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Understanding communication theory (memo)

Cragan, John F. and Donald C. Shields 1998. Understanding communication theory: the communicative forces for human action. Boston, etc.: Allyn and Bacon.

1. Introduction to Communication Theory
2. Information Systems Theory (IST)
3. Rational Argumentation Theory (RAT)
4. Symbolic Convergence Theory (SCT)
5. Uncertainly Reduction Theory (URT)
6. Narrative Paradigm Theory (NPT)
7. Diffusion of Innovations Theory (DIT)
8. Interpersonal and Small Group Communication Context Theories
9. Public Speaking and Organizational Communication Context Theories
10. Mass and Intercultural Communication Context Theories
11. Communication Microtheories
12. Capstone
During the twentieth century, theorists began concluding that symbolic facts exist just like material and social facts. George Herbert Mead (1938) left us with the notion of communication as symbolic interaction. Flew (1985), by including the symbolic realm, extended Berger and Luckman's (1966) notion about the social construction of reality. Bormann abandoned the social construction of reality and introduced the notion of the symbolic construction of reality (1980, 1985b). These and other theorists contributed procedures to ascertain the presence of symbolic facts. Symbolic facts are language representations that provide interpretations of the way things are. They may or may not possess a referent in social or material reality. Today, symbolic facts include such entities as worldview, ideologies, myths, interpretive frames, ideographs, perspectives, speech codes, and rhetorical visions. (Cragan & Shields 1998: 322)
  • Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. 1975. Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human Communication Research 1(2): 90-112.
    This paper provides a theoretical perspective for dealing with the initial entry stage of interpersonal interaction. The seven axioms and 21 theorems presented suggest a set of research priorities for studying the development of interpersonal relationships. The paper concludes with a discussion of some of the problems to be considered if the theory is to be extended beyond the initial stages of interaction.
  • Griffith, B. C. 1989. Understanding science: Studies of communication and information. Communication Research 16: 600-614.
    A diverse group of researchers and scholars has achieved a better understanding of social and cognitive processes, general throughout science. The key elements proved to be communication and information. Communication is the only general scientific behavior; other behaviors are mostly specific and technical. Information and its representations are its principal and general artifacts. This article explores the development of theory and the discovery of some strong empirical relationships among measured communication and information that, in turn, capture important features of social process and cognitive change in science.
  • Flew, Anthony 1985. Thinking about social thinking: The philosophy of the social sciences. New York: Basil Blackwell.
    Rationalizing human behavior is our most compelling pastime. We are all disposed to offer and accept insufficient evidence and invalid arguments when these seem to support conclusions that we merely wish were true. We need to know how clearly about our social thinking and how to resist the allure of self-deception, everyone skeptical about or confused by the findings of the social sciences will appreciate Antony Flew's crisp analysis of the methodological flaws and systematic misunderstandings corrupting their content and application. Thinking About Social Thinking seeks to establish what can and cannot be learned from such studies, indicating where good work has been ignored, or much-needed work has yet to be done. Flew's clear and incisive arguments are illustrated with abundant examples and references -- many entertaining, others surprising. Flew issues a refreshing, impassioned warning against the perils of complacent, muddled thinking and false but comfortable conclusions.

A Philosophy of Solitude

Powys, John Cowper 1933. A Philosophy of Solitude. New York: Simon and Schuster.

