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A Poor Authority

Procopé, J. F. 1990. Democritus on Politics and the Care of the Soul: Appendix. The Classical Quarterly 40(1): 21-45. [JSTOR]

The political fragments of Democritus have come down to us out of context. The choice of any one as a starting-point for a discussion of them is bound to be arbitrary. But a good many can be linked to B 252 with its message that private well-being depends on the well-being of the state. Protection of the public well-being is the underlying concern of his political fragments. One obvious way to protect it is to crack down on anything that threatens it. Hence the fragments (B 257-60) about killing public pests, animal or human. (Procopé 1990: 21)

Part and whole. Who decides who or what is a pest? One of Fourier's examples along these lines concerns some worm or grub, which he intended the inhabitants of his Phalanx to go out and destroy.

The implication of texts like B 264 or B 181 is that the ultimate remedy for social disorder lies less in coercion than in the care of individual souls. Again, if states are to prosper or even survive, concord among the citizens is essential (B 250). Discord is fatal (B 249), and the danger of discord makes it necessary to have repressive laws (B 245). But Democritus could also offer a more positive prescription for civic concord, in voluntary generosity on the part of the rich (B 255). He was to be credited with the assertion that there are only two gods, Poena and Beneficium (A 76 = Pliny, NH 2.14). Perhaps they symbolized for him the two fundamental bonds of society (cf. Theophrastus ap. Stob. 4.1.72). (Procopé 1990: 22)

Strongly disagree. This view of discord can put Fourier's positive view of it in relief. Interested to find out what those two fundamental bonds are.

Concerning the slaughter or non-slaughter of certain animals, the rule is as follows: he who kills those which do or are disposed to do harm goes scot-free, and to do so shall be for well-being rather than otherwise.
ζώιων ἒστιν ὦν: does this mean that there are other animals to whom this role does not apply? Perhaps. As J. Bernays claimed (Theophrast über die Frömmigkeit [Berlin, 1866], p. 149), Democritus is invoking a distinction, of the kind ascribed to Pythagoras (Plut. 964f), between dangerous wild animals, e.g. 'foxes and reptiles' (B 259), lions and wolves (Hermarchus ap. Proph. abst. 1.11), which may be killed [|] with impunity, and gentler domesticated animals. Cf. R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes (Leipzig, 1902), p. 215 n. 1. You kill snakes and scorpions on sight (Ps.- Demosth. 25.96). But you had better wait before killing a theotening ox or horse. It probably belongs to someone, and will be under legal protection. (Procopé 1990: 23-24)

Notable only for being attributed to Pythagoras.

κιναδέον: strictly 'foxes'. Sicilian in origin, the word is more commonly applied to foxy humans (Androc. 1.99; Ar. Av. 430. Nu. 448, etc.). έρπετέων: note the story in Herodotus (4.105.1) of how the Neuroi were driven out of their country by an infestation of snakes. The link between snakes and foxes is that both live in holes - which is why, according to Aristotle (HA 610a12), they are friends. (Procopé 1990: 26)

"Foxy humans" sounds like something else. Did not know about that link between foxes and snakes.

Poverty is a democracy is as preferable to so-called prosperity among dictators as freedom is to slavery.
ἠ έν δημοκρατίηι πενίη: impoverishment in a democracy? Perhaps Democritus is retorting to observations regularly made by the insecure, over-taxes rich about the advantages of being poor in a state run by and for the δῇμος (cf. Ps.-Xen. Anth. Pol. 1.13, Xen. Symp. 4.31f., Isoc. 8.128, etc.). (Procopé 1990: 27)

Good characterisation on Procopé's part.

εύδαιμονιης 'felicity', 'prosperity', 'high standard of living' (cf. Plato, Ep. 7.326b on the βίος εύδαίμων in Sicily). (Procopé 1990: 27)

I wonder if this could be connected with Fourier's "Luxury". Happiness is an emotion.

The comparison of the body with an 'implement' or 'vessel' chimes awkwardly with its depiction, in the preceding clauses, as a litigant. Moreover, the image of it as the 'implement' which the soul' uses' is a Platonist commonplace (e.g. PLotinus 1.1.3.3) which goes back to the Alcibiades I (129e). But how consistent much the imagery be? Democritus is quite capable (B 223) or referring to the body as the ακήνος or 'tent' (i.e. 'what the soul lives in'), while still speaking of its 'demands' and 'longing' (χρηίζει, ίμείρεται). [...] The theme of the quotation from Democritus is the contrast, to be found elsewhere in the fragmenta moralia (B 149, 223, etc.) and much invoked by Epicurean writers (e.g. Epicurus Gn.V. 33, frr. 445, 456, 469 U; Diog. Oen. fr. 1.i-ii), between the readily satisfied wants of the body and the endless, perverse and vexing desires of the soul. (Procopé 1990: 32)

The "demands" of the body is pretty much the only thing that stuck with me when I read The Apology of Socrates as a 18yo (didn't understand half the English words then). The "veking desires" of the soul is phraseologically interesting, and could describe Fourier's "distributive" passions of the soul.

άτερπείη: the most prominent word in the fragment (see above), recurs in a much discussed sentence, B 188: ὂρος συμφόρων καί τέρφις καί άτερπίη, 'the boundary-mark between things suitable and unsuitable is enjoyment and lack of enjoyment'. The sign that something agrees with you or is good for you is that you enjoy it; if you find it horrible, it cannot be doing you good. The principle applies primarily to questions of diet and physical well-being, but can be greatly extended. And it works in both directions. The fact that something agrees or disagrees with you [|] is a fact about yourself as much as about the thing: for a sick man, food which is sweet to a healthy man tastes bitter (Plato, Prt. 166e); its bitter taste is an indication of his sickness. (Procopé 1990: 34-35)

Suitable, enjoyable, agreeable. The underlying logic being that if something feels good to do, then it must be good. Fourier insists that this is the nature of passional attraction - that God gave us desires and instincts to lead us right.

