morris calls "putty", concepts. "The meaning of nonverbal communication" sounds way too general and no, it cannot be translated into a computer program.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1964]. Clinical Science and Communication Theory. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 486-502.

Communication between persons and beetween automata also differs significantly with regard to impact of messages and attribution of meaning. In the case of robots and automata, messages may have impact but no meaning; and they have impact only if receiver is matched to sender, the code is consistent and the machine has been properly programmed (Foerster 1962). In the human situation, messages not only have impact, but this impact may change the referential property of symbols, if not the code itself. In social situations both the sender's and the receiver's interpretations of symbols are forever undergoing modification over both the short and the long term. Because externally similar people internally are not attributing the same meaning to symbols and are changing the meaning in somewhat unpredictable directions, the laws of thermodynamics and concepts such as entropy, which are based upon the assumption of similarity and stability of particles, cannot be applied to social communication. (Ruesch 1972[1964]: 491)

The code! The code! The code is on fire! We don't need no dictionary let the code be modified!

There are a number of older and well-established disciplines which for centuries in one way or another have been concerned with symbolic systems and actions of people. The humanists and the social scientists believe that one person is linked to another by a number of complex processes subsumed under the word "social", which in effect denotes relatedness based on an exchange of messages. These older disciplines (Hoselitz 1959) are concerned with concepts such as language, symbols, values, roles and rules. While the mathematicians and engineers emphasize the technical aspect of sending, receiving and evaluating, the social scientists are concerned with the persons who send and interpret messages. (Ruesch 1972[1964]: 492)

Curiously, Jakobson's so-called "communication model" is not social, then, because the addresser and addressee are "verbal persons" that fulfill a linguistic functions. The addressee is not so much a person as an intended addressee - a conceptual person. In some cases the addressee is simply a concept - e.g. god as a "celestial addressee" or how in Juri Lotman's semiotics of fear the mass-psychosis was "addressed" to a non-existent entity, the witch conspiracy.

The "who" and the "to whom" of any communication must be described in sociological terms. People are known by name and address, by age and sex and by their role, status and function in a group. In analyzing a communication network the task is to identify out of a pool of thousands of people the one person who actually sent or received a given message. However, the answer to the question of who sent the message is found not only in the social characteristics of the sender but also in the message itself. The way a message is coded, phrased and timed frequently identifies the sender - a fact which is made use of in detective and intelligence work. These additional metacommunicative aspects of a message (Ruesch & Bateson 1951) which help to decipher the principal message can be considered intentional or unintentional, conscious or unconscious intstructions of the sender to the receiver. Thus we come to recognize that the social characteristics of a person are nothing else but signs of communicative behavior that inevitably enter the message and influence its interpretation. For example, a signal given by a uniformed traffic officer is a command; the same signal given by a 10-year-old child may be entirely ignored. Social role, status and position of the speaker or the receiver thus may annotate, amplify, condense or alter the fate of a message in certain predictable ways. (Ruesch 1972[1964]: 494)

Here Ruesch and Jakobson are actually on the same page: "By correlating the speaker's code with his own code of features, the listener may infer the origin, educational status, and social environment of the sender. Natural sound properties allow the identification of sex, age, and psycho-physiological type of the sender, and, finally, the recognition of acquaintance." (Jakobson & Halle 1962[1956a]: 470-471)

The "how" of a message is the domain of the code specialist and the engineer. In the human field the engineer is the linguist, the speech specialist and the neurophysiologist. His task is to discover how nervous impulses or sounds are made and received and how they are recorded. The linguist also is joined by the gesture expert and all those artists and craftsmen who specialize in nonverbal codes (Ruesch & Kees 1956). Much is known in this area, but the knowledge has not been systematized and no theoretical model exists which would facilitate analysis. (Ruesch 1972[1964]: 495)

Exactly 50 years later is he still right?

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1951]. Part and Whole: The Sociopsychological and Psychosomatic Approach to Disease. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 503-525.

An example might help to clarify the situation. When a physician attends to a sick patient, he has to be his own observer. To assume that he deals with a two-person system is obviously a useful simplification which does not quite correspond to the facts. Both the patient and physician have families, associates and other human contacts and both operate in a certain matrix which is made up of the social situation, the surrounding object system and culture at large which constantly transmits messages to both the physician and the patient. At any one moment there are circulating within the patient and within the physician a multitude of signals, a minor part of which is transmitted to the other person. (Ruesch 1972[1951]: 507)

Remember from Ruesch and Bateson (1951) that interpersonal communication is a reduced variant of intrapersonal communication. Also, that the social matrix involves not only "us" (in-group), "them" (out-group) and "it" (the "surrounding object system"), but also the cultural network with it's constant mass of almost anonymous messages.

Whenever an entity - be it cell, organ, human being, group or nation - emits a given set of stimuli and perceives the effect of this transmission a network of communication has been established. In human relations this postulate has been fulfilled when the acknowledgement of a message is perceived by the sender. For complete understanding of the happenings within a communication network, an observer has to consider all the messages, whichever direction they may take and whatever their nature may be. It does not matter whether the signals originate from a book distributed by a government agency, from a voice transmitting soundwaves, from the cortex which fires some efferent neurones, or from the muscles which produce lactic acid. What counts is whether a signal is transmitted from the source of origin to the source of destination, and whether the latter acknowledges reception, which event in turn influences the functioning of the primary source of information. An example might illustrate the case: A young man is spying upon a young girl swimming in the lake; as long as she does not know of his presence no network of communication has been established. But as soon as she perceives that she is being watched, her behavior will change, which fact will in turn influence subsequent moves of the young man. (Ruesch 1972[1951]: 510)

Again, very similar to Ruesch & Bateson (1951), also cf. the mu- or μ-function (Bateson 1972[1966]).

In recent years a profound change has come from the study of systems which have characteristics of self-correction, and are capable of predictive and adaptive responses (Wiener 1948). The reader will recognize that such systems closely simulate the characteristics of organisms and in fact we discover that implicitly such systems have been anticipated by physiologists such as Claude Bernard who in 1860 introduced the term "milieu interne". The concept of the internal environment and its constancy exerted a profound influence upon physiologists, but not until Cannon's (Cannon 1929, 1932) formulation of the concept of homeostatic mechanisms did the circular, self-corrective mechanism find explicit and official recognition in medicine. Today the majority of physicians and biologists utilize the concept of homeostasis as a scientific model to explain bodily processes. (Ruesch 1972[1951]: 511)

Wiki: "The concept [homeostasis or "milieu interne"] was described by Claude Bernard in 1865 and the word was coined by Walter Bradford Cannon in 1926." At first sight I thought this may be comparable to Sherrington's "deep field".

A fourth type of condition frequently labeled "psychosomatic" or to be facetious, "somatopsychic", is composed of persons suffering from permanent disability as a result of disease: the deaf, blind, mutes, spastic, arthritic and tuberculous patients including those afflicted by irreversible changes following operations or other mutilating treatments. (Ruesch 1972[1951]: 515)

"Psychosomatic" is a wider term than I had thought.

(c) Afferent and efferent messages are interpreted as coercive, the emphasis being on the change of conduct rather than upon the enlightening aspects of information. (Ruesch 1972[1951]: 518)

Wow. Does this concern the conative-imperative function? Afferent is defined in physiology as "conducted or conducting outward or away from something (for nerves, the central nervous system; for blood vessels, the organ supplied)." Wiki adds that it comes frot Latin, ad meaning "to" and ferre meaning "to carry"; and means "conveying towards a center, for example the afferent arterioles conveying blood towards the Bowman's capsule in the kidney"; and that it is opposite to efferent, which means "conveying away from a center". In terms of Tartu semiotics, afferent cultural process would entail a movement from the periphery to the center while efferent cultural process would entail a movement from the center to the periphery. This is not related to the conative-imperative function as such, but is a characteristic of the psychosomatic patient - treating institutional messages as coercive, because these are not as "enlightening" (referential, cognitive, informative) than regulative (emphasis on change of conduct).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1961]. Psychosomatic Medicine and the Behavioral Sciences. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 526-539.

The mind-body and man-environment dichotomies of Western peoples are conceptual and linguistic devices which facilitate the study and control of nature (Siu 1957). Guided by a materialistic philosophy and dedicated to technological progress, nineteenth century scientists believed that the abstractions that were used so successfully in the exploration of the physical universe also could be applied to the study of psychological and social events. Subsequent developments, however, proved them to be wrong. While for many centuries Zen Buddhists (Suzuki 1956, Watts 1957) have been familiar with the vicissitudes of verbal language Western scientists have only recently become aware of the relationship between language and thinking (Whorf 1956). Today we know that abstractions, dichotomies, and other dialectic devices are a function of the language structure and that words do not necessarily reflect entities which occur in nature. Only towards the middle of the twentieth century did students of human behavior abstain from breaking entities into smaller component parts and avoid the pitfall of studying one feature in isolation from another. In order to retain the complex psychological and social aspects of behavior, they finally arrived at the "organism as a whole", "Gestalt", "being in the world", "relationship", and "social pattern" kind of abstractions (Margetts 1954). (Ruesch 1972[1961]: 526)

A truism. Similarly, one should study communication in total, not just nonverbal communication (e.g. Birdwhistell and his noncardiac physiology analogy).

