Chase, Pliny Earle 1863. Intellectual Symbolism: A Basis for Science. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 12(3): 463-594. [JSTOR]
A fondness for philosophy is, then, fit cause for rejoicing, provided the spirit of inquiry is rightly guided. It is easy to show that no dictum of reason can be depended on as true, unless it can be traced to an infallible source, and that source can be none other than a Perfect Intelligence. All knowledge must, therefore, ultimately rest on revelation; the general knowledge of the race on a general revelation, and the special knowledge that may be adapted to newly arising needs of human liberty, on a special revelation. The question of faith, therefore, should not be, "Is this teaching perfectly comprehensible?" or "Is it such as unaided reason could have demonstrated for itself?" but "Is it such as the teacher knew to be true?" (Chase 1863: 464)
What is the logical fallacy called "appeal to authority"? We have yet to create a perfect intelligence. Knowledge is discovered, not revealed.
On this account, Philosophy should begin with the study of Consciousness, and that study, like any other, may be most satisfactorily pursued, if it is pursued systematically. All system rests on laws of thought, and all laws imply relation. (Chase 1863: 464)
The traditional laws of thought being those of identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle.
Generalization is always necessarily superficial, yet it often leads to the most satisfactory results. The very fact of its superficiality relieves memory from a heavy burden, and facilitates the use symbols, by which the labors of reasoning and investigation are greatly abbreviated. (Chase 1863: 464)
Üldistused on alati pinnapealised, aga lubavad mõttetööd lühendada ja koormust mälule vähendada. Sümbolite üldisus.
A symbol in any case is not to be regarded as a box or wrapper in which some valuable but unknown truth is hidden, but it may be properly employed to represent, in the simplest possible form, an analysis that has already been made, and to keep the pure, unmixed results of that analysis so steadily in view, that they may be most conveniently used to facilitate farther investigation. Thus, although the Intellectual Symbols can convey very little meaning, until they are interpreted in familiar language, our operations with them may possibly lead us to reflect upon relations that had never before been observed, and by the study of these relations, new discoveries may be made. (Chase 1863: 465)
Sümboli mnemooniline funktsioon - hoida midagi keerulist selgelt meeles ja kõigest ülejäänust lahus.
As the infinite limits the finite, so may the boundless realm of the doubtful and unknown be regarded as the limit of faith. (Chase 1863: 466)
Piiramatu piirab piiratut.
Science is knowledge based on belief; Faith is belief based upon revealed knowledge. (Chase 1863: 467)
What about evidence?
Plato, Republic, B. 6, pp. 510-511, speaks of four different operations of the mind (φυχή): intelligence (νόησις), demonstration (διάνοια), faith (πίστις), and conjecture (ειχασια). (Chase 1863: 467; ff)
ψῡχή - life, life-breath/blood, soul, ghost, mind, spirit; νόησις - intelligence, understanding, mental perception, process of thought, idea, concept; διάνοια - intention, purpose, process of thinking, capacity of thought, intelligence, understanding; πίστις - trust in others, faith, belief in a higher power, the state of being persuaded by something, belief, condifence, assurance, commercial trust, credit, faithfulness, fidelity, that which is entrusted; ειχασια - imagination? false opinion?
(Chase 1863: 468)
- Revelation is knowledge communicated in any manner by the Deity to his creatures. It is either direct or mediat.
- Direct revelation is knowledge acquired without the aid of human reasoning, or the intervention of any human intelligence except our own.
- Mediate revelation is knowledge which was originally acquired by direct revelation, and transmitted either by oral instruction, or by written record.
Psychopathology and its spread.
Descartes, in his celebrated dictum, "Cogito Ergo Sum," was the first philosopher who clearly stated the fact, that consciousness necessarily involves the existence of the conscious being, and that all our knowledge must be based upon our personal consciousness. The same truth was more faintly shadowed forth in the "know thyself" of the Greek schools, but Descartes gave to the idea a clearness, simplicity, and fecundity of expression, that have revolutionized all metaphysical investigations. (Chase 1863: 468)
Knowledge cannot be mediated?
If the essentially and permanence of this duality, as well as its dependence on "the necessary condition of intelligence," is fully appreciated, Mahan's forcible statement of one of the strongest arguments in favor of immortality (p. 435), will seem almost axiomatic. "At death, not a particle of the physical organization, with which the soul is here connected, perishes. How unreasonable and absurd the supposition, that the soul, for which all else was made, is the only reality that then ceases to be." (Chase 1863: 468)
Considering the vastness of the universe, it does seem an awful waste, for the soul for which it was "made" only inhabits one minuscule speck of it. It's nearly equivalent of building a metropolitan city to facilitate a colony of unicellular organisms on a petri dish.
