Iamblichus 1818. Life of Pythagoras, or Pythagoric Life. Accompanied by Fragments of the Ethical Writings of Certain Pythagoreans in the Doric Dialect; and a Collection of Pythagoric Sentences from Stobæus and Others, Which are Omitted by Gale in his Opuscula Mythologica, and Have Not Been Noticed by Any Editor. Translated from the Greek by Thomas Taylor. London: J. M. Watkins. [Internet Archive]
When it is considered that Pythagoras was the father of philosophy, authentic memoirs of his life cannot fail to be uncommonly interesting to every lover of wisdom, and particularly to those who reverence the doctrines of Plato, the most genuine and the best of all his disciples. And that the following memoirs of Pythagoras by Iamblichus are authentic, is acknowledged by all the critics, as they are for the most part obviously derived from sources of very high antiquity; and where the sources are unknown, there is every reason to believe, from the great worth and respectability of the biographer, that the information is perfectly accurate and true. (Taylor 1818: v)
Father of Western philosophy. That Pythagoras is uncommonly interesting is well attested by the fact that more than a few people throughout history and currently living have spend their whole lives hanging on Pythagoras. Even the Wikipedia page on Thomas Taylor says that he "was an admirer of [...] the "most divine" Iamblichus".
While Iamblichus on this occasion waited rather to be interrogated, than to propose a question himself, Alypius, contrary to the expectation of every one, relinquishing philosophical discussions, and seeing himself surrounded with a theatre of men, turned to Iamblichus, and said to him: "Tell me, O philosopher, is either the rich man unjust, or the heir of the unjust man? For in this case there is no medium." But Iamblichus hating the acuteness of the question, replied: "O most wonderful of all men, this manner of considering, whether some one excels in externals, is foreign from our method of philosophizing; since we inquire whether a man abounds in the virtue which it is proper for him to possess, and which is adapted to a philosopher." (Taylor 1818: viii)
Some things indeed never change. This may be why Jeshua is said to have said that it is easier to thread rope through a needle than for a rich man to go to heaven - much like most lefties today, the ancients recognized that those who acquire riches do so on the backs of others, by committing economic injustices or inheriting the legacy of such injustices.
As to the Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, all eulogy of them is superfluous, when it is considered that, independently of their being written by very early Pythagoreans, they were some of the sources from which Aristotle himself derived his consumate knowledge [|] of morality, as will be at once evident by comparing his Nicomachean Ethics with these fragments. (Taylor 1818: ix-x)
Nice. Perhaps Nicomachean Ethics will go down easier after I've finished this book.
With respect to the collection of Pythagoric Sentences in this volume, it is almost needless to observe that they are incomparably excellent; and it is deeply to be regretted that the Greek original of the Sentences of Sextus being lost, the froudulent Latin version of them by the Presbyter Ruffinus alone remains. I call it a fraudulent version, because Ruffinus, wishing to persuade the rader that these Sentences were written by a bishop of the name of Sixtus, has in many places perverted and contaminated the meaning of the original. (Taylor 1818: x)
God damn christians.
If the English reader has my translation of the Sentences of Demophilus, and Mr. Bridgman's translation of the Golden Sentences of Democrates, and the Similitudes of Demophilus, he will then be possessed of all the Pythagoric Sentences that are extant, those alone of Sextus excepted, which I have not translated, in consequence of the very impure and spurious state, in which they at present exist. (Taylor 1818: x)
He must mean this translation by William Bridgman. His own translation of the Sentences of Demophilus is not currently available, but then again the list of his works that aren't (yet?) available spans some 40 pages.
Since it is usual with all men of sound understandings, to call on divinity, when entering on any philosophic discussion, it is certainly much more appropriate to do this in the consideration of that philosophy which justly receives its denomination from the divine Pythagoras. For as it derives its origin from the Gods, it cannot be apprehended without their inspiring aid. (Iamblichus 1818: 1)
If a thing cannot be understood without reference to imaginary friends, then it does not deserve to be understood.
It is said, therefore, that Mnesarchus and Pythïs, who were the parents of Pythagoras, descended from the family and alliance of this Ancæus, who founded the colony. In consequence, however, of this nobility of birth being celebrated by the citizens, a certain Samian poet says, that Pythagoras was the son of Apollo. For thus he sings,Pythaïis, fairest of the Samian tribe,It is worth while, however, to relate how this report became so prevalent. The Pythian oracle then had predicted to this Mnesarchus (who came to Delphi for the purposes of merchandize, with his wife not yet apparently pregnant, and who inquired of the God concerning the event of his voyage to Syria) that his voyage would be lucrative and most conformable to his wishes, but that his wife was now pregnant, and would bring forth a son surpassing in beauty and wisdom all that ever lived, and who would be of the greatest advantage to the human race in every thing pertaining to the life of man. (Iamblichus 1818: 2-3)
Bore from th' embraces of the God of day
Renown'd Pythagoras, the friend of Jove. [|]
Sounds suspiciously like another mythical figure, already named above, who was simultaneously begot by Joseph, Jacob, Matthan, etc. until another Jacob, Isaac and then Abraham and also god's only begotten son.
On the death of his father, likewise, though he was still but a youth, his aspect was most venerable, and his habits most temperate, so that he was even reverenced and honored by elderly men; and converted the attention of all who saw and heard him speak, on himself, and appeared to be an admirable person to every one who beheld him. Hence it was reasonably asserted by many, that he was the son of a God. (Iamblichus 1818: 5)
I don't think I've seen "convert" used in this sense. The definitions of modern uses aren't helpful but the etymology is: con-vertere - altogether-turn; convertere - turn about.
But he being corroborated by renown of this kind, by the education which he had received from his infancy, and by his natural deiform appearance, in a still greater degree evinced that he deserved his present prerogatives. (Iamblichus 1818: 5)
Define:deiform - having the form or appearance of a god; sacred or divine.
To all which we may add, that the youth was every where celebrated as the long-haired Samian, and was reverenced by the multitude as one under the influence of divine inspiration. (Iamblichus 1818: 5)
Another coincidence with Jesus. This one is kinda funny because we imagine Jesus with long hair but "the earliest images as many show a stocky and short-haired beardless figure in a short tunic, who can only be identified by his context" (Early Jewish and Christian Art).
Observing, likewise, that there was something greater than what pertains to human nature in the modesty of the youth, they called to mind how unexpectedly he had appeared to them on their landing, when from the summit of mount Carmelus, which they knew was more sacred than other mountains, and inaccessible to the vulgar, he leisurely descended without looking back, or suffering any delay from precipices or opposing stones; and that when he came to the boat, he said nothing more than, "Are you bound for Egypt?" (Iamblichus 1818: 8)
Like something out of Dune.
On his return to Samos, however, being known by some of the more aged inhabitants, he was not less admired than before. For he appeared to them to be more beautiful and wise, and to possess a divine gracefulness in a more eminent degree. Hence, he was publicly called upon by his country to benefit all men, by imparting to them what he knew. Nor was he adverse to this request, but endeavoured to introduce the symbolical mode of teaching, in a way perfectly similar to the documents by which he had been instructed in Egypt; though the Samians did not very much admit this mode of tuition, and did not adhere to him with that according aptitude which was requisite. (Iamblichus 1818: 10)
Presumably, this involves the short sentences, parables, that contain or hide an inner meaning.
And such was the success of his journey, that on his arrival at Crotona, which was the noblest city in Italy, he had many followers, amounting, as it is said, to the number of six hundred, who were not only excited by his discourses to the study of philosophy, but also to an amicable division of the goods of life in common; from whence they acquired the appellation of Cænobitæ. (Iamblichus 1818: 13)
The first instance is obviously κοινά τά φιλων, and the second possibly where Peirce derived his "cenopythagoreanism", from cenobite - a member of a monastic community.
For the following apothegm was always employed by him in every place, whether in the company of a multitude or a few, which was similar to the persuasive oracle of a God, and was an epitome and summary as it were of his own opinions; that we should avoid and amputate by every possible artifice, by fire and sword, and all-various contrivances, from the body, disease; from the soul, ignorance; from the belly, luxury; from a city, sedition; from a house, discord; and at the same time, from all things, immoderation: through which, with a most fatherly affection, he reminded each of his disciples of the most excellent dogmas. (Iamblichus 1818: 16)
The first inklings of the triad: "When the philosopher rules, the city will be purged of all luxury and ostentation. The unnecessary appetites will be suppressed, the swagger of the soldire will be corrected, and the full-grown State will be ready for united action at home and abroad." (Stocks 1915: 215)
A few days also after this, he entered the Gymnasium, and being surrounded with a crowd of young men, he is said to have delivered an oration to them, in which he incited them to pay attention to their elders, evincing that in the world, in life, in cities, and in nature, that which has a precedency is more honorable than that which is consequent in time. As for instance, that the east is more honorable than the west; the morning than the evening; the beginning [|] than the end; and generation than corruption. In a similar manner he observed, that natives were more honorable than strangers, and the leaders of colonies than the builders of cities: and universally Gods than dæmons; dæmons than demigods; and heroes than men. Of these likewise he observed, that the authors of generation are more honorable than their progeny. He said these things, however, for the sake of proving by induction, that children should very much esteem their parents, to whom he asserted they owed as many thanks as a dead man would owe to him who should be able to bring him back again into light. (Iamblichus 1818: 17-18)
And the first inkling of the dualism and "oscillations between polar opposites: night and day, winter and summer, drought and flood, age and youth, life and death" (cf. Burnyeat 1962: 249).