Some men, not knowing the dissolution of mortal nature, but with a consciousness of ill-doing in life, toil out their time of life in perturbations and fears, fabricating lying legends about the time after the end.
[.|.] But Nestle, Philologus 67 (1908), p. 548, was surely right to argue that, if it is simply the misery in this life of which the men are conscious, they might more reasonably hope for a better hereafter; what fuels their anxieties about the after-life is their consciousness of having themselves acted badly. [...] An ambitious piece of Kunstprosa, the fragment falls into roughly equal halves, subject and predicate, both of them composed of two more or less balancing members. Each of its four κώλα introduces its own thought - (1) men ignorant of the facts about death, (2) but with a consciousness of evil doing, (3) live in fear and confusion (4) giving themselves nightmares about the afterlife; and they are linked to each other by various formal devices, above all by word-echo [...] (Procopé 1990: 35-36)

Putting it bluntly, this. Visions of afterlife, then, arise from conscience of doing evil, and the possibility that one will be punished for them in the afterlife.

Even if you are alone, neither say nor do anything vile. Far more than in front of others, learn to feel shame in front of yourself.
(Procopé 1990: 40)

Not sure how to feel about this. On the one hand this clearly links up with the discourse on self-control. On the other the culture of shame hasn't really worked out that great for humanity.

Whensoever those with means have the nerve to lend to those who have none, to do them services and kindnesses - that is when you first find pity and an end to isolation, the birth of comradeship, mutual assistance and concord among the citizens, and other blessings so many that none could count them.
οίκτίρειν: pity is an emotion to which the rich and confidently prosperous, οί ύπερευδαιμονείν οίόμενοι, are not normally susceptible (Ar. Rhet. 1385b21). έρήμου: isolated, bereft of allies. To be 'bereft' of allies and 'comrades' who might provide 'defence' is a recognisable claim to pity (cf. Thuc. 3.57.4, 67.2, 3, 5). έταίρους: very nearly 'comrades in arms', 'partners in crime', the word implies a certain equality of social status, as well as suggesting membership of a έταίρεία, a political faction or club organized for the άμύνειν άλλήλοισι, the 'mutual defence', of its members. (Procopé 1990: 43)

Sadly modern psychology confirms this about the rich. The Pythagorean hetaireia evidently meant for mutual defense. (Kaasvõitlejad, kamraadid.)

Prowse, K. R. 1964. Numa and the Pythagoreans: A Curious Incident. Greece & Rome 11(1): 36-42. [JSTOR]

In 181 B.C. a curious event happened at Rome. As usual the accounts vary, but only in the details. Livy tells us that workers turning over the soil in a field at the foot of the Janiculum discovered two stone containers measuring approximately eight feet by four, and sealed with lead. Greek and Latin inscriptions were to be seen on the outside. The one supposed to be Numa's coffin was empty but the other contained two bundles of documents preserved in wax: seven books written in Latin, de iure pontificio, and seven in Greek, de disciplina sapientiae, not only undamaged but of very new appearance. Livy remarks that Valerius Antias (an annalist living in the time of Sulla), accommodating his view to [|] the then prevailing opinion, said that the books contained Pythagorean doctrines. The filed in which the discovery took place was owned by Lucius Petilius, a clerk. Q. Petilius Spurinus, the praetor unbanus, obtained the documents from the clerk, whom he had employed earlier when a quaestor, and finding that they attacked religious observances, he told him that he intended to burn them, but gave him a chance to try by legitimate means to recover possession. The clerk approached the tribunes of the people, who in turn referred the matter to the Senate. Nevertheless his efforts failed and the Senate ordered the books to be publicly burned. (Prowse 1964: 36-37)

A sad story, this.

No doubt Valerius Antias was right in following the tradition that the books were Pythagorean in nature. There was a persistent belief that Numa had come under the influence of Pythagoras himself. Dionysios of Halikarnassos refers to a tradition that Numa was studying at Croton in southern Italy, where Pythagoras had established his school, when he was chosen king of Rome. (Prowse 1964: 38)

The dates don't match up. Wikipedia currently gives Numa Pomilius as having lived 753-673 BC, and Pythagoras 573-495 BC.

The Dionysiac religion was concerned with the after-life. In his recent study M. P. Nilsson says that the Bacchic mysteries promised the bliss of an eternal banquet; he also points to features which were common to Bacchanalians, Orphics, and Pythagoreans, such as the possession of a sacred literature, as well as a special taboo placed on the eating of eggs. But there was more than this. 'Both enjoined a certain way of living. [...] These ways of life [the Orphic and the Pythagorean] were similar, e.g. the abstention from meat was the foremost requirement of both, and both proclaimed the same end, katharsis or the purification of the soul', to quote W. K. C. Guthrie. There were differences among the three groups, but these seem to be mainly differences of emphasis rather than of belief. They may have diverged considerably in early times, but their origins are hard to believe. The main point is that, when in 181 B.C., books were produced claiming the authorship of Numa to support Pythagorean doctrines, educated Romans clearly could not accept their origin and almost certainly failed to distinguish between Pythagorean teachings and those of the Bacchanalians, so recently suppressed. The swift action of the Senate was to be expected. (Prowse 1964: 41)

Still don't know much about the ancient mystic religions.

Bremmer, J. N. 1992. Symbols of Marginality from Early Pythagoreans to Late Antique Monks. Greece & Rome 39(2): 205-214. [JSTOR]

In the fourth century B.C., Pythagoristae make a rather sudden appearance in Attic comedy. These characters are conspicuous for their deviant lifestyle and appearance. They wear only a single garment, go barefoot, and probably stink to high heaven, since they never wash. In addition they are taciturn and of sombre appearance. Moreover, they take only water and otherwise subsist on vegetables and herbs, totally abstaining from meat. Comedy exaggerates, of course, and takes no account of different currents in Pythagoreanism, but the imagery is quite clear. Pythagoristae place themselves squarely against the existing norms and values of Greek society. (Bremmer 1992: 205)

God damn hippies.

