Peirce, Charles Sanders 1982-2000. The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. 6 volumes. (The Peirce Edition Project. Fisch, Max H.; Kloesel, Christian J. W.; Houser, Nathan, eds.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [In-text references are to W.]
The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization [P 12: Cambridge Chronicle 21 November 1863, p. 1]
In attempting to address you, I feel keenly the disadvantage of never having made any matter of general interest a special study. I am, therefore, forced to select a topic on which I have scarcely a right to an original opinion - certainly not to urge my opinion as entitled to much credit. I beg you, then, to regard whatever I say on THE PLACE OF OUR AGE IN THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION, as such a suggestion as might be put forth in conversation, and nothing more. (W 1: 101)
What are matters of general interest? Being conversational.
This century's doings taken apart are mere jugglery - clever feats - but this age is that in which "the sun becomes black as sack-cloth of hair, and the moon becomes as blood, and the stars of heaven fall unto the earth even as a fig-tree casteth her untimely figs, when she is shaken of a mighty wind." (W 1: 102)
"Jugglery" a word I have a need for. Metaphysics qua analysis of terms is a kind of jugglery with representations.
Descartes is the father of modern metaphysics, and you know it was he who introduced the term "philosophic doubt," he, first, declaring that a man should begin every investigation entirely without doubt; and he followed a completely independent train of thought, as though, before him, nobody had ever thought anything correctly. Bacon, also, respects no philosophers except certain Greeks whose works are lost; Aristotle he scouts at, and maintains that there has been no science before his time and that nothing has ever been discovered except by accident. (W 1: 103)
Of course, those works that are lost are the best. Undisputable.
The human mind having been emancipated by these great sceptics, works of great originality were speedily produced, so that the same century saw the productions of Hobbes, Cudworth, Malebranche, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, and Newton. The effect of these works was stupendous. Every question that the human mind has to ask seemed at once answered, and that too by works of such greatness of thought and power of logic, that the attention of every reasoning mind was engrossed by them. Their vastness, indeed, was overwhelming; so complete were they, so true, so profound, that, at first, they seemed to check originality. In the first half of the eighteenth century scarcely anything new seems to have been produced. (W 1: 103)
Malebranche comes up with the physical portions of Kant, and Cudworth I've only seen mention in relation with Peirce having read the most readable parts. By "checking originality" he means stifling.
The book in which he embodied the discussion of this question is, perhaps, the greatest work of the human intellect. All later philosophies are to be classified according to the ideas contained in it, for it is all the direct result of this production. And in these later philosophies, whether we consider their profundity or their number, our age ranges far above all others put together. This wonderful fecundity of thought, I say, is the direct result of Kant's Kritik; and it is to be explained by the fact that Kant presented a more insoluble doubt than all the rest, and one which has not been answered to this day, for while he showed that our innate ideas of space, time, quantity, reality, cause, possibility, and so on are true, he found himself utterly unable to do this respecting the ideas of Immortality, Freedom, and God. Accordingly, all metaphysicians since his time have been endeavoring to remove this difficulty, but not altogether with success. (W 1: 104)
Peirce's summary once again on point.
If therefore we are Christians it seems to me we must believe that Christ is now directing the course of history and presiding over the destinies of kings, and that [|] there is no branch of the public weal which does not come within the bounds of his realm. And civilization is nothing but Christianity on the grand scale. (W 1: 107-108)
Oh no, saying the quiet part out loud.
Religion ought not to be regarded either as a subjective or an objective phenomenon. That is to say, it is neither something within us nor yet altogether without us - but bears rather a third relation to us, namely, that of existing in our communion with another being. Nevertheless, religion may be revealed in either of the three ways - by an inward self-development, or by seeing it about us, or by a personal communication from the Most High. An example of revealed religion in the first way is natural religion. A man looks upon nature, sees its sublimity and beauty and his spirit gradually rises to the idea of a God. He does not see the Divinity, nor does nature prove to him the existence [|] of that Being, but it does excite his mind and his imagination until the idea becomes rooted in his heart. In the same way, the continual change and movement in nature, suggest the idea of omnipresence. And finally, by the events of his own life, he becomes persuaded of the relation of that Being with his own soul. Such a religion, where all is hinted at, nought revealed, is natural religion. (W 1: 108-109)
An interesting triplicity. (1) subjective, (2) objective, and (3) subjective-objective.
Every object is obliged to appear under a certain set of forms. The most familiar exemplification of these is found in a proposition. Every statement may be regarded as an object, that is it is something outside of us which we can know, and the grammatical analysis of a statement exemplifies I say more familiarly than anything else the laws of objective presentations. Hence, in order to trace the laws of the objective presentation of religion, I shall try to embody it in a proposition. The first condition of a statement is that it shall state something, - that it shall have a predicate. (W 1: 109)
Another qualification of the "object". I've already gathered a handful from this book, it seems.
But this again implies a whole series of conditions previously to the statement of the proposition, which shall enable you to comprehend the notion which I wish to convey as well as the language in which I convey it. Before a man can read a book, he must [|] understand the meaning of terms, that is, he must already have the elements of the thought which the book propounds. In the same way, before a man can hear the voice of God or even comprehend an example of religion he must have a notion of what religion is, and that implies that he must previously have had an inward revelation of religion. (W 1: 109-110)
Also not the first iteration of using reading as an analogue of whatever he's trying to explain. Words, here, are as if elements of thought.
After the inward revelation, comes the objective revelation, and the latter must itself be the culmination of the former, for bearing as it must a higher message it must itself act suggestively in order that its meaning may be perceived. This culminating point will be the phenomenon of perfection in such a form that man can see and know it; that is, it must be perfection in human form. The first condition, therefore, the enunciation of a predicate, was fulfilled at the birth of Christ. (W 1: 110)
This looks like "the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first" (Kant 1855: 67) or "The less, also, are ministrant to the greater goods" (Archytas 1818: 157).
The most striking tendency of our age is our materialistic tendency. We see it in the development of the material arts and the material sciences; in the desire to see all our theories, philosophical or moral, exemplified in the material world, and the tendency to value the system only for the practice. This tendency often seems to be opposed to another great movement of our age, the idealistic movement. The idealist regards abstractions as having a real existence. - Hence, he places as much value on them as on things. Moreover, by his wide and deep study of the human mind he has proved that the knowledge of things can only be attained by the knowledge of ideas. This truth is very distasteful to the materialist. His object being the ideas contained in things, there is nothing that he would more carefully eradicate than any admixture of ideas from our own minds; so that it seems to him like overturning natural science altogether to tell him that all truth is attained by such an admixture. He thinks at least that nothing more than common sense should be admitted from the mind. This amounts to admitting the loose ideas of the untrained intellect into his science, but to refuse admission to such as have been exercised, strengthened, and developed. He retorts that the conjunction of speculation with science has constantly led to error. Be it so; but then it is only by means of idealism that truth is possible in science. Human learning must fail somewhere. Materialism fails on the side of incompleteness. Idealism always presents a systematic totality, but it must always have some vagueness and thus lead to error. - Materialism is destitute of a philosophy. Thus it is necessarily one-sided. It misunderstands its relations to idealism; it misunderstands the nature of its own logic. But if materialism without idealism is blind, idealism without materialism is void. Look through the wonderful philosophies of this age and you will find in every one of them evidences that their novel conceptions have been to a very large extent suggested by physical sciences. (W 1: 111)
Several things going on here. First of all, this discussion of materialism (matter) and idealism (mind) should be considered with the third, his realistic pantheism (god), that is, as representing three distinct worlds (cf. W 1: 83). Secondly, the looseness of ideas or thinkers is loaded, and leads to his ethics of terminology. Thirdly, blind/void distinction a Kantianism he has mention/employed before: "Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind" (Kant 1855: 46). Lastly, that the humanities gain novel conceptions from STEM is well illustrated by Lotman (chaos theory, deep ecology). Recognizing Kantian tropes like blind/void leads us to a better grasp of what was important in Kant's system for Peirce, as is illustrated here by "novel conceptions" - "Knowledge is that which we get empirically but Wisdom is wrought by the unfolding of the mind" (W 1: 4); empirical knowledge can culminate in pure wisdom.
Our age is brilliand; and apparently confident of its own eternity. But is it never to end, as the Greek age merged in the Roman? The human mind cannot go on eon after eon with always the same characteristics, for such monotony is too poor for it. Is our age never to end? Are we then to go on forever toying with electricity and steam, whether in the laboratory or in business, and never use these means in the broad field of humanity and social destiny? I seem, perhaps, to sneer at what you respect. And I confess we have utilized a little surplus energy in the business of philanthropy on our triumphant road to wooing things. (W 1: 112)
"As for Civilization, from which at last we are about to escape, so far from being the social destiny of man, it is only a transient stage - a state of temporary evil with which globes are afflicted during the first ages of their career" (Fourier 1876: 10). Could his Transcendentalist friends have introduced him to Fourier before 1863? I might have to look into this pair of words - social destiny.
The fulcrum has yet to be found that shall enable the lever of love to move the world. Is our age never to end? As man cannot do two things at once, so mankind cannot do two things at once. Now Lord Bacon, our great master, has said, that the end of science is the glory of God, and the use of man. If then, this is so, action is higher than reason, for it is its purpose; and to say that it is not, is the essence of selfishness and atheism. So then our age shall end; and, indeed, the question is not so much why should it not, as why should it continue. What sufficient motive is there for man, a being in whom the natural impulse is - first to sensation, then reasoning, then imagination, then desire, then action - to stop at reasoning, as he has been doing for the last 250 years? It is unnatural, and cannot last. Man must go on to use these powers and energies that have been given him, in order that he may impress nature with his own intellect, converse and not merely listen. (W 1: 113)
An interesting series, this. It goes against Kant: "Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding" (Kant 1855: 214). It looks like this series is consciously presented as illogical, that placing action above reason is inane.