The simplest possible form of division is dual, but in treating of the faculties or capacities of Mind, there has been a very general recognition of triplicity. From the days of Pythagoras, who recognized in the soul three elements, Reason (νοῦς), Intelligence (φρήν), and Passion (θυμός), (Chase 1863: 469)
νόος - mind, intelligence, intellect, reason; φρήν - will, purpose, intellect, wits, mind, chest; θυμός - soul, life, breath, heart, desire, will, temper, passion, disposition, anger, rage, wrath, love, thought, mind.
Lewes. See also Anderson, p. 76, the following citation from Fragmenta Pythag. ex Theage in Opusculis Mythologicis. "The soul conssists of three parts: reason, irascible passion, and cupidity. Reason has subjected to it knowledge; passion, the bravery of strength; cupidity, appetite." Aristotle (Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια, B. II, Chap. 7), says: "But of these three things, there would seem to be one; either according to longing (χατ' ὄρεξιν), or according to intention (χατά προαίρεςιν), or according to understanding (χατά διάνοιαν)." Many modern metaphysicians, adopting a more imperfect, because less comprehensive division, admit but three principal faculties of the mind: will, judgment, and understanding. (Chase 1863: 469; ff)
"Hing koosneb kolmest osast: mõistusest, ärrituvast kirest ja saamahimust. Mõistus on allutanud teadmise; kirg vapruse tugevuse; saamahimu isu." Kohmakas, aga vähemalt midagi. Sellest joonealusest märkusest alates uurin Pütagorase pükse.
"Within each of these three cardinal divisions, the same rhythmical movement repeats itself, and produces a like threefold division. The Logic has to deal (a) with the first immediateness, or with being; (b) this divides itself into the antagonism of essence and existence, and these finally coalesce together to form the idea (Begriff), with which we have already become acquainted, both in its real as well as ideal import, as the living circulation of momenta including itself within itself." (Chalybäus, pp. 343-345) (Chase 1863: 470)
I wonder if Peirce read this: "Hence, in the first intuition, or the first stage of sensuous consciousness, we can pronounce nothing else about the object than simply this, that it is." (Chalybäus 1854: 352)
The essential attribute of Mind is Consciousness. There may be forms of immaterial substance that are devoid of Consciousness, of which Force is perhaps one, but we give the name of Mind only to that portion of our being which has the power of perceiving its own operations, and the impressions that are made upon it. We can neither feel, act, nor think, without being conscious at the moment, of the feeling, action, or thought. It is true that the conscious impression is often faint and momentary, and that it often slips instantly from our memory unless there is [|] something to fix the attention, but we can study mind only in Consciousness, and it is entirely out of our power to form any notion of the nature or attributes of unconscious mind. (Chase 1863: 471-472)
Just verbs and nouns, nothing to see here.
In the Objective-Subjective relation, the impulse commencing externally and terminating in Consciousness, our attention is aroused, and we are induced to exercise our activity in various ways. To this form of Consciousness, which corresponds very nearly to the Passion (θυμός) of Pythagoras, the name of Passivity or Receptivity might be given, to designate the condition of the mind as the recipient of an impulse not originating in itself. But as the simplest exercise of Consciousness involves some degree of activity, and as the aroused attention tends to incite increased activity, the term Motivity seems more appropriate. (Chase 1863: 472)
Passion → Passivity/Receptivity once again vindicates "aisteetika". Motivity is "the power of moving or producing motion", so no go, more suitable for Secondness.
I do not remember to have seen the boundaries of the primary divisions of Consciousness more clearly indicated, than by Mahan (p. 15), who employs the terms, "Intellect or Intelligence, Sensibility or Sensitivity, and Will. To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sensibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, and affections. To the Will we refer all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, purposes &c." Although this division, which is based upon pure observation, does not precisely correspond with our own, the resemblance is sufficiently striking to afford a very satisfactory confirmation of our theory. (Chase 1863: 472)
Even earlier than Bain.
