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The Model of Language as Organon

Bühler, Karl 2011[1934]. Theory of Language: The representational function of language. Translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin in collaboration with Achim Eschbach. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

The objective view of language requires the organon model and does not permit even one iota to be removed from the insight: "What human language does is threefold: profession, triggering and representation" (Bühler 1981: 1). (Bühler 2011[1934]: 2)
"Triggering" would be a neat metaphor for the conative-imperative function. It would signify "triggering" an action in the addressee.
"Dreifach ist die Leistung der menschlichen Sprache, Kundgabe, Auslösung und Darstellung." An anticipation of the organon model of language (Section 2) referring to the three "relational foundations" of the model: the things (that are represented), the sender (whose inner states are professed) and the receiver (whole reaction is triggered). The term Leistung ("what language does"), which would frequently be translated with "performance", is used to set the organon model off from a genetic view in terms of how speech arises; Bühler defines language in terms of its performance as a Zweckgebilde, a goal-oriented structure (Bühler 1918: 15). The term Kundhabe is used by Wundt, as well as by Husserl in the Logical Investigations; Findlay translates it with "intimation" (Husserl 1912 II,1: 78; 1970: 312), whereas Cairns (1973: 78) suggests "giving cognizance of, (making known)". Neither of these would be good in this context; "giving cognizance" would be worst because the primarily cognitive function in Bühler's triad is representation, not expression; "intimation" does not make it clear enough that the inner states of the speaker are involved, whereas "profession" and "expression" at least permit this reading. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 2; footnote 1)
Wow. Bühler's model is much more down to earth than Jakobson's.
Physics and psychology meet in linguitics as they do in all other cultural sciences; there is no way out (there is no casting of lots for the whole robe), according to Paul, the rent in the cloth is there, and it is up to the language researcher to try to match the pieces in his own field - an effort that has been going on since Descartes. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 3)
This is exactly what Jakobson does in defining the phatic function of language: he brings together the physical channel and the psychological connection.
What Paul says seems true enough: "The science of culture is always a social science. Not till society is formed is culture possible; society gives the first impulse to make man a historical being" (Paul 1909: 7 = 1890: xxx). (Bühler 2011[1934]: 4)
Score for sociosemiotics.
And here comes a long list, in which it is noted, for example, that "linguistic phenomena always present two complementary facets, each depending on the other" (Saussure 1922:23 [1983:8; 1959:8; 1931:9]). Of course; but a specialist certainly does not need to be told that sound and function belong to the entirety of a concrete language phenomenon. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 8)
Sound and function? Sound and function? Why not sound and meaning as in Jakobson's "phonica-semantic knot"? Is meaning nothing more than a function? (Note: I'll be reading parts of The Meaning of Meaning next.)
The old Husserlian model of language only contains enough relational foundation for the logical explication of the speech of a monad, the soliloquy of a Diogenes in the Barrel who was capable of the highest abstractions. The new model of human language, which would have to be consistently laid out in keeping with the concessions made in the Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1973a = 1973b), is quite as rich as that needed by the theory of language and practically applied by it since Plato; it is the organon model of language. We shall begin our presentation of the principles of the science of language with it. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 12-13)
It sounds like Husserl's model of language in the Logical Investigations was something like a model of speech-making and this new organon model of language is more like a model of communication.
Of course, only what is audible in the concrete speech event can be fixed on records, and this first only weighs heavily in the methodological discussion. Fo there is more to the full speech event - we could just as well call it the 'significant' or 'meaningful' speech event - than just what is audible. But how is the rest of what belongs to the speech event also registered and made accessible to exact observation? (Bühler 2011[1934]: 17)
Is he referring to the nonverbal components of the speech event?
In this example, it is not documents in stone and papyrus that are at issue, but rather certain phenomena, procedures in the social life of beings alien to us, of which it can be assumed that they function as do our human communicative signals. The alien beings can be ants, bees, termites, they can be birds or other social animals, they can even be human beings and the "signals" a human language. If I hear commands, the first hint of an understanding of their meaning, more precisely, of their signal value dawns on me from the behaviour of the receiver of the command. This manner of understanding is substantially different from deciphering texts. Yet a third time the point of departure is different when I turn to interpreting what is perceived as an expression [of inner states]. Human expressions are many and various: facial expressions, gestures; expression is also found in the voice and language. Thus, expression provides another key to understanding. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 18-19)
First we have an example of the conative-imperative function and then a valuable note that would suggest nonverbal behaviour as an intrinsic aspect of the emotive function.
The successful pioneers of language research include occasional references to how tehy handled these keys to understanding in their reports; how the same keys areused in the course of the advanced analysis of a language has never been systematically and adequately described. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 19)
In this sense I feel compelled to discuss "phatics" not as a newfangled field of investigation but rather as one such "key" that can be used to unlock aspects of human behaviour.
What I have in mind departs from previous procedures in that this reduction is not only actually performed [and the results presented], but also that an account is given of the procedure, whereas previously the working notes were thrown into the waste-paper basket. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 27)
I think we are approaching an age when the working notes will be public by default. #metablog
We begin with the maxim of the three semantic functions of language structures. The most interesting attempt in which a similar project is consistently carried out is Gardiner's book The Theory of Speech and Language (Gardiner 1932). Gardiner's analysis tends toward a situational theory of language. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 28)
Is that the full name of "language functions"? The parallel with Gardiner sounds eerily like the one between Jakobson and Ruesch.
Whoever is just as unbiased in trying to fathom the fact that there is speech independent of the situation as he is in treating the situation sensitivity of utterances, will, if he comes from the lecture hall of a committed situation theorist, first find that the fact that there is also situatio insensitivity is a just cause of philosophical wonder at what great variety is in fact possible. Then, if he does not obstinately insist on the dogma that the causal analysis that he learned in the lecture hall is enough, but rather proceeds to consider sentences removed from the situation such as 'Rome is on seven hills', or 'two times two is four', he will be thrust unerringly onto the tracks of the venerable descriptive grammar. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 28)
Continuing my forced parallel, when a Jakobsonian semiotician takes up Ruesch s/he discovers that communication is more than language, that the "fatigue" that Jakobson mentions once is an everyday occurrence and that there is a great variety of semiotic processes in communication systems.
I think it was a good idea of Plato's when he claims in Cratylus that language is an organum for the one to inform the other of something about the things. There is no question that such information takes place, and the advantage of taking it as the starting point lies in the fact that all or most other cases can be derived from this one typical case by reduction; for as far as fundamental relationships are concerned, informing by means of language is the richest of the manifestations of the concrete speech event. The list the one - to the other - about the things names no fewer than three relational foundations. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 30-31)
In other words, language is a means of communication (or means for the exchange of information).
Let us sketch a diagram on a piece of paper, three points in triangular formation, a fourth point in the middle, and begin to reflect on what this diagram can symbolize. The fourth point in the middle symbolizes the phenomenon susceptible of sense perception, normally an acoustic phenomenon, which clearly must stand in some relation or other to the three foundations at the corners, whether it be a direct or a mediated relation. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 31)
This diagram is eerily similar to Peirce's triadic sign model. I did not know that there was a fourth point because the diagram on Wikipedia doesn't mention this. This means that "message" (in the form of "the phenomenon susceptible of sense perception") was already a part of the organon model and Jakobson did not add it. Did he add code, though?
The first thing that will occur nowadays to any impartial interpreter of this figure consists of points and lines is a direct causal view. The "one" produces the sound phenomenon, and it affects the "other" as a stimulus; the sound is thus both effectus and efficiens. There are various ways of making sense of the third line. The simplest possibility is to interpret it as a complex causal relationship between events going on around the speech event, complex by reason of being a relationship that is mediated by intermediate foundations. Assume the production of the acoustinc phenomenon is prompted in the speaker by a temporally prior sensory stimulus coming froma a thing in the perceptual field, and hearing the acoustic language phenomenon stimulates the hearer to turn his eyes to the same thing. Thus for example: two people in a room - the one notices a drumming, looks to the window and says, "it's raining" - the other, too, looks to the window, whether directly on hearing the expression or because his gaze is directed to it by looking at the speaker. That can happen, and then the process elegantly makes a full circle. If one wishes, the process can be repeated in this closed circle as on an endless screw. If the thing or event is rich enough to furnish continually new stimulations that are taken up by the one or the other partner in turn, if the incident has ample 'appeal' to them (as a very apt expression has it), then they will indulge in observant probing and discussion of the affair in dialogue form.
(Bühler 2011[1934]: 31-32)
Wow. This approach conflates the context and the channel, as both work through appeal. Thus in Jakobson's example of the phatic function, the boy is trying to appeal to the girl's attention (or vice versa) by continuing the stream of irrelevant replies.
I would claim that the rather too primitive idea of Saussure's "speech-circuit" (Saussure 1922:27 [1983:11; 1959:11; 1931:13]) as once propagated by psychophysics also meets with difficulties of the same kind; these are the same ones that become quite generally manifest in central areas of psychology. Today we have some idea of where the miscalculation is: the systems α and β function in the chain as largely autonomous stations. Even in the simplest case the reception of the stimulus is indeed similar to a genuine 'message' and one's own sending is always an 'action'. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 33)
In Ruesch we similarly find that the sender intends to communicate a message, but the receiver interprets the signals he receives - not only those intended as messages by the sender but also unintended actions that the receiver himself may not be aware of. Or more succinctly: any action can become a message.
What I say here must stand alone for the moment without detailed evidence; the theory of language must contain a special chapter on the signal function of language, where details can be treated. It must be shown there that within biology itself Jakob von Uexküll's approach arose as a sort of Hegelian antithesis to mechanistic behaviourism, and that this approach is sematologically oriented from the beginning, with "perceptual signs" (Merkzeichen) and "effector" or "operative signs" (Wirkzeichen) as basic concepts. The reform I am talking about is carried out in exemplary fashion in Edward C. Tolman's excellent work Purposive Behavior (1932).
(Bühler 2011[1934]: 34)
If I remember correctly then Morris was a follower (or, conversely, an opponent) of Tolman's purposive behaviorism.
With due respect for these facts we sketch the organon model of language a second time in Figure 3. The circle in the middle symbolizes the concrete acoustinc phenomenon. Three variable factors in it go to give it the rank of a sign in three different manners. The sides of the inscribed triangle symbolize these three factors. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 34)
Thus according to the functional models the same message acts in three or six different sign-functions.
The parallel lines symbolize the semantic functions of the (complex) language sign. It is a symbol by virtue of its coordination to objects and states of affairs, a symptom (Anzeichen, indicium: index) by virtue of its dependence on the sender, whose inner states it expresses, and a signal by virtue of its appeal to the hearer, whose inner or outer behaviour it directs as do other communicative signs. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 35)
Of the six types of signs outlined in Sebeok's Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics, the first two are Bühler's symptom and signal; the next three are Peirce's icon, index and symbol; and the last one is name. Sebeok also noticed that Bühler's signals "act like regulators, eliciting or inhibiting some action or reaction" (Sebeok 2001: 10).
In this model it is possible to add Jakobson's three additional components and function to the inner triangnle. The upper left corner connecting sender with objects and states of affairs constitutes the code. The upper right corner connecting the receiver with objects and states of affairs would be the message. And the corner connecting the sender and the receiver would be the channel. This is ingenious because another level appears: the parallel lines coming from the side of the outer triangle and the distant corner of the inner triangle form a visual arrow from all sides. In this way the side of the outer triangle becomes connected with the distant (away-pointing) corner of the inner triangle. Context points to channel; sender points to message and receiver points to code. In other words, there is no common context without there also being a channel; there is no sender without the message; and there is no receiver without the code. It is the sender that forms the message and may do it for his or her own sake irrespective of what it signifies and whether anyone receives it (poetic function). The receiver's arrow points to the code because that is it's causal end-point: while the sender has the code and formulates the message, the receiver has the message and must decipher the code (also, the metalinguistic function is necessary for the sake of the receiver). And channel and context are connected in the sense that for there must be common memory or experience for there to be a common frame of reference. It all falls into place beautifully. This is my crude sketch of it:
This organun model, with its three largely independently variable semantic relations, was first expounded completely in my paper on the sentence (Bühler 1918), which begins with the words: "What human language does is threefold: profession, triggering and representation." Today I prefer the terms expression (Ausdruck), appeal (Appell) and representation, because among language theorists 'expression' is increasingly taking on the precise meaning demanded here, and because the Latin word 'appelare (English: appeal, German: more or less 'ansprechen') is apt for the second; as everyone knows today there is sex appeal, and in addition to that speech appeal seems to me to be just as palpable a fact. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 35)
And the first-person singular present indicative of appellare is appello from ad- ('to, towards") + pello ("push; impress"). Asa a verb it means "I address as, call by name".
At any rate, whoever has realized that language has a significative nature must take care that his concepts are homogeneous; all three basic concepts must be semantic concepts. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 35)
I'm not that sure if Jakobson's six concepts are all semantic. The metalingual, poetic and phatic functions do have something to do with semantics, but in wildly different ways.
A mixture of concepts that in part belong to the (physical) causal view and in part to the significative view would result in such a thorough confusion of the symbolic interpretation of our three-foundation diagram that no one could find his way and pseudo-problems would arise. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 36)
This does sound like what has happened to Jakobson's scheme of language functions.
Though we do not dispute the dominance of the representational function of language, what now follows is suited and intended to delimit it. The concept "things" or the more adequate conceptual pair "objects and states of affairs" does not capture everything for which the sound is a mediating phenomenon, a mediator between the speaker and the hearer. Rather, each of the two participants has his own position in the make-up of the speech situation, namely the sender as the agent of the act of speaking, as the subject of the speech action on the one hand, and the receiver as the one spoken to, as the addressee of the speech action on the other hand. They are not simply a part of what the message is about, rather they are the partners in an exchange, and ultimately this is the reason why it is possible that the sound as a medial product has a specific significative relationship to each, to the one and to the other severally. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 37)
Jakobson does dispute the dominance of the cognitive or representational function. In Mukarovsky this is the "practical" function which the aesthetic/poetic function undermines or deforms. The message mediates the reference (objects and states of affairs) but it also mediates between the speaker and the hearer in a sense that would suggest that the sign is the channel or, as the more popular saying goes, the medium is the message. I would much more prefer to talk of the subject instead of the "addresser". And I'd add that the message is about the subject and addressee severally but also about their relationship.
What are we to make of the third relationship, appeal? It is only our list that makes it the third, whereas in natura rerum, in human and animal communication with signs it is the appeal that first and more exactly becomes evident to the analyst, namely in the behaviour of the receiver. If, instead of human beings, one looks at bees, ants, termites, and studies their means of communication, the researcher's attention will be directed first and foremost to the reactions of the receiver. As an animal psychologist I speak of signals and grasp their communicative valence from the behaviour of those who receive them and process them psychophysically. As theorists of human language we will also not neglect this side of the matter. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 38)
And yet this is exactly the aspect that Jakobson ignores almost completely. It is only with the help of Ruesch that this aspect can be rehabilitated.
The chalk marks drawn by mathematicians and logicians on the blackboard still contain an expressive residue. Hence, there is no need to go to the lyric poet to discover the expressive function as such; it is just that the lyric poet will offer a richer yield. And if he is a high-handed poet, he will sometimes write over his portal that the logician shall remain outside. That is just one of those exaggerations that need not be taken all too seriously. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 39)
Compare this to Jakobson's various emotive tinges and colorings.
Let me stress the point once again: these are only phenomena of dominance, in which one of the three fundamental relationships of the language sounds is in the foreground. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 39)
E.g. the command and the insult are examples of purely conative and emotive functions.
The decisive scientific verification of our constitutional formula, the organon model of language, has been given if it turns out that each of the three relationships, each of the three semantic functions of language signs discloses and identifies a specific realm of linguistic phenomena and facts. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 39)
Note that the correct formula is "emantic functions of language signs" - this suggest that something like "semantic functions of body signs" are possible. Also, it may be possible to disclose and identify a "phatic sphere" (of semiotic phenomena and facts), "expressive sphere", etc.
Finally, the word 'Tische' has a place value in context, and it is sometimes phonematically enriched by an s at the end [which would make a genitive singular of it]: we generally call this the field values that can accrue to a word in the synsemantic surrounding field. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 40)
Welp, you don't often see the term synsemantic dropped so casually. Bühler mentioned Anton Marty in the introduction of this book.
It is thus correct to say that according to the teaching of the organon model of language, phenomena must be regarded as many-sided, and according to this new reflection as many-levelled significative structures. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 40)
I guess many-sided and many-levelled is Bühler's way of talking about polysemanticity. I like it, because Ruesch likewise talks about the levels and functions of communication - it may be possible to import these terms.
Is it expedient to unite symbols, symptoms and signals under the one proximate genus 'sign'? There is no doubt that there is truth to this multiplicity; but the question still arises as to whether the word 'sign' as a superordinate concept becomes an empty husk of a word (as do seemingly so many words from everyday language, which has not been subjected to scientific clarification) if it is retained for everything that is called by this name; some claim that under the must exact logical analysis symbol is the uniform superordinate concept that applies to all. (Bühler 2011[1934]: 42-43)
define: expedient - "convenient and practical, although possibly improper or immoral". Sounds about right. This is where I stop for now, because I have Malinowski to get to.