It is a profound psychological truth that the words of a moral optimist are futile mockery to a neurotic pessimist. It is like telling a person who feels despair that if he makes the grimaces of happiness that he will be happy (Powys 1933: 2)
Like the popular sayings, "Turn that frown upside down" and "Smile and the world similes with you" - as if modifying the outward expression would somehow eliminatu the deep psychological troubles of the person. Such pretending will only serve to calm those around that "if you can't see it then it is not there".
No one who has lived for a decade in a large American city could rise to the pitch of Walt Whitman's splendid and flowering "yes!" to such a Pandemonium. Human nature would simply crack under the strain, under the vast hypocrisy - for it would be no less - of giving an assent to such a Malebolge. And moreover, we are so driven to the wall in a great modern city, and so deafened by the tumult, and so drunken upon shameless sex and deadly liquor, and so scoriated in our nerves by the gregarious confusion, that the only thing that can really help us is a much more definite and drastic philosophy than these eloquent writers supply; a real, hard, formidable, unrhetorical philosophy, that gets down to the granite rock-bed of the ultimate situation when it is stripped and stark and bare. (Powys 1933: 3-4)
For me this stark and bare granite rock-bed of the ultimate situation is materialistic and concerned with the embodied existence of concrete individuals with very little eloquont ideas but much bodily dread and very real expenditure of energy on everyday practices. That is, the ultimate situation is nonverbal.
It will be noticed that I begin with the Taoist thinkers; and there is a reason for this. Alone among all the heathen soothsayers who can help us to attain solitude in the midst of the crow these superior men are free from pride, from conceit, from vanity! (Powys 1933: 4-5)
These are good qualities for any deserving person, but somehow denigrated in our own modern society where pride (uhkus, concit (upsakus) and vanity (edevus, tühisus) run rampant.
Le tus therefore - even in the midst of our vulgar civilization - sink into our own souls and be alone with that Solitude that can create and destroy without the help of any violence. The power of the individual mind to create its own happiness, from the barest, starkest, simplest surrounding, is something that the early Christian mystics possessed. They had God to fall back upon; but we, if lacking God, have at least the cosmic elements, These great presences have a singular value for that psychic-sensuous contemplation which is the secret of lasting human happiness. When you concentrate upon these things it is as if you were aware of another Dimension through thinner walls than exist anywhere else in the Cosmos, and thus were able to tap some reservoir of unfathomable power, from which a mysterious life-magnetism can pour through your whole being. (Powys 1933: 6-7)
Seems like a step toward a guide to being happy in solitude.
The essence of the doctrine of Tao seems to be that it is through withdrawing ourselves rather than asserting ourselves, through retreating rather than advancing, through yielding rather than pursuing, through inaction rather than through action, through becoming quiet rather than through making a stir, that we attain wisdom and spiritual power.(Powys 1933: 11)
This sounds vaguely familiar, but via pesonal experiences with psychedelics, that it is much better to lie down and let the earth - as some sort of raft - to carry you and mold you, rather than to fight it and force it.
Laotze teaches that we should cultivate the art of reducing our self-asserion to the supremelimit. He insists that we should un-learn our superficial cleverness and not only cease competing with others, but flow with them and into them, through them, and lose our identitiy in their presence, deliberately become undistinguished, insignificant - but thus becoming the most magical of magicians! (Powys 1933: 11)
Knowing ourselves through others, gaining by letting go.
"If thou set thine heart upon philosophy, prepare straighway to be laughed at and mocked by many who will say, Behold he has suddenly come back to us a philosopher; or, How came you by that brow of scorn?"
There seems something peculiarly adapted to our case about the ideas of Epictetus, when, just as in his day, we are all so brow-beaten by officials, persecuted by petty tyrants, threatened by brute violence.
"But the tyrant will bind - what? The leg. He will take away - what? The head. What then can he not bind and not take away? The will. And hence that precept of the ancients - Know Thyself." (Powys 1933: 20-21)
You can be laughed at and mocked, beaten and even killed, but remember to be yorself - it is the one thing that cannot be taken away. The body can be beaten to submission, but the soul cannot.
- "What, then, if one come and find me alone and slay me? Fool! not thee, but thy wretched body. Thou art a little soul bearing up a corpse." (Powys 1933: 23)
Do noh be afraid of death or seek sociality for the sake of security - for you are not your body, but your soul (trapped in a dying body).
We need, just now, a certain fierce, bitter, indignant philosophy that is neither too easy-guing towards the gods for the sort of a world they have made, nor towards ourselves for the folly with which we make the bad worse. We need to put into our cosmic philosophy a little of the black bile that we put into our human relations We need a certain bone to bone austerity in our mental vision combined with a new emphasis upon the power of the will and the magic of the will. (Powys 1933: 25)
Wise words to live by. I think I should embellish my thesis with the same sort of black bile that I find in dystopian fiction.
Every human being is alone in the core of the mind. When we are born we cry; and that cry is the cry of loneliness.
Thus it is with children. Thus it is with the growing youth. And the older we grow the lonelier we grow. (Powys 1933: 37)
Ain't that the truth.
By the constant practice of this mental awareness our reaction to the world will come to rest, not on the shifting sands of human opinion but on the sublime and terrible truth of the ultimate situation. This situation is not changed because in the body we may be surrounded by other bodies, Our innermost self is indeed fatally involved with the personal peculiarities of our material flesh and our blood. Our lonely ego is always hemmed in by our own body, and very often by the intrusive and aggressive bodies around us. The life of our soul is cruelly dependent upon our bodily health, upon our idea of ourselves as irrevocably bound to our burdened and exhausted senses. But the fact that every conscious self possesses a central core, a unifying force, an integral identity, implies a constant renewal of our natal solitude; of our inherent isolation, from the security of which we gather ourselves together for our next outrush into sight, smell, taste, hearing, touch and the overpowering pressure of other personalities. (Powys 1933: 38)
E.g. the body is an endless source of trouble.
It is indeed so involved wih the body that its chief activity seems to be the unifying and focussing of the senses; and yet there come moments when this central power within us seems to withdraw into some mysterious and remote levels of its own being and we feel as if we approach the verge of the strange and startling possibilities.
This is a feeling only; but it is connected with a constant sensation that represents an unquestionable fact, the fact namely that we possess a centralizing, unifying self or ego, which is the driving-force of all we think, or do, or feel, or say.
And whatever may be happening to our body this self or ego, the conscious "I am I" within us, is absolutely alone. It is alone from the first moment of its awareness of life to its last moment on the treshold of what may be its final extinction. (Powys 1933: 39)
The self is within the body and absolutely alone - this is the ultimate situation.
The drifting, brainless gregariousness of so many human boings , imitating one another, conciliating one another, admiring, desiring, envying, competing, tormenting one another, is an attempt to escape from this inherent loneliness of the self. (Powys 1933: 39)
Apply cold water to the burned area.
Because the instinctive image-making tendency of old times regarded this "soul" as a spiritual replica of the body, and born to survive the body, we have grown hostile to the very word. Malicious folly! A if any word could be better to express all the secret experiences of the self; its resistance, its creative energies, its furtive withdrawal. (Powys 1933: 43)
It is because nothing internal to the body - other than bones - can survive. External - such as mans creation - does survive.
The person who makes it the main purpose of life to clarify, concentrate, crystallize his inmost self against the universe, can be immensely assisted in this task by the ideas of the early Greek philosophers, and the early Medieval Schoolmen.
It is St. Thomas Aquinas who says, "Creare proprium personae," which might be translated, "To create is the prerogative of personality."
St. Thomas is right; but such creation by personality is not done by accident. It is done by practice. It is done by focussing the mind upon the mind, the self upon the self, the life upon life. It is done by acquiring theh bait of doing it. It is done in the beginning by an act of faith and it is done last by repeated acts of the will. (Powys 1933: 46)
Autopoiesis through poesis.
Only those whose interior selves live habitually in loneliness, know - as the convalescent does - the tremulous approaches of human tenderness. This is one of the ultimate paradoxes.
The primeval simplicities of the dignity of life that each man, each woman grows aware of in the austere mystery of solitude are what purges the mind for the welcoming of the most delicate touches of human sympathy.
Only the lonely know the full vibration of a look, a touch, a word, let fall at the moment when most it is needed. (Powys 1933: 53)
Sweet.
It must always be remembered that the isolation of the self, in a deliberately lonely life, need not imply living in actual solitude.
What it does imply is the choice of a contemplative life over every other; but a contemplative life that can be lived under almost every conceivable condition.
A person can be a soldier, a school-master, a revolutionary agitator, a farmer, a factory-hand; a person can be any kind of working-woman. or domestic woman, and live in profound loneliness. (Powys 1933: 60)
Indeed.
To be possessed of a philosophy of its own, the lonely self must detach itself from all philosophical systems, both old and new, but it need not dogmatically reject any of these.
They will always remain there, these slowly-evelved accumulations of thought and feeling. They will always be at hand for the libeated ego to take what lends itself to its nature, from all these great intellectual and emotional deposits; henceforth, after this one clear act of detachment, it is no longer committed to any of them by the insidious hypnosis of custom. It is free. It is removed a certain distance from all and it is critical of all. (Powys 1933: 65)
Theorizing and tradition.
A man's philosophy, a woman's philosophy, is the conscious habit of thought by which the self gathers itself together, cleanses itself, governs itself, steers itself; and copes as well as it may with all the pleasant or unpleasant impacts of the vast impinging Not-self. (Powys 1933: 67)
#self #habit #theorizing
In spite of what Miguel Unamuno says, we can live happily without knowing whether there is a God; we can live worthily without knowing whether we survive death. Why torment ourselves any further then by going round and round in this tread-mill circle?
The better way is to find a substitute for God, a substitute for Immortality. For this refusal to waste our precious hours in kicking against the pricks does not mean that the satisfaction our fathers got from these things can be supplied in no other way. (Powys 1933: 74-75)
Not knowing; Purpose.
Intellectual people may be forced to give up their loneliness for the sake of love or of lust - that is altogether a different matter, and when you came to analyze it to the bottom both love and lust are profoundly lonely - but they will never give up their loneliness for the mere herd-pleasure of feeling warm and cheerful and friendly and spiteful.
Intellectual people are not rare. There are a great many of them. Most families contain at least one such. An intellectual person is a person who has the gonius to grasp the fact that it is a curious experience to be olive; so curious in fact that it is madness not to sacrifice everything to get the full taste of it!
A well-managed solitary life, whether surrounded by people or protected from people, is a very delicate and a very difficult work of art.
Routine plays a leading part. Men and women who do not insist on routine in their lives are sick or mad. Without routine all is lost. Just as without some kind of rhythm all is lost in poetry. For routine is man's art of copying the art of Nature. In Nature all is routine. The seasons follow ane another, the blossom and the fruit follow, and then comes the fall.
Routine is the rhythm of the universe. By routine the harvests are reaped, by routine the tides rise and ebb; by routine the Constellations march in their sublime order across the sky. The feel of routine is the feel of the mystery of creation. In the uttermost abysses of life it holds sway. Beautiful and tragic is its systole and diastole. Without routine there can be no happiness; for there can be no endurance, no expectation, no security, no peace, no old or new, no past or future, no memory and no hope.
But after routine has been attained the most important achievement in the art of a solitary life is having the right thoughts, that is to say having thoughts that give you a calm happiness, in place of thoughts that prick you and sting you and bite you and corrode you!
It is astonishing to think how long humanity has existed, and yet how little we have advanced in gaining control over our thoughts. To control your thoughts - that is the most important thing you can do; far more important than to control your children or your food or your drink or your wife or your husband or your business or your work or your reputation. He who can control his thoughts is at the key-position of the Cosmos. He has the clue, the secret password. Down into the depths of the sea he can dive and find pearls and coral and drowned gold. Over the grassy prairies he can follow the wind till he feels os if he were clutching the rim of the horizon with his crooked fingers. (Powys 1933: 77-79)
Intellectuality, routine, happiness.
A person's life-illusion is that secret dramatic way of regarding himself which makes him feel to himself a remarkable, singular, unusual, exciting individual. Everyone has a life-illusion; and it is something that goes much deeper than mere vanity or conceit.
A life-illusion is never wholly untrue. It is a vaporous eidolon of yourself that walks about with you wherever you go. It is a shadow. And becaue it is a shadow it has truth. But it is not a shadow of your objective self; - that dressed-up popinjay or scarecrow that your negihbours catch sight of before you open your mouth; - it is the shadow of your own subjective self; tho shadow of that etheric mask of the obysmal thing-in-itself, which has been created by your mind. The imost "I am I" is the thing-in-itself; and this creates the etheric self, whose shadow is the life-illusion. (Powys 1933: 80)
Life-illusion is a neat concept.
Women would not be the adepts they are both at flattering men's life-illusions and at stabbing them with bodkin-thrusts of a miraculous cruelty if they were not merciless critics of these subjective mas'uerades ... and heroic protectors too ... in deep and terrible intuition.
Strangers who visit some menage-a-deux all unexpectedly are often shocked at the way woman will tear to pieces, as if for their special enteriainment, every shred of dignity in her mate. Ah! you do not know the secrets of these people's hearts! She will deride and mock her man's real character to her heart's centent. He minds this no more than a pig minds scratching, or a trout minds tickling. But to his life-illusien oshe will preserve an inscrutable, mysterious, and hieratic reverence. (Powys 1933: 81-82)
The negative side of woman's intuition.
Every cult has its dominant clue-gesture; and the dominant clue-gesture of the "vita nuova" described here might be expressed in the term premeditated extacy; an erotic embrace of the not-self by the self. (Powys 1933: 86)
The TMS clue-gesture is a word, namely, "text."
These walls, or these half-open wndows, through which the yellow sun or the dark night appears, are the fringes, edges, margins of an unfathomable universe, or the brink of which we stand, while our soul grapples with the Unknown. (Powys 1933: 91)
Semiotics of windows could be an actual topic, dealing - besides glass windows - with computer screens and virtual application windows.
Men are such monsters to ment that no happiness is possible without a definite and premeditated forgetting of what they are always doing to one another. There is little danger that lonely, sensitive people become callous to such things. Even a great reformer, like Lord Shaftesbury, must have had to forget some things in order to live to do what he did for the torture victims of industrial greed; and the same apllies to those among us who follow his steps. (Powys 1933: 95)
#sensory_gating "forgetting #numbness
Nothing that any power can do can murder the senses, while a man lives, that he loses the distinction between self ond non-self. At the worst - in a great numbness, blankness, darkness, paralysis - he is aware of his body, the yot more objectively-remote non-self, and he is aware, if his plight be not unique in its desperation, of other minds, not so very far away, that resemble his own. (Powys 1933: 99)
#ego_death
It seems to me that the first thing such a person turns his mind to is to chance of his having acquired consciousness at all! How extraordinary, how never to be taken for granted, is the fact that in a universe - so full, as far as he knows, of so many inanimate things, and of so many things that, though animate, possess levels of consciousness apparently very different from his own - he should be saying so clearly to himself: - "Here am I, a living, conscious entity, in the midst of all this!"
Having realized the miracle of his being what he is - a conscious self in this bleak place - the next thing he does is to ponder on the inevitability of death.
He is alive now, he is conscious now; but in a given time, short or long as it may happen, he will be as unconscious as the woodwork of this melancholy window, the withered leaves blown across it, as the raindrops streaming down it. (Powys 1933: 96-97)
Sounds like he is describing a psychedelic trip.

