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Showing posts with label Source: RVL. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Source: RVL. Show all posts

Problems and Principles

Abercrombie, David 1956. Problems and Principles: Studies in the teaching of English as a second language. London: Longmans.

These chapters originally appeared during the years 1948-54 in English Language Teoching, published by the British Council, and I am grateful to the Editorial Board for permission to reprint them here. They are reproduced with some slight revision. An abridged version of Ch. IV was published in Education To-day in 1953, and it was also reprinted in full in The Speech Teacher (U.S.A.) in 1955. (Abercrombie 1956: iii)
Apparently the first chapter appeared in ELT Journal in 1948 under the title "The Social Basis of Language".
General linguistics is partly concerned with the problem of what language does; that is, with the functions of any and every language. It is also concerned with what languages are, how they may best be analysed, described, compared, and classified; in other words, with the form of different languages. (Abercrombie 1956: 1)
Abercrombie is a functionalist. If it is true that the lectures in this book were first published between 1948 and 1954, then this does indeed predate Jakobson's scheme of linguistic functions.
First, language makes it possible for individuals to live in a society. It is characteristic of, indeed fundamental to, the modern point of view in linguistics to regard language as a social activity rather than as a means of individual self-expression. 'Speech is the instrument of society,' as Ben Johnson said; there is a very close connection between the two facts that man is a speaking animal, and that he is the social animal par excellence. The definition of language as 'a means of communicating thoughts' is nowadays commonly held to be, as a partial truth, more misleading than illuminating; a more fruitful definition is that language is a means of social control. (Abercrombie 1956: 1-2)
We do tend nowadays to conflate communication and social control. The connection between language and sociability is also at the heart of Ruesch's social techniques.
There are other uses of language which are not concerned with the communication of thoughts. The conversations which English people hold about the weather, for example, do not as a rule leave the participants any the wiser; only on rare occasions can information be said to have been exchanged. As far as communicating thoughts is concerned, they get nowhere; are they then quite pointless? No; a little reflection will show that this kind of language also has great social value. (Abercrombie 1956: 2)
What is phatic communion? "Quite pointless" is also characteristic of Jakobson's interpretation of phatic communion. In other treatments the point is to form an atmosphere of sociability, to communicate about relationship, etc. Notice also that Malinowski's "social function" has become "social value".
Most peoples have a feeling that a silent man is a dangerous man. Even if there is nothing to say, one must talk, and conversation puts people at their ease and in harmony with one another. This sociable use of language has been given the name phatic communion. The anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski invented the term, 'actuated' as he said, 'by the demon of terminological invention'; and although he was half in joke, the name has stuck. (Abercrombie 1956: 2-3)
This is the so-called Phatic Maxim (Keepi Talking!). I was not aware that Malinowski meant it humorously when he coined the term, but then again his writing is ambiguous enough to allow for a variety of interpretations.
The actual sense of the words used in phatic communion matters little; it is facial expression and intonation that are probably the important things. It is said that Dorothy Parker, alone and rather bored at a party, was asked 'How are you? What have you been doing?' by a succession of distant acquaintances. To each she replied, 'I've just killed my husband with an axe, and I feel fine.' Her intonation and expression were appropriate to party small-talk, and with a smile and a nod each acquaintance, unastonished, drifted on. (Abercrombie 1956: 3)
The nonverbal communication component of phatic communion is often neglected. I have a feeling that Abercrombie - as an early pioneer in paralanguage - does not neglect it. This brings him closer to Ruesch and Bateson with regard to metacommunication (this is the breaking point where facial expressions and intonation are relegated from simple "noise" to a relevant component of communication). Also, DP1. I am going to count the use of Dorothy Parker in this book. If Abercrombie uses the same illustration that Jakobson does then my hypothesis about influence has been valid.
A knowledge of the spoken form of any language must include knowledge of its conventions of phatic communion. Conversation is impossible unless one is equipped with meaningless phrases for use when there is nothing to say, and the teacher dealing with advanced students will take care to give them command of the necessary formulas and the rules governing their use. (Abercrombie 1956: 4)
I wouldn't say meaningless. There is definitely a semantic component (which becomes apparent in interlingual comparison of greetings, for example). But the suggestion that language teachers should provide phatic utterances for pupirs is in line with a whole host of later research on this front.
Grace de Laguna, in her excellent book Speech: Its Function and Development (1927), said, 'men do not speak simply to relieve their feelings or to air their views, but to awaken a response in their fellows and to influence their attitudes and acts.' The profoundly social character of language should constantly be borne in mind by the language teacher. (Abercrombie 1956: 4)
In other words, speech is not only expressive, but emotive and conative. A comparison with the functions of Ogden and Richards would be something to consider. Especially considering the fact that influencing of the other's attitude is often neglected when dealing with Jakobson's emotive function (it is exactly why he named it Emotive, after Anton Marty, rather than emotional or expressive). Also, de Laguna's book negates Berardo's suggestion that Jakobson brought the concept of function to American linguistics.
An utterance consists of symbols referring to whatever is being talked about; but it is also at the same time an index to various things about the speaker, particularly his personality. These two systems of signs are quite independent of each other. (Abercrombie 1956: 4)
As I thought, when Laver (1972: 11-12) talks about indexical information, he refers to a later work by Abercrombie.
Almost everyone, when meeting a stranger, bases an immediate judgment on the way he or she talks; and we can often infer from their speech, when meeting people known to us, whether they are in a bad temper, or feeling well-disposed. (Abercrombie 1956: 5)
More on metacommunication. This is also present in Malinowski's treatment of phatic communion. Speaing alleviates tension because it enables us to determine whether he is one of our own or a stranger, based on the language or the style or dialect of language spoken. Indeed, aside from indexical information there is nary a term for this kind of metacommunication (in fact, this term would have to be stretched to fit it, since in Ruesch and Bateson's conception it only covers code and relationship; similar issue plagues my notion that all of Jakobson's later functions - including poetic - are essentially metacommunicative).
It is not always easy to say how present to consciousness these interpretations are. Sometimes it is only on careful reflection that an attitude taken up towards someone can be traced to his voice and pronounciation; at other times we are fully conscious of the effects of someone's voice on us. (Abercrombie 1956: 5)
If I ever do take up a semiotic elaboration of Clay's The Alternative, this is exactly the kind of stuff that indistinctness can apply on.
Wrong judgments are particularly apt to be made on foreigners. It is likely, for example, that English assertions concerning the excitability of Frenchmen are founded on the fact that certain features of the speech of normal Frenchmen are closely similar to features of excitable Englishmen's speech. Americans, again, often accuse Englishment of superciliousness: normal English intonation closely resembles the intonation adopted by supercilious Americans. (Abercrombie 1956: 5)
Supercilious - behaving or looking as though one thinks one is superior to others. The latest trend is to view the British as more intelligent. In other words, it's the same perception of superiority, but as-if given into, thinking that they really are superior in some way (not only intellectually, but, for example, better mannered).
Possibly something similar lies behind the conviction in some countries that the presence of foreign words in the language is a menace to the national consciousness. Such a feeling has never, fortunately, been effective in this country, but elsewhere it has on more than one occasion given rise to legislation. (Abercrombie 1956: 6)
Similar tendency is growing in Estonia. This mostly due to American cultural influence and youth using a lot of English jargon and slang. I, too, sometimes give into this. I was recently somewhat annoyed that a poster advertising a real estate agency had the phrase "üks visioon", where "üks nägemus" would have sufficed.
Thirdly, forms of speech delimit social groupings, or classes, within a language community. When people congregate in a group they tend to behave in a similar way, and this similarity in behaviour, in so far as it is different from the behaviour of others, then becomes one of the factors which characterise, and so preserve, the group. Speech behaviour is deeply affected in this way: 'one may wonder', write Edward Sapir, 'if there is any set of social habits that is more cohesive or more disrupting than language habits.' (Abercrombie 1956: 6)
This is Morrisian communization (as opposed to differentiation), and related to de Saussure's force unifiante (as opposed to force particulariste).
The fact is that tu is regularly used, not as a sign of personal familiarity, but between members of certain social groups, political parties, and so on; and may often be used, therefore, between complete strangers. (Abercrombie 1956: 7)
This, on the other hand, is closer to Ruesch's version of communization - i.e. communion based on common experience or group membership.
One powerful impulse to the creation of slang is boredom with outworn locutions, and the desire to be expressive and vivid; which is why it is nearly always picturesque and sometimes in doubtful taste. But its real explanation lies in the fact that it is always the property of a group; its use proclaims membership of that group and distinction from other groups. (Abercrombie 1956: 7)
In this sense it likens to Tynyanov's literary evolution, i.e. how outworn styles or genres are replaced by newer, perhaps more expressive and vivid, ones.
Language not only brings human beings into relationship with each other, it also brings them into relationship with the external world. Language mediates between man and his environment. (Abercrombie 1956: 9)
In terms of systems theory: Language is not only an integrative system but a constitutive system. Now all that is needed is the field system aspect: Language mediates between man and all other forms of systems (cultural, literary, artistic, etc.).
The naïve, or common-sense, view is that language reflects the world and our thinking about it; that to the categories of language correspond categories of the real world. Modern linguistics, however, inclines to the view that language is not a passive reflection of, but rather an active practical approach to, the world - a sorting out of it for the purpose of acting on it. Experience is dissected, split up, along lines laid down by language, not necessarily along lines laid down by nature. (Abercrombie 1956: 9)