The Phatic Function in Translation

Nord, Christiane 2007. The Phatic Function in Translation: Metacommunication as a Case in Point. Belgian Journal of Linguistics 21(1): 171-184.

Metacommunication is regarded as a specific variety of the phatic function, which, according to Jakobson (1960), is responsible for establishing, maintaining and closing the communicative channel between senders and receivers. It is an empirical fact that the phatic function relies more on culture-specific conventions than any other function in communication. This means that translation can only work properly if the receivers recognize phatic elements as such. Therefore, adaptation to target-culture conventions may very often be the best way to make sure that the phatic function "works" for them. (Nord 2007: 171)
What in the world? I've retyped Jakobson (1960) and know for certain that he says nothing about metacommunication. After the phrase "It is an empirical fact" one should put a Wikipedian "[citation needed]".
After a definition of metacommunication (as opposed to object communication) and metalanguage (as a subcategory of metacommunication), the paper seeks to explore some of the conventions of metacommunication, drawing on a corpus of English, German, Spanish and French university manuals and textbooks. (Nord 2007: 171)
Huh. This sounds like an interesting topic, especially because Ruesch is not in the references - so how is Nord going to define metacommunication?
Drawing on the models of language function presented by Karl Bühler (1934) and Roman Jakobson (1960), I have suggested as a schema of four basic communicative functions, with their respective sub-functions, for the purposes of translation-relevant text analysis both in translation practice and training (cf. Nord 1997: 44ff.). The four functions are the referental or representative, the expressive or emotive, the appellative or operative functions included by both Bühler and Jakobson, and the phatic function which, as I see it, is unique in Jakobson's model. (Nord 2007: 171)
Operative function? What? My interest has peaked. She is very correct in the last part. The first three functions come from Bühler; the fourth, poetic, feels more like Mukarovsky's contribution, code and message were added by Jakobson, but these are essentially Saussure's langue and parole. It is exactly the latest addition, the phatic function, that is most unique in Jakobson's scheme. Although, to be fair, the channel component was not ignored by Ruesch, who treated it in terms of "medium".
Most scholars take the view that the phatic function is limited to the channel as such, as in small-talk or hesitation phenomena. In my view, however, "making the communicative channel work" presupposes an appropriate communicative relationship between sender and receiver. If this is true, one of the most important purposes of the phatic function will be to specify this relationship (e.g. formal/informal or symmetrical/asymmetrical) and perhaps even to shape it in the course of the communication process. Forms of address and other relation markers will therefore play an important part in phatic utterances, as I have tried to show in another context (cf. Nord 2002). (Nord 2007: 172)
Wow. How? How did Nord reach an interpretation of the phatic function as the mu-function (communication about relationship) without the aid of Bateson? This is incredible!
As opposed to object communication (i.e. communication referring to any object that is out there in the world), metacommunication can be defined (drawing on Lauer 1986: 33, annd Tegmeier 1984: 133) as the sum total of verbal and nonverbal (including paraverbal) means used by a writer or speaker to comment on the conditions and factors of the communicative occurrence in progress, including the interacting partners (author and audience) and the relationship holding between them. Some authors speak of metadiscourse or text reflexivity (cf. Mauranen 1993: 145ff.). I prefer the term metacommunication because it seems more appropriate if one wants to indicate the whole range of aspects included. (Nord 2007: 172)
Huh. So she reached this term through some German writers. I have to admit, this is a pretty concise and exact statement on metacommunication. The references: (1) Lauer, I.-A. 1986. Fachtextlinguistische Untersuchungen zum Kommunikationsbereich der Pädagogischen Psychologie - dargestellt an ausgewählten Fachtextsorten im Englischen. Diss. A. Leipzig University. (2) Techtmeier, B. 1984. Das Gespräch. Funktionen, Normen und Strukturen (Sprache und Gesellschaft 19). Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. and (3) Mauranen, A. 1993. Cultural Differences in Academic Rhetoric: A Textlinguistic Study. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang.
Metacommunication aims at monitoring one's own communicative activities and the reactions of the audience, which are observed in face-to-face and anticipated or assumed in written communication. In order to make communication successful, these activities and reactions have to be in line with the overall goal of the communicativ eact. Metacommunication thus seems to be an efficient way of controlling social interaction as it is developing between author and audience (cf. Nord 2002: 38). (Nord 2007: 172)
Monitoring one's own communicative activities I would not categorize as metacommunication because I have a separate cluster of terms for that very purpose (autocommunication, intrapersonal communication, self-communication, self-indication, etc.). The reactions of the audience, on the other hand, was explicitly part of Ruesch's metacommunication (cf. Communication, the social matrix of psychiatry, 1951: 152). Specifying how metacommunication is related to the regulative function (e.g. controlling social interaction) is on my agenda.
Metalanguage, which refers to linguistic objects only, is a specific form of metacommunication. If metalanguage refers to language as such or a particular natural language system or the use of language in an occurrence outside the communicative action in progress, it can be regarded as a subcategory of the referential function, the object of reference being language or language use (which, unlike Jakobson 1960, I do not regard as being in principle different from othe robjects of reference like horses or the values of democracy). If, however, it refers to the actual communicative event in progress, it is phatic according to the definition of metacommunication given above. (Nord 2007: 173)
I think Jakobson regarded metalingual reference as a separate category because he was an überlinguist (he gave language a privileged status in everything) and it may have a little something to do with Bakhtin's metalinguistics. I, on the other hand, wouldn't identify the phatic function and metacommunication so easily because that would be, in a sense, to dismiss the original meaning of phatic communion, which was not at all about commenting on the channel or relationship. Also, the liquidation of functions can be dangerous, because in the end all functions are referential - the emotive aspects of speech have a reference to the speaker's state of mind just like the phatic function - in Jakobson's strict sense - makes reference to the fact of communicating (e.g. "Here we are. Yeap...").
If the object of metacommunication is the actual communicative action in progress, metacommunication itself has to be regarded as located on a hyperlevel above the level of object communication. [...] [...] We probably learnt to use and identify metacommunicative markers in the course of acquiring communicative competence, but to my knowledge the subject has not really been studied very extensively, either in Linguistics or in Translation Studies. I have often noticed that young students find it difficult to distinguish between object communication and metacommunication. When asked to name the overall topic of at ext they start retelling the story or paraphrasing the words of the text, instead of moving to a hyper-level in order to look down at the communication presented by the text. Obviously, recognizing the meta-level requires a specific ability that has to be acquired. Students, therefore, should be made aware of the metacommunication markers used in their own culture, first, and then proceed to learn about those of the other cultures they work with. (Nord 2007: 173)
Well, it doesn't have to be. In Peeter Torop's semiotics of translation metacommunication is understood in a way that made me invent an arbitrary distinction between synchronic metaommunication (communication about the ongoing communication process) and diachronic communication (communication about previous communications). I find Torop's intertextual metacommunication problematic because it presupposes the assumption of identification between culture and communication.
In phatic communication in general, i.e. in salutations, in small-talk about the weather and the like, we observe that people tend to use stereotypical forms of expression, standardized formulae which are almost void of any other meaning than that of operating or closing the communicative channel or keeping it open. In a greeting like "How are you?", the sender does not expect a detailed account of the receiver's health and mood but only a "Oh, fine, how are you?" (with a slightly different intonation). We might even say that phatic communication works on the basis of conventionalized forms. (Nord 2007: 173)
Dipti Kulkarni pointed out that these conventionalized forms are like desemanticized utterances. But the whole channel-maintenance through small talk theme seems to begin with Jakobson's reference to "talking birds" in Mowrer. I'm not sure how well this aspect was represented in Malinowski's phatic communion (I'll have to read his essay again as soon as possible).
a) If metacommunication directly or indirectly refers to the relationship between the participants in the communicative interaction, it may be assumed to be of particular importance in those cases where this relationship is essential to a successful outcome of the communication. Or to put it the other way round: when the receiver has a natural or professional interest in the object of communication (like in a scholarly debate published in a specialized journal for experts of the discipline), metacommunication is probably much less important than in an asymmetrical relationship in which the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take an interest in an object the latter would not have chosen of his or her own accord. Therefore, metacommunication may be assumed to be particularly important in manuals and textbooks, which can be regarded as a kind of simulation of classroom teaching. (Nord 2007: 174)
Hmm. Kulkarni's study on the phatic function in instant messages reached a similar assumption but her point was exactly the reverse: when the relationship is asymmetrical (as between a student and a teacher) then phatic utterances are "skipped" for sake of immediate getting-to-the-point. Otherwise it may come across as a social engagement and this is... bad? This difference may amount to a cultural difference between Nord the German and Kulkarni the Hindu.
Communicative occurrences are interactions between two or more participants in a situation that is fixed with regard to time and space. The participants use a certain combination of signs, such as a text, to convey messages between them. We can thus schematically identify the three possible objects of metacommunicative utterances: the situation, the participants and the text itself (see Figure 1). (Nord 2007: 176)
So we got rid of some functions in Jakobson's scheme only to supplant them into a new model of metacommunication? I still think that perhaps the only object of metacommunication is communication. Otherwise you're bending the concept of metacommunication quite arbitrarily. It is beginning to seem that Nord confuses metacommunication with metatextual communication - or, in effect, something like metatextual instructions (or, to use her own favored term, markers).
It is interesting to note that comments on the sender's activities or intentions are frequently (although not always) adjusted to the deixis of the situation of production (I am not saying..., I shall not enter further into...), whereas references to the receiver's reactions take the receiver's perspective, anticipating the situation of reception (as in You may wonder whether...). In these cases, metacommunication seems to simulate a face-to-face communication, which is also indicated by the use of tenses. (Nord 2007: 178)
But this is the conative function! "You may wonder whether..." is a literal appeal to the reader. It is not a reference to communication but a reference to the receiver's anticipated reaction. It turns out that if you take writing and reading a text as your case of communication then "metacommunication" isn't a very productive concept - it seems to turn everything into a jumbled mess.
To be classified as metacommunicative, a text reference has to be directed at the receivers and must be related to the communication in progress. (Nord 2007: 179)
Under what conditions can a text be thought of as communication in progress?
Acknowledgements are therefore not regarded as metacommunicative; nor are evaluations of other works or studies. However, bibliographical references are metacommunicative if tehy are expressed in the (conventional) form of an imperative or using verbs referring to steps the audience is asked to take (like see, cf. = confer, vgl. = verleiche, voir, véase). (Nord 2007: 180)
But bibliographic references are intertextual and imperatives are conative! I see no metacommunication here.
Since Grundlegung, Introduction à, Análisis or Suggestions refer to the communicative activities the sender wants to bring about by means of the text, they are metacommunicative. (Nord 2007: 180)
Here's the problem: we have different understandings of what constitutes communicative activities. Following Nord's own previous definition ("Communicative occurrences are interactions between two or more participants in a situation that is fixed with regard to time and space") I can't really see how a student reading the description of the task in a textbook constitutes a "communicative occurrence".
Since my focus in this paper was on the methodological aspects, the results presented are no more than indicators of the culture-specificity of metacommunicative behaviour. They are mainly intended to raise the interest in a hithero neglected aspect of the phatic function. I believe that there is still plenty of gold in this mine. (Nord 2007: 183)
I have to admit that this is an interesting topic and, at least in my opinion, quite relevant for translation studies, but! I was hoping this to be about the culture-specificity of metacommunicative behaviour and it turned out to be about the culture-specificity of some meta- or intratextual markers. I consider this to be an abuse of the concept of metacommunication because the original concept of metacommunication was about behaviour: how verbal and nonverbal messages interact in the communicative situation. Ultimately, metacommunication implies a metachannel. The title of a chapter or the instructions of a task in a textbook lack this essential component. In the end this is an example of the communication paradigm being more of a hindrance than benefit for linguistics, semiotics and translation studies.

Exploring Jakobson's 'phatic function'

Kulkarni, Dipti 2014. Exploring Jakobson's 'phatic function' in instant messaging interactions. Discourse & Communication 8(2): 117-136.