First there was the egotistical stage when man arbitrarily imagined perfection, now is the idistical stage when he observes it. Hereafter must be the more glorious tuistical stage when he shall be in communion with her. And this is exactly what, step by step, we are coming to. (W 1: 113)
Of course I went googling for "idistical", thinking that he must have misspelled "idiotic". Then it looked like Id-istical, as if this wasn't half a century too early for Freud. Then I recalled that there is indeed a Peircean neologism, tuism. All in all, these just label the three ways religion is revealed:
- egoistical - "by an inward self-developing"; "A man looks upon nature, sees its sublimity and beauty and his spirit gradually rises to the idea of a God."
- idistical - "by seeing it about us"; "the continual change and movement in nature, suggests the idea of omnipresence";
- tuistical - "by a personal communication from the Most High"; "by the events of his own life, he becomes persuaded of the relation of that Being with his own soul."
Physics will have made us familiar with the body of all things, and the unity of the body of all; natural history will have shown us the soul of all things in their infinite and amiable idiosyncrasies. Philosophy will have taught us that it is this all which constitutes the church. Ah! what a heavenly harmony will that be when all the sciences, one as viol, another as flute, another as trump, shall peal forth in that majestic symphony of which the noble organ of astronomy forever sounds the theme. (W 1: 114)
It's surreal how much intuitive sense this passage makes - there's are at least four triads present here:
Now, the last row doesn't make sense yet, as the classical distinction was between the lyre and the flute. Instead of "church", too, it should ideally read "intellect", but Peirce quite possibly inserted his own conception of "church" here - will see if I can find an explanation in the following, or upon second reading. With "harmony" Peirce might already be indicating that he has found Pythagoras.
Letter Draft, Peirce to Pliny Earle Chase [L 82a] [Cambridge 1864 April 4]
Dear Sir
I saw this morning for the first time your Intellectual Symbolism with which I was greatly interested for a reason which may perhaps interest you in hearing from me.
I have myself been studying Kant's categories for several years, and have called them the categories of the IT - an obvious name for them but suggesting the existence of other categories. I have added other categories of the IT and have thus made a circle of which Kant's form an arc. Thus my circle stands in the same position as your 2nd circle. But unfortunately there is very little resemblance beyond that. My circle is the result of hard study: so, I suppose, is yours. In my view of the matter, their being different would not prove either to be false. Nevertheless, I have no great confidence in either circle.
As our general views are very similar, I should esteem it a great favor, if you would consent to discuss the matter with me, in order that we may separate some error. In the hope of your thinking well of this I send you now (before reading your book) somet houghts of mine intended to discover how we ought to investigate the categories.
The first and fundamental question is What is metaphysics? To answer this, I must consider it in three different lights.
The first of these views is that of Aristotle - which is the freshest and most pregnant - that metaphysics is that science "which is desirable on its own account, and for the sake of knowledge," and which is pre-eminent over the others. This is about what we express by "Philosophy."
The second view is that Metaphysics is Psychology. [|]
the third view is that it is Analysis.
The first view distinguishes betweeenImages à priori and Images à posterioriThe second distinguishes betweenInner Images and Outer ImagesThe third betweenImages as Images and Images as RepresentationsThese distinctions are involved in the three definitions of Metaphysics, according to these different views. Now I regard these views as equally true, because I am satisfied that the 3 distinctions amount to the same thing. Images à priori are are only Images à priori recalled as Images, while Images à posteriori are only Images à priori excited as representations. An image to be viewed as an Image must have come from within and to be viewed as a representation must have come from without. The proof of this, I omit. These 3 views lead to 3 methods of investigation, each one-sided; each needing the influence of the other two to keep it right. (W 1: 115-116)
I had to re-type the whole letter because nothing may be allowed to escape notice. In "A Treatise on Metaphysics" (1862), in which he laid it out befere, there are only slight variations (cf. W 1: 62). For a phraseological comparison of the most important sentences, here's a table (W 1: 61 on the left; W 1: 116 on the right):
| Yet I have based each of these sciences on a separate distinction. How to reconcile them. | Now I regard these views as equally true, because I am satisfied that the 3 distinctions amount to the same thing. |
| Perhaps it will turn out that Images à priori are only Images à posteriori viewed as Images | Images à priori are are only Images à priori recalled as Images |
| that those à posteriori are only those à priori excited as Representations | while Images à posteriori are only Images à priori excited as representations |
| that to view an image as an image it must indispensably have come from within and that such as do so come we cannot regard as representations but as immediate consciousness | An image to be viewed as an Image must have come from within and to be viewed as a representation must have come from without. |
My current impression is that what this really represents is his movement towards semiotics: internal à priori images viewed as images being the stuff of immediate consciousness (Kant's stuff), whereas external à posteriori images viewed/recalled as images are representations (that is, signs). Let this stand as a working hypothesis for the moment.
Shakespearian Pronunciation [P 13: North American Review 98 (April 1864): 342-69]
It has come to pass that in our day we have two separate languages, - English spoken and English printed. The works of some of our authors were composed on paper; when they are read aloud, they sound almost like translations; they may not lack rhythm and euphony, but it is a rhythm and a euphony that the eye can see. Another class, on the other hand, among whom Shakespeare is pre-eminent, can only be quite comprehended, appreciated, and accompanied in the spoken language; the print may give an indication of what that is, but it is only in that that the words breathe and are quick. It cannot, then, be useless to pount out precisely how Shakespeare pronounced. It may be a small portion of the commentary upon his works, but no sincere disciple of his will despise labor bestowed even on this small object. And a knowledge of the old pronunciation is not merely a curious thing; it leads to other knowledge, highly important. (W 1: 117)
Not a bad observation; nearly approaching Herbert Spencer On Style, spoken English being more Anglo-Saxon, written English more Latin and French. Over time the former has gained most of the ground, no-one uses Latin interspersed in English texts as they did during Peirce's day. That words breathe and are quick can probably be connected with the force of words (cf. W 1: 17). That no objective is too small or unimportant not to invest "hard study" could be said of Peirceanism as well, particularly with reference to his letter to Chase. The aspects of spoken language comes across as another triad, given that "accompanied" stands for speaking out loud:
Doctor Johnson observes that every language has two pronunciations: one, which is regular and sedate, is its true orthoëpy; the other, existing in colloquial and vulgar use, is merely a corruption of the former. Now it is to this latter only that researches like Mr. White's can be directed, and it is an extremely interesting subject of antiquarian research; but it must be evident to every reader that the study of that which is irregular and various can only be successfully prosecuted when founded upon a thorough knowledge of that more stable thing about which it shifts and veers. (W 1: 118)
Jakobson calls these variant and invariant.
Their agreement demonstrates that, notwithstanding the popular looseness, there was a correct pronunciation of words containing th which very nearly coincides with the orthoëpy of our times. (W 1: 125)
Merely gathering Peirce's phraseology surrounding the word "loose" - here, loose pronunciation.
The French o nasal was anciently pronounced 'soon'. It is by means of this tendency to pronounce om 'oom', that the puns between Rome and room are to be explained. (W 1: 127)
The "Roman room" mnemonic technique may have gotten its name from this alliteration.
3. 'dance', 'daunt', 'dawn'. These three vowels, which, in Mulcaster's phrase, "entermedle with each other" so much, will be conveniently considered under one head. (W 1: 130)
Intermeddle or intermediate?
The ei in receive, deceive, etc., was a diphthong in Gil's time; it was used interchangeably with ai, as both Smith and Mulcaster observe. The latter says: -Ai, is the man's dipthong, and soundeth full: ei, the woman's, and soundeth finish in the same both sense, and use; a woman is deintie, and feinteth soon; the man fainteth not, bycause he is nothing daintie. (Gil 1619: 119)(W 1: 138)
Did you recaive my message? (Harsh, huh.)
Analysis of the Ego [MS 78: Spring 1864]
This investigation seeks an answer to this question: How does anything which exists, exist? or What are the conditions of subjectivity? The first thing to be said is that it exists by virtue of being whatever it is. Thus, Gold is, by virtue of being heavy and yellow. The subject is subject by being an incarnation of a predicate. Every subject is the incarnation of a predicate, which is an abstraction, and which when incarnated in the consciousness is called a conception or in its relation to the exterior incarnation an idea. It is only, then, by its idea,t hat any thing exists. Of most things we do not know the ideas, of none wholly. Subjects are either monads or collective subjects or universal subjects. No monad is known to exist, for all subjects which we know have extension. Extension is infinite; thus, all collective subjects are partial subjects. The Universal subject we only know through conceptions and partial subjects. This explanation, perhaps not in place here, is made to remove the objection which would arise to my saying that artificial objects exist through the qualities they are intended to embody, namely that I have not explained the existence of the subject but only the form. (W 1: 144)
Very neat, almost like the "key" found in Kant's gradual list of representations. Some twenty seven more examples and I might finally understand subject and predicate. This "reincarnation" sounds interesting, almost like another way of approximating viewing/recalling. On the whole, this is conception (2) and idea (3), without the experience (1), which is as if replaced by "reincarnated" abstractions (images?). Monads, collective subjects, and universal subjects quite plainly Unity, Plurality, and Totality in different verbal clothes. The infinity of extension something I must return to once I have grasped what's up with limiting the infinite in Kant.