Besides their poverty-stricken look, Pythagoreans could be recognized by their sombre countenances. Their joyless facial expressions are in line with the report that the great Master himself never laughed either. Allowing laughter only in moderation is not often mentioned, but it is noteworthy that Chaeremon, when describing Egyptian priests - already Reitzenstein saw in this description similarities to Pythagoreans - remarks that they rarely laugh and when they do never go beyond a smile. (Bremmer 1992: 207)

This I did not know.

Drinking wine, then, was a sign of affluence, as is clear also from the frequent distributions of wine by wealthy citizens at certain festivals, recorded regularly in inscriptions from later antiquity. In archaic and classical Greece, the symposium was the place par excellence for social intercourse. To aristocrats, then, total abstention meant first and foremost a total break with their milieu, while to monks it meant rather a rejection of luxury. Symbols that at first sight seem identical turn out to belong to wholly different social contexts. (Bremmer 1992: 209)

The communion of food and the communion of words go hand in hand.

Tate, J. 1939. Plato, Phaedo 92cd. The Classic Review 53(1): 2-3. [JSTOR]

While admiring Mr. W. L. Lorimer's emendation (δοκεῖ <ἂ δοκεῖ> in d2: C.R. LII. 165), I should like to say something on behalf of the traditional text, which means (as we agree) that most people believe the soul to be an άρμονια. It is by no means obvious to me that this statement is 'wildly untrue'. Aristotle says of this very theory that 'many' find it highly credible; and Stallbaum, Archer-Hind, etc., seem to me right in thinking that it is, according to the Phaedo itself, a widespread view. But Mr. Lorimer's emendation calls attention to a real difficulty which the commentators do not seem to have faced: why are 'the many' credited with believing a tenet which sounds so highly philosophic? This is the difficulty for which I wish to suggest a solution. (Tate 1939: 2)

Finally something short but to the point.

The doctrine itself contains nothing recondite. It appeals, as we are told in 92d, to those who have not thought deeply on the matter. 'Harmony' (structure) is exhibited not only by the lyre when it is tuned, and by its notes when they fit together into modes and melodies, but also by 'all the works of craftsmen', and clearly by everything which is 'put tofether' whether by art or by nature. The word is synonymous with κρᾶσις in 86b 9 and αύνθεσις in 93a I. 'Harmony' is the compositeness of any composite whole; when the parts fly asunder, the 'blend', 'structure', 'harmony', is gone. The living body consists of physical elements held in tension or equipoise as described in 86b; and the soul, when regarded as άρμονία, κρᾶσις, αύνθεσις, is precisely this state of union, balance or 'attunement'. For soul, if it is a 'harmony', is 'a composite thing', consisting of these physical elements (so long as they fit together), and not something apart from them. (Tate 1939: 2)

That "structure" could be equivalent of (synonymous with) "harmony" I would not have guessed, but it makes a lot of sense. Even Jakobson, the linguistic structuralist, constantly gravitates towards some sense of harmony. For example, his reading of Peirce's sign theory amounts to a harmony between iconic, indexical and symbolic elements. It is dubious if Peirce's writings support this reading, but that's what Jakobson puts forth.

Macrobius (see RP 86) - a poor authority - says that Pythagoras and Philolaus called soul a harmony. If this is right (which is not likely), a different doctrine must be intended from that which Plato expounds as obviously inconsistent with Pythagoras' (and, let me add, Philolaus') belief in immortality and transmigration. [...] It has also been suggested (Burnet, G.P., p. 3390 that the Timaeus is based on Philolaus' system. If this is so, Philolaus is surely innocent of the άρμονία-doctrine described in the Phaedo. The same conclusion would follow if the treatise on the soul, ascribed to him in antiquity, either was written by him or had any foundation in what he realy taught. (Tate 1939: 3)

This is what happens when you have fragments and quotations to work with.

Dillon, J. M. 1969. A Date for the Death of Nicomachus of Geresa? The Classical Review 19(3): 274-275. [JSTOR]

'Since the cube of 6 comes to 216, (which is) the time of birth for seven-month babies, if one counts in with the seven months the six days during which the sperm is in the form of foam and is undergoing germination, Androcydes the Pythagorean, the author of the work On Symbols, and Eubulides the Pythagorean, and Aristoxenus, and Hippobotus, and Neanthes, who have written on [|] the subject of Pythagoras, have declared that the reincarnations which befell him happened at interval of 216 years. They say, at any rate, that after this number of years Pythagoras came to re-birth, and lived again, as it were after the first circuit and return of the soul-creating cube of six, it being recurring because of its spherical circuit, and that on other occasions he came to new life through this same process.' (Dillon 1969: 274-275)

No idea what this means. If you look up images of "spherical circuit" you get pictures of circuit board planets.

It is plain from the above passage that the figure of two hundred and sixteen years was arrived at by extrapolation from the two hundred and sixteen days in which the embryo comes to birth. A closer examination nof this, however, is matter for another treatise. (Dillon 1969: 275)

Yeah, this makes no sense either. Seven months old babies born prematurely only survive with special care. On the other hand, if my calculations are correct then Pythagoras' soul was last reborn in 1881 (Pablo Picasso?) and will be reborn again in 2097.

Bennett, Victor 1945. Thoughts from Pythagoras. Music & Letters 26(4): 195-200. [JSTOR]

If his thoughts proceed in this direction, they must encounter some such question as "What importance has music as an element of the universe?". As for his answer, it is not made any more easy to frame by the fact that the majority of eminent philosophers have attached little or no importance to music. Even Plato, who recognizes the high educational value of music, makes no attempt to relate it to ultimate reality. It is true that in relating the Mytho of Er he introduces the celebated doctrine of the Harmony of the Spheres, but this is made a mere incident in his statement on the Immortality of the Soul and it evidently fails to hold his interest. (Bennett 1945: 195)

Fourier, on the other hand, subscribed to both the Harmony of the Spheres and the Immortality of the Soul, and believed that music theory is the only science that had been perfected, and it is related to ultimate reality.