Those Gods, according to the Orphic theology, that contain in themselves the first principle of stability, sameness, and being, and who were the suppliers of conversion to all things, are of a male characteristic; but those that are the causes of all-various progressions, separations, and measures of life, and of a feminine peculiarity. (Taylor 1818: 18; fn)
That's the stuff. Yin and Yang.
And that on this account, they have at the same time introduced the hypothesis of father and mother among the Gods, the former indeed generating [|] Minerva, but the latter Vulcan, who are of a nature contrary to each other, in order that what is most remote may participate of friendship. (Iamblichus 1818: 18-19)
What Lotman termed dynamic dialogue. Examples supernumerary. Even a definition of Yin and Yang can suffice: "Briefly put, the meaning of yin and yang is that the universe is governed by a cosmic duality, sets of two opposing and complementing principles or cosmic energies that can be observed in nature." - opposing/"contrary to each other", complementary/"may participate of friendship".
He likewise farther observed, that they comprehended in themselves symphony, harmony, rhythm, and all things which procure concord. (Iamblichus 1818: 21)
Very relevant. Might explain "series" in Fourier.
In the next place, he said it was necessary they should apprehend that they received their country from the multitude of the citizens, as a common deposit. Hence, it was requisite [|] they should so govern it, that they might faithfully transmit it to their prosperity, as an hereditary possession. And that this would firmly be effected, if they were equal in all things to the citizens, and surpassed them in nothing else than justice. (Iamblichus 1818: 21-22)
Politicians should not use their office to enrich themselves but to serve the people.
That they should also be genuinely disposed towards their own offspring, as being the only animals that have a sensation of this conception. And that they should so associate with a wife the companion of life, as to be mindful that other compacts are engraved in tables and pillars, but those with wives are inserted in children. (Iamblichus 1818: 22)
Very closely approximates "life-mate" (elukaaslane).
And said, that he ought to be considered as the most excellent man, who is able to foresee what will be advantageous to himself; but that he ranks as the next in excellence, who understands what is useful from things which happen to others. But that he is the worst of men who waits for the perception of what is best, till he is himself afflicted. (Iamblichus 1818: 23)
Like the christian conservatives who deny science and couldn't care less for environmental change because it doesn't yet affect them personally.
He also exhorted the women to use words of good omen through the whole of life, and to endeavor that others may predict good things of them. He likewise admonished them not to destroy popular renown, nor to blame the writers of fables, who surveying the justice of women, from their accommodating others with garments and ornaments, without a witness, when it is necessary for some other person to use them, and that neither litigation nor contradiction are produced from this confidence, - have feigned, that three women used but one eye in common, on account of the facility of their communion with each other. (Iamblichus 1818: 26)
The first sounds like a form of mimesis, like the "smile, and the world will smile at you". The second instance sounds like a reference to female in-group bias.
It is also said, that Pythagoras was the first who called himself a philosopher; this not being a new name, but previously instructing us in a useful manner in a thing appropriate to the name. For he said that the entrance of men into the present life, resembled the progression of a crowd to some public spectacle. For there men of every description assemble with different views; one hastening to sell his wares for the sake of money and gain; but another that he may acquire renown by exhibiting the strength of his body; and there is also a third class of men, and those the most liberal, who assemble for the sake of surveying the places, the beautiful works of art, the specimens of valor, and the literary productions which are usually exhibited on such occasions. Thus also in the present life, men of all-various pursuits are collected together in one and the same place. For some are influenced by the desire of riches and luxury; others by the love of power and dominion; and others are possessed with an insane ambition for glory. But the most pure and unadulterated character, is that of the man who gives himself to the contemplation of the most beautiful things, and whom it is proper to call a philosopher. (Iamblichus 1818: 28)
"Similarly Aristotle's Ethics begins with a reference to the three lives: the vulgar seek pleasure, sometimes perverted into money, the politician seeks honour, and finally there are the spectators, who live the life of contemplation." (Stocks 1915: 219) - The triad unfolded in a sort of narrative.
Pythagoras, however, did not procure for himself a thing of this kind through instruments or the voice, but employing a certain ineffable divinity, and which it is difficult to apprehend, he extended his ears, and fixed his intellect in the sublime symphonies of the world, he alone hearing and understanding, as it appears, the universal harmony and consonance of the spheres, and the stars that are moved through them, and which produce a fuller and more intense [|] melody than any thing effected by mortal sounds. This melody also was the result of dissimilar and variously differing sounds, celerities, magnitudes, and intervals, arranged with reference to each other in a certain most musical ratio, and thus producing a most gentle, and at the same time variously beautiful motion and convulsion. (Iamblichus 1818: 32-33)
There is "a siren who, with inexplicable conservation of breath, piped forever a single note as she travelled, thus contributing with her sisters to the production of one lost chord of music; for humanity could not hear the sound, for the simple reason that it never varied and never ceased" (Bennett 1945: 196) - "What is the song of the Sirens? The world." (W 5: 51)
This adaptation therefore of souls was procured by him through music. But another purification of the dianoetic parts, and at the same time of the whole soul, through all-various studies, was effected by him as follows: He conceived generally that labor should be employed about disciplines and studies, and ordained like a legislator, trials of the most various nature, punishments, and restraints by fire and swords, for [|] innate intemperance, and an inexhaustible avidity of possessing; which he who is depraved can neither suffer nor sustain. (Iamblichus 1818: 35-36)
Taylor gives the definition in the footnote: "i.e. Of the discursive energy of reason, or that part of the soul that reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect." (ibid, 35; fn)
Hence also, he ordered them to abstain from wine, to be sparing in their food, to sleep little, and to have an unstudied contempt of, and hostility to glory, wealth, and the like: to have an unfeigned reverence of those to whom reverence is due, a genuine similitude and benevolence to those of the same age with themselves, and an attention and incitation towards their juniors, free from all envy. (Iamblichus 1818: 36)
In other words "passion for power and wealth". In the triad, glory being second, wealth first, but knowledge third. Also, all these reported discourses of Pythagoras now make it clear why Peirce categorized Pythagoras as a "moralist".
He likewise surveyed their form, their mode of walking, and the whole motion of their body. Physiognomically also considering the [|] natural indications of their frame, he made them to be manifest signs of the unapparent manners of the soul. When, therefore, he had thus made trial of some one, he suffered him to be neglected for three years, in the mean time observing how he was disposed with respect to stability, and a true love of learning, and if he was sufficiently prepared with reference to glory, so as to despise [popular] honor. (Iamblichus 1818: 37-38)
A bit of semiotics can be found everywhere. Wealth and honour must not only be chased, they must be despised.
For he did not impart spurious doctrines, nor snares, in which most of the sophists, who are at leisure for no good purpose, entangled young men; but he possessed a scientific knowledge of things human and divine. (Iamblichus 1818: 40)
Sounds like French theory.
After this we must narrate how, when he had admitted certain persons to be his disciples, he distributed them into different classes according to their respective merits. For it was not fit that all of them should equally participate of the same things, as they were naturally dissimilar; nor was it indeed right that [|] some should participate of all the most honorable auditions, but others of none, or should not at all partake of them. For this would be uncommunicative and unjust. While therefore he imparted a convenient portion of his discourses to each, he benefited as much as possible all of them, and preserved the proportion of justice, by making each a partaker of the auditions according to his desert. (Iamblichus 1818: 41-42)
Starting to look like Fourierism.
Hence, in conformity to this method, he called some of them Pythagoreans, but others Pythagorists; just as we denominate some men Attics, but others Atticists. Having therefore thus aptly divided their names, some of them he considered to be genuine, but he ordained that others should show themselves to be the emulators of these. (Iamblichus 1818: 42)
This appears to be endonymic. Pythagoreans vs pythagorizers would be exonymic. "Emulators" another aspect of Fourierism, related with rivalry. This whole page looks like something Fourier must have studied closely.
But all these auditions are divided into three species. For some of them indeed signify what a thing is; others what it especially is; but others, what ought, or what ought not, to be done. The auditions therefore which signify what a thing is, are such as, What are the islands of the blessed? The sun and moon. What is the oracle at Delphi? The tetractys. What is harmony? That in which the Syrens subsist. But the auditions which signify what a thing especially is, are such as, What is the most just thing? To sacrifice. What is the wisest thing? Number. (Iamblichus 1818: 43)
Part of this Peirce quoted directly. The three species are quite obviously Possibility, Reality, and Necessity (cf. Kant 1855: 61).