This research investigates the nature of phatic communion in instant messaging interactions. It adopts and expands Jakobson's much-quoted definition according to which 'phatic' is the language in an interaction whose primary purpose is to maintain contact between the speakers. Adapting conversation analysis for the study of textual interactions, the research observes the linguistic means used by interlocutors to signal attention, interest, and agreement - these being identified as important constituents of contact. The corpus comprises 60 chats, collected from 20 participants who chat in a mixture of English and Indian languages such as Marathi and Hindi. Openings, middles, and closings of these interactions are analyzed to study the ways in which participants establish, maintain, and terminate contact. The use of various linguistic means in these interactions such as back-channels, evaluations, expressives, and questions draws attention to a significant amount of interactional work done by interlocutors towards maintaining contact. (Kulkarni 2014: 117)
This is one extremely interesting abstract (abstracts are not often this interesting). I see that Kulkarni has made the connection between phatic function and phatic communion, but probably is not critical towards the simplicity of Jakobson's interpretation of phatic communion, as this seems focused on his interpretation. On the other hand, one could probably replace attention, interest and agreement with Ruesch's understanding, acknowledging and agreeing and reach new frontiers. Dipti Kulkarni defended a 150-page doctoral thesis on this subject in 2012 and uploaded it to academia.edu - which means that I may read the complete work, too.
The idea of phatic communion is traced to Malinowski (1923), who coined the phrase to refer to the language used to build ties of union with other members of the community. The linguistic function so conceived as some overlaps with the 'interpersonal' in Halliday's functional model (1973) and the 'social' in Lyons's classification (1996). The concept is important because it counteracts the emphasis on the descriptive function of language and draws attention to the social, interpersonal use of language. (Kulkarni 2014: 117-118)
Firstly, it was the demon of terminological invention that coined the phrase through Malinowski and I'm not so sure it originally referred to "phatic language". Secondly, wow. I'm only dimly aware of Halliday and Lyons so I didn't know about these parallels, but reached a similar conclusion through Ruesch - that the phatic function should rather be the social function.
The predominance of internet-based media such as instant messaging and social networking sites in facilitating our social interactions makes it pertinent to study phatic communion in this environment. Amongst the various communication platforms available on the internet, phatic communion will be observed here in instant messaging (IM). IM is a computer-based programme offered by websites such as Gmail, Yahoo and MSN that allows two people (in each other's contact list) to interact in real time through the continuous exchange of text messages. (Kulkarni 2014: 118)
I agree - the growing role of social media and new means of communication in contemporary society call for investigation. The definition of instant messaging I find weird, though, mainly because of the outdated and/or out of place word "programme". Instant messaging is not a specific programme but rather a type of communication characterized by it's temporal aspect. Technically, face-to-face interaction is also instant messaging, but instant messaging as such is the face-to-face analogy of internet communication: while face-to-face communication implies being in the same space, instant messaging implies being in the same time. These are very crude characterizations, but capture the spatiotemporal aspects quite well.
The foremost difficulty in studying phatic communion empirically is the problem of identifying a justifiable definition which at the same time can assist in recognizing phatic phenomena in natural conversation. I discuss these problems in the next section and review the approaches adopted in extant literature. Following this, I discuss Jakobson's (1960) interpretation of phatic and the ways in which it is adopted and expanded here. Jakobson (1960) defined phatic as the language in an interaction whose predominant function is to maintain contact between the speakers. Through this interpretation has been much quoted, it has not been pursued empirically. I take up the task and following this definition of phatic, the objectives of my analysis are to identify the communicative means used by interlocutors to maintain contact in their interactions and to see what these suggest about the nature of contact in IM. (Kulkarni 2014: 118)
Just like I had guessed - this expands on Jakobson's interpretation on phatic. This is probably why Kulkarni wishes to identify "phatic phenomena" - something like phatic language. Much could be written about expressive language and the emotive function, for example, in terms of the former being a heuristic device - a fiction useful for scientific analysis - and the latter being a relation between language and how it is used. I guess "phatic phenomena" is better than "phatic language" because maintaing or eliminating contact has verbal as well as nonverbal aspects. In IM, I imagine, there are similar chronemic rules as there are in oral communication - e.g. saying something, anything, after a period of quiet just for the sake of continuing the conversation. This is very narrow and not at all what I see in phatic communion, but I'm sure Kulkarni can lead the way towards a better understanding of phatics.
In order to investigate phatic communion in natural interactions we first need to know what is phatic. Though there is a broad agreement which suggests that phatic is language in an interaction directed at being social, there is considerable variance in the specific interpretations. Malinowski, who coined the phrase, primarily uses the method of instantiation to suggest the scope of the phenomenon: when a number of people sit together at a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, when they chat resting from work, a mere phrase of politeness, inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some superbly obvious state of things (1923: 314-315). Functionally, phatic communion according to Malinowski serves to avoid silence, diffuse hostility, acknowledge the presence of another person, and enjoy each other's company (1923: 314-315). This description, along with the examples offered, does not point to a homogeneous set of interactional phenomena that can be labeled as phatic. It is unclear whether phatic is limited to short, routine exchanges or it includes longer stretches of interaction, whether it refers to communion building or contact maintenance, whether it is limited to desemanticized utterances or it also includes meaningful utterances; further, whether it includes only intances of bonding and coming together of people or also occasions of disagreement and estrangement. (Kulkarni 2014: 118-119)
I wish to distance my approach from the understanding of phatic communion as merely "niceties", "politenesses" or "small talk" as well as from management of involvement (channel management). Rather, I would make my way from phatic to emphatic, that is, empathy (from em + pathos - "in, at" + "passion"; like German Einfühlung - "co-feeling"). In effect, phatic communion in this sense would mean something like fellow-feeling, a sense of social unity. The phrase "desemanticized utterances" is relevant here, because it is close to what Charles Morris and Jurgen Ruesch mean by "communization" (sharing by means other than signs) and, following the empathy-line, phatic language should indeed - like expressive language - be introversive (desemanticized in the sense of not having external reference). The difference between phatic and emotive is in this sense very simple: emotives refer to the emotions or attitudes of the speaker while emphatics refers to the emotions or attitudes shared by the sender and receiver (e.g. what Jakobson generalizes as the "psychological connection").
Amidst these interpretations we find another definition of phatic communion in Jakobson's essay 'Linguistics and Poetics' (1960). Here he defined 'phatic' as the language in an interaction whose primary function is the maintenance of contact between the spakers; where 'contact' is the physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee, enabling them to enter and stay in communication. (Kulkarni 2014: 119)
My aim is to show that there are other, nonverbal or simply broader, factors that enable people to enter and stay in communication. This is what Ruesch calls "common experience". For example, I am able to get what Kulkarni is writing about phatics because I already have a lot of background knowledge about phatics. Much like the Trobriand villagers who can exchange a few words with their neighbours and feel like they have something in common, I can read this text and feel that I have something in common with Kulkarni - interest in phatics. For my purposes it is relevant that interest, experience, emotions, etc are nonverbal and thus untouched by Jakobson's definition of the phatic function.
If we compare Jakobson's definition of phatic to that of Malinowski, we see that while Malinowski emphasizes the creation of ties or the relational goal of phatic messages, for Jakobson, phatic utterances were those that help to maintain contact between the speakers. This restricted interpretation has been questioned and criticized (Schneider, 1988: 24; Senft, 1996). (Kulkarni 2014: 119)
Oh my god, YES! Jakobson is restrictive in his interpretation of phatic communion just as he is of basically all other components and functions of the communication system. Also, now that I think about it, reinventing the phatic function as something like the social function would make a lot of sense in terms of groups (collective "I"-s) or figurations as well - it is often (sometimes even solely) phatics that establishes a collection of individuals as a distinct whole, a unity, a community. References to these critics: Schneider KP (1988) Small Talk: Analysis of Phatic Discourse. Malburg: Hitzeroth. and Senft G (1996) Phatic communion. In: Verschueren J. Östman J and Blommaert J (eds) Handbook of Pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins (loose leaf installment, 10 pp.). - I was not aware that so much has been written about phatics - Kulkarni's references are a gold mine!
However, I would like to argue that ther are overlaps between the two interpretations and Jakobson's definition is not as off-the-mark as it may look at first sight. First, some of Malinowski's examples point to the contact function of phatic utterances - uttering a polite phrase on seeing someone or saying something to avoid silence are examples of establishing contact (1923: 314-315). Second, Jakobson's notion of contact as not only the physical channel but also the psychological connection between the speakers takes care of the relational aspect of phatic utterances. The only significant difference is that Jakobson firmly situates phatic communion in a communicative context or speech situation as opposed to seeing it as a general social phenomenon. (Kulkarni 2014: 119)
This is exactly why I deem it necessary to connect phatic communion to communization: communication is not the only means of establishing contact or relations between people. That is, besides the explicit exchange of signs there are other forms of sharedness, some quite physical or materialistic, but others simply either too effervescent or too complicated for strictly linguistic or even semiotic analysis.
Jakobson does not specify what he means by these terms and neither is there any elaboration in existing literature. However, it appears that the physical channel is a notion associated with some necessary part of contact that must be present for the conversation to go on, whereas the psychological connection must be related to the attitudes that speakers must have and display so that the interlocutors find the environment conductive enough for conversation. Following these preliminary cues, I interpret 'physical channel' as the attention that speakers must pay towards each other. That the interlocutors should be mutually attentive seems to be the most minimal requirement for human communication (when all other material conditions are in place). It is only when the other interlocutor is attending to the conversation that a speaker can continue. Amongst the attitudes that form a part of the 'psychological connection', the current corpus suggests that showing interest and expressing agreement are the most crucial. That attention, interest and agreement are important in conversation and work towards contact maintenance has also been suggested by others (Jones, 2009; Schegloff and Sacks, 1974: 261; Schneider, 1988: 160). (Kulkarni 2014: 119)
Exactly! Jakobson elaborates the other functions and uses them for different purposes in speech and poetic analysis, but the newcomer - the phatic function - is almost abandoned by him. (Or at least that is the impression I have reached from reading a large portion of Jakobson's corpus.) Thus far I have associated the physical channel with - in Jakobson's terms - "some kind of contiguity between the participants of any speech event" and the psychological connection with "the perceiver's attention and fatigue". It is actually quite interesting how Jakobson - in his "Linguistics and Poetics" - very elliptically draws together the social, physical and psychological universes and imposes a hierarchy upon them - the social (phatic function) depends on the physical (channel) and the psychological (connection). Mutual attention is indeed the most minimal requirement for human communication and Ruesch has captured this in his definition of the communication system, which is contingent on mutual perception and awareness between the participants. My interest in Kulkarni's work has peaked and so far I agree with almost everything.