A philosophy of solitude: John Cowper Powys: 9780904247183: Amazon.com: Books. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://www.amazon.com/philosophy-solitude-John-Cowper-Powys/dp/090424718X

John Cowper Powys (1872-1963) was born in Derbyshire, brought up in the West Country (the Somerset/Dorset border area was to have a lasting influence on him), went to Cambridge University and then became a teacher and lecturer mainly in the USA where he lived for about thirty years. On returning to the UK, after a short spell in Dorset, he settled in Wales in 1935 where he lived for the rest of his long life. Those are the bare bones of his life. In some senses they seem unimportant when set alongside his extraordinary writing career. Not only was output prodigious, it was like nothing else in English Literature. Indeed, George Steiner has made the bold claim that his works are 'the only novels produced by an English writer that can fairly be compared to the fictions of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky'. And even that doesn't touch on their multifarious strangeness. John Cowper Powys wrote compulsively: letters, diaries, short stories, fantasies, poetry, literary criticism, philosophy and, above all, novels poured out of him. He also wrote a remarkable autobiography. In addition to his Autobiography his masterpieces are considered to be Wolf Solent, Glastonbury Romance, Weymouth Sands and Porius. But his lesser, or less well-known, works shouldn't be overlooked, they spring from the same weird, mystical, brilliant and obsessive imagination. John Cowper Powys is a challenging author with an impressive list of admirers. In addition to George Steiner, these have included Robertson Davies, Margaret Drabble, Theodore Dreiser, Henry Miller, J. B. Priestley and Angus Wilson.

The Philosophy of Walking, by John Cowper Powys. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://willnixon.com/insights/the-philosophy-of-walking-by-john-cowper-powys

Nietzsche maintained the admirable opinion that all exciting and enlarging human thoughts come to their originator’s heads in the process of walking. Philosophy that is worthy of the name is a walking philosophy. Now there are many subtle reasons for this. In the first place the “humours” of the body, as Burton explains them in his “Anatomy of Melancholy,” are stirred up, shaken off, dissipated, dispersed by the movement of walking.
This is actually reasonable. Walking incites more energetic thought processes. A.R. paces to and fro when giving a lecture.
Fifty years ago the philosopher had to struggle all his life against the narrow fanaticism of puritans who sought to suppress every free gesture of the sex-instinct; but now, at least among that large portion of the crowd that has imbibed the new fashion of thinking, the whole situation is reversed and every reaction against sex that we feel is regarded as a hopeless intellectual limitation.
This may explain why the situation in the BNW was so different from Orwell and Bradbury - the thirties were apparently a time of sexual freedom.

Nietzsche – The Lonely One | Harper's Magazine. Online. Accessed 7th Mar 2013. Available: http://harpers.org/blog/2009/11/nietzsche-the-lonely-one/

Verhaßt ist mir das Folgen und das Führen.
Gehorchen? Nein! Und aber nein – Regieren!
Wer sich nicht schrecklich ist, macht niemand Schrecken:
Und nur wer Schrecken macht, kann andre führen.
Verhaßt ist mirs schon, selber mich zu führen!
Ich liebe es, gleich Wald- und Meerestieren,
mich für ein gutes Weilchen zu verlieren,
in holder Irrnis grüblerisch zu hocken,
von ferne her mich endlich heimzulocken,
mich selber zu mir selber – zu verführen.
I detest following, but also leading.
To obey? Never! And just as bad – to govern!
He who wishes not to be terrified, will summon no terror for others:
Yet only he who peddles fear can lead others.
I even detest having to lead myself!
Like the creatures of the forest and the sea, I love
To lose myself for a while
In meek error thoughtfully to cower
Drawn home at length by distant things
Being enticed by myself to my Self.
–Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Einsame (ca. 1882) in Gedichte und Sprüche p. 75 (1908) (S.H. transl.)
Hannah Arendt ends The Origins of Totalitarianism with an extended essay on loneliness and solitude. Why? “Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time.” The essence of the alienation associated with the “crisis of modernity” involves the outsider’s swing between being a lone wolf and dissolving into the masses generated by the totalitarian wannabes of all stripes. Arendt sees the philosophical roots of this dilemma in works of classical antiquity, from Cicero to Seneca, in the writings of Augustine, but most of all in a handful of poems by Friedrich Nietzsche. She cites his short work Sils Maria and the more complex poem Aus hohen Bergen which has quite striking references to Friedrich Hölderlin. But still more important for this point is the poem Der Einsame which puts loneliness or solitude on one hand and the feeling of “belonging” in a still more starkly political context.
This is a valuable clue to cennecting solitude and dystopian fiction.

Preconditions and Possibilities

Bookchin, Murray 1986. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Montreal; Buffalo: Black Rose Books.