For each of these shows what a thing especially is. This however is the same with what is called the wisdom of the seven wise men. For they investigated, not what is simply good, but what is especially so; nor what is difficult, but what is most difficult; viz. for a man to know himself. Nor did they investigate what is easy, but what is most easy; viz. to do what you are accustomed to do. (Iamblichus 1818: 44)
Nothing is easier than habitual action. Only the most difficult things are worthwhile.
Labors are good; but pleasures are in every respect bad. For as we came into the present life for the purpose of punishment, it is necessary that we should be punished. (Iamblichus 1818: 45)
What.
The probable reasons however, which are added about things of this kind, are not Pythagoric, but were devised by some who philosophized differently from the Pythagoreans, and who endeavoured to adapt probability to what was said. (Iamblichus 1818: 46)
Exactly what has happened to the teachings of Jesus over the past 1800+ years.
And it is requisite to arrange under these, the political, economic and legislative Pythagoreans. (Iamblichus 1818: 48)
I'm starting to think that these accord with the triad: economic (wealth), political (ambition), legislative (reason) - the last explained with "a necessary law [being what] reason seeks for and requires" (cf. Kant 1855: xxvii).
And believing that he was no other than the God himself, and that no man resembles him, but that he was truly Apollo, both from the venerable indications which he saw about him, and from those which the priest had known before, he gave Pythagoras a dart which he took with him when he left the temple, as a thing that would be useful to him in the difficulties that would befal him in so long a journey. For he was carried by it, in passing through inaccessible places, such as rivers, lakes, marshes, mountains, and the like, and performed through it, as it is said, lustrations, and expelled pestilence and winds from the cities that requested him to liberate them from these evils. (Iamblichus 1818: 49)
This "dart" is everywhere else an arrow: "Herodotus (4.36) writes that he "carried his arrow over the whole earth, fasting," but from the time of Heraclides (fr. 51c) it was said that Abaris flew on an arrow." (Eliade 1972: 269)
Pythagoras also added, that he came [into the regions of mortality] for the purpose of remedying and benefiting the condition of manking, and that on this account he had assumed a human form, lest men being disturbed by the novelty of his transcendency, should avoid the discipline which he possessed. (Iamblichus 1818: 50)
Haping on more parallels with Jeshua.
In the next place, I shall speak of the studies which he delivered through the whole of the day to his associates. For those who committed themselves to the guidance of his doctrine, acted in the following manner: they performed their morning walks alone, and in places in which there happened to be an appropriate solitude and quiet, and where there were temples and groves, and other things adapted to give delight. For they thought it was not proper to converse with any one, till they had rendered their own soul sedate, and had co-harmonised the reasoning power. For they apprehended it to be a thing of a turbulent nature to mingle in a crowd as soon as they rose from bed. On this account all the Pythagoreans always selected for themselves the most sacred places. But after their morning walk they associated with each other, and especially in temples, or if this was not possible, in places that resembled them. (Iamblichus 1818: 52)
Take a walk and meditate in the morning.
But when it was evening they again betook themselves to walking; yet not singly as in the morning walk, but in parties of two or three, calling to mind as they walked, the disciplines they had learnt, and exercising themselves in beautiful studies. After they had walked, they made use of the bath; and having washed themselves, they assembled in the place where they eat together, and which contained no more than ten who met fro this purpose. (Iamblichus 1818: 53)
Something poetic about this. Walk alone in the morning, walk in good company in the evening.
But after this supper libations were performed, and these were succeeded by readings. It was the custom however with them for the youngest to read, and the eldest ordered what was to be read, and after what manner. (Iamblichus 1818: 53)
Practical. Reading aloud impedes comprehension but will train the mind (improve vocabulary and pronunciation).
For to contend pervicaciously with such as these, anger or some other similar passion intervening, is not to preserve, [but destroy] the existing friendship. (Iamblichus 1818: 54)
Define:pervicacious - very obstinate or stubborn; headstrong; inflexible and self-willed; extremely willful; wilfully contrary or refractory.
The mode however of teaching through symbols, was considered by Pythagoras as most necessary. For this form of erudition was cultivated by nearly all the Greeks, as being most ancient. But it was transcendently honored by the Egyptians, and adopted by them in the most diversified manner. Conformably to this, therefore, it will be found, that great attention was paid to it by Pythagoras, if any one clearly unfolds the significations and arcane conceptions of the Pythagoric symbols, and thus develops the great rectitude and truth they contain, and liberates them from their enigmatic form. (Iamblichus 1818: 55)
Adding nothing but verbiage. The enigmatic form - symbol/signifier; the truth they contain - thing symbolized/signified.
Their writings also, and all the books which they published, most of which have been preserved even to our time, were not composed by them in a popular and vulgar diction, and in a manner usual with all other writers, so as to be immediately understood, but in such a way as not to be easily apprehended by those that read them. For they adopted that taciturnity which was instituted by Pythagoras as a law, in concealing after an arcane mode, divine mysteries from the uninitiated, and obscuring their writings and conferences with each other. Hence he who selecting these symbols does not unfold their meaning by an apposite exposition, will cause those who may happen to meet with them to consider them as ridiculous and inane, and as full of nuacity and garrulity. When, however, they are unfolded in a way conformable to these symbols, and become obvious and clear even to the multitude, instead of being obscure and dark, then they will be found to be analogous to prophetic sayings, and to the oracles of the Pythian Apollo. (Iamblichus 1818: 56)
Esoteric, occluded (occult). Silence is golden.
Nor will it be improper to mention a few of them, in order that this mode of discipline may become more perspicuous: Enter not into a temple negligently, nor in short adore carelessly, not even though you should stand at the very doors themselves. Sacrifice and adore unshod. Declining from the public ways, walk in unfrequented paths. Speak not about Pythagoric concerns without light. And such are the outlines of the mode adopted by Pythagoras of teaching through symbols. (Iamblichus 1818: 57)
First rule of Pythagoreanism: don't talk about Pythagoreanism.
In short, it is asserted that Pythagoras was the inventor of the whole of political erudition, when he said that nothing is pure among things that have an existence; but that earth participates of fire, fire of air, air of water, and water of spirit. And in a similar manner the beautiful participates of the deformed, the just of the unjust, and other things conformably to these. From this hypothesis, however, the reasoning tends to either part. He also said, that there are two motions of the body and the soul; the one being irrational, but the other the effect of deliberate choice. That three certain lines also constitute polities, the extremes of which mutually touch each other, and produce one right angle; so that one of them has the nature of the sesquitertian; another that of the diapente; and the third is a medium between the other two. (Iamblichus 1818: 70)
Everything is a commixture (of opposites). Taylor's footnote: "These lines are as the numbers 4, 3, 2. For 4 to 3 is sesquitertian, 3 to 2 is sesquialter, and 2 is an arithmetical medium between 4 and 3."
If, therefore, any one wished to learn what were the sources whence these men derived so much piety, it must be said, that a perspicuous paradigm of the Pythagoric theology according to numbers, is in a certain respect to be found in the writings of Orpheus. (Iamblichus 1818: 77)
Straight from the spider's mouth.
For when Pythagoras died, he was left very young with his mother Theano. In this Sacred Discourse also, or treatise concerning the Gods (for it has both these inscriptions), who it was [|] that delivered to Pythagoras what is there said concerning the Gods, is rendered manifest. For it says: "that Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus was instructed in what pertains to the Gods, when he celebrated orgies in the Thracian Libethra, being initiated in them by Aglaophemusq and that Orpheus the son of Calliope, having learnt wisdom from his mother in the mountain Pangæus, said, that the eternal essence of number is the most providential principle of the universe, of heaven and earth, and the intermediate nature; and farther still, that it is the root of the permanency of divine natures, of Gods and dæmons." From these things, therefore, it is evident that he learnt from the Orphic writers that the essence of the Gods is defined by [|] number. Through the same numbers also, he produced an admirable fore-knowledge and worship of the Gods, both which are especially most allied to numbers. (Iamblichus 1818: 77-79)
Another coincidence with Dune, in which Jessica teaches her son Paul the ways of the Bene Gesserit. (Another coincidence being, of course, that Pythagoras could recall his former lives - the essential ability of the Kwisatz Haderach - "other memory".) The rest elaborates upon "all is number". Taylor adds in a footnote: "Hence that proverb was peculiar to the Pythagoreans, that all things are assimilated to number. Pythagoras, therefore, in The Sacred Discourse, clearly says, that "number is the ruler of forms and ideas, and is the cause of Gods and dæmons." [...] Syrianus adds, "But Philolaus declared that number is the governing and self-begotten bond of the eternal permanency of mundane natures."" (ibid, 78; fn)
He paid attention likewise to rumors andomens, prophecies, and lots, and in short, to all casual circumstances. (Iamblichus 1818: 80)
Phatic.
i.e. To spheres; Iamblichus indicating by this, that Pythagoras as well as Orpheus considered a spherical figure as the most appropriate image of divinity. For the universe is spherical; and, as Iamblichus afterwards observes, the Gods have a nature and morphe similar to the universe; morphe, as we learn from Simplicius, pertaining to the color, figure, and magnitude of superficies. (Taylor 1818: 81; fn)
"But divine numbers both according to Orpheus and Pythagoras are the Gods themselves" (ibid, 81; fn) - gives the semiosphere a divine outlook.