Our philosopher, however, is not without consolation. Around this idea of the Harmony of the Spheres there clusters a tradition which, if it be but a minor one, has for music some impressive claims to make. This tradition, it is true, is not very coherent, but it may yet become so. Its threads are scattered, but they may yet be gathered up. It is a tradition which is as much the providence of poets as of accredited philosophers, but which, nevertheless, has behind it a force of intuition which ensures its survival after each recurring age of rationalism. When it develops, the philosopher is bound te remark, it has a surprising way of doing so by leaps and bounds, but its origin is not merely ancient but venerable. To begin at the beginning is to return to the source of so very much that is mysterious and valuable in the world of ideas; to return, that is, to Pythagoras. (Bennett 1945: 195)

This is so well written. "A force of intuition" good candidate for post title.

In that legendary sage the learned satirists of ancient and modern times have found a favourite object of exercise. No doubt that is not precisely the kind of immortality he would have welcomed, nor is it his just reward. What brought it upon him was his innocence as to the sobering effect which rationalistic modes of thought have upon philosophy, though indeed it was he who put system into the nebulous notions that prevailed in the Orphic cult. He would have agreed with Montaigne that philosophy is but sophisticated poetry, and not felt that the connection was a damaging one. Other thinkers have been pleased to ally philosophy with science or logic, but philosophy has never been more than half made up of these quantities. The other half of philosophy consists of spontaneous ideas, which often can neither be proved nor disproved, and of this creative side of philosophy Pythagoras is surely the prophet, so that he remains, as he was in his own day, at the centre of the philosophic storm. Indeed a man who can project his influence over 2,500 years without leaving a written record of his teaching, and without having more than a few of his sayings recorded for him, belongs to a very select gallery of human genius. (Bennett 1945: 195)

Curious to learn more about the Orphic cult (from Reinach, for example). Personally, I veer towards the side of poetry rather than logic. Not only because the latter subject has hindered my graduation but because much of the fertility (young Peirce would have said pregnancy) of philosophy is due to the poetic function. See, for example, notes on the language of Democritus, which so often point out that there are rhymes and "word-echoes" in his fragments.

The eight concentric whorls which, in the account given in the 'Republic', make up the heavenly bodies may have been a Pythagorean conception, for eight was one of his favourite numbers; but it seems that some less skilled artificer inserted into each whorl a siren who, with inexplicable conservation of breath, piped forever a single note as she travelled, thus contributing with her sisters to the production of one lost chord of music; for humanity could not hear the sound, for the simple reason that it never varied and never ceased. (Bennett 1945: 196)

The tenth book of Republic is about the Harmony of the Spheres. The emphasized sentence calls to mind The Legend of 1900, where the main character does not know the sound of the sea because he has lived all his life floating upon it. It also made me think of that damn triangular scheme, but the case appears to be opposite: it is not taken notice of because it constantly varies in at least one dimension (most commonly the first and second, somehow almost all agree that Reason is the highest faculty) and has probably gone through periods when it was not in vogue.

While the ancient idea of music in the heavens is preserved, another cause has been substituted. The music was formerly the work of the sirens; now it is the result of simple planetary motion. Now like causes in like circumstances should have like results, and if simple motion can produce music in the heavens, and if the most audibility does not apply to it, then why should not simple motion have the same effect elsewhere in the physical universe and more particularly on the face of this earth? If motion is a cause of music, it becomes impossible to deny to all things that move, which is to say all things that exist, their own appropriate music-making. It is no longer possible to keep the music to the skies. The chamber music of the stars becomes the concerto grosso of the whole hierarchy of existence, manifesting itself with the utmost proximity and ubiquity. The faint exalted hymn of the sirens becomes a universal symphony, in which everything that walks, crawls, swims, flies or merely agitates in a frantic performer, living to music, by music and for music; for everything that likes moves, and everything that moves harps or sings. This hypothesis is the converse to an established fact. For it is an established fact of acoustics that all music is a kind of motion, and the hypothesis we are being led to frame is that all motion is a kind of music. The music is everywhere and there is nothing but music anywhere. All existence is motion; all motion is music: therefore all existence is music. To this triple identification the shade of Pythagoras beckons us on. (Bennett 1945: 198)

Bennett might have appreciated String Theory.

Harap, Louis 1938. Some Hellenic Ideas on Music and Character. The Musical Quarterly 24(2): 153-168. [JSTOR]

Although not a great deal of technical literature on music has survived, enough remains to assure us that this study was deeply investigated by the Greeks. I shall not here be much concerned with their technical theories of the octave, modes, or notation. In this essay, which no pretense to completeness, I shall try mainly to set down some ideas entertained by the Greeks upon how the enjoyment of music affected human character, usually designated as the "ethos" theory of music. (Harap 1938: 153)

This has already passed through some immediate past readings, i.e. some philosopher becoming a tutor for a son of nobility because his theory of music was supposed to build character.

As everyone knows, the earliest and most basic of all musical discoveries in the West was made by Pythagoras, when he discerned the principle of the regular proportional relationship between the pitches. The subsequent development of music would have been impossible without this knowledge. However, what is for us a technical principle [|] of music was to Pythagoras the primary metaphysical fact about the world. The Milesian philosophers, Anaximander and Anaximenes, had bequathed to Pythagoras the problem of accounting for the existence of an ordered world in the midst of conflict and opposition. Pythagoras tried to solve the problem by the principle of harmony (άρμονία). By experimenting with a musical string he had discovered that the pitch intervals of the octave, the fourth and the fifth were related in a regular ratio. In other words, high and low pitches were resolved in an "attunement" (άρμονία) that resolved their opposition, for each was related to the other in due measure. Pythagoras reasoned analogously from this example of numerical regularity to everything else, and he thought harmony was the clue to an explanation of the world. Human life, to be properly healthful and ordered, should also be harmonious. (Harap 1938: 153-154)

Same goes for Fourier, whose theory of social organization is based on this metaphysical tenet. In the highest form of human society, every person is "attuned" to everyone else "in due measure", meaning that there will still be rich and poor but they will be in harmony, their accords and discord properly measured.