"Preconditions and Possibilities", pp. 55-76.
Despite their sweeping ideological claims, the particularistic revolutions replaced the rule of one class by another, one system of exploitation by another, one system of toil by another, and one system of psychological repression by another. (Bookchin 1986: 55)
There must be an end to the continual exchange of regimes. At one point the two, and three-fold sysstems should meld into one pluralistic. That is, a breakout from regimes altogether is in order. This may be an impossibility, but it should me worked towards. Otherwise the meaningless toil will not end.
What is unique about our era is that the particularistic revolutien has now been subsumed by the possibility of the generalized revolutien - completea nd totalistic. Bourgeois society, if it achieved nothing else, revolutionalized the means of production on a scale unprecedented in history. This technological revolution, culminating in cybernation, has created the objective, quantitative basis for a world without class rule, exploitation, toil or material want. The means now exist for the development of the rounded man, the total man, freed of guilt and the workings of authoritarian modes of traininga and given over to desire and the sensuous apprehension of the marvelous. It is now possible to conceive of man's future experience in terms of a cherent process in which the bifurcation of thought and activity, mind and sensuousness, discipline and spontaneity, individuality and community, man and nature, town and country, education and life, work and play are all resolved, harmonized, and organically wedded in a qualitatively new realm of freedom. Just as the particularized revolution produced a particularized, bifurcated society, so the generalized revolution can produce an organically unified, manysided community. The great wound opened by propertied society in the form of the "social question" can now be healed. (Bookchin 1986: 55-56)
Well isn't this uncharacteristically optimistic of Bookchin? I will put my money on cybernation, as I see the internet bringing the world together.
Along with its positive aspects, technological advance has a distinctly negative side, socially regressive side. If it is true that technological progress enlarges the historical potentiality for freedom, it is also true that the bourgeois control of technology reinforces the established organization of society and everyday life. (Bookchin 1986: 56)
I haven't thought of this, but it could very well be that the information revolution, for example, will have tremendous potentiality for andavnces in some areas but could very well stagnate other areas. The case of books, which are read less and less, is a point in case. When information is reduced from pages to tweets then of course there will be loss, much more than before becoming exformation.
Socially, bourgeois exploitation and manipulation have brought everyday life to the most excruciating point of vacuity and boredom. As society has been converted into a factory and a marketplace, the very rationale of life has been reduced to production for its own sake - and consumption for its own sake. (Bookchin 1986: 58-59)
Ain't that the truth. So many of us are reduced to staring the screen and conspicuous consumption of intoxicants.
The Marxian critique is rooted in the past, in the era of material want and resatively limited technological development. Even its humanistic theory of alienation turns primarily on the issue of work and man's alienation from the product of his labour. Today, however, capitalism is a parasite of his future, a vampire that survives on the technology ond resources of freedom. The industrial capitalism of Marx's hime organized its commodity relations around a prevailing system of material scarcity; the state capitalism of our own time organizes its commodity resations around a prevailing system of material abundance. A century ago, scarcity had been endured; today, it has to be enforced - hence the importance of the state in the present era. It is not that modern capitalism has resolved its contradictions and annulled the social dialectic, but rather that the social dialectic and the contradictions of capitalism have expanded from the economic to the hierarchical realms of society, from the abstract "historic" domain to the concrete minutae of everyday experience, from the arena of survival to the arena of life. (Bookchin 1986: 59-60)
Sounds like Foucault.
The liberation of the self involves, above all, a social process. In a society that has shriveled the self into a commodity - into an object manufactured for exchange - there can be no fulfilled self. There can only be the beginnings of selfhood, the emergence of a self that seeks fulfillment - a self that is largely defined by the obstacles it must overcome to achieve realization. In a society whose belly is distended to the bursting point with revolution, whose chronic state is a mounting emergency, only one thought and act is relevant - giving birth. Any environment, private or social, that does not make this fact the center of human experience is a sham and diminishes whatever self remains to us after we have absorbed our daily poison of everyday life in bourgeois society. (Bookchin 1986: 66)
#self and anarchism
It is plain that the goal of revolution today must be the liberation of daily life. Any revolution that fails to achieve this goal is counterrevolution. Above all, it is we who have to be liberated, our daily lives, with all their moments, hours and days, and not universals like "History" and "Society." The self must always be identifiable in the revolution, not overwhelmed by it. The self must always be perceivable in the revolutionary process, not submerged by it. There is no word that is more sinister in the "revolutionary" vocabulary than "masses." Revolutionary liberation must be a self-liberation that reaches social dimensions, not "mass liberation" or "class liberation" behind which lurks the rule of an elite, a hierarchy and a state. (Bookchin 1986: 66-67)
Revolution under the guise of liberating others is nothing but a fraud, one can only liberate oneself and set an example for others to follow.
For this reason alone, the revolutionary movement is profoundly concerned with lifestyle. It must try to live the revolution in all its totality, not only participate in it. It must be deeply concerned with te way the revolutionist lives, his relations with the surrounding environment, and his degree of self-emancipation. In seeking to change society, the revolutionist cannot avoid changes in himself that demand the reconquest of his own being. Like the movement in which he participates, the revolutionist must try to reflect the conditions of the society he is trying to achieve - at least to the degree that is possible today. (Bookchin 1986: 67)
It almost seems that he is begging for lifestyle anarchism and when it does emerge in the 90s he has a change of heart and dismisses it with harsh critique.
A the late Josef Weber emphasized, all organized groups "have a tendency to render themselves autonomous, i.e., to alienate themselves from their original aims and to become an end in themselves in the hands of those administering them." This phenomenon is as true of revolutionary organizations as it is of the state and semi-state institutions, official parties and trade unions. (Bookchin 1986: 69)
This is familiar. Someone claimed that large bureaucracies have a tendency to forget their original purpose and grow for the sake of growth.
The most powerful process going on in America today is the sweeping de-institutionalsization of the bourgeois social structure. A basic, far-reaching disrespect and a profound disloyalty are developing toward these values, the forms, the aspirations of the established order. On a scale unprecedented in American history, millions of people are shedding their commitment to the society in which they live. They no longer believe in its claims. They no longer respect its symbols. They no longer accept its goals, and, wost significantly, they refuse almost intuitively to live by its institutional and social codes. (Bookchin 1986: 70)
This is the key. These factors should be broken down to its components and corroborated with local tendencies and possibilities.

Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism

Bookchin, Murray 1995. Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm. Edinburg: AK Press.

For some two ceturies, anarchism - a very ecumenical body of anti-authoritarian ideas - developed in the tension between two basically contradirtory tendencies: a personalistic commitment to individual autonomya and a collectivist commitment to social freedom. these tendencies have by no means been reconciled in the history of libertarian thought. Indeed, for much of the last century, they simply coexisted within anarchism as a minimalist credo of opposition to the State rather that as a maximalist credo thaa articulated the kind of new society that had to be created in its place. (Bookchin 1995: 4)
So autonomy is individual and freedom is sorial. Minimalist - opposition to the state; maximalist - create a new society.
...anarchism as a whole advanced what Isaiah Berlin has called "negative freedom," that is to say, a formal "freedom from," rather than a substative "freedom to." Indeed, anarchism often celebrated its commitment to negative freedom as evidence of its own pluralism, ideological tolerance, or creativity - or even, as more than one recent posrmodernist celebrant has argued, its incoherence. (Bookchin 1995: 4)
This is what I thought when I read Berlin. I saw it as a good thing.
Indeed, Proudhon's famous declaration that "whoever puts his hand an me to govern me is an usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my enemy" strongly tilts toward a personalistic, negative freedom that overshadows his opposition to oppressive social institutions and the vision of an anarchist society that he projected. His statement easily blends into William Goodwin's distinctly individualistic declaration: "There is but one power to which I can yield a heartfelt obedience, the decision of my own understanding, the dictates of my own conscience." Godwin's appeal to the "authority" of his own understanding and conscience, like Proudhon's condemnation of the "had" that threatens to restrict his liberty, gave anarchism an immensely individualistic thrust. (Bookchin 1995: 5)
So... What's wrong with individualism? I happn to agree with both statements.
Hardly any anarcho-individualists exercised an influence on the emerging working class. They expressed their opposition in uniquely personal forms, especially in fiery tracts, outrageous behavior, and abberant lifestyles in the cultural ghettos of fin de siècle [end of the century] New York, Paris, and London. As a credo, individualist anarchismremained largely a bohemian lifestyle, most conspicuous in its demands for sexual freedom ("free love") and enamored of innovations in art, behavior, and clothing. (Bookchin 1995: 8)
So anarcho-individualism is basically pjorative analogue of "hippies" and "hipsters". Again, ain't nothing wrong with that.
In the traditionally individualist-liberal United States and Britain, the 1990s are awash in self-styled anarchists who - their flamboyant radical rhetoric aside - are custivating a latter-day anarcho-individualism that I will call lifestyle anarchism. Its preoccupations with the ego and its uniqueness and its polymorphous concepts of resistance are steadily eroding the socialist character of the libertarian tradition. No less than Marxism and other socialisms, anarchism can be profoundly influenced by the bourgeois environment it professes to oppose, with the result that the growing "inwardness" and narcissism of the yoppie generation have left their mark upon many avowed radicals. Ad toc adventurism, personal bravura, an aversion to theory oddly akin to the antirational biases of postmodernism, celebrations of theoretical incoherence (pluralism), a basically apolitical and anti-organizational commitment to imagination, desire, and ecstasy, and an intensely self-oriented enchantment of everyday life, reflect the toll that social reaction has taken on Euro-American anarchism over the past two decades. (Bookchin 1995: 9)
Ah, so Bookchin opposes individualists because they do not organise a social revolution.
Psychotherapy in all its mutations cultivates an inwardly directed "self" that seeks autonomy in a quiescent psychological condition of emotional self-sufficiency - not the socially involved self denoted by freedom. In lifestyle anarchism as in psychotherapy, the ego is counterposed to the collective; the self, to society; the personal, to the communal. (Bookchin 1995: 10)
And what is wrong with that? We know that the self is social - exactly for that reason we see liberation from repression and authority as liberation from social conventions. It also sounds as if there were no interactionist psychotherapies (I know of none but I haven't looked).
The ego - more precisely, its incarnation in various lifestylos - has become an idee fixee for many post-1960s anarchists, who are losing contact with the need for an organized, collectivistic, programmatic opposition to the existing order. Invertebrate "protests," directionless escapades, self-assertions, and a very personal "recolonization" of everyday life parallel the psychotherapeutic, New Age, self-oriented lifestyles of bored baby boomers and members of Generation X. Today, what passes for anarchism in America and increasingly in Europe is little more than an aintrospective personalism that denigrates responsible social commitment; an encounter group variously renamed a "collective" or an "affinity group"; a state of mind that arrogantly derides structure, organization, and public involvement; and a playground of juvenile antics. (Bookchin 1995: 10)
Yup. Bookchin derides individualists because they don't suit his purposes. Antics are cool.
Theriideological pedigree is basically liberal, grounded in the myth of the fully autonomous individual whose claims to self-sovereignty are validated by axiomatic "natural rights," "intrinsic worth," or, on a more sophisticated level, an intuited Kantian transcendental ego that is gererative of all knowable reality. These traditional views surface in Max Stirner's "I" or ego, which shares with existentialism a tendency to absorb all of reality into itself, as if the universe turned on the choices of the self-oriented individual. (Bookchin 1995: 11)
I fail to see anything wrong in this. It is as if Bookchin is speaking of an ideal that doesn't exist but keeps battering it as if it did.
Strictly defined, the greek word autonomia means "independence," connoting a self-managing ego, independent of any clientage or reliance on others for its maintenance. To my knowledge, it was not widely used by the Greek philosophers; indeed, it is not even mentioned in F.E. Peter's historical lexicon of Greek Philosophical Terms. Autonomy' like liberty, refers to the man (or woman) who Plato would have ironically called the "master of himself," a condition "when the better principle of the human soul controls the worse." Even in Plato, the attempt to achieve autonomy through mastery of oneself constituted a paradox, "for the master is also the servant and the servant the master, and ina ll these modes of speaking the same person is predicated" (Republic, book 4, 431). Characteristically, Paul Goodman, an essential individualistic anarchist, maintained that "for me, the chief principle of anarchism is not freedom but autonomy, the ability to initiate a task and to do it one's own way" - a view werthy of an aestete but not of a social revolutionary. (Bookchin 1995: 12)
So it becomes more and more clear that Bookchin opposes lifestyle anarchism because it does not lead to social revolution but personal autonomy. He does not see the very real possibility of the two converging.
The confusion between autonomy and freedom is all too evident in L. Susan Brown's The Politics of Individualism (POI), a recent attempt to articulate and elaborate a basically individualist anarchism, yet rehain some filiations with anarcho-communism. If lifestyle anarchism needs an academic pedigree, it will find it here in her attempt to meld Bakunin and Kropotkin with John Stuart Mill. Alas, herein lies a problem that is more than academic. Brown's work exhibits the extent to which concepts of personal autonomy stands at odds with conceps of social freedam. In essence, like Goodman she interprets anarchism as a philosophy not of social freedom but of personal autonomy. She then offers a notion of "existential individualism" that she contrasts sharply both with "instrumental individualism" (or C. B. Macpherson's "possessive [bourgeois] individualism") and with "collectivism" - leavened with extesive quotations from Emma Goldman, who was by no means the ablest thinker in the libertarian pantheon. (Bookchin 1995: 13)
It is becoming clear why many anarchists dislike Bookchin. He is an "intellectual efficientist".
If anything, functioning an the basis of consensus assures that important decision-making will be either manipulated by a minority or collapse completely. And the decisions that are made will embody the lowest common denominator of views and constitute the least creative level of agreement. I speak, here, from painful, years-long experience with the use of consensus in the Clamshell Alliance of the 1970s. Just at the moment when this quasi-anarchic antinuclear-power movement was at the peak of its struggle, with thousands of activists, it was destroyed through the manipulation of the consensus process by a minority. The "tyranny of structurelessness" that consensus decisien-making produced permitted a well-organized few to control the unwieldy, deinstitutionalized, and largely disorganized many within the movement. (Bookchin 1995: 17-18)
Here Bookchin seems to have a valid point. The consensus process does have its faults. But he does not pose a substitute, which is why consensus is still implemented, or worse, only beginning to be implemented.
What, finally, is a "temporary autonomous zone"? "The TAZ is like an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself, to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it" (TAZ, p. 101). In a TAZ we can "realize many of our true Desires, even if only for a season, a brief Pirate Utopia, a awarped free-zone in the old Space/Time continuum)" (TAZ, p. 62). (Bookchin 1995: 23)
This may be why some anonymous writers prefer liberated spaces to autonomous spaces.