Now, I reply that it is the formed substance only of which we have any knowledge; and I say that it is by the form or collective quality that the collective substance exists, for it is by the quality that substance in general, exists. At the same time, that the final cause of an artificial body is only partially its cause. I shall occupy no more space with thin point although the objection will probably not be effaced from the mind, but will content myself with pointing out that it is a purely metaphysical question of the mode of existence of the noumenon and can never affect any scientific conclusions, for empirically speaking capacity for containing fire is the subjective condition of the existence of a furnace. (W 1: 144)
Quite neat. Really complicates the conception of "function". The function of a furnace is to contain fire; or, the capacity for containing fire is the cause of a furnace.
But, first, let us notice that it is only by means of this circumstance that every concretion is the product of some abstraction that we can classify things, for classification consists in ranging things under their predicates. Is classification arbitrary? To a certain extent it is, for we can classify a body according to any of its predicates. But here again we must distinguish between the quality in the body and the representation of that quality in sensation and in conception. It is by the representation that we classify bodies and the classification will be just, according as the representation is just. Were the representation perfect, it would represent the idea of the body fully, so that the body would have no predicate which this representation failed to express; and classification according to such a representation would have nothing arbitrary in it. (W 1: 145)
Here he is clearly developing his conception of thirdness (type). I.e. verity or "perfect veracity is of a distinct character from cognizable veracity and it approaches quite as nearly perfection of verisimilitude" (W 1: 80). "Concretion" might be a loaded word, as if it were Kant's in concreto. In other words, we recognive concrete wholes through their concordances with abstract parts - and this is indeed classification, in a sense. The quality in the body and its representation appears to approximate noumenon and phenomenon, or at least the logic of it - quality in the body itself, and as we experience (sense and understand) it. Perfectly just classification illustrated by the idiomatic saying "if it walks like a duck..."
Idea of α. The idea of Charles S. Peirce is that of a created soul (not excluding body). Without undertaking therefore to say precisely what that is, because it doesn't happen to be necessary, but remembering Plato's definition that it is something which moving itself does not cease to move because its motion does not pass beyond itself, and Swedenborg's idea of a bud upon the Almighty, we may be content with saying he is a living being. (W 1: 145)
This follows the "List of Substances" I've read being compared to Borges? These are: "α 1. Charles S. Peirce; β 2. The orbit of the earth; γ 3. The idea of substance; δ 4. The stars of heaven; ε 5. The piano in this room; ζ 6. A certain dog - "Scott"; η 7. The Great Organ in Boston; θ 8. A computing scale I have before me; ι 9. The Government of the United States; κ 10. The Tragedy of Othello; λ 11. A retort; μ 12. The Bodies HCl, H2O, NH3, SO3, NO, CN, ClS, &c." (ibid, 145).
Idea of β. The orbit of the earth according to all previous philosophy is not a substance. But I, seeing that there are no substances in the ordinary sense, except the universal and incomprehensible substance, regard all subject as substance. The idea of the orbit of the earth is an external geometrical line. (W 1: 146)
I have an inkling that the reasoning behind it is the same as in only "that whose abstraction is in a world of space or dependence" is real (cf. W 1: 47).
Idea of γ. The idea of an idea. The idea of a conception is the realization of an abstraction in the consciousness. (W 1: 146)
"Every subject is the incarnation of a predicate, which is an abstraction, and which when incarnated in the consciousness is called a conception or in its relation to the exterior incarnation an idea." Is there a distinction between the idea of a conception and the idea of a conception? "Reincarnation" and "realization" both require close inspection when going forward.
Idea of ε. The idea of a piano, is its final cause, namely a sonorous vibrating instrument. (W 1: 146)
Sounds vaguely Aristotelian. Don't know squat about teleology.
Idea of ι. The idea of a Government is its definition (for here the final cause may be doubtful). That is, the centre of the force in the organization of a society. (W 1: 146)
Vaguely anarchist. Fourier?
We thus see that the idea of artificial objects is their inherent purpose expressed as inherent. This is in all cases the most general definition that can be applied to an artificial object. And hence forms the largest category of their classification. (W 1: 147)
Is "inherent purpose" equivalent with "final cause"?
The idea of a conception, regards the conception a realizer and expresses its realization. (W 1: 148)
What?
In general, therefore, the idea regards the subject as doing or expressing something - as working itself out - and expresses the particular working out that it does. It disregards the abstraction worked out and it disregards that in which it is worked out, and looks to the identity or difference of the working out function itself. We may therefore discard the vague term idea and substitute for it Function. (W 1: 148)
Philosophy so high-caliber that it's practically incomprehensible.
When that incarnation of a predicate which we have called Function becomes Perfect, we have no matter left, in the sense of an impressed thing, so that there is no longer an incarnation but rather a Carnification of the predicate. (W 1: 148)
Reminds me of that idiotic interpretation of Kant I came up with to get through it, that while imperfect human beings progress from sensation to conception to reason, a perfect being could progress in the opposite direction, from reason to conception to sensation. In that sense, instead of "reincarnation" of an idea in an imperfect human being, the perfect supernal being would "carnificate" ideas. Nonsense that only makes sense under the influence of certain plant matter.
The incarnation reduced [|] to a nullity is merely the Function of Function, and may be called Linguistification because meaningless language is the function of expression reduced to zero; or it may be called Materiafication. (W 1: 148-149)
His odd views of meaning, language, and expression again (cf. W 1: 86). Would make perfect sense if used to discuss phatic communion, but that's probably not even in the ballpark of what he's on about here.
A Treatise of the Major Premisses of Natural Science [MS 80: 5 August 1864]
Whenever we make an observation for the sake of trial, we clearly assume that the observed result will be an indication of something not observed. It is difficult to find a warrant for such an assumption, yet to assume without warrant is to beg our conclusion. Only a mind which cannot see this will imagine that such an assumption is warranted by some previous experience, for this is simply to repeat the same fallacy. A warrant for inferring something not observed, is in itself an inference of something not observed. These assumptions, therefore, originate à priori. (W 1: 152)
Add to this abditive and inabditive distinctness, and bada bing bada boom you have inchoate semiotics.
Every judgment consists in referring a predicate to a subject. The predicate is thought, and the subject is only thought of. The elements of the predicate are experiences or representations of experiences. The subject is never experienced but only assumed. Every judgment, therefore, being a reference of the experienced or known to the assumed or unknown, is an explanation of a phenomenon by an hypothesis, and is in fact an inference. Hence there is a major premiss behind every judgment, and the first principles are logically antecedent to all science, which I call à priori. (W 1: 152)
Ultimately I'm going to have to construct a table of the 33 different ways Peirce explains subject and predicate. Here it looks like "Images à priori" are, well, experiences, and "Images à posteriori" are representations of experiences.
On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception [MS 81: August 1864]
I hold the Doctrine of Common Sense to be well fitted to Reid's philosophical calibre and about as effective against any of the honored systems of philosophy as a potato-pop-gun's contents might be against Gibraltar. (W 1: 153)
Apply cold water to burned area.
I will first endeavor to show that this doctrine taken strictly is a truism. It will be admitted that if anyone has denied it, it is Kant. And yet he has not done so, even with respect to the speculative employment of Pure Reason. On the contrary the whole gist of his argument is that the ideas of pure reason, having no relation to any possible experience, could not possibly be employed to test our knowledge; and he equally insists that as speculative (not practical) ideas they have no bearing on the morality of actions. So in his Deduction of the Categories, - where the course of his reasoning is obscured only to those who can understand no portion of his work, - Kant only overrides Hamilton's Law by never requiring any test further than compliance with the conditions of the possibility of cognition. And by these conditions of cognitions he means the conditions of judgment. (W 1: 153)
From what I gather, ideas "give to reason a systematic unity" (Kant 1855: 350) and Reason rearranges "the order of things presented by experience [and] rearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical conditions to agree" (Kant 1855: 339) but in the final analysis "we know nothing about them" (Kant 1855: 296).
But that there is a significance in making this truism the principle of investigation, I admit. It is in restricting us to one line of inquiry, namely that of finding what convictions are native to the mind and what are abnormal results of experience. Now there is no criterion by which it may be determined whether a given conviction is normal or not. The test of universality and necessity only determines whether a proposition may be derived from real observation, but clearly not whether it is true. The consciousness in giving us a proposition, confines itself to that without disclosing its origin. Hence the application of the rule is only possible by indirect reasoning à posteriori. (W 1: 154)
If it were the case that we had "innate ideas", how would we know which ones they were?
Let us now come to the celebrated application of this principle to the theory of perception. It is said to be a fact that consciousness testifies to our perceiving the non-ego. This is put forward as opposed to the doctrine that our knowledge of the non-ego is inferential. (W 1: 154)
Is the minds embrace of an object immediate or mediate?
This pretended testimony of consciousness must either be given in the act of perception itself, or it must be an axiom concerning perception. On the former alternative every perception itself involves and contains a proposition. A proposition is the thinking a predicate of a subject; the universal usage of speech argues that this is a natural conviction. Accordingly, we have the testimony of consciousness that the subject is not thought but thought of, that it does not enter into the field of consciousness. (W 1: 154)
Huh. I now notice his careful wording: "When a thing influences the soul its effect comes into the field of consciousness or not" (W 1: 42).
All the cognitions which we actually have experience of are propositions, in which the non-ego enters only as something to which certain predicates are referred, these predicates being in themselves modifications of consciousness. Here is the observed fact, and genuine common sense will not oppose it. (W 1: 155)
The quote given above continues, "In the former case we call the modification of consciousness a true thought" (W 1: 42). That is, when the effects of a thing do not come into consciousness, it is "an unconscious idea" (ibid, 42), but if it does, it is called a modification of consciousness, or predicates.