Following Jakobson's definition of phatic, the objectives of the analysis are twofold: first, to identify the various linguistic means used by participants to establish, maintain, and terminate contact (thus identifying instances of phatic communion), and second to see what these suggest about the nature of contact in IM. (Kulkarni 2014: 119-120)
My enter similarly consists of trying to identify the various nonverbal or bodily means used by participants to establish, maintain and terminate communication and to see what these suggest about nonverbal communication more generally.
From the point of view of contact maintenance, the absence of non-verbal cues in IM is significant, as these aret he primary carriers of contact-related information (Lyons, 1996: 53). (Kulkarni 2014: 120)
Huh. From Lyons's Semantics but Lyons himself refers to the reader on face-to-face communication by Laver & Hutcheson and their "interaction-management information" on this matter.
It is interesting to contrast this situation with Malinowski's observation of phatic communion as: '...personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak' (1923: 314). In IM, participants do not have to wait. Also, like all computer-mediated communication (CMC), IM exchanges are made possible because of a host of hardware and software technologies, and the affordances of this technology has an effect on the nature of interaction. With regard to the circumstances of interaction, IM participants are spatially separated and therefore, unlike face-to-face interactions, information regarding the interlocutor's availability and commitment to conversation is not readily available; rather this has to be inferred. Nardi et al. (2000) have observed that this allows the users to 'negotiate availability' and respond to messages at a time suitable to them. (Kulkarni 2014: 120)
I vaguely remember this part in Malinowski but now understand it differently. This makes me question whether it really is related to pathos. I must read some papers on Aristotle's rhetoric (e.g. ethos, pathos and logos). The bit about "the speaker's views and life history" does indicate that it has something in common with Ruesch's communization (although not perhaps with Morris's communization, which seemingly isn't about common experience). The interlocutor's availablitiy and commitment is related to Goffman's "involvement idiom", but I'm trying to distance my own thing from mere contact-maintenance and get at the underlying "base", so to say (I don't yet have specific terms chosen to handle what I'm trying to bring attention to).
Using Jakobson's definition of phatic as the heuristic tool the chats are scanned to identify utterances wich were, it can be argued, predominantly used to signal contact. Semantically similar instances are grouped together to form categories and then, drawing on contextual information like the relationship between the participants, properties of IM, and established understanding of conversational sequencing, I describe the nature of contact maintenance in IM. (Kulkarni 2014: 121)
But what does it mean "to signal contact"? I would argue that the phatic function should be approached as the social function because it's not so much about the transient physical channel as it is about the more lasting psychological connection - the social relation. I fully understand that Jakobson means psychological connection as something transient as well, but it can be reviewed in terms of Bateson's mu-function (communication about relationships), for example.
A third set of cues is the non-verbal behavior of the participants such as the alignment of the body, facial gestures such as smiling while reading messages, etc. The closest attempt at capturing the interaction in its entirety would be to have three cameras at each end which would record screen activity, keyboard activity, and the participant. The analyst would then draw on all these video recordings to fill out the chat script. Past research (e.g. Beisswenger, 2008; Marcoccia et al., 2008) has demonstrated the significance of this information in studying chats. However, it needs to be noted that while there could be some non-verbal behavior that may have been interactionally significant, largely as the hands are tied to the keyboard and the body is aligned towards using the computer, the body is not free for movement and gesture as it is in the case of face-to-face interactions. Evene the gaze is directed at the screen and not at the other participant. The textual cues that are mutually available thus are the only cues that are being communicatetively produced to a large extent. Recording the non-verbal behavior also raises the question of whether the analyst is trying to study the interaction as it was mutually available or as it was available to the researcher as a third party. However, as this research is based on the analysis of chat scripts alone, other interactionally significant information such as the system generated messages was not available for analysis. (Kulkarni 2014: 121)
This is an interesting topic which I know very little about but which is becoming increasingly important as more and more people spend more and more of their waking life interacting with technology (personal computers, laptops, tablets, smart phones, smart watches, and other smart objects). I can only quibble with the terminology that concerns nonverbal behaviour. I understand now that she means alignment of the body with the computer, but posture itself is not so much the alignment of the body as it is the alignment of body parts (I may be wrong because I don't specialize in postures). "Facial gesture" has the connotation of being interactionally significant (communicative) and intentional. If someone smiles to him- or herself when receiving an instant message then it is a "facial expression".
Laver (1975) observes the openings in face-to-face conversations and suggests that the indexical tokens used in the openings help speakers to identify the roles they will adopt in the oncoming interaction. (Kulkarni 2014: 121)
These indexes belong to a larger category that Ruesch calls metacommunicative instructions - e.g. the janitor's uniform is an index that instructs passers-by about his role as janitor.
Unlike face-to-face interactions, in CMC, potential interlocutors do not occupy the same physical space; rather, they only happen to be online at the same time. And being online at the same time does not place an obligation on them to acknowledge someone's presence in the way in which actually encountering someone does. In such circumstances it is through the first message, or the 'ping' as it is known, that one interlocutor invites the other to a conversation. The opening ping is identified as phatic irrespective of its content because its location in the conversation is such that it plays an important role towards establishing contact. (Kulkarni 2014: 122)
I would argue that it does place such an obligation, but in a significantly different way. I don't much enjoy instant messaging exactly because I feel obliged to answer and I can't concentrate on anything else when a conversation is ongoing. It feels weird letting someone's message wait for a reply indefinitely, especially when you know the content like in facebook chat where you can see the message in an open tab but don't send the "X has seen the message" if you don't click on the tab (I can do this because I use several different browsers, so that I can migrate to another browser to avoid acknowledging the ping). Ultimately I prefer e-mail because even if you're a distant and aloof person like me an instant message feels like it requires an answer in 24 hours max, while an e-mail can be answered 1 week later. In short, these different mediums/channels have different "involvement idioms". (I'm actually pretty sure that I'm misusing Goffman's term because he wrote at a time when there were no personal computers and the involvement idiom didn't apply to all forms of communication but only to face-to-face interaction.)
In IM, as the programme prefixes the message with the user's name, interlocutors do not have to identify themselves. Further, as IM interactions are often between friends, information about the availability and interest of the other person in having a conversation is also often known. Therefore much of the work that an opening in intended to do is already in place. In this context it is not surprising that speakers choose to omit the opening sequence completely. Interestingly, such non-routine pings were found between two extremes of the solidarity continuum. They were found either between people who share a very close relationship or between those who shared a very formal relationship. (Kulkarni 2014: 123)
This is what I'm trying to get at: friends and colleagues are communized (I'm not sure if this is the correct back-formation from communization) - they already know each other, have communicated before, have common experience and thus can engage in more atypical (non-routine) patterns of interaction. What I'm trying to get at, in the end, comes to an explanation of why Juri Lotman identifies the channel with memory in his model of autocommunication. It was actually very insightful and can explain some fundamental aspects of socialization as such. One of the points that I wish to make is that phatic communion and/or communization has a very important role to play in any kind of group-formation and community-building.
In a situation like IM, where non-verbal cues are not available, phatic utterances play a very crucial role. By 'phatic utterances' I mean those utterances that are directed primarily at signaling that the person is attending to the conversation. Unlike informative utterances that are considered valuable precisely because they give some information about the world, phatic utterances merely convey that the recipient of this information has attended to what has been said - besides this they may not convey any further information. (Kulkarni 2014: 125)
Yeap, this is exactly Gregory Bateson's mu-function or communication about relationship. The canonical nonverbal parallel to a phatic utterance is a headnod that signals that the nodding person is attending to the speaker's content. There are of course cultural variations in such "phatic gestures" as to a Western person a headnod may signal agreement while for the Japanese it signals understanding or acknowledgement.
In contrast, Shreyasi's 'wow!' provides Manavi with no new information. Yet what I want to argue is that this utterance does a significant amount of work towards maintaining contact. (Kulkarni 2014: 126)
It could be argued that this wow is more emotive than phatic. Irregardless of whether Sheryasi is really amazed or surprised at Manavi's information, Sheryasi is expressing amazement or surprise for Manavi's sake. But that's where the beauty of Jakobson's scheme actually lies: any given utterance can have a dominant function as well as subordinate functions. Kulkarni in this sense points out, in effect, that the phatic function is dominant, while emotive function is subordinant in this specific "wow!".
b) Evaluations/expressives. While a back-channel can be considered as a minimal response to incoming information, an evaluation does something more - as the name suggests, it evaluates the information. Evaluations and expressives are a little different from each other and yet they are so close that it is difficult to differentiate one from the other in all instances. Evaluations evaluate the incoming information with remarks such as good, nice, cool, too bad, etc. Expressives, on the other hand, are like interjections which exclaim using utterances like oh!, wow! or emoticons like :( and :). (Kulkarni 2014: 127)
I think they are difficult to differentiate because they are in fact the same thing. Jakobson subsumes both under the term "emotive" because he drew from the German phenomenological linguist Anton Marty, a student of Franz Brentano, according to whom emotive utterances inherently contain a judgment (evaluation). Interjections are the purely emotive stratum as Jakobson puts it, while most any kind of language can express an emotion or attitude towards what is spoken about.
In the absence of non-verbal cues like head nods, eye contact, and body posture which are significant carriers of contact-related information, all the work of signaling attention and interest during the conversation has to be done by the textual messages. (Kulkarni 2014: 134)
It is my task to investigate exactly how significant nonverbal communication is to maintaining contact. But since I'm an undergrad and my work is not empirical, I can go into an almost philosophical discussion of what it really means to have communicative contact.
Also, this research interpreted phatic communion in a specific sense (contact) which took attention away from certain other (relational, communion building) aspects of phatic communion. There is a need to observe phatic communion and community building as it happens online, from a macro-sociological perspective. It is through many such studies that we will gain a fuller understanding of phatic communion in the online environment. (Kulkarni 2014: 134)
Yup. Phatic communion is a curious phenomenon and despite the word being coined by a concrete text (Malinowski's essay) it has taken on very different connotations. It's as if Malinowski's demon of terminological invention was met by a whole host of demons of terminological appropriation. That is why I prefer not to talk about phatic communion, phatic function or even phaticity (as one of the next papers does) but about Phatics, although I'm not yet sure whether it signifies a field of investigation (spanning interdisciplinary efforts) or a host of phenomena related to phatic communion in some measure. There is much that needs to be covered before I can have a say in this veritably interesting and growing subject.

Universal features of human society

Elias, Norbert 1978[1970]. What is Sociology? New York: Columbia University Press.

In the past, societies have often been depicted as though they were really a kind of super-organism. This is because, at first, people's power of conceptual understanding was limited to focusing on the similarities between higher and lower levels of integration. So they were not yet able to grasp the differences upon which their relative autonomy is based. (Elias 1978[1970]: 105)
This is seemingly also how culture is viewed in cultural semiotics - as a kind of super-organism, a collective "I".
Sociology's autonomy in relation to biology is ultimately based on the fact that people are indeed organisms, but organisms which are unique in certain respects. It is necessary to establish this before the universal features of human society can be discussed. The central, unalterable factor in all societies is human nature. But the uniqueness of man among other forms of life is shown by the fact that the meaning of the word 'nature', when referring to mankind, differs in certain respects from its meaning in other contexts. 'Nature' is usually understood to mean something which will always remain unaltered, something beyond change. One unique aspect of humanity is that human beings are in certain ways changeable by nature. (Elias 1978[1970]: 107)
All species of organisms are unique in certain respects. By itself this would be very much untrue because nature is in constant change - the origin of species is an example of this. What he seems to mean is that we humans view our human nature as something beyond change because our lives or even the existence of written word is not long enough to enable observation of change in the biological make-up of humans.
These differences [between animal and human societies] in turn indicate differences between the nature of man and that of animals or, more accurately, differences between the biological constitution of man and that of other organisms. In short, the structure of societies composed of nonhuman creatures only changes when the biological structure of those creatures alters. Animals of the same species always form societies of the same type, except for very slight local variations. (Elias 1978[1970]: 108)
But aren't all human societies similarly of the same type, except for very slight local variations (in diet, language, etc.)? And again, I don't think we have enough data on animal societies to jump to such a conclusion.
The anthropoid apes make considerably more varied sounds when communicating with each other, and are considerably more capable of modifying their behaviour by learning, than animals whose organization is that of an earlier stage of evolution. (Elias 1978[1970]: 110)
What a speciesist thing to say! Is evolution a race? Will cats, dogs, pigs and doves grow hands, start to speak and build computers, given enough time?
The word 'power' again is usually used as if it referred to an isolated object in a state of rest. Instead we have shown that power denotes a relationship between two or more people, or perhaps even between people and natural objects, that power is an attribute of relationships, and that the word is best used in conjunction with a reminder about more or less fluctuating changes in power. That is an example of a concept traditionally based on static components being turned into a concept of relationship. (Elias 1978[1970]: 116)
Here one cannot but agree - that is why we speak of power relations instead of an object called power.
In his theoretical work, Max Weber was thus one of the great representatives of sociological nominalism; to those inclined to this way of thinking, human society appears to be merely a flatus vocis. (Elias 1978[1970]: 117)
"To the nominalists universals were voces 'voices', which means: (1) above all that universals are not "res", that is that only the individual exists [...] Nominalism was essentially anti-Realist. (2) that universals are merely words, "flatus vocis", e.g., the word "homo", divisible into syllables, consonants and vowels. [...] The universal is reduced to an emission of sound (flatus vocis), in conformity with Boethius' definition [...]" (Roscellinus)
According to Weber it is not a social action to open an umbrella when it begins to rain. In his eyes, the action of opening an umbrella is performed without regard to other people. Clearly it never occurred to him that umbrellas are only found in certain societies, and neither manufactured nor used in all. Similarly, he interpreted a collision between two cyclists as non-social; only the insults and blows which might follow were social actions. Weber held that every action directed only to inanimate objects was nonsocial, though it is plain that different people may attach diverse meanings to a rock, a river or a storm. Thus people in simpler societies with magico-mythical belief systems will ascribe different meanings to these objects, and so their behaviour towards them will also differ from that of people in more secularized industrial societies. (Elias 1978[1970]: 120)
But the use of umbrellas in a given society doesn't make opening the umbrella a social act; just like the collision between two cyclist is different from a collision with a tree only because of what follows - an interaction involving apologies or insults.
The pronoun 'I' is normally used to communicate to others that a certain statement refers to the person speaking. But in scientific usage it is abruptly turned into a substantive and, given prevailing habits of speech, appears to refer to some independent, isolated person. (Elias 1978[1970]: 122)
Don't I have a separate and independent existence from other people? I think I do.
The function of the pronoun 'I' in human communication can only be understood in the context of all the other positions to which the other terms in the series refer. The six other positions are absolutely inseparable, for one cannot imagine an 'I' without a 'he' or a 'she', a 'we', 'you' (singular and plural) or 'they'. (Elias 1978[1970]: 123)
Nonsense! "I" refers to the person who uttered the word "I". It's as simple as that. Where's the confusion?
The personal pronouns represent the elementary set of coordinates by which all human groupings or societies can be plotted out. When communicating directly or indirectly with each other, all people refer to themselves as 'I' or 'we', and to those with whom they are communicating at the moment as 'you'. The third person who temporarily or permanently stands outside the intercommunicating group is referred to as 'he' or 'she', or in the plural as 'they'. Other societies use other signals to enable their members to communicate which of the basic positions in the web of relationships is occupied by the person to whom they are referring. But all human groups seem to have certain standardized symbols for the set of coordinates, which is itself one of the universal properties of human society. (Elias 1978[1970]: 123)
Has he surveyed all human languages for first-, second-, and third-person personalizers?
The concept 'I' - the first person pronoun - is symptomatic of the nature of the whole set, indicating the positions held by the communicating people in their relationships with each other. It serves as a means of orientation in a group, whether or not the members are actually present, whether people only refer to themselves as 'I' out loud in the presence of others, or whether they use the concept silently when thinking of themselves. In any case, it must include the idea of other people occupying other positions in the web of relationships to which the set of personal pronouns refers. As we have already said, there can be no 'I' without 'he', 'she', 'we', 'you' or 'they'. It is plainly very misleading to use such concepts as 'I' or ego independently of their position within the web of relationships to which the rest of the pronouns refer. (Elias 1978[1970]: 124)
How is it misleading? If I think to myself about myself or talk to myself about myself, using the word "I", how does this indicate the positions held by the other people - who are not involved in this act? It's like saying that you cannot smoke a cigarette without indicating that you are not, at that time, smoking a cigar and/or a pipe. What's the use of this way of thinking?
The concept of function provides a simple example of the perspectival character of human relationships. It is usually employed in connection with maintaining a particular social system. Roughly speaking, it is said that a particular institution fulfils this or that function for the society. But if we look beyond the reifying use of the concept of institution, to the people who comprise the institution at the time in question, it becomes clear that it is a rather crude simplification to view social functions from a single perspective. This links up with another instance where reification hides the true nature of events. Because the conventional concept of function is substantive in nature, it conceals both the fact that functions are attributes of relationships, and that they are matters of multiple perspectives. (Elias 1978[1970]: 126)
This is actually useful for my purposes, because Roman Jakobson's language functions are similarly treated as if they were substantives - as if there were poetic language, expressive language, etc. as such - neglecting the other, more true to form, option of viewing language functions as a relationship between any given message and the component it's intention is directed towards. In this sense there is no "expressive language" as such, but any part of language can be used to express an emotion or attitude.
Thus, from the point of view of those who form them, institutions never perform a function exclusively for the so-called 'system', such as a state or a tribe; they also perform a function for their members. To put it another way, they have an 'Ifunction' as well as an 'it-function'. Either function may be dominant, according to the way power is distributed. In the France of Louis XIV, for example, the office of king performed a function for Louis XIV himself which took precedence over its function for France. As a result of increasing democratization, the function of government posts for a state-society comes to take precedence over their function for those who occupy them, although the latter does not vanish altogether. Unless it takes into account these multiple perspectives, any analysis of social positions and social functions must remain one-sided. It cannot get to grips with what is actually happening. (Elias 1978[1970]: 126)
Exactly! Unless language functions are divorced from language and viewed as sign-functions, the scheme will remain impractical! In this sense any sign can function in any of the six functions outlined. That is, language is not divided into six different types of sub-languages but the material of language can be used for any of the six functions.
Such concepts as structure or function, role or organization, economy or culture often fail to convey that they refer to particular figurations of people. The same is true of the concept 'game', if one loses sight of the fact that the game is an aspect of a particular figuration of players. (Elias 1978[1970]: 131)
Jurgen Ruesch has actually defined some of these concepts (e.g. role, status, institution, culture, etc.) as figurations of people and their interactions (or interdependence).

Elias, Norbert 2013[1970]. Mis on sotsioloogia? Tlk Katrin Kaugver; toim. Sirje Laidre; eessõna Mikko Lagerspetz; kujundanud Sirje Ratso. Tallinn: Tallinna Ülikooli Kirjastus.

Tasapisi kasvab arusaam, et organismidena, s.t taimede ja loomadena organiseeritud füüsikalistel nähtustel on oma iselaadsed seaduspärad ja struktuuriomadused, mis ei lase end käsitleda füüsikalis-keemilisteks sündmusteks taandatuna, teisisõnu arusaam, et kõrgema lõimumistasandi korrastatud üksused on suhteliselt sõltumatud madalamal lõimumistasandil toimuvast ja et läheb tarvis spetsiifilisi mõttevorme ning uurimismeetodeid, et käsitleda kõrgema lõimumistasandi seoseid ja nende vorme teadustööks sobival viisil. (Elias 2013[1970]: 126)
Millegi pärast jääb mulje, et ta räägib semiootilisest lävendist ehk sellest, et organismide toimimine on oluliselt erinev füüsikalis-keemilistest protsessidest. St organismide ühiskondlik käitumine pole kausaalne, vaid valikuline ja tahte komponenti sisaldav.
Sama lugu on järgmise astme lõimumistasandiga, mida on võimalik jälgida, nimelt inimühiskondade lõimumistasandiga. Sealgi on need üksused, mis eraldi võetuna kuuluvad eelmisele lõimumistasandile, omavahel spetsiifilistes funktsionaalsetes seostes, aga seda täiesti uuel moel, mis täielikult erineb viisist, kuidas on omavahel seotud füüsikalised üksised bioloogilistes üksustes. (Elias 2013[1970]: 126)
Jakobsoni keelefunktsioonidega paralleele luues võib samuti välja tuua tõiga, et see funktsionaalne seos tekib keelemärkide ja kommunikatsiooni konstitutiivsete printsiipide vahel ja viimasteks on põhiliselt keelevälised tegurid (saatja, vastuvõtja, kanal, kood ja kontekst/referent).
Inimese eripärade hulka kuulub see, et oma loomu poolest on ta erilisel viisil muutuv. Seda näitab ilmekalt inimeste lõimumine ühiskonda. (Elias 2013[1970]: 129)
St inimesed õpivad. Inimene on kultuuriline loom.
Ühesõnaga, struktuur ühiskondades, mis ei koosne inimolenditest, muutub ainult juhul, kui muutub nende olendite bioloogiline struktuur. (Elias 2013[1970]: 129)
Elias alahindab teisi elusolendeid.
Pole vähimatki põhjust oletada, et tööstuse-eelsete Euroopa ühiskondade teisenemine tööstuslikeks ühiskondadeks tugines inimliigi, inimese bioloogilise struktuuri teisenemisel. Ajavahemik, mil see üleminek toimus, on liialt lühike, et hakata üldse kaaluma mõtet liigi muutumisest. (Elias 2013[1970]: 130)
Tehnoloogia areng ei ole päris sama mis liigi areng, jah.
Meie keeled on konstrueeritud niimoodi, et paljudel juhtudel saame me pidevat liikumist, järjepidevat muutumist väljendada ainult sel moel, et omistame liikumisele sellest rääkides ja mõeldes kõigepealt mingi isoleeritud, paigalseisva objekti iseloomu ning seejärel, lisades tegusõna, väljendame mõneti tagantjärele seda, et tavapäraselt paigalseisev objekt liigub. Näiteks kui seisame jõe ääres ja mõtleme vee järjepidevale voolamisele oma silme ees ning tahame seda väljendada suhtluses teistega, siis me ei mõtle ega ütle midagi niisugust nagu: vaata vee järjepidevat voolamist. Me ütleme ja mõtleme: vaata, kui kiiresti jõgi voolab. Me ütleme: tuul puhub. Nagu oleks tuul kõigepealt midagi paigalseisvat, miski, mis läheb ühel ajahetkel liikvele ja hakkab puhuma - nagu oleks tuul midagi muud kui puhumine, nagu võiks olla ka tuult, mis ei puhu. (Elias 2013[1970]: 134)
Tuule näidet oli vaja lisada, sest sama asja ei saa öelda jõe kohta. On ka seisvaid jõgesid. Minu kodulinnas kaevati uut jõesängi vanast natuke eemal, niiet vana seisis aastaid liikumatult ja oli endiselt "jõgi" (või vähemalt osa jõest). St jõe puhul ei räägi me ainult liikuvast veest, vaid rajast mille liikuv vesi on endale uuristanud või mis on tema jaoks ette kaevatud. Tuule puhul võib samamoodi norida, et tegelikult ei räägi me kunagi tuule puhumisest kui sellisest vaid tuule puhumist millegi suhtes: tuul puhub näkku, tuul sahistab lehti, tuul tantsiskleb maas lebavat kilekotti jne. Kui õhu liikumine ei mõjuks asjadele ja ei oleks meile visuaalselt või taktiilselt tajutav siis oleks vähe põhjust tuulest üldse rääkida.
Võib täiesti ühemõtteliselt öelda, et seisundiks taandamise tendents teaduses ja taandamist ideaaliks pidavate teadusteooriate viljakas aeg on läbi saanud. (Elias 2013[1970]: 138)
Semiootikas võiks samamoodi loota koodilt ümberorienteerumist märgiprotsessile.
Max Weber lammutas "ühiskonna" oma teoorias üksikute, iseseisvate ja täiesti sõltumatute täiskasvanud indiviidide tegevuste üsna korratuks hulgaks, mistõttu ta sattus sundseisu, kus kõik vaadeldavad ühiskondlikud struktuurid, tüübid ja reeglipärasused näisid ebareaalsed. (Elias 2013[1970]: 142)
See on vägagi tuttav tunne, erit mis puudutab riiki.
"Ei mingit kahtlust," kirjutas ta [Emile Durkheim] teoses "De la Division du travail social" ["Ühiskondlikust tööjaotusest"], "ühiskonnas ei [ole] olemas midagi, mida ei oleks olemas indiviidide teadvuses. Teisalt tuleb peaaegu kõik, mille me indiviidi teadvusest eest leiame, ühiskonnast. Suurem osa meie teadvuse sisust ei oleks saanud tekkida isoleeritud inimolendites ja oleks võtnud üsna erinevaid kujusid inimestes, kes oleksid rühmitunud kuidagi teisiti." (Elias 2013[1970]: 142)
Samasuguseid argumente on ehitanud paljud teised - ka Charles Peirce nende hulgas. Küll aga tuleb tähele panna seda "eest leidmise" momenti, sest siin on ümbersõnastatuna öeldud midagi sellist, et kõik mida võib indiviidi verbaalselt küsitledes teada saada on ühiskonnas juba mingil kujul olemas. See on selle pärast, et verbaalne suhtlemine on vähendatud versioon sisekõnest ja -tundmustest, mis omakorda on vähendatud versioon sellest mis inimese teadvuses tegelikult toimub. See oleks nagu ulpiva jäämäe (iceberg) veepealse osa mõõtmine.
Kuigi see on esialgu vastuolus tavapäraste keele- ja mõtteharjumustega, on märksa asjakohasem öelda, et inimene on pidevas liikumises; ta mitte ainult ei läbi protsessi, ta on protsess. Ta areneb. Ja kui me räägime arengust, siis mõtleme seesmist korda tolles järjepidevas kulgemises, mille käigus varasemast vormist sünnib katkematult hilisem, näiteks lapsepõlvest noorus, noorusest täisiga. Inimene on protsess. (Elias 2013[1970]: 143)
Mulle meeldib see mõtteviis, kuigi seda on raske otseselt kuidagi kasutusse panna. Ainus asi millega see seostub kohe on Peirce'i ja Rimbaud'i ütlused mõtlemise kohta, milles inimene pole tegutseja, vaid mõte on tegutseja ja inimene on selle tegevuse produkt või kõrvalsaadus. A la "mitte mina ei mõtle, vaid mina olen mõeldud". Selles tähenduses, et inimene ei ole tegija (agent), vaid inimene on tehtud.
Need ruumimetafoorid, millega inimene omistab endale mingi ruumilise ja tõendamatu positsiooni kestas, mis peab ju mingis mõttes olema tema ise ja mida ei ole kerge tõestada, peavad ilmselt väljendama üht inimese erakordselt tugevat, alatasa naasvat tunnet. Selle tunde ehtsuses ei tule kahelda. Kahtlema peaks, kas sellest tundest lähtuv ettekujutus iseendast ja seejärel pilt inimestest üldse vastab tõsiasjadele. (Elias 2013[1970]: 144)
Analoogia kaudu võiks samamoodi küsida, et kas kultuuridel on keskused või on see ainult tunne nagu oleks? Sellisel juhul on aga võimalik vaadelda materjaalseid jälgi - raamatute läbimüüki, kunstinäituste toimumisarve, jne. Aga ka individuaali tasandil võib vabalt osutuda tõeseks, et inimese teadvuse kese on seotud ajukelmetega mis omakorda on seotud teatud kehaosadega jne. (St neurokognitiivne tõestus pole välistatud.)
Me ei oska endale ette kujutada üksikinimest, kes eksisteerib täiesti omaette, ilma et maailmas oleks olnud või oleks teisi inimesi. (Elias 2013[1970]: 148)
Mina oskan. Näiteks Ishi kohta lugedes on kerge ette kujutada millises maailmas ta üksinda eksisteeris. Tõsi, ta ei eksisteerinud ilma, et maailmas oleks olnud või oleks teisi inimesi, aga kui su kujutlusvõime ei suuda sellist maailma luua siis on tegu kujutlusvõimetusega.
Weber ei pea sotsiaalseks ühtegi tegevust, mis on suunatud üksnes elututele objektidele, kuigi on ilmne, et mõte, mida mingi kalju, jõgi või torm omab üksikindiviidi silmis ja vastavalt sellele ka indiviidide tegevus seoses nende objektidega võib lihtsamates maagilis-müstiliste ususüsteemidega ühiskondades ning tugevamalt sekulariseerunud tööstusühiskondades olla äärmiselt erinev. (Elias 2013[1970]: 146)
Aga sotsiaalne tegevus ja jagatud/sotsiaalne tähendus on ju ometi erinevad asjad! Siin on vaja tookeni ja tüübi eristust.
Asesõna "mina", mida tavaliselt kasutatakse teistega suheldes, väljendades tõika, et mingi kindel ütlus käib kõneleja enda kohta, saab teaduslikus kasutuses korraga nimisõna, mis vastavalt valitsevatele keeletavadele näib tähistavat iseseisvat, isoleeritud üksiktegelast. "Ego" mõiste, nii nagu seda kasutavad Freud või Parsons, on hea näide suhtemõiste teisenemisest substantsi või eseme mõisteks. (Elias 2013[1970]: 148)
Jakobsoni "verbaalsed isikud" on ka suhtemõisted, sest tähistavad sõnumi (intentsionaalset) suhet (funktsiooni) isikute suhtes. See on kontseptuaalne-semantiline, sest puudutab sõnade tähendust. Väljaspool ütlust, lausungit, sõnumit jne on saatja (mina), vastuvõtja (sina) ja personaliseeritud referent (tema) ikkagi iseseisvad, isoleeritud üksiktegelased.
Üsna kiiresti on võimalib k veenduda, et üksikuid positsioone selles suheteseerias ei saa üksteisest lahutada. Funktsioon, mida asesõna "mina" inimestevahelises suhtluses täidab, on arusaadav üldse ainult seoses kõigi teiste positsioonidega, millele osutavad selle seeria ülejäänud liikmed. Kuus positsiooni on lausa lahutamatud, me ei suuda endale ette kujutada "mind" ilma "sinuta", "temata", "meieta", "teieta" ja "nendeta". (Elias 2013[1970]: 149)
Jällegi, mina suudan, sest keel on ainult üks viis kuidas "positsioonidele" osutada, kuidas suheldavat sisu personaliseerida, kuidas isikuid identifitseerida jne. Lihtne viipekeelne või mitteverbaalne vaste oleks nimetissõrmega osutamine (või isegi pelgalt vaatamine, ehk pilguga osutamine). Kui ma osutan näpuga iseendale, siis erinevalt keelelisest asesõnade hulgast (siin on neid kuus, aga võib eksisteerida keel kus neid on rohkem või isegi vähem) ei eksisteeri kindlat "suheteseeriat". Iseendale osutamine võib vastanduda suhtluskaaslasele osutamisest, aga kolmandale isikule või elutule esemele osutamine ei moodusta selgelt piiritletavat hulka. Siin on sama probleem mis suitsupakile osutamisega - ilma lisamärkideta on raske öelda kas osutuse point on "suitsud", "suitsupakid", "igasugused suitsupaki moodi esemed" jne. Tegelikus suhtluses ilmneb, et iga inimese peale langev pilt või osutav sõrm on identifikaator. Näiteks, vestled teise inimesega ja kolmas inimene kõnnib teie vahelt läbi. Sa vaatad kolmandale inimesele järele ja kortsutad kulmu, et väljendada oma pahameelt sellise ebaviisaka sekkumise peale ja ilma verbaalselt seda addresseerimata saab teine inimene aru, et sinu kulmukortsutuse adressaat oli kolmas isik.
Isikuliste asesõnade seeria esindab kõige elementaarsemat koordinaatide seeriat, mida saab rakendada kõikidele inimrühmadele, kõikidele ühiskondadele. Oma otseses ja kaudses suhtluses teistega jagunevad kõik inimesed rühmadeks: inimesteks, kes ütlevad enda kohta "mina" või "meie"; inimesteks, kes ütlevad "sina" või "teie" nende kohta, kellega nad suhtlevad siin ja praegu; inimesteks, kes ütlevad "tema" või mitmuses "nemad" kolmandate isikute kohta, kes viibivad siin ja praegu suhtlevatest isikutest antud hetkel või ka pidevalt eemal. Teised ühiskonnad kasutavad teisi signaale, mis võimaldavad ühiskonna liikmetel suheldes väljendada seda, millisel põhipositsioonil tolles suhtevõrgustikus asub see, kellega suheldakse. Aga selle koordinaatide seeria standardiseeritud sümbolid, olgu need kui erinevad tahes, on küll kõikidele inimrühmadele ühised. Koordinaatide seeria ise on üks inimühiskondade üldmõistetest. Ühtaegu on see tunnistus nende sidususevormide ainulaadsusest ja eripärasusest, millega on tegemist inimühiskondade lõimumistasandil. Inimeste kogemustel ja rühmitumisel "mina", "sina" ja "tema", "meie", "teie" ja "nemad" alusel ei ole vastet madalamate lõimumistasandite suhtevormides. (Elias 2013[1970]: 149)
Ühtäkki meikib senssi miks me seda teksti Andreas Ventseli seminaris loeme - see puudutab "meie" teemat. Võtmesõna on siin "põhipositsioon".
Nagu näha, erinevad positsioonide seeriad, mille kohta käivad isikulised asesõnad, nendest seeriatest, mida tavaliselt silmas peetakse, kui räägitakse ühiskondlikest positsioonidest kui rollidest, näiteks sedalaadi positsioonide seeriad nagu isa-ema-tütar-poeg või veltveebel-allohvitser-kapral-reamees. Suhtluses kasutatakse neid väljendeid ühtede ja samade isikute kohta. Suhteid ja funktsioone väljendavatele isikulistele asesõnadele on iseloomulik, et ühed ja samad asesõnad võivad mitme inimese üheaegselt toimuvas suhtluses tähistada erinevaid isikuid, sest see, mida need sõnad väljendavad, on isiku hetkepositsioon suhetes kõnelejaga või siis, olenevalt olukorrast, tema positsioon suhetes kogu suhtleva rühmaga. (Elias 2013[1970]: 150)
St mitteverbaalse vaste leidmine võib olla väga raske või isegi võimatu, sest vaja oleks midagi nagu vahelduvrolli identifikaator.
Figuratsiooni mõiste aitab luua lihtsat mõistelist tööriista, millega leevendada ühiskondlikku sundust rääkida ja mõelda nii, nagu oleksid "indiviid" ja "ühiskond" kaks erinevat ja tagatipuks antagonistlikku tegelaskuju. (Elias 2013[1970]: 157)
Minu jaoks ei ole see probleem, sest kommunikatsioonisüsteemi vaade sisaldab indiviidi ja ühiskonda kui erinevaid tasemeid.
Kui neli inimest istuvad laua ümber ja mängivad kaarte, siis nad moodustavad figuratsiooni. Nende tegevus sõltub üksteisest. (Elias 2013[1970]: 157)
See ongi kommunikatsioonisüsteem - kus lisaks vastastikkusele mõjule on ka vastastikkune teadlikkus.
See, mida me figuratsioonina mõistame, on muutuv muster, mille mängijad kui tervikud moodustavad üksteisega suheldes, mitte üksnes oma mõistuse, vaid kogu oma isikuga, kõigi oma tegemiste ja tegematajätmistega. Nagu näha, tekitab see figuratsioon pingestatud struktuuri. Mängijate vastastikune sõltuvus, mis loob eelduse, et nad moodustaksid mingi spetsiifilise figuratsiooni, ei ole üksnes sõltuvus üksteisest kui liitlastest, vaid ka kui vaenlastest. (Elias 2013[1970]: 157-158)
Vt ka pingestatuse ja võimusuhte seost:
Selgelt on näha ka põhjused, miks muudeti eespool mõiste "võim" substantsimõistest suhtemõisteks. Muutuvate figuratsioonide ehk, teisiti öeldes, figuratsioonide moodustumise protsessi keskmes seisavad vahelduvad pinged, siia-sinna kõikuv võimutasakaal, mis kaldub kord ühele, kord teisele poole. Sedalaadi kõikuv võimutasakaal kuulub kõigi muutuvate figuratsioonide struktuuriliste iseärasuste hulka. (Elias 2013[1970]: 158)
Kahjuks pole võimu kohta öeldud muud kui seda, et see on suhtemõiste.
Ühe klassi õpetajad ja õpilased, teraapiarühma arst ja patsiendid, kõrtsi püsikülaliste laudkond, lapsed lasteaias - kõik nad moodustavad omavahel suhteliselt hoomatavaid figuratsioone, aga figuratsioone moodustavad ka küla või suurlinna elanikud, rahvusrühma liikmed, ehkki sel juhul ei ole figuratsioon otseselt tajutav, sest sõltuvusahelad, mille inimesed siin omavahel moodustavad, on märksa pikemad ja diferentseeritumad. (Elias 2013[1970]: 159)
Viimane on Rueschi järgi kultuuriline (kommunikatsiooni)võrgustik.

Gfaller, Georg R. 1993. 'Figuration': The Contribution of Norbert Elias to Group Analysis and the Contribution of Group Analysis to the Social Sciences. Group Analysis 26(3): 341-356.

Medicine and psychiatry are relevant because they understand the somatic processes preceding, accompanying or resulting from psychological development. (Gfaller 1993: 341)
I should modify my own formula to: autocommunication precedes, accompanies and results from intercommunication.
Elias rejected the concepts of the holistic and the systemic approach, both of which he considered too inflexible and exclusive of boundary phenomena. According to him, the development of the ego or the development of the personality is never completed in the course of life. The majority of those individuals who are able to survive (also in a social sense) develop constantly changing inner figurations of ego, id and superego which are more or less adapted to prevailing general figurations. (Gfaller 1993: 342)
I concur that if the individual is viewed as a process then it cannot be a finished process but only an ongoing process. The "self" is never "ready". One could easily invent a parallel to the mythical version of Vana Toomas story - much like the city (Tallinn), which is constantly being developed, built and rebuilt - when the "self" is ready, then it is essentially dead (or about to die). Surviving in the social sense, on the other hand, seems to imply orientation and dependence on other people. I would argue that the hermit may be socially dead, but intellectually alive (and in fantasy communication with great thinkers through the medium of written word, for example).
As a follower of Elias I cannot see any useful way of applying systems theory to group analysis as it would require enormous theoretical effort to define the systemic boundaries of each new group-analytic situation that would also have to include the inferences caused by colliding systems. (Gfaller 1993: 343)
I can, though. What you call orientation and determination are accounted for by Ruesch's communication system approach. The boundaries of each new system depends on people's mutual awareness and perception. Inference caused by colliding systems (what an aggressive phrase!) is accounted for by situating the communication system (the given social interaction) in broader sociocultural matrix (a system of systems, so to say).
The superego of the powerful or ruling classes is itself already broken and thus pathological. To a certain extent it is made up of three different superegos. For the powerful there are alse even more powerful persons whose code of behaviour they have to become socialized into. This constitutes the first superego. Moreover, the powerful retain a fossilized superego from the time of their own ascent. This is the past superego. Finally, the powerful, threatened by the subjected groups which are striving to gain power, have to lean on the ascending classes in order to disguise the difference of interests. During this process they take over parts of the primitive superego of the ascending masses (Elias, however, also showed the opposite process of their distancinc themselves from the 'primitive' lifestyle of the masses, as Bosse (1991) points out). (Gfaller 1993: 345-346)
If this were solely about codes of behaviour I would be so on beard. But as it stands I'd have nothing to do with talk of ids, egos and superegos. It's an interesting concept though, if not relying too heavily on theory of social classes.
Interpersonal interactions in early childhood originally take almost exclusively physical forms. Only later when the child begins to explore and to comment on the world of objects do these interactions gain an additional symbolic character. Socialization into the given social situation does not begin here, it merely finds a new and special form (of language and motoric appropriation). Thus a first stage of socialization takes place in the apparently 'private practice' of the mother-child situation. (Gfaller 1993: 347)
This "motoric appropriation" yields only two search results: one in a presentation by G. Trevianus titled "dynTAM - a dynamic Thought Action Mood "cube" incorporating the approach curve. From Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wundt Weygand/Kraepelin, Sherrington to present triadic models of personality and temperament"; and the other in a text by Vincent Botella on the work of Ineke van Koningsbruggen. I wonder what this term designates specifically.
Together with Bosse I have developed the theory that the specifically Western form of mother-child interaction leads to phantasies of omnipotence in the child (Gfäller, 1986b) because in the Western baby's daily life there is no continuous physical contact with the mother and the individual mother is overburdened by the responsibility for the baby's total 'world'. (Gfaller 1993: 347)
Bullshit. ...Ugh, I mean: Transference!
Lorenzer's concept of the 'mother-child dyad' is an artificial abstraction which goes back a step behind Elias's theory of figuration where the interdependency of institution and individual constitutes the person. (Gfaller 1993: 348)
Is that what Elias's theory of figuration is about?
Lorenzer made another important contribution with his concept of 'scenic understanding":
The so called capacity to introspect is in reality the ability to narrate in images, i.e. the ability to cast spontaneous experience ... into physical symbols. The analyst ... uses scenic understanding as a tool to decode something that cannot yet be named, but has bee ndescribed to him in a scenic and physical way. (Lorenzer, 1981: 163)
Habl (1988) attempted to demonstrate how Lorenzer's concepts could be used in group analysis by giving concrete examples of group sessions and group enactments. (Gfaller 1993: 348)
This sounds like something that deaf sign language 'speakers' engage in constantly in the natural development of their signs. And there are more than two instances of this notion available online.
2. The so called individual does not exist as such but is always in figuration as individual as well as part of the surrounding social world. Individual abilities are repressed or furthered according to the need of the corrective or institution. Neuroses are the individual expression of disturbances in the whole network, which means that they also have institutionalized functions. (Gfaller 1993: 352)
This was also Ruesch's point: that sometimes the mental problems of the individual are actually manifestations of communication disturbances in the family or group and this calls for a social psychiatry.