Le Sapir de Whorf hypo thesis.
Language enables man to live in society, but the kind of society in which he lives will profoundly effect his language. Lexical structure and social structure are intimately connected, and it is here that the most serious difficulties for the language learner are probably to be found. A language is not only part of the cultural achievement of a people, it also transmits the rest of their culture system. (Abercrombie 1956: 11)
Here we have something similar to Ruesch's discussion of the relation between verbs and actions. And also the field system - language mediates the rest of the cultural field.
Many writers, and most notably Ogden and Richards in The Meaning of Meaning, have drawn the distinction between the referential or scientific and the emotive or lyrical uses of languages. The first is not, of course, confined to science, nor the second to poetry. Even though certain words are commoner in one than the other, the difference between them does not depend on vocabulary; the use of scientific terminology is no guarantee of a scientific use of language. (Abercrombie 1956: 15)
Could it be that Ogden and Richards influenced the aesthetic and/or poetic function?
The terms active and passive are, of course, relative; they do not imply that reading, and listening to speech, are effortless. They may entail the expenditure of a great deal of energy, and certainly will when a new language is being learnt. 'Expressive' and 'receptive' are alternative, and perhaps preferable, terms. (Abercrombie 1956: 17)
One could wonder if addresser and addressee, or sender and receiver, by some chance could have given way to expressor and receptor. These are only marginally weirder than communicator and communicant, or ego and alter.
When a language, whether mother tongue or foreign, is fully known, some parts of it will remain relatively passive. Some words are 'known' in the sense that they are under full control and regularly used for self-expression, others are 'known' in the sense that they are recognised and understood (perhaps with the context to remind) when met in reading or listening, but seldom or never uttered or written. This distinction between active and passive vocabulary is pedagogically a useful one, for it is too often believed that learning a word necessarily means adding it to the active vocabulary. (Abercrombie 1956: 17-18)
Just a few days, in I.A.'s lecture, I attempted to make the case that "code" is a cover-all term which, in accordance with Jakobson's cryptographic model, appears homogeneous on the surface but in actuality is quite heterogeneous. That is, despite us speaking the same language, my code is different from your code. Activity and passivity perhaps better make my point.
Parrot-fashion teaching is apt to result from regarding reasoned explanation as 'unnatural'; there is bound to be, in any course, a good deal of mechanical, repetitive, boring work, but it should be set off by whatever appears to the intelligence and powers of analysis of the learner are suited to his age. (Abercrombie 1956: 25)
Exactly why I think I should proceed with Bergheimer Musikanten Geschichten.
The greatest incentive which the learner can have is the feeling that he is doing something with the language - reading a book, playing a game - which is worth doing for its own sake. It is most important, therefore, that he should acquire as soon as possible a body of knowledge of the language which can be used as language, as a medium of communication, and not as a mere material for exercise. It is a fallacy that simple vocabulary can handle only simple thoughts; matters of considerable complexity can be expressed in a small but well-chosen vocabulary consisting only of common words. (Abercrombie 1956: 25)
Yup. My method of improving my English has consisted mainly of re-writing passages in order to gather source material for my research.
Every phonetician must have had the experience, at some time or other, of meeting a person to whom the imitation of the most exotic sounds at first hearing presented no difficulty at all. At the other extreme are a more numerous minority who are hopelessly recalcitrant, and for whom any deviation from the native sound system is apparently impossible. These two extremes are said to differ from each other in the matter of 'ear'; but what exactly this ear consists of is mysterious enough. (Abercrombie 1956: 34)
This minority around here - i.e. Estonian speakers who speak English as if it were a bastardized form of Estonian - is quite large.
Is it really necessary for most language learners to acquire a perfect pronounciation? Intending secret agents and intending teachers have to, of course, but most other language learners need no more than a comfortably intelligible pronounciation (and by 'comfortably' intelligible, I mean a pronounciation which can be understood with little or no conscious effort on the part of the listener). I believe that pronounciation teaching should have, not a goal which must of necessity be normally an unrealized ideal, but a limited purpose which will be completely fulfilled: the attainment of intelligibility. (Abercrombie 1956: 37)
I believe in something like this in terms of writing. I admit that I often stumble over English syntax, and notice that some non-native researchers, when corresponding in English, sometimes fail to come across as intelligible. But there is a comfortable zone, and I'm sure that it has interlingual characteristics: Estonians tend to find less-than-perfect English with some implicit Estonianisms more palatable than perfect English. At least that's the impression I've formed over the years when reading the works of local colleagues.
Even if he has no particular intentions of spending his time with English people, RP [Received Pronounciation] might be thought the most suitable accent for a European learner, just as an accent of the United States is the obvious one for learners in Central and South America. (Abercrombie 1956: 54)
Claiming and dividing territory, eh?
IN NORMAL friendly conversation, it is most important to avoid silence. If somebody volunteers a piece of information or some exciting news, or puts forward an opinion, or exclaims with surprise at something, an answer is just as necessary as when a question is asked. The answer may be purely formal and may convey little or no information, but it keeps the conversation going, and prevents the discomfort of a pause. For someone who is still a learner of the language in which the conversation is being conducted, however, it is not easy to know what exactly ought to be said under these circumstances. (Abercrombie 1956: 57)
And we are back to phatics! Keeping the conversation going is at the core of Jakobson's penchant for prolongation.
The basis of this type of comment is simply the repetition of the verb and subject of the original sentence. The subject is repeated in the form of a pronoun, and the verb in the form of whatever anomalous finite was used in the original sentence, or, if no anomalous finite occurred there, in the appropriate form of the verb to do. Thus:
StatementComment
'This is a good book.''It is.'
'What nasty weather we're having.''We are.'
'Rain seems unlikely.''It does.'
The subject may come first, as in the preceding examples, or there may be verb-subject inversion:
StatementComment
'This is a good book.''Is it?'
'The shops close early today.''Do they?'
The negative not may be inserted in the comment:
StatementComment
'This is a good book.''It isn't.'
'I speak English very badly.''You don't.'
The intonation may be a falling one:
StatementComment
'This is a good book.''It is.'
'You can't drive without a lince.''Can't you?'
Or there may be a rising intonation:
StatementComment
'This is a good book.''It is.'
'The government will never allow it.''Won't they?'
It can be seen at once that a good many varieties are possible, and they must be classified and tabulated before it can be shown how they are used. (Abercrombie 1956: 58-59)
For some reason this looks exceedingly Malinowskian, specifically with regard to the constant focus on affirmation.
It should be noted, in passing, that the same sentence may sometimes be an expression of opinion, and at other times may convey information, depending on who is speaking and who is being addressed. 'This is a good book', when said during casual party conversation, is an expression of opinion; but when said by a professor to a student it probably conveys information. In some situations the person addressed may choose how he will take the sentence, and make his comment accordingly. (Abercrombie 1956: 62)
Relevance theory! Relevance theory!
HUMAN conversation consists of much more than a simple exchange of words and sentences, and although our vocial organs are enough for the mere production of speech sounds, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that we need our entire bodies when we converse. There is a whole range of bodily behaviour which forms an essential 'background' to talking, whatever the language may be. It is surprising that this has up to now been the object of so little study, in spite of the continually increasing interest taken in spoken language over the last hundred years. Sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists have at times called attention to its importance, but only scattered, incidental remarks on the subject are to be found in the literature of linguistics. Nobody seems ever to have attempted a detailed, systematic, comprehensive survey which could be put to use by (among others) language teachers. (Abercrombie 1956: 70)
Well, at the time, Ray Birdwhistell was attempting a detailed, systematic study, but without an emphasis on language teaching. The chapter ends with the following footnote: "I had not, when this was written, succeeded in seeing a copy of Ray L. Birdwhistell's Introduction to Kinesics (University of Louisville, 1952); it gives a very complete notation for bodily movements." (Abercrombe 1956: 82ff)
It is hard to understand the remarkable neglect of gesture as a subject for comparative study, in spite of the obvious difficulties. Most writers on the subject have confined themselves either to rhetorical gesture, the kind that actors and orators employ, the kind that used to be known technically as 'action' (as in Hamlet's advice to the players: 'suit the action to the word'); or to the sign-languages of Red Indians and of deaf-mutes. (Abercrombie 1956: 71)
That's actually a good point, because historical studies also (like Aldrete 1999) focus on "rhetorical" or "oratorical" gesture.
There is here a fascinating, but almost untouched, subject, and one which should interest teachers of language as much as any other students of linguistics. It is a subject, incidentally, which is so far without a recognized name. I shall not attempt here to start on the comparative survey which is so much needed; all I wish to do is to indicate briefly what seem to be some of the reasons why gesture has been neglected, and to suggest some of the preliminary work necessary to a full-scale study. (Abercrombie 1956: 71)
I recall my linguistic supervisor retelling how she was approached by her supervisor at the time and just told, "study this". It is as if he had read this paragraph.
The contexts in which gesture is found also vary. It may be mainly an emotional running commentary on what is spoken, or it may be used to supply highly important items of meaning; it may be a continuous flow of movements, all merging into each other, or the speaker may have recourse to it only when at a loss for words. The English, when emotionally aroused, are likely to use more gestures; Egyptians, on the other hand, have been observed, when very excited, to use less. (Abercrombie 1956: 77)
What is metacommunication? By and large an emotional running commentary on what is spoken.
These independent gestures - a nod of the head, a shrug of the shoulders, stroko - stand in a different sort of relation to speech from the poko gesture. The latter is an example of dependent gesture. Its value in conversation is emotive rather than referential. (Abercrombie 1956: 78)
Emotive and referential function before Jakobson.