Though Motivity, Spontaneity, and Rationality may never be seen in pure and separate activity, in their combined action we can always, and usually without much difficulty, recognize one of the three as predominant. The respective degree of influence severally exerted by the three conscious forms, furnish us with a basis for division into primary faculties, and for subdivision to any required extent, according to subjective or objective tendencies, or rather according to motive, spontaneous, or rational resemblances. (Chase 1863: 473)
Where the three categories go, hierarchical functionalism follows. The latter is most succinctly put as follows: "Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfill only one function. The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several functions but in a different hierarchical order of functions." (Jakobson 1960: 353)
Our primary division of Consciousness has been logically deduced from a consideration of the relations which it necessarily assumes to the objective, but these relations do not in any way change the essential nature of the related terms. Like Consciousness itself, each of its subdivisions is subjective, and may be analyzed in its turn by regarding the modifications it assumes under different relations, as determining or determined by the objective, or as acting under subjective influences for purely subjective ends. (Chase 1863: 473)
As with other hierarchical functionalisms, this one sets a reasonable bar that is nevertheless practically unattainable: regardless of however many times the above-quoted mantra is reiterated, I cannot think of one exception where the dictum of "interrelation" or, here, "modification" is seriously taken up so as to show how the predominance of one category influences the rest.
(Chase 1863: 474)
See Table 1: The Ten Classes of Peirce's Sign.
If we assign names to each of these symbols indicative of their exact significance, we may make an exhaustive catalogue of the powers of the mind. In selecting those names, it will be well to appropriate as far as possible, those that are already in use; for new and unfamiliar names would have no advantage over the simple symbols, and they would cumber the memory without conveying so distinct ideas as the symbols that they were supposed to illustrate and explain. (Chase 1863: 474)
Peirce's one incontestible contribution to humanity (at the very least, humanities) is an admirable attempt to provide these categories with useful terminology.
Dr. Reid, starting from the division of the mental faculties into those of understanding and those of will, - a division which Hamilton traces "to the classification taken in the Aristotelic school, of the powers into gnostic or cognitive, and oretic, or appetent," recognizes the mutuality of the faculties [...] (Chase 1863: 474)
The page given in the footmark to Hamilton's Reid gives the categories as "apprehension, judgment, and reasoning". Can't find "oretic" anywhere.
To this passage, Sir William Hamilton appends the following note: "It should be always remembered that the various mental energies are all only possible in and through each other" (Should we not rather say, in and through Consciousness?) "and that our psychological analyses do not suppose any real distinction of the operations which we discriminate by different names. Thought and volition can no more be exerted apart, than the sides and angles of a square can exist separately from each other." Reid, p. 242. This fundamental characteristic of mental manifestation facilitates our analysis, by rendering a system that would otherwise appear arbitrary and artificial, perfectly philosophical and natural. (Chase 1863: 475; ff)
That's a great point. Ogden and Richards put the focus on angles, Bühler on the sides.
The following are some of the prominent terms that philosophers have employed, to designate mental states that they have specially observed, with the symbol attached to each that seems most precisely to indicate its meaning:In order to determine the correctness of this relative assignment, it may be well to examine each of the terms somewhat carefully. (Chase 1863: 476)
Propensity (MM),
Desire (MS),
Sentiment (MR),Instinct (SM),
Will (SS),
Energy (SR),Perception (RM),
Judgment (RS),
Understanding (RR).
Fucking brilliant! I'm astounded at how correctly Desire and Sentiment are placed: desire being an emotion tending towards an action, and sentiment an emotion tending towards an idea.
Whatever we may think of the comparative accuracy of these several definitions, there can be little doubt that their authors regarded Propensity as directly subject to an external, objective stimulus, and it may, therefore, be ranked unhesitatingly under Motivity. Inasmuch as it denotes a mere tendency, without any perceptible (quantitative) elements of Spontaneity or Rationality, it may well be regarded as the simplest or motive form of Motivity (Motivity affected), the symbol of which is MM. (Chase 1863: 476)
A rhematic iconic qualisign: "Feeling of red".
Desire, "even when its object is some action of our own, is only an incitement to will, but it is not volition." (Motivity, but not Spontaneity, though somewhat like it.) (Chase 1863: 476)
Concurs with my own use of words: "tending towards".
Sentiment "supposes the existence of some social relations, either among individuals of a different species, or especially between individuals of the same species apart from sex, and determines the character which the tendency of the animal must impress on each of these relations, whether transient or permanent." (Chase 1863: 477)
This is Comte again. Makes "social sentiments" kinda redundant.
"Authors who place moral approbation in feeling only, very often use the word Sentiment, to express feeling without judgment. This I take likewise to be an abuse of a word. Our moral determinations may, with propriety, be called moral sentiments; for the word sentiment, in the English language, never as I conceive, signifies mere feeling, but judgment accompanied with feeling." (Say rather, feeling implying or suggesting the idea of judgment.) (Chase 1863: 477)
Ah! Not so much "a feeling about an idea" as much as a feeling accompanied by judgment. Tundmus on hinnanguline tunne.
Instinct, as defined by Reid, is "a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." This is exemplified in "that natural instinct by which a man who has lost his balance and begins to fall, makes a sudden effort to recover himself, without any intention or deliberation." (Chase 1863: 477)
Hea kraam. Instinkt on pime impulss tegutseda ilma eesmärgi, kaalutlemiseta ja arusaamata, miks tegutsetakse. This definition very nearly approximates the categories: conception of what is being done (cognitive), without deliberation (conative), with "end in view" taking the place of the putative emotional aspect.
Bacon says: "The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, is of two kinds; the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth direction or desire, the latter action or execution." (Chase 1863: 468)
Bacon, turns out, was not an affectionate man.
Cousin observes as follows: "The peculiar characteristic of the me is causality, or will, since we refer to ourselves, we impute to ourselves only what we cause, and we cause only what we will. To will, to cause, to exist for ourselves, - these are synonymous expressions for the same fact, which comprises at once will, causality, and personality. [...] The phenomenon of will presents the following elements, 1, to decide upon an act to be performed; 2, to deliberate; 3, to resolve. Now if we look at it, it is reason which composes the first element entirely, and even the second; for it is reason also which deliberates, but it is not reason which resolves and determines." (Chase 1863: 479)
Aside from the phenomena of will, this is significant due to the construction, "the me", in Cousin's Elements of Psychology, where others would put "the self". In Estonian, we are still on the level of "the me" ("inimese mina") - a situation to be rectified with "isemus" (self).
By the examination of facts or conclusions, for the intelligent determination of their full objective meaning, - the Rational ME overstepping the bounds of experience, to declare the reality of the Not ME. (Chase 1863: 480)
Brilliant illustrations.
"The arts intellectual are four in number, divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred; for man's labor is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is judged; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art of examination or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of elocution, or tradition." (Chase 1863: 482)
This is Bacon's Works.
Cousin quotes in illustration, the following passage from Fenelon: Existence of God, Part I, ch. 4, Of Human Reason. "In truth, my reason is in myself, for it is necessary that I should continually turn inward upon myself in order to find it, but the higher reason, which corrects me when I need it, and which I consult, is not my own, it does not make a part of myself. Thus, that which might seem the most our own, and to be the [|] very foundation of our being, I mean our reason, is that which least belongs to us, which we are to believe the most borrowed. We receive continually and at every moment, a reason superior to ourselves, just as we continually breathe an air which is not of ourselves, or as we constantly see the objects around us by the light of the sun, whose rays do not belong to our eyes. There is an internal school, where man receives what he can neither acquire himself, nor learn from other men who live by alms like himself. Where is this perfect reason which is so near me, and yet so distinct and different from me? Is it not God himself, the being for whom I am inquiring?" (Chase 1863: 484-485)
"Primarily, naturally, it is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense; thinking is rather something that happens in us." (Dewey 1910: 34); ""It's wrong to say: I think. Better to say: I am thought. [...] I is an other" (Rimbaud 1871: 100; in Macke 2008: 141).
The result of considerable study and examination, according to each of the above enumerated methods, is the following list of secondary faculties:(Chase 1863: 487)
MMM, Proclivity,
MSM, Selfishness
MRM, Enjoyment,
SMM, Cautiousness,
SSM, Attention
SRM, Vivacity,
RMM, Sense
RSM, Discernment,
RMM, Conception,MMS, Appetence,
MSS, Curiosity,
MRS, Approval,
SMS, Forecast,
SSS, Direction,
SRS, Concentrativeness,
RMS, Memory,
RSS, Deliberation,
RRS, Abstraction,MMR, Attachment,
MSR, Purpose,
MRR, Respect,
SMR, Constructiveness,
SSR, Resolution,
SRR, Decision,
RMR, Intuition,
RSR, Discursiveness,
RRR, Comprehension.
Jesus having carnal intercourse with Christ! Süsteem on väga uhke ja kahtlemata loogiline, aga seletused jätavad palju vajaka on pigem vihjed, mis tuleks endal põhjalikult välja töötada - aga kes jõuab seda teha?
Appetence may be regarded either as a propensity or a desire, according to the latitude of meaning we accord it. By giving it the symbol MMS, we may indicate this equivocal significance, for it will then represent the spontaneous form of Propensity (MM, S), and the desiring form of Motivity (M, MS). (Chase 1863: 487)
Define:appetence - a feeling of craving something. Given here as "A disposition to seek after the simplest form of subjective gratification." (ibid, 489)
The fourth order of subdivision is omitted, as the nomenclature I have suggested is a wholly experimental one, requiring a long series of careful observations before it will be possible to determine whether it has any value. The faculties of the third order are marked with a note of interrogation, to show that farther study is desirable, to ascertain whether their relative assignment is the best that can be made. It is quite probable that some other order of classification may be more convenient for the lower faculties, but I have thought it would be best to show that the principle of trichotomy may be extended as far as the needs of science may require. (Chase 1863: 494)
Yuup, the table given above, which I colour-coded into trichotomies, would take a monograph to unpack. The most annoying thing about it is that it could probably be done with Peircean terminology but one would first have to be fully conversant with that system, and surely there are minute differences between Chase and Peirce. Marking this down as one of my long-term goals, probably to be pursued in my old age when I have absolutely nothing better to do.
The phenomenal rests on the absolute, and the metaphysical fashion, which can be donned or doffed at pleasure, must be dependent on the purely metaphysical investigations of thinkers, whose magnetic vigor can polarize the world of mind. (Chase 1863: 395)
Define:doff - remove (an item of clothing). // For these kinds of remarks, I preface them with "Define:" in order to be able to find them later in case I ever feel the need to write a completely incomprehensible text full of words that sent me for the dictionary.
This term is often used by those who have a very vague idea of its meaning. The signification originally attached to it by the schoolmen, was modified by Kant, who called the necessary cognitions which are the foundation of experience transcendental. All philosophy which recognizes something higher than demonstration, as the source of all possible knowledge, may be called transcendentalism. See Hamilton's remarks on "TRANSCENDENTAL truths, principles, cognitions, judgments, &c.," in his edition of Reid, p. 762, and Logic, p. 140. (Chase 1863: 495; ff)
The dictionary concurs: 1. relating to a spiritual realm (vague); 2. (in Kantian philosophy) presupposed in and necessary to experience (a priori).
There is much in a superficial acquaintance with metaphysical literature, that tends to discourage the ardent seeker after truth, and to strengthen the vulgar opinion that all philosophical research is foolish and unsatisfactory. The pages of an ordinary Encyclopædia will show that in the earliest historical times, the Brahminical sages taught many of the leading doctrines that characterize some of the most distinguished modern philosophical schools. A cursory perusal of the works of Plato and Aristotle reveals the origin of so much of the variety and profundity of thought that later writers would gladly claim as their own, that one is tempted to exclaim with Solomon, "there is nothing new under the sun," and to believe that in what poor, weak, deluded humanity regards as the most exalted sphere of investigation, it is destined to move in a continual circle, making no real progress, but constantly repeating the ideas and systems of earlier ages. (Chase 1863: 496)
The philosophers do tread water, don't they?
A life of investigation, however directed, should doubtless bring to light a mass of valuable truth, which might be recorded for the benefit of future investigators in the same field, but if the record shows no connecting thread of thought, which makes all the details parts of a consistent whole, it will be of little value. (Chase 1863: 497)
The most glaring problem of this blog: no through-line.
Hence we are naturally led to the study of Consciousness under three distinct forms of manifestation:(Chase 1863: 499)
- As a stimulus to exertion, acted upon by external influences. To this form of Consciousness we have given the name of Motivity.
- As acting of its own accord, free from any extraneous impulse, and stimulated only by its own conscious Motivity. To this form of Consciousness we have given the name of Spontaneity.
- As operating intelligently for the discovery of truth. This third and highest form of Consciousness, to which Motivity and Spontaneity should be both subservient, we have called Rationality.
This view of things actually concurs with Shadworth Hodgson's (1890-1891: 6) "three main and comprehensive functions - (1) sense-presentation, (2) spontaneous redintegration [and] (3) volitional re-active redintegration".
If amidst this absorption, we are suddenly startled, - as for instance, by a vivid flash of lightning, the near report of a cannon, or a violent blow, - we have first a confused consciousness of disturbance, to which succeed a motive desire to understand the cause of the disturbance, and a spontaneous act changing the direction of the faculty of attention, followed immediately by a rational objective perception. In every instance of the recognition of a physical object, the process appears therefore to be, - first, an impression on the brain through the nerves, - second, if this impression is sufficiently strong, a simple and at first confused consciousness of that impression, exciting Spontaneity through the intervention of Motivity, - third, a rational perception of an object. (Chase 1863: 502)
Semiosis.
If I place in the hands of a pupil a book in which the words are so far perverted from their usual meaning that he cannot fail of receiving a false impression, and if, although [|] conscious of that perversion at the time, I do nothing to correct the false impression, I deceive him, - I lie to him; and my guilt is as great as though I had communicated the falsehood to him verbally. (Chase 1863: 508-509)
The general ethos of "French philosophy": intentionally confounding.
We are all pupils in the school of universe. (Chase 1863: 509)
"Eluülikool." Back then the "school of life" wasn't synonymous with the NEET lifestyle.
All that is self-evident is, therefore, true. All truth is a revelation from God. Revelation is perfect and continual. It is not confined to mere words, times, or localities. It is uttered in a language that all can understand, at all times and in all places, where a Soul is found capable of receiving it. It comes in music to the ear, in beauty to the eye, in symmetry to the touch, in perfume to the smell, in pleasant savor to the taste, in truth to the mind. It is independent of human agency and human laws, its truthfulness depending on the highest conceivable authority, the word of the Almighty. (Chase 1863: 509)
I'd give the razor to the deity, but agree with the sentiment; "It's always there in front of us, just trust and it happens" (The Magic).
"It is not improbable that the writings of Proclus were indebted to Christianity for a term that occurs with peculiar frequency in them, - the term πίστις, or faith, which Proclus regards as direct communion with the Infinite and Absolute, and the highest faculty of the human soul." Butler, Vol. II, p. 330. (Chase 1863: 510)
Wrong page number, but interesting continuation: "This, you will remember, is a departure from the original Platonic phraseology. This author is not content with a single Trinity; his philosophical triads recur in every age. Essence, identity, variety; being, life, intelligence; limit, illimitation, mixture; are some of the instances of this threefold partition which Proclus conceives to obtain universally through nature. But over all, he, in common with all his brother teachers, enthrones the Absolute Unity; and with them he maintains that with this Unity the soul of man is by a special faculty enabled to converse, until absorbed in the intricacy of the communion it is lost in its object, and becomes, in a manner, itself divine." (Butler 1856b: 360)
Every faculty, sensual or spiritual, is susceptible of culture. The trained hound will follow the scent of game more steadily than one that is wholly unused to the chase; the educated musician is more sensitively alive to the slightest discord, than the tiro; the thorough mathematician will immediately detect an error of demonstration that would escape the notice of an elementary student. (Chase 1863: 511)
Define:tiro/tyro (UK/US) - a beginner or novice. By "culture" he means cultivation (growing, developing).
Behold the three guides to knowledge, - the only three that we can possibly employ, - the three within whose province lies the whole territory of conceivable or possible truth. Sense, the guide to a knowledge of the outward world; Self-consciousness, the observer of the inward workings of our own minds; Reason, the teacher of abstract and general truth, and the judge to whose tribunal is our ultimate appeal in all questions of doubt. Distinct, and yet working in entire harmony with each other, they have each a separate and equally important office; the decisions of each in its appropriate sphere are equally reliable. (Chase 1863: 518)
I cannot help but notice that these are modeled after the above categories, motility (object-subject), spontaneity (subject-subject), and rationality (subject-object). Self-consciousness being reflexive, the subject working upon itself, is especially poignant.
At the very outset, we are confused by the vagueness of the term Absolute. It "is of a twofold (if not threefold) ambiguity, corresponding to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin.Besides these two meanings, there is to be noticed the use of the word, for the most part in its adverbial form; - absolutely (absolute) in the sense of simply, simpliciter (άπλῶς), that is, considered in and for itself, - considered not in relation." [Hamilton, Discussions, p. 21] (Chase 1863: 523)
- Absolutum means what is freed or loosed, in which sense the Absolute will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, dependence, &c., and thus is tantamount to τό άπόλυτον of the lower Greeks. In this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite.
- Absolutum means finished, perfected, completed; in which sense the Absolute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, total, and thus corresponds to τό ὂλον and τό τέλειον of Aristotle. In this acceptation, - and it is that in which for myself I exclusively use it, - the Absolute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite.
So it is: absolute - "unrestricted, free from limitation; complete, perfect, free from imperfection;" - related to absolve (to set free, acquit, to loosen, untie, release, detach).
Man finds in himself not only the triform Intelligence, but also an analogous threefold nature, - Intelligence, Force, and a passive material frame, which is controlled by Intelligence through the instrumentality of Force. Of these three coexistences, Intelligence occupies the highest rank, and Matter the lowest, while Force is intermediate, acting and reacting between the other two. (Chase 1863: 538)
Peircean before Peirce. I'm going to have to find a different label for it.
"But my thinking, my reason is not something specially belonging to me, but something common to every rational being; something universal, and in so far as I am a rational and thinking being, is my subjectivity a universal one. But every thinking individual has the consciousness that what he holds as right, as duty, as good or evil, does not appear as such to him alone, but to every rational being, and that consequently his thinking has the character of universality, of universal validity, in a word, - of objectivity, [...] and therefore with him [Socrates] the philosophy of objective thought begins." Id., p. 51, 52. (Chase 1863: 541)
Reminiscent of various statements to the same effect. Most notably Bakhtin, who reportedly had no great regard for his own writings because good ideas have a way of returning to you. The quote comes from Albert Schwegler's handbook or history of philosophy.