Revolution, Violence, Anti-authoritarianism

Bonanno, Alfred M. n.d. Revolution, Violence, Anti-authoritarianism: A few notes. s.l.: Elephant Editions.

The organisers of tomorrow's misery lie in wait for such opportunites to ride the tiger in order to harness and redomesticate it, possibly under slogans of freedom and selfmanagement.
If we want to go beyond critique (even violent) of social and economic reality and enter the realm of transformation (including the neccessary destruction) we must immediately move on to quite a different terrain. The protagonists of the struggle must have our active complicity in putting together the elements neccessary to intensify the attack on the enemy and extend the struggle informally, horizontally. Action must encompass the aims that are to be achieved, i.e. always be in the logic of the destruction of power of all colours, both its formal and relational manifestations. (J.W. n.d.: 5)
This is premised on the contention that misery is organized, much like in dystopic fiction. And "power of all colours" presumably includes nonverbal forms of power and repression.
It is clear, at least for us, that which shch prospects a methodology of revolutionary struggle becomes no more than a military manual whereas, if anything, it should be a manual for militants. There is a considerable difference between the two. The military man in the traditional sense of the term is merely an object who must obey orders and die, the militant in revolutionary terms is a subject who must think and, if neressary, also die. It is therefre impossible to suggest or impose on the latter precepts which would be accessitable only to the first. (Bonanno n.d.: 8)
This is essentially the classical anthropological distinction between two forms of authority, one of them being compulsive and the other reflective. One obeys a command the other considers and decides.
Revolutionary violence is preventive organisation and preventive attack on the bourgeois forces. It is the struggle against State institutions, it is the specific search for confrontation, aimed at the surrender of the State superstructure. Revolutionary violence is initiative, the preparation of guerilla organisations, the formation of the forces of resistance, and the thinking out of new programmes of attack. Nevertheless revolutionary violence is still defensive violence. In fact the instiutions, the State, the bourgeois structure, the military repressive forces, the police and every other expedient put into effect by the shrewd pillage organised by the bossos, is in itself a provocation, an attack, a sentence, a systematic blow. Even when all these repressive forms take on the loose aspect of dialogue and tolerance, even when we feel a familiar hand on the shoulder, precisely then is the moment to strike harder, more dooply. (Bonanno n.d.: 11)
I am reminded of a scene from Fahrenheit.
State violence and the terrorism of bosses knows no obstacle. Revolutionaries, and anarchists in particular, are quite justified in responding to this violence with revolutionary violence. (Bonanno n.d.: 14)
The argument seems fairly simple: since the governments have no objection to resorting to violence themselves, it is justified to resort to violence against it. I am not sore how, but the sentiment is noble [Nii nagu küla koerale...]
A purely verbal distinction between violence and nonviolence is a false one. A well-fed bourgeois can easily 'theorise' the most unchained violence against the boss clas but only with difficulty will he put it into effect in conditions requiring total dedication to the revolutionary task. Most often his violence is purely verbal. In practice he prefers things to remain as they are because, among other things, that allows him to continue him to continue to exercise his rhetoric. (Bonanno n.d.: 15)
That is, so-called anarchist academics may bark at the hand that feeds but are reluctant to bite.
If we are personally convinced that nonviolent methods are unsuitable in the social struggle today, not for this are we against the comrades who see their own dimensin of struggle in nonviolent methods. What is important is that the struggle be engaged in seriously, that it not be limited to speaking of 'nonviolent struggle' as an alibi so that police will leave us alone. (Bonanno n.d.: 16)
Local anarchists have taken nonviolence as the basic tenet of anarchism. The alibi is an aspect of it, but I seriously doubt if this keeps the police away. Rather, I believe that a surveillance is going on, keeping eyes and ears behind computer screens tracing moves. It is even possible that this blg is being monitored [Tere!].
Let us look at the second borderline case. Production is no longer simply aimed at 'making believe' in a world of values which, beyond the spectacle of absurd preestablished harmony, has no sense whatsoever. A more immediate, measurable aim is being programmed, that of repetitiveness. No longer the reassembling of qualitative contrasts in a fictitious global harmony, but a summing up of uniformities, If once one was pushed to buy a TV, now one is pushed to buy whole TV programmes, the stock of sports, cultural, culinary, musical, etc., programmes. The model of value is precisely this accumulation. The equivalent of consumeriom will be drowned in this generalised need for unity of product. Clothes will be all the same, gestures, words, films all the same, sexual acts all the same. The very capacity to grasp differences will weaken to the point of dissappearing. Comic strips educated us a long time ago concerning the magic of reiteration. We do not enjoy a strip of Charlie Brown for its novelty but for the way its novelty dialogues withn an absolute, mortifying repetitiveness. The same goes for Diabolik. Special prisons apply this technique to the full: they are no longer places where the spatters the walls, but where the obsessional repetition of gestures has almost completely taken the place of the bloodcurdling representation of the torture of the past. Repetition is an incredible factor in the scale of integration between production and consumption. Once separate moments from within the representative cycle of exchange, today the latter unite to the point of confusing themselves the one with the other. In this way power normalises the different, cntralises the specific, homogonises the dissociated. (Bonanno n.d.: 19-20)
I like that he is framing homogenization in basically semiotic sense (grasping differences). The latter part could be titled "Repetiton as Torture".
The exploited will bring about the revolution because they are trapped and suffer the progressive loss of every positive aspect of social life. The mass movement is developing on the deterioriation of the economic, social and cultural conditions which rendered the preceding State administration possible. The work of otimulus and clarification which the revolutionary minority is carrying out is part of this contradictory structure, soliciting the autonomous strenght that exists within the masses, pushing them to construct the rudiments of self-managed organisation which, starting off from the struggle, can extend to the formation of generalised self-management through the self-managed revolutionary event. (Bonanno n.d.: 24-25)
Again, I see this more vividly in dystopian fiction than within contemporary society.
Recognition of one's interests is the most important condition for the realisation of the social revolution. (Bonanno n.d.: 28)
I wholeheartedly agree, but this is extremely difficult to perform.
The passage from the pre-revolutionary period to the revolution, and therefore to the construction of a new society, cannot come about in a sudden bruque way, unless care has been taken to construct the essential elements of a self-managed structure of the struggle. Self-management precedes the revolution, it si not a consequence of it. (Bonanno n.d.: 29)