A Philosophy of Solitude

Powys, John Cowper 1933. A Philosophy of Solitude. New York: Simon and Schuster.

It is a profound psychological truth that the words of a moral optimist are futile mockery to a neurotic pessimist. It is like telling a person who feels despair that if he makes the grimaces of happiness that he will be happy (Powys 1933: 2)
Like the popular sayings, "Turn that frown upside down" and "Smile and the world similes with you" - as if modifying the outward expression would somehow eliminatu the deep psychological troubles of the person. Such pretending will only serve to calm those around that "if you can't see it then it is not there".
No one who has lived for a decade in a large American city could rise to the pitch of Walt Whitman's splendid and flowering "yes!" to such a Pandemonium. Human nature would simply crack under the strain, under the vast hypocrisy - for it would be no less - of giving an assent to such a Malebolge. And moreover, we are so driven to the wall in a great modern city, and so deafened by the tumult, and so drunken upon shameless sex and deadly liquor, and so scoriated in our nerves by the gregarious confusion, that the only thing that can really help us is a much more definite and drastic philosophy than these eloquent writers supply; a real, hard, formidable, unrhetorical philosophy, that gets down to the granite rock-bed of the ultimate situation when it is stripped and stark and bare. (Powys 1933: 3-4)
For me this stark and bare granite rock-bed of the ultimate situation is materialistic and concerned with the embodied existence of concrete individuals with very little eloquont ideas but much bodily dread and very real expenditure of energy on everyday practices. That is, the ultimate situation is nonverbal.
It will be noticed that I begin with the Taoist thinkers; and there is a reason for this. Alone among all the heathen soothsayers who can help us to attain solitude in the midst of the crow these superior men are free from pride, from conceit, from vanity! (Powys 1933: 4-5)
These are good qualities for any deserving person, but somehow denigrated in our own modern society where pride (uhkus, concit (upsakus) and vanity (edevus, tühisus) run rampant.
Le tus therefore - even in the midst of our vulgar civilization - sink into our own souls and be alone with that Solitude that can create and destroy without the help of any violence. The power of the individual mind to create its own happiness, from the barest, starkest, simplest surrounding, is something that the early Christian mystics possessed. They had God to fall back upon; but we, if lacking God, have at least the cosmic elements, These great presences have a singular value for that psychic-sensuous contemplation which is the secret of lasting human happiness. When you concentrate upon these things it is as if you were aware of another Dimension through thinner walls than exist anywhere else in the Cosmos, and thus were able to tap some reservoir of unfathomable power, from which a mysterious life-magnetism can pour through your whole being. (Powys 1933: 6-7)
Seems like a step toward a guide to being happy in solitude.
The essence of the doctrine of Tao seems to be that it is through withdrawing ourselves rather than asserting ourselves, through retreating rather than advancing, through yielding rather than pursuing, through inaction rather than through action, through becoming quiet rather than through making a stir, that we attain wisdom and spiritual power.(Powys 1933: 11)
This sounds vaguely familiar, but via pesonal experiences with psychedelics, that it is much better to lie down and let the earth - as some sort of raft - to carry you and mold you, rather than to fight it and force it.
Laotze teaches that we should cultivate the art of reducing our self-asserion to the supremelimit. He insists that we should un-learn our superficial cleverness and not only cease competing with others, but flow with them and into them, through them, and lose our identitiy in their presence, deliberately become undistinguished, insignificant - but thus becoming the most magical of magicians! (Powys 1933: 11)
Knowing ourselves through others, gaining by letting go.
"If thou set thine heart upon philosophy, prepare straighway to be laughed at and mocked by many who will say, Behold he has suddenly come back to us a philosopher; or, How came you by that brow of scorn?"
There seems something peculiarly adapted to our case about the ideas of Epictetus, when, just as in his day, we are all so brow-beaten by officials, persecuted by petty tyrants, threatened by brute violence.
"But the tyrant will bind - what? The leg. He will take away - what? The head. What then can he not bind and not take away? The will. And hence that precept of the ancients - Know Thyself." (Powys 1933: 20-21)
You can be laughed at and mocked, beaten and even killed, but remember to be yorself - it is the one thing that cannot be taken away. The body can be beaten to submission, but the soul cannot.
- "What, then, if one come and find me alone and slay me? Fool! not thee, but thy wretched body. Thou art a little soul bearing up a corpse." (Powys 1933: 23)
Do noh be afraid of death or seek sociality for the sake of security - for you are not your body, but your soul (trapped in a dying body).
We need, just now, a certain fierce, bitter, indignant philosophy that is neither too easy-guing towards the gods for the sort of a world they have made, nor towards ourselves for the folly with which we make the bad worse. We need to put into our cosmic philosophy a little of the black bile that we put into our human relations We need a certain bone to bone austerity in our mental vision combined with a new emphasis upon the power of the will and the magic of the will. (Powys 1933: 25)
Wise words to live by. I think I should embellish my thesis with the same sort of black bile that I find in dystopian fiction.
Every human being is alone in the core of the mind. When we are born we cry; and that cry is the cry of loneliness.
Thus it is with children. Thus it is with the growing youth. And the older we grow the lonelier we grow. (Powys 1933: 37)
Ain't that the truth.
By the constant practice of this mental awareness our reaction to the world will come to rest, not on the shifting sands of human opinion but on the sublime and terrible truth of the ultimate situation. This situation is not changed because in the body we may be surrounded by other bodies, Our innermost self is indeed fatally involved with the personal peculiarities of our material flesh and our blood. Our lonely ego is always hemmed in by our own body, and very often by the intrusive and aggressive bodies around us. The life of our soul is cruelly dependent upon our bodily health, upon our idea of ourselves as irrevocably bound to our burdened and exhausted senses. But the fact that every conscious self possesses a central core, a unifying force, an integral identity, implies a constant renewal of our natal solitude; of our inherent isolation, from the security of which we gather ourselves together for our next outrush into sight, smell, taste, hearing, touch and the overpowering pressure of other personalities. (Powys 1933: 38)
E.g. the body is an endless source of trouble.
It is indeed so involved wih the body that its chief activity seems to be the unifying and focussing of the senses; and yet there come moments when this central power within us seems to withdraw into some mysterious and remote levels of its own being and we feel as if we approach the verge of the strange and startling possibilities.
This is a feeling only; but it is connected with a constant sensation that represents an unquestionable fact, the fact namely that we possess a centralizing, unifying self or ego, which is the driving-force of all we think, or do, or feel, or say.
And whatever may be happening to our body this self or ego, the conscious "I am I" within us, is absolutely alone. It is alone from the first moment of its awareness of life to its last moment on the treshold of what may be its final extinction. (Powys 1933: 39)
The self is within the body and absolutely alone - this is the ultimate situation.
The drifting, brainless gregariousness of so many human boings , imitating one another, conciliating one another, admiring, desiring, envying, competing, tormenting one another, is an attempt to escape from this inherent loneliness of the self. (Powys 1933: 39)
Apply cold water to the burned area.
Because the instinctive image-making tendency of old times regarded this "soul" as a spiritual replica of the body, and born to survive the body, we have grown hostile to the very word. Malicious folly! A if any word could be better to express all the secret experiences of the self; its resistance, its creative energies, its furtive withdrawal. (Powys 1933: 43)
It is because nothing internal to the body - other than bones - can survive. External - such as mans creation - does survive.
The person who makes it the main purpose of life to clarify, concentrate, crystallize his inmost self against the universe, can be immensely assisted in this task by the ideas of the early Greek philosophers, and the early Medieval Schoolmen.
It is St. Thomas Aquinas who says, "Creare proprium personae," which might be translated, "To create is the prerogative of personality."
St. Thomas is right; but such creation by personality is not done by accident. It is done by practice. It is done by focussing the mind upon the mind, the self upon the self, the life upon life. It is done by acquiring theh bait of doing it. It is done in the beginning by an act of faith and it is done last by repeated acts of the will. (Powys 1933: 46)