He likewise ordained that men should make libations thrice, and observed that Apollo delivered oracles from the tripod, because the triad is the first number. (Iamblichus 1818: 81)
What.
But he ordered that temples should be entered from places on the right hand, and that they should be departed out of from the left hand. For he asserted that the right hand is the principle of what is called the odd number, and is divine; but that the left hand is a symbol of the even number, and of that which is dissolved. (Iamblichus 1818: 83)
Divine-permanent-type; dissolved-impermanent-token.
This science, therefore, concerning intelligible natures and the Gods, Pythagoras delivers in his writings from a supernal origin. (Iamblichus 1818: 84)
Define:supernal - relating to the sky or the heavens; celestial; of exceptional quality or extent.
And that wisdom is the science of things which are properly beings, but not of such as are homonymously so. For corporeal natures are neither the objects of science nor admit of a stable knowledge, since they are infinite and incomprehensible by science, and are as it were non-beings, when compared with universals, and are incapable of being properly circumscribed by definition. (Iamblichus 1818: 85)
"Accordingly, an empirical conception cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such a conception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a certain class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time a greater, at another a smaller number of signs." (Kant 1855: 443)
He was also accustomed to pour forth sentences resembling oracles to his familiars in a symbolical manner, and which in the greatest brevity of words contained the most abundant and multifarious meaning, like the Pythian Apollo through certain oracles, or like nature herself through seeds small in bulk, the former exhibiting conceptions, and the latter effects, innumerable in multitude, and difficult to be understood. Of this kind is the sentence, The beginning is the half of the whole, which is an apothegm of Pythagoras himself. (Iamblichus 1818: 86)
Define:apothegm - a concise saying or maxim; an aphorism. The comparison with seeds calls to mind what some Christians hold of "logos"; also, the curious coincidence of Greek sema (σῆμᾰ) and Estonian seeme ("seed").
But not only in the present hemistich, but in others of a similar nature, the most divine Pythagoras has concealed the sparks of truth; depositing as in a treasury for those who are capable of being enkindled by them, [|] and with a certain brevity of diction, an extension of theory most ample and difficult to be comprehended, as in the following hemistich:All things accord in number:which he very frequently uttered to all his disciples. Or again, Friendship is equality; equality is friendship. Or in the word cosmos, i.e. the world; or by Jupiter, in the word philosophy, or in the so much celebrated word tetractys. (Iamblichus 1818: 86-87)
A spark of truth indeed, "the secret in all cases, and the sine qua non of good conversation, is to establish equality, at least momentarily, if you like fictions, but at all costs equality, among the members of the company who make up the party" (Mahaffy 1892: 101-102).
The principle of justice therefore, is the common and the equal, through which, in a way most nearly approximating to one body and one soul, all men may be co-passive, and may call the same thing mine and thine; as is also [|] testified by Plato, who learnt this from the Pythagoreans. This therefore, Pythagoras effected in the best manner, exterminating every thing private in manners, but increasing that which is common as far as to ultimate possessions, which are the causes of sedition and tumult. For all things [with his disciples] were common and the same to all, and no one possessed any thing private. And he indeed, who approved of this communion, used common possessions in the most just manner; but he who did not, received his own property, which he brought to the common stock, with an addition to it, and departed. And thus he established justice in the best manner, from the first principle of it. (Iamblichus 1818: 89-90)
The first principle of justice is equality.
Some one however of the Crotonian counsellors, after reviling the rest of the ambassadors, observed that he understood they had defamed Pythagoras, whom not even a brute would dare to blaspheme, though all animals should [|] again utter the same voice as men, which fables report they did in the beginning of things. (Iamblichus 1818: 94-95)
Talking cats and dogs in popular culture attest to the staying power of this idea. Made me consider employing it in my future science fiction. The "anti-animals" could very well talk; much like Homer invented a "baby-translator", we could one day have collars that translate animals.
The accuracy too, with which they preserved their writings is admirable. For in so many ages, no one appears to have met with any of the commentaries of the Pythagoreans, prior to the time of Philolaus. But he first published those three celebrated books, which Dion the Syracusan is said to have bought, at the request of Plato, for a hundred mina. For Philolaus had fallen into a certain great and severe poverty; and from his alliance to the Pythagoreans, was a partaker of their writings. (Iamblichus 1818: 104)
"The Republic was a theft from Protagoras, the Timæus from the Three Books bought from Philolaus." (Stocks 1915: 208) - hence was born "the so-called "Bible of the Platonists", Plato's Timaeus" (Runia 1995: 11).
And universally, it is said that the Pythagoreans exhorted both those they happened to meet, and their familiars, to avoid pleasure as a thing that required the greatest caution. For nothing so much deceives us, or precipitates us into error, as this passion. In short, as it seems, they contended that we should never do any thing with a view to pleasure as the end. (Iamblichus 1818: 106)
Might be one of those instances in which Fourier "turned around" (converted) the dogma of old into its opposite.
i.e. Humble (τᾶπεινής ούσης). With the Pythagoreans, therefore, humility was no virtue, though in modern times it is considered to be the greatest of the virtues. With Aristotle likewise it is no virtue: for in his Nicomachean Ethics he says, "that all humble men are flatterers, and all flatterers are humble." (Taylor 1818: 116)
I'll make an attempt to keep this in mind when I next meet humility described as a virtue.
The precept, however, which is of the greatest efficacy of all others to the attainment of fortitude, is that which has for its most principal scope the being defended and liberated from those bonds which detain the intellect in captivity from infancy, and without which no one can learn or perceive any thing sane or true, through whatever sense he may energize. For according to the Pythagoreans,'Tis mind that all things sees and hears;(Iamblichus 1818: 117)
What else exists is deaf and blind.
Ainult mõistus kõike näeb ja kuuleb, kõik muu on kurt ja tumm.
These therefore are beautiful instances of friendship. The decisions, however, of the Pythagoreans respecting the communion of divine goods, the concord of intellect, and things pertaining to a divine soul, are much more admirable than the above examples. For they perpetually exhorted each other, not to divulse the God within them. Hence all the endeavour of their friendship both in deeds and words, was directed to a certain divine mixture, to a union with divinity, and to a communion with intellect and a divine soul. But it is not possible to find any thing better than this, either in what is uttered by words, or performed by deeds. (Iamblichus 1818: 123)
One of the beliefs of the Pythagoreans, that "the soul can rise to union with the divine" (Veljan 2000: 259).
This observation applies also to those of the present day, who, from a profound ignorance of human nature, attempt to enlighten by education the lowest class of mankind. For this, as I have elsewhere observed, is an attempt to break the golden chain of being, to disorganise society, and to render the vulgar dissatisfied with the servile situations in which God and nature intended them to be placed. (Iamblichus 1818: 126)
Thomas Taylor's translations may have their merits but the man himself appears as detestable as they come. God ordained the lowly to remain forever lowly, the "uneducated classes" to remain forever uneducated? What a horrible person. Of course, what else could be expected from the author of A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes?
These also, being left by themselves, and not moderately dejected by the calamity, were scattered in different places, and no longer endured to have any communion with the rest of mankind. But they lived alone in solitary places, wherever they happened to meet with them; and each greatly preferred an association with himself to that with any other person. (Iamblichus 1818: 130)
Still wondering why Peirce would call his phenomenology κοινό-pythagoreanism. Could it be because it is based on what little fragments have remained in circulation, i.e. become common?
It is also said that Epicharmus [|] was one of the foreign auditors; but that he was not one of the school. Having however arrived at Syracuse, he abstained from philosophizing openly, on account of the tyranny of Hiero. But he inserted the conceptions of the men in metre, and published in comedies the occult dogmas of Pythagoras. (Iamblichus 1818: 136-137)
Contrary to our translator, "Epicharmus taught that the continuous exercise of virtue could overcome heredity, so that anyone had the potential to be a good person regardless of birth" (Wiki).
Fragments of the Ethical Writings of Certain Pythagoreans
From Hippodamus, the Thurian, in his treatise On Felicity
Of animals, some are the recipients of felicity, but others are incapable of receiving it. And those animals, indeed, are receptive of it that have reason. For felicity cannot subsist without virtue; and virtue is first ingenerated in that which possesses reason. But those animals are incapable of receiving felicity, that are destitute of reason. For neither can that which is deprived of sight, receive the work or the virtue of sight; nor can that which is destitute of reason, be the recipient of the work, or the virtue of that which possesses reason. With respect to felicity, however, and virtue, the former is as a work, but the latter as a certain art, to that which possesses reason. But of animals which possess reason, some are self-perfect, and these are such as are perfect through themselves, and are indigent of nothing external, either to their existence, or to their existing well and beautifully. And such, indeed, is God. Those animals, however, are not self-perfect, which are not perfect through themselves, but are in want of external causes to their perfection. And man is an animal of this kind. (Hippodamus 1818: 143)
This must be eudaimonia (cf. Procopé 1990: 27). Man is an imperfect animal.