But in the behavioral sciences, laws of causality and determinism rarely can be ascertained (Lins 1959). Instead, there exist associations which Dewey and Bentley (1949) have termed "transactions" - that is, processes that are not causally related. Living organisms are always engaged in transactions with self, with others, and with the wider surroundings. This mass of relationships, as Jaspers [in Allgemeine Psychopathologie] has pointed out, can only be grasped by understanding and interpretation. (Ruesch 1972[1961]: 529)

Thus, what I used to call "Goffman's triad", and upon reading this book started calling "Ruesch's triad", may be Dewey and Bentley's triad. I'm talking about: (1) self; (2) other, alter; and (3) situation, context, environment. This triad may originate from before the 20th century - I still don't know. But it does have countless mirrors in numerous different approaches, from Karl Bühler to zoosemioticians.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1948b]. The Infantile Personality: The Core Problem of Psychosomatic Medicine. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 540-559.

In terms of the theory of social learning, the infantile personality is characterized by the following criteria:

1. Lack of generalization or over-generalization of modes of response associated with displacement of erogenic zones (Erikson 1946a, 1946b).
2. Paucity of instrumental actions, characterized by lack of diversification and lack of skill (Ruesch et al. 1947, Ruesch et al. 1948, Ruesch 1948).
3. Deficiency in the discrimination of cues; paucity of cues; inability to understand the multiple meaning of cues and roles; ignorance or repression of cues arising in self. These preprioceptive cues which arise within the organism itself are made up of cues contained in instinctual drives (hunger, thirst, sex, etc.), of cues which are the result of superego or self-interference (anger, anxiety, fear, shame, guilt, depression) (Ruesch 1948, 1949).

(Ruesch 1972[1948b]: 542)

"Infantile personality" sounds like a label that rightfully didn't last until the 21st century. These are not problems of personality. These are neurological disorders.

If in interpersonal relations an individual choose saction as the prevailing vehicle of expression, resolution of excess tension depends upon the possibilities of carrying out such action. While symbolic expression for the sake of communication needs little or no social space, action-expression needs a suitable setting; otherwise it results in conflict with the environment. Expression through action is, on the whole, gratifying only when there are other individuals who understand this type of communication; otherwise either there's regression or action is used to provide for substitute gratification, compensation, and alleviation of frustration without getting at the root of the interference. (Ruesch 1972[1948b]: 545)

I assume that symbolic expression is something like speaking ad expression through action is something like dancing.

The infantile character is chronologically adult but emotionally a child who has scarcely ever experienced successful personal relations. Hence, necessary foundations for utilizing insight therapy are missing, inasmuch as experiences remain isolated and integration does not take place. Verbal, gestural, or other symbols are not connected with affects and feelings, and consequently symbols have little merit for self-expression, although they can be manipulated in a manner similar to management of gadgets or objects. (Ruesch 1972[1948b]: 551)

This definition is correct, as the first meaning of īnfāns in Latin is "speechless, inarticulate", the second "newborn" and then third "childish, foolish". Speechlessness and inarticulation are infantile characteristics.

In psychotherapy, then, the therapist has to be aware that nonverbal expression is the only means of communication which the patient understands. As therapy progresses, an attempt is made to connect verbal content and manipulative procedure. The patient has to learn to utilize words for the sake of expression rather than manipulation, and to abandon the use of words as sound without corresponding meaning. (Ruesch 1972[1948b]: 553)

Because words are sounds with corresponding meaning.

Mature persons differ from the infantile personalities by having at their disposal suitable techniques for interpersonal relations and by having mastered problems of communication in terms of self-expression and self-extension, thus availing themselves of expressive signs which are derived from the somatic sphere, from action, and from verbal symbolization. In contrast, the infantile person does not possess the necessary techniques for social interaction and communication; hence life experiences cannot be integrated. In the absence of satisfactory interpersonal relations communication is limited; signs used for self-expression originate in the somatic sphere or are related to action, and interpersonal relations on the level of verbal symbolization are rudimentary or nonexistent. (Ruesch 1972[1948b]: 556-557)

What neat notions. Since I'm conspecting a month after reading, I don't actually remember what he meant by self-extension, but it sounds interesting.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1962]. Human Communication and the Psychiatrist. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 560-571.

Human communication is concerned with all the procedures by which one mind my affect another (Shannon & Weaver 1949). This involves not only speech but also the other forms of nonverbal and action beavior which people use to influence one another (Ruesch & Kees 1956). (Ruesch 1972[1962]: 560)

Not "use to communicate with one another" but "use to influence one another".

But a note of caution is here in place. Many of the concepts of the communication engineers cannot be applied to the human situation. Noise, for example, cannot be identified in face-to-face relations because we cannot separate the intentional signals that emanate from a person from the accidental signals that arise in the surroundings. In face-to-face communication we deal with multiple channels of transmission; these are not discrete, and their capacity is unknown. Also, we cannot determine the set of possible messages in any given situation; the amount of information transmitted hence is unknown and information theory is hardly applicable. The concept of entropy likewise cannot be applied because in human relations we deal with identified persons rather than with unidentified particles upon which the laws of thermodynamics are based (Frank 1951). The mathematical and scientific theories of communication never deal with content or the ways human beings experience events. Instead, they refer to quantitative and formal aspects of communication (Quastler 1955). (Ruesch 1972[1962]: 565)

This is much more realistic than approaches which naively discuss intention, information and entropy. In cultural semiotics, though, it is somewhat permissible because there a text is that "unidentified particle".

Therapeutic communication (Ruesch 1961) thus can be viewed as a regulatory process. When a disturbed patient is introduced into a communication network, the therapist and other persons exert a regulatory influence. The participants amplify or reduce quantitatively deviant messages of the patient, alter the timing, rearrange the sequence, and influence the rhythm of the exchange; meaning is clarified, and interpretative devices are mastered. All this is an art which has to be learned through experience. (Ruesch 1972[1962]: 569)

This is extremely valuable for my purposes (e.g. the regulative function).

Ruesch, Jurgen and A. Rodney Prestwood 1972[1949]. Anxiety: Its Initiation, Communication, and Interpersonal Management. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 577-603.

The events underlying this and other related accounts were made the subject of a study bearing on the observation that anxiety is infectious, transmission proceeds at a rapid rate and a person's sensitivity to the anxiousness of other people is great. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 577)

Cf. George Herbert Mead, conversation of attitudes and his famous dog fight illustration.

In anger, impending danger or interference has been perceived as a threat which can be managed, fought and conquered; action is contemplated or already undertaken, and the behavior of the organism has been coordinated for this purpose. In fear, integrated action is initiated to avoid the interference (Mowrer 1939). If for internal psychologic or external environmental reasons fight or flight is impossible, fear and anger change into anxiety. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 578)

In the triune brain version, there are three options: freeze, fight or flight. Anxiety would probably result when freezing is the only option. In a word, it is the ability to act that differentiates anxiety from fear and anger.

Gestalt. - Reaction to stimulation is determined not only by intensity and suddenness of the stimulus, with its cue values, but also by its relation to other sets of stimuli (Lewin 1936) and their arrangement in time and space. This togetherness and totality of impressions may by called its gestalt (Kohler 1947). Whenever impressions from the environment form a pattern and are perceived as being of approximately equal intensity, and when they appear to be coordinated, harmonious, regular, rhythmic and familiar, the person feels more at ease than when there is roughness, irregularity and strangeness. This observation seems to apply already to the human fetus in utero (Greenacre 1941), for the rate of the fetal heartbeat can be increased if a vibrating tuning fork is placed on the mother's abdomen, if a doorbell buzzer is placed over the fetal heart or if loud noises occur in a nearby room (Sontag & Wallace 1936). It also applies to the great apes, which can be terrified by large and unfamiliar objects or by strange events (Kohler 1925, Yerkes & Yerkes 1929). Thus, a group of gibbons was paralized with terror when trees were being felled, and many were crushed under the falling trees. Unfamiliarity with mutilated or unresponsive bodies creates alarm in both man and chimpanzee. Alarm with regard to strangeness is therefore not determined by the particular source of sensory excitation but by discrepancy of the total pattern from that which previously had been frequently experienced by the subject. The same principle can be applied to interpersonal relations. Unconsciously most persons combine the impressions gained about another person with their subjective reactions into a total gestalt. If there is a resulting unity of fit and feeling of well-being, the basis is established on which a good interpersonal relationship can develop. If there is a strangeness and disunity of fit, an alarm reaction is likely to occur, interfering with communication. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 579-580)

First impression is that this touches upon the context feature. But then this: "In most cases, it [the term "Gestalt"] is used in a concrete sense; it designates the visible or tangible form of a material body, especially of a human body." (Cassirer 1945: 118) Here, Gestalt is not very concrete. I am also aware that Roman Jakobson was influenced by Gestalt psychology in his Prague days, but I have no idea yet where to turn to get a grip of it. (Maybe here?)