Autopoiesis through poesis.
Only those whose interior selves live habitually in loneliness, know - as the convalescent does - the tremulous approaches of human tenderness. This is one of the ultimate paradoxes.
The primeval simplicities of the dignity of life that each man, each woman grows aware of in the austere mystery of solitude are what purges the mind for the welcoming of the most delicate touches of human sympathy.
Only the lonely know the full vibration of a look, a touch, a word, let fall at the moment when most it is needed. (Powys 1933: 53)
Sweet.
It must always be remembered that the isolation of the self, in a deliberately lonely life, need not imply living in actual solitude.
What it does imply is the choice of a contemplative life over every other; but a contemplative life that can be lived under almost every conceivable condition.
A person can be a soldier, a school-master, a revolutionary agitator, a farmer, a factory-hand; a person can be any kind of working-woman. or domestic woman, and live in profound loneliness. (Powys 1933: 60)
Indeed.
To be possessed of a philosophy of its own, the lonely self must detach itself from all philosophical systems, both old and new, but it need not dogmatically reject any of these.
They will always remain there, these slowly-evelved accumulations of thought and feeling. They will always be at hand for the libeated ego to take what lends itself to its nature, from all these great intellectual and emotional deposits; henceforth, after this one clear act of detachment, it is no longer committed to any of them by the insidious hypnosis of custom. It is free. It is removed a certain distance from all and it is critical of all. (Powys 1933: 65)
Theorizing and tradition.
A man's philosophy, a woman's philosophy, is the conscious habit of thought by which the self gathers itself together, cleanses itself, governs itself, steers itself; and copes as well as it may with all the pleasant or unpleasant impacts of the vast impinging Not-self. (Powys 1933: 67)
#self #habit #theorizing
In spite of what Miguel Unamuno says, we can live happily without knowing whether there is a God; we can live worthily without knowing whether we survive death. Why torment ourselves any further then by going round and round in this tread-mill circle?
The better way is to find a substitute for God, a substitute for Immortality. For this refusal to waste our precious hours in kicking against the pricks does not mean that the satisfaction our fathers got from these things can be supplied in no other way. (Powys 1933: 74-75)
Not knowing; Purpose.
Intellectual people may be forced to give up their loneliness for the sake of love or of lust - that is altogether a different matter, and when you came to analyze it to the bottom both love and lust are profoundly lonely - but they will never give up their loneliness for the mere herd-pleasure of feeling warm and cheerful and friendly and spiteful.
Intellectual people are not rare. There are a great many of them. Most families contain at least one such. An intellectual person is a person who has the gonius to grasp the fact that it is a curious experience to be olive; so curious in fact that it is madness not to sacrifice everything to get the full taste of it!
A well-managed solitary life, whether surrounded by people or protected from people, is a very delicate and a very difficult work of art.
Routine plays a leading part. Men and women who do not insist on routine in their lives are sick or mad. Without routine all is lost. Just as without some kind of rhythm all is lost in poetry. For routine is man's art of copying the art of Nature. In Nature all is routine. The seasons follow ane another, the blossom and the fruit follow, and then comes the fall.
Routine is the rhythm of the universe. By routine the harvests are reaped, by routine the tides rise and ebb; by routine the Constellations march in their sublime order across the sky. The feel of routine is the feel of the mystery of creation. In the uttermost abysses of life it holds sway. Beautiful and tragic is its systole and diastole. Without routine there can be no happiness; for there can be no endurance, no expectation, no security, no peace, no old or new, no past or future, no memory and no hope.
But after routine has been attained the most important achievement in the art of a solitary life is having the right thoughts, that is to say having thoughts that give you a calm happiness, in place of thoughts that prick you and sting you and bite you and corrode you!
It is astonishing to think how long humanity has existed, and yet how little we have advanced in gaining control over our thoughts. To control your thoughts - that is the most important thing you can do; far more important than to control your children or your food or your drink or your wife or your husband or your business or your work or your reputation. He who can control his thoughts is at the key-position of the Cosmos. He has the clue, the secret password. Down into the depths of the sea he can dive and find pearls and coral and drowned gold. Over the grassy prairies he can follow the wind till he feels os if he were clutching the rim of the horizon with his crooked fingers. (Powys 1933: 77-79)
Intellectuality, routine, happiness.
A person's life-illusion is that secret dramatic way of regarding himself which makes him feel to himself a remarkable, singular, unusual, exciting individual. Everyone has a life-illusion; and it is something that goes much deeper than mere vanity or conceit.
A life-illusion is never wholly untrue. It is a vaporous eidolon of yourself that walks about with you wherever you go. It is a shadow. And becaue it is a shadow it has truth. But it is not a shadow of your objective self; - that dressed-up popinjay or scarecrow that your negihbours catch sight of before you open your mouth; - it is the shadow of your own subjective self; tho shadow of that etheric mask of the obysmal thing-in-itself, which has been created by your mind. The imost "I am I" is the thing-in-itself; and this creates the etheric self, whose shadow is the life-illusion. (Powys 1933: 80)
Life-illusion is a neat concept.
Women would not be the adepts they are both at flattering men's life-illusions and at stabbing them with bodkin-thrusts of a miraculous cruelty if they were not merciless critics of these subjective mas'uerades ... and heroic protectors too ... in deep and terrible intuition.
Strangers who visit some menage-a-deux all unexpectedly are often shocked at the way woman will tear to pieces, as if for their special enteriainment, every shred of dignity in her mate. Ah! you do not know the secrets of these people's hearts! She will deride and mock her man's real character to her heart's centent. He minds this no more than a pig minds scratching, or a trout minds tickling. But to his life-illusien oshe will preserve an inscrutable, mysterious, and hieratic reverence. (Powys 1933: 81-82)
The negative side of woman's intuition.
Every cult has its dominant clue-gesture; and the dominant clue-gesture of the "vita nuova" described here might be expressed in the term premeditated extacy; an erotic embrace of the not-self by the self. (Powys 1933: 86)
The TMS clue-gesture is a word, namely, "text."
These walls, or these half-open wndows, through which the yellow sun or the dark night appears, are the fringes, edges, margins of an unfathomable universe, or the brink of which we stand, while our soul grapples with the Unknown. (Powys 1933: 91)
Semiotics of windows could be an actual topic, dealing - besides glass windows - with computer screens and virtual application windows.
Men are such monsters to ment that no happiness is possible without a definite and premeditated forgetting of what they are always doing to one another. There is little danger that lonely, sensitive people become callous to such things. Even a great reformer, like Lord Shaftesbury, must have had to forget some things in order to live to do what he did for the torture victims of industrial greed; and the same apllies to those among us who follow his steps. (Powys 1933: 95)
#sensory_gating "forgetting #numbness
Nothing that any power can do can murder the senses, while a man lives, that he loses the distinction between self ond non-self. At the worst - in a great numbness, blankness, darkness, paralysis - he is aware of his body, the yot more objectively-remote non-self, and he is aware, if his plight be not unique in its desperation, of other minds, not so very far away, that resemble his own. (Powys 1933: 99)
#ego_death
It seems to me that the first thing such a person turns his mind to is to chance of his having acquired consciousness at all! How extraordinary, how never to be taken for granted, is the fact that in a universe - so full, as far as he knows, of so many inanimate things, and of so many things that, though animate, possess levels of consciousness apparently very different from his own - he should be saying so clearly to himself: - "Here am I, a living, conscious entity, in the midst of all this!"
Having realized the miracle of his being what he is - a conscious self in this bleak place - the next thing he does is to ponder on the inevitability of death.
He is alive now, he is conscious now; but in a given time, short or long as it may happen, he will be as unconscious as the woodwork of this melancholy window, the withered leaves blown across it, as the raindrops streaming down it. (Powys 1933: 96-97)
Sounds like he is describing a psychedelic trip.