Those also are perfect according to life, who are not only good, but happy. For felicity, indeed, is the perfection of human life. But human life is a system of actions: and felicity gives completion to the actions. Virtue also and fortune give completion to actions; virtue, indeed, according to use; but good fortune according to prosperity. God therefore is neither good through learning virtue from any one, nor is he happy through being attended by good fortune. (Hippodamus 1818: 144)
By way of opposition, humans become good through learning virtue from others, and happy through being attended by good fortune (luck). Note that the triad is all messed up here. Happiness (fortune/wealth) is first; (moral?) goodness/virtuosity second (honour); reason either missing or on another level (these two pertaining to a reasonable animal).
But man is neither happy nor good by nature, but requires discipline and providential care. And in order to become good, indeed, he requires virtue; but in order to become happy, good fortune. On this account, human felicity summarily consists of these two things, viz. of praise, and the predication of beautitude. Of praise indeed, from virtue; but of the predication of beatitude, from prosperity. It possesses virtue therefore, through a divine destiny, but prosperity through a mortal allotment. (Hippodamus 1818: 144)
Define:beatitude - supreme blessedness. This is "providential care", Gods smiling upon you. Discipline (Iamblichus frequently refered to "piety") is self-evident (manifest in Pythagorean silence, regard, and self-control). Praise links up with honour.
So that it is necessary that he who is to be happy, and whose life is to be prosperous, should live and die in a country governed by equitable laws, relinquishing all illegality. At the same time what has been said is attended with necessity. For man is a part of society, and hence from the same reasoning, will become entire and perfect, if he not only associates with others, but associates in a becoming manner. For some things are naturally adapted to subsist in many things, and not in one thing; others in one thing, and not in many; but others both in many, and in one thing, and on this account in one thing, because in many. For harmony, indeed, any symphony and number, are naturally adapted to be ingenerated in many things. (Hippodamus 1818: 146)
We Live In a Society. The one/many dialectic exemplifies the all-too-familiar threefoldness of things (Possibility, Reality, Necessity; Quality, Type, Token; Accord, Discord, Modulation; and so on and on and on).
And on this account they subsist in one thing, because they also subsist in many: and they subsist in many, because they are inherent in a whole and in the universe. For the orderly distribution of the whole nature of things methodically arranges each particular. And the orderly distribution of particulars gives completion to the whole of things and to the universe. (Hippodamus 1818: 146)
Sounds like E. R. Clay's orderly concurrence of aptitudes, though I suspect he derived it from like likes of Spencer and/or Huxley, if not Swedenborg.
For harmony not existing, and a divine inspection of mundane affairs, things which are adorned would no longer be able to remain in any excellent condition. And equitable legislation not existing in a city, it is not possible for a citizen to be good or happy. Health, likewise, not existing in the animal, it is not possible for the foot or the hand to be strong and healthy. For harmony indeed is the virtue of the world; equitable legislation is the virtue of a city; and health and strength are the virtue of the body. Each of the parts likewise in these things is co-arranged on account of the whole and the universe. (Hippodamus 1818: 147)
Iamblichus discussed the divine inspection of mundane affairs not far above. In the second emphasis we have what can be called Pythagorean levels of abstraction: body → city → world.
From Euryphamus, in his treatise Concerning Human Life
The perfect life of man falls short indeed of the life of God, because it is not self-perfect, but surpasses that of irrational animals, because it participates of virtue and felicity. For neither is God in want of external causes; since being naturally good and happy, he is perfect from himself; nor any irrational animal. For brutes being destitute of reason, they are also destitute of the sciences pertaining to actions. But the nature of man partly consists of his own proper deliberate choice, and partly is in want of the assistance derived from divinity. (Euryphamus 1818: 148)
The same stuff in every regard. System/science of action. "Deliberate choice" equivalent of "free will". "Assistance derived from divinity" - beatitude.
For the whole reason of the thing is as follows: Divinity introduced man into the world as a most exquisite animal, to be preciprocally [|] honored with himself, and as the eye of the orderly distribution of things. Hence also man gave names to things, becoming himself the character of them. He likewise invented letters, procuring through these a treasury of memory. And he imitated the established order of the universe, co-harmonizing by judicial proceedings and laws the communion of cities. For no work is performed by men more decorous to the world, or more worthy of the notice of the Gods, than the apt constitution of a city governed by good laws, and an orderly distribution of laws and a polity. For though each man himself by himself is nothing, and is not himself by himself sufficient to lead a life conformable to the common concord, and apt composition of a polity, yet he is well adapted to the whole and to the perfect system of society. (Euryphamus 1818: 148-149)
A hodgepodge of familiar tropes. "The eye of the orderly distribution of things" - nearly, that God created man in his image to behold/enjoy his creation. "Man gave names to things", including himself - I don't recall the exact wording but something along the lines of we are brains that gave ourselves names. The extended emphasis on laws illuminates the legislative aspect of thirdness in Kant, Schiller and Peirce.
For the life of a man is the image of a lyre accurately [harmonized,] and in every respect perfect. For every lyre requires these three things, apparatus, apt composition, and a certain musical contrectation. (Euryphamus 1818: 149)
Now that's a five dollar word! It means manual fondling, or sexual foreplay. Probably meant in the sense that a lyre is worked by hand.
And the musical contrectation is the motion of these conformably to the apt composition. Thus also human life requires these same three things. Apparatus, indeed, which is the completion of the parts of life. But the parts of life are the good of the body, of riches, renown, and friends. (Euryphamus 1818: 149)
Again the triad is messed up. First - the goods of the body (fortune, luck, blessings) and riches (fortune, prosperity, wealth); Second - renown (praise, fame, admiration) and friends (social).
And virtue, indeed, is a part of him so far as he is soul, but prosperity so far as he is connected with body. But both are parts of im so far as he is an animal. For it is the province of virtue to use in a becoming manner the goods which are conformable to nature; but of prosperity to impart the use of them. And the former, indeed, imparts deliberate choice and right reason; but the latter, energies and actions. (Euryphamus 1818: 150)
"The union of soul and body cannot be scientifically explained for man is, as it were, a third substance formed out of two heterogeneous substances" (Arnett 1904: 173). Here, man is a union of virtue and prosperity - "For the general conquers in conjunction with virtue and good fortune. The pilot sails well in conjunction with art and prosperous winds. The eye sees well in conjunction with acuteness of vision and light" (ibid, 150).
From Hipparchus, in his treatise On Tranquility
Since men live but for a very short period, if their life is compared with the whole of time, they will make a most beautiful journey as it were, if they pass through life with tranquility. This however they will possess in the most eminent degree, if they accurately and scientifically know themselves, viz. if they know that they are mortal and of a fleshly nature, and that they have a body which is corruptible and can be easily injured, and which is exposed to every thing most grievous and severe, even to their latest breath. (Hipparchus 1818: 151)
Here the notorious "know thyself" boils down to simply recognizing one's mortality. Perhaps that is indeed the extent of it. Iamblichus repeated it often that the Pythagoreans recognized their mortality and did not fear death, perhaps because they knew that they will go to the "isles of the blessed" or become one with divinity.
But the diseases which happen to the soul are much greater and more dire than these. For all the iniquitous, evil, illegal, and impious conduct in the life of man, originates from the passions of the soul. For through preternatural immoderate desires many have become subject to unrestrained impulses, and have not refrained from the most unholy pleasures, arising from being connected with daughters or even mothers. Many also have been induced to destroy their fathers, and their own offspring. (Hipparchus 1818: 151)
The viewpoint Fourier opposed, seeing the passions of the soul as instituted by God. The "most unholy pleasures" are incest, patricide and infanticide.
Hence well considering these things, and also being persuaded, that if what is present and is imparted to us, is able to remain for the smallest portion of time, it si as much as we ought to expect; we shall then live in tranquility and with hilarity, generously bearing whatever may befal us. (Hipparchus 1818: 152)
The Pythagorean solution of tranquility is to take what comes, i.e. "not to eat your heart out" over things that you cannot change. In several instances Iamblichus's emphasized viewpoints very close in wording to the Serenity Prayer, "God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom to know the difference."
From Archytas, in his treatise concerning The Good and Happy Man
Since therefore of goods, some are eligible for their own sakes, and not for the sake of another thing; but others are eligible for the sake of something else, and not on their own account; there is also a certain third species of goods, which is eligible both on its own account, and for the sake of another thing. (Archytas 1818: 155)
Unity, Plurality, and Totality again.