In human beings transmission of danger signals occurs through various channels. Throbbing pulsations, blanching, blushing, sweating, tension, strained posture, certain forced motions, twitching, tremor, general restlessness, fatigue, sighing and rapid shallow breathing are all signs of an alarm reaction which can be observed visually and in the therapeutic situation. Speech and associated manifestations such as high-pitched, shrill, loud or tremulous voice, arrhythmic alternation between a high and a low pitch, sudden spurts, outbursts or rushes of words, overtalkativeness, lack of periods, pauses and silences, unfinished words and sentences, interruption of other speakers, snapping of words, sudden variations in speed, repetition of words, insistence, forced or inappropriate laughter are auditory signs which communicate uneasiness. The reverse picture can be observed in people whose uneasiness is communicated through long pauses, meager production of words, hesitating and faltering voice or introduction into speech of inarticulate sounds such as "ah" and "oh" or words such as "and", "or" or "well" which are then used as conjuctives for tying together unrelated sentences. Such signs of uneasiness were observed in sound recordings of therapeutic sessions, which neutral witnesses declared as communicating to them a certain degree of anxiety. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 581)

What a long list of descriptive labels. This is concourse.

Experiment 4: In this experiment an attempt was made to analyze the verbal symbols contained in anxiety and anger recordings. A comparison of 300 word samples of speech of 8 patients in three emotional states - labeled relaxed, anxious, and angry - revealed significant differences [...] which were arrived at by applying a simple analysis of words and expressions. The following aspects were analyzed and counted:

1. Frequency of expressions of feeling: e.g., "I felt bad".
2. Frequency of abstract nouns used to express abstraction: e.g. "thought", "life", "love".
3. Frequency of concrete nouns: "house", "tree", "bird", "ship".
4. Frequency of personal references: (a) nouns referring to persons, e.g., father, mother, sister or teacher or animals used in the sense of a person; (b) personal pronouns, such as "I", "he", "she", "we".
5. Frequency of (a) self-instigated action in which the speaker is instigator - e.g., "I ran away"; (b) of other-instigated actions involving the speaker passively, in which some one or something else was the instigator - e.g. "I was taken to school", "I was forced to -".
6. Frequency of qualifications: (a) subjective qualifications, such as "happy", "strong", "successful", "sad", "poor", "weak"; (b) objective qualifications, such as "American", "four", "green".

The results of this analysis are graphically demonstrated in the chart and may be interpreted as follows: increase in number of words referring to feelings, personal pronouns and subjective qualifications seems to be perceived by the listener as a state of excitement and of self concern in the speaker. In contrast, reduction in number of subjective qualifications and of personal pronouns with simultaneous increase in use of concrete nouns and objective qualifications seems to be perceived as representative of a more relaxed attitude, denoting an objective rather than subjective state of emotions of the speaker. Anger samples differed from anxety samples inasmuch as in anger expressions of self-instigated action increased in frequency consistently. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 586-587)

The first item, "expressions of feeling", is essentially the emotive language. I wonder if abstract and concrete nouns are somehow related to abstract and concrete reference? The fourth item takes care of personalization (first, second and third person and other "personal references"), although I would call these person references to avoid the connotation of "personal" as "private". The fifth, instigation, aspect follows the (presumed) Dewey-Bentley triad, which is neat. (This instigation aspect should be included in the study of concourse.) The sixth aspect is of little use for the moment - distinguishing subjective and objective adjectives seems useless for my purposes.

True communication can be achieved only when there is mutual understanding of semantics, syntactics and pragmatics. In the process of communication, then, perception of the external sign is followed by subjective identification through feelings (Saul 1947) such as anger, anxiety, fear, shame, guilt and depression or satisfaction. In true communication between two persons the external sign is used by one to elicit in the other those specific feelings and associations which when combined with the external sign will transmit the correct meaning to that person. This, of course, can be achieved only through long personal contact between the two and through the background of a common culture (Ruesch 1948). (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 591)

Equazilation of codes through culture. See "centrifugal and centripetal forces in language" (Jakobson 1971[1960b]: 421)

The principal distinction between communication and communization is to be found in the motivation of persons engaging in social contact. In communization the intent of the person is not to communicate, but instead, a common denominator is selected in order to establish a certain degree of commonness and to avoid the anxiety of strangeness. Activities, interests, possessions, health or the weather may be utilized as topics in common for the establishment of contact. Frequently nothing need be said at all,if, for example, events occur which all participants witness, since each participant then knows that every other individual through the common experience will have a limited understanding. Communization is a phenomenon observed in a variety of organizations and social groups, such as golf clubs, yacht clubs and country clubs. It also inevitably occurs in times of catastrophes and emergencies. There, a common danger cue, such as an earthquake or an epidemic, instils fear, fright and panic, and this common experience binds all participating persons together. Communization then partially substitutes for communication. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 591-592)

When Charles Morris defined communization as "the establishment of a commonage other than that of signification" (1949: 118), I thought he meant stuff like emotions because he goes on with the "becoming angry" example, much like G. H. Mead and his conversation of attitude. Here, actually, Morris's approach becomes suspect, because he delimits'communication' to "the use of signs to establish a commonage of signification" (ibid, 118). Every other act of establishing a commonage other than signification - be it emotion, attitude, action, object, etc. is communization. In this sense communization really is somewhat related to establishing communism, a society in which all property is publicly owned. But then this doesn't click with Ruesch's communization, which still relies on a commonage of signification. Ruesch's communization actually seems to concern the phatic function of Jakobson.

In social gatherings long periods are frequently spent in clarifying definitions and the semantic meaning of certain signals. After these external barriers have been removed and a common denominator established in terms of acceptance of the meaning of certain external cues, the process of mutual understanding then proceeds to encompass the internal and proprioceptive cues associated by each individual to these external events. If the participants have understood each other, it means that they have been able to understand what kind of proprioceptive cues the other person has associated with the externally perceived signal. This, then, creates a common frame of reference, and once it has been established - that is, mutual understanding has taken place - the behavior of the participating persons may or may not be adjusted to this perceived frame of reference. Understanding - that is, the assessment of one's own frame of reference, comprehension of other person's frame of reference and welding the two frames of reference into a larger gestalt - has to be followed by appropriate action. There are, however, people who can never appreciate consequences of what originated within themselves. They perceive the reality situation but cannot follow through to the necessary consequences. Although in such a case communication is possible, it will not lead to successful interaction or to a gratifying relationship. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1949]: 598)

Is that a broader version of metalingual operations? Also, compare "frame of reference" to "universe of discourse".

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1953b]. The Interpersonal Communication of Anxiety. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 604-613.

The prevention of panic is accomplished through leadership; leadership, in turn, is characterized by the ability of one or a few people to structuralize the communication network in such a way that origin and destination of messages becomes known, that instructions for action are simple and clear, and that, in case of doubt, messages can be checked upon. True leaders emit messages that are unambiguous and appropriately geared to the expectations of the receivers. (Ruesch 1972[1953b]: 611)

Thus, true leader must be well acquaintant with whom s/he leads.

Ruesch, Jurgen and A. Rodney Prestwood 1972[1950b]. Communication and Bodily Disease: A Stody of Vasospastic Conditions. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 614-634.

The male patients, with one exception, tended to describe their mothers in idealized terms; these were said to have been good, virtuous and understanding mothers. Fathers, in contrast, wer ereparted as having been rather distant and not particularly interested in the children. A not of rivalry was common when the conversation drifted towards the topic of father inasmuch as half of the male patients accused an older brother of having been father's favorite. All but one male had at least one older brother. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950b]: 621)

It's as if he's describing my family, except I don't accuse my older brother of having been father's favorite - it's not something I hold against him (they had common interest in cars, mechanics, electronics, etc. while I share a common interest in psychology with my mother).

The two components of any perceived message, the command-like aspect of the information and the enlightening feature of the information are well known to mature people. Similar to all immature people, our vasospastic patients tended to magnify the command-like aspect of any message received and tended to neglect the enlightening aspects of the information obtained. Likewise they felt that any expression on their part would necessarily act as a command to other people. This peculiar distortion explains their behavior in psychotherapy, in which they expected from themselves and from the therapist nothing but coercive manifestations. In order to tolerate the coercive aspects of communication, they needed an unusual amount of affection and protection which in turn rendered them resentful and hostile towards themselves and the therapist. (Ruesch & Prestwood 1972[1950b]: 627-628)

At this point I think that Jakobson did not as much neglect the aspect of metacommunicative instructions but diffused these in all other functions. That is why you can find metacommunicative aspects in all but the referential (cognitive, "enlightening") function in his scheme.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1959a]. The Schizophrenic Patient's Ways of Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 635-647.

First a word about the movements of schizophrenics. Through clinical observation and the study of films [Ruesch, Bateson & Kees, "The Child Who does not speak", 16mm silent film (30 min.)], it becomes apparent that the movements of psychotic children who tend to play with their fingers, make grimaces, or assume bizarre body positions rarely involve other people; instead they are directed towards themselves, sometimes to the point of producing serious injury. These children also show gross uncoordination of speech, and consequently they have difficulties in expression (Goldfarb et al. 1956). Many adult schizophrenics still display angular, jerky, and unco-ordinated movements which are carried out with unoven acceleration and deceleration at either too slow or too fast a tempo. In observing autistic, withdrawn, or outright psychotic children together with their parents, it becomes apparent that the adults frequently do not respond to the communicative actions of the child. An outstretched hand, ready to grasp, is not helped to the toy for which it reaches; a child running towards the parent is not picked up. The mother does not playfully and with time gladly respond to the interpersonal movements of the child; and in her refusal to acknowledge, to complement, or to develop the movement she undermines the pleasure the child may derive from communication. (Ruesch 1972[1959a]: 637)

Communicative actions and interpersonal movements are interesting variations of terms.

Language and Codification
Semiotics: Semantic processes are disturbed. (Semantics are defined as the relation of signs to the objects to which they refer.) Syntactic processes function well. (Syntactics are defined as the formal relation of signs to one another.) Pragmatic processes are disturbed. (Pragmatics are defined as the relations of signs to their interpreters.) (Ruesch, 1957.)
Discursive Language: Patients are not skilled in the use of discursive language, which is dependent upon conventions, and see in these instruments of control and coercion. (Ruesch, 1957.)
Digital Codification: Patients have an affinity for arbitrary symbols such as words and numbers - that is, digital codifications - but use these in an idiosyncratic way. (Ruesch, 1955.)
Sentence Structure: Predicate orientation in thinking, writing, drawing, painting, decorating and action predominates over subject orientation. (von Domarus, 1944; Arieti, 1955; Ruesch and Kees, 1956.) (Ruesch 1972[1959a]: 644)

This is a weird mixture of notions. I'm a bit dissapointed that Ruesch doesn't elaborate Morris's three-fold distinction (semantics, syntactics, pragmatics) in any way (it is all too common that these are taken at face value and no effort is put into clarifying further or doing something unexpected with 'em).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1959b]. Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 648-661.

In order to carry out psychotherapy we must use language. But the patient's tendency to withdraw results in disturbances of the language process. The schizophrenic has difficulties with semantics. Instead of agreeing with other people as to what the objects or events are that certain words refer to, he makes up his own definitions. Instead of consulting a dictionary, he appears to his fantasy. The schizophrenic uses symbols in an idiosyncratic way, and it is the task of the therapist to discover the private meanings that the patient attributes to the symbols he uses. The syntactic processes, which indicate the formal relation of word to word or sign to sign, are much less disturbed; and, strangely enough, schizophrenics do not show striking aberrations in grammar or calculus. The pragmatic processes, however, which include all the relationships between words and their users (Ruesch 1957), are highly disturbed. The schizophrenic patient does not realize that signs and words are interpreted and that they are interpreted differently by everyone who uses them. The patient's poor mastery of discursive language is in part traceable to the fact that he has not learned the procedure of interpretation. In order to speak fluently and understandably, the speaker must abide by the conventions that have been established for the use of words; he must be able to distinguish a question from a command and an appeal from an informative statement. But unfortunately the schizophrenic perceives the words of others as instruments of control and coercion, and in his own use of verbal communication, he often plays with a word or a number as if it were a toy. (Ruesch 1972[1959b]: 652)

Appeal is "a serious or urgent request, typically one made to the public". In other words, the speaker must distinguish the interrogative question from the imperative command and the imperative appeal from referential informative statement. The question here may be an exception to conation because Frageton may be emotive. // Another thing that's beginning to nag me is the feeling that perhaps it is not so much a communication disturbance to perceive the words of others as instruments and control and coercion. The "power turn" in humanities has shown that words indeed are instruments of control and coercion. He himself often repeats the formula that "information controls action, and action changes information" (see above).

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1952]. The Therapeutic Process from the Point of View of Communication Theory. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 667-678.

The elements which compose a communication system, therefore, embrace: a source of a message, usually a human mind; a transmitter, usually a human voice and gesture; a channel, usually space - sometimes it may be a telephone line; a receiver, the sense organs; a destination, another human mind in which the message is interpreted and evaluated. These basic elements of a communication system can be found in small, two-person systems or in systems embracing hundreds of millions of people. The only difference between small and large systems is the fact that in small groups the instruments of reception, transmission and evaluation are located in one organism, while in large groups they are distributed among many persons. In communication theory, a message of the government to the people can be treated in the same way as a message between two persons; and the mental processes of a single person, with no other people in sight, can be treated as an exchange of messages between a real person and a symbolic, internalized person. Intraorganismic communication thus becomes a special case of interpersonal or group communication. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 667)

A list of constitutive features, drawing on Shannon and Weaver. The latter bit about communication between government and its subjects demonstrates the kind of thinking lead to Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and corporate personhood (e.g. corporations are people).

The third question, dealing with an analysis of the destination of the message, raises the question: "To whom is the message addressed?" While in the field of propaganda and broadcasting this is called "receiver" or "audience" analysis (Smith et al. 1949), in interpersonal relations we may call it an analysis of the "addressee". (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 669)

This does make sense, but doesn't negate the fact that "addressee" has the connotation of involving mail.

In a fifth step the channels and symbolization systems are analyzed, raising the question as to "what media of communication have been employed". Thus a message may be expressed in words, being paraphrased by gesture and modified by some involuntary grunts such as coughing. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 669)

As Roland Posner (2004) has suggested, channel and media are almost interchangeable notions. The confusion comes about when one considers that here media is like "material" while some nonverbal researchers identify channels with codes (because of the plurality of kinesic, proxemic, vocalic, ocilesic, etc. channels).

The sixth problem deals with the analysis of metacommunication. The question, "How is it being said?" focuses the observer's attention not upon the content but rather upon the instruction as to how to interpret the message. Explicit instructions, for example, are given by a person who enters an office and introduces himself as an insurance agent. Less explicit are the instructions given through the uniforms of officers, judges, and other functionaries who, when they speak, assume that the listener identifies their words as being spoken in the pursuit of their official duties. Most implicit, of course, are those instructions which people assume needn't be expressed because they are shared by all - namely, values. The assumptions which people make about other people's messages take the place of explicit instructions given for the interpretation of messages.
In any culture, the ways of communication are prescribed by tradition. The signals used to evoke in the listener the appropriate set of assumptions usually are nonverbal. The intonation of a voice, the use of sequence, and the omission of certain details may serve as instruction. Furthermore, in making a statement, a person assumes that the other person has some knowledge about his omissions. If somebody smokes a cigar, we do not perceive his smoking the cigar but we also know that he does not smoke a pipe, does not smake a cigarette, and does not chew tobacco at this moment. These conclusions are fill-ins from our experience; they are value judgments which help us to interpret a message by evaluating the statements which have been omitted. These omissions, of course, exceed many times the number of statements actually made. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 670)

I consider the phrase "focuses the observer's attention" here relevant because it is essentially Ruesch's version of Einstellung (or empasis) upon a specific function. In this sense the questions that Ruesch poses in place of a model act much like dominant functions in Jakobson's parlance.

Most neurotic patients, and especially compulsive and phobic patients, try to establish social situations which will produce results which correspond to their anticipations. Though this is theoretically feasible, there is a flaw in such reasoning. Action is always different from anticipated action, primarily because the human mind telescopes events in time and in space and because not all of the obstacles can be accurately predicted. A neurotic person is unwilling to admit limitations of the human mind, and when failure is encountered further controls are initiated. The more controls are applied, the more failures occur, until action becomes so restricted that the whole system breaks down. In practice, the controlling tendencies of the patient diminish when the relationship to the therapist improves to the point where the patient can realize that he does not register failures and that he does not correct his performances. The task of therapy is to help the patient to abandon excessive control of self and manipulation on the other, until a happy medium has been established between control and adaptation. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 674)

"Telescoping" the future is an awesome metaphor.

The nature of the human communication machinery forces the individual to be selective in the evaluation of information. Since simultaneously occurring events have to be treated successively, the temporal and spatial representation of events is always distorted. All that the human being can do is to be aware of such a distortion. In his mind an individual can delay or speed up events; he can bridge distances; he can add, subtract, maximize, or minimize certain features. This ability, which is commonly called fantasy, enables the individual to better tolerate the frustrating aspects of real life. Fantasy acts like a buffer system; it provides for a delay of gratification. In therapy, then, an attempt is made to correct deficiencies which arise because a person is equipped with too little or too much fantasy. Some psychosomatic patients, for example, lack fantasy; they are unable to delay gratification and therefore to tolerate frustration. With the development of their fantasy, encouraged by the therapist, their physical symptoms tend to disappear (Ruesch & Prestwood 1950). Conversely, in psychoneurotic patients the excessive fluidity of fantasy has ceased to act as a buffer against the realities of life. Here the therapeutic efforts are directed at reducing the fantasy elaboration in an attempt at tying information closer to action. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 675)

Thus the function of fantasy is to act as "a buffer against the realities of life". When the protagonist in Zamyatin's We (1921) loses his fantasy, what should follow - according to this - is an inability to delay gratification and to tolerate frustration.

Communication can be used in a constructive or a destructive way. If a four-year-old boy runs to his mother in great joy to show her a snail he has found and she acknowledges this message by saying, "Go and wash your dirty hands", the mother makes a tangential reply which does not acknowledge the original message. To ignore, to reply tangentially, to willfully misinterpret messages, or to deny somebody the pleasure of an acknowledgement means to act cruelly. It is frustrating to hear a "no" where a "yes" has been expected, but both "yes" and "no" are straight answers. Not to acknowledge a person's intent is to use communication for destructive purposes. Many of our neurotic and psychotic patients have learned to use communication as a tool of warfare or as a tool of diplomacy, but never have they experienced the pleasure of sharing information. One of the most important therapeutic processes consists of helping the patient to experience the pleasure of acknowledgment. If the patient can learn to acknowledge the messages of others and therefore to be acknowledged himself without avoiding personal contact, the most important therapeutic event has taken place. If manipulation can be replaced by communication and if "person-to-person calls" can be substituted for "station-to-station calls", therapeutic progress has been made. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 676)

The issue of ignoring or avoiding another concerns the phatic function, or, more exactly it concerns phatic communion and the release of social tension.

Modern communication theory is concerned primarily with the formal aspect of communication; "what is said", or the content, is intentionally neglected. This viewpoint developed from the observation that content and form of messages are intimately connected, and that once the form of communication changes, the content must, by necessity, also change. Inasmuch as form and content are two different, but related, aspects of one and the same process, this mutual relationship can be utilized for scientific purposes. By minimizing content and maximizing form, communication theory aims to establish more abstract criteria of human relations. To use an analogy, one might say that communication theory is not concerned with apples or pears that might fall from a tree, but with the law of gravitation. The hundreds and thousands of varieties of contents inherent in human messages do not lend themselves for scientific consideration. However, the more formal aspects of communication can be approached with scientific methods. (Ruesch 1972[1952]: 677)

This applies to my current efforts as well: it would be difficult or impossible to consider all forms of semantics in nonverbal communication, but it is possible to modify Jakobson's scheme to shed light at least some aspects that are already familiar to semioticians. The analogy applies readily to other fields as well. For example, in the case of jazz-hop we are not dealing with jazz or hip-hop per se but with the disposition to fuse these genres and the outcomes thereof.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1956c]. Psychotherapy and Communication. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 679-687.

Whatever takes place inside an individual is accessible to another person only through some means of communicaton. Words which pertain to the psychological processes of another individual stand for inferences which the observer made by combining observations of the communicative behavior of the other person with introspective and observational data about self. The referential property of these words, therefore, points to at least two persons, and usually involves, in addition, some cultural standards. (Ruesch 1972[1956c]: 680)

Huh. This is an old argument - that signs are social because as soon as one tries to explicate or express any kind of signs, it is as-if communicated to another person. Here the argument is much more fleshed out. It is made clear that intrapersonal processes can be infered and mediated only through words that pertain to oneself as if one was another person. It's a classical autocommunicative I is an other situation: I can observe me as another person. The person in the mirror becomes an Other. The last bit about cultural standards is even more important, as culture offers a large stock of semiotic material for autocommunicative purposes.

When the verbal expressions of a person reflect both his actions and his thinking and feeling, then the study of verbal production is somewhat representative of the individual's behavior. But if verbal statements do not stand in a one-to-one relationship to action, emotion, or thinking - and such is the case in the majority of patients we deal with - then the study of verbal behavior becomes meaningless. Furthermore, even in those instances where people attempt to reflect their actions in words, they meet with difficulties, since only a few aspects of action are accessible to verbal representation in the first place. Verbal and digital denotation can only indicate arbitrary points on a continuum, such as:

1. The point of departure of action, e.g., the mental state upon first examination of the patient.
2. The point of arrival of action, e.g., the mental state after treatment.
3. The direction of action, e.g., the goals of therapy.
4. The impact of action, e.g., the effect of the doctor's treatment upon the patient.
5. Hierarchical or chronological sequences of actions, e.g., the events in the first or second week of treatment.
6. The type of action as expressed by verbs, e.g., talking, waiting, sleeping.
7. The context in which action occurred, e.g., in the office or on the ward.
8. The roles which the patient assumed, e.g., the student nurse in the role of the little sister of the patient.
9. The rules which were observed, e.g., freedom of speech and restriction of action during interview.

In science, there is today a growing awareness that the observer's way of reporting and the limitations inherent in language distort our own thinking (Ruesch 1954). Words are incapable of representing subtleties of timing, intensity or transition. To indicate the continuum of an action process, we have to employ nonverbal denotation devices in the form of moving pictures, sound, three-dimensional models or direct human re-enactment (Ruesch & Kees 1956). Words are aligned serially, and much time is needed to report the events that happened in nature simultaneously. Also, certain words denote abstractions, and because we have created different terms we end up by believing that the things we have honored with a label are separate entities in nature. Likewise, the position of the observer relative to the person or thing that is observed matters. When we are far away, we perceive only mass effects; from an airplane, people on the ground look alike. But if we move in close, we become aware of individual differences and the perception of these differences depends on how much we, as observers, differ as persons from the individuals we are observing. Thus, the process of perceiving, evaluating and reporting observations has become a subject matter in its own right; we might call it "scientific communication". The physicist's struggle with the theory of cognition and knowledge was at the root of these endeavors. Heisenberg's principle, indicating that the velocity and the position of a particle cannot be determined simultaneously and that the two types of information stand in a relation of complementarity, marks the introduction of the human observer as a variable into considerations of physics. But unlike the physicist who assesses, within the limits of the human communication machinery, the physical nature of events, the psychiatrist has to employ the observer's way of perceiving, evaluating and reporting in order to explore the patient's way of perceiving, evaluating and reporting in order to explore the patient's ways of perceiving, evaluating and expressing. Thus, communication is used to explore, study and report about communication. (Ruesch 1972[1956c]: 680-681)

Concourse! Concourse! Concourse! Verbal representations of actions are not - at least in my mind - as limited as Ruesch makes it out to seem. Aside from "cultural standards" there exists a body of phrases, idioms, expressions, labels, terminology, stock descriptions, literary and poetic references that accommodate verbal representation of action. I also believe that each culture and language has a somewhat different stock of these semiotic resources than the next. I also believe that Ruesch's list of indications can be appropriated for concursive analysis. The most important point here is (f), but others as-if work around it. In what measure, in fact, are words incapable of representing subtleties of timing, intensity or transition is up to investigation. Literature is a good source material for such investigation because literary characters are personalized and although the actions represented may be fictitious, the means of representation are very real. It may be possible to distinguish abstract and concrete references and to arrive at an understanding of how verbal representation of action works, what are its limits and possibilities. In the end, the study of concourse is a study of knowledge of nonverbal behaviour - in a word, an epistemological enterprise - and this body of knowledge will ultimately have to be compared to visual representation and other empirical evidence of human behaviour.

Such a theory encompasses all the inner events subsumed under the heading of attitudes, memory, decision-making, beliefs, emotions, thought, assumptions or drives; it includes nonverbal perception and action, and verbal manifestations of speech and writing as well. The unit of observation is not one person, but all the individuals participating in a given situation. In this approach, instead of talking about psychotherapy - its nature, value, and outcome - we talk about the effects of communication with self, with one other person and with many. (Ruesch 1972[1956c]: 682)

(1) Nonverbal perception and action is missing from Jakobson's so-called communication model; (2) The unit of observation in the study of communication is the communication system - the social situation; (3) It includes all levels of communication (intrapersonal, interpersonal, group and public).

In the two-person situations, which may be either dominated by one person alone or controlled by both participants, the exchange is, by and large, determined by only one set of roles at any one period of time. If a change in a relationship occurs, it is usually gradual. However, therules of interaction fluctuate rapidly, and the great art of interpersonal communication is related to the perception of signs that signal a change in the communicative context. With only two composing the system, each participant can devote his undivided attention to the management of the situation, being able to monopolize the other person's attention, to observe the impact of his own statements directly, and to rely upon the other's immediate replies. The feedback circuits are simple, and correction of information is relatively easy. The language used in interaction is more of the analogic, nonverbal type, involving a multitude of sensory and effector channels. Efficiency in expression and perception are hardly required inasmuch as statements may be repeated and messages may be redundant. Agreement and disagreement, both as to the stated subject and as to the underlying assumptions, can be tested to the limit. (Ruesch 1972[1956c]: 683-684)

I think I can forgive Ruesch for using the oxymoronic phrase "nonverbal language" here, because it's the 1950s and Birdwhistell's data is not yet in. Using the same phrase in the 1970s when consensus had been achieved that nonverbal communication does not constitute a language, is less forgivable.

Psychopathic persons, with their tendency to use action language, have mastered discursive language in part only. They have difficulties functioning in a group unless they can reduce the group to a two-person situation: the self is opposed to the rest of the group, which is treated as one entity - the audience. The schizophrenic patients, especially children, appear as if they had not mastered discursive language at all; they cannot function in a group, and in two-person situations only with the greatest difficulties. Even their nonverbal expressions can hardly qualify as language, inasmuch as they are idiosyncratic and not shared. Their somewhat angular and clumsy movements are in part the result of unsatisfactory cation responses by their parents, so that schizophrenics can be regarded as persons whose action and analogic language is underdeveloped (Ruesch [1972]1955a). The manic-depressives, in their depressed or manic phases, lack synchronization between verbal and nonverbal language. (Ruesch 1972[1956c]: 685)

The assumption i that most nonverbal expressions are shared.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1953c]. Social Factors in Therapy: A Brief Review. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 688-726.

Let us analyze for a moment what is meant by culture. Data pertaining to a large number of people who neither as individuals nor as a group are readily identifiable usually are subsumed under the heading of culture. The influences of tradition, of custom, of language, and of a host of other factors to which the individual is exposed in daily life cannot be examined individually; collective terms, therefore, are more practical for these more ephemeral mass events (Smith et al. 1946). With this construct, anthropologists, for example, are enabled to evaluate the influence of the newspapers, the movies, or the taxation system upon masses of people without having to bother about the effect of a particular movie upon a particular person. Culture this is a concept which exists in the heads of the scientists; it does not exist in reality. But nonetheless it fulfills a useful purpose (Ruesch & Bateson [1972]1949). (Ruesch 1972[1953c]: 703)

A similar statement could be made about the concept of "language". Roman Jakobson acknowledged that some approaches do make language out to seem like a linguistic fiction. We can talk about language, culture, and other "wholes" or imaginary entities pertaining to mass phenomena.

It is a well established fact that anything that a human being perceives, whether it be word, object, or action, will influence his conscious or unconscious body of information. Social factors then are nothing else but mandatory or enlightening messages perceived by the patient. In person to person communication, the origin and destination of messages are more or less known to the participants. In mass communication, through the means of radio, the press, and the movies, for example, messages are distributed over a network in which the identity of the receivers is unknown and remains anonymous. Social factors thus are all those conscious and unconscious perceptions by an individual which derive directly or indirectly from human beings and which influence the individual's thinking and his actions. Any individual operates in a social matrix consisting of a multitude of messages, the origin and destination of which are frequently unknown. This is the way the concept ofculture is understood in terms of communication. (Ruesch 1972[1953c]: 706)

Compare this to how Juri Lotman understands culture in terms of communication.

It is easier to do therapy with a white member of the western civilization who does not speak the same language than to do therapy with a person who speaks English but does not really belong to the orbit of western civilization. The difficulties are essentially related to a misinterpretation of messages - especially of the non-verbal messages - which are exchanged between the patient and the doctor. The cues pertaining to familiarity and distance, to status superiority and inferiority, to similarities ad differences, to approval and disapproval, are not shared in common; the basic assumptions about communication are different; the social approaches vary; and in this confusion it is difficult to find a common meeting ground. (Ruesch 1972[1953c]: 710)

It almost seems that in therapy nonverbal conformity and understanding is more important than verbal connection.

Therapy with political radicals is a particular psychiatric problem. At first sight, it seems but natural that different opinions exist about political systems. Upon closer scrutiny (Krout & Stagner 1939, Sanai & Pickard 1949), however, it becomes quite evident that rebellion against an existing political system, especially on the part of middle-class persons, is related to certain life experiences within the family. Judging from the literature, the problem of the revolutionary has changed little in the course of time; since time immemorial he has devoted his life to rebellion against authority (McCormack 1950). While useful to his own party in the early stages of a social upheaval, the revolutionary may be liquidated once that party has assumed power. Persecution and oppression enable the revolutionary to function well, but once in power he may not know how to act judiciously. Trained to oppose, he eventually will turn against his associates; in need of fight and rebellion, he eventually will make so many enemies that his own position and that of his party are endangered. (Ruesch 1972[1953c]: 713)

The problem of the revolutionary has nod changed because the problem of persecution and oppression has not changed.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1955a]. Nonverbal Language and Therapy. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 727-738.

I can quote no better words than those of Harry Stack Sullivan to introduce this discussion:

Incidentally there are people who seem completely staggered when one talks about nonverbal referential processes - that is, wordless thinking; these people might simply seem to have no ability to grasp the idea that a great deal of covert living - living that is not objectively observable but only inferable - can go on without the use of words. The brute fact is, as I see it, that most of living goes on that way. That does not in any sense reduce the enormous importance of the communicative tools - words and gestures. (Sullivan 1953)

Specifically I shall be concerned with the following facts: First, that mental disease is intimately associated with disturbances in sign behavior, language, and communication. Second, that disturbances in nonverbal sign behavior, language, and communication are associated with more severe and often longer lasting mental and nervous conditions, while disturbances in verbal sign behavior, language, and communication are associated with less severe psychiatric conditions. And third, that the way is now open for the development of new and more effective methods of therapy. (Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 727)

This is, by my account, the first blockquote in this book. The terms in this one are interesting.

Action language embraces all movements that are not used exclusively as signals. Such acts as walking and drinking, for instance, have a dual function; on the one hand, they serve personal needs, and on the other, they constitute statements to those who may perceive them. (Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 727)

In Umberto Eco's terms, these functions are denotative (intrinsically coded) and connotative (extrinsically coded).

Similarities and Differences between Verbal and Nonverbal Codification
Nonverbal codification	Verbal Codification
General Characteristics
The nonverbal denotation unit is a Gestalt, the appreciation of which is based on analogies.	The verbal denotation unit - either sound or its written representation - is based on phonetics.
The nonverbal denotation unit can be broken down further - for example, parts of a unit such as a photograph can be cut out and the details are meaningful in themselves.	The verbal denotation unit - spoken or written - cannot be broken down further; for example, there does not exist a meaningful fraction of the letter, word, or sound A.
Nonverbal denotation is based on continuous functions; for example, the hand is continuously involved in movement as long as the organism lives.	Verbal denotation is based on discontinuous functions; for example, sounds and letters have a discrete beginning and end.
Nonverbal denotation is governed by principles and rules which depend largely upon biological necessities - for example, the signals which indicate alarm.	Verbal denotation is governed by arbitrary, man-made principles; for example, grammatical and language rules differ in various cultural groups.
Nonverbal denotation is used as an international, intercultural, interracial, and interspecies language; it is adapted to communication with an out-group.	Verbal denotation is used as a culturally specific language; it is adapted to communication with the in-group.
Spatiotemporal Characteristics
Nonverbal denotation can indicate successive events simultaneously; for example, come and go signals can be given at the same time.	Verbal denotation must indicate simultaneous events successively; for example, a spoken or written report consists of words which are aligned serially.
Nonverbal denotation is temporally flexible; for example, a movement can be carried out slowly or quickly.	Verbal denotation is temporally rather inflexible; for example, words when spoken too slowly or too quickly become unintelligible.
Nonverbal denotation is spatially inflexible; movements and objects require a known but inflexible amount of space.	Verbal denotation is spatially flexible; print may be large or small.
Methods of nonverbla denotation such as sketches, photographs, or three-dimensional models can represent space superbly.	Verbal denotation cannot indicate space successfully except for description of boundaries.
Nonverbal denotation is poor for indicating elapsed time, but good for indicating timing and coordination.	Verbal denotation is good for indicating elapsed time, but poor for indicating timing and coordination.
Characteristics Referring to Perception, Evaluation, and Transmission
Nonverbal denotation can be perceived by distance and proximity receivers alike; for example, action may be not only seen and heard, but may also produce physical impact.	Verbal denotation can be perceived by distance receivers only; that is, it can only be heard or read.
Nonverbal language influences perception, coordination, and integration, and leads to the acquisition of skills.	Verbal language influences thinking and leads to the acquisition of information.
In nonverbal language, evaluation is tied to appreciation of similarities and differences.	In verbal language, evaluation is governed by principles of logic.
In nonverbal language, expression may be skilled or unskilled, but regardless of its quality, it is usually understandable.	In verbal language, expression must be skilled; otherwise it is unintelligible.
The understanding of nonverbal denotation is based upon the participant's emphatic assessment of biological similarity; no explanation is needed for understanding what pain is.	The understanding of verbal denotation is based on prior verbal agreemeent; the word paindiffers from the German wordSchmerz or the French word douleur, and the understanding of the significance of these words is bound to such previous arrangements.
Neurophysiological and Developmental Characteristics
Nonverbal denotation is tied to phylogenetically old structures of the central and autonomic nervous systems.	Verbal denotation is tied to phylogenetically younger structures, particularly the cortex.
Nonverbal denotation is learned early in life.	Verbal denotation is learned later in life.
In the presence of brain lesions, analogic understanding may be affected while repetition of words or ability to read is retained; for example, disturbances such as aphasic alexia or transcortical sensory aphasia indicate separate neural pathways for nonverbal as opposed to verbal codification.	In the presence of brain lesions, understanding may be retained while verbal ability is impaired; for example, verbal agnosia or alexia indicate again separate neural pathways for verbal as opposed to nonverbal codification.
Nonverbal codification involves complicated networks and includes the effector organs; for example, athletes and musicians go through certain warming-up motions prior to a performance.	Verbal codification involves the central nervous system only; for example, nomovements and no external perceptions are necessary in order to recall a name.
Semantic Characteristics
Actions and objects exist in their own right and usually fulfill not only symbolic but also practical functions.	Words do not exist in their own right; they are only symbols. Words, therefore, represent abstractions of aspects of events, the accuracy of which is a function of the human observer.
Nonverbal codifications permit redundancies.	Verbal codification produces fatigue when redundant.
Nonverbal codifications permit brief and succinct statements.	Verbal codification necessitates somewhat long-winded statements.
Nonverbal codifications are subject-oriented.	Verbal codification is prodicate-oriented.
Nonverbal codifications have emotional appeal.	Verbal codification exerts an intellectual appeal.
Nonverbal, analogic codifications are suitable for understanding.	Verbal codification is suitable for reaching agreements.
Nonverbal codifications represent an intimate language.	Verbal codification represents a distant language.

(Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 728-730)

This is one of the lengthiest such comparisons I have come across.

This thesis is supported by observations of the behavior of psychotic children who tend to play with their fingers, make grimaces, or assume bizarre body positions (Ruesch & Kees 1954 ["Children in Groups" 16mm film]). Their movements rarely are directed at other people but rather at themselves, sometimes to the point of producing serious injuries. As therapy proceeds, interpersonal movements gradually replace the solipsistic movements, and stimulus becomes matched to response. (Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 732)

This is what I call "nonverbal self-communication", although my treatment is far from framing it negativel.

Language functions have a direct bearing upon the practical aspects of therapy. First, a word about the distinction between somatic, action, and verbal language. If a patient walks into the doctor's office, takes off his coat, opens his shirt, and points, with or without comment, to his hives, he is using somatic language. If the doctor gets up, looks, and passes his hand over the skin, he likewise is using somatic language. If a patient walks drunk into the office, mumbling to himself, and plunges into the doctor's chair, he is using action language. If the doctor gets up, takes him by the arm, leads him to the door, puts him into a taxi, and gives the driver the patient's home address, he also is using action language. (Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 735)

A good illustration of "somatic language" ("body language" in the strict sense).

In his interaction with patients who are not masters of discursive language, the psychiatrist has the choice of either being specific in terms of action and leaving the interpretation implicit, or verbally talking about what has happened - being explicit about the interpretation but failing to reply in terms of action. Thus an interesting problem of complementarity arises. When action is denotative, the interpretation is connotative; when the interpretation is denotative, the corresponding actions become connotative. Since in communication the effects produced matter more than intentions, it is important that the reply be gratifying, personal, and specific to the patient. It is only through nonverbal replies that a nonverbal patient can be influenced; and once such nonverbal interaction has been established, the organization of the patient's experiences gradually can be translated into words. (Ruesch 1972[1955a]: 736)

This reversal sounds cool but I don't yet understand what it is exactly that he means.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1955b]. Transference Reformulated. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 739-748.

Some hold that transference includes only neurotic and irrational manifestations on the part of the patient in therapy (Silverberg 1948); others believe that it embraces the whole doctor-patient relationship; finally, there are those who feel that the concept should be extended to include irrational elements in all non-therapeutic, spontaneous relations of daily life. This particular controversy is summarized by Thompson (Thompson 1945), who writes: "Transference was not created by psychoanalysis... When Freud first described the phenomena which he grouped under the name of transference, he was merely clarifying something which had been used unwittingly by physicians in their treatment of the sick throughout the ages." And I might add that Freud was the first to describe some of the general characteristics of two-person communication systems, althoug he believed that the events subsumed under the term transference were limited to therapeutic situations. Today, finally, we have come to recognize transference as a general feature of social behaviour, an idea that I propose to elaborate further. (Ruesch 1972[1955b]: 739)

Ruesch himself similarly has outlined various aspects of communicative phenomena in the therapeutic situation that are equally valid in general face-to-face communication.

If two persons' mutual adaptation fits like a key to a keyhole and the behavior blends into the larger social framework like a doorlock into the style of the door, behavior is by definition adaptive, rational, and normal. (Ruesch 1972[1955b]: 742)

Metaphors. Congruous behaviour is normal.

It is interesting to note that the distinction between verbal and nonverbal language can also be applied to man's intra-organismic codifications. When people confer with each other, they use spoken or written verbal signals to elicit in the other person images and fantasies which by their very nature are analogic. But no two persons' sensations and interpretations are completely identical, and this analogic imagery is suitable for understanding only. (Ruesch 1972[1955b]: 743)

I'll take this as a go-ahead to distinguish verbal and nonverbal forms of autocommunication.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1965]. Psychotherapy for the Well and Psychotherapy for the Ill. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 749-762.

The psychological therapies, which include approaches such as psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, group therapy, hypnosis, and counseling, share in common the fact that communication is used to influence the patient. These procedures traditionally are verbal and content-oriented, whereby the referential property of the symbolic expression is given the greatest weight (Ruesch & Bateson 1951). The verbal therapies have often been compared to games (Haley 1963) in that the patient and the therapist communicate in a controlled situation, assuming standardized roles and observing standardized rules. Also the patient has to leran the therapeutic vocabulary and new ways in which to interpret verbal productions and behavior. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 750)

All communication is - at least in some measure - used to influence another person (or in case of autocommunication oneself).

Psychotherapy based upon the study of personality and experience is aimed at increasing maturation, differentiation, and individuation, and it presupposes the intactness of the following functions:
Perception of verbal sounds and behavioral clues.
Scanning what was perceived against the background of similar past experiences.
Reaching a decision as to what the perceived entity refers to.
Reaching a decision as to whether the message needs a reply.
Arriving at a choice of expression for the reply.
Timing and spacing the response so that it is intelligible.
Observation of the impact that the reply produces upon the other person. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 750-751)

These points are comparable to language functions in Jakobson, but also elaborate some important aspects of the actual communication process.

What are the conditions that interfere with the functions of communication? That massive stress, functional psychoses, and physical disease may grossly disturb the functions of communication is well known. Not so well known are the many conditions that may interfere with the functions of communication in a more subtle way (Ruesch 1957):
Perception may be distorted through inattention, excessive or insufficient food or fluid intake, emotional preoccupation, sensory deprivation, or sleep deprivation, or simply because the person has not learned to observe (Broadbent 1958).
Scanning may be deficient because of defective memory, inappropriate or disordely cataloging of experiences, or simply lack of skill.
The recognition of the referential property of a symbol requires selection of the most probable among the possible meanings. Low intelligence, oppositional behavior, or lack of experience may induce the person to pick improbable interpretations.
The choice of reply requires a clear appreciation of the total social situation. Knowledge of the probable expectations of the other person is necessary for adequate response. Socially deviant people usually are deficient in the assessment of the other person's expectations and they cannot appreciate the usefulness of conformist practices to establish communication.
Expressive skills may be unilaterally developed or the sense of timing may be off. Nonverbal persons possess expressive skills that are mediated through their bodies but not through words; verbal persons, in contrast, may be unable to understand gestures, to give nonverbal hints, or to interpret action.
The observation of effects may be deficient in people who are not alert, who are self-centered, and who cannot relate the actions of others to their own. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 751-752)

Some deficiencies are comparable to those that came up in reading Jakobson. And I did not expect Ruesch to use the expression "nonverbal person".

The analogico-nonverbal form of denotation is characterized as follows (Ruesch [1972]1955):
It contains features which in spatial configuration, color, sound, texture, smell, taste, timing, or rhythm are analogous to the events it purtports to represent.
Its perception is based upon appreciation of a total Gestalt.
It is not limited to vision and hearing but includes all sensory modalities.
The codification process does not require arbitrary assignment of static symbols; the representation can be a dynamic one and it lends itself for coding continuous functions.
Most analogic symbols are universally understood. Being basic to the experience of people they do not need legends or explanatory systems.
It is learned early in life.
It permits redundance.
It has emotional appeal.
It influences perception and decision-making little and does not distort the representation of original events to an appreciable degree.
It is understood by the in-group and the out-group alike and therefore is suitable as an international and inter-age-group language. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 754)

And yet there are explanatory systems and other representations of nonverbal behavior (e.g. concourse).

The failure of psychiatrists to bring forth a workable theory for therapy with the very ill can be traced to the fact that the majority of therapeutic theories took the association psychology of the nineteenth century as their point of departure. Unfortunately these approaches were based upon the tacit assumption that associations were representative of a person's thinking and experience. The prevailing concern with thought and memory processes induced both psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to overestimate the significance of verbal codification - a trend that was supported by the scientific-analytic orientation of our technological civilization.
At the present time more than ever we are captives of the world of verbal unreality in which the referential property of symbols is validated not against real events but against other symbols. Thus nobody ever sawa another person's dream; the therapist was not there when the events happened that the patient narrates about his past and the control analyst does not see the patient that the student describes. All exercises of this kind have the character of a dictionary game. A dictionary is characterized by the fact that every word is defined by the other words listed in the same volume; it indeed represents a closed system. To compensate for this shortcoming, some of the good dictionaries contain pictures, whereas in the customary forms of psychotherapy analogically coded material is rarely available. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 755)

A similar issue nags me with semiotic approaches that stem from de Saussure, because his semiology was influenced by that very same association psychology. The principles of contrast and opposition are workable if you're a linguist but won't do if you're a nonverbal semiotician. Even today, the Italian semiotician Massimo Leone writes: "Every expression, though, as linguists and semioticians of all backgrounds assert, results from exclusion." - Not all backgrounds, surely.

The anchor person. In addition to physical and somatic care, the mentally ill patient needs a steady companion who fulfills the role of an anchor person. In deep psychotic confusion this person serves as a point of reference. He or she has to be good natured, rather even tempered, available and accessible, non-coercive, and patient. Vocal qualities (Ostwald 1963), supportive and friendly gestures (Feldman 1959), appropriate bodily distance (Hall 1959), posture, timing, speed of movements, and smell are features which convey to the patient whether the therapist is coercive, naive, self-centered, rule-conscious, or angry. These clues also indicate whether the anchor person nicludes or excludes the patient, whether he retaliates in case he is attacked, whether he understands logical contradictions and double-bind situations (Bateson et al. 1956), and whether he tolerates being leaned upon without exacting an exaggerated emotional price. The anchor person thus serves as an alter-ego, lending support in perception, decision-making, expression, and action. At this stage the anchor person is not perceived as a separate organism but merely compensates for whatever social or physical functions the patient cannot perform. As the patient improves the anchor person becomes a distinctly different organism in the perception of the patient. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 756-757)

I just like the concept. An anchor person anchors you to the world.

The advantages of emphasizing communication in the process of psychotherapy are manifold. Above all other reasons, communication is the social function that interconnects human beings with one another. Rudimentary or defective communication is a most frustrating experience, as everyone can tell, and solitary confinement and exclusion from the group are among the severest punishments that are known to man. Without satisfactory communication people do not function well, and all seriously ill patients, regardless of psychopathology, suffer from some kind of disturbance of communication and are continuously frustrated because of it. If patients can learn to communicate satisfactorily they are put into a position to correct their information, to steer their behavior, and to act according to the necessity of the moment. If they can satisfy these conditions they behave like normal people. The advantage of using communication theory for conceptualizing abnormal behavior lies in the fact that the disturbance, the method of gathering information, and the remedy can all be conceptualized within one system. (Ruesch 1972[1965]: 759)

The social function is what should be instead of the phatic function in Jakobson's scheme. Instead of channel or medium the process of communization should be emphasized. In the end it does turn out, as Juri Lotman had suggested, that the notion of channel here embodies the function of memory.

Ruesch, Jurgen 1972[1968b]. Psychotherapy in the Computer Age. In: Sebeok, Thomas A. (ed.), Semiotic Approaches to Human Relations. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 763-777.

The world of the past was structured around people. Technology was subservient to immediate human needs; space was organized to satisfy the individual's sense of ownership and territoriality; history was written around the personalities of the leaders; laws defined personal responsibility; the social order was designed to regulate human relations; and control consisted of making people do what those in power desired.
The new world is structured around systems made up of man, machine, and the environment surrounding both (Boguslaw 1965). Technology no longer serves people exclusively; it also is subservient to robot and gadget. Persons no longer own land; they lease and share in rotation whatever facilities they need, and spatial arrangements have become collective and discontinuous. Man has ceased to be king pin in the modern order. The individual has become anonymous, and history is being written in terms of social movements or technological achievements. Our laws (Miller 1964) no longer can be structured around persons because within gigantic organizations responsibilities are allocated not to individuals but to groups. Responsibility thus has become collective and has been extended to include long-term effects of technological innovations. For these reasons, modern rules and regulations tend to be written around products or situations rather than around people. This new orientation thus is concerned with man-machine interaction, and control measures are geared towards keeping the whole system, with all its animate and inanimate componets, operative. (Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 763-764)

And the collection ends with a paper that more fully outlines his vision that modern age is not for the man but for the machine.

Human relations, of course, reflect the character of the individual, and vice versa. If the old order was characterized by small communities where human contact with the same people was frequent and contact with outside sparse, the new order requires contact with many people who are seen but occasionally (Ruesch 1967). Homogeneous groups have given way to heterogeneous groups and contact restricted to the ingroup is being replaced by short-lasting contacts with the outgroup. With this widening in number of casual acquaintances goes a diminished contact with the extended famil. Generations no longer live together in the same hous. Often they even livie in different states or on separate continents. The core family remains together as long as the children as small, but thereafter there is a tendency for the members to regroup with different partners (Berelson et al. 1966). (Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 764)

Here most of it seems to hold true half a century later. At least when it comes to widening of communication radius. On any given day I communicate more with people on the internet that I'll never meet than I do with those who surround me physically.

From a world governed by principle we are moving to a world governed by mutual agreement, always under the supervision of big brother, the information processing machine (Cox 1964, Lapp 1965). (Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 766)

At times the big brother even has a name, be it CCTV or NSA.

Most individuals are particularly sensitive to the image they possess about themselves. The precarious balance between individual identity (image of self when considered alone) and group identity (image of self juxtaposed to image derived from statements of others) can be altered by influencing perception and awareness concerning the differences that exist between self and others. Perceived social differences can be increased or decreased through three fundamental processes: understanding, acknowledging, and agreeing. Understanding is based upon the availability of satisfactory explanations that will justify the differences. Acknowledgment refers to the response received following a message addressed to another person. Agreeing implies the isolation of a certain topic within the universe of discourse and the establishment of corresponding views or opinions, a necessary prerequisite for action. Understanding, acknowledging, and agreeing all are gratifying experiences in that they represent steps towards ultimate action, with its tension-reducing effects (Ruesch 1961). (Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 768)

Reminiscent of Daniel Kulp's (1935) interconnected notions (opinion, rationalization, judgment, etc.). Tension-reducing function is, by Malinowski's original definition, phatic.

The modern therapist rarely treats a patient in isolation from his family or group. Therefore, once the therapist is called upon to assess, advise, or intervene in interpersonal or social conflicts he first must decide whether the differences should be increased or decreased. If he believes that opinions and views can be brought closer together, he will use methods that are intended to equalize information (Ruesch 1966). Among these are:

1. Communization, which is achieved through exposure of people to similar persons and situations, resulting in equivalent experiences.
2. Communicative exchange, which is facilitated by social interaction and contributes to a leveling of information and behavior and to mutual understanding.
3. Interpretation, which leads to a sharing of explanations to justify existing differences.
4. Coercive action or threats which induce people to change their views.

(Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 768-769)

These I must consider closely and in detail when I come to the regulative function.

The computerization of information gives every statement two faces: the official version which is entered on the IBM card or tape, and the private version which remains anonymous (Gardner 1962). This dual aspect of communication will change our lives profoundly, and a word about the computer may be in place.
In the first million years of man's technological evolution were devoted tot he extension of his motor system, the last four hundred years have added extensions of his sensory system. Only within this century have machines been made to amplify his central functions, and by now the computer has been accepted as man's auxiliary brain (Feigenbaum 1963). The computer works on a binary system, and it can compute at a rate that is easily a thousand times faster than the human brain; its components are arranged in series, but all of them have to be in working order if it is to function properly. The brain, in contrast, has about a thousand times more nerve cells than the largest computer, occupies considerably less space, and works on a multiple input system that can process different kinds of information simultaneously. While computers can attend to one task at a time accurately and speedily, the brain can pursue several things simultaneously but with less accuracy. Loss of cells does not appreciably influence the functioning of the brain as a whole, a feature that is helpful in the survival of the individual (Crick 1966).
Computers lends themselves superbly for information storage and retrieval (Kent & Taulbee 1965). Journals, books, and possibly personal notes in the future will be stored electronically. Access to the electronic memory is gained through dialling from one's desk, reaching the desired page in the microlibrary in a matter of seconds. Computers also are helpful in collating data, compiling statistics, calculating, making medical diagnoses, or assessing personality (Korein et al. 1963, 1966a, 1966b). (Ruesch 1972[1968b]: 771)

That's it!

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