A philosophy of solitude: John Cowper Powys: 9780904247183: Amazon.com: Books. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://www.amazon.com/philosophy-solitude-John-Cowper-Powys/dp/090424718X

John Cowper Powys (1872-1963) was born in Derbyshire, brought up in the West Country (the Somerset/Dorset border area was to have a lasting influence on him), went to Cambridge University and then became a teacher and lecturer mainly in the USA where he lived for about thirty years. On returning to the UK, after a short spell in Dorset, he settled in Wales in 1935 where he lived for the rest of his long life. Those are the bare bones of his life. In some senses they seem unimportant when set alongside his extraordinary writing career. Not only was output prodigious, it was like nothing else in English Literature. Indeed, George Steiner has made the bold claim that his works are 'the only novels produced by an English writer that can fairly be compared to the fictions of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky'. And even that doesn't touch on their multifarious strangeness. John Cowper Powys wrote compulsively: letters, diaries, short stories, fantasies, poetry, literary criticism, philosophy and, above all, novels poured out of him. He also wrote a remarkable autobiography. In addition to his Autobiography his masterpieces are considered to be Wolf Solent, Glastonbury Romance, Weymouth Sands and Porius. But his lesser, or less well-known, works shouldn't be overlooked, they spring from the same weird, mystical, brilliant and obsessive imagination. John Cowper Powys is a challenging author with an impressive list of admirers. In addition to George Steiner, these have included Robertson Davies, Margaret Drabble, Theodore Dreiser, Henry Miller, J. B. Priestley and Angus Wilson.

The Philosophy of Walking, by John Cowper Powys. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://willnixon.com/insights/the-philosophy-of-walking-by-john-cowper-powys

Nietzsche maintained the admirable opinion that all exciting and enlarging human thoughts come to their originator’s heads in the process of walking. Philosophy that is worthy of the name is a walking philosophy. Now there are many subtle reasons for this. In the first place the “humours” of the body, as Burton explains them in his “Anatomy of Melancholy,” are stirred up, shaken off, dissipated, dispersed by the movement of walking.
This is actually reasonable. Walking incites more energetic thought processes. A.R. paces to and fro when giving a lecture.
Fifty years ago the philosopher had to struggle all his life against the narrow fanaticism of puritans who sought to suppress every free gesture of the sex-instinct; but now, at least among that large portion of the crowd that has imbibed the new fashion of thinking, the whole situation is reversed and every reaction against sex that we feel is regarded as a hopeless intellectual limitation.
This may explain why the situation in the BNW was so different from Orwell and Bradbury - the thirties were apparently a time of sexual freedom.

Nietzsche – The Lonely One | Harper's Magazine. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://harpers.org/blog/2009/11/nietzsche-the-lonely-one/

Verhaßt ist mir das Folgen und das Führen.
Gehorchen? Nein! Und aber nein – Regieren!
Wer sich nicht schrecklich ist, macht niemand Schrecken:
Und nur wer Schrecken macht, kann andre führen.
Verhaßt ist mirs schon, selber mich zu führen!
Ich liebe es, gleich Wald- und Meerestieren,
mich für ein gutes Weilchen zu verlieren,
in holder Irrnis grüblerisch zu hocken,
von ferne her mich endlich heimzulocken,
mich selber zu mir selber – zu verführen.
I detest following, but also leading.
To obey? Never! And just as bad – to govern!
He who wishes not to be terrified, will summon no terror for others:
Yet only he who peddles fear can lead others.
I even detest having to lead myself!
Like the creatures of the forest and the sea, I love
To lose myself for a while
In meek error thoughtfully to cower
Drawn home at length by distant things
Being enticed by myself to my Self.
–Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Einsame (ca. 1882) in Gedichte und Sprüche p. 75 (1908) (S.H. transl.)
Hannah Arendt ends The Origins of Totalitarianism with an extended essay on loneliness and solitude. Why? “Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time.” The essence of the alienation associated with the “crisis of modernity” involves the outsider’s swing between being a lone wolf and dissolving into the masses generated by the totalitarian wannabes of all stripes. Arendt sees the philosophical roots of this dilemma in works of classical antiquity, from Cicero to Seneca, in the writings of Augustine, but most of all in a handful of poems by Friedrich Nietzsche. She cites his short work Sils Maria and the more complex poem Aus hohen Bergen which has quite striking references to Friedrich Hölderlin. But still more important for this point is the poem Der Einsame which puts loneliness or solitude on one hand and the feeling of “belonging” in a still more starkly political context.
This is a valuable clue to cennecting solitude and dystopian fiction.

NVC: Readings with Commentary


AutorShirley Weitz (ed.)
PealkiriNonverbal communication: readings with commentary
IlmunudNew York; London; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1974
Linkhttp://books.google.ee/books?id=xyA8AAAAIAAJ
ViideWeitz, Shirley (Ed.) 1974. Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press.

Sisukord



Weitz, Shirley 1974a. Introduction. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 3-10.

Best sellers like Julius Fast's Body Language have safely established the study of nonverbal communication in the popular mind as a short cut to an understanding of human motivation and interaction. But, what is the more enduring place of nonverbal research in the behavioral sciences? When the fad passes and sensitivity groups are no longer in vogue, will interest in this area similarly fade? The opinion of this writer and many others in the field is an emphatic "no," because simultaneously with the emergence of "body language" as a popular pastime has come an avalanche of serious scientific work, on both the theoretical and the empirical levels. Indications are that nonverbal research will become an integral part of social psychological theories of interpersonal communication, person perception, and emotional expression, as well as contribute heavily to such applied fields as psychotherapy and integroup relations. Workers in fields allied to psychology, such as linguistics, anthropology, and communications, have also invested heavily in this research, and their different methodological and theoretical approaches have given a breath and variety to this field that is unusual in behavioral sciences. (Weitz 1974a: 3)
Tha last year alone has produced five major books in the area, devoted to theory and research of important investigators (Dittmann; Ekman, Friesen and Ellsworth; Hinde; Mehrabian; Scheflen, all 1972). The latest volume of the prestigious Nebraske Symposium on Motivation (Cole, 1972) has a major section on nonverbal communication, including articles by Ekman, Exline, and Mehrabian. Two textbooks entirely devoted to this area have been published (Eisenberg and Smith, 1971; Knapp, 1972), along with a reader emphasizing the communications aspect of nonverbal research (Bosmanijan, 1971). Semiotica, a new journal entirely devoted to research in nonverbal communication, has been created within the past five years. The Journal of Communication (Harrison and Knapp, 1972) has produced an entire issue on the subject. Hardly an issue of the Journal of Personality and SOcial Psychology goes by without two or three articles utilizing nonverbal or paralinguistic variables. (Weitz 1974a: 3-4)
Weitz thought that Semiotica was entirely dedicated to nonverbal communication :D


Weitz, Shirley 1974b. Facial expression and visual interaction. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 11-19.

A rather different contribution has been made by Allen Dittmann in his recent book, Interpersonal Messages of Emotion (1972). Dittman has developed a theory of emotional interaction based on the mathematical theory of communication (Shannon, 1948; Shannon and Weaver, 1949). By taking this point of view, Dittmann looks at many neglected areas of emotional communication. He considers individual and cultural differences in choice of channels for emotional messages, so, for example, some people and cultures may favor the voice rather than the face. He also thinks that channels change as a function of the age and depth of a social relationship. Two strangers may comunicate in the most universally understood channels: words, stereotyped facial expressions, and gestures. As the two get to know each other better, they use more subtle gradations of expressions and rely more on subcultural variations common to both or decoded by each member. Dittmann observes, "Many 'family resemblances,' by which we ordinarily mean genetic similarities of facial features or body build, are probably really based on family codes of expression" (Dittmann, 1972, p. 141). Dittman also considers the effects of noise on emotional communication. "Noise" in communications theory refers to interfering stimuli which are received along with the message. Noise can be random or nonrandom; interference between chanels is a related problem. Any code of emotional communication has to provide for a filtering mechanism to deal with such noise. One critical problem would be to discriminate emotional from similar nonemotional messages. (Weitz 1974b: 15-16)
This is the first time I've met any mention of this book by Dittmann. Could it be that the discussion on the role of culture in forming physical appearance mentioned in Flora Davis' Inside Intuition came from Dittmann's work?


Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus 1974. Similarities and Differences Between Cultures in Expressive Movements. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 20-33.

ELSEWHERE: http://tartu.ester.ee/record=b1238102~S1*est


Ekman, Paul, Wallace V. Friesen and Silvan S. Tomkins 1974. Facial Affect Scoring Technique: A First Validity Study. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 34-50.

ELSEWHERE: Ekman, Paul, Wallace F. Friesen and Silvan S. Tomkins 1971. Facial Affect Scoring Technique: A First Validity Study. Semiotica 3(1): 37-58.


Buck, Ross W., Virginia J. Savin, Robert E. Miller and William F. Caul 1974. Communication of Affect Through Facial Expressions in Humans. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 51-64.

ELSEWHERE: Buck, Ross W. Savin, Virginia J. Miller, Robert E. Caul, William F. ; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 23(3), Sep, 1972. pp. 362-371.
OR psp-23-3-362.pdf


Exline, Ralph V. 1974. Visual Interaction: The Glances of Power and Preference. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 65-92.

ELSEWHERE: Exline, Ralph 1971. Visual Interaction: The Glances of Power and Preference. In Nebraska Symposium On Motivation, 19. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. pp. 163-206


Weitz, Shirley 1974c. Paralanguage. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 93-98.

We have slowly moved away from the strictly linguistic and cognitive analysis of language exemplified by the psycholinguists and have gone on to the social context of language usage considered by the sociolinguists. Allied with the sociolinguists and the paralinguists, the subject of our present chapted. What differentiates the psycholinguists and sociolinguists from the paralinguists is that the first two are concerned with the semantic aspects of speech, the words themselves, while the paralinguists are happy with the "leavings" of the psycho- and sociolinguists - the nonsemantic aspects of speech, everything but the wowrds themselves. At first glance, it may seem that they have concerned themselves out of a filed, but what else is left after the words are gone? Quite a bit, it seems. Paralinguists set great store on how something is said, not on what is said. The tone of voice, pacing of speech, and extralinguistic sounds (such as sighs) make up their area of concern. (Weitz 1974c: 94)


Davitz, Joel R. and Lois Jean Davitz 1974. The Communication of Feelings by Content-Free Speech. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 99-104.

ELSEWHERE: Davitz, Joel R. (ed.) 1964. The communication of emotional meaning. New York: McGraw-Hill.


Scherer, Klaus R. 1974. Acoustic Concomitants of Emotional Dimensions: Judging Affect from Synthesized Tone Sequences. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 105-111.

An experiment with Moog synthesizers. Basically, Ctrl+F "Vocal Cues of Emotion" (here).


Milmoe, Susan, Robert Rosenthal, Howard T. Blane, Morris E. Chafetz and Irving Wolf 1974. The Doctor's Voice: Postdictor of Successful Referral of Alcoholic Patients. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 112-121.

ELSEWHERE: The doctor's voice: postdictor of successful referral of alcoholic patients.
Milmoe, S S; Rosenthal, R R; Blane, H T HTView Profile; Chafetz, M E ME; Wolf, I I; et al. Journal of abnormal psychology 72. 1 (February 1967): 78-84.
OR abn-72-1-78.pdf


Milmoe, Susan, Michael S. Novey, Jerome Kagan and Robert Rosenthal 1974. The Mother's Voice: Postdictor of Aspects of Her Baby's Behavior. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 122-125.

Discrepancies in anxiety (more filtered, less unfiltered) werre related to lack of expression of positive affect in boys at three different ages (for 8, 13, and 27 mo.: r's = -.67; p<.05; -.33; and -.60, respectively). (Milmoe, Novey, Kagan & Rosenthal 1974: 124)
Yeah, no.


Weitz, Shirley 1974d. Body movements and gestures. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 127-133.

The most popularized aspect of nonverbal communication is undoubtedly the area of body movement and gestures. Books like Julius Fast's (1970) Body Language promise the reader that he can "penetrate the personal secrets, both of intimates and total strangers" by reading key body signs. Advice on love and business encounters is especially well covered. Nierenberg and Calero's (1971) How to Read A Person Like A Book tries to apply body movement research to business success. Fast (1970) does a competent job of summing up research in nonverbal communication for the layman, though one suspects his conclusions will be taken a bit too uncritically by the average reader. (Weitz 1974d: 127)
Uncritically, indeed.
Historically, the entry of Ray Birdwhistell and Paul Ekman to the study of body movement signaled the beginning of two important research traditions. Birdwhistell's tradition is more heavily represented in this section, with Scheflen, Dittmann, and Kendon having the same general view. Ekman is represented by contributions in two other sections, with articles on facial expression and deception. Both have shaped different research traditions in nonverbal communication in general, and body movement in particular. Duncan (1969) makes a similar distinction between the structural and the external variable approach.
Ray Birdwhistell first began his research in 1952, with the publication of Introduction to Kinesics and has continued for the ensuing twenty-odd years to be an active proponent and pioneer in body movement research. His 1970 book, Kinesics and Context, is a collection of his essays (of which, two are presented here, p. 134 and p. 144) and presents his point of view quite directly and persuasively. Adam Kendon (1972) has written a very fine book review of Kinesics and Context which may well serve as an introduction to Birdwhistell's work. (See also Dittmann, 1971.) An anthropologist by professional affiliation, Birdwhistell's influence has been felt most heavily in the nonexperimental areas of psychiatry and communications research. He favors a contextual approach to studying the entire communications situation and vigorously opposes the isolation and manipulation of variables favored by Ekman's group. Birdwhistell characteristically does an extremely detailed analysis of short film segments of interactive behavior, taken in naturalistic settings. One famous film clip, "The Cigarette Scene," about a woman having her cigarette lighted by a man, takes eighteen seconds on film time, but considerably longer than that to read the finely honed analysis of verbal and nonverbal components. Birdwhistell's method of analysis is based on the descriptive linguistic model. Kinemes are relatively large units of body movement, such as lateral head sweeps and eye lid closure. Kinemes combine to form kinemorphs, then kinemorphemic classes, complex kinemorphs, and complex kinemorphic constructions. Birdwhistell has isolated body, facial, and head kinemes and is also interested in integrating kinesic behavior into the general communicative stream, including verbal behavior. In fact, he does not see the verbal-nonverbal dichotomy as a valid one and is reported by Knapp (1972) to have said that "studying nonverbal communication is like studying noncardiac physiology"; the distinction simply does not exist in his system. (Weitz 1974d: 128-129)
The Birdwhistell holistic, nonexperimental tradition has its drawbacks as well as its virtues. On the negative side, kinesic analysis is very much like literary analysis, one can impose one's own structure on the material and never really be certain that this is the best fitting model or the "correct" one. Experiments can, of course, be stacked in favor of a model, though we are slower to ascknowledge the existence of this sort of bias than the other. On the more practical side, Birdwhistell's mode of analysis is extremely time-consuming and difficult for one not carefully trained and experienced in the notation system. The sampling of situations often seems haphazard and is limnited to few cases. However, since Birdwhistell is working within the linguistic model, he feels that there is a universal grammar of kinesics, as in language, so that any kinesic sample, like any speech sample, can provide reliable information about the deep structure of the language. On the positive side, Birdwhistell's insistence on a holistic approach to communication has much to offer psychology, a field already riddled by atomism. At some point, we will have to fit all the verbal and nonverbal pieces together, and it makes sense to have a gadfly to continually remind us of our ultimate aim. (Weitz 1974d: 130)


Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1974a. Toward Analyzing American Movement. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 134-143.

ELSEWHERE: Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1971. Kinesic and Context: Essays on Body-Motion Communication. Allen Lane The Penguin Press


Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1974b. Masculinity and Femininity as Display. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 144-149.

ELSEWHERE: Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1970. Kinesic and Context: Essays on Body-Motion Communication. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press


Kendon, Adam 1974. Movement Coordination in Social Interaction: Some Examples Described. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 150-168.

The phenomenon of movement mirroring, which has been observed in a number of isntances in TRD 009, appears to occur only between the speaker and the person he directly addresses. As in the T extract, so in the other instances examined, it occurs most conspicuously at the very beginning of an interchange. Other participants may move concurrently with the movements of speaker and listener, as the axis of interaction between them is set up, but their movements are either of quite a different form from those of the direct addressee, or else they have a different timing. By mirroring the movement of the speaker, the person directly addresses thus at once differentiates himself from the others present, and at the same time he heightens the bond that is being established between him and the speaker. For the speaker it can serve as visual confirmation that his speech is properly directed, and for the others present it can serve to clarify the way in which participants activities are being patterned. (Kendon 1974: 158)


Dittmann, Allen T. 1974. The Body Movement-Speech Rhythm Relationship as a Cue to Speech Encoding. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 169-181.