Letter, Peirce to Francis E. Abbot [Francis E. Abbot Papers]
In reference to the distinction between Space and Extension, I am inclined to agree with you that Kant did not intend it even in his early paper on the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science. Space, in fact, is as you say known, if at all, by pure intellect; and therefore the conception of it would be utterly false (transcendent) according to Kant. He would probably say that it was the supposition of an object to correspond to the form of intuition; and as he says (Rosencrantz' Ed., p. 236), "The mere Form of Intuition, without Substance, is in itself no object, but the mere formal condition of it (as Phenomena), as the pure Space and pure Time (ens imaginarium) which certainly are something, as Forms for Intuiting, but are themselves no object which can be intuited." His Space as an image is, therefore, your extension. But you will ask how he can speak of a pure intuition of space by which you say (p. 103) that he means "the mental image of empty space." You seem not to have noticed that in the Transcendental Aesthetic he is not considering the mode of Apprehension in Intuition but only the questions "Whether and how Space and Time can be objectively valid?" (W 1: 156)
Presently way above my head. Why is space so complicated? This letter is in response to Francis Ellingwood Abbot's 1864 paper "The Philosophy of Space and Time" in North American Review.
Now for the adjective pure. I need not say that the fundamental and central idea of the whole critic, is that all cognitions whatsoever are cognitions of objects of a possible experience. But it occurs to me that the manner in which this view is carried out, slipped your mind when you say, on page 105, that Kant did not foresee the difficulty that intuited triangles are still not general cases and will not lead to general propositions; for Kant devotes a whole chapter (pp. 122-13) to explaining this point. I will therefore go on to say that these pure cognitions are simply cognitions contained in the experience of objects in general, that is to say, as much in any one object as in any other. (W 1: 157)
Cognitions of objects not full of certitude, but of probability.
The question Kant has in view may be stated thus. The present instant is felt, the past is remembered, the future is expected with certainty. How can the phenomena of memory and feeling be connected into one continuum seeing that there is feeling in each instant of time though in this instant is no continuum? How can pre-remembered time and future time be known; if they can be known? The same with reference to Space. Here are some prerogative instances of space-perception. The eye can easily see objects which make smaller images on the retina than the distances of the nerve-points. The fingers can feel finer texture in moving than when still. The retina is not a field for a picture but a bundle of tubes each containing a nerve point. (W 1: 158)
Verisimilitude is remembered, veracity is felt, and verity is expected. The instant/continuum question leads us to Clay's "specious present". Retinal tubes possibly connected with "the manifold".
All the principles à priori are in his view, not it is true logical inductions, nor yet partial scientific inductions, but material inferences from every and any experience. An attentive study of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories will show this. Let me express myself a little more precisely. Scientific men when they adopt hypotheses excuse themselves by saying that it is only by so doing that the facts can be comprehended (that is brought to a logical unity) and they say they do not believe these hypotheses as facts in themselves but only so far as they do bring the facts to a unity. In the same way Kant admits universals on the ground they are indispensible for bringing to the unity of consciousness, not facts merely, but the very impressions of sense. And he also refuses to accept them any further than this, into speculative philosophy or science, whatever practical presumption there may be in their favor and however admissible they may be into the court of conscience. According to Kant then material inference from experience is the very thing which alone can give validity to synthetic judgements à priori. (W 1: 159)
Recording this for my second reading of CPR - perhaps Peirce's explanations will prove helpful then.
I observe you complain of the technicality of Kant's terminology. He did not invent all these terms or give them their modern meanings at one jump. For many years the truly scientific spirit of Germany had been producing and developing this philosophical language. Every science in a vigorous state must have a language of its own; it is pedantry to confine oneself to classical language when one ought to have post-classical ideas. Kant seized the elements of this young language and brought them to full development introducing very little absolutely new but generally going to the scholastic storehouses. But it is fine, now, to object of everything Kantian as new-fangled. (W 1: 160)
Ethics of terminology, one of my favourite subjects.
ON THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE [Harvard Lectures of 1865]
Lecture I [MS 94: February-March 1865]
Though I ask your attention to one of the studies of the ancient Trivium - a study therefore according both to etymology and long prejudice, trivial - I trust I need not at this day defend it from the charge of piddling. It is now pretty plain that though modern science has scorned the scholastic terminology it has either continued to employ or has been forced to relearn the ideas that terminology conveyed, having simply thrown away the advantage of exact expressions. Logic in itself, however, has never been contemned by profound minds. It was a particular scheme of logic and not the science itself against which Bacon protested (see Aphorism XI); hence, heproceeds at once to substitute for that scheme another of his own, - and that intended to be a strictly logical one as I shall hereafter show. In the same way the reform of Ramus, the reform of Kant and all the reforms of science have been logical reforms. The Ramists sneered at the scholastics, the modern natural theorists sneer at both, and certain persons are now beginning to sneer at the natural theorists. Another reform seems to be coming: it is in the air. Several logical questions are already under discussion by scientific men. (W 1: 162)
Define:piddling - "to spend time in a wasteful, trifling, or ineffective way; dawdle (often followed by around): He wasted the day piddling around. Informal. (especially of children and pets) to urinate." ["pissing time away"] This was one of the aspects Jakobson came away with from his studies of Peirce: "In many cases discoveries were made only to be temporarily swept away. This, for instance, the historic attainments of the Schoolmen's linguistic (particularly semantic) theory were dismissed after, as Charles Sanders Peirce used to say, "a barbarous rage against medieval thought broke out"" (Jakobson 1972b: 81).
What then is logic? Of course, the definitions of a subject which has been pursued with ability for two thousand years and more have been very various. They may however be divided into two classes; those which do not and those which do give to logica psychological or human character. (W 1: 163)
Psycho-logical logic - soulful logic.
St. Augustine calls it the science of truth. Several writers of the renaissance (Peter Molyneux, Vossius) and at least one modern one Reimarus (1790) have advocated this definition. There is great merit in the view, but it is too broad; for logic does not consider how an object or idea may be presented but only how it may be represented; eyesight, that is to say, and inspiration are both beyond the province of logic. Another curious definition is that of Hobbes. "Ratiocination is Computation." A very remarkable and profound conception. (W 1: 163)
Slowly but surely, he is adding to those cryptic distinctions in his letter to Chase. Eyesight concerns Images as Images, or presentation; logic on the other hand deals with Images as Representations.
Since Kant, there has been a vast majority of the suffrages of logicians in favor of his definition which is as follows - the science of the necessary laws of the Understanding and Reason - or what is the same thing - the science of the sheer Form of thought in general. Observe the two branches of this statement the former more psychological the latter scarcely at all so; one has two faculties and their capacities; the other thoughts as objects with forms. This is certainly the best definition yet given. It has been more or less modified in one way or other by subsequent logicians but not essentially by anyone who knows logic. One may say it is the science of the normative laws of human cognition. Another that it is the science of the relations of Conceptions. Another that it is the science of the laws of formal thinking. (W 1: 164)
This is also close to how logic is taught these days at the universities; i.e. something like the science of self-consistent argumentation. Though this approximates more on the unpsychological view, concerning "the sheer Form of thought in general". I'm already quite partial to the psychological view which includes the distinction between Understanding and Reason (or Soul and Intellect).
For this purpose, suppose I write this syllogism on the boardAll conquerors are ButchersNow this has a particular logical character to me as I write it; it has the same to all of you as you read it; it will have the same if you read it tomorrow; and while it remains on the board it will retain the same character to whoever can read it. Now is this logical character a form [|] of thought only? My thought when I wrote it was a different event from each one of your thoughts, and your thoughts will be each different if you read it again from what they were when you read it just now. The thoughts were many, but this form was one. For that which was written on the board remained the same. What is written, therefore, is the continual determinator of this form. Now a continual determinator of form is that in which the form inheres by the definition of the relation of substantia et accidens. Hence, this logical character belongs to what is written on the board at least as much as to our thought. (W 1: 164-165)
Napoleon is a conqueror
∴ Napoleon is a butcher.
Easy to see that this ultimately begets the type/token distinction. Type being a continual determinator of a logical form and token a thought as a subsequent event. I inserted "subsequent" per arbitrium, meaning really that the logical form appears to be "continuous" in some sense, but individual thoughts "discrete".
There are ten words there - that is to say ten conglomerations of writing. Yet there are ten only because by a mental process we distinguish ten objects. Indeed there is no form which could be unless the mind could think it. Form is as much determined by the subject or I as it is by the object or IT; but it is the IT which constitutes its matter and in fact matter may be defined as the //pure/sheer// IT and the analogous word substance may be defined as the absolute IT. (W 1: 165)
Odd definition of words, but not essentially wrong. That "there is no form which could be unless the mind could think it" is probably another iteration of the phenomenon/noumenon distinction, that it is the mind which partly determines the world. Here, too, we see that Peirce is still in some measure operating with the I, IT, and THOU. It also kinda looks like matter as "pure" IT and substance as "absolute" IT may be what ultimately leads to immediate/dynamic distinction, but this is a poor guess.
That which I set out to prove was that the psychological character of the Kantian definition was not an essential character. There is no difference amounting to the slightest contradiction between the two views. The psychological view is that these forms are only realized in thought, and that language is essential to thought. The unpsychological view is that they are forms of all symbols whether internal or external but that they only are by virtue of possible thought. (W 1: 165)
The emphasized part, too, Jakobson took away from his readings of Peirce. Logic can equally well be conducted via symbols (numbers and Greek letters) but as "by virtue of possible thought" may indicate, these, too, ultimately need to be translated into language? (if language is essential to thought, that is). That symbols could be "internal or external" is the essence of "metaphysics as psychology" (in "A Treatise on Metaphysics" and letter to Chase) but the exact point here seems to elude me - do these refer simply to thoughts as internal symbols and writing as external symbols?