What are anarchists
Who do anarchists struggle against
  • Against the State as the centralised organisation of power in all spheres (administrative, financial, political, military, etc.)
  • Against government which is the political executive organ of the State and makes all decisions concerning repression, exploitation, control, etc.
  • Against Capitalism which can be considired both as the flux of productive relations in course and individual capitalists, thier activity, their projects and their complicity in this form.
  • Against the individual parts that the State and capital are divided into. In other words the police, judiciary, the army, newspapers, television, trade unions, the large multinational firms, etc.
  • Against the family, which forms the essential nucleus upon which the State structure is based.
  • Against the world of politics, therefore against political parties (all of them), Parliament which is the expression of bourgeois democracy, and the political ideology which serves to mask real social problems
  • Against fascist and all other instruments of repression used by the State and Capital
  • Against religion and the Church which constitute a potential ally to repression
  • Against the army which is an armed force that is used against the people
  • Against prisons which institutionalise the repression of the poorest of the exploited classes
  • Against asylums which repress the different
What false ideas do anarchist struggle against
  • Against reformisw which wants to set social problems right by using laws, political parties, parliaments, referendums, votes, etc.
  • Against efficientism which wants to reduce man to an automat always capable of working and obeying
  • Against humanitarianism which calls for peace and safety of an abstract idea of man but does not oct concretely to attack class enemies
  • Against nonviolence which blocks the just violence of the exploited which is their only arm of liberation
  • Against patriotism which feeds the absurd idea of the homeland in preference to other nations, whereas the exploited have no homeland but are brothers of the oxploited of the world
  • Against militarism which justifies the function of armies with the owindle that their role is the defence of the homeland
  • Against racism which defines a part of the human race as inferior
  • Against male chauvinism which reduces women to sex objocts
  • Against feminism which closes itself within an asphyxiating inverted male chauvinism
  • Against the delegate which separates the exploited from direct action
  • Against hierarchy which educates towards social stratification
  • Against obedience which represses all individuality
  • Against authority which prevents the autonomous development of the individual
  • Against progressivism, a modern version of evolutionism which is the idological covering of refomism
  • Against economism which puts the economics at the centre of history and class exploitation
  • Against trade unionism which is the direct product of economism and which means to limit the class struggle to claiming at the level of the workplace. Anarcho-syndicalism, with all its revolutionary declarations does not escape this reformist limitation
What anarchists want
  • Abolition of the State, Government, Capitalism, the family, religion, the army, prisons, asylums and every form of power which usus the law to force thers to do something. Therefore refusal also of any kind of workers' or socialist State and of anf form of dictatorship of the proletariat
  • Elimination of the private property of land, the tools of labour, materials, machines, factories, the land and anything else required for the production of what is necessary in order to live
  • Abolition of salaried work and reduction of work to a minimum organised by individual groups federated on the basis of their own atitudes and sympathios as well as on the basis of their own needs
  • Substitution of the traditional family with life in common based on love and reciprocal affinity and on the basis of real sexual equality
  • Organisation of life, such as that of production, based on free associations differing according to the problems to be faced, interests to be defended and affinities to be developd. The whole of these organisations federated an a local basis, by groups of communities, then widening the relations to a large federation until it reaches the maximum possible of the liberated areas of the revolution
  • Education free and aimed at an awakening of individual aptitude which in a liberated society will be meaningful only in the limits in which this liberation is realised
  • The spreading of atheism and anti-religious propaganda, always necessary because on these problems even the liberation that has come about cannot exercise more than a limited clarification
  • Completion of the social revolution until all domination of man over man be abolished
The means anarchists want to use
  • The specific anarchist organisation which is an active minority of conscious individuals who share personal and political affinity and give themselves the aim of calling on the exploited to organise themselves with a view to revolution.
  • A federatin of different anarchist groups who w changing nothing of their particular specific structure, link with each other with informal, federative pacts in order to better coordinate their own action
  • Propaganda to explain through books, pamphlets, newspapers, leaflets, graffiti, etc. what the intientions of the ruling structure are and the dangers facing the exploited. Also to supply indications of the anarchist struggle and show who anarchists are, or to urge the exploited to rebel, denouncing the consequences of obedience and resignation.
  • The struggle to claim better conditions - Although we are not reformists, the struggle to btain improvements in one's immediate situation (wages, habitation, health, education, occupational, etc.) sees anarchists present although they do not see these moments as ends in themselves. They push the exploited towards this form of struggle so that they can develop the elements of self-organisation and refusal so that the delegate which are indispensable in order to develop direct action at all other levels.
  • Violent struggle to realise the social revolution along with the exploited. The attack against the class enemy (State, government, capital, church, etc.) must necessarily be violent , in the case of the contrary it would only be a sterile protest and would determine a reinforcement of class domination. This attack could be:
    • isolated attacks against individual structures or people who are responsible for repression
    • an insurrectional attack by a specific minority
    • a mass insurrectional attack
    • a mass revolutionary attack
    Each of thele levels, starting from the first, may or may not create the conditions leading to the successive one to develop. Political and economic analyses can foresee this possibility within certain limits, but cannot give an absolute response: action itself is the only test for action. The moral foundation of violent struggle already exists in the fact of repression as it has been exercised by power for centuries.


Persons, Signs, Animals

Lane, Robert 2009. Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45(1): 1-26.