What, therefore, is the good which is eligible on its own account, and not fro the sake of something else? It is evident that it is felicity. For we aspire after other things for the sake of this, but we do not desire this for the sake of any thing else. Again, what are those goods which we desire indeed for the sake of something else, but which we do not desire on their own account? It is evident they are such things as are useful, and preeligible goods, which become the causes of our obtaining things which are eligible [on their own account]; such as corporeal labors, exercise, and frictions which are employed fro the sake of a good habit of body; and also reading, meditation, and study, which are undertaken for the sake of things beautiful and virtue. But what are the things which are eligible on their own account, and also for the sake of something else? They are such things as the virtues, and the habits of them, deliberate choice and action, and whatever adheres to that which is really beautiful. Hence, that indeed which is eligible on its own account, and not on account of something else, is a solitary good and one. But that which is eligible for its own sake, and for the sake of another thing, is triply divided. For one part of it indeed subsists about the soul; another about the body; and another pertains to externals. And that which is about the soul, consists of the virtues of the soul; that which is about the body, of the virtues of the body; and that which pertains to externals, consists of friends, glory, honor, and wealth. (Archytas 1818: 155)
Soul, body, and externals a neat novel triad. Goods "eligible for their own sakes" links up with Aristotle's "self-sufficient activity" (cf. Harap 1938: 162). In Fourier' system, the first 5 passions pertain to the body (the senses, "sensual appetites"), the next 4 passions to the soul (actually even called "appetites of the soul"), and the last 3 passions, distributive, pertain to felicity. Even the one/many dialectic is in accord: first series satisfies one(self), the second satisfies others (family, friends, etc.), and the third satisfies both.
There are likewise three definite times of human life; one of prosperity; another of adversity; and a third subsisting between these. (Archytas 1818: 156)
When things go well, when things go bad, and "the time between these" (ibid, 156). An ephemeral parallel with cabalist (adversity), butterfly (novelty), and composite (combined) passions is possible.
But man is not soul alone, but is likewise body. For the animal which consists of both, and that which is constituted from things of this kind is man. For though the body is naturally adapted to be the instrument of the soul, yet this as well as the soul is a part of man [so far as he is an animal.] Hence of goods also, some are the goods of man, but others, of the parts of man. And the good of man, indeed, is felicity. But of the parts of man, the good of the soul is prudence, fortitude, justice, and [|] temperance. And the good of the body is beauty, health, a good corporeal habit, and excellence of sensation. With respect to externals however, wealth, glory, and nobility, are naturally adapted to be attendant on man, and to follow precedaneous goods. The less, also, are ministrant to the greater goods. Thus friendship, glory, and wealth, are miistrant both to the body and the soul; but health, strength, and excellence of sensation, are subservient to the soul; and prudence [i.e. wisdom] and justice are ministrant to the intellect of the soul. (Archytas 1818: 156-157)
Although Taylor explicitly argues against this interpretation in his footnote, I think this manifests something along the lines of Peirce's principle of degeneracy, which is here embodied in that "The less, also, are ministrat to the greater goods", ministrant meaning serving as a minister or guide/ruler - essentially approximating Kant's "determination". In other words, the goods of the body (beauty, health, etc) determine the goods of the soul (prudence, fortutidue, jutice, and temperance), which in turn determine external goods (wealth, glory, honor, and nobility).
Since therefore virtue and science are in our power, but prosperity is not; and since also felicity consists in the contemplation and performance of things [truly] beautiful; but contemplation and actions, when they are not prosperous, are attended with ministrant offices and necessity, but when they proceed in the right path, produce delight and felicity; and these things are effected in prosperity; - this being the case, it si evident that felicity is nothing else than the use of virtue in prosperity. Hence the good man is disposed with respect to prosperity, in the same manner as he who has an excellent and robust body. For such a one is able to endure heat and cold, to raise a great burden, and to sustain easily many other molestations. (Archytas 1818: 158)
The crux of the matter here, as it pertains to fortune (fate/destiny), is that we do not choose into what kind of bodies we are born - we cannot select our parents and pick the genes we want. But while there is a sequence of "ministration", body → soul → man (rational animal), in the second instance (proceeding from soul) we have free will and can determine our character (how we behave, virtue) and knowledge (what we learn, science). This links up nicely with the discussion of man being partly determined by God(s) (i.e. "assistance derived from divinity"), and partly by our own "proper deliberate choice" (Euryphamus 1818: 148; above).
Since therefore felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity, we must speak concerning virtue and prosperity, and in the first place concerning prosperity. For of goods, some indeed do not admit of excess, and this is the case with virtue. For there is not any virtue which is excessive, nor any worthy man who is beyond measure good. For virtue has the fit and becoming for a rule, and is the habit of the decorous in practical concerns. But prosperity receives excess and diminution. And when it is excessive indeed, it generates certain vices, and removes a man from his natural habit; so that he frequently through this opposes the constitution [|] of virtue. And this is not only the case with prosperity, but many other causes likewise may effect the same thing. For it is by no means proper to wonder, that some of those who play on the pipe should be arrogant men, who, bidding farewell to truth, ensnare by a certain false imagination those who are unskilled in music; and to disbelieve that a thing of this kind does not take place in virtue. For the more venerable a thing is, so much the more numerous are those that pretend to the possession of it. (Archytas 1818: 159)
Only upon the third repetition do I realize that "felicity is the use of virtue in prosperity" is also 3=2+1. As to excessiveness, the point seems to be that a man can be too rich, but never too well-mannered; moreover, good manners have a tendency to become permanent habits, while riches can be lost. The quip about "those who play on the pipe" still relevant, see anyone with a guitar. With the last emphasis on there being more pretenders to the posession of the most valuable things, I thought of Bourdieu - cultural capital (knowledge/wisdom) is the most valuable, most difficult to attain, which raises the question about pretenders to knowledge.
But as indigence and excess are injurious to the body, yet excess and what are called superfluities, are naturally adapted to produce greater diseases [than those caused by indigence]; thus also prosperity or adversity injure the soul, when they unseasonably happen; yet that which is called by all men prosperity, is naturally adapted to produce greater diseases [than adversity], since it intoxicates like wine the reasoning power of good men. (Archytas 1818: 160)
It is better to suffer want than to have an excess of wealth. While both corrupt, excess corrupts more. I'm guessing the best is an interplay of prosperity and adversity, the mean between want and excess.
From Theages, in his treatise On the Virtues
The order of the soul subsists in such a way, that one part of it is the reasoning power, another is anger, and another is desire. And the reasoning power, indeed, has dominion over knowledge; anger over impetus; and desire intrepidly rules over the appetitions of the soul. When therefore these three parts pass into one, and exhibit one appropriate composition, then virtue and concord are produced in the soul. But when they are divulsed from each other by sedition, then vice and discord are produced in the soul. (Theages 1818: 161)
Iha ja viha. Define:impetus - the force or energy with which a body moves; so pretty much motivity.
It is necessary, however, that virtue should have these three things, viz. reason, power, and deliberate choice. The virtue, therefore, of the reasoning power of the soul is prudence; for it is a habit of judging and contemplating. But the virtue of the irascible part, is fortitude; for it is a habit of resisting, and enduring things of a dreadful nature. And the virtue of the epithymetic or appetitive part is temperance; for it is a moderation and detention of the pleasures which arise through the body. But the virtue of the whole soul is justice. (Theages 1818: 161)
Prudence is cautiousness. Reason is cautious, fortitude is power, and temperance is achieved by deliberate choice.
The passions, however, are the matter of virtue; for the virtues subsist about, and in these. But of the passions, one is voluntary, but another is involuntary. And the voluntary, indeed, is pleasure; but the involuntary is pain. (Theages 1818: 162)
Makes some sense. Pain is suffering - literally, pathos.
For that which is less excellent, is co-arranged for the sake of that which is more excellent. Thus in the world, every part that is always passive, subsists for the sake of that which is always moved. And in the conjunction of animals, the female subsists for the sake of the male. For the latter sows, generating a soul; but the former alone imparts matter to that which is generated. In the soul however, the irrational subsists for the sake of the rational part. (Theages 1818: 163)
These can be turned around. We know now, for example, that in the long history of evolution, the "male" was a late offshoot, a convenience. In effect, the male came about for the genetic diversification of the female. Likewise, every other relation in this passage can be turned around: that which is most excellent, subsists for the less excellent; the parts of the world that are in motion ultimately come to relative rest. The last one is probably truest of all - the rational mind is a late addition that serves the irrational, earlier parts. We think in order to eat, still.
From Metopus, in his treatise Concerning Virtue
And the rational part indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire. These however, are either concordant or discordant with each other. But the contest and dissonance between them, are produced through excess and defects. (Metopus 1818: 165)
Theages gave it as impetus (above). As before, much the same stuff with slight variations. Taylor seems to have selected a continuum based on similarity. This one was also really short.