In short, I say that the logical form [|] is already realized in the symbol itself; the psychologist says that it is only realized when the symbol is understood. (W 1: 165-166)
This question of realizing the logical form of a symbol is paralleled by questioning whether books in storage space that no-one reads is "information" or whether something made to indicate something but which will never again meet human senses is really a sign. Somewhat pedantic issues. Not not uninteresting.
If the two views are so nearly alike why should the new one be pressed? What are its advantages? I answer that it has three. 1st It is philosophically more perfect. A definition of a science should not include conceptions foreign to that science. For instance, according to the generally received view space is the form of the external sense. If this be true, it would not be false to call geometry the science of the formal laws of the external sense. It would, however, be bad as a definition, because geometry regards extension simply as an object without any reference to its psychological or ontological character whatsoever. In the same way logic needs no distinction between the symbol and the thought; for every thought is a symbol and the laws of logic are true of all symbols. (W 1: 166)
Okay, yeah. The logic is fine. But is every thought a symbol? What is the definition of symbol here?
But why ought we to be logical? Because we wish our thoughts to be representations or symbols of fact. It is evident therefore that logic applies to the thought only in so far as the latter is a symbol. It is to symbols, therefore, that it primarily applies. (W 1: 166)
The takeaway here is that "representation" and "symbol" are equivalents. The use of "fact" here yet again dubious, because self-consistent logical form is no guarantee of empirical necessity. Logic is as if better equipped to point out what cannot be, rather than what is.
The inner and the outer worlds as represented in common opinion and even sometimes by philosophers are two completely separated experiences, as distinct as two chambers; but this representation is a metaphysical fiction. Nothing is more common than for the philosophizing intellect in attempting to state clearly some view of the natural common-sense, to fall into a great error; and then this clear but false view displacing the true but undefined one produces a popular error. But having once eat of the tree of knowledge, there is no remedy but to eat more. We first draw a distinction and draw it badly; then the only way is to push on our analysis and draw it well. In the present instance it becomes important to distinguish two kinds of self-knowledge - two selves, if you please, one known immediately and the other mediately. The mediate knowledge of self is not the inner world with which we are at present concerned, is not something presented to us but is a mere product of active thought. We find that every judgment is subject to a condition of consistency; its elements must be capable of being brought to a unity. This consistent unity since it belongs to all our judgments may be said to belong to us. Or rather since it belongs to the judgments of all mankind. But the world of self, the world of the feelings does not contain such a unity. Much rather does this unity contain the feelings. The world of feelings then is not a world of self but of instances of self. We know our feelings immediately; we also know what is before us in space immediately. But nevertheless we do not distinguish what is within from what is without immediately; for this distinction implies an act of comparison [|] the product of which requires to be known before we can judge that the inner is not the outer. But however this may be, whether this judgment is immediate or not; one thing will be admitted namely that the representation of the distinction between the two is a judgment. Furthermore it is a judgment which involves abstraction. Under all circumstances we have outward and inward feelings at once; that is to say we have a mixed feeling. We cannot then separate this feeling into two parts one of which is in space and the other not. For the feeling is all connected with space if any of it is. We can separate the relations not of space as for instance that of light and dark are not inward relations. No; the inward world must have a positive definition. Now everything within is known by memory except the mere point of present consciousness. But unless we could compare our consciousness by memory we could attain no consciousness of ourselves. An immediate knowledge of the past is contradictory in the same sense in which an immediate knowledge of the distant is. In both cases some machinery is requisite for bringing them into the present. The past of which we have an immediate knowledge is a remembered past, but memory is a mere mechanical faculty without any feeling or active consciousness. And when we say knowledge is immediate we do not mean to exclude mechanical media. The inward world is then the world of memory for it is clear that we can remember nothing except what is within. But the world of memory is the world of time; hence the inward world and the world of time are the same. Taking it for granted, then, that the inner and outer worlds are superposed throughout, without possibility of separation, let us now proceed to another point. There is a third world, besides the inner and the outer; and all three are coëtensive and contain every experience. Suppose that we have an experience. That experience has three determination - three different references to a substratum or substrata, lying behind it and determining it. In the first place, it is a determination of an object external to ourselves - we feel that it is so because it is extended in space. Thereby it is in the external world. In the the second place, it is a determination of our own soul, it is our experience; we feel that it is so because it lasts in time. Were it a flash of sensation, there for less than an instant, and then utterly gone from memory, we should not have time to think it ours. But while it lasts, and we reflect upon it, it enters into the internal world. We have now considered that experience as a determination of the modifying [|] object and of the modified soul; now, I say, it may be and is naturally regarded as also a determination of an idea of the Universal Mind; a preëxistent, archetypal Idea. Arithmetic, the law of number, was before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been created. It was though it did not exist. It was not a fact nor a thought, but it was an unuttered word. 'Εν ἂρχᾗ ἧν ὁ λὁγος. We feel an experience to be a determination of such an archetypal LOGOS, by virtue of its //depth of tone/logical intension//, and thereby it is in the logical world. (W 1: 167-169)
This is a long paragraph that spans several pages (I even excluded the beginning, a polemic against psychologists) but its arguments follow one another with such consistency that it would be criminal to break it up into smaller chunks. Hence, I'll rather break down my own comments to particular bits.
a metaphysical fiction ··· The verbiage of "completely separate experiences" already hints that we are once again dealing, in disguise, with the three separate worlds (I, IT, and THOU; or materialism, idealism, and realistic pantheism; matter, mind, and god).
a popular error ··· Something to add to the ethics of terminology and the growth of signs; the false but clear can easily displace the true but undefined - a statement with implacable universality across the field.
But having once eat of the tree of knowledge, there is no remedy but to eat more. ··· Knowledge is addictive.
We first draw a distinction and draw it badly; then the only way is to push on our analysis and draw it well. ··· Try and try again. This statement could equally apply on his own development of the I, It, and Thou, which in this very paragraph become something better and more lasting, partly because more true to the original Pythagorean conception.
two kinds of self-knowledge - two selves, if you please, one known immediately and the other mediately ··· "I, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body" (Kant 1855: 237).
a mere product of active thought ··· "I, as thinking", also recall his objections against introspection, that thought cannot be caught on the fly.
Much rather does this unity contain the feelings ··· The protocol of degeneracy at play: feelings being first, are contained and "cumulate" towards higher unity. Also, the thoughts are not in me, I am in thoughs.
the mere point of present consciousness ··· The specious present.
memory is a mere mechanical faculty without any feeling or active consciousness ··· I disagree. "Remembering" is a conscious activity (an act of consciousness) aided by feelings. Also, see Chase's Suggestion, Recollection, and Retention.
the world of memory is the world of time ··· By conflating various triads, it now appears that the soul consists foremost in memory.
all three are coëtensive and contain every experience ··· "Here then we have three worlds Matter, Mind, God, mutually excluding and including each other" (W 1: 83).
it is a determination of our own soul, it is our experience ··· Beautiful. Self-consciousness does require time and memory, it all makes sense.
a determination of an idea of the Universal Mind; a preëxistent, archetypal Idea ··· The Pythagorean Third, Intellect, is divine: "God dwells in the intellect of the wise man" (Sextus 1818: 194).
Arithmetic, the law of number, was before anything to be numbered or any mind to number had been created ··· A superb illustration of why the Third is the province of Laws. Profound.
In this point of view, efforts to ascertain precisely how the intellect works in thinking, - that is to say investigation of internal characteristics - is no more to the purpose which logical writers as such, however vaguely have in view, than would be the investigation of external characteristics. (W 1: 169)
Peirce's point is now clear: logic deals with the logical world, and no more with the internal world (psychology) than with the external world (physics).
Some reasons having now been given for adopting the unpsychological conception of the science, let us now seek to make this conception sufficiently distinct to serve for a definition of logic. For this purpose we must bring our logos from the abstract to the concrete, from the absolute to the dependent. There is no science of absolutes. The metaphysical logos is no more to us than the metaphysical soul or the metaphysical matter. To the absolute Idea or Logos, the dependent or relative word corresponds. The word horse, is though of as being a word though it be unwritten, unsaid, and unthought. It is true, it must be considered as having been thought; but it need not have been thought by the same mind which regards it as being a word. I can think of a word in Feejee, though I can attach no definite articulation to it, and do not guess what it would be like. Such a word, abstract but not absolute, is no more than the genus of all symbols having the same meaning. We can also think of the higher genus which contains words of all meanings. A first approximation to a definition, then, will be that logic is the science of representations in general, whether mental or material. This definition coincides with Locke's. It is however too wide for logic does not treat of all kinds of representations. The resemblance of a portrait to its object, for example, is not logical truth. It is necessary, therefore, to divide the genus representation according to the different ways in which it may accord with its object. The first and simplest [|] kind of truth is the resemblance of a copy. It may be roughly stated to consist in a sameness of predicates. Leibniz would say that carried to its highest point, it would destroy itself by becoming identity. Whether that is true or not, all known resemblance has a limit. Hence, resemblance is always a partial truth. On the other hand, no two things are so different as to resemble each other in no particular. Such a case is supposed in the proverb that Dreams go by contraries, - an absurd notion, since concretes have no contraries. A false copy is one which claims to resemble an object which it does not resemble. But this never fully occurs, for two reasons; in the first place, the falsehood does not lie in the copy itself but in the claim which is made for it, in the superscription for instance; in the second place, as there must be some resemblance between the copy and its object, this falsehood cannot be entire. Hence, there is no absolute truth or falsehood of copies. Now logical representations have absolute truth and falsehood as we know à posteriori from the law of excluded middle. Hence, logic does not treat of copies. (W 1: 169-170)
we must bring our logos from the abstract to the concrete, from the absolute to the dependent ··· "Absolutum means what is freed or loosed, in which sense the Absolute will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c." (Chase 1863: 523).