Music and mathematics, because they presented the soul with pure instances of harmony, were held by Pythagoras to have purgative effects. He was the first among philosophers to expound the idea of catharsis, which had been transmitted to him through the Orphicism in his religious background. The idea of catharsis by music was present in the ancient tradition that Orpheus with his lute calmed beasts and that Amphion moved the stones with his music. The χαθαρμοί, rites of purification by enthusiasm, were regularly practised in the Orphic religions as a means of releasing the soul from its bodily tomb. Pythagoras carried this idea further in prescribing appropriate music for each specific type of mental disturbance, and in his doctrine of the harmony of the "circles." (Harap 1938: 154)

I would not have guessed that katharsis denoted Ancient Greek music therapy.

Pythagoras believed that the hearing of sounds which bore ceratin arithmetical relationships had a powerful and quite specific effect on the soul. The movements in each piece of music produced similar movements in the soul. Since desirable states of the soul could be induced by suitable music, it assumed great importance for moral life. (Harap 1938: 155)

Made me think of binaural beats.

For the ethos-theory is based on the view that music directly and precisely imitates human dispositions, because of the similarities of movement in music and in the soul. The Greeks conceived of the soul as being in motion when affectively alive (hence the term "emotion"). Plato said that melody has "movements akin to the revolutions of the soul within us." The musician must know, relative to "harmonies," what are "the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures." Melodies express the virtues of the soul and body of their vices. "Everyone will admit," plato affirmed, "that musical compositions are all imitative and representative." (Harap 1938: 156)

Hingeliigutus (Gemütsbewegung). Emotion - something in us is in motion. See also "motivitiy".

Although Plato does admit the cathartic function of music in a Pythagorean passage ("Timaeus" 47 E), this admission is an isolated one. Otherwise he forbids the exciting music of the aulos, while Aristotle deals differently with this question. There is a "proper time" for playing the aulos, "when the performance aims not at instruction, but at the relief of the passions." In other words, this use of the music of the aulos is just what we found in Pythagoras: a homeopathic treatment of an agitated emotional state by orgiastic music. (Harap 1938: 161)

A very well crafted definition of katharsis.

A fourth, and very significant, use of music named by Aristotle is that of enjoyment for its own sake as a disciplined, "intellectual" activity (διαγωγή). Such self-sufficient activity is for Aristotle the end of human life, the complete realization of man's rationality. All liberal pursuits - that is, those which are not "useful or necessary" - are enjoyed for themselves alone, each in its own right. Musical activity of this kind is not merely pleasant, like relaxation, but one in which the pleasant (ήδονή) is joined with the rationally fine (χαλόν). (Harap 1938: 162)

Autonomous/reflexive function! Footnote cites "Politics" 1338 a 31, and adds: "Plato approaches this point of view in the "Philebus," where he says that the good in itself is a mixture with knowledge (επιστήμη) (60 A f.), and then includes musical knowledge among these goods (62 C)." - This could be a boon for phatic theory, as it basically reinforces Mahaffy's point about the "theory" of conversation.

On the other hand Aristotle comes closer to expressing the self-sufficiency of musical enjoyment of which modern musicians are more keenly aware than the ancient appear to have been. For Aristotle holds that music is one of the liberal, intellectual pursuits (διαγωγή) that are self-sufficient. But Aristoxenus came even closer to an understanding of the specific internal nature of music than any other theorist of antiquity. After all, the διαγωγή of Aristotle was a general term applying equally to the self-sufficiency attached to the association of friends, or to thought itself. (Harap 1938: 167)

This διαγωγή means behavior or conduct.

Kingsley, Peter 1994. From Pythagoras to the Turba Philosophorum: Egypt and Pythagorean Tradition. Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 57: 1-13. [JSTOR / DOI: 10.2307/751460]

For Heraclitus, Pythagoras was someone who 'practised inquiry (historia) to a greater extent than any other men'. When we look at the meaning of this term historia, in Ionic Greek but also very often in later literature, we see that its chief and unmistakable implication is of investigations carried out through visiting distant places and people. It is also worth noting that because historia as disinterested travel was naturally conducted to a large extent along the normal trade routes, juxtaposition of the term emporia and historia - 'trade' and 'inquiry' - was a commonplace in Greek literature. As for Heraclitus's purpose in dwelling on Pythagoras's passion for historia, it was savagely polemical. He made fun of Pythagoras for looking for wisdom everywhere else except in the one place where according to Heraclitus it was to be found - inside oneself - and for failing to realise the truth, so elegantly formulated by Lao Tzu, [|] that 'the further one goes the less one knows: the sages acquire their knowledge without travel'. And yet Heraclitus would only have been able to make fun of Pythagoras in this way if traditions about him as a traveller, explorer and collector of wisdom from distant parts were already in existence, among people who will have known him best, by the late sixth century BC. (Kingsley 1994: 2-3)

It's amazing how little I actually know. Had no idea that history had this meaning. Histōl, learned, wise man → historia (ἱστορία), finding out, narrative, history.

The Samians were phenomenal traders; they appear, for instance, to have been the first Greeks to exploit commercial possibilities in Andalusian Spain. But where Pythagoras himself is concerned we can be more specific, thanks to one significant but neglected piece of evidence. We are told that his father, Mnesarchus, was a gem-cutter by trade; the information is highly credible. What is interesting about this detail is the fact that, at precisely the period when Pythagoras's father is likely to have been living, the island of Samos played a major role in the birth of the Greek art of gem-engraving. In the 570s and 560s BC Greeks seem to have started learning the techniques of working hard stones from easterners, notably Phoenicians. For at least the first generation or two of workers - and it is important to bear in mind that Pythagoras would as a matter of course have been trained to inherit his father's craft - this will inevitably have involved travel in the eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of learning, not to mention a very close relationship with foreign traders and trading as far as obtaining materials was concerned. Once again we are brought back to the theme of trade, travel and learning from foreigners - which in connection with sixth-century Samos is hardly surprising. (Kingsley 1994: 2)

Wikipedia affirms that the island of Samos was near popular trade routes and "was able to become so prominent despite the growing power of the Persian empire because of the alliance they had with the Egyptians and their powerful fleet".