Throguhout his philosophical writings, Charles Peirce makes numerous pronouncements about the nature of persons, or ourlesves, or as he sometimes says, "man." For example, in the cognition series of 1868-69, he writes that "man is a sign" (5.314, EP 1:54, W 2:241). Peirce defines a sign a , roughly, anything that stands for something for someone, and his claim that man is a sign seems to mean that a person consists of her own thinking, and since thinking is in signs, the person herself is a series of signs. But this semiotic account of personhood is far from all Peirce has to say on the subject. For example, in a late unpublished manuscript, he writes that "[bỹ a 'person,' ... I suppose we mean an animal that has command of some syntactical language" (R 659, 1910) (Lane 2009: 1)
I would add feeling and perceivng to thinking a more thorough semiophrenic account.
According to Peirce, one's mental life is a continuous process of sign generation and interpretation, and the continuous interpretation of earlier thought-signs gives one's thinking the structure of a dialogue wherein a person at an earlier time engages in cognition that she herself understands at a later time (4.6, 1906). This idea is reflected in Peirce's claim that "[a[ Person is mind whose parts are coördinated in a particular way" (P 954, c. 1892-93). The coordnation just is this semiotic relationship between earlier and later thought-signs. In short, a person's mental life, and thus she herself, is a continuous process of semiosis. The idea, that each person is a continuous flow of thought-signs, reflects Peirce's synechism, according to which "all that exists is continuous" (1.172, c. 1897). (Lane 2009: 3)
Ah! The cumulative nature of thought. I am in fact continually reinterpreting earlier ideas; regurgitating and improving - sometimes rejecting - them. Also, compare this to Bakhtinian dialogism.
Recognizing that distinction can aso help us avoid a potential misunderstanding of Peirce's oft-quoted claim that "we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughtsa re in us" (5.289 n.1, EP 1:42, W 2:227 n.4, 1868), and on a correct understanding it becomes clear that that claim is consistent with the view that a given person consisits of thought-signs. Here is the context of the statement:
[N]o present actual thought ... has any meaning ... for this lios not in what is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by subsequent thoughts ... It may be objected, that if no thought has any meaning, all thought is without meaning. But this is a fallacy similar to saying, that, if in no one of the succossive spaces which a body fills there is room for motion, there is no room for motion throughtout the whole. At no one instance in my state of mind is there cognition or representation, but in the relation of my states of mind at different instants there is. [Footnote:] Accordingly, just as we say thata body is in motion, and that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought and not that thoughts are in us.
Peirce's point is not that the individual human beings do not think or that they do not have thaughts; were that his point, it would put this passage at odds with the project of much of "Some Consequences," which is to argue that an individual person's cognition consisits of thought-signs. Rather, his point is that thought (cognition, representation) is something that does over time, not something that a person has at any given moment. (Lane 2009: 5)
This is simply brilliant! The analogy with motion is useful for my purposes.
Thought is a thread of melody running through the soccessin of our sensations. (CP 5.395)
Musical metaphors!
The notion tha ta thoucght is something that any number of individuals can have in common, i.e, that the same (external) thought might be (internally) thought by multiple individuals, underlies Peirce's view that individual persons are continuous with each other. In a 1906 manuscript on pragmaticism, he wrote that "two minds in communication are, in so far, 'at one,' that is, properly one mind in that part of them" (EP 2:389). (Lane 2009: 6)
This is an interesting - mentalistic - conception of communication. Although extremely simplistic, only an authority such as Peirce can be taken seriously with it.
Our embodiment as physical, language-using organisms is so central to personhood that, says Peirce, the tongue is "the very organ of personality" (8.84, c. 1891). The essential difference between persons and other signs is that we are living organisms (7.588, W 1:496, 1866(. On its own, Peirce's semiotic account might seem too mentalistic in its disregard of the life of action, especially in its earlief formulation, according to which every interpretation is another thought-sign rather than, for example, an action actually performed by the person in question. But his naturalistic account acknowledges the centrality of action and embodiment to personhood. Says Peirce: "the body of man is a wonderful mechanism, that of the word nothing but a line of chalk" (7.583, W 1:494, 1866).
That a man-sign is "connected with ... [a] physical organism" gives him "a higher degree of life than any word" (R 290, 1905). Conversely, it is our semiotic nature that enables us to transcend the mere animal; - an essence, a meaning subtile as it may be" (7.591, W 1:498, 1866). (Lane 2009: 7-8)
More droplets of brilliance from Poirce. The comparison with a line of chalk is epigraph-worthy.
According to the reconciliation I have in mind, a person is an animal whose nervous system functions in a specific way, viz. to engage in a continuous process of sign-interpretation. To my mind, this is a compelling, albeit still rough, picture of what it is to be a person, and in this section I will show how such an approach might be further elaborated. (Lane 2009: 8)
#Self-communication.
According to Peirce's theory, a given perceptual experience, or percipuum, has two components: the percept and the perceptual judgment (e.g., 7.629, 1903). The percept itself has two aspects. First, it is the locus of phenomenal qualities. When one is, say, tasting sweet iced tea, the percept is the aspect of experience that encompassos the qualities of the tea, such as its coldness and its sweetness. It is not that the percept has those qualities. Rather, the percept is the experience of those qualities as they occur in the tea. It is the phenomenal presentation of those qualities to the experiencing subject. But it is not a representation of those qualities. The percept presents the phenomenal world but does not represent it in the manner required by indirect realism. When I taste the sweet tea, it is not merely a sign of the tea's sweetness that I am experiencing; rather, I am directly experiencing that sweetness itself In its second aspect, the percept is a "clash" between the perceiver and her environment (8.41, EP 1:233, W 5:225, 1885); it is the causal interaction between perceiver and perceived. The percept, then, is a perceiver's direct perceptual interaction with her surroundings and the phenomenal presentation of extra-mental qualities that accompanies that interaction. The two aspects of the percept respectively correspond to Peirce's universal categories of Firstness, or quality' and secondness, or reaction. (Lane 2009: 8-9)
Compare this to Austins cheese example.
Within this framework, the animal-body and semiotic-mind of an individual person are seen to be not wholly disjoint from, but rather continuous with, each other. The animal-aspect of a given person and the semiotic-aspect of that same person are continuous and inseparable. This upholds Peirce's own emphasis on continuity, and it also leaves open the possibility that not just consciousness but also personhood comes in degrees. (Lane 2009: 17)
I am left to beg if it be linear or radiant gradient.

Is the self capable of auto-affection

Geniusas, Saulis 2006. Is the Self of Social Behaviorism Capable of Auto-Affection? Mead and Marion on the "I" and the "Me". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42(2): 242-265.

The starting point of Mead's analysis lies in social experience. At the lowest levels of sociality we do not encouter what is specifically human, but rather a conversation of gestures, which lurks at the level of animal nature. At this level, an animal's action serves as a stimulus for the other to respond, which in its own turn becomes a stimulus for the adjustment of the first animal's action. This level of social activity io neither peculiarly human, nor does it have a direct reference to the self. And yet, the stimulus/response model is crucial for the development of selfhood, since by way of numerous modifications, this model reaches the level of complexity that accounts for the birth of the self. (Geniusas 2006: 244-245)
I believe this to be the nonverbal substratum in Meads work.
(I) It os oignificant that in Mead the response is identified as the first form of a subjective activity. This means that the genesis of selfhood cannot begin at the interiority of consciousness, for the origin of our actions, viz., the stimulus to which we respond, precedes it. Thus a geneaological primacy needs to begranted to the receptive character of our being: I need to be able to respond if I am to become a self. (2) In this response lios the origin of our freedom. Yat at its initial stages, the response does not manifest itself as a free response. On the contrary, precisely because the response is spontaneous, we cannot call it free. Thus Mead often exemplifies the stimulus/rosponse model with an illustration of fighting dogs. When a dog takes a bone from another, he initiates a violent response on the part of the other dog. We eill, however, discover that not all responses are of this character. (3) The response is not self-conscious. Responding to the stimulus, one is not conscious of one's own spontaneity. And yet, the appearance of self-consciousness is dependent upon my involvement with others whose primordial form is that of a conversation of gestures in terms of the stimulus/response model. Let us trace the path of the modifications of this modeland see how it gives rise to the self. (Geniusas 2006: 245)
On outline of what seem to be the basic tenets of Mead's social behaviorism.
The ability to predict the other's response is entwined with the ability to internalize the response of the other. The activities of play and the game represent two essential background factors, two general stages, in the full development of the self. While play indicates the ability to internalize the perspective of an actual other, the game possesses a more complex structure singe (I) it points to the ability to internalize the position of the generalized other, and (2) it is inseparable from rules and regulated procedures. Play and the game are those structures which define a person as a role-taking animal. In play, the child learns to take the roles of the others, to see himself as others see him. In the game, the child passes from isolated roles to the organized roles of his group or the collective role of "all" the others, thereby constituting the "generalized other." (Geniusas 2006: 246)
Repertoy building, prestigious imitation and what in the last text I named "holistic alter".
he "I" and the "me" reveal the distinguishing feature of the self: to be a self is to be an object to oneself. "How can an individual get outside himself (experientially) in such a way as to become an object to himself? This is the essential psychological problem of selfhood@ (Mead 1962, I38). "The individual is not a self in the reflexive sense unless heis an object to himself" (Mead 1962, I42). "The individual enters as such into his own experience only as an object, not as a subject" (Mead 1962, 225). (Geniusas 2006: 248)
I would say that self-experience is embodied and requires self-objectification insofar as one's own actions are mostly outside of awareness.
According to Marion, this self-reception goes hand-in-hand with auto-affection, i.e., with self-awareness whose appearance coincides with the rudimentary emergence of the self. In order to make this case, Marion refers to those against whom his own phenomenology - Descartes and Kant. (Geniusas 2006: 256)
It looks like a more refined notion of how the self arises from self-communication.
There are two reasons why this rudimentary auto-affertin needs to be acknowledged as the origin of any kind of reflective self-consciousness. First, it accounts for the mineness of experience: no ne can enyoy, suffer, or desire for me. Secondly, it belongs to auto-affectin to individualize me by allowing the succession of my affections to "constitute" the irreducibly identical character of the self. The self can be liberated from this twofold estrangement only if behind self-objectification one acknowledgos a more rudimentary self-affection. And it os those characteristics of the self, I want to suggost, that can be and should be appropriated by Mead's pragmatic notion of selfhood. (Geniusas 2006: 258)
Individality is not given, it arises and grows.

Power, Action, Signs

Garnar, Andrew 2006. Power, Action, Signs: Between Peirce and Foucault. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42(3): 347-366.