Emotional expression has been my research interest for some time, and most of my empirical work on body movements has been done in the context of research on interview behavior. The method of studying these movements has been to count their frequency rather than to try to determine their individual meanings. The work can thus most properly be referred to as research in nervousness or didgetiness. (Dittmann 1974: 169)
The trouble with counting litle nervous movements in interviews is that the people are talking while they are fidgeting, and talking casts a shadow over everything else a person does at the same time. Everybody knows this at some level, so it is not a point worth belaboring. What is not known is how much this shadow affects different activities - difgeting in this case - and this is what we started out to learn. Maybe these little movements are so bound up with the act of talking that there is no point to trying to use them as measures to get at other things, like changing emotional states. (Dittmann 1974: 169)
and ah (pause) we would print
(pause) ah (pause) by the offset process
(pause) which isn't with a press
it's a (pause) photographic process
We call "fluent clause" one which has no non-fluencies within it. Juncture pauses are not counted as non-fluencies, so the third clause in our example is the only fluent one. Hesitation pauses, the ones other than juncture pauses, both filled and unfilled, are considered non-fluencies. A filled pause is usually an "ah," and it may be accompanied by additional non-phonation, as they are in our first two clauses above. Other non-fluencies are false starts, retraces and the like, but hesitation pauses are by far the most frequent. (Dittmann 1974: 171)


Scheflen, Albert E. 1974. Quasi-Courtship Behavior in Psychotherapy. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 182-198.

[182] One of these regular structures that invariably appeared in psychotherapy included behaviors like those found in American courtship. The ethics of psychotherapy have traditionally proscribed sexual behavior, and most of the therapists we studied were unaware that they behaved in ways which could be identified as sexual in therapy sessions. When we interviewed them about it, they spoke defensively, saying that if indeed they showed such actions they did not intend to; they must have unresolved personal problems or untoward countertransference reactions. So at first we thought that these little-known elements of courtshiplike behavior were undesirable contaminants of psychotherapy. But there were reasons to as[183]sume that this was no the case. First of all, some few therapists were quite aware of such behaviors and considered them a necessary part of their technique. Second, we saw these behaviors in all the psychotherapies we examined and in nearly all other interactions as well. Behavior this universal could not be written off as untoward or incidental.
So it seemed likely that our subject-therapists were mistaken in their surmises that courtinglike activities were merely undisciplined evidences of acting-out. We have found in talking to subjects about other covert kinesic activities that they do not know they are performing them, or they have culture-bound myths about the meaning of such activities. And we also know from experience that psychotherapists' conceptions of what they do are very different from those of research observers who study what they do. The point is evident. If we are to study poorly known and poorly understood human behaviors, we are going to have to be dissatisfied with preconceptions and free associations about their meanings and instead observe them systematically in the context in which they occur in order to derive their actual functions in an interaction.

The method of research
Recent developments in the behavioral and biological sciences have provided a method for doing this. From general systems theory we have gotten a model for conceptualizing the organization of living systems. Components are organized into units which, in turn, are part of larger systems. Even more recently it has become evident that behavior is integrated analogously; that is, standard units are integrated into larger units which, in turn, make up still larger units.
Such an arrangement of behavioral units in a hierarchy of levels has been applied to animal behavior by the ethologists. It has been held by gestalt theorists that human behavior is perceived in gestalten. In the last generation methods have been worked out in structural linguistics for determining the units of speech behavior and their arrangement in larger units, analogous to the hierarchies of levels of material systems. And in both the American and British schools of anthropology the realization has been growing that all behavior - not only speech - is patterned this way. So we no know why the gestalt theorists could find that people perceive units, not merely qualities of behavior; for these units are coded in a cultural and institutional tradition, and each generation learns them by conscious and unconscious processes.
These strands of development were formalized as a method of research at Palo alto in 1956 by Gregory Bateson, Ray Birdwhistell, Henry Brosin, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Charles Hockett, and Norman McQuown, and since then have been developed further by Ray Birdwhistell and the author. This approach to human behavior is known as "context analysis." Its principles and procedures have been described in other publications by Birdwhistell and myself. While I shall not detail the approach in this paper, it is this method that I applied to understanding the quasi-courting behaviors to be described here.
Briefly, the main elements of behavior are examined to their structural configurations as they appear in a stream of behavior. (This practice is very different from the usual approach in the psychological sciences, where this or that a priori decision made about what elements of behavior will [184] be selected or which qualities will be abstracted for study as variables.) Then, when a unit has been identified, each recurrence of it is examined in the contexts in which it occurs. By contrasting what happens when it does and does not occur, its function in the larger systems - and, therefore, its significance or meaning - is derived. This method differs from the practice of using free associations or judges to determine by intuition the meaning of the various behaviors in an interaction. It should be noted that I did not successfully derive the meanings of the sexual-like activities by asking psychotherapists why they perform them. As it happened, they did not know why, and when they speculated as to the reasons, their speculations did not fit the observable findings. It should also be noted that I did not count these behaviors or measure them. For I am interested in their meaning, and the rule of levels is that the meaning of an event is in its relationship to the larger picture, not in the qualities of the event itself. Finally, I did not correlate these activities with other activities, for it would not be sufficiently informative to know merely that two events occurred simultaneously. I must know, to derive meaning, exactly how each behavioral unit fits in relation to the others in the larger system. So I shall not present charts and statics, but only simple descriptions, and later abstractions not unlike those that every clinician makes. The advantage is that I can retrace my steps and tell exactly how each is derived. In other words, context analysis makes explicit (and precise) processes that are implicit in intuitive clinical observations.
[...]

COURTSHIP READINESS
Courtship behavior occur after a participant has come into a specific state of readiness. People in high courtshipp readiness are often unaware of it and, conversely, subjects who think they "feel" very sexually active often do not evidence courtship rediness at all. Courtship readiness is most clearly evidenced by a state of high muscle tonus. Sagging disappears, jowling and bagginess around the eyes decreases, the torso becomes more erect, and pot-bellied slumping disappears or [185] decreases. The legs are brought into tighter tonus, a condition seen in "cheesecake" and associated with the professional model or athlete. The eyes seem to be brighter. Some women believe their hair changes. Skin color varies from flush to pallor - possibly depending upon the degree of anxiety. It is possible that changes in water retention and odor occur.
Preening often accompanies these organismic changes, sometimes only as token behaviors. Women may stroke their hair, or glance at their makup in the mirror, or sketchily rearrange their clothing. Men usually comb or stroke their hair, button and readjust their coats, or pull up their socks.
[...]

[186] Other activities also appear to invite reciprocation in courtship. In addition to complementary or invitational statements and soft or drawling paralanguage, characteristic body motions are seen. Flirtatious glances, gaze-holding, demure gestures, head-cocking, rolling of the pelvis, and other motions are well known. In women, crossing the legs, slightly exposing the thigh, placing a hand on the hip, and exhibiting the wrist or palm are also invitational. Protruding the breast and slow stroking motions of the fingers on the thigh or wrist also are common.
[...]

Qualifiers of courting behavior

REFERENCES TO THE INAPPROPRIATE CONTEXT
Partners in a quasi-courtship may make references to the inappropriateness of the situation for sexuality by reminding each other that other people are present or by reminders of taboos or ethical considerations. They [187] may also remind each other that they are together to conduct the business at hand. In psychotherapy, the patient may be encouraged to feel her sexual feelings fully, yet be cautioned, by reference to the context, not to act them out. More often than not, such references are nonverbal. A gesture or movement of the eyes or head toward the setting or toward others is as effective as any verbal statement of inappropriateness.

INCOMPLETE POSTURAL-KINESIC INVOLVEMENT
After the earliest steps in a courtship the partners move into vis-á-vis relationship of posture and adopt as intimate mode of conversation, excluding others from their relationship. In quasi-courtship this relationship of postures is incomplete. The participants may face each other, but turn their bodies so that they face partly away from each other, or they may extend their arms so as to encompass others. Or they may cast about the room with their eyes or project their voices so as to be clearly audible to third parties. When no third parties are present, quasi-courting people may face, look at, or project to unseen third parties.
[...]

OMISSION OR INCOMPLETENESS OF KEY COURTING BEHAVIORS
The behaviors may be modified so as to leave out characteristic courting elements. This is done by failing to complete typical courting actions or by conducting them only in certain communicative modalities so that the gestalt required for a courting unit is not completed. For example, in courtship a man may lean forward, touch his partner, soften his facial expression, and, in soft paralanguage, verbalize his love. In quasi-courtship he may say the words while leaning slightly away from her, smile only by retracting the corners of his lips without crinkling his eyes, and use a matter-of-fact tone of voice.

DISCLAIMERS
Participants in quasi-courting may try to reduce ambiguity and indicate noncourtship by lexical disclaimers. They may reassure the partners and others that their interest is not sexual. They may seem to court [188] while talking about their love for another partner, or they may intellectualize the flirtation ina discussion of great books.

BIZARRENESS OF PERFORMANCE OF THE COURTSHIP ELEMENTS
Sometimes in an interaction where seduction is inappropriate, the courtship elements appear without the above qualifiers. But instead, the elements are performed in a bizarre, histrionic manner, which seems improper to middle-class eyes, and which can appear to be burlesque of courtship. When I first saw this in schizophrenic patients I thought such actions were psychotic. But broader observation shows this variant to be characteristic of teen-agers and men and women of the lower social class. The bizarre pattern is used by those who do not use the other qualifiers. If, indeed, this is a class difference, then my choice of word "bizarre" represents a middle-class value judgment. It is logical that quasi-courting forms might differ between the classes, since their dating and courtship patterns are known to differ markedly.
  • See, for example: Morris W. Brody, Observations on "Direct Analysis"; New York, Vantage, 1959.
  • W. Ross Ashby, "General Systems Theory as a New Discipline," General Systems (1958) 3: 1-6. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "An Outline of General Systems Theory," British J. Philosophy of Science (1950) 1:134. Bertalanffy, Problems of Life; New York, Harper, 1960.
  • Konrad Lorenx, King Solomon's Ring; New York, Crowell, 1952. Peter H. Klopfer, Behavioral Aspects of Ecology; Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1962.
  • Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology; New York, Harcourt, 1935.
  • Henry A. Gleason, An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics; New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1955. Charles F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics; New York, Macmillan, 1958.
  • Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture; New York, Mentor Books, 1946.
  • E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology; London, Cohen and West, 1951.
  • Gregory Bateson, "Tehe Message. 'This Is Play,'" in Group Processes, Vol. 2, edited by Bertram Schaffner; New York, Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1956.


Weitz, Shirley 1974e. Spatial behavior. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 199-204.

Two major research traditions have been concerned with the social psychological use of space. Proxemics, introduced in Edward Hall's work, The Hidden Dimension (1966), is clearly linked to anthropology. The meaning and use of space in different cultures is a primary focus of study, and naturalistic methods of observation are generally used. Some thought is also given to the psychological significance of spacing, but that approach is more characteristic of the other school of thought, what we will call, personal space, discussed in a book by Robert Sommer (1969). This research tradition chiefly deals with the meaning of space to the individual in terms of the effects of crowding, territoriality, architectural design, and so on, and is only peripherally concerned with intercultural variations. Controlled laboratory and field studies are used, in contrast to proxemics, which mainly relies on observational studies. The difference between proxemic and personal space research is anaolgous to that between the structural and experimental appraoch to body movement, discussed in Part 3.
However, there is considerable overlap between studies of proxemics and personal space, and the division between them is a very permeable one. Generally, when spatial behavior is studied within the purview of anthropology it is known as proxemics; when it comes under scrutiny by experimental social psychology and sociology, it is known as personal space. (Weitz 1974e: 199)
The logica end of proxemics is touching. Once two people touch they have eliminated the space between them, and this act usually signifies that a special type of relationship exists between them. Studies of touching, or tactile behavior as it is more formally known, have appeared infrequently in the literature. Frank (1957) summarized some of the psychiatric and anthropologicla literature on the sobject, as does Montagu's (1971) more recent popular book. (Weitz 1974e: 203)
Frank, L. K., "Tactile communication," Genetic Psychology Monographs, 1957, 56, 209-55.


Hall, Edward T. 1974. Proxemics. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 205-229.

ELSEWHERE:
Edward T. Hall, Ray L. Birdwhistell, Bernhard Bock, Paul Bohannan, A. Richard Diebold, Jr., Marshall Durbin, Munro S. Edmonson, J. L. Fischer, Dell Hymes, Solon T. Kimball, Weston La Barre, Frank Lynch S. J., J. E. McClellan, Donald S. Marshall, G. B. Milner, Harvey B. Sarles, George L Trager, Andrew P. Vayda
Current Anthropology, Vol. 9, No. 2/3 (Apr. - Jun., 1968), pp. 83-108
OR 2740724.pdf


Watson, O. Michael 1974. Conflicts and Directions in Proxemic Research. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 230-241.

ELSEWHERE: The Journal of Communication, Vol. 22 (4), December 1972.


Sommer, Robert 1974. Small Group Ecology. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 242-251.

ELSEWHERE: SMALL GROUP ECOLOGY.
SOMMER, ROBERT
Psychological Bulletin, Vol 67(2), Feb 1967, 145-152.
OR bul-67-2-145.pdf


Sommer, Robert and Franklin D. Becker 1974. Territorial Defense and the Good Neighbor. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 252-262.

ELSEWHERE: Territorial defense and the good neighbor.
Sommer, Robert Becker, Franklin D. ; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 11(2), Feb, 1969. pp. 85-92. [Journal Article]
OR psp-11-2-85.pdf


Weitz, Shirley 1974f. Multichannel communication. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 263-268.

Finally, Smith's article (p. 331) takes the broadest view yet of nonverbal communication by placing it in an evolutionary perspective. Smith sees a gradual overtaking of kinesics and paralinguistic communication by language in man but asserts that the more primitive forms of communication still persist and are important sources of intraspecific messages. The new science of semiotics (Sebeok, Hayes, and Bateson, 1964; Sebeok and Ramsey, 1969) takes as its subject matter, "patterned communication in all modalities," and its concern ranges from animal communication to linguistic analysis. According to Sebeok, human semiotic systems consist of two varieties: (1) anthroposemiotic systems, chiefly language communication, unique to man, and (2) zoosemiotic systems, paralinguistic and nonverbal behavior, characteristic of other animals as well as man. Linguistics is the science concerned with the first area, nonverbal communication with the second. Semiotics urges an ultimate joining of the two concerns, an aim shared by such researchers as Birdwhistell, whose work was discussed earlier in the section on body movement. The founders of the semiotic movement publish their own journal, Semiotica, from which the Smith article, as well as the earlier Ekman, Friesen, and Tomkins piece (p. 34) are taken. (Weitz 1974f: 266)
Sebeok, T. A., Hayes, A. S., and Bateson, M. C., eds., Approaches to Semiotics: Transactions of the Indiana University Conference on paralinguistics and Kinesics, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1964. and Sebeok, T. A., and Ramsey, A., Approaches to Animal Communication, Mouton, The Hague, 1969.


Ekman, Paul and Wallace V. Friesen 1974. Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 169-190.

ELSEWHERE: Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception.
Ekman, Paul; Friesen, Wallace V.
Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes, Vol 32(1), 1969, 88-106.
OR 689341.pdf


Mehrabian, Albert and Sudan R. Ferris 1974. Inference of Attitudes from Nonverbal Communication in Two Channels. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 191-197.

ELSEWHERE: MEHRABIAN, ALBERT FERRIS, SUSAN R. ; Journal of Consulting Psychology, Vol 31(3), Jun, 1967. pp. 248-252. [Journal Article]
OR ccp-31-3-248.pdf


Duncan, Starkey Jr. 1974. Some Signals and Rules for Taking Speaking Turns in Conversations. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 198-311.

ELSEWHERE: Duncan, Starkey ; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 23(2), Aug, 1972. pp. 283-292.
OR psp-23-2-283.pdf


Mehrabian, Albert and Scheldon Ksionzky 1974. Some Determinants of Social Interaction. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 312-330.

ELSEWHERE: Some Determiners of Social Interaction
Albert Mehrabian and Sheldon Ksionzky
Sociometry , Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1972), pp. 588-609
OR 2786535.pdf


Smith, W. John 1974. Displays and Messages in Intraspecific Communication. In: Weitz, Shirley (ed.), Nonverbal communication: readings with commentary. New York (etc.): Oxford University Press, 331-340.

ELSEWHERE: Smith, John W. 1969. Displays and Messages in Intraspecific Communication. Semiotica 1(1): 357-369.
OR semi.1969.1.4.357.pdf