We can begin with the famous 'Orphic' gold plates, or more accurately pieces of gold foil which were inscribed with direction for finding one's way in the other world and with promises for attaining immortality. Intended to accompany the dead person into the underworld, they have been discovered in graves across much of the Greek-speaking world - but above all in southern Italy. The ideas they contain represent a vital aspect of the religious landscape in the Greek West which Pythagoras himself will have encountered after he migrated, and which early Pythagorean tradition rapidly assimilated and made its own. These gold plates bear remarkable similarities to ancient Egyptian ideas concerning the afterlife, and as a result have often been assumed to have an Egyptian background. [...] As far as the textual content of the gold plates is concerned, Zuntz felt bound to acknowledge the 'striking' similarities with spells in the Egyptian so-called Book of the Dead. But at the same time he drew attention to certain supposed differences which are in fact unreal: in spite of his remarks to the contrary, we are presented in both cases with the same fundamental themes of guardians in the underworld blocking and challenging the soul that demands refreshment, and of the soul stating its identity by claiming it is one of the gods or is a star in heaven. (Kingsley 1994: 3)

Anchoring the Orphic cult. Now I know that it was most germane to Southern Italy and that there's a connection with Book of the Dead, (spells to help the deceased in the underworld) which in turn had their beginnings in Pyramid Texts.

Some four hundred years after Pythagoras, probably in the late second century BC, we encounter the figure of Bolus of Mendes, from the Nile delta in Egypt. Very little is known about him, but that little is particularly significant. On the one hand the evidence suggests that he played an important role as a transmitter of Pythagorean traditions, and specifically of miracle stories about wonder-workers of antiquity - with Pythagoras himself taking centre-stage. What is more, Bolus also produced [|] works very closely related to the Pythagoreanising literature of his time. On the other hand he appears to have been a crucial figure in shaping the subsequent development of Graeco-Egyptian alchemy, and it is no doubt largely as a result of his influence that we find Pythagoreanism and alchemy starting to overlap. He also shows the closest of affinities with the world of the Graeco-Egyptian magical papyri, particularly on the subject of dream oracles and divination. (Kingsley 1994: 5-6)

As of yet I've found very little out about wonder-works and miracles.

First, there is the work called Cheirokmēta - literally 'Hand-made Products' - which is attributed to Bolus by Columella. Clearly significant here is the use of this same term cheirokmēta - both as a technical expression and as a book-title - in later alchemical literature, and in particular in the work of that key figure for our understanding of Graeco-Egyptian alchemy: Zosimus of Panopolis. (Kingsley 1994: 6)

Evidently the book by this name is the first known source of the Sorcerer's Stone. The Greek word itself is composed of χείρ (kheir, "hand") that gave us chirurgia (surgery) - John Bulwer comes to mind.

Third, in Bolus's On Sympathies and Antipathies we are introduced - via the person of Democritus - to the teacher-figure Ostanes, the Persian Magus. The role of Ostanes in alchemical literature - here, too, as the teacher of Democritus - is well known. (Kingsley 1994: 7)

Sounds like something right up my alley. Sadly the source given here is French, J. Bidez and F. Cumont, Les mages hellénisés, Paris 1938, pp. 198-212. One interesting side-note: "The emphasis on Bolus and the pseudo-Democritean tradition more generally on antipathies - enmities, contrarieties - as well as sympathies in the natural world suggests a possible link to Empedocles, whose cosmology was founded on the dual principles of Love (philia) and Strife (neikos). Behind, then, what Gordon calls "the emergence in the Hellenistic period of a strong view of magic," to which ideas of sympathy and antipathy were fundamental, lies a complex network of influences and associations: Stoic, Pythagorean, Peripatetic, Democritean, Empedoclean." (Lobis 2015: 7)

The Turba philosophorum - 'Gathering' or 'Assembly' of the Philosophers - was one of the most influential of all western alchemical texts. It takes the form of [|] discussions and debates on alchemical subjects between ancient philosophers who have gathered together for this purpose under the presidency of Pythagoras. For a long time it has been realised that the work was not originally written in Latin, but is a translation from the Arabic. In fact fragments of an Arabic version still survive, and in one manuscript are described as coming from a work called Muṣḥaf al-jamā'a or Tome of the Gathering. There are two points worth noting about this title. First, here we plainly have the prototype of the word used in the Latin title: turba is a straightforward translation of the Arabic jamā'a which, just like the Latin term, menas both a 'gathering' or a 'crowd'. (Kingsley 1994: 9-10)

Rahvakogunemine. The image this paints is certainly vivid. What an excellent paper.

Keith, A. Berriedale 1909. Pythagoras and the Doctrine of Transmigration. The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 12: 569-606. [JSTOR]

As often, his treatment remained for many years definitive; his arguments were repeated and extended, but nothing solid was added to the foundation which he had laid until in 1884 Dr. Leopold von Schroeder published his admirable study on Pythagoras und die Inder. His presentation of the case for the theory that the philosophy of Pythagoras is derived from India is, I think, complete, and the ability and learning of the teratise have won for the theory itself the deliberate and reasoned acceptance of Professor Garbe, of Professor Hopkins, and of Professor [|] Macdonell, all sane and able critics, so that, though acceptance has been by no means universal, the theory may be deemed to be the ruling one of the present day. (Keith 1909: 569-570)

Leave no stone unturned. Uythagoras und die Inder; eine Untersuchung über Herkunft und Abstammung der pythagoreischen Lehren is available online, and only spans 93 pages.

The chronology of Sanskrit literature is an extremely difficult subject, but, so far as we can see, the great Indian systems are later in date than the Greek philosophies which they most nearly resemble. (Keith 1909: 570)

Which came first, the chicken or the egg?

Against these conjectures it must be pointed out that the evidence for the travels is all post-Aristotelian, that is, at least 200 years after Pythagoras' death, save as regards a visit to Egypt. For that visit the evidence is that of a statement in the Busiris of Isokrates, a work which frankly explains itself to be a rhetorical exercise and not to be based on any tradition. That it can be true is, I think, conclusively disproved by the silence of Herodotos, who was an admirer of Pythagoras, and who could not [|] have refrained from all mention of him in his Aigyptioi Logoi. The simple explanation of the later reports of travels is one suggested by the procedure of Herodotos. (Keith 1909: 572-573)

There are some translations of Isokrates, but Busiris (name of an Egyptian king) does not appear to be among them. I've seen mentions of this treatise so many times by now that I would like to include it in my future readings.

We know definitely that Pythagoras was a believer in the doctrine of transmigration: one of the few certain anecdotes of him is the sarcastic reference of Xenophanes (c. 540 B.C.) that he forbade the beating of a dog because he recognized in its howls the voice of a friend. Another anecdote, famous through Ennius and Horace, which we [|] can safely trust tells us that he was gifted with the power of remembrance of his former births, and claimed to have been Euphorbos among others. Moreover, he clearly believed in purification of the soul, and regarded the cycle of births as a means towards the growth of man's higher nature. Further, to him is due, it seems, the doctrine of the theoretic as the highest form of life: the man who devotes himself to the contemplative understanding of existence is the one who most effectually releases himself from the burdens of existence, and we may say frees himself from continued rebirth, though the latter idea cannot be proved for Pythagoras. (Keith 1909: 575-576)

Indeed, these are the main anecdotes told by countless encyclopedic entries on Pythagoras.

In the first place, the Pythagorean system is undoubtedly deeply religious in spirit: Plato in the Phædo gives not only as Pythagorean, but as older than Philolaus, the Pythagorean of the latter part of the fifth century B.C. to whom we owe most of our scientific knowledge of the school, the doctrine that men are strangers to the world and the body is the tomb of the soul, and that yet we must not seek to escape by self-murder, for we are the chattels of God, who is our herdsman, and without his Command we have no right to make our escape. (Keith 1909: 576)

A concise summary. "Tomb" could also be "tent". This is the Philolaus from whom Plato reportedly bought Pythagorean manuscripts from.

Thirdly, despite the part which undoubtedly was played by the moral sense in developing the transmigration doctrine, the Upaniṣads hold that enlightenment frees the soul, and all their stress is laid on right knowledge. If that knowledge in possessed, sin is as nothing: the Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad assures us that the knowledge of the truth saves a man from harm, even if he steal, or slay his father or his mother; even if he does any evil the bloom leaves not his face. The Aitareya Āraṇyaka permits falsehood in the man who has true knowledge. (Keith 1909: 577)

Callso to mind one profound formulation about Fourier's system: "Sex in all its forms is innocent; it is the repression of our inborn sexual instincts that creates evil." (Katsaros 2012: 408) - By analogy, no sin is really sinful, it is falso knowledge which makes an act evil. This is by no means an endorsement to slay one's father and mother but a shift of emphasis from deeds to frame of mind: "No amount of mere action or good deeds would ever produce freedom from the weary round of transmigration, for action merely [|] produced further life; and the end was the extinction of rebirth" (ibid, 577-578).

One very early view of the lot of the dead in Egyptian religion was that the dead man occupied the same place in the next world as he had done in life. Gradually, however, the wish developed itself to prepare for the dead a happier lot than he had enjoyed on earth. The end was to be gained by spells, which would enable him to spend a happy life in the fields of Aalū: should this celestial life pall he could return to wander on earth, visiting the places he had [|] loved in life or abiding in the tomb and receiving the offerings made by his relatives. Or, again, he could change himself into a heron, a swallow, a snake, a crocodile, a god, could indeed take any form that he pleased. This is indeed transmigration, but a different transmigration from either that of Greece or of India: it is a boon granted only to those who were provided with the necessary spells, and who were pronounced just at the judgment of the dead. None the less, I do not think we need deny that it is sufficiently like Pythagoreanism to allow us to believe thta Herodotos could mistake it for that. (Keith 1909: 579-580)

With the Orphic-Egyptian parallel in mind (Kingsley, above), this seems wholly reasonable. It would be nice indeed if one could return to one's favourite places in the form of animals. But it also makes sense that this would require the use of spells, which must be put into the grave to be accessible. Very keen to learn more about those spells, particularly "Spell 80 (preventing incoherent speech)" (Wiki).

Von Schroeder's view of Pythagoras depends essentially on that of Zeller, and Zeller was a rationalist of a pronounced type. In thus treating Pythagoras he had distinguished predecessors in Dikaiarchos and Aristoxenos, who from different points of iew, the political and the scientific, endeavoured to remove from the master of the school the strange collection of legends which had grown round his name. But in doing so they were obliterating history and rendering the position of Pythagoras unintelligible. (Keith 1909: 580)

That's a neat way of putting it. Those anecdotes which the researchers are quick to throw out to leave us a realistic picture of the life of a man might be crucially necessary for understanding what the philosopher's ideas actually were. There is a grain of truth in every myth, etc.

It was not until 1894 that Rohde published his study of the doctrine of the soul in Greece, a study which renders all earlier work antiquated and which treats of the topic from the point of view of tehnology and psychology. Even since that date, however, much evidence has accumulated which helps to overthrow the foundation on which von Schroeder worked, the theory that the ideas of Pythagoras were so un-Greek as only to be accounted for on the theory of the deliberate borrowing of them by Pythagoras from abroad. (Keith 1909: 581)

Erwin Rohde's Psyche: Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen is only 800 pages.

In the first place, the doctrine of the five elements - ether, wind, fire, water, and earth - is not found in the early Upaniṣads. The Aitareya Upaniṣad, the only text in which the five occur, and which is, in my opinion correctly, though on grounds of no cogency, reasonably retarded as old enough to have conceivably influenced Pythagoras, has not the fixed order which is laid down in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad as the result of the combination of the older triad, fire, water, erath, with ether and wind, which were originally regarded as symbolic representation of Brahman and not as elements like the others. The order in the Aitareya is earth, wind, ether, water, light. So that so far from the view of the five elements being the regular philosophical view in the time of Pythagoras, it was merely one of a large number of conflicting views, and its general acceptance lies at a date long after Pythagoras had ceased to exist. (Keith 1909: 594)

Yeah, the elements make no sense (yet?). IMO only water, earth and air are elements. Fire and wind are transient states, ether is nothing. Keith continues, "In the second place, there is conclusive evidence that Pythagoras never held the view of five elements" (ibid, 594).