metaphysical logos[,] soul[, and] matter ··· "they say they do not believe these hypotheses as facts in themselves but only so far as they do bring the facts to a unity" (W 1: 159).
unwritten, unsaid, and unthought ··· Types do not require tokens.
to divide the genus representation according to the different ways in which it may accord with its object ··· We are slowly inching towards the triad of icon, index, and symbol.
the resemblance of a copy ··· A curious bit that could be serviceable to those investigating iconicity in literature: "The idea of a Tragedy, is that of a Dramatic representation" (W 1: 146), "The function of a tragedy is the representation of human life. The method of introducing that function is by rendering it a copy of men and women." (W 1: 149), and "This [OTHELLO] is a copy of men and women, so far as it is, and by means of being, an illustration or expression of the action of scandal. This is the second function which it fulfils which conditions the first" (W 1: 151).
a sameness of predicates ··· likeness (cf. W 1: 79).
the falsehood does not lie in the copy itself but in the claim which is made for it, in the superscription for instance ··· In art forgery, it is not the new copy that lies, it is the description besides it that claims it to be the original that does.
logic does not treat of copies ··· This whole discussion is eerily reminiscent of Jakobson's definition of the emotive function, which "tends to produce an impression of a certain emotion, whether true or feigned" (Jakobson 1960d: 22). Emotive sentences, just like imperative sentences, are "not liable to a truth test" (ibid, 23).
The second kind of truth, is the denotation of a sign, according to a previous convention. A child's name, for example, by a convention made at baptism, denotes that person. Signs may be plural but they cannot have genuine generality because each of the objects to which they refer must have been fixed upon by convention. It is true that we may agree that a certain sign shall denote a certain individual conception an individual act of an individual mind, and that conception may stand for all conceptions resembling it; but in this case, the generality belongs to the conception and not to the sign. Signs, therefore, in this narrow sense are not treated of in logic, because logic deals only with general terms. The third kind of truth or accordance of a representation with its object, is that which inheres in the very nature of the representation whether that nature be original or acquired. Such a representation I name a symbol. To clear up the vagueness of this statement let us consider for an instant, our words. Every human word was once the sign of an individual conception, - a sign in the narrow sense. But does it always retain this character? (W 1: 170)
This part, too, has developed from its previous iteration, "Veracity consists in a constant connection between the sign and the thing" (W 1: 80). Now symbol, as everyone knows, pertains to the Third. What it practically means now, is that it is outside of mind and matter, time and space. Here these poles are represented with "original" (matter, inherent in nature) or "aquired" (mind, previous convention). At this point it is in a curious shift from what is usually thought of icon, index, and symbol - that the last one is a product of convention.
On this point I will read a few paragraphs from Locke.§4. Words often secretly referred,
First, to the Ideas in other mens minds.
But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet they in their thoughts give them a secret reference to two other things. [|]
First, They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea, where such as by the hearer were applied to another; which is to speak two languages. But in this men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same: but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine, in the common acceptation of that language; in which they suppose, that the idea they make it a sign of, is precisely the same, to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.§5. Secondly, to the Reality of things.
Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose their words to stand also for the reality of things. But this relating more particularly to substances, and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes, and substances in particular: though give me leave here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification, whenever we make them stand for any thing, but those ideas we have in our own minds.§6. Words by use readily excite Ideas.
Concerning words also it is farther to be considered, First, That they being immediately the signs of men's ideas, and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions, and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts, there comes by constant use to be such a connection between certain sounds, and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas, as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses. Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities; and in all substances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us.I have adduced Locke, as a good authority on questions of fact. His critic, however, is wholly inadequate and false. It is enough to state this, because it is now a thing of the past. He here states the natural conceptions of the Human mind. He thinks them illusions; I shall accept them as valid. I ask you therefore to attend to his facts and to consider my interpretations of them. His first fact is that "a word as it is used by a man can immediately signify nothing but the idea that is in the mind of the speaker." This is true; but we are not now dealing with words in their use, but with words in themselves. Upon this latter point he makes two observations. "First that men suppose their words to be marks of ideas in other men's minds." This opinion that the individuality of the mind which has the idea corresponding to a word is of no account, shows that the idea is regarded as belonging to mind in general, to a universal mind, and that words are considered, however obscurely, as determinations of the pure idea. "Secondly, men suppose their words to stand for the reality of things." That is, they regard that intelligible form of the word wherein its agreement with the conception and with the fact consists to be also a form of the fact and not merely of the conception; this agreement of form constituting, in short, the truth of both word and conception. These two observations of Locke repose on the truth that the representative character of a word is naturally expressed in two ways, first as determined by the idea of the universal mind and second as determined by the abstract form of a possible object; this idea and this pure form being one and the same. Locke now makes two other observations which bear more precisely upon my expression of "symbolization by nature." "Concerning words also it is used farther to be considered," he says, "that there comes by constant use to be such a connection between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for, that the names heard, almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect the senses." Now this readiness of excitation obviously consists in this; namely, that we do not have to reflect upon the word as a sign but that it comes to affect the intellect as though it had that quality which it connotes. I call this the acquired nature of the word, because it is a power that the word comes to have, and because the word itself without any reflection of ours upon it brings the idea into our minds. (W 1: 170-172)§7. Words often used without signification.
Secondly, That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker, yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our tongues, and always at hand in our memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or settle their significations perfectly; it often happens that men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things. Nay, because words are many of them learned, before the ideas are known for which they stand; therefore some, not only children, but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds. But so far as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connection between the sound [|] and the idea, and a designation that the one stand for the other; without which application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant noise. (Book iii, Ch. 2, §§4.5.6.7)
words [...] give [...] a secret reference to two other things ··· This is just perfect: I, IT, and THOU! Or, if one wishes, expression, representation, and appeal (per Bühler): words express what I think they stand for, but but I also consider what might appeal to my audience and how You ("Thou") would understand them, with the underlying assumption that the do represent something in the real world.
They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other men with whom they communicate ··· We suppose an equivalence between the ideas our words stand for.
men stand not usually to examine whether the idea they and those they discourse with have in their minds, be the same ··· Locke is saying that the metalingual function of language is fairly uncommon.
being immediately the signs of men's ideas ··· I wonder if this has anything to do with immediate/dynamic distinction.
Words often used without signification ··· Phatic communion. Malinowski argues exactly against this attitude, that words are "the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions"; there are uses of language in which the communication of ideas is not the primary function, foremost among these being greetings.
some, not only children, but men, speak several words no otherwise than parrots do ··· Phatic function. Jakobson, too, includes children and parrots. A study of how parrots have been used to make this point - that some uses of language are without meaning or intent to communicate information - would be interesting in itself, and perhaps not that difficult to do, seeing as Locke has already set a precedent for several centuries.
but we are not now dealing with words in their use, but with words in themselves ··· Peirce is a Kantian through and through. He manages to establish something like a phenomenon/noumenon distinction even for words: words-for-us (in their use) and words-in-themselves.
the idea is regarded as belonging to mind in general, to a universal mind ··· In the manifold of "other men's minds" Peirce finds the unity of "universal mind", later the "community of inquirers".
determined by the abstract form of a possible object ··· Another Kantianism, or is this the only way Peirce can conceive of "the reality of things"?
we do not have to reflect upon the word as a sign but that it comes to affect the intellect as though it had that quality which it connotes ··· I call BS. No matter how many times I repeat the word "cheese", I won't see cheese in front of my nose.
the word itself without any reflection of ours upon it brings the idea into our minds ··· Only if it's a familiar enough word. This "readiness of excitation" is, if we're not getting too much ahead of ourselves, a matter of habit.
I may mention in passing that if the symbolic nature is original it is more like a copy and that instances of such symbols are hieroglyphs, geometrical symbols, emblems, parables, &c., as well as conceptions or mental symbols. On the other hand if the symbolic nature is acquired the symbol is more like a sign as ordinary letters, language, and algebraical symbols. Locke says that the use of words in this symbolical way is attended with danger of ambiguity and that the only safety lies in using them as signs of recognized conceptions. That may be. But I believe it is demonstrable that attempts to define words, in the sense of determining the conceptions which correspond to them, are attended with some peculiar dangers. It is true, that the essence of philosophy is definition; but it is a trite remark that there is danger of error in philosophizing. It is substituting complex machinery for simple; artificial machinery for simple; it is walking on stilts. It is true that this machinery however dangerous is indispensible. (W 1: 173)
Are conceptions and "mental symbols" equivalents? I asked above what could be material and mental symbols. This looks like the answer. I'd correct Peirce's wording here slightly; the essence of philosophy is the work of definition. Not many would agree, I imagine, but this is peculiar to Peirce - in "A Treatise on Metaphysics" he wrote something to the effect that the essence of metaphysics is the analysis of conceptions, for example.
Still I believe that there is a far better way of acquiring the use of our words; namely, the way in which we acquire the use of our arms, by exercise, by selected exercise. [|] And even for communicating the use of words, what can be more perfect than the method of examples? (W 1: 173-174)
They do say that the key to language-learning success is "comprehensible input", which does amount to "selective exercise".
But not to follow this subject too far, we have now established three species of representations; copies, signs, and symbols; of the last of which only logic treats. A second approximation to a definition of it then will be, the science of symbols in general and as such. But this definition is still too broad; this might, indeed, form the definition of a certain science which would be a branch of Semiotic or the general science of representations which might be called Symbolistic, and of this logic would be a species. But logic only considers symbols from a particular point of view. (W 1: 174)
Icon, index, and symbol used to be copy, sign, and symbol. The order, as I currently read it, is as follows: Semiotic → Symbolistic → Logic. One can only imagine what other categories he will come up with in this and succeeding volumes. Will Symbolic be complemented by Signific or Indexic, and Copistic or Iconic?
A symbol in general and as such has three relations. The first is its relation to the pure Idea or Logos and this (from the analogy of the grammatical terms for the pronouns I, IT, THOU) I call its relation of the first person, since it is its relation to its own essence. The second is its relation to the Consciousness as being thinkable, or to any language as being translatable, which I call its relation to the second person, since it refers to its power of appealing to a mind. The third is its relation to its object, which I call its relation to the third person or IT. (W 1: 174)
This is so thick that I have to break it down into a table:
This is more like it! At least the I, THOU, and IT are now in the order I would prefer them! I notice that in the first the "agent" is still (cf. W 1: 81) in the symbol itself, which is a bit odd - whose own essence is the symbol's relation to? In the second Peirce is as if trying to consolidate Kant's Understanding and what, through Locke, is the basis for the conative function - language as being translatable and appealing to another mind. With the third it's taken for granted that the object should come in third, as in Representamen, Interpretant, and Object. Jakobson must have caught, in his interpretation of the interpretant, a hold of this "translatable".
Every symbol is subject to three distinct systems of formal law as conditions of its taking up these three relations. If it violates either one of these three codes, the condition of its having either of the three relations, it ceases to be a symbol and makes nonsense. Nonsense is that which has a certain resemblance to a symbol without being a symbol. But since it stimulates the symbolic character it is usually only one of the three codes which it violates; at any rate, flagrantly. Hence there should be at least three different kinds of nonsense. And accordingly we remark that we call nonsense meaningless, absurd, or quibbling, in different cases. (W 1: 174)
This, too, feels Kantian - reminiscent of Kant, after putting forth his categories, employing it on the concept of "nothing". Now, if the order is in place, we can construct the following table:
If a symbol violates the conditions of its being a determination of the pure Idea or logos, it may be so nearly a determination thereof as to be perfectly intelligible. If for instance instead of I am one should say I is. I is is in itself meaningless, it violates the conditions of its relation to the form it is meant to embody. Thus we see that the conditions of the relation of the first person are the laws of grammar. (W 1: 174)
This looks like petitio principii, if I'm using this expression correctly (probably not), that is, he looks to be trying to fit the trivium - grammar, rhetoric, and logic - into his scheme. I say this because the laws of grammar and intelligibility don't easily follow from the symbol's relation to itself, does it?
I will now take another example. I know my opinion is false, still I hold it. This is grammatical, but the difficulty is that it violates the conditions of its having an object. Observe that this is precisely the difficulty. It not only cannot be a determination of this or that object, but it cannot be a determination of any object, whatever. This is the whole difficulty. I say that, I receive contradictories into one opinion [|] or symbolical representation; now this implies that it is a symbol of nothing. (W 1: 174-175)
Whaa? He as if jumped over the second (person) to the third person (relation to object). Dammit.
At the same time symbolistic in general gives a trivium consisting of Universal Grammar, Logic, and Universal Rhetoric, using this last term to signify the science of the formal conditions of intelligibility of symbols. (W 1: 175)
Why this order?
Lecture II [MS 95: February-March 1865]
To solve this problem, whether it be logical or extralogical, is the object of these lectures; and the solution which I offer is a logical solution arising directly out of the Aristotelic doctrine. (W 1: 176)
Reminiscent of Jakobson's linguistic and extralinguistic.
And premisses shall mean the two propositions from which another apodictically follows, in contradistinction from data which shall mean the propositions from which something is inferable. The sense of this distinction will be made clear by an example.This you recognize as an induction, because it infers the character of the whole from the character of the parts. The first two propositions are the data, and the third is the inference; but this inference is not related to these data as conclusion to premisses because it does not follow apodictically. (W 1: 176)
- Neat and deer are herbivora
- Neat and deer are cloven-footed
- Hence Cloven-footed animals are herbivora.
I'm such a stranger to logic that even the distinction between data and inference is for me "information".
That induction is through simple enumeration or, at least, that there is such an induction is the doctrine of all logicians. I object to this, however, in toto. Aristotle evidently supposes that a general term is equal to a sum of singulars. But this is easily refuted. Singulars are not symbols but only signs. Even if they have extension they have certainly no intension. By that I mean that their truth does not depend on any quality of the object. (W 1: 177)
And just like that I'm lost. While having a vague notion of what "extension" is, "intension" is beyond me. And what would I make of quality?
'All men', in logic, means man in general. I might perhaps enumerate all the men who have been, but I never can know that I have enumerated all who are to be. So 'all the letters on this page' is not limited in logic to the letters there at any one inspection or at any plural of inspections; and such a limitation of its meaning would simply deprive it of all its generality and leave it a mere sign. In short, the logical comprehension, is a total of possibles and possibles have no total of enumeration. (W 1: 178)
Probably how he gets the "universal mind" from simply "other men". "Mere sign" probably refers to indexicality; that is, instead of generality there would, indeed, be enumeration (listing).
But this error of making generals composed of singulars was long ago noticed; and though individuals are still sometimes called infimæ species it is customary now to speak of the enumeration of particulars and not the enumeration of the singulars composing a whole of comprehension. (W 1: 178)
His fine semantic distinctions between "particular", "singular", and "special" (cf. W 1: 26) requires elucidation (if need be?).
In reference to my employment of the terms à priori, à posteriori, and inductive, I will confess that it is not according to usage for the simple reason that the distinction itself is not according to usage; but this usage professes to adhere to the original and strict sense of the words and this I altogether deny and insist that this original sense is justification enough for the very distinct and useful definitions which I have given to the words. (W 1: 180)
Another tidbit of his ethics of terminology.
Upon our conception of logic, everything of the nature of immediate inference is referred to grammar, because it depends on the relations of symbols to each other without reference to their relations to their objects. (W 1: 181)
It is beginning to dawn how Morris's syntactical emerged from Peirce's grammatical.
What we seek is an explicit statement of the logical ground of these different kinds of inference. This logical ground will have two parts, 1st the ground of possibility and 2nd the ground of proceedure [sic]. The gorund of possibility is the specialproperty of symbols upon which every inference of a certain kind rests. The ground of proceedure is the property of symbols which makes a certain inference possible from certain premisses. The ground of possibility must be both discovered and demonstrated, fully. The ground of proceedure must be exhibited in outline, but it is not requisite to fill up all the details of this subject, especially as that would lead us too far into the technicalities of logic. (W 1: 183)
Very little idea of what's going on here; noted for the distinction of "grounds".
As the three kinds of reasoning are entirely distinct, each must have a different ground of possibility; and the principle of each kind must be proved by that same kind of inference for it would be absurd to attempt to rest it on a weaker kind of inference and to rest it on one as strong as itself would be simply to reduce it to that other kind of reasoning. (W 1: 183)
Noted because the distinctness, coextension, etc. of three different kinds of things appears to be a common trope in Peirce's writings. It seems unlikely that all iterations of three separate worlds are in some hidden concordance with each other, but other triads have proved surprisingly concordant, so I'll note it down just the same.
Moreover, these principles must be logical principles because we do not seek any other ground now, than a logical ground. As logical principles, they will not relate to the symbol in itself or in its relation to equivalent symbols but wholly in its relation to what it symbolizes. In other words it will relate to the symbolization of objects. (W 1: 183)
What a great leap or shift it might have been, indeed, if Morris derived his semantics, syntactics, and pragmatics from this distinction. It must have meant that "the symbol in itself" got thrown away and its relation to its user was added. Highly spurious.
Now all symbolization is of three objects, at once; the first is a possible thing, the second is a possible form; the third is a possible symbol. It will be objected that the two latter are not properly objects. We have hithero regarded the symbol as standing for the thing, as a concrete determination of its form, and addressing a symbol; and it is true that it is only by referring to a possible thing that a symbol has an objective relation; it is only by bearing in it a form that it has any subjective relation, [|] and it is only by equaling another symbol that it has any tuistical relation. (W 1: 183-184)
Oh wow. My first thought was that thing, form, and symbol might have an obscure analogy with the earlier language, expression, and meaning (in random order, because I don't understand at all what was going on there). Here it turns out that this "form" that bears a "subjective relation" might have turned into the pragmatic axis in Morris. Only a guess. What is a "tuistical relation" in this context?
But this objective relation once given to a symbol is at once applicable to all to which it necessarily refers; and this is shown by the fact of our regarding every symbol as connotative as well as denotative, and by our regarding one word as standing for another whenever we endeavor to clear up a little obscurity of meaning. And the reason that this is so is that the possible symbol and the possible form to which a symbol is related each relate also to that thing which is its immediate object. Things, forms, and symbols, therefore, are symbolized in every symbolization. And this being so, it is natural to suppose that our three principles of inference which we know already refer to some three objects of symbolization, refer to these. (W 1: 184)
A very buzy paragraph. Connotative and denotative currently obscure, but one word standing for another to clear up meaning is the essence of Jakobson's metalingual function - quite clearly he was inspired by this. "Immediate object" makes a first appearance but the meaning is a bit obscure.