The selections in this chapter are taken from the works of German philosophical historians, because Kant and his successors of the modern German school have recognized a prevailing triplicity, to which they have been empirically led through the rational duality of the subjective and objective. (Chase 1863: 541)
I have an inkling that the ambiguous origin of this line of thinking (O-O, O-S, S-S, S-O) is going to haunt me for a long time.
"The threefoldness, here exhibited psychologically, is found, in different applications, through all the last general period of Plato's literary life. Based upon the [|] anthropological triplicate of reason, soul, and body, it corresponds also to the division of theoretical knowledge into science (or thinking), current opinions (or sense-perception), and ignorance; to the triple ladder or eroticism in the symposium and the mythological representation connected with this of Poros, Eros, and Penia; to the metaphysical triplicates of the ideal world, mathematical relations and the sensible world." Id. p. 99. (Chase 1863: 541-542)
Just piling on and piling on. Everything in triads.
Aristotle calls the soul in plants, nutritive, - in animals, sensitive; "lastly, the human soul is at the same time nutritive, sensitive, and cognitive." (Chase 1863: 542)
This one has made it into biosemiotics through Thure von Uexküll.
According to Locke, "the complex ideas may be referred to three classes, viz., the ideas of mode, of substance, and of relation. [...] Our idea of substance is distinguished from all other complex ideas, in the fact that it is an idea which has its archetype distinct from ourselves, and possesses objective reality, while other complex ideas are fromed by the mind at pleasure, and have no reality corresponding to them external to the mind. We do not know what is the archetype of substance, and of substance itself we are acquainted only with its attributes. A relation arises when the understanding has connected two things with each other in such a way, that in considering them, it passes over from the one to the other." Id., pp. 196. (Chase 1863: 542)
Semiotic. But keep in mind that this is still Schwegler, not Locke himself.
"God gives us ideas; but as it would be contradictory to assert that a being could give us what it does not possess, so ideas exist in God, and we derive them from [|] Him. Those ideas in God may be called archetypes, and those in us ectypes. In consequence of this view, says Berkeley, we do not deny an independent reality of things; we only deny that they can exist elsewhere than in an understanding." Id., pp. 221-2. (Chase 1863: 542-543)
Archetype → ectype is, in terms of newfangling jargon, right up there with Object → eject.
[Kant.] "All the faculties of the soul, he says, may be referred to three, which are incapable of any farther reduction; knowing, feeling, and desire. The first faculty contains the principles, the governing laws for all the three. So far as the faculty of knowledge contains the principles of knowledge itself, is it theoretical reason, and so far as it contains the principles of desire and action, is it practical reason, while, so far as it contains the principles which regulate the feelings of pleasure and pain, is it a faculty of judgment. Thus the Kantian philosophy (on its critical side) divides itself into three criticks; (1) Critick of pure, i.e. theoretical reason; (2) Critick of practical reason; (3) Critick of the judgment." Id., pp. 237-8. (Chase 1863: 543)
Holy crap. Big if true. Kant appears to have reversed the Pythagorean categories, but the overall system is exactly the same. This, again, if Schwegler can be trusted to report it accurately. If true, this would finally constitute my "key" to Kant - a reason for reading him.
"The relation of these three principles to each other is, in fine, this, viz., that the second stands opposed to the first, while the third is the product of the two. Hence, according to this plan, the first absolute principle starts from the Ego, the second opposes to the Ego a thing, or a Non-Ego, and the third brings forward the Ego again in reaction against the thing, or the Non-Ego. This method of Fichte (thesis, - antithesis, - synthesis), is the same as Hegel subsequently adopted and applied to the whole system of philosophy, a union of the synthetical and analytical methods." Id., p. 285. (Chase 1863: 544)
Again, I'm now in dire need for what to call this system, seeing as Peirce now appears as a hopeless late-comer to the scene. In any case, this Schwegler has amply justified the need to read his handbook/history of philosophy.
[Schelling.] "In this freedom [of the ideal] it was said that we encounter the last potentializing act, whereby the whole of nature become transfigured into sensation, intelligence, and finally into will. In the last and highest instance, there is no other [|] being whatever than volition. Volition is primordial being, and with this alone all its predicates of groundlessness, independence of time, and self-affirmation conform." Id., p. 265. (Chase 1863: 545-546)
Once again, same stuff, different order and priorities.
Motivity, although it refers to objects exterior to ourselves, cannot immediately give us those objects. It relates only to phenomena, and to the influence of those phenomena on our own minds. If, for example, I receive a sensation of solidity, or heat, or color, the sensation is entirely subjective; it belongs exclusively to myself, and not to the body, to which Motivity refers as its cause. I cannot, therefore, merely as receptive, assert the reality of anything objective; the most I can do is to admit its Possibility. (Chase 1863: 547)
A manifestation of philosophical scepticism - I cannot be absolutely certain but there's a certain possibility that I'm not just a brain in a vat. Perhaps this accounts for the "fuzzy feeling" of Firstness in Peirce - there's a possibility that something is.
Spontaneity, being exclusively subjective in its action as well as its reference, is entirely valid in all its determinations. I know absolutely all that I feel, wish, do, or think, and hence I derive a consciousness superior to the mere possibility of the Motivity, - [|] a consciousness of Reality. My own reality is more evident than that of any being out of myself, and the highest reality to which I can attain is, therefore, that of a Spontaneous Intelligence. (Chase 1863: 547-548)
Compare this to Peirce's "resistance", one of the main qualifiers of Secondness. Where's Firstness is a mere possibility - something can be, here there is some certitude, if only subjective - recall that spontaneity Chase relates to self-consciousness, whatever the status of the external world, Cogito, ergo sum.
Rationality decides not only with unvarying uniformity from the data that are given it, but it does so with the full conviction that it would be impossible for any intelligent being to decide otherwise from the same data. In viewing the possibility of Motivity, it decides that there must necessarily be an external objective cause of all our external impressions; it seeks in the reality of the subjective Spontaneity a necessary object for its consideration; and it conjoins the idea of necessity with all its determinations, thus completing the circle of our modes of thought. (Chase 1863: 548)
Equally congruent with Peirce, whose Thirdness pertains to lawfulness (here, unvarying uniformity).
Consciousness, therefore, in the three conditions of intelligence, gives us the three categories of Modality, - Possibility, Reality, and Necessity, all of which refer to General Science. (Chase 1863: 548)
Consistent dejavu: "Peirce’s adoption of a more sophisticated approach to the reality of modal notions like necessity and possibility. In the 1870's, Peirce’s account of possibility and necessity are based on the epistemological facts about believers in relation to some statement containing modal terms." (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
All the impressions of mere Motivity are single and momentary. Merely as receptive beings, we neither distinguish parts of objects nor unite different impressions together. If we feel, our sensation is a unit, - merely a feeling, and nothing more; if we see, we see an object as a unit, and so with every impression on the senses. It is merely the impression that is cognized through Motivity, and the category of Motivity, cognizing its own impressions, is, therefore, Unity. (Chase 1863: 548)
Aight, this is getting weird. This is basically a definition of qualisigns. The proof is in the pudding: "[...] Pliny Earl Chase who wrote the best introduction to the art I ever saw; from which I learned to cipher as a boy; and though he wrote (probably under the influence of idiotic publishes) several very inferior arithmetics, I never saw but one copy of his only excellent work, the one I studied in school at my father's dictation; but I still often refer to the arithmetic of Pliny Earl Chase [...]" (CP 4.658). This is the only mention of Chase in Collected Papers but it does tell a definite tale.
Spontaneity unites several determinations in its own consciousness. It embraces the faculty of attention, and applying itself to the determinations of Motivity, it can attend successively to all the parts of an object or of an impression, and derive the idea of plurality from unity. The category of Spontaneity, cognizing the impressions of Motivity, is, therefore, Plurality. (Chase 1863: 548)
Sinsigns. There's a plurality of them.
The office of Rationality is, as we have seen, to cognize and compare the representations of the other intellectual conditions. Applying itself to the determinations of [|] Motivity, it will therefore recognize both the receptive unity and the spontaneous plurality, and from their relations will derive the category of Totality, in which Unity and Plurality and both combined. (Chase 1863: 548-549)
Legisigns. Thirdness is "an attained unity; and would better have been called totality" (CP 1.302). Turns out, Peirce even wrote a draft letter to Chase in 1864 on his reaction to "Intellectual Symbolism" (Chronological Edition, pp. 115-116).
When Hamilton says that Time and Space are only the images or intuitions or concepts "of a certain correlation of existences, - of existence, therefor, pro tanto, as conditioned," he appears to have his mind fixed on position, rather than on the Infinites that make Position possible. Time is the absolute (of Cousin) which renders possible "the image or concept of a certain correlation of existences," which is date, and not time. Space is the parallel absolute which renders possible place, or conditioned Space. (Chase 1863: 555)
Had a conversation about exactly this with Ott and Silver in front of the department today.
0 comments:
Post a Comment