From Clinias
Since however, man is naturally adapted to act unjustly from exciting causes; and these are three, the love of pleasure in corporeal enjoyments; avarice, in the accumulation of wealth; and ambition, in surpassing those that are equal and similar to him; - this being the case, it is necessary to know, that it is possible to oppose to these such things as procure fear, shame, and desire in men; viz. fear through the laws, shame through the Gods, and desire through the energies of reason. (Clinias 1818: 267)
The really difficult question is, how did we get from avarice (the man who goes to the public spectacle to sell his wares) to "the love of pleasure in corporeal enjoyments", to just any kind of emotion. Also short.
From Theages, in his treatise On the Virtues
When however, the better part of the soul governs, but the less excellent part is governed; and the former leads, but the latter follows, and both consent, and are concordant with each other, then virtue and every good are generated in the whole soul. When likewise the appetitive follows the reasoning part of the soul, then temperance is produced; but when this is the case with the irascible part, fortitude is produced; and when it takes place in all the parts of the soul, then justice is the result. For justice is that which separates all the vices and all the virtues of the soul from each other. And justice is a certain established order of the apt conjunction of the parts of the soul, and perfect and supreme virtue. (Theages 1818: 169)
"Subsisting" (above) is here "governing". The latter variant calls to mind determination in Kant and Schiller. Also, "justice" sounds like it should be "harmony".
Since however, the virtue of manners is conversant with the passions, but of the passions pleasure and pain are supreme, it is evident that virtue does not consist in extirpating the passions of the soul, pleasure and pain, but in co-harmonizing them. For neither does health, which is a certain apt mixture of the powers of the body, consist in expelling the cold of the powers of the body, consist in expelling the cold and the hot, the moist and the dry; but in these being [appropriately] mingled together. For it is as it were, a certain symmetry of these. Thus too, in music, concord does not consist in expelling the sharp and the flat; but when these are co-harmonized, then concord is produced, and dissonance is exterminated. (Theages 1818: 170)
Something to take into account when I next meet the origin of passions from the soul, or the like.
From the treatise of Archytas On Ethical Erudition
But the good man is not always happy; for felicity does not consist in the possession, but in the use of virtue. For neither does he who has sight always see; for he will not see, if he is without light. (Archytas 1818: 174)
Somehow I had an inkling that the "use" in Archytas' discussion of felicity (above) is loaded.
We should therefore exercise ourselves in the mediocrity of the passions, as we shall then equally avoid insensibility, and too much passivity, and shallnot speak higher of our nature than we ought. (Archytas 1818: 175)
Haven't ever noticed this - are passion and passivity contraries?
From Archytas, in his treatise on The Good and Happy Man
I say then that the good man is one who uses in a beautiful manner great things and opportunities. He likewise is able to bear well both prosperity and adversity. In beautiful and honorable circumstnaces also, he becomes worthy of the condition in which he is placed; and when his fortune is changed, received it in a proper manner. In short, on all occasions, he contends well from contingencies that may arise. Nor does he only thus prepare himself [for whatever may happen], but likewise those who confide in and contend together with him. (Archytas 1818: 176)
That's the whole fragment. Basically, accept with dignity whatever comes.
From Crito, in his treatise on Prudence and Prosperity
For the life of man requires intension and remission, sorrow and gladness, prosperity, and adversity. For some things are able to collect and retain the intellect to industry and wisdom; but others impart relaxation and delight, and thus render the intellect vigorous and prompt to action. If however one of these prevails in life, then the life of man becomes of one part, and verges to one part, tending either to sorrow and difficulty, or to remission and levity. (Crito 1818: 178)
Oppositions. Evidently these fragments appear so random because they are Gale's "Collection of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments", now supplemented by Taylor, who has left so many footnotes about how Gale messed up.
From Archytas, in his treatise On Disciplines
It is necessary that you should become scientific, either by learning from another person, or by discovering yourself the things of which you have a scientific knowledge. If, therefore, you learn from another person, that which you learn is foreign; but what you discover yourself is through yourself, and is your own. Moreover, if you investigate, discovery will be easy, and soon obtained; but if you do not know how to investigate, discovery will be to you impossible. (Archytas 1818: 181)
Pretty much how I feel about learning. People cannot be taught, they can only learn. Teaching and learning may coincide, what is learned on one's own is thoroughly one's own.
From Polus, in his treatise On Justice
Man was generated and constituted, for the [|] purpose of contemplating the reason of the whole of nature, and in order that, being himself the work of wisdom, he might survey the wisdom of the things which exist. - For if the reason of man is contemplative of the reason of the whole of nature, and the wisdom also of man perceives and contemplates the wisdom of the things in existence, - this being acknowledged, it is at the same time demonstrated, that man is a part of universal reason, and of the whole of the intellectual nature. (Polus 1818: 183-184)
Man's purpose is to be "the eye of the orderly distribution of things" (Euryphamus 1818: 148-149; above).
Whoever, therefore, is able to analyze all the genera which are contained under one and the same principle, and again to compose and con-numerate them, he appears to me to be the wisest of men, and to possess the most perfect veracity. Farther still, he will also discovered a beautiful place of survey, from whcih it will be possible to behold divinity, and all things that are in co-ordination with, and successive to him, subsisting separately, or distinct from each other. (Polus 1818: 184)
See Charles Fourier and his list of types of cuckoldry and bankrupcy.
Pythagoric Ethical Sentences from Stobæus
Do not even think of doing what ought not to be done. (Stobæus 1818: 186)
Ära isegi mõtle selle tegemisest, mida teha ei tohi.
Choose rather to be strong in soul than in body. (Stobæus 1818: 186)
Eelista olla tugev hinge, mitte keha poolest. St kanna hoolt oma hinge eest.
Be persuaded that things of a laborious nature contribute more than pleasures to virtue. (Stobæus 1818: 186)
Ole veendunud, et rasked asjad panustavad voorusesse rohkem kui naudingud. St ainult asjad, mis on rasked, keerulised, aeganõudvad, jne. on väärt tegemist.
Those alone are dear to divinity, who are hostile to injustice. (Stobæus 1818: 188)
Ainult need on Jumalale kallid, kes astuvad vastu ebaõiglusele.
It is impossible that he can be free who is a slave to his passions. (Stobæus 1818: 189)
Oma kirgede orjal on võimatu olla vaba.
Pythagoras said, that it was either requisite to be [|] silent, or to say something better than silence. (Stobæus 1818: 189-190)
Kui sul ei ole öelda midagi, mis oleks parem kui vaikus, siis vaiki.
To the wwise man every land is eligible as a place of residence; for the whole world is the country of the worthy soul. (Stobæus 1818: 190)
Targa inimese jaoks võib iga maa olla kodu; väärilise hinge jaoks on kogu maailm kodumaa. Vt maailmakodanik.
It is the same thing to think greatly of yourself in prosperity, as to contend in the race in a slippery road. (Stobæus 1818: 191)
Mõelda endast hästi kui sul on (raha/rikkust) küllalt, on sama kui joosta võidu libedal teel.
It is the province of a wise man to bear poerty with equanimity. (Stobæus 1818: 191)
Targa inimese asi on kanda vaesust väärikalt.
Select Sentences of Sextus the Pythagorean
The wise man, and the despiser of wealth, resembles God. (Sextus 1818: 192)
Tark inimene ja rikkuse jälestaja sarnanevad Jumalale.
You have in yourself something similar to God, and therefore use yourself as the temple of God, on account of that which in you resembles God. (Sextus 1818: 192)
Sinus on midagi sarnast Jumalale, ja seetõttu kasutad ennast Jumala templina. // Might have to do with the "soul as a tent" figure.
The wise man whose estimation with men was but small while he was living, will be renowned when he is dead. (Sextus 1818: 193)
Note that this goes for wise men, not just anyone. I.e. this pertains to those thinkers whose writings become popular posthumously.
You should not possess more than the use of the body requires. (Sextus 1818: 194)
Extreme asceticism. Likewise with the next, "Possess those things which no one can take from you", i.e. only possess social and cultural capital.
God dwells in the intellect of the wise man. (Sextus 1818: 194)
God is imaginary.
Be unwilling to admit accusations against the man who is studious of wisdom. (Sextus 1818: 195)
A good one. Probably originally meant that you shouldn't literally accuse men of learning; but it can be taken in the sense that you shouldn't "hold anything against" people who are honest lovers of knowledge.
No good originates from the body. (Sextus 1818: 195)
Especially not children.
Think that your body is the garment of your soul; and therefore preserve it pure. (Sextus 1818: 196)
Mõtle oma kehast kui hinge rõivastusest ja hoia seda puhtana.
You should not dare to speak of God to an impure soul. (Sextus 1818: 197)
First rule of God, don't talk about God.
P. 44. That it is not proper to walk in the public ways.This is the 5th Symbol in the Protreptics of Iamblichus, but is there differently expressed: for it is, "Declining from the public ways, walk in unfrequented paths." On which Iamblichus observes: "I think that this Symbol also contributes to the same thing as the preceding, [which is, "Disbelieve nothing wonderful concerning the Gods, nor concerning divine dogmas"]. For this exhorts us to abandon a popular and merely human life; but thinks fit that we should pursue a separate and divine life. It also signifies that it is necessary to look above common opinions; but very much to esteem such as are private and arcane; and that we should despise merely human delight; but ardent pursue that felicitous mode of conduct which [|] adheres to the divine will. It likewise exhorts us to dismiss human manners as popular, and to exchange for these the religious cultivation of the Gods, as transcending a popular life. (Taylor 1818: 204-205)
In other words, it's a roundabout way to say "Follow God".
P. 59. He likewise exhorted them to abstain from beans.In the Proptreptics this is the 37th Symbol; and Iamblichus has not developed for us The more mystical signification of this symbol. For he only says that "it admonishes us to beware of every thing which is corruptive of our converse with the Gods and divine prophecy." But Aristotle appears to have assigned the true mystical reason why the Pythagoreans abstained from beans. For he says, (apud Laert.) "that Pythagoras considered beans as a symbol of generation [i.e. of the whole of a visible and corporeal nature,] which subsists according to a right line, and is without inflection; because a bean alone of almost all spermatic plants, is perforated through the whole of it, and is not obstructed by any intervening joints." Hence he adds, "it resembles the gates of Hades." For these are perpetually open without any impediment to souls descending into generation. The exhortation, therefore, to abstain from beans, is equivalent to admonishing us to [|] beware of a continued and perpetual descent into the realms of generation. Hence the true meaning of the following celebrated lines in Virgil:[...] facilis descensus Averno.i.e.
Noctes atque dies patet atri janua Ditis:
Sed revocare gradum, superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opus, hic labor est.the gates of Hell are open night and day,Dryden. (Taylor 1818: 211-212)
Smooth the descent, and easy is the way;
But to return, and view the cheerful skies,
In this, the mighty task and labor lies.
A pretty good interpretation. The gist of the bean symbol, thus, being a reference to the palingenesia (Dillon 2000: 553), in effect "do not eat beans" amounts to don't born again. The analogy with Virgil that Taylor sets up pretty much makes Earth out to be the Hell, and getting out of it, to the isles of the blessed, an intellectual effort.
For how shall we account for those plants called heliotropes, that is, attendants on the sun, moving in correspondence with the revolution of its orb, but selenitropes, or attendants on the moon, turning in exact conformity to her motion? It is because all things pray, and hymn the leaders of their respective orders; but some intellectually, and others rationally; some in a natural, and others after a sensible manner. (Taylor 1818: 214)
Evidently this was only held by Proclus, i.e. we don't account for the plants that turn towards the moon - not a thing?
P. 78. The eternal essence of number is the most providential principle of the universe, &c.The following account of the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about numbers, is extracted from my Theoretic Arithmetic, and the information contained in it is principally derived from the great Syrianus. "The Pythagoreans, turning from the vulgar paths, and delivering their philosophy in secret to those alone who were worthy to receive it, exhibited it to others through mathematical names. Hence, they called forms, numbers, as things which are the first separated from impartible union; for the natures which are above forms, are also above separation. The all-perfect multitude of forms, therefore, they obscurely signified through the duad; but they indicated the first formal principles by the monad and duad, as not being numbers; and also by the first triad and tetrad, as being the first numbers, the one being odd, and the other even, from which by addition the decade is generated; for the sum of 1, 2, 3, and 4, is ten. But after numbers, in secondary and multifarious lives, introducing geometrical prior to physical magnitudes; these also they referred to numbers, as to fromal causes and the principles of these; referring the point indeed, [|] as being impartible, to the monad; but a line, as the first interval, to the duad; and again, a superficies, as having a more abundant interval, to the triad; and a solid to the tetrad. They alse called, as is evident from the testimony of Aristotle, the first length the duad; for it is not simply length, but the first length, in order that by this they might signify cause. IN a similar manner also, they denominated the first breadth, the triad; and the first depth the tetrad. (Taylor 1818: 219-220)
This goes to explain the cryptic "three is the first number". As to "all is number", it appears that it symbolizes the sequence from numbers to geometrical figures to physical magnitudes.
They also referred to formal principles all psychical knowledge. And intellectual knowledge indeed, as being contracted according to impartible union, they referred to the monad; but scientific knowledge, as being evolved, and as proceeding from cause to the thing caused, yet through the inerratic, and always through the same thing, they referred to the duad; and opinion to the triad, because the power of it is not always directed to the same thing, but at one time inclines to the true, and at another to the false. And they referred sense to the tetrad, because it has an apprehension of bodies; for in the duad, indeed, there is one interval from one monad to the other; but in the triad there are two intervals from any one monad to the rest; and in the tetrad ther are three. They referred, therefore, to principles every thing knowledge, viz. beings, and the gnostic powers of these. But they divided beings not according to breadth, but according to depth; into intelligibles, objects of science, objects of opinion, and sensibles. In a similar manner, also, tehy divided knowledge into intellect, science, opinion, and sense. (Taylor 1818: 220)
Sadly, this is so damn different from the post-Kantian triadic progression. For one, it is backwards? Perhaps the geometrical progression and numbering just aren't the same... Here, the logic appears that the monad is all truth, the diad is true or false, and the triad is sometimes true and sometimes false. This interpretation divides what should be "free will" into either correct (science) or incorrect (opinion) knowledge.
The seventh tetractys is of communities; of which the principle indeed, and as it were monad, is man; the duad is a house; the triad a street; and the tetrad a city. For a nation consists of these. And these indeed are the material and sensible tetractys. (Taylor 1818: 238)
Again different from "body → city → world" (somewhere above).
The Ninth tetractys is that from which the animal is composed, the soul and the body. For the parts of the soul, indeed, are the rational, the irascible, and the epithymetic, or that which desires external good; and the fourth is the body in which the soul subsists. (Taylor 1818: 238)
Intellect, anger, and desire (viha ja iha).
Thus, for instance, the first tetractys is 1. 2. 3. 4. The second is the monad, a side, a square, and a cube. The third is a point, a line, a superficies, and a solid. The fourth is fire, air, water, earth. The fifth the pyramid, the octaedron, the icosaedron, and the cube. The sixth, seed, length, breadth and depth. The seventh, man, a house, as treet, a city. The eight, intellect, science, opinion, sense. The ninth, the rational, the irascible, and the epithymetic prats, and the body. The tenth, the spring, summer, autumn, winter. The eleventh, the infant, the lad, the man, and the old man. (Taylor 1818: 239)
Summary of the foregoing.
P. 116. Such as dig not fire with a sword.This is the 9th Symbol in the Protreptics, and is thus explained by Iamblichus. "This symbol exhorts to prudence. For it excites in us an appropriate conception with the respect to the propriety of not opposing sharp swords to a man full of fire and wrath, nor contending with him. For frequently by words you will agitate and disturb an ignorant man, and will yourself suffer things dreadful and unpleasant. Heraclitus also testifies to the truth of this symbol. For he says, "It is difficult to fight with anger: for whatever is necessary to be done redeems the soul." And this he says truly. For many, by gratifying anger, have changed the condition of their soul, and have made death preferable to life. But by governing the tongue, and being quiet, friendship is produced from strife, the fire of anger being extinguished; and you yourself will not appear to be destitute of intellect." (Taylor 1818: 242)
Pretty much the ancient equivalent of the Estonian saying ära sitta näpi, sitt läheb haisema (~don't poke feces, it'll stink).
P. 167. Such therefore as have the intellective and gnostic part of virtue, are denominated skilful and intelligent: but such as have the ethical and preelective part of it, are denominated useful and equitable.The following account of the virtues in extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the Phædo of Plato: The first of the virtues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament: or that they are the result of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethical virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone; for they are scientific. (Taylor 1818: 243)
Now that's more like it! This is pretty much the triad I'm after. No idea (yet) how Taylor read all this out of the passage quoted, which appeared in Iamblichus's main text, above. Taylor gives other references, but the most important is this: "And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic" (ibid, 243).
Observe too, that Plato in the Phædo calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist in servile souls; but he calls the ethical σκιογράφιαι adumbrations, because their possessors only know that the energies of such virtues are right, but do not know why they are so. It is well observed too here, by Olympiodorus, that PLato calls the cathartic and theoretic virtues, those which are in reality true virtues. (Taylor 1818: 245)
This is on point, already congruent with the rest. I.e. if physical virtues pertain to Firstness, ethical virtues to Secondness, then the cathartic/theoretic virtues to Thirdness, where lie the ideas, laws, logic, and the rest. It is also congruent with the backwards progression in the tetractys: triad is physical - opinions (sometimes true and sometimes false; i.e. random fuzzy feelings); diad is ethical - science (matters are true or false, but no idea as to why); and the monad is cathartic/theoretic - intellect (only truth).
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