Moodne Orjus

Kärner, Jaan 1931. Moodne Orjus: Tõsielu-romaan. Tartu: J. Mällo.

Tal oli valus seda tunnetada, ja ühtlasi tal hakkas ääretult piinlik oma vaesusest. See vahtis talle vastu nagu sõnatu, tumm etteheide kelleltki, kes vaikselt ning nurisemata kannatab tema pärast. Ta ei saanud seda enam taluda, tõmbas kiiresti riided selga ja tahtis lahkuda toast. (Kärner 1931: 8)

"It might be true that the average human being was better off now than he had been before the Revolution. The only evidence to the contrary was the mute protest in your own bones, the instinctive feeling that the conditions you lived in were intolerable and that at some other time they must have been different." (George Orwell, 1984)

Alles siis muutus tema meel rõõmsamaks, kui kutsutud võõraste järele hakkasid lahkuma ka kutsumatud, kes kogu aja olid seisnud tummade statistidena. Nagu oleksid nende suud jäänud sootuks lukku, ei lausunud hääd päevagi, vaid kadusid tähelepanemata. Küll aga pidas pristav oma kohuseks tema kätt suruda ja midagi pomiseda enese vabanduseks. Kuid seda polnedu eriti vaja, ta teadis niigi, et sihuke on pristavi amet. (Kärner 1931: 15)

It appears that he felt violated. Isegi head päeva ei jäetud kui tema vara oli oksjonil ära hinnatud ja minema kantud.

See suurereedene norutuju kestis harilikult kogu järgneva pühadeaja. Ja kas ei olnud see nüüdki nõnda? See süngepilvine poolhämarus, haavana veretab õhtueha mändide taga? Kas ei seadnud ta ennast alateadlikult ristilöödud Kristuse asendisse? Kas ei olnud see Kristuse kannatamise müüt üldse mõjustanud ennasthaletsevat pessimismi tema elus? Kristus tõusis surnuist kolmandal päeval, tema aga ei näe oma kannatusil olevat mingit lõppu. (Kärner 1931: 19)

Norutuju ja sügnus on mujal edaspidi muutunud sünonüümseks, kuid "sünk" viitab tõepoolest algupäraselt pilvedele. Meenub Somobe laulusõna, "The weather was in many ways reflective of the man I called dad."

Tema närvid olid viimase võimaluseni pingul. Tema kõrvakuulmine oli terav nagu nõel. Ta kuulis juab suurest kaugusest öise kiirrongi tumedat kõminat. Kuulis läbi kukkumist oksalt ja koera luuravat astumist üle muru. Jaamas olid süüdatud tuled. Ta nägi oma aknast inimeste liiklemist perroonil. Jaamaülema punane müts eraldus puude vahelt külmalt ning hoiatavalt. Siis sõitis rong mürisedes ette. Vedur pahistas suitsu ja valget auru. Pikk vagunite rida säras tuledes. Reisijate tumedaid kogusid vilkus läbi ruutude. (Kärner 1931: 21)

Sama tundmust kogen mina pohmeluses või haigena - silmad kinni, kuid kogu ruum on vaimusilmas erk ja iga heli lähedal ja kaugel on kannatamatult tajutav. Alles romaani lõpuleheküljel tuleb välja, et ka Moodne Orjus on kirjutatud Elvas. Viidete poolest siis Tartu on "linn" ja Elva on "küla". Siit võib veel järeldada, et Kärner elas Elvas üpris rongijaama lähedal ja kus pool.

Ka viimasel ülestõusmispühal ei tulnud tema juurde keegi. Koguni mitte ühtegi sugulast, keda tal siin ümbruses oli rohkesti. Ta oli unustatud sellest saadik, kui tal enam ei olnud raha. Kui tal seda oli, siis muidugi oli ka sõpru ja tuttavaid küllalt. Siis leidsid nad teed tema juurde kas või südaöösi. Aga nüüd ta oli kõigist mahajäetud. See on ju ikka nii, mõtles ta, et inimest hinnatakse mitte selle järele, mis ta ise on, vaid selle järele, mis tal on. Kus sõira, sääl sõpru. Ta on ilma teenistuseta, ta on vaene, tema nime ümber on tehtud halba kõmu. Kes julgeks end veel siduda ühe säärasega? Sellest ei oleks mingit kasu. Pigemini see võiks tuua ainult kahju. Ja nõnda tema juurde ei tule enam keegi.
Olgu, jumal nendega, mõtles ta. Kas maksab selle üle imestuda, sellepärast ennast haletseda? Ta usub, et pisut tunneb inimesi ja teab, mispärast nad on sellised. Need on olud, mis lükkavad neid. See on elu, mis sunnib igaühte hoolitsema ainult enese eest. See on inimlik animaalsus, mis lööb läbi kultuurikesta, kui päevakorda tuleb lihtne olemasoluküsimus. Seda kõike tuleb võtta huumoriga, ilma liigse kibeduseta. Ainult kahju on sellest, et ka osa nõndanimetatud vaimuinimesi leivakannikat hakkam kummardama üle kõige. Kui sool tuimaks jääb, millega peab see siis jälle soolaseks tehtama? (Kärner 1931: 22)

Sellised tähelepanekud, mida märkasin ka Soodoma Kroonikat lugedes, osutavad Kärneri ebatavasele läbinägelikkusele inimloomuse suhtes. Minu arvates on see ehk seotud ka tõigaga, et ta 1946. aastal "haigestus", nagu Vikipeedia ütleb, ja bibliograafiline andmebaas märgib, et ta oli "vaimuhaige Trt-s 1946--58". Naljakal kombel ei ole Moodne Orjus Vikipeedias tema romaanide sektsioonis üles märgitud. Üldse on Vikipeedia sissekanne kummaline: "Looming" sektsioon algab lausega, "Väärtuslikum osa on luule." Kelle andmetel?

Või aga siiski? tema pessimism iseenesest? Kas on siin süüdi ainult laokil närvid? Kas ei ole selles mingit atavistlikku uha, mida viimased sündmused üles keerutaksid tema hingepõhjast? Tema orjadest esivanemate verd, mille vabadusetungid ei ole kunagi leidnud lahendust, mis on käärinud ning roiskunud eneses nagu seisev vesi?
On kummaline, kui kaugel minevikus võivad peituda meie tegude ja mõtete algjuured. Enamasti me ei jõuagi nende kohta selgusele. Siis me laotame arusaamatuses käsi nii eneste kui teiste üle. Aga sellest ajast saadik, kui me hakkame taipama ning endid ja teisi erapooletult vaatlema, me õpime valitsema omi mõtteid ja tegusid. (Kärner 1931: 27)

Kõlab peirceaanlikult, eriti enesekontrolli osa (maakeeli enesevalitsemine). Ka tegude ja mõtete algjuured sobituvad Peirce'i sünehhismiga.

Ta kandis punast kalli nahkkraega mantlit, mis andis tema sirgele ning saledale kehale suursuguse ilme. Tema kahvatus õrnas näos kajastus mingit erilist meelekülmust. Tema suured tumedad silmad vaatasid kõrgete kulmude alt sellise rahuliku läbitungivusega, nagu ei viibiks ta mitte siin, vaid kuskil eemal, nagu vaataks ta kogu aja ainult oma mõtteid, mis viibivad sääl kuskil, kõige nähtava taga. Ja sääl talle kõik on enesestmõistetav, et teda ei eruta enam mingi asi. (Kärner 1931: 30)

Üpris poeetiline see mitteverbaalne kirjeldus (kehv terminoloogia, kuid ei taha öelda "konkursus"). See kõige nähtava taga asuv koht kuhu läbitungiv pilk vaatab on nö middle-distance.

Nõnda kulusid mõned päevad, kuni saabusid jälle vekslitärminid. Siis ta pidi minema alevisse otsima vekslitele vastutajate pealkirju ja tarvilikku raha nende pikendamiseks. See täitis teda nagu alati vastikustundega. Ta kujutas juba ette neid nägusid, üleolevaid, iroonilisi, poolpõlastavaid ja poolhaletsevaid, millega teda vastu võetakse. Ta kuulis kõrvus neid noomitusi ja manitsusi, millega teda ära saadetakse. Ikka ühte ning sedasama kuni tüütuseni. See kõik oli talle alandav nagu oleks ta enese tabanud kerjamiselt. Aga parata polnud midagi. Tuli teha süda kõvaks ja kannatada. (Kärner 1931: 32)

Nagu oleks teadlik, et inimese näopoolet võivad kuvada väga erinevaid ilmeid samaaegselt.

Elu on laat, kus ka kõige süütumat pillutakse poriga. Jälle läbistas Kivirähka vastikusevärin.
Nagu mingi mürk kääris temas, õõnestas salaja tema enesevalitsemisvõimet. Kui rumal, kui mõttetu on see kõik! Kuid inimene peab seda siiski taluma. Oma näolt ära pühkima pori ja minema naeratades edasi. (Kärner 1931: 34-35)

Huvitav kas Kärneri vaimuhaiguslikest tähelepanekutest saaks kirjutada uurimuse? Seda ei saaks vist sooritamata ilma vaimuhaigust romantiseerimata.

Ta valvas vaikselt haige lapse juures, kuni see jäi magama, ja heitis siis ise ka voodisse, riidest lahti võtmata. Kuid uni ei tulnud. Ääretu kibedus täitis teda südant. Kibedus inimeste vastu, kelle pärast nad pidid kannatama. Kibedus maksva maailmakorra vastu, mis on nii ülekohtune ning ebaõiglane. Kibedus lõpuks ka iseenese vastu, et ta ei ole osanud oma elu korraldada teisiti. (Kärner 1931: 46)

Siin on juba näha ühiskonnakriitilisi algmeid mis teose lõpupoole kulmineeruvad tähelepanekuga, et Eesti ühiskond on haige ja vajab arsti vms. Lugesin hiljuti ajalehetükki pealkirjaga "Suurim vihakõneleja enne sõda oli president Konstantin Päts ise" (Ivo Karlep, 28. september 2015). Nimelt oligi Päts 15. märtsil 1934 riigikogu ees väitnud, et "Eesti rahvas on propagandast pimestatud ja haige ega suuda täita kõrgeima võimu kohuseid, mistõttu peab valitsus võtma mõneks ajaks kõrgeima võimu enda kätte." Võib-olla on see kokkusattumus, et mõned aastad varem oli rahvakirjanik just käesolevas teoses just seda soovitanud. Kui vaid viitsimist oleks siis kirjutaks Ivo Karlepile, aga mõtet vist ei ole, sest tema kirjatükk oli suuremalt jaolt ajaloolase Rein Ruutsoo arvamuste ümberjutustamine (sj mitte ajalooliste tõsiasjade, vaid arvamuste).

Siis tuli tema, ikka sessamas punases mantlis, kõndis temast mööda hõljuval mõõdukal sammul, silmad maas, nägu kahvatu, nagu mingis somnambuulses seisundis. Mis läks see talle kord? Ta vaatas teda üsna põgusalt, kui ta kadus puude vahele, ja märkas, et ta niisama vargsi tema poole tagasi vaatas. Kui ta nägi, et tema tagasivaadet on tähele pandud, käänas ta nagu pisut kohkunult pää ära ja sammus edasi. (Kärner 1931: 51)

Mitteverbaalne faatika, või, metakommunikatiivne teadlikkus: "If I know that the other person perceives me and he knows that I perceive him, this mutual awareness becomes a part determinant of all our action and interaction", and "The moment such awareness is established, he and I constitute a determinative group, and the characteristics of ongoing process in this larger entity control both individuals in some degree" (Ruesch & Bateson 1951: 208).

Olles niiviisi tõendanud oma Venes omandatud meditsiinilisi teadmeid, ta ei astunud eesti ülikooli ometi mitte õppima arsti-, vaid õigusteadust. See tähendab: ta maksis igas semestris korralikult oma õppemaksu, kuid loenguile ei läinud kordagi ja eksameid ei mõtelnudki sooritada. Ülikooli ruumides ta käis ainult harva ja nimelt kõige kibedama ihulise häda sunnil. Vähemalt sedagi peab ülikoolis saama lahendama oma kalli raha eest, naljatas ta ise. (Kärner 1931: 61)

Mul on tunne, et see "kõige kibedam ihuline häda" on tõenäoliselt sugutung. Sel ajal ei olnud kombekas taolisi asju otse välja öelda vaid tantsiti ümber teema või jutustati "läbi rooside". Tüüpiline on näiteks fraas "kaela langema". Kui neiu langeb noormehele kaela siis võib sealt järeldada, et toimub ka midagi enamat. Kusta Savipart, kelle ülikooliteed siin kirjeldatakse, ei sarnane kahjuks ühele nö perpetual student'ile, Benjamin Bolger, kelle kraes on hetkel 29 teaduskraadi. Minu arvates on natuke narr nii palju õppida ja nii vähe panustada - EBSCO andmetel on ta avaldanud vaid ühe artikli, Thomas Edisonist ja tehaste leiutamisest, ja siingi pole kindel kas on tegu sama isikuga.

Männid muutsid oma värvi, suur kask Kiviräha akna all seisis üleni nooris lehis, aedviljade värske muru kattis peenraid. Kogu maja uppus haljusse. Kevad tungis sisse uksest ja aknast. (Kärner 1931: 65)

Kummalisim kasutus sõnale "muru" mida ma olen kohanud. Muru on seega igasuguste madalate taimede roheline osa?

Ta tundis oma silma ja kõrva, iga oma ergukiu ja nahatäpiga seda kasvamise ning õitsemise kirge, mis hoovas nähtamatu lainena puust puusse, lillest lillesse. Seda elu edasiandmise õhinat, mis kostis helisedes ühe linnu laulust teiseni. (Kärner 1931: 65-66)

Teos sisaldab päris palju taolist looduskirjeldust. Üldse, päris paljudes tolleaegsetes teostes on ohtralt sisutäidet mis tegeleb looduse ilu lahkamisega. Siin aga on tähelepanek "elu edasiandmise õhina" kohta tõene: linnulaul on sisuliselt paaritumissignaal. Üks SMBC koomiks isegi tegi selle kujul nalja. Mul ei õnnestu seda hetkel üles leida, aga leiutati tõlkeaparaat loomariigi jaoks ja metsas jalutades kuuldakse kuidas linnud muudkui hõikavad "Fuck me! Fuck me!".

Kivirähk tervitas. Ta vastas sellele vaevalt kuuldava torisemisega. Oli tunda, et ta meelsamini vaikiks ning mõtiskleks enda ette kui kõneleks.
Nad vahetasid mõne pääliskaudse sõna ilmast ja põllutööst. Siis kulus tükk aega vaikides. Selle vanamehega ei olnud kerge jutule saada.
Tema nägi oli süngelt tõsine, läbinähtamatu ning peaaegu ükskõikne. Kas oli ta õppinud oma tundmusi varjama? Oli ta niivõrt kibestunud elust ja inimesist, et kartis neid endale lähedale lasta? (Kärner 1931: 67)

See vanamees on metsavaht Tehvand, kellega Kivirähk siin sobitab juttu. Edasi hakkab Tehvand pidama pikki poliitilisi monolooge, sest ta poeg oli Tallinnas olnud kõrgel kohal. Selle pojaga sõbruneb Kivirähk lähemalt ja teose lõpus on neil päris diip vestlus Kiviräha olukorrast. Selle lõigu siin tuleks vist inglise keelde tõlkida millalgi, sest see on üks olulisemaid seiku faatikast. Tuleks ka analüüsida, sest peale ilmast rääkimise on tegu siiski suhte algatamisega (st saab ka sotsiaalsete tehnikate seisukohast vaadata).

Oli tal aga raha juba taskus, tema meel muutus korraga üsna rõõmsaks. Ta oli sootuks unustanud oma endise kibeduse, oma südames ta ei tundnud enam viha kellegi vastu. Milline nõiavõim on siiski rahal, ka säärasel väikesel summal, et see teeb kohe inimese nagu uueks. Kogu maailm ning elu paistab korraga hoopis teises valguses. Kõikjal aina repiad, sõbralikud näod ja elav, rõõmus liiklemine. (Kärner 1931: 79)

Seda olen ka ise tajunud, et kui pärast tühjade taskutega elamist natukenegi raha valgub on ellusuhtumine ja maailmavaade hoopis rõõmsam, isegi kui seda ei jätku kauaks. Kõikjal sõbralike nägude nägemine võib aga olla emotional contagion'i mõju: kui sa käid naeratades ringi siis vastutulevatel inimestel on raske ka mitte naeratada, kasvõi hetkeks. Naerata ja maailm naeratab sulle vastu, nagu öeldakse. Suuremas plaanis on see muidugi illusioon, sest teised inimesed ei ole päriselt sinuga koos õnnelikud vaid kuvavad tahtmatut reaktsiooni.

Mis oli temaga juhtunud? Milline peronospora kasvas tema ajus, mis tegi haigeks ning virilaks kõik tema mõtted? Ta vabises nagu palavikus, kõik tema närvid põlesid, ja süda, see tagus nagu haamriga vastu rinnakorvi. (Kärner 1931: 82)

Kärneri vaimuhaiguse tekkepõhjuseid võib otsida just tema majanduslikust olukorrast. Statistiliselt käivad sellised asjad käsikäes. Samuti vaesus ja terviseprobleemid. Kindlasti mängib olulist rolli ka sotsiaalne isolatsioon, mida nägime ülal, sest selle seos vaimu- ja terviseprobleemidega on just praegusel ajal suure uurimise all.

Kivirähk jälgis neid kogu õhtupooliku läbi akna, istudes oma laua juures ja jätkates oma pooleliolevat tööd. Ta nägi, kuidas Adalbert Laul Ritast-õele nihkus aina lähemale, kuidas nende pilgud alguses nagu kobades ja uurides peatusid teineteisel ja siis järjest rohkem sulasid vastastikkuseks sümpaatiaks. Ohtuks olid nad juba niivõrt leidnud ühist keelt, et lahkusid käsikäes õuest ja jalutasid aeglaselt metsa poole. (Kärner 1931: 84)

Mine võta kinni kas käsikäes metsa poole aeglaselt jalutamine on jällegi läbi lillede millelegi viitamine. Aga hoopis paelub mind see kas Adalbert Laulu kummaline nimi ei ole mitte viide Friedebert Tuglasele. Millegi pärast kujutasin just teda ette Adalberti kirjeldusi lugedes. Aga võib-olla on kokkusattumus, just nagu peategelase nimi Kivirähk tänapäevane kirjanik Andrus Kivirähk.

Kui nad õhtu eel tagasi tulid ja uuesti oma kohtadele asetusid, näisid nad mõlemad kurnatud ning väsinud. Mehe palged hõõgusid, tema silmis oli segane palavikuline läige. Ta vahtis vaikides oma ette ja mängis kasteheinakõrrega, pööritades seda aeglaselt sõrmede vahel. Tütarlaps lamas tema kõrval mingis kannatava süüdlase poosis. Tema sõrmed nippisid kohmetult oma kleidi rinnaesist. Mis oli nendega juhtunud metsas? Kas olid nad kohanud proua Kilpi, tülitsenud tema pärast? Või olid nad milleski pettunud teineteises? Ja nüüd üks põrnitses sellepärast, kuna teisel sellest oli kahju? On ka probleemid, millega maksab oma pääd vaevata. (Kärner 1931: 88)

Tahtmatult meenub oma üheksanda klasis väljasõit ja ööbimine mingis kämpingus kus noorukid muidugi suitsetasid ja tarvitasid alkoholi. Kui klassi ilusaim tüdruk ja istuma jäänud sportlik ja populaarne poiss jäid natukeseks kaduma ja naasesid siis esitati neile ka taolisi küsimusi: Miks te higistate? Miks te näost punased olete? jne. Mida te tegite metsas? Everybody alread knows.

Oli see tütarlaps temasse armunud? Miks oli tema pilk nii kummaliselt pehme ning niiske, kui ta temale otsa vaatas ja temaga kõneles? Miks libises tema vari üle tema näo, kui ta temale teatas, et peab minema? On ta üks sääraseid, kes armub kergesti igasse võõrasse mehesse? (Kärner 1931: 91)

Inglise keelde ei saa seda pilku tõlkida kui soft and moist ilma, et see kannaks teatud konnotatsioone. Sealjuures terve teos pärsib Kivirähk lühikese-paksu naabritüdruku lähenemiskatseid. Tubli abielumees.

Margarete? Aga, jumal, mis on tal tegemist tolle Margaretega? Miks tuleb tema nimi talle alati meelde? Miks ei lahku tema kuju enam tema silmade eest? Kas on ta tõesti armunud, sipleb kõrvuni amoori kavalalt ülesseatud võrgus nagu mõni elutundmatu poisike? Veripunane mantel, valge špits, roosa siidpael - mingi segu suursugusest ja kõige panetunumast väikekodanlusest. See ei ole ometi mitte tema maitse. (Kärner 1931: 94)

Pidin siiski Õigekeelsussõnaraamatu lahti lööma. "Panetuma" on harjumuse tõttu tuimaks muutuma, ka "paadunud" ja "tardunud".

Ta vajus toolile laua äärde, toetas pää ühe käe najale ja hakkas teisega paberile kritseldama mõttetuid, segaseid sõnu. (Kärner 1931: 100)

Meeldib. Lihtsalt meeldib.

Ta ei vaadanud aknast välja, aga tundis, kuidas keegi akna alla ilmus ja talle oma suurte, sügavate silmadega otsa vaatas. Ta tundis seda pilku oma näol ja kätel nagu mingit teravat, selgesti tajutavat asja. (Kärner 1931: 100)

Hiljuti oli redditis ka teema selle kohta, et miks me tajume seda nii selgesti kui keegi meie poole, eriti otsa, vaatab. Mul ei olnud muud lisada kui viidata Ralph Exline'i varajastele katsetele 1960ndatel milles avastati, et ahvid lähevad marru kui neile otsa jõllitada ja hakkavad oma puuris ringi visklema ja seinu peksma; sama asi juhtub kui puuri ja inimese vahele asetada suur vinüülplaat ja teisel pool inimene jõllitab umbmäärast kohta kus ahvi silmad peaksid olema. Ma ei oleks üldse üllatunud kui millalgi avastatakse, kui seda juba ei ole tehtud, et see ajukäär mis tegeleb silmade ja suude tuvastamisega teeb sellistel puhkudel ületööd (st aktiveerub magnetresonantsi all vaadatuna).

Oligi päris naeruväärne mõtelda, et temast selles eas võiks veel saada korralik talusulane. See oli vaid neurasteeniku tuju, mis ei viinud kuhugi välja. See lõppes ääretu väsimatusega kehas ning valudega pihas ja ristluis. See näitas, et tal ei olnud enam pääsu sellelt teelt, millele ta juba paar aastakümmet tagasi oli astunud. Selle aja sees ta oli võõrdunud taluelust, oli enese lõplikult lahti juurinud maast. Ja nüüd oli hilja sinna tagasi pöörata. Kogu tema minevik rippus tal kätes ja jalus nagu raske kivi. (Kärner 1931: 102)

Tähendab, ennast on raske tagasi maasse istutada? "Neurasteenia" on närvinõrkuse sünonüüm. Need psühhomeditsiinilised terminid selles teoses iseenesest moodustaksid ühe osa, kui võtta käsile Kärner ja tema vaimuhaiguse kajastus tema teostes.

Õieti mitte kogu asi, vaid üks ainus võrdlus, üks veider mõte, et tol härral on härja silmad. Eks ole, see on ju päris veider mõte? Ja nüüd ei lähe see mul enam meelest. Ma näen nii selgesti neid härja silmi enda ees, nagu oleksin ma mõni härjavõitleja ning seisaksin parajasti tsirkuse areenil. Ma tean, need saavad mulle nüüd tükiks ajaks mingiks kinnismõtteks, millest ma ei saa vabastuda uneski. Olen juba varem läbi elanud midagi sarnast. Olin kinos ühes Indiaanlase kättemaksu nimelises filmis näinud madu, kes lasti läbi lahtise akna põrandale asetatud kinniseotud mehe kallale. Ja mitu kuud pärast seda ma ei saanud magama heites kustutada tuld. Pimedas ma nägin aina madu liikuvat oma voodi kõrval. Ütelge, kas see pole hullumeelsus, või vähemalt selle algus? (Kärner 1931: 117)

Härjasilmad ja härjavõitleja osa viitab eelnevale episoodile milles Margarete mees seisab keset teed ja peatab Kiviräha, et teda süüdistada oma naisega vahekorras olemises. Tegelikult on see Margarete koolivend FriedeAdalbert kes "käib metsas" koos Margaretega. Mao ja unenägude osa oleks olnud hea teada kui ma kirjutasin (olematute raamatute põhjal) pseudo-teadusliku tüki unenägudest. Ma kirjeldasin midagi sarnast sellele kinnisideele, aga väljamõeldud allikates. Tsitaadi viimane lause on ennast-teostav ennustus, kas pole? Muideks, see Indiaanlase Kättemaks on tõenäoliselt Revenge (1928), mida tõlgiti eesti keelde kui "Mustlase kättemaks" - ehk Kärner eksis ühe sõnaga.

"Vaevalt tosin aastaid on kulunud sellest meeletust maailmasõjast, ja mida me näeme, kuuleme? Igal pool täristatakse aina relvi, õhutatakse vaenu, külvatakse tuult. Juba käivad kõikjal ringi mesiste nägudega surnumatjad ja sabakuubedes raisakullid ja sosistavad õrritades: kui tuleks sõda, läheks elu jälle lahedaks. Ja see sõda tuleb, küllap näete. Riigid seisavad riikide, klassid klasside, parteid parteide ja iga inimene iga inimese vastu. Igaüks näeb teises võitlejat, kes kätt sirutab tema omanduse järele või kipub alandama tema prestiiži. Söödamaa on jäänud liiga kitsaks. Peab muist kariloomi maha tapma, muidu ei saa härrad enam edasi. Tuleb sõda, mille kohutavat ulatust me ei oska kujutellagi." (Kärner 1931: 118-119)

Nägime, oli kohutav. See on noor Tehvan kes siin tulevikku ennustab, kahjuks õigesti. Paneb mõtlema, et kui ma siin blogis kirjutan, et raudselt peagi üritatakse Eestimaad jälle Venemaa oblastiks muuta, nagu meedia viimasel ajal pasundab. Olgu siis märgitud, et minu kõhutunne ütleb, et kui Venemaa võttis Krimmi "tagasi" üsna pea pärast olümpiamänge, siis Eestil tasub olla ettevaatlik kui Venemaa peaks pärast 2018. FIFA maailmameistrivõistlusi taas minema äksi täis ja Baltimaid jälle "tagasi võtma". Isegi praegust Venemaa kaarti vaadates läheb kõhust õõneks, sest Venemaast läänes on Krimmi ja Kaliningradi vahel täpselt paras ristküliku-kujuline ala mille Vene Impeerium võiks jälle endale võtta, ja kui juba suuremaks võtmiseks läheb siis võtta ilus lõik koos Baltimaadega.

Kui palju on kogu maailmas neid vaimuinimesi, kes julgevad ujuda vastu voolu ja ka hädas ning viletsuses truuks jäävad oma veenetele, tõelisi kultuuriinimesi? (Kärner 1931: 119)

Kolm.

Kivirähk märkas tema sisemist rahutust, tundis, kuidas ta kogu oma olemusega kippus oma armastatu juurde. Ta tundis nende mõlemate keha põlemist, nende janust igatsust teineteise järele, nende suurt ja ülevat armastust. See hoovus temasse igast nende pilgust, sammust, käeliigutusest, igast nende südametuksest ja hingetõmbest. Tal oli otse valus seda tunnetada, aga ühtlasi ometi häämeel, et tänapäev veel olemas on sellist puhast, sügavat armastust ja sellist sädelevat teineteise leidmise õnne. (Kärner 1931: 124)

Need osad teosest mis kirjeldavad noore Tehvani ja Ines Sahlweide läbikäimisi on põhimõtteliselt softcore pornograafia (pehmeporno?).

Milleks ta seda kõike nii pikalt ja laialt seletab, küsis Kivirähk eneselt. Aga muidugi: tema põskede ebatavaline õhetus ja hääle värin kõneleb küllalt selget keelt. Ta armastab siiski seda naist ja tahab ennast õigustada tema, Kiviräha, ees, sest ta on neid sageli näinud koos. (Kärner 1931: 128)

See põskede õhetus ja hääle värin räägivad... keha?... keelt?

"Või arvad sa," jätkas Pahkel, "et sa sellega jääd ilmatoeks, kui sa ei võta tilka viina. Küll näed, kärvad veel ennemini ära. Kõik tõbed ja taudid tulevad sulle kooris kallal, kui sa vahel oma sisekonda ei desinfitseeri."
"Õigus!" hüüatas advokaat. "Ma olen seda ikka ütelnud, et viin on kõige parem rohi iga nohu ja ohu vastu. Proosit." (Kärner 1931: 131)

See on päris esimene kord kui ma kohtan sellist asja nagu ilmatala (siin "ilmatugi") kirjanduses. Selle sõna õpetas mulle suhteliselt hiljuti isa. Ühtlasi on selles lõigus kajastav filosoofia see mida mu isa järgib.

Tõsteti klaase, sunniti teda jooma, žestikuleeriti ja trallitati. Advokaat haaras pahema käega lauast kinni, sirutas parema käe ette ja kutsus komissaari sõrme vedama. Komissaar võttis kutse vastu. Jalad seatu vastamisi, käed löödi kokku, ja ähkides ning puhkides läks lahti plaanitu, rüselev sõrmetirimine. Mõlema nägu punetas, higi tilkus üle põskede, sõrmekondid ragisesid, põrand naksus ja põrises. (Kärner 1931: 135-136)

Ja see on täpselt teine kord kui ma kohtan kirjanduses sõrmevedamist. Esimene kord, kummalisel kombel, on Kärneri Soodoma Kroonika kuuendal leheküljel. Olen ühes seminaris küsinud inimestelt kas nad teavad mis see on, aga vastus oli negatiivne. Mina mäletan seda oma lapsepõlvest. Võib-olla ei mängita pöidlasõda ka enam ja seegi on varsti ära ununenud? Nah, thumb war on võõrsil ka, aga sõrmevedamise kohta ma ei ole kindel. Sisuliselt haagitakse nimetissõrmed ja tõmmatakse - kelle poole tõmmates teine lahti laseb on võitja.

Kas olen ma tõesti sattunud võõra kera pääle, mõtles ta ja taandus tuppa. Ta lükkas mõlemad aknapooled pärani, istus laua juurde ja jäi üksisilmi vahtima pilvede kerkimist taeval. (Kärner 1931: 147)

Koos füüsikateaduse arenguga muutuvad ka metafoorid. Nüüd küsiksime, kas oleme paralleeluniversumisse sattunud?

Siis pööras ta oma pilgu lõunasse ja tõmbus ehmunult akna juurest tagasi. Nagu ääretu hall laviin veeres säält uuesti üles vihane pilvelohe. Tuul paisus kiiresti ja muutus peaaegu tormiseks. Mõne minutiga tõmbus sünge kate üle kogu taeva. Äike puhkes kahekordse jõuga. Vihma valas nagu olks ülalt tuhat koske alla kohamas. Välgud sähvisid peaaegu vahetpidamata. Kogu laotus oli täis valutuld. Pimedus metsa all paistis selle tõttu veel sügavam ning mustem kui enne. Ajutine vaikus äikese mürina ja vihma kohina vahel oli nii kurjakuulutavalt tühi, et seda otse valus oli taluda. Selles vaikuses ja pimeduses ta tundis julma selgusega oma inimlikku osa. See on nii naeruväärselt väike, nii ääretult tähtsusetu aja ning ruumi lõpmatuses. (Kärner 1931: 151)

Epigraafivääriline. Muidugi saab seda kasutada, et osutada kuidas Kärner tõepoolest tajus julmema selgusega kui teised inimese ääretult, naeruväärselt tähtsusetut osa aja ja ruumi lõpmatuses.

Ah, see tapvalt vägev ja hukutavalt ilus öö. Õudne üksindusehirm ja põletav igatsus kokkukõla järele. Suur, sügav armastus. Meeletu tung välja tühjusest. Moraalne seadus igaühe südames. Usklik hardumus, mis painutab põlvi jumala ette. Jumal - meie isa põlvest põlve. Jumal, kes viib inimkonda edasi läbi igaviku. Kõlbeline kett, mis seob ta üheks aastasadadest aastasadadesse. Tõuseme ja vajume nagu lained mõõtmatus ookeanis. Igavene elu uuendab end surma läbi. Noorus tungib alati tormakalt pääle. Tema rõkkamises ning hõiskamises kõlab kosmilise muusika rühm. Loodusvägede mäss, