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A civically pertinent science

Teaduslugu (FLFI.03.098) [Kevad 2021]

Shapin, Steven 2006. The Man of Science. In: Daston, Lorraine; Park, Katharine (eds.), The Cambridge History of Science Vol. 3: Early Modern Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179-191. [ESTER]

It is difficult to refer to the early modern man of science in other than negative terms. He was not a "scientist": The English word did not exist until the nineteenth century, and the equivalent French term - un scientifique - was not in common use until the twentieth century. Nor did the defined social and cultural position now picked out by "the scientist's role" exist in the early modern period. The man of science did not occupy a single distinct and coherent role in early modern culture. There was no one social basis for the support of his work. Even the minimal organizing principle for any treatment of the man of science - that he was someone engaged in the investigation of nature - is, on reflection, highly problematic. (Shapin 2006: 179)

Esimene lugemine oli seminari tarbeks, teine lugemine essee tarbeks. Üks küsimustest on, "Kas on õigustatud rääkida varauusaegsetest teadlastest või on need erinevused liiga sügavad?" Siin ilmneb, et varauusaegne teadusmees ei olnud "teadlane". Sõna "teadus" ei olnud veel kasutuses ja teadlase rolli veel ühiskondlikult ja kultuuriliselt ei eksisteerinud. Teadusmeestel ei olnud ühtset, selgepiirilist ja kooskõlalist rolli varauusaegses kultuuris. Nende töö toetuseks ei olnud ühte kindlat ühiskondlikku alust (nt ülikoolid).

Despite the legitimacy of asking how the relatively stable professionalized role of the modern scientist emerged from diverse sixteenth- and seventeenth-century arrangements, it would be misleading to mold historical inquiry solely to fit the contours of present-day interest in "origins stories" or to construe historical inquiry solely as a search for traces of present arrangements. (Shapin 2006: 180)

Päritolu või põlvnemise küsimus. Varauusaegsete teadusmeeste mitmekesisusele ei tasuks läheneda tänapäeva teaduse seisukohalt, otsides praegu eksisteerivatele rollidele eellasi justkui teaduse areng oleks sirgjooneline ja paratamatult praeguse konfiguratsioonini viiv.

Early modern scientific work - of whatever version - was pursued within a range of traditionally established social roles. One has to appreciate the expectations, conventions, and ascribed attributes of those existing roles, as well as the changes they were undergoing and their mutual relations, in order to understand the social identities of men of science in the period. Yet, vital as it is to insist on the heterogeneity of existing roles in which natural knowledge was harbored and extended in the early modern period, a brief survey such as this one can treat just a few of the more consequential roles - and here I have elected to focus on the university scholar or professor, the medical man, and the gentleman. (Shapin 2006: 180)

Shapin keskendub nende rollide mitmekesisuses kolmele: ülikooli õpetlane või professor, meditsiinimees, ja härrasmees. Järgneval leheküljel jätkub, et ta jätab sellest arutelust välja usumeeste (clerical) rolli, mis osaliselt kattub ülikooli õpetlaseomaga. Preestritel oli kahtlemata oluline roll, mida ei saa ületähtsustada (vt. Shapin 2006: 181).

Still other major scientific and philosophical figures spent much of their careers as amanuenses, clerks, tutors, or domestic servants of various kinds of members of the centry and aristocracy, a common career pattern for Renaissance humanist intellectuals in several countries. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) functioned in a variety of domestic service roles to the Cavendish family for almost the whole of his adult life, and one of John Locke's (1632-1704) first positions was as private physician, and later as general secretary, to the Earl of Shaftersbury. (Shapin 2006: 181)

Paljud teadusfifuurid olid assistendid (amanuenses), ametnikud (clerk), eraõpetajad (tutors) või teenijad (domestic servants). Hobes oli teenija, Locke oli arst ja sekretär.

Relationships binding the practice of science to the patronage of princes and wealthy gentlemen were pervasive and consequential: The significance of the Tuscan court's patronage for Galileo Galilei's "socioproffessional identity" and for the direction of his scientific work has been vigorously asserted, and the importance of patronage and clientage relations for the careers and authority of very many other notable early modern men of science - and for the authority of the knowledge they produced - merits much fuller study. (Shapin 2006: 181)

Teadusmehed olid sageli rikaste härrasmeeste või printside teenistuses. Selles osas meenutab teadusmeeste rolli luuletajate oma ~13. sajandi kandis. Olen entsüklopeediast talletanud mõned sellised juhtumid, millest kõige silmatorkavam oli üks, kus tüüp kirjutas mingile printsile ülistava luuletuse ja ainult selle põhjal sai rikkaks meheks, kes omas mitut villat ja oli terveks eluks majanduslikult kindlustatud.

Finally, a more extensive account of the early modern man of science would treat a whole range of less exalted figures - mathematical practitioners, instrument makers, lens grinders, and various types of "superior artisans" - whose significance both for the practical conduct of scientific research and for the development of empirical methods was much insisted upon by the Marxist historiography of the 1930s and 1940s and as vigorously denied by idealist historians. (Shapin 2006: 181)

Veel mõned olulised rollid: matemaatikud, instrumentide valmistajad, läätselihvijad ja mitmesugused muud kõrgemad meistrid. Läätselihvijatest kõige olulisem on ilmselt Spinoza. Matemaatikute hulgast ehk Leibniz. Marksistlik historiograafia meikib senssi, sest see rõhutab jällegi, et kõige olulisem roll on töölisel. Shapini järgi on kõige olulisem sotsiaalne eristus siiski kirjaosklike ja kirjaoskamatute vahel (vt. Shapin 2006: 182). Kirjaosklike osakaal oli üliväike.

By no means all noteworthy early modern men of science were systematically shaped by university training. Among those who did not formally attend university at all were Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Robert Boyle (1627-1691), and René Descartes (1596-1650), though Descartes' training at the Jesuit school of La Flèche was considerably more significant to his intellectual development than was Boyle's time at Eton College. At both ends of the social scale, the future man of science might escape university training - those being bred to artisanal or mercantile work, such as the potter and natural historian Bernard Palissy (1510-1590) or the merchant and microscopist Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723), because they lacked the means or current interest, and the aristocrat (e.g., Boyle) because private resources might be preferred and because there was no professional or material inducement to secure formal [|] training. For a large number of other men of science, university education was part of a background preparation for roles in civic life, and the acquisition of scientific expertise, or at least of that expertise for which they became known, occurred elsewhere. The mathematician Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) and the astronomer Johannes Hevelius (1611-1687) studied law at a university, as did many other future men of science; William Gilbert (1544-1603), author of De magnete (On the Magnet, 1600), and the mathematician and physicist Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637) studied medicine; and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) studied mainly theology. (Shapin 2006: 182-183)

Mõned märkimisväärsed varauusaegsed teadusmehed ei käinud üldse ülikoolis. Mõned samas said mingi hariduse religioossetest õppeasutustest. Ülikoolis õppimine oli tol ajal kallis (ka Eesti ajaloos on mäletatavasti sage juhtum, et kõrgharidus omandatakse mõne rikkuri patronaaži all). Paljude teadusmeeste jaoks oli ülikool ka vaid osaline ettevalmistus tulevaseks teadustööks, sest ülikoolis valmistuti hoopis avaliku ametniku positsiooni tarbeks. Siin antud näited - juura, meditsiin, ja teoloogia - vastavad ka tollasele ülikooli struktuurile - ka Tartu Ülikoolis oli alguses vist neli teaduskonda, just need siin nimetatud ja üks veel. Kui mälu ei peta, siis see neljas võis olla "filosoofia", mille all mõeldi loodusteadusi.

In their mature careers, however, many scientific practitioners in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were professionally engaged by universities or related institutions of higher learning, though the proportion of these among the great figures making up the canon of early modern science can be overestimated. Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), Galileo, and Isaac Newton (1642-1727) were professors (for at least part of their careers), whereas Copernicus, Kepler, Bacon, Descartes, Mersenne, Pascal, Boyle, Tycho Brahe (1546-1601), and Christian Huygens (1629-1695) were not. Moreover, the professorial role was by no means a stable one. Although for late twentieth-century scientists a permanent university appointment generally represents a natural career culmination, this was not necessarily the case for the early modern man of science. Occupying a university chair or fellowship might be just an episode in a career that included a variety of other social roles. There was indeed an early modern pattern of using university employment as a stepping stone to more desirable positions directly supported by court patronago. (Shapin 2006: 183)

Paljud teadusmehed olid ülikoolidega seotud, aga professoriamet ei olnud väga stabiilne ja seda kasutati sageli hoopis astmena (stepping stone) parema ameti peale saamiseks, näiteks kuningliku õukonna hulgas. Kui mälu ei peta, siis osaliselt oli asi selles, et õppejõud võtsid õpilastelt otse õppetasu ja professori palk ("teenistus") sõltus otseselt sellest, kui palju sa suutsid endale õpilasi muretseda.

Both Isaac Barrow (1630-1677) and his successor in the Cambridge Lucasian Chair of Mathematics, Isaac Newton, abandoned their university appointments while they were relatively young men - Barrow for brighter prospects as a royal chaplain (returning to Cambridge later as Master of Trinity and University Vice Chancellor), and Newton (after health problems) to become an official of the Royal Mint. Their contemporary Seth Ward (1617-1689), the Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford, gave up his professorial career in early middle age, accepting several church livings and ultimately becoming bishop of Exeter. (Shapin 2006: 183)

Mõned näited sellistest ametitest väljaspool ülikooli: õukonna kaplan, ametnik riigikassas (Royal Mint), ja kirikuga seotud rollid. Need kolm viitavad ka põhilistele varauusaegsetele sotsiaalsetele institutsioonidele.

Hence the identification of scientific work with the professorial career was significant but tenuous and patchy during the early modern period. If you were, for example, a cleric-professor, or a physician-professor, then it needs no special explanation that you gave up your chair - and even gave up your scientific research - when better-paid or more prestigious ecclesiastical or medical opportunities presented themselves. (Shapin 2006: 184)

Siin ilmnevad põhilised põhjused ülikoolisüsteemist väljumiseks. Denis Papin olevat lahkunud professoriametist, sest palk oli nigel ja õpetamiskoormus liiga suur ("miserable salary and heavy teaching load", ibid, 184). Muud ametid olid tasuvamad ja prestiižsemad. Seega teadustöö ja professoriamet kattusid vaid osaliselt, lapitiselt. Shapin nimetab järgmiseks kolm asjaolu, mis soodustasid ametlikku seost ülikooliga. Esimene neist on seos kristliku religiooni organisatsioonidega. Nimelt olid ülikoolid varauusaegsel perioodil laialdaselt kiriku kontrolli all. Kristlike doktriinide tõekstunnistamine oli Shapini järgi üldiseks tingimuseks ülikooli astumiseks, lõpetamiseks, ja professoriametisse astumiseks (vt. Shapin 2006: 184).

Second, the university combined curatorial and culturally reproductive roles, and its professors' activities and identities were primarily understood in those lights. Universities signified both responsible custodianship of the knowledge inherited from the past and its reliable transmission to future generations, and, although a significant number of professors took it upon themselves to engage in research that challenged orthodox beliefs, nowhere in early modern Europe was such a conception of the professorial role standard. Original research was not, so to speak, a role requirement. (Shapin 2006: 184)

Teiseks aspektiks on see, et ülikool "taastootis" olemasolevat kultuuri, oli traditsiooni jätkamise aluses. Siia võib lisada filosoofia ajaloost seik, et kuni Descartese, Locke'i ja Hume'ini ei olnud filosoofia eriliselt traditsioonikriitiline. Uue teadmise tootmine ei olnud hädavajalik tingimus. Siin võib eristada ka õpetaja ja uurija rolle, mis on ka tänapäeval ülikoolides tajutavad: õppejõu põhiline institutsionaalne roll on olemasolevate teadmiste edasiandmine uuele põlvkonnale - õpetamine. "Uurija" või "teaduri" roll võib hõlmata õpetamistööd, aga on ka rolle, mis seda ei hõlma - eksisteerivad ka "lugejad" (readers), kelle põhiline töö ongi lugeda teadustöid ja koondada informatsiooni. Traditsiooni säilitamise osas võib siin viidata Uku Masingu varajasele kirjatükile sellest, kuidas just kirik on kõige stabiilsem traditsiooni säilitamise vahend (vt. Masing 1989a). Kui mälu ei peta, siis kirjutas ta selle II MS eelõhtul või ajal ja oli siiralt mures, et kogu Lääne kultuur jääb tankiroobaste alla ja sureb.

Third, affiliation with the university associated the man of science with specific hierarchical social forms: The master was understood to be a master of knowledge traditionally accumulated and traditionally vouched for, and his institutional purpose was to transmit that mastery to future generations. The value placed on these hierarchical forms implicated the value placed on traditional forms of knowledge. The "modern" assault on school-knowledge proceeded importantly by way of criticisms of the schools' hierarchical social forms and the role of the professor in those forms. The university setting vouched for expertise, authenticity, and orthodoxy, and those ascribed characteristics spoke in favor of the knowledge housed there. But to those of a mind to criticize university arrangements, the same site and role were associated with authoritarianism, dogmatism, pedantry, [|] disputatiousness, and melancholic sequestration from the civic and material worlds. (Shapin 2006: 184-185)

Kolmandaks ülikooli autoriteet. See on mõistetav ka tänapäeval: kedagi, kes pole ülikoolis käinud, võib pelgalt selle tõsiasja tõttu mitte tõsiselt võtta. Mitte, et ülikooliharidus oleks mingi garantii - "Ülikoolilõpetamine iseendast ju pole veel kedagi teinud intelligentseks, inimene võib ülikooliski leppida valmispuretud toiduga ja olla õnnelik, et alma mater muretseb nii emalikult talle suhu nämmi kogu eluajaks" (Masing 1989a: 148). Küsimus on pigem selles, et ülikooliharidust tajutakse mingisuguse garantiina. Edasi kõneleb Shapin sellest, kuidas seitsmeteistkümnenda sajandi keskel tulid esile uued teaduslikud ühiskonnad, mis eneseteadlikult vastandusid ülikoolidele. Tekkisid "uurijate kogukonnad" (community of inquiring equals, mis sarnaneb väga Peirce'i sõnastusele community of inquirers). Rõhk on siin nähtavasti selles, et erinevalt ülikooli hierarhilisusest olid sellistes seltskondades uurijad omavahel võrdsed. Sama aspekti rõhutatakse sageli Tartu-Moskva Koolkonna eripärana - omade seltsis ollakse võrdsed (peaaegu nagu κοινά τά φιλων). Põhiline on siin vististi see, et need teaduslikud seltskonnad olid teistsuguste väärtushinnangutega kui tollane ülikoolistruktuur. Nimetatud omadused on tänapäeval tugevalt seotud teadlase eeskujuga üldiselt: helged pead, kes ei rivaalitse või kadetse, ei varasta (plagieeri) teiste tööd, ei tegele pettusega ja ei ürita saada ususekti asutajaks (vt. Shapin 2006: 185).

In such venues, disapproving assessments of the professorial character precipitated by negation, as it were, the developing identity of the free academic member of the Republic of Science. Yet, apart from a very general commitment to a harmoniously collaborative - or at least collective - pursuit of natural knowledge, there is no single coherent pattern to be discerned in the establishment or structure of seventeenth-century scientific societies. Members of the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris enjoyed substantial Crown pensions and devoted themselves effectively to the extension of state power through reformed natural knowledge and technology, but, although fellows of the Royal Society of London intermittently expressed their desire to realize the imperializing dreams of the utopian research institute described in Bacon's New Atlantis (1627), the English Crown offered no stipends and little financial support. Charles II laughed at them for wasting their time on intellectual trivialities. (Shapin 2006: 185)

Üldine tendents sellistes seltskondades oli harmoonilisele koostööle, aga nende hulgast ei tule esile üks selge muster. Prantslased üritasid loodusteaduse uuendamise ja tehnoloogia arendamise kaudu laiendada riigivõimu, inglased väljendasid soovi realiseerida Bacon'i utoopilist nägemust, mille üle kuningas naeris.

Membership in a scientific society or academy therefore had no one stable significance for the identity of the seventeenth-century man of science, though eighteenth-century developments, and especially patterns emerging in France, did eventually make the academic role increasingly important for scientific identity. The role of the seventeenth-century scientific academician might be recognized as a modified form of long-standing social roles - the court bureaucrat or the recipient of Crown patronage - or, where the ties between scientific societies and the state were weaker, patterns of gentlemanly conversation and virtuosity might be more central to his identity. In the former case, the contribution of academic membership to the recognized role of the man of science could be substantial; in the latter, the significance of such membership might be subsumed in the gentlemanly role. (Shapin 2006: 186)

Seega ka teaduslikesse ühiskondadesse kuulumine ei andnud vähemalt seitsmeteistkümnendal sajandil teadusmeestele ühtset identiteeti. Alles kaheksateistkümnendal sajandil, eriti Prantsusmaal, hakkasteadlaste identiteedi jaoks akadeemiline roll järjest tähtsamaks saama. Seitsmeteistkümnendal sajandil oli teadusmehe roll veel traditsiooniliste sotsiaalsete rollide erivormid - õukonna bürokraadiks või kuninga teenistuses olemine. Riigivõimust kaugemal oli teadlase identiteedi jaoks kesksem härrasmehelik vestlus ja vooruslikkus (st teadusmeeste omavahelised sotsiaalsed läbikäimised olid olulisemad kui institutsionaalsed rollid, vt nt Transactions of the Royal Society varajaseid numbreid, kus on pmst üks sõpruskildkond, kes omavahel vahetavad informatsiooni usaldusväärsematelt allikatelt - inimestelt, keda nad isiklikult teavad ja usaldavad). Riigivõimule lähemal oli akadeemiline kuuluvus tähtsam, riigivõimust kaugemal oli akadeemiline kuuluvus pelgalt osa härrasmehelikkusest.

The profession of medicine also associated the pursuit of natural knowledge with recognized and authoritative early modern social roles, and many medical men pursued scientific investigations within the rubric of a professorial role, such as Vesalius (at Padua) and Marcello Malpighi (1628-1694) (at Bologna). Established colleges of physicians and surgeons might also offer quasi-academic roles, such as the lectureship on surgery held for many years by William Harvey (1578-1657) at the London Royal College of Physicians. Nevertheless, the medical role was one that in principle provided for the authoritative pursuit of natural knowledge outside the rubric of the [|] universities or, indeed, of incorporated learning. To become a physician, of course, one had to pass through the institutions of higher learning - sometimes only quite nominally - but once one had done so, one could occupy that role, and be active in scientific inquiry, without necessarily being a member of any university or in the pay of any medical corporation. (Shapin 2006: 186)

Pärast ülikooliameteid on järgmine kategooria arstiteadus, mis võimaldas loodusteadusliku teadmise arendamist arsti ametis. Arstidel võisid olla kvaasi-akadeemilised rollid, näiteks kirurgiast loengute pidamisel, mida võib näha näiteks filmis From Hell, kus Johnny Depp mängib Sherlock Holmes'i taolist rolli "Jack the Ripper" episoodis ja kurjategijaoks, spoiler!, osutub õukonnakirurg, kes annab ka loenguid. Arsti roll oli Shapini järgi põhimõtteliselt autoritatiivne loodusteaduse jälitamise viis väljaspool ülikooli, peaasjalikult selle pärast, et arstiamet nõudis ülikooli lõpetamist.

Unlike the role of the university scholar in general, the social role of the medical man strongly linked natural knowledge with practical interventions. No matter how much the physician's role - though not the surgeon's or apothecary's - was argued to belong to the world of polite and pure learning, the value of the physician's knowledge was nevertheless vouched for by its ability both to explain the real vicissitudes of human bodies and, where possible, to guide those practices that maintained health and alleviated disease. Although physicians were commonly mocked for what were seen as their illegitimate therapeutic pretensions, the very existence of the role testified to the overall esteem in which formal medical knowledge was held and the overall efficacy attributed to that knowledge. Medicine was therefore one important domain within which natural knowledge enjoyed well-established social authority and credibility. (Shapin 2006: 187)

Erinevalt ülikooliõpetlase rollist üldiselt, oli ravitseja sotsiaalne roll seotud praktiliste interventsioonidega - arstide teadmisi legitimeeris tõik, et nad tegid midagi praktilist, ravisid inimkeha. Arstiteadus oli seega erilise austuse sees, sest tegu ei olnud puhtalt teoreetilise spekulatsiooniga. Arstid päriselt tegid midagi ühiskonnale kasulikku.

Moreover, medical roles - unlike those of the professoriate generally - were centrally concerned with the description, explanation, and management of natural bodies. And however much many early modern philosophers insisted upon the dual nature of human beings - spiritual and material - the medical role tended to focus its interventions on human beings in their material aspects. For these reasons, it was common for medical men to pursue those scientific subjects most closely linked with the form and functioning of the human body. (Shapin 2006: 187)

Ühtlasi on oluline, et arstid tegelesid kehade, inimeolendite materiaalsete aspektidega (anatoomia ja füsioloogia), st nende uurimisobjekt oli konkreetne, erinevalt valdkondadest nagu filosoofia, teoloogia ja juura, mis tegelesid hinge, vaimu ja (seadus)tekstidega. St arstid olid mingis mõttes sammu võrra lähemal "päris teadusele", olid empiirilisemad kui ülikooliprofessorid muidu olid (eriti tol ajal).

However, the participation of medical men was not confined to subjects strictly related to medical practice; see, for example, the work of such physicians as Gilbert (in magnesium), Nicolaus Steno (1638-1686) (in geology), and Henry Power (1623-1668) (in experimental natural philosophy). John Locke earned a medical degree before establishing his reputation in smental and political philosophy, and it might be said that Thomas Sydenham's (1624-1684) key achievement was a methodology of quite wide scientific applicability. Nor was substantial interest in medical subjects restricted to those occupying the social role of physician or surgeon: Bacon, Descartes, and Boyle lacked professional qualifications but either theorized on medical subjects or dabbled in medical therapeutics and dietetics. (Shapin 2006: 88)

Viimaseks tähelepanekuks arstide rolli juures on see, et meditsiin võis olla hüppelaud, millelt sukelduti teistesse valdkondadesse. Nagu ülal sai välja toodud, nõudis arstiks saamine ülikooli läbimist - arstid pidid olema lugemis- ja kirjaosklikud inimesed ning võisid seetõttu tegeleda ka teiste asjadega. Minu isiklik lemmiknäide on nö renessansi kommunikatsionalist John Bulwer (vt Cleary 1959), kes oli ametilt apteeker, aga kirjutas raamatuid käežestidest, näoilmetest ja kurttummade keelest.

Like the roles of the scholar and the medical man, the gentlemanly role offered both problems and opportunities for changing conceptions of what it was to make natural knowledge. On the one hand, the traditional gentlemanly role was not, of course, primarily defined around the acquisition and pursuit of formal knowledge, though humanist writers argued strenuously through the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that virtuous and polite knowledge ought to be central to legitimate conceptions of gentility. Although there were important overlaps between the gentle and the learned classes, gentlemanly culture was uncomfortable - in England more than in Italy or France - with the idea that the wellborn should make the pursuit of formal knowledge a professional activity, either in a remunerative sense or in the sense of the pursuit being fundamental to one's social identity. (Shapin 2006: 188)

Siin tuleb esile, et Shapin on peaasjalikult huvitatud loodusteadusliku teadmise tootmisest ("teadus" ranges tähenduses, "tõsiteadus" vms). Härrasmehe roll on siin Shapini järgi problemaatiline, sest formaalsete teadmiste omandamine ja jälitamine ei kuulunud loomuomaselt traditsioonilisse härrasmehelikku rolli. Humanistid kuue- ja seitsmeteistkümnendal sajandil küll väitsid, et teadmiste omandamine peaks olema osa peenekombelise ühiskonnaklassi määratlusest. Härraste ja õpetlaste vahel on küll kattuvusi, aga härraskultuur tundis ebamugavust selle idee suhtes, et hõbelusikas-suus-sündinud peaksid professionaalselt teadmiste poole püüdlema. Ühest käest on teenistus "alandav" - miks peaks härra midagi raha nimel tegema? Teisest käest ei saa teamiste jälitamist ka härrase identiteedi osaks muuta, sest suur osa härradest - nagu ilmneb Keyserlingi suhetest teiste Baltisakslastega - olid lollid nagu lauajalad ja ei näinud oma mõisast ja tulust kaugemale. Shapin lisab siin, et härrased võisid küll õpetlasi austada, aga tõmbas nende rollide vahele selge eristuse - õpetlase "karakter" takistas teda võtmast osa härraste omavahelisest vestlusest - õpetlane oli eraklik, morn või melanhoolne, kaldus vaidlema ja olema pedantne (vt. Shapin 2006: 188).

On the other hand, the gentle classes were widely literate, sometimes well educated, and, especially on the Continent, often disposed to act as patrons to men of science - in the case of the "mixed" mathematical sciences because of their acknowledged utility to the arts of war, wealth-getting, and political [|] control, and, in the case of other scientific practices, such as astronomy or natural history, because they lent luster to the patron and sparkle to civil conversation. The gentry, aristocracy, and nobility therefore controlled an enormously important pool of resources for supporting the work of men of science, while cultural and social attitudes placed obstacles between patronage or amateurism, on the one hand, and the professional pursuit of, or systematic identification with, scientific practice on the other. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, those obstacles could in principle be set aside - there were some very notable aristocratic men of science - but contemporary culture possessed few resources for appreciating and approving a substantive merger between the role of the professionally learned and the role of the gentle. (Shapin 2006: 188-189)

Teisest käest olid ülikud laialdaselt kirjaosklikud, mõnikord kõrgelt haritud, ja kaldusid (majanduslikult) toetama teadusmehi, sest isegi varajasest teadusest oli kasu sõjapidamises, majandustegevuses ja poliitikas. See meenutab kangesti "sofistide" rolli Vana-Kreeka ühiskonnas - õpetada noortele ülikutele retoorikat, loogikat ja demagoogiat. Astronoomide ja loodusteadlastega läbikäimises oli ka sotsiaalset prestiiži - teaduslikud avastused andsid materjali härraste omavahelisele vestlusele. Aadlil, aristokraatial ja ülikutel oli seega kontroll oluliste ressursside üle teadusmeeste töö toetamises. Lühidalt, need rollid lõikusid, aga ei kattunud - aadlik võis hakata õpetlaseks, aga selles kultuuris ei olnud vahendeid nende rollide ühildamiseks või samastamiseks. Teiste sõnadega, raamatuahvid pakkusid rikkuritele kõrgemat sorti meelelahutust, aga rikkurid hakkasid väga harva ise raamatuahvideks.

Those cultural resources soon began to be available, with potential consequences for changing notions of the social role of the man of science and of scientific knowledge itself. Beginning in the late sixteenth century, Francis Bacon - English aristocrat and Lord Chancellor - argued strenuously for methodological and organizational reforms in natural knowledge that would at once make that knowledge an effective arm of state power and render it a pursuit suitable for civically engaged gentlemen. Natural knowledge was to be hauled out of the privacy of the traditional scholar's study - which made science disputatious, wordy, and barren - and into the bright light of real-world phenomena and practical civic concerns. The reformed man of science was supposed to live a vita activa, and reformed science was to be done in public places. (Shapin 2006: 189)

Muutus hakkas pihta kuueteistkümnenda sajandi lõpust, kui Lord Bacon võitles reformide nimel, mis muudaks loodusteaduse riigivõimu tõhusaks tööriistaks ja teadmiste püüdlemise kohaseks ettevõtmiseks avalikkusega läbikäivale härrasmehele. Umbes sellest ajast pärineb ka kameralism - maaomanikud hakkavad esmakordselt mõtlema maaparandusest ja keskkonna säästmisest, sh talurahva küsimusest jne. Loodusteadus tuleb seega kista välja õpetlaste hämarast kabineti privaatsusest, mis tegi teaduse vaidlushimuliseks, sõnakaks ja viljatuks - ja panna päriselus rakendusse. Teadusest saab avalik asi - uuenenud teadusmees elab aktiivset elu ja teeb teadust avalikus ruumis.

Bacon's vision of a civically pertinent science practiced by civically situated scholars was further developed in England starting in the 1660s by the new Royal Society of London. Here such publicists as Henry Oldenburg (1618-1677), Thomas Sprat (1635-1713), and Joseph Glanville (1636-1680) announced that the Royal Society had turned traditionally deductive natural philosophical practice upside down, and, placing particular facts before causal and metaphysical systems, and cured science of its disputatiousness, pedantry, individualism, authoritarianism, and aridity. And when the social and intellectual virtues of the new practice were embodied in the person of the Honourable Robert Boyle - a great Anglo-Irish aristocrat - the Royal [|] Society declared that it had realized Bacon's dream of joining a new science to a new social role for the man of science: not a professional scholar, not a schoolman, not a slave to a philosophical system, not a professional cleric, and not a professional physician, but a free, independent, modest, and virtuous seeker of truth about God's nature. Science, the Society said, had been remade into both a polite and a useful practice, fit for gentlemanly participation and equipped to secure and extend state power. (Shapin 2006: 189-190)

Nii saab teadus "kodanlikuks". Traditsiooniliselt deduktiivse loodusteadmise all mõeldakse ilmselt Eukleitese, Newtoni ja Descartese laadset süsteemiehitamist. Kausaalsete ja metafüüsiliste süsteemide asemel saavad oluliseks konkreetsed tõsiasjad (avastused). Teadusmeeste roll võtab uue kuju: mitte ametnikustunud ametnik, vaid "vaba, iseseisev, tagasihoidlik ja vooruslik tõeotsija". Teadus saab härraste jaoks seisusekohaseks asjaks, mille üle ei pea häbi tundma, vaid võib suisa uhkust tunda, sest see teenib riigivõimu.

It is the gentlemanly pattern of changing conceptions of the social role of the man of science that poses the greatest challenge to the traditional "professionallization model." Historians and sociologists working within that model searched the historical record for traces of modern arrangements, particularly for emerging appreciations of the distinctiveness of autonomy of science and for a remunerative basis for the conduct of scientific research. Yet gentle culture tended to be suspicious of intellectual specialization and scholarly isolation, and, again especially in England, those who offered their intellectual labor in exchange for pay were sometimes considered to have sacrificed that freedom of action and integrity considered vital to making reliable knowledge. (Shapin 2006: 190)

Härrased muidugi ei usalda neid, kes peavad endale elatist teenima. Kuidas saad sa tõest teadmist toota kui sa saad selle eest palka?

Inherited independent means overwhelmingly provided the practical resources to seek natural knowledge, while such independence might be pointed to as a powerful symbolic guarantee of the integrity and disinterestedness of the authentic amateur, he who pursued knowledge for love rather than for lucre. (Shapin 2006: 190)

Teadust hakkavad tegema need, kes on iseseisvalt jõukad (pärinud oma rikkuse). See tagab, et nad teevad seda puhtast tõearmastusest, mitte elatise teenimiseks (kahtlane!). Tean selliseid näiteid 19. ja 20. sajandist nagu Shadworth Hodgson ja Alan Gardiner, kuigi mõlema kohta kasutatakse sageli sõna "ekstsentriline", sest selleks ajaks on tekkinud justkui vastupidine suhtumine - rikas asjaarmastaja teeb küll huvitavaid asju, aga need on põhimõtteliselt kahtlased, sest nad on eraldunud juba väljakujunenud teaduslikust struktuurist.

Shapin, Steven 1988. The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England. Isis 79(3): 373-404. [JSTOR]

Seventeenth-century England witnessed the rise and institutionalization of a program devoted to systematic experimentation, accompanied by a literature explicitly describing and defending practical aspects of that program. Nevertheless, aspects of the historiography manifest in this paper may prove of more general interest. Historians of science and ideas have not, in the main, been much concerned with the siting of knowledge production. (Shapin 1988: 373)

Siin on essee jaoks oluline teaduse institutsionaliseerimine.

The physical and the symbolic siting of experimental work was a way of bounding and disciplining the community of practitioners, it was a [|] way of policing experimental discourse, and it was a way of publicly warranting, that the knowledge produced in such places was reliable and authentic. That is to say, the place of experiment counted as a partial answer to the fundamental question, Why ought one to give one's assent to experimental knowledge claims? (Shapin 1988: 373-374)

Kummaline - see "bounding" peaks tähendama piiritlemist, aga sõnastiku järgi tähendab see hüppamist. Küsimus jällegi selles, et institutsionaalsusega kaasneb mingi garantii -teadustegevus on rangema kontrolli all kui ta oleks erakätes.

The question of access to these sites is then considered: who could go in and how was the regulation of entry implicated in the evaluation of experimental knowledge? The public display of the moral basis of experimental practices depended upon the form of social relations obtaining within these sites as much as it did upon who was allowed within. Indeed, these considerations were closely related, and I discuss how the condition of gentlemen and the deportment expected of them in certain places bore upon experimental social relations and, in particular, upon the problems attending the assessment of experimental testimony. (Shapin 1988: 374)

Varajases eksperimentaalteaduses osalemiseks pidid olema härrasmees.

English empiricists did not think that testimony could be dispensed with, but they worked strenuously to manage and discipline it. Most empiricist writers recognized that the bulk of knowledge would have to be derived from what one was told by those who had witnessed the thing in question, or by those who had been told by those who had been told, and so on. If, however, trust was to be a basis for reliable knowledge, the practical question emerged: Whom was one to trust? John Locke, among others, advised practitioners to factor the creditworthiness of the source by the credibility of the matter claimed by that surce. (Shapin 1988: 375)

Küsimus jällegi selles, keda saab usaldada?

Nevertheless, credibility had other sources: certain kinds of people were independently known to be more trustworthy sources than others. Roughly speaking, the distribution of credibility followed the contours of English society, and that it did was so evident that scarcely any commentator felt obliged to specify the grounds of this creditworthiness. In such a setting one simply knew what sorts of people were credible, just as one simply knew whose reports were suspect. (Shapin 1988: 376)

Usaldusväärsus on sotsiaalne ja intuitiivne.

When in 1667 the Royal Society wished to experiment on the transfusion of animal blood into a human being, they hit upon an ingenious solution to the problem of testimony posed by such an experiment. The subect, Arthur Coga, was indigent and possibly mad (so it was expedient to use him), but he was also a Cambridge graduate (so his testimony of how he felt on receipt of sheep's blood might be credited). (Shapin 1988: 376)

Ülikooliharidus teeb isegu hullu katsealuse usaldusväärseks allikaks.

The performance and the consideration of experimental work in mid to late seventeenth-century England took place in a variety of venues. These sites ranged from the apothecary's and intrument maker's shop, to the coffeehouse, the royal palace, the rooms of college fellows, and associated collegiate and university structures. But by far the most significant venues were the private residences of gentlemen or, at any rate, sites where places of scientific work were coextensive with places of residence, whether owned or rented. The overwhelming majority of experimental trials, displays, and discussions that we know about occurred within private residences. (Shapin 1988: 378)

Eksperimentaalteadus sai alguse härrasmeeste kodudes.

In the 1640s he told his Hartlibian friends of his purposeful "retreat to this solitude" and of "my confinement to this melancholy solitude" in Dorset. But it was said to be a wished-for and a virtuous solitude, and Boyle complained bitterly of interruptions from visitors and their trivial discourses. (Shapin 1988: 384)

A phatic complaint.

This transit was particularly difficult for a man in Boyle's position to accomplish and make visible as legitimate. He presented himself as an intensely private man, one who cared little for the distractions and rewards of ordinary social life. This presentation of self was successful. (Shapin 1988: 384)

"Anti-phatic".

He advertised the public status of experimental work and, from his first publication, condemned unwarranted secrecy and intellectual unsociability. Yet he chose much solitude, was seen to do so, and was drawn only fitfully into the company of fellow Christian virtuosi, extended exposure to which drove him once more to solitude. (Shapin 1988: 385)

Not a bad expression. Intellectual unsociability pretty aptly summarisez the "anti-phatic" attitude common amongst very serious people.

But the strain of maintaining quarters "constantly open to the curious" told upon him and was seen to do so. As an overwrought young man be besought "deare Philosophy" to "come quickly & releive Your Distresst Client" of the "vaine Company" that forms a "perfect Tryall of my Patience." Experimental philosophy might rescue him "from some strange, hasty, Anchoritish Vow"; it could save him from his natural "Hermit's Aversenesse to Society." (Shapin 1988: 386)

A common aspect of the "phatic complaint" - that casual social intercourse (especially with strangers) is vain (empty).

That obligation was a powerful constraint. The forces that acted to keep Boyle's door ajar were social forces. Boyle was a gentleman as well as an experimental philosopher. Indeed, as a young man he had reflected systematically upon the code of the gentleman and his own position in that code. The place where Boyle worked was also the residence of the son of the first Earl of Cork. It was a point of honor that the private residence of a gentleman should be open to the legitimate visitors of other gentlemen. Seventeenth-century handbooks on the code of gentility stressed this openness of access: one such text noted that "Hospitalitie" was "one of the apparentest Signalls of Gentrie." (Shapin 1988: 387)

Härrasmehe ühiskondlike kohustuste hulka kuulub ühiskonna võõrustamine (külaliste vastu võtmine).

Whoever was speaking was never interrupted, "and Differences of Opinion cause no manner of Resentment, nor as much as a disobliging Way of Speech." An English observer said that the society "lay aside all set Speeches and Eloquent Haranques (as fit to be banisht out of all Civil Assemblies, as a thing found by woful experience, especially in England, fatal to Peace and good Manners)," just as the reading of prepared speeches was (and is) conventionally deprecated in Commons. "Opposite opinions" could be maintained without "obstinacy," but with good temper and "the language of civility of moderation." (Shapin 1988: 392)

"Sättefraasidele" (set phrases) komplemendiks "sättekõned" (set speeches).

Boyle's technicians, including those of mixed status like Hooke and Papin, were paid by him to do jobs of experimental work, just as both were paid to do similar tasks by the gentlemen of the Royal Society. As Boyle noted in connection with his disinclination to become a cleric, those that were paid to do something were open to the charge that this was why they did it. A gentleman's word might be relied upon partly because what he said was without consideration of remuneration. Free verbal action, such as giving testimony, was credible by virtue of its freedom. Technicians, as such, lacked that circumstance of credibility. (Shapin 1988: 395)

Lisainformatsiooni selle kohta, et raha eest töötavaid inimesi ei saa lõpuni usaldada (vt. Shapin 2006: 190, ülal).

Shapin, Steven 1989. Who was Robert Hooke? In: Hunter, M.; Schaffer, S. (eds.), Robert Hooke: New Studies. Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 253-285. [Harvard Library]

Mid to late seventeenth-century English society recognised what it was to be a gentleman, a professor, a physician, an architect, an operator, a mechanic, an instrument-maker. It did not, however, automatically comprehend the role of experimental philosopher, nor were resources readily available to explain or justify behaviour by referring it to what was normal and proper for a person performing this role. (Shapin 1989: 253)

Teiste sõnadega, teadlase ühiskondlik roll ei olnud veel täielikult välja kujunenud.

Second, there is the relationship of dependence which informed much, though not all, of Hooke's work. A great deal of what Hooke did during a day's work was done at the behest of others, in accordance with their general or specific directions. That relationship of dependence was usually signalled by the exchange of money for services, as in his work as Curator of the Royal [|] Society. By contrast, it would appear that the area of work in which Hooke had the most independent interest and autonomy was that involving the invention of mechanical and optical devices: lenses, lens-grinding machines, telescope sights, clocks and watches, and, not least, his 'thirty several' contrivances for flying which preoccupied him throughout his life and whose secrtes he took to his grave. (Shapin 1989: 255-256)

Hustle for money. Jällegi läbiv teema, mida võib nimetada võõrandunud tööks.

One conclusion based on this evidence stands out. Hooke was recognised as a person dependent upon others, a person of at best compromised freedom of action, of ambiguous autonomy, and of doubtful integrity. That is to say, his contemporaries might not generally recognise Hooke as a gentleman. At most, his entitlement to the status and attributes of a gentleman was recognised as problematic. This is not, of course, a conclusion which will come as a revelation to anyone at all acquainted with the details of Hooke's life. (Shapin 1989: 256)

Pole päris härrasmees, sest teeb kellegi teise jaoks tööd, mis piirab tema enda tegevusvabadust ja teeb tema töö tulemused mitte-lõpuni-usaldusväärseks (vähemalt selle loogika järgi, mis näib olevat ajastule iseäralik).

His early eighteenth-century biographer Richard Waller said that Hooke was accustomed to a 'rather Monastick Life', that he lived 'like a Hermit or Cynick'. Waller presented Hooke as someone who cared little for the conventions, customs and corporeal rewards of the world. He said, and the Diary tends to bear him out, that Hooke slept little and erratically, that he worked hard (often 'continuing his Studies all Night, and taking a short Nap in the Day'), and that his temperament ('Melancholy, Mistrustful and Jealous') was not one which suited him to a life of conventional sociability. (Shapin 1989: 259)

See sama "intellectual unsociability" (Shapin 1988: 385, ülal). "Temperamendi" osas samalaadne sõnastus nagu esimeses artiklis (ülal) põhjus, miks härrasmehed ja teadusmehed täiuslikult ei lõimunud.

This pattern of movement was understood in the seventeenth century to be a visible sign of the relative standings of the persons involved. In the most influential seventeenth-century English guide to the code of the gentleman, Henry Peacham said of an individual who was our social superior that 'We must attend him and come to his house and not he to ours.' Indeed, if we wish to be precise about seventeenth-century gentlemanly usage, it might be better to say that Hooke did not have a 'home'. His lodgings were a fit place to work and, on some occasions, to talk work; they were not a place fit to receive and to entertain gentlemen. (Shapin 1989: 260)

Härrasmehel on kodu, teadusmees võib oma teadust ka ühiselamust teha.

Boyle's portrayal of the experimental philosopher was substantially novel. The pattern he traced publicly contrasted the new role with a number of existing roles, for example, that of the combative professor, the secretive and selfish 'chymist', the over-confident mathematician, the facile and speculative 'wit', and the tawdry mechanical 'wonder-mongerer' or 'juggler'. On the other hand, in constructing the experimental persona Boyle practised moral bricolage, pointing to and recombining the moral characteristics of roles which were widely understood in seventeenth-century English society. Put simply, Boyle modelled the experimental philosopher on the recognised patterns of the devout Christian and the English gentleman. (Shapin 1989: 270)

Teadusmehe roll kujunes osaliselt usumehe ja härrasmehe rollide põhjal.

First, such a man was said to be personally uninterested in the material rewards that might flow from genuine natural philosophy. Although proper science would undoubtedly yield useful outcomes, the Christian virtuoso set himself against Mammon; his concern was solely with the truth whose evidences God left in the natural world; making that truth manifest was his ambition. Boyle said that the 'genius and course of studies' of 'an experimentarian philosopher [...] accustoms him to value and delight in abstracted truths; [...] such truths as do not at all, or do but very little, gratify mens ambition, sensuality, or other inferior passions and appetites.' (Shapin 1989: 270)

Üsna sarnane pütaagorlikule eetikale - siiral uurijal peaks olema "an unstudied contempt of, and hostility to glory, wealth, and the like" (Iamblichus 1818: 36). Esmasus ja teisesus langevad kokku: 1) "material rewards"/wealth/sensuality ja 2) ambition/glory.

His Lectures and Discourses of Earthquakes made repeated references to the Noachian deluge, and there is no expression of disbelief in the reality of the events described in Genesis. (Shapin 1989: 278)

Define Noachian - relating to the biblical patriarch Noah or his time. Pole varem kohanud sellist nimetust.

Shapin, Steven 1991. "A Scholar and a Gentleman": The Problematic Identity of the Scientific Practitioner in Early Modern England. History of Science 29: 279-327. [Sage]

Three years ago I found the plaque noteworthy enough to photograph, and I have been trying ever since to articulate why I found it so interesting. "A Gentleman, a Scholar, and a Christian" - possibly I found it remarkable because of the stranger's natural curiosity: I have not the good fortune to be any one of those things, let alone all three. (Shapin 1991: 279)

See "a gentleman and a scholar" ei olegi pelgalt meem, vaid täitsa tunnustatud idioom. "Kristlane" jäetakse harilikult siit välja.

An alert and provoked friend drew my attention to a late seventeenth century description of the poet Hugh Crompton (fl. 1657) as "born a Gentleman and bred up a Scholar". On closer inspection, however, the message is that Crompton was born into a comfortable landed family, but that his father fell on evil times, and the son was obliged to earn his living by his wits - as a scholar. A contrast is indicated between the two roles rather than (the more modern usage) an approving gesture towards two compatible and mutually supporting dimensions of an individual. (Shapin 1991: 280)

Küsimus jälle selles, kas teadusmees saab olla härrasmees (vastupidine on vähem problemaatiline).

I note that specific early modern descriptions and evaluations of the characters of scholars and gentlemen have ancient sources, and I devote some attention to the sixteenth century humanist background to seventeenth century initiatives which sought, by reforming a body of culture, to re-specify the identity of both gentlemen and scholars. (Shapin 1991: 280)

See võiks küll huvitav olla, sest nagu siinne artikkelgi mainib, oli "Viktoorianlik" kultuur tuntava antiikse maiguga: "The formula possibly developed through the nineteenth century in association with Newmanite educational philosophy and the muscular Christian and Romano-classical culture of the great Victorian public schools" (ibid, 279).

There were, however, other sources of legitimacy in contemporary English society, and among the most consequential of these for the new science was the pervasive and quite traditional culture which specified who gentlemen were, how it was proper for them to live and behave among their fellows, and how the gentlemanly role stood with respect to various forms of cultural practice and their practitioners. (Shapin 1991: 282)

Härrasmeeste kultuur oli muidugi põhiline.

I shall show that the new science secured little legitimacy within seventeenth or eighteenth century gentlemanly society. Indeed, it is far more likely that the new science ultimately secured what legitimacy it did partly by processes of intercalation into existing roles for the learned and partly by the gradual development of new sources of support and approval outwith genteel society. (Shapin 1991: 282)

Define:intercalate - insert (an intercalary period) in a calendar. "Vahele lisama". Härrasmehelikkultuur ei kindlustanud teaduse legitiimsust, vaid see "lisati vahele" (sisestati) olemasolevate rollide vahele.

The institucion of a gentleman (1555) went so far as to assert that the very idea of nobility originated in an ancient learned class. Some neo-Stoicists argued that the defining characteristics of the gentleman were his integrity and independence. The gentleman wanted and depended upon nothing external to himself - nil admirari. The philosopher too needed less of the world's goods, its applause or sustenance. Indeed, he provided his own company, established and conversed with his own society, within the privacy of his mind. (Shapin 1991: 283)

Härrasmees on usaldusväärne ja sõltumatu. Imetlus (applause) ja elatus (sustenance) jällegi vastavalt teisesus ja esmasus (pütaagorlikus eetikas).

The Tudor Revolution in government provoked widespread recognition among the gentry that their neglect of learning might result in the loss of effective political power to ambitious and humbly-born clerks. For these and other reasons, the period from c. 1580 to c. 1640 saw very substantially increased demand from the gentry for the intellectual and moral goods purveyed at Oxford and Cambridge. The growth in university enrolments as a whole, and the rising proportion of matriculants from the gentry and aristocracy, have been well documented. If, at the beginning of the sixteenth century it was true that the universities "were little more than seminaries for the education of the clergy of the Established Church", by the early seventeenth century, according to Curtis, "the academic haunts of the medieval clergy had become a normal resort for the sons and heirs of the English gentry and nobility". (Shapin 1991: 284)

Aristokraadid hakkasid alles seitsmeteistkümnenda sajandi alguses ülikoolis käima.

In the middle of Elizabeth's reign Gabriel Harvey observed that Cambridge scholars were becoming "active rather than contemplative philosophers" and that they were reading such practical and worldly works as Castiglione's Courtier and Guazzo's Civile conversation. (Shapin 1991: 285)

Kuna Shapin mainib seda teost enam-vähem igas kirjutises, vaatasin sisse. Stefan Guazzo teos kannab hilisemas tõlkes pealkirja The Art of Conversation. Kahjuks on lugu praegu nii, et paljud mõjukamad vanad teosed ei ole internetiarhiivis allalaaditavad. Paremal juhul on nad Google Books'is loetavad (nagu see), halvemal juhul müüakse reprint'e Amazonis. Mõlemad juhud on laidetavad, sest ei ole mõistlikku põhjust, miks need skännid ei võiks kõigile vabalt ligipääsetavad olla.

That is one story: during the course of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century learning triumphed over ignorance, as braying hordes of rising gentry tramped through the scholar's study and emerged on the other side canny, smooth and virtuous. (Shapin 1991: 285)

Elav kujutluspilt: kisav ja märatsev hord aristokraatide võsukesi marsib läbi õpetlase lugemistoa.

Despite complaints that the aristocracy were pushing poor scholars out of the colleges, the evidence suggests that the proportion of gentlemen and above nveer rose much over 50%, and after 1660 the lesser gentry in particular again regarded higher education with a jaundiced eye, reluctant to rub shoulders with their social inferiors. According to Anthony à Wood, they thought "an University too low a breeding". (Shapin 1991: 286)

Neil, kes on hõbelusikas suus sündinud, ei kõlba istuda nende kõrval, kes seda ei ole.

The identification of gentlemanly decorum and active engagement in the world provided a sharp contrast to attributions of scholars' temperament and mode of life. Aristotle asked why it was "that all men who have become outstanding in philosophy [...] are melancholic", and concurrence that they were morose and withdrawn echoed through medieval and early modern culture. While early Christian thinking condemned the melancholic temperament and its "disordered wanderings of the imagination", a more approving attitude emerged in the late Middle Ages. Melancholia and attachment to solitude became for many intellectuals a recognized mode of self-presentation, "a way of feeling and being" that identified the intellectual and that vouched [|] for the authenticity of his cultural goods. In this respect, a withdrawn and depressive persona marked out the intellectual in cultural space and constituted an understood token of the value of his knowledge, while contrasting his character and circumstances to those of the active engaged public citizen. Throughout early modern Europe the portrayal of the scholar and philosopher as solitary melancholics was an institution in social commentary, medicine, poetry and painting. (Shapin 1991: 289-290)

Esimeses artiklis (ülal) ainult mainitakse seda aspekti. Siin ilmneb, et see ettekujutus melanhoolsest õpetlasest on tõepoolest antiikne ja mingil määral annab õpetlasele usaldusväärsust. Õpetlane on tõsine inimene.

The scholar's melancholic temperament and solitary situation were widely mobilized as explanations of the most damaging attribution about his character. Throughout early modern Europe professional cholars were characterized as pedants. The characters of the pedant and the gentleman were set in radical opposition. Indeed, in the courtesy literature and practical social philosophies of early modern Europe the disposition and deportment of the pedant appeared as a practical inversion of the gentlemanly character. The root meaning of 'pedant' was simply someone who taught, who acted as a pedagogue. This neutral usage is still found in late sixteenth century England, but, as time went on, to say that someone was a pedant was invariably to identify a deeply damaged and unsatisfactory character. (Shapin 1991: 290)

See tähendusvarjund on alles jäänud. "Mis ta tuleb siia mind õpetama?" Pedant on keegi, kes alustab lauset sõnadega, "Well, actually..."

What were the characteristics of the pedant considered to be in sixteenth and seventeenth century England? He was someone whose manner was disputatious, litigious, affected and hectoring; he lectured rather than conversed. He was selfish, aiming not to please but to dominate. He was, thus, deficient in the key gentlemanly virtue of magnanimity. He was both temperamentally unbalanced and the source of discord in company; his gravity and melancholia annoyed and disturbed; his disputatiousness subverted social harmony and order. (Shapin 1991: 290)

Midagi faatilist. "A great mistake lies at the root of such an opinion, which assumes that the first object of conversation is not to please but to instruct" (Mahaffy 1892: 31).

Schoolmen's discourse was nothing but "canting"; their blind reliance upon authority "is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry". (Shapin 1991: 294)

Samuti nö "faatiline süüdistus". Define:cant - 1) To speak tediously or sanctimoniously. 2) To speak in argot or jargon. 3) To speak in a whining or singsong voice.

In specific terms, the Honourable Robert Boyle was the instantiation of the Christian experimental natural philosopher; in general terms, his life and work were mobilized as a concrete representation of the new gentleman-scholar. (Shapin 1991: 299)

Boyle oli üks esimesi härrasmehest teadusmehi.

The Earl of Shaftesbury developed the critique of pedantry and systematic learning into one of the foundations of his good-humoured and commonsensical civil polity. The pedant's canting and hectoring causes "a breach of the harmony of public conversation"; it "puts others into silence, and robs them of their privilege of turn". (Shapin 1991: 302)

Pedandiga ei kõlba vestelda, sest tema targutamisele ei ole kellelgi midagi omalt poolt lisada. Vestluse monopoliseerimise probleem.

Joseph Addison reckoned that "A Man who has been brought up among Books, and is able to talk of nothing else, is a very indifferent Companion, and what we call a Pedant", generalizing the term to anyone who cannot think "out of his Profession, and particular way of Life". Such a man could give no pleasure in company. Richard Steele pointed to scholarly lecturing, carping and quibbling as the bane of civil conversation. Scholars insisted upon teaching and instructing others, while the good order of gentlemanly conversation depended utterly upon participants' presumed equality: "it is the greatest and justest skill in a man of superior understanding, to know how to be on a level with his companions." The greatest enemies of "good company", and those who most violated "the laws of equality (which is the life of it), are the clown, the wit, and the pedant". (Shapin 1991: 303)

Jällegi nagu otse vestlusõpikust: "the sine qua non of good conversation, is to establish equality, at least momentarily, if you like fictions, but at all costs equality, among the members of the company who make up the party" (Mahaffy 1892: 102).

Chesterfield's Letters to his son represent eighteenth century English polite society's view of learning and the learned at the most practical level. By all means, "hoard up, while you can, a great stock of knowledge" and do it in your youth so that you can in later life draw upon it "to maintain you". (Shapin 1991: 303)

Kangesti meenutab Bourdieu märkust, et inimesed koguvad noorena uut informatsiooni, et vanana seda vältida.

Dr Johnson's Rambler related a story about the social solecisms of a scientific scholar bred up in solitude and quite unable to make agreeable conversation in polite company. He had nothing suitable to say to the ladies, and found himself standing apart. Approached by a clergyman who asked the [|] scholar "some questions about the present state of natural knowledge" and who affected interest in "the Newtonian philosophy", the scholar was drawn into pedantic babble grossly violating "the laws of conversation". The bored company turned its chatter to "the uselessness of universities, the folly of book-learning, and the awkwardness of scholars", and the philosopher made haste to leave, though not before spilling his tea, staining a lady's petticoat and scalding the lap-dog. (Shapin 1991: 311-312)

Kahjuks ei leia hetkel üles, aga olen Campanella Päikeselinnast leitud märkusele, et raamatute lugemine teeb inimese tuimaks, leidnud üha enam lisandusi, ja raamatute lugemine teeb mehe võimetuks naistega rääkima on vähemalt korra juba läbi käinud.

Shapin, Steven 2003. The image of the man of science. In: Porter, Roy (ed.), The Cambridge History of Science Vol. 4: Eighteenth-Century Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 159-183. [Cambridge]

The roles of the university professor, the physician or surgeon, the gentleman, the courtier, the crown or civil servant, the cleric, and many others were each accompanied by a set of widely understood, and relatively coherent, characters, conventions, and expectations, and it was these that colored whatever pursuit of natural knowledge might happen to occur within such roles. That is to say, the image of eighteenth-century men of science - in all their variety - were very significantly shaped by appreciations of what was involved in the host roles: what sorts of people occupied such roles, with what characteristics and capacities, doing what sorts of things, and acquitting what sorts of recognized social functions, with what sorts of value attached to such functions? (Shapin 2003: 161)

Õpetlase, härrasmehe ja usumehe rollid, mille raames toodeti teaduslikku teadmist, andsid sellele teadmisele ka teatud värvingu.

To do science - as current sensibilities recognize it - was not necessarily the same thing as to be a man of science, to occupy that social role. What historians recognize as crucially important scientific research might be, in contemporary terms, only a moment or an element - among others - in a life fundamentally shaped by other concerns and lived out within other identities. (Shapin 2003: 161)

Teadust ei ole alati teinud teadlased.

The roles of the pious naturalist and, more specifically, of the parson-naturalist, were thickly populated and culturally understood throughout the period, especially, but not exclusively, in Protestant culture. The Renaissance argument that God had written two books by which His existence, attributes, and intentions might be known - Scripture and the Book of Nature - continued in currency in the developing culture of "natural theology." (Shapin 2003: 162)

Selle seltskonnaga liitub vististi ka Hupel.

In Sweden Carl Linnaeus was described as "a second Adam," giving species their proper names and conceiving [|] of his binomial nomenclature as a "psalter for divine worship": "Man is made for the purpose of studying the Creator's works that he may observe in them the evident marks of divine wisdom." In Germany Leibniz reckoned that there was great religious utility in science, on the condition that natural inquiry was informed by a proper "intellectualist" theology, showing that God's wisdom had created the "best of all possible worlds." (Shapin 2003: 163-164)

See sektsioon seletab nö "looduspreestrite" ("priests of nature") nähtust, mida Shapin ülal küll nimetas, aga pikemalt ei seletanud.

Like many of Plutarch's Greek and Roman heroes, Fontanelle's eighteenth-century men of science were described as embodiments of Stoic fortitude and self-denial. The life of science held out few prospects of material reward and little hope for fame, honor, and the applause of the polite and political worlds. The dedication to truth that drew men to such a life was made manifest by neglect of self and of material self-interest, and by a disregard for public favor and approval. (Shapin 2003: 165)

Jällegi see, mida mina nimetan pütaagorlikuks eetikaks, sest see on vanem kui stoikud ja Platon. Teadmistele pühendunud inimesed ei ole huvitatud rikkusest ega kuulsusest.

Seventeenth-century "modern" critics of Scholastic knowledge insisted on its barrenness just as they condemned Scholastic society for its incivility. Criticisms of knowledge and of social forms were strongly linked: the schoolmen's wrangling was said to be so ferocious because - as the current quip has it - so little was at stake. If their inquiries had solid intellectual substance on which to feed, and if the veracity of their claims could be made manifest, then wrangling would truly come to an end. Such moderns as Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Boyle proposed to remedy wrangling through both conceptual and methodological reform. (Shapin 2003: 168)

Sellest sai pikemalt lugeda eelmises artiklis: skolastikud olid "viljatud", sest nad tegelesid eluvõõraste peenutsemistega, ja "ebaviisakad", sest nad ei osanud viisakast seltskondlikust vestlusest osa võtta vaid esitasid (laulvalt, papagoi kombel - canting) arusaamatuid asju, mida ülikoolis õpetati, aga millest tavaline inimene kes ei olnud ülikoolis käinud midagi ei mõiganud.

The result would be a new natural philosophy whose products were socially useful and whose practitioners were suitable for membership in civil society. Empirical and experimental methods - favored by the English - would replace Aristotelian "learned gibberish" and dogmatic arrogance with work, fact, and lowered norms of natural-philosophical certainty. (Shapin 2003: 168)

Uue loodusfilosoofia - "teaduse" - erinevus eelnevast seisnes selles, et selle tulemused olid praktiliselt kasulikud ja selle viljelejad olid inimesed, kellega oli võimalik normaalselt suhelda.

Yet, as Thackray has shown, scientific culture in such venues as the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society was primarily a resource used to redefine rather than to reject the values of politeness. For provincial medical men, organized culture of any sort lent social cachet, and no cultural form was more natural for such men than science. And for those few manufacturers and tradesmen who felt the need for cachet - most did not - science was also an attractive vehicle. (Shapin 2003: 178)

Liitub aruteluga sellest, et arstid pidid ülikooli läbima, et oma ametit harrastada, ja olid seetõttu mitte ainult kirjaosklikud, vaid ka tajutavamate teaduslike huvidega kui näiteks teoloog või härrasmees.

Both the receipt of government subvention and the institutionalization of scientific research in the professorial role made it harder to portray the man of science as fulfilling his calling through ascetic self-denial. (Shapin 2003: 178)

Ülal oli palju arutelu varajaste teadusmeeste askeetlusest. Siin esitatud põhjus, miks see kalduvus taandus - riiklik rahastus ja institutsionaliseerimine.

Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth century a new possibility for the character of the man of science had begun to open up, although the full development of that character was not to occur for many years. The man of science might be conceived of as someone who was neither particularly godly, nor particularly virtuous, nor particularly polite. It could be considered that there was nothing very special about the sorts of people drawn to the study of the natural world, nor anything very special about the effects on character wrought by the study of the natural world. The man of science was not thought to be constitutionally better or worse than other men, nor did his manner of inquiry or object of study make him better or worse than other men. Within his domain of legitimate expertise he knew more, and knew it more reliably. Such men were useful. (Shapin 2003: 183)

Viimane sõna: "teadusmehest" sai "teadlane", mitte traditsiooniliste rollide muutumise tõttu, vaid teadlase rolli iseseisvumise tõttu - teadlane osutus kasulikuks inimeseks.

A trans-historical given

Teaduslugu (FLFI.03.098) [Kevad 2021]

Ruse, Michael 2009. The Darwinian revolution: Rethinking its meaning and significance. PNAS 106(s1): 10040-10047. DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0901011106

In response, let us agree at once that focusing on revolutions (in science) does rather skew things in certain ways. Dwelling at length on Darwin carries the danger of ignoring the contributions of others in the 19th century, from the Naturphilosophen (people like the German anatomist Lorenz Oken who saw homologies everywhere) at the beginning to the orthogeneticists (people like the American paleontologist Henry Fairfield Osborn who thought that evolution has a momentum that carries it beyond adaptive success) at the end. Worse, it gives the impression that unless you have something dramatic and crisis-breaking, the science is of little value. (Ruse 2009: 10040)

Even science must have a "hook" if it is to catch any attention.

The same is true of others, like Herbert Spencer. For all that Spencer, too, hit on the idea of selection, he always thought that Lamarckism is the chief cause of evolutionary change, and while his thinking did influence some, including his big friend Thomas Henry Huxley, he likewise did not swing people in the way that the Origin did. (Ruse 2009: 10041)

Naturally. I'll have to keep this in mind if or when I read them both.

Before the Origin, the evidence for evolution just was not there. If you believe in evolution, you were fueled primarily by ideological reasons. It is true that people knew about homologies, the fossil record was starting to fill out, embryology was suggestive, and so forth. But the full picture was not there. After the origin, being an evolutionist was just plain common sense. And people did become evolutionists. Even church people. With the notable exception of American evangelicals, especially in the South, evolution was accepted. (Ruse 2009: 10042)

Reminiscent of how Lavoisier doubted in the phlogiston theory before he could disprove it (cf. Butterfield 1958: 206).

First, he argued analogically from artificial selection (the work and triumphs of the animal and plant breeders) to natural selection, from something known and seen to something not known and seen. Then he turned around, and showed how evolution through selection throws light on topics across biology, instinct, paleontology, biogeography, systematics, anatomy, embryology, and more. (Ruse 2009: 10042)

But God made the banana specifically for the shape of the human hand!

There certainly was professional evolutonism, particularly that around the German biologist Ernst Haeckel. But, increasingly, a lot of what was produced lost touch with reality as fantabulous tales were spun using the unreliable biogenetic law, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. (Ruse 2009: 10042)

This I recall from some audiobook about the history of biology. If memory serves, Haeckel's wife died and this sent him spiralling, psychologically, and writing a work that gave us many commonplaces (e.g. "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny") but also some nonsense that is nearly undecypherable.

And what you want in museums are displays, with an educational and cultural message. So this is what was supplied. Terrific displays of fossils, especially of all of those dinosaurs now being discovered and brought back from the American West, and all put in a progressive fashion to demonstrate that life may have started as blobs but that it ends as humans, especially white humans. (Ruse 2009: 10042)

Life is truly miraculous, from its humble single-celled beginnings to its pinnacle, Josh.

The official Catholic position, for instance, is that we have souls and these are created and inserted miraculously into human frames, actually, human zygotes. And this obviously is but one end of the spectrum that goes all of the way, through the kind of directed evolution allowed by some members of the intelligent design theorists, across the hard-line young earth creationists who think that humans were created miraculously on the sixth day. (Ruse 2009: 10043)

Why stop at zygotes? Perhaps there are billions of half-souls trapped in our testicles and ovaries waiting to be made whole.

When, to take a particularly egregious example, German general Friedrich von Bernhardi claimed that Darwin showed that might is right and that the Motherland has almost an obligation to seize from its neighbors, he owed little to the old evolutionist who had worked away in his study in the English countryside. One might as much credit Plato because the doctrine more closely resembled the thinking of Thrasymachus in the Republic. Today one has similar divisions. For instance, philosopher Peter Singer has claimed the authority of Darwin for an explicitly left-wing manifesto. Philosopher Larry Arnhart has no less enthusiastically claimed Darwin's support for a right-wing view of society. (Ruse 2009: 10043)

"Trasymachus [...] was the first to discover period and colon". What? How do you discover punctuation marks?

And in confirmation of Kuhn, this is where we tend to get the nastiness: Sedgwick writing irate letters to the newspaper about Darwin's methodology; Bishop Wilberforce sneering at Huxley's ancestry; Owen doing everything he could to give the Darwinians a bad name; and so forth. There were certainly vigorous debates about the science, but rarely did the science itself cause unpleasantness. It was always (as in the Huxley-Owen squabble over the brain) in the cause of the bigger metaphysical picture. (Ruse 2009: 10045)

As with flame wars online: whatever particular is in question, ultimately it comes down to the general world-views of the participants.

Less paradoxically, let us say that a complex phenomenon like the Darwinian revolution demands many levels of understanding. Blunt instruments will fail us as we try to understand scientific change. It is necessary to tease strands apart and consider them individually as we try to understand and to assess what is going on. (Ruse 2009: 10046)

Throwing putty does little. What are needed are sharpened instruments.

Ghiselin, Michael T. 2005. The Darwinian Revolution as Viewed by a Philosophical Biologist. Journal of the History of Biology 38:123-136. DOI: 10.1007/s10739-004-6513-2

Even though the crucial breakthrough that resulted from reading Malthus would seem to have come to him in a moment, the Origin was the product of some 20 years of study and reflection. We know that he only gradually abandoned the old ways of thinking and replaced them with the new. (Ghiselin 2005: 124)

Likewise with The Expression of the Emotions, for which he reportedly collected materials for several decades.

The layperson's travesty of evolution has been that man is descended from an ape: it has not changed much since Darwin's day. The twentieth-century historian's travesty of evolution has been that although the [|] Darwinian Revolution succeeded with respect to evolution, so far as natural selection goes, it was a non-event. Both of these travesties are at once closer to reality and farther from reality than one might think. (Ghiselin 2005: 124-125)

It is truly tragic that Harambe was killed before he could evolve into a human.

The problem of intellectual retooling is particularly difficult because the old assumptions and ways of thinking often persist, whether explicitly, implicitly, or unconsciously, as a part of intellectual tradition. A great deal of that which is implied or unconscious is there because it is taken over uncritically, perhaps from every day life, perhaps from what we have been taught in school, perhaps through indoctrination as a graduate student. (Ghiselin 2005: 125)

Permanent dynamic synchrony in the realm of scientific assumptions or ideology.

Pre-Darwinians conceived of change as something superficial, and in that sense they did not treat it as real. This is clear from the way in which they attempted to relate organic evolution to the kinds of change with which they were already familiar. If the world was created, then it had pre-existed in the Mind of the Creator and therefore evolution was the unfolding of something that already existed but had not yet been realized. (Ghiselin 2005: 126)

The archetype/ectype question in the realm of evolution/creation. Cabbits

There is no way in which an "ought" can be justified by an "is" once the teleological assumptions that underlie such efforts have been rejected. Whatever is is trite. But efforts along such lines have been pervasive, and it is obvious that the teleology is still being presupposed, as it is in other contexts, perhaps without the proponents even being aware of what they are doing. (Ghiselin 2005: 129)

A kind of ontology in four words.

Everything could be arranged in a single series from lower to higher. That conception underlay Lamarck's approach to taxonomy. It was also integral to Lamarck's notion of progress: a law of nature necessitated that animals would evolve so as to become increasingly like man, unless something interfered. There was an implicit theosophical assumption driving Lamarck's thinking. (Ghiselin 2005: 130)

Again, they interfered with evolution when they took that shot at the gorilla, hindering him from actualizing his full evolutionary potential and becoming a real estate agent in Akron.

The rejection of typology, or essentialism, has often been treated as one of the most important features of the Darwinian Revolution. However the essences of "essentialism" that are invoked by its critics all too often reveal that essentialism has been dealt with only at a very [|] superficial level. The priority of the concrete implies that what is causally important is particular things, not abstractions. That does imply that individual organisms are important, and that when dealing with evolutionary problems we must not screen out variation or think of groups in terms of stereotypes. (Ghiselin 2005: 130-131)

The problem of essentialism in attempts at typologization should also be examined in semiotics. Abstract typologies without concrete examples are... typical.

Supposedly, Scholastic notions about definition in terms of necessary and sufficient defining properties could be replaced by more "Wittgensteinian" notions of family resemblances, disjunctive or polythetic definitions, fuzzy sets, or whatever. But there is no reason why a Platonic Idea cannot be conceptualized as somewhat elastic, fuzzy, or even muddled. A timeless and eternal pattern can still be assumed to underlie appearances. Both the distinction between essential and accidental characters and the notion that the essential limits cannot be passed are unaffected. (Ghiselin 2005: 131)

As I (currently, without yet having read him) understand it, we don't have, by definition, access to Platonic ideas to confirm their distinctness or indistinctness.

Morphology has been somewhat modernized by the adoption of cladistic techniques and new materials such as sequence data. However, many who have embraced cladism are retread typologists who continue to think as if only the algorithms had changed. One wonders why they continue to use the nomenclature of eighteenth century occult metaphysics rather than modern science. Why do they talk about Baupläne, instead of anatomical diagrams? Why do they talk about archetypes, rather than common ancestry? Why do they say that synapomorphies define groups, rather than diagnose them? (Ghiselin 2005: 132)

A terminological permanent dynamic synchrony in the field of morphology.

Orr, H. Allen 2009. Darwin and Darwinism: The (Alleged) Social Implications of The Origin of Species. Genetics 183: 767-772. DOI: 10.1534/genetics.109.110445

In the decades that followed the publication of The Origin of Species, it was often suggested that Darwin's work had implications for the economic order. Darwinism, it was said, demonstrated the effectiveness of competition and provided a defense of capitalism. This claim is, at best, only partly true. As many have emphasized, the full story is far more complex and interesting. (Orr 2009: 767)

Taking the surplus value of your workers makes you better adapted?

Taken to their extreme, Darwinian defenses of laissez-faire capitalism shaded into arguments for full-blown Social Darwinism of the sort often associated with Herbert Spencer: competition in human society may be ruthless but it is natural, inevitable - and defensible scientifically. (Orr 2009: 768)

This I'll have to find out when I read him beyond that one paper.

Nonetheless, it's tricy to see how an economic situation that suggested a biological theory can be simultaneously justified by that theory, an objection that goes back at least to Engels. In any case, folk sociology probably reveals as much as scholarly history here. (Orr 2009: 768)

"Folk psychology" is familiar enough, but "folk sociology" is new. Is there a "folk politology" or "folk semiotics", too?

To Darwin, the challenge of adaptation was that of simultaneously reforming and preserving a species. A species must be able to change those aspects of its [|] phenotype that require improvement without thereby wrecking the intricate arrangement of parts that characterizes any living thing. Darwin and his intellectual heirs concluded that the answer to this challenge was change that is gradual. In a phrase, successful change must be evolutionary, not revolutionary. (Orr 2009: 768-769)

Not that far off from the "permanent dynamic synchrony" I've evoked several times here already. Innovations reform, archaisms preserve.

The second component of the argument - the necessity of gradual change in complex systems - can also be found in pre-Darwinian political thought. In my own reading, I have been struck by the similarity between Edmund Burke's arguments for the wisdom of gradual change in politics and Darwin and Fisher's arguments in biology. Burke (1729-1797), an Irish political thinker and member of Parliament, is best remembered as a father of modern conservative political philosophy. Shaken by the turmoil that followed the revolution in 1789, Burke (1790) produced his best-known work, Reflections on the Revolution in France. (Orr 2009: 769)

Even Estonian conservatives are bouncing on this guy's D - see Edmund Burke'i Selts.

In the now well-known words of Brooke (1991, p. 321), these historians have concluded that "[t]here is no such thing as the relationship between science and religion." In some places and at some times, science and religion have conflicted (e.g., the Galileo affair, although even here matters were more complex than they first appear). In other places and times, they have lived in harmony (e.g., the Church was a leading patron of astronomical research). And, just as often, science and religion have been indifferent to each other (e.g., Pauling's discovery of beta-sheets caused little stir in Sunday schools). (Orr 2009: 771)

Well, beta-sheets have no bearing upon religious dogmas, whereas evolutionary theory makes the story of genesis look like the fairy-tale it is.

The appearance of The Origin of Species came as a great shock to Victorian culture and many, in the wake of the Darwinian revolution, felt their world to be upended. Darwinism, they concluded, perhaps hastily, had changed everything. Moreover, among those with a political or cultural agenda, the temptation to overextend or otherwise exploit a scientific theory can be strong (if often unconscious). (Orr 2009: 772)

My favourite example, for which I am currently unable to find the citation, is that William James read Darwin and fell into a decade long depression because of it.

Claeys, Gregory 2000. The "Survival of the Fittest" and the Origins of Social Darwinism. Journal of the History of Ideas 61(2): 223-240. DOI: 10.1353/jhi.2000.0014

Darwin was extraordinarily widely read and extraordinarily influential. We are all aware of the great theological debates associated with his name in late Victorian Britain, of the counter-attack against Darwin begun by Bishop Wilberforce in June 1860, and of the tenacious war of attrition conducted by "Darwin's bulldog," T. H. Huxley, who coined the term "agnostic" in 1869 to define the lack of scientific evidence for the existence of God. Much has been written of the moral panic and growing loss of religious faith, paralleling the course of darwin's own "reluctant agnosticism," which followed the conclusion that human beings had been levelled to the status of animals and deprived of a special Providential creation as well as any divine purpose in the perpetuation of their species. (Claeys 2000: 225)

Wow. This is surprising but makes perfect sense.

With the extension of the doctrine that "Might is Right" to international conflict and the rendering of Darwinism "in terms of efficiency resting on force," warfare between nations at a time of critical intra-European economic, military, and imperial competition was increasingly praised as a salutary means of testing the criteria of survival. Selfishness, personal and national, seemed to be the prescribed law of social evolution. To assist the weak by any form of mutual aid was to act as "the persistent enemy of progress." The Darwinian world-view, "red in tooth and claw," thus seemingly legitimated both social and international warfare. (Claeys 2000: 226)

Is this why conservatives/rightists are vehemently opposed to helping anyone but themselves?

It is a mistake, therefore, to presume that there was a single "poritics" of Social Darwinism or that all forms of Social Darwinism were illiberal. Evolutionist perspectives bolstered liberal arguments in a number of notable instances. In Walter [|] Bagehot's Physics and Politics (1872), for example, liberal democracy was touted as most likely to ensure progress towards higher forms of social development, primarily because political freedom ensured the wider circulation of competing ideals and people. (Claeys 2000: 228-229)

This seems to have survived in the figure of "the marketplace of ideas". Bagehot's Physics and Politics is available.

For Malthus of course did propose gradually abolishing the poor laws as a means of ensuring that the natural and necessary course of nature was not stemmed by human error. Benevolent assistance did not aid the poor but weakened their prospects for survival by undermining their desire for independence, augmenting population, and indulging idleness without increasing the food supply. (Claeys 2000: 231)

This reads like a summary of the whole American political discourse about black single mothers. From tha end of the page: "In 1834, poverty was believed to be chiefly a function of character. Assisting the poor prevented them from supporting themselves." (ibid, 231) - Too many Americans appear to believe in this in 2021 still.

In the mid-1860s Darwin himself became in effect a Social Darwinist, and came increasingly to hope that the optimal outcome of human natural selection would be the triumph of "the intellectual and moral" races over the "lower and more degraded ones." It must be stressed that this was not the inevitable outcome of the logic of the Origin of Species nor the only path Darwin might have trod but the specific result of his reaction to a variety of critics and fellow philosophers. In this sense too, then, "Social Darwinism" was not as such "Darwinian" but the result of Darwin's acceptance of other interpretations of evolutionary theory, some of which were incorporated into the Descent of Man. (Claeys 2000: 237)

How is morality hereditary? How does it apply to a whole race? Are there genetic markers for moral choices?

Hull, David L. 2005. Deconstructing Darwin: Evolutionary Theory in Context. Journal of the History of Biology 38:137-152. DOI: 10.1007/s10739-004-6514-1

For almost a half-century students of science have disagreed fundamentally about what influences science. Put too crudely this controversy is between "internalists" and "externalists." The traditional internalist view is that reason, argument and evidence play the major role in science. Other factors at times also enter into science, but the influence of these factors is treated as being extraneous if not downright detrimental. [|] Chief among these "other factors" are sociopolitical factors. Darwin lived in a competitive, individualistic, dog-eat-dog society. So the story goes, Darwin came up with a scientific theory that was just as competitive, individualistic and dog-eat-dog as Victorian society because of his experience in Victorian England. (Hull 2005: 137-138)

A short breakdown of these terms. Internalist factors (reason, argument and evidence) are removed from the context, whereas the externalist factors include economic, social, and political aspects.

What is more, Darwin's contemporaries accepted Darwin's theory because it fit in so nicely with this very same view of society. For example, according to Alexander Vicinich, Karl von Baer thought that the "Darwinian theory was popular not because of its scientific merits but because it was in full harmony with the materialist bent of modern ideologues." (Hull 2005: 138)

For some reason our two-kroon-boy keeps popping up in recent readings (cf. e.g. Gomperz 1901a, where he was mentioned several times, more than anyone else).

In Darwin's own day, students of science saw an interplay between Darwin's theory and politico-economical theories. For example, Charles Sanders Peirce claimed that the "Origin of Species of Darwin merely extends politico-economical views of progress to the entire realm of animals and vegetable life." It is the "Gospel of Greed." Here Peirce is explicit with respect to politico-economic views. They are views, not causes. (Hull 2005: 140)

Would not have expected to meet Peirce here, though it's on point. James, Peirce, Baldwin, etc. were all in some sense reacting to Darwin's work (cf. e.g. Peirce's "Evolutionary Love").

The familiar claim is that Darwin and later Wallace read the socio-economic views of Malthus into their biological theories. What is rarely, if ever, mentioned is that Malthus himself begins his treatise by reasoning from biology to human beings. In the opening pages of the 1803 edition of his famous book, Malthus begins by noting the fecundity of plants and animals and then goes on to apply these observations to human beings. For example, if all the people in the world except Englishmen were removed from the face of the earth, within a few ages it would become completely replenished. (Hull 2005: 141)

A sort of scientific "dialogism". From nature to society and back.

The social constructivists are certainly right about Victorian society being dog-eat-dog. All you have to do is read Dickens to get a feel for exactly how brutal the early years of capitalism were in England. The data on the period are staggering. Of the children put in work houses, 85% died before they were old enough to leave. But Victorians could also be extreme maudlin, especially when it came to faithful dogs and little match girls, but not sufficiently concerned to do much about these conditions. Instead they introduce Poor Laws that were so harsh that one might suspect that they were devised to make poor people strive even harder to free themselves from poverty. Herbert Spencer for one thought that these laws were not stringent enough. (Hull 2005: 142)

Never forget that these are your class-enemies.

Numerous scholars have complained that Wallace did not get the credit he deserved for the genesis of evolutionary theory. This tradition has been continued with respect to the reception of evolutionary theory. Wallace gets even less credit - and for good reason. The papers by Darwin and Wallace appeared in 1859 and caused hardly a ripple. It was Darwin's Origin of Species that raised all the hubbub. If Wallace had returned to England immediately upon discovering the fate of his paper and started publishing on the evolution of species, we might today refer to the Darwin-Wallace Theory. As it was, Wallace did not return to England until 1862 and did not publish his Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection untyl 1870. Whatever the early reception of evolutionary theory, Wallace did not play much of a role in it. (Hull 2005: 148)

An instance of the role of intrigue in science. They say "publish or perish" but if you publish something no-one reads and feels compelled to "forward", how is it different from perishing?

Shapin, Steven 2006. The Man of Science. In: Daston, Lorraine; Park, Katharine (eds.), The Cambridge History of Science Vol. 3: Early Modern Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 179-191. [ESTER]

The significance of the priestly role for contemporary appreciations of the proper relationship between natural knowledge and religion cannot be overemphasized. When some seventeenth-century practitioners circulated a conception of natural philosophers as "priests of nature," they meant to display the theological equivalence of the Books of Nature and Scripture and also to imbue scientific work with the aura surrounding the formally religious role. (Shapin 2006: 181)

There's a perfect identification in those religionists who consider god to be nature.

The man of science, and almost all specific versions thereof, represented a subset of the early modern learned classes. By construing the investigation of nature as an act within learned culture, one is immediately marking out a massively importance social division in early modern Europe, that between those who were literate and those who were not, between those who had passed through formal schooling and those who had not. European cultures did differ in the extent to which their populations were schooled, and therefore literate, but, in general, the fractions of the literate was very small and that of the learned even smaller. (Shapin 2006: 182)

This cannot be undertaken. There are probably more learned people in modern Estonia today than there were in the whole of europe two to three centuries ago.

Throughout the early modern period, universities outside Italy were widely under church control - the Reformation splitting the institutional nature of that control but not, with some important exceptions, diluting it. The universities had as one of their major purposes the training of individuals for clerical roles, and membership in the clergy, or formal subscription to church doctrine, were very general conditions for matriculation, graduation, or entry to the fellowship and professoriate. (Shapin 2006: 184)

Of course I believe your nonsense, please let me study.

The Royal Society of London was a notable site in which such sentiments were expressed, whereas in Germany Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646-1716) plans for a state-supported scientific academy stressed the importance of selecting persons who were not only knowledgeable but who were "also endowed with a unique goodness of mind; in whom rivalry and jealousy are wanting; who will not use despicable devices to appropriate for themselves the labors of others; who are not factitious and have no wish to be regarded as the founders of sects; who labor for love of learning and not for ambition or sordid pay." (Shapin 2006: 185)

Why even take up higher education if you can't become a leader of your own cult?

Scholars might in many cases be genuinely respected by gentle society, but that society importantly distinguished the roles of the gentleman and the professional scholar or pointed to features of the scholar's "character" that handicapped his ability to take part in gentlemanly conversation. Particular targets of criticism were the scholar's traditional isolation, his "morose" or "melancholic" complexion, his tendency toward disputation, and his pedantry. (Shapin 2006: 188)

"For such knowledge as this of yours much servile labor and memory work are required, so that a man is rendered unskilful, since he has contemplated nothing but the words of books and has given his mind with useless result to the consideration of the dead signs of things." (Campanella 1901: 151)

Daston, Lorraine 1992. Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective. Social Studies of Science 22(4): 597-618. [JSTOR]

Current usage allows us to apply the word as an approximate synonym for the empirical (or, more narrowly, the factual); for the scientific, in the sense of public, empirically reliable knowledge; for impartiality-unto-self-effacement [|] and the cold-blooded restraint of the emotions; for the rational, in the sense of compelling assent from all rational minds, be they lodged in human, Martian, or angelic bodies; and for the 'really real', that is to say, objects in themselves independent of all minds except, perhaps, that of God. (Daston 1992: 597-598)

"Objectivity" in premodern usage - archetypes in the mind of god.

Among philosophers, those who have written analytically about objectivity recognize (or exemplify) the conceptual fault lines that sunder its various meanings, but all nevertheless treat it as a trans-historical given. Few of these recent studies, even those most directly concerned with objectivity in the sciences or with the historical context in which objectivity allegedly emerged once and for all, seriously entertain the hypothesis that objectivity might have an ongoing history intimately linked to the history of scientific practices and ideals. (Daston 1992: 598)

The common enemy of all historians - ahistoricity. Objectivity, indeed, comes across as tran-historical almost by definition or tautology - objectivity is objective.

Only in the middle decades of the nineteenth century was aperspectival objectivity imported and naturalized into the ethos of the natural sciences, as a result of a reorganization of scientific life that multiplied professional contacts at every level, from the international commission to the well-staffed laboratory. Aperspectival objectivity became a scientific value when science came to consist in large part of communications that crossed boundaries of nationality, training and skill. Indeed, the essence of aperspectival objectivity is communicability, narrowing the range of genuine knowledge to coincide with that of public knowledge. In the extreme case, aperspectival objectivity may even sacrifice deeper or more accurate knowledge to the demands of communicability. (Daston 1992: 600)

This is curious. Wasn't the medieval intercommunication in latin an analogous case? Did aperspectival objectivity emerge amongst the scholastics?

The terms 'objective' and 'subjective' were native to scholastic philosophy, where they signified something quite different from what they do now: 'objective' pertained chiefly to objects of thought, rather than those of the external world. These terms were of ontological, not epistemological import in late medieval discussions of universals, and were flavoured with a strong Augustinian aftertaste: truly real objects were ideas in the divine mind. (Daston 1992: 600)

Oh, yeah: Latin objectum, 'thing presented to the mind'. Finite human minds naturally a reduced images of infinite divine mind.

These are citations taken more or less at random, and they witness rather than fix the meaning of the word 'objectivity' during this period. It is Kant who appropriated the old scholastic derivative objektiv as a technical term and gave it a new lease on life as a key concept in philosophy, albeit a concept that still differs significantly from our own. Kant's 'objective validity' (objektive Gültigkeit) pertains not to external objects in se, but rather to the relational categories (such as time, space and causality) which are the preconditions of experience. For our purposes, Kant's own use of the term is less important than its adoption and adaptations by less nice-minded followers, such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge. It was Coleridge who seems to have re-introduced the term into English philosophical usage in 1817, and it was his creative misunderstanding of Kant that crystallized an opposition of objective and subjective which we can at last readily recognize if not wholly embrace:
Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE we will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the phenomena by which its existence is made known to us. On the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name of SELF or INTELLIGENCE. Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis. Intelligence is conceived of as exclusively representative, nature as exclusively represented; the one conscious, the other as without consciousness.
This Gallop throught the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century usage of the word 'objectivity' and its variants in English, French and German (all deriving and then diverging from the Latin terminology of scholasticism) is intended to make three points. First, 'objectivity' concerned ontology, and, post-Kant, to some measure epistemology in a transcendental vein. It had little or nothing to do with emotional detachment, restraint from judgment, method and measurement, or [|] empirical reliability. Second, its inseparable opposite, subjectivity in the sense of the mental, has yet to become a matter for regret or reproach. On the contrary: Coleridge branded our instinctive belief in the existence of things independent of us a 'prejudice', and though '[t]he highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualization of the laws of nature into the laws of intuition and intellect', Third, the perspectival metaphor that (Daston 1992: 602-603)

Absolutely riveting stuff. Naturally Kant had his hand in this. Quote from Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (1817; Vol. I and Vol. II), which looks exceedingly interesting (cf. e.g. Ch. V, "The laws of association"). As to the use of "objective" and "nature" in his quote, it got me thinking about the "objectification" in young Marx's ramblings about alienation, especially with regard to his odd view of nature.

Kant could use the 'subjective' and the 'empirical', both belittled by a prefatory 'merely', as near-synonyms in his treatment of duty, so remote was his moral conception of objectivity from the natural sciences. (Daston 1992: 606)

Phraseology concerning mereness. I would not have thought to use "prefatory" in this sense.

Charles Sanders Peirce conceived of this necessarily communal form of truth-seeking as proceeding by a kind of symmetric concellation of individual errors:
The individual may not live to reach the truth; there is a residuum of error in every individual's opinions. No matter, it remains that there is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run, tending [...] This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary or individual in thought; it is quite independent of how you, or I, or any number of men think.
The objectively real is not that which eliminates the mental, but that which eliminates individual idiosyncracy through the prolonged 'averaging' of viewpoints by communication. (Daston 1992: 607)

I think about this often whenever "truth" or objectivity is under discussion. The "final interpretant" in the community of inquirers.

Scientific communication also lies near the heart of Gottlob Frege's conception of objectivity, his reputation as a metaphysical Platonist notwithstanding. Frege objected to a psychological treatment of logic because it would make scientific communication impossible: 'Thus, I can also acknowledge thoughts as indepnedent of me. Other men can grasp as much as I: I can acknowledge a science in which many can be engaged in research'. (Daston 1992: 607)

As did Peirce. See his arguments for an unpsychological logic in "On the logic ofscience" (MS 94; 1865).