To prove then, first, that all symbols are symbolizable. Every syllogism consists of three propositions with two terms each, a subject and a predicate, and three terms in all each term being used twice. It is obvious that one term must occur both as subject and predicate. Now a predicate is a symbol of its subject. Hence in all reasoning à priori a symbol must be symbolized. But as reasoning à priori is possible about a statement without reference to its predicate, all symbols must be symbolizable. (W 1: 185)
26 more and I'll have an impressive table!
Apodictic reasoning, can only be applied to the manipulation of our knowledge; it never can extend it. (W 1: 186)
"It is taken for granted that the office of the faculty is confined to the humble work of making knowledge ship-shape, and explaining the meaning of words, - that he, for example, who achieves a definition of Induction has not augmented - has merely arranged - knowledge." (Clay 1882: 12) - augmented/extended; arranged/manipulated.
The three figures of à priori inferences are as follows: -The first figure consists in taking as a predicate the predicate of another predicate. Every predicate is a symbol of its subject. So that this inference depends on the fact that the symbol of the symbol is itself a symbol of the same object. Now the most that a symbol of a symbol can contain is the symbol itself; hence if all this can be predicated, any other symbol of the symbol may be; but the proposition 'A which is A = A' is the law of identity. The second figure depends in the same way on the equivalent law of contradiction, There is no symbol whose symbol is not a symbol. The third figure depends upon the law of [|] excluded middle, A symbol is a symbol or not according as it coincides with its objects. (W 1: 186-187)
All A is B
X is A
∴X is BAll A is B
X is not B
∴X is not AX is B
X is A
∴Some A is B
A sign is a sign is a sign? On the whole, these are familiar from the logic lectures I poorly attended (I fell ill). Maybe reading enough of Peirce will, in the end, spark some love for logic? Dubious but not impossible.
The principles of the three inductive inferences of the three major premisses of the above forms are, 1st The symbol of an object has the same predicates as its object, 2nd Nothing which is not the symbol of an object has the same predicates as its object, 3rd A predicate applies to an object or not according to its predicability of the symbol of that object. Were these principles of easy application induction would have as much centainty (though of a different kind) as inference à priori. But, unfortunately, they never can be applied, directly. For they require us to find a symbol which shall have the same predicates as an object of which we have not already a symbol. This is never possible, since we do not know the predicates of objects except through symbols. It remains to be seen why this circumstance does not destroy induction altogether. (W 1: 187)
The sameness of pradicates I've already internalized as the logic of verisimilitude. The third, some, has something to do with probabilities (predictability). Once more I think some of Peirce's triplicites are "upside-down" - shouldn't identity be "absolutely Ideal" (i.e. third) and possibility first?
Symbols are alterable and comparable in three ways. In the first place they may denote more or fewer possible differing things; in this regard they are said to have extension. In the second place, they may imply more or less as to the quality of these things; in this respect they are said to have intension. In thet hird place they may involve more or less real knowledge; in this respect they have information and distinctness. Logical writers generally speak only of extension and intension and Kant has laid down the law that these quantities are inverse in respect of each other. (W 1: 187)
Yeah, this doesn't get through my thick skull.
Again, to give a better case, rational animal is divisible into mortal rational animal and immortal rational animal; but upon information we find that no rational animal is immortal and this fact is symbolized in the word man. Man, therefore, has at once the extension of rational animal with the intension of mortal rational animal, and far more besides, because it involves more information than either of the previous symbols. Man is more distinct than rational animal, and more formal than mortal rational animal. (W 1: 188)
Hot diggity, why aren't more of his illustrations Pythagorean? "The perfect life of man falls short indeed of the life of God, because it is not self-perfect, but surpasses that of irrational animals, because it participates of virtue and felicity. For neither is God in want of external causes; since being naturally good and happy, he is perfect from himself; nor any irrational animal." (Euryphamus 1818: 148)
Lecture III [MS 96: February-March 1865]
Closely allied to the subject of logic, if not actually a part of it, is the theory of probabilities, - or doctrine of chances. It is a matter with which it is of considerable advantage to have a practical acquaintance. (W 1: 189)
Chance, Love, and Logic.
The first point is that instead of writing words, we write letters. Thus instead of horses we write h, instead of black b, and so forth, h stands not for one horse but for all horses, - the whole class of horses collectively. b stands for all black things. (W 1: 190)
Symbols and generalities.
Then, if we wish to write all black horses, it will be natural to put bh - black horses. This is analogous to multiplication in arithmetic for as three times two menas three twos and six times seven, six sevens, so we may say that black horses are black into horses. (W 1: 190)
I wonder if the same could be applied in Chase's system, i.e. if MS is "Motivity into Spontaneity"?
Perhaps you will think this analogy fanciful; I do not say that it is not. But it will serve our purpose very well as you will see. (W 1: 190)
Phraseology. Multiplying Motivity with Spontaneity and/or Rationality, too, is "fanciful".
We thus see that in this Boolian calculus no letter can have any numerical value except 1 (unity) and 0 (zero). But unity means all things and zero menas nothing. (W 1: 192)
Not if you're a follower of Kalev Rajangu, in which case 1 means penis and 0 means vagina. Ingenius!
I have now given explanations of the signification of the more simple combinations of letters; but for the benefit of those who may have lost a word here and there I will briefly repeat what I have said. (W 1: 193)
Neat digression. This is a lecture, after all, and he has gone over a number of arithmetic equations. I'm the exact type of person who when listening to someone mathematizing out loud takes exactly nothing in, so I appreciate this.
As I know your minds must be wearied with this mathematics, I will now postpone the further consideration of it for another lecture and will take up now a lighter subject. (W 1: 199)
Yeah, my eyes glazed over and I started skimming from the first equations. I can still appreciate how considerate Peirce was towards his audience.
The art of Logic began with the conflict of pantheistic and sensational philosophies. This conflict led to acute arguments on the one side to show the contradictions involved in the doctrine that many things exist. And to curious instances on the other side to show that there is no absolute truth. Those who took this latter ground were called Sophists; and the purpose of their sophistry was to show that valid argument contradicts itself and that therefore truth is nothing more than what any man believes. (W 1: 199)
Our age must be "Sophistic", because very few people indeed these days believe that absolute truth exists.
It seems to me, therefore, that Aristotle's remarks upon the advantages of picking to piece even the most obvious fallacies and detecting precisely where the fallacy lies, are exceedingly just; and that the contcempt with which such things are commonly received is only another instance of what will be found a general rule, that the unintellectual man considers the object to which the intellectual man applies himself as too trifling to bestow any attention upon. But, in fact, as Aristotle says, the analysis of sophisms not only sharpens the wits and makes us wary in inferring, but is also the great means for the discovery of logical forms. (W 1: 200)
Despite the frequent appeals to "facts and logic", it seems to me that my age is defined by emotional reaction, a fuzzy feeling of arguments rather than syllogizing. Yet, here, too, it is generally advised to familiarize yourself with the speeches (videos) of your opponents to spot their faulty arguments. Some things never change. As to the part I've emphasized, it's because it looks like an echo from his paper on "Shakespearian Pronunciation", where he writes that "no sincere disciple of his will despise labor bestowed even on this small object" (W 1: 117), which is an admirable sentiment in itself. On the whole, I consider it an admirable guide to life in itself. With a recent re-watching of Marju Lepajõe's documentary, in which she said that the University is one of those few places where a person is free to aimlessly engage with knowledge or find herself (sihitu eneseotsing), I think this instance is analogous - nothing is too small or too unimportant not to merit careful study from someone who feels s/he is up for the task.
When we say that all men are sinful; we make a merely contingent assertion because we generally allow that there was a state of innocence in Eden and that there will be another in the Millennium. (W 1: 201)
I've search for half an hour in Taylor's translation of Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras but am unable to point where exactly it is said that man is depraved by nature. The closest I can come at the moment is that "we came into the present life for the purpose of punishment" (Iamblichus 1818: 45), from which one can draw his or her own conclusion as to the Pythagorean view of human nature.
But there is no last one and therefore they are about nothing and have no meaning at all. The statement here written then is not true because it has no meaning; and therefore it is true, after all because it says so. (W 1: 203)
One of the initial thoughts I had is that I should gather together all instances (tokens) of "meaning" in Peirce's writings and then write something like "Peirce's Meaning" (analogous to The Meaning of Meaning in method), but doing so would be extremely difficult. Here, for example, on is incited to consider the meaning of logical paradoxes. What is the meaning of this? It is a higher case of meaningless language, it seems to me. Moreover, it is succored into that trap called "truth", with which I wish to have little to do. Or, to put it another way, instances which explicitly incite the concept of truth regularly have nothing to do with it, just like calling oneself "intelligent" is a sure sign that one is not that, and actual truth/intelligence lies somewhere else, unannounced, for both truth and intelligence (wisdom) are regularly rather silent.
It is true that a surface is recquired to constitute colour; but we apply the term to every point of that surface. In the same way a community is requisite to make a city but every individual of that community is called a citizen. If that line is not red it lies without the red part of the sheet; therefore if I simply draw away the red portion, I cannot affect the color of that line which lies without it. (W 1: 204)
I vaguely recall a paper in Sign Systems Studies that investigated the concepts of "community" and "society" in Peirce's writings - they clearly missed this.
We cannot say say that this proposition is neither true nor not true. That is self-contradictory. It is not self-contradictory to say that it is both true and not-true because this is a special case when the difference between affirmation and negation vanishes. Now these questions may seem trifling and puerile; but I have no hesitation in saying that I know of none upon the correct solution to which man's happiness depends more; for the paradoxes which beset our highest practical interest - our religion - the puzzles of free will, of divinity, of immortality are precisely of such a character as these. (W 1: 204)
These are the notorious "ideas of Immortality, Freedom, and God" Kant couldn't solve (cf. W 1: 104).
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