Nor is it denied that some degree of fantasy crept into the Pythagorean number theory, when attempts were made to carry the principle of number beyond the sphere in which it has relative validity. But it is important not only to note that we have no warrant to attribute this to Pythagoras himself, for the reference to him in the Magna Moralia merely proves the non-Aristotelian character of that compilation, but that it was based on a sound principle. The Pythagorean had discovered one category, and, like all discoverers, thought that they could find in it an open sesame to all questions: they did not preserve in the idea when they found it unsubstantial, but developed a philosophy which is enshrined in the Phædo of Plato, and which is of great value and importance. (Keith 1909: 600)

This is pretty much what must have happened to Fourier, who took Pythagoreanism - however he came across it in French - and applied it in every sphere imaginable.

[...] the Pythagorean doctrine of the five elements was not due to Pythagoras himself, but was adopted by his school, partly from Empedokles, who had experimentally proved the existence of a substance air, and in part from Pythagoras' own theory of an extra-mundal breath; [...] (Keith 1909: 601)

What an expression. It is very obviously based on latin mundus. In several languages (Spanish, Portugese, Catalanian) mundial means global.

The arguments of Colebrooke, derived from a distinction between φρήν and θυμός similar to that between jirātman and manas, and from a distinction between the coverings of the soul analogous to those between the sūksma and sthūla sarira, are not borne out by any Pythagorean writings, and probably refer to Neo-Pythagoreanism. For [|] the real position of θυμός in early Greek thought, see Comperz, i, 248 seq. It may be added that the Upaniṣads. have not yet learned to distinguish sharply manas and jirātman (Deussen, op. cit., p. 271), or the sūksma and sthūla śarira (ibid., pp. 280 seq.). (Keith 1909: 602-603)

Gomperz must be this edition.

Quasten, Johannes 1942. A Pythagorean Idea in Jerome. The American Journal of Philology 63(2): 207-215. [JSTOR / DOI: 10.2307/291044]

The most important words here veste linea nihil in se mortis habente. Why has this garment of linen nothing of death in itself? The answer is given as soon as we compare it with the old clothing which the candidates wore formerly. These former garments are called tunicae pelliceae. We have here nothing else than the contrast between wool and linen. The old clothing which the candidates have taken off was made of wool, in other words, of material which comes from animals. Therefore it has [|] something of death in itself because it reminds us of creatures which are mortal, destined to die. That is the reason thatt hese garments cannot be worn after baptism, the sacrament of regeneration. Death and life do not go together. On the other hand, the white garment is made of linen, the product of a plant, and has therefore nothing of death in itself. Nothing could be more fitting for the sacrament which was called "the garment of immortality." We are here in the middle of an interesting world of ideas, centering around "wool and linen," which goes bakc to the Pythagoreans and Egypt. And here we have again an example which proves that the ecclesiastical writers cannot be understood without throughout knowledge of ancient culture. (Quasten 1942: 207-208)

Flax plants didn't die in the making of said linen? Are plants not living organisms that can die? Personally, I like the version of metempsychosis that includes plants. Bushes were mentioned. But, including what was said above about returning to Earth to visit your favourite places or living relatives, what if you could become a houseplant for your grandchildren?

Iamblichus tells us that Pythagoras always wore a white and pure garment and had only clean white linen spread over his bed, but never skins of animals. This custom was taken over by his followers, as he remarks. (Quasten 1942: 208)

Maybe he was just ahead of his time? Nowadays it is quite difficult to imagine someone sleeping on a bed covered with the skins of animals. Also, hemp clothes are super eco-conscious.

The reason why there is such a difference between wool and linen is their entirely different origin. Linen comes from the most pure seed of one of the best plants which the earth produces. And therefore this material is used for sacred vestments by the priests of Egypt. For the same reason it is most fitting for objects of cult. But wool is "the excretory product of a slugish body," [|] taken from an animal. No wonder that the Orphics and Pythagoreans regarded as woollen garment as profane. (Quasten 1942: 209-210)

Okay, but the earth doesn't excrete plants. By this logic, the holiest of textiles would be completely synthetic.

In another chapter of the same book, Herodotus gives more exact details of this sacred custom:
They wear tunics of linen fringed about the legs which they call calasiris; over these they have garments of white wool thrown on afterwards. Woollen garments however are not taken into the temples, nor are they buried with them for this is not premitted by their religion. In these points they [|] are in agreement with the observances called Orphic and Bacchic and also with those of the Pythagoreans. For one who takes part in these mysteries is also forbidden by religious rule to be buried in wollen garments; and about this there is a sacred story told.
Apuleius' reference to the mysteries of the Orphics and Pythagoreans is here proved to be correct. Wool is regarded as impure and unclean. Therefore a sacred rule bans it from the temple. But why is it forbidden for the Egyptian priests as well as for the initiates of the Orphic, Bacchic, and Pythagorean mysteries to be buried in wollen garments? It is regrettable that Herodotus does not give us the "sacred story," the mythos, which in his time existed about this custom; for here we are again very close to Jerome who connects wool with death and calls linen nihil in se mortis habens. We know, however, that these mystery cults had a highly developed doctrine of immortality. For the immortal soul of the mystic, wool is not suitable, especially when his body is dead. His garment is linen, the garment of immortality. (Quasten 1942: 210-211)

While reading about metempsychosis, above, I started thinking how horrible it would be if it were divined that you would have to be reborn as every animal you have eaten, or of whose flesh you have partaken (for a sausage could contain parts of numerous animals). With modern "factory farming", you'd have to live thousands of lifetimes as chickens, pigs and cows in cramped cages and pens.

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