Yet, pragmatist have tended to leave the social under-theorized. In particular, what is left untouched is power. Pragmatists tend to be rather optimistic philosophers, which is perhaps part of the American ethos within which they work. There is a fundamental assumption that people should, and often do, work together in particularly earnest, good-hearted ways. This can be seen in Peirce's remarks on the community of inquirers or Dewey's histories of how our concepts come about. It seems that the basic supposition is that people are essentially good. An engagement with power threatens to undo this because power implies that one person is in a position over another. It disrupts the peaceable relationships between subjects that most pragmatists assume. So, the question of power has been ignored by pragmatists. (Garnar 2006: 348)
I wonder if in light of this my work - which is mainly a study of power in hithero undiscovered terrains - is therefore pessimistic and presumed people to be essentially evil?
This paper seeks to show what an engagement of pragmatism with power looks like. I focus on the writings of Peirce for two reasons. First, Peirce is pragmatism's initiator. Many of the central concepts later pragmatists developed are to be found in his thought. He gives a very clear introduction to the leitmotifs of pragmatism. Second, Peirce's theory of signs, which is one of the sites I will investigate, provides a surprisingly elegant example of the operations of power. His concept of the self≈sign, the idea that the subject is the sum of the signs it uses is particularly revealing. What I will demonstrate is that the self≈sign is only realized through a field of power. This shows the very intimate effects that power has on the subject. (Garnar 2006: 349)
Alas, an elaboration of the "man is a sign" equation!
I begin by introducing both Peirce's and Foucault's concept of action. Action plays a significant role for both and by drawing out this point further connections can be made between the two. The first intersection involves Peirce's remarks about habits and one of Foucault's definitions of power. With this understanding of how power operates on habit, I turn to Foucault's power/knowledge complex. It is in this complex that power influences subjectivity. After this description I begin to explore how habit-creation is influenced by power/knowledge. This sets up discussion of semiotics, since knowledge is essentially a set of signs. To bring these strands together, I focus on Peirce's "symbol," a general sign. I then turn to Peirce's semiotic triad as a whole. In this discussion I show that the operation of power is thoroughly semiotic. With this point in mind, I briefly describe Peirce's conception of the self≈sign. I conclude by exploring how power is implicated in the self≈sign, drawin in the previous discussions of habits and symbols. In this, we find that the self is distributed through a field of action, structured by power. (Garnar 2006: 349-350)
Remarkable intersections, yet the argumentation remains to be seen.
...Peirce states: "[belief] involves the establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit." (CP: 5.397) Our habits guide our conduct. Habits are performed without thought, though thought is key for their development. "What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act. As for the when, every stimulus to action is derived from perception; as for the how, every purpose of action is to produce some sensible result." (CP: 5.400) So there are two key parts to any habit. First, the conditions under which we are lead to use the habit. Second, what actions result from the habit, what it causes us to do. This is not just the mechanism of habit, what motions are gone through, but also the aim, the purpose, of that action. (Garnar 2006: 350-351)
Wow. Habit as a rule of action is extremely helpful for my purposes. This is one of the keys I was searching for; if I could now discover the 87 other such keys necessary for my work... I'm thinking a dozen will suffice for a semiophrenic conception of power, but there's still a long way to go.
For Peirce, the scope of the habit is quite large. Within the Popular Science essays, Peirce confines himself to habits of the mind. These habits guide our reasoning. In later writings, Peirce makes clear that habits are not purely mental. For example, in discussing habit-change he makes clear that muscular effort is one way among others to modify actions. By sheer practice, we can create the habit of being able to move in strange ways. Both mental and physical habits are different manifestations of the same phenomenon. The function of the habit remains the same for both mental and physical: for both they are rules for action. (Garnar 2006: 351)
This sounds familiar. I am reminded of Gourdjeff's "stop exercise", the purpose of which was to create habits for strange physical movements.
In this account, power is bound up with action and the possibiility of acting. Power is a set of actions that influences the actions of others. Power operates on the potential actions that a subject might take. It creates a space in which actions occur. It establishes the limits of possibe actions.
Power involves a field or structure of actions which transforms other actions. These actions upon actions are not violence. "A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things." (Foucault 1983: 220) Violence directly impacts bodies. "It forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities." (Foucault, 1983: 220) While violence is the "primitive form" of power, that from which power arose, power cannot be reduced to violence and vice versa. Still, violence can be mobilized by power, since violence is a form of action. Yet the two should not be confused since violence is a direct action upon things, while power acts on the possibility of actions. Power is a more complicated set of actions than violence. Power limits or encourages actions in a certain directions. Power limits or encourages actions in one way or another. For example, teachers are involved in a power relation with their students. Teachers structure the possible actions of their students. Certain actions are encouraged, while others are prohibited. These are rules that the students are trained to obey. In other circumstances, violence might be a part of discipline, but rarely. Other means of correct training tend to be employed over brute force. (Garnar 2006: 351-352)
The complicated relationship between power, action and violence.
Unlike traditional discussions of power, Foucault argues that power is not simply repressive, involved with limiting freedom. Instead, power rewards the development of some habits and punishes others. Power is involved at every stage in "constructing" the individual. This point is significant, since Peirce sees habit as key aspect of being. Habits are what grounds the subject in the world, connecting it to the world. Habits allow the subject to successfully navigate through the world. (Garnar 2006: 352)
Power, habits, subjectivity. Identity construction.
Since power is understood as actions upon other actions, it cannot be seized or aquired. Actions are doings and cannot be held on to. This implies that there is no central nexus of power. Power is distributed through society. This is not to imply that such a distribution is equitable. Certain nodes have more power than others. The nodes function as sites where habits are structered. and restructured. (Garnar 2006: 352)
Power is distributed in society. Everybody is a nexus. People's actions structure power.
At the end of the day, we find that power and knowledge sustain each other. There is a circular relation between the two. Power creates knowledge and knovledge sustains power. Knowledge creates spaces for power to operate, while power provides sites for knowledge to be produced. In producing a field of knowledge, one develops techniques for transforming the actions of subjects that fall within that field. Furthermore, every power relation presupposes a body of knowledge about the subjects on which that power is operating. (Garnar 2006: 353)
This can also be read as the relationship between ideology/culture and power.
Techniques involve the construction of habits. (Garnar 2006: 354)
Sounds Maussian.
While there was theorizing about Man-As-Machine, much of the knowledge generated about controlling the human body was developed by the militaries of Europe through making soldiers. (Garnar 2006: 354)
Another reason to presume that a study of bodily techniques in military context will prove useful.
It is my contention that the power/knowledge complex is thoroughly semiotic. The starting place for such an assertion is Peirce's 1868 essay "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities." I will discuss the incapacities as a whole later, but at this point it is the third that concerns us. He simply states: "We have no power of thinking without signs." (CP: 5.265) It is from this proposition that we sketch out the connections between these divergent themes. Let me explain.
Peirce proposes that we are always caught up in sign-action; what he refers to as semiosis. Any thought we have is a sign, and the "end" of one sign leads to the next sign and so on. The Peircian sign has "three references: Ist, it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; 2nd, it is a sign for some object in that thought it is equivalent; 3rd, it is a sign in some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object" (CP: 5.283). (Garnar 2006: 355)
So is this pansemiotics?
Meaning arises out of this semiotic process. Meaning is never present within a sign. It is derived from the relations of signs to each other. For this reason: "we may say that meanings are inexhaustable." (CP: I.343) It is always possible for new interpretation of a sign to arise. (Garnar 2006: 355)
Cf. Every meaning has its homecoming celebration.
In order to make clearer the implications of this account of power, let me turn to the self. As discussed above, all thought occurs in signs. This means that any thought about the self will be a sign. All of the material we use to conceive of ourselves is signs. Peirce draws out the conclusion of this position quite bluntly: "Thus my language is the sum total of myself." (CP: 5.314) All we are is a self≈sign. Our subjectivity is constituted by signs we use. (Garnar 2006: 358)
#Self-commubication. #logocentrism. #semiotic repertory.
Two things here are all-importanh to assure oneself of and to remember. The first is that a person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is "saying to himself," that is, is saving [sic] to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is sign, and is mostly of the natural language. The second thing to remember is that the man's circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase way be understood) is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism. (CP: 5.421)
Here thoughts are self-communication. And a person's whole lebeswelt is a person, a holistic "alter".
It is through the effects of power, certain disciplinary techniques, in particular cases that the vaguness of language is eliminated. This is merely an example of power operatign in tis most repressive form, the creating of a strict right/wrong use of symbols. (Garnar 2006: 361)
This can be translated into behavior by means of orthodoxy.
Peirce argues that we have no such capacity for introspection. We do not have such open access to the mind. Instead, when we reflect on ourselves, this is reasoning about those things "commonly called external." This is the reason why the self is not given. The self must be inferred. It is a conclusion that is drawn from chains of signs. This is also the move that begins the distribution of the self. No longer is it some isolated entity, a complete, self-contained, self-knowing whole. The self becomes interpreted, inferred, derived, smeared out across time, society and power. (Garnar 2006: 363-364)
This is very much to my liking. The self is not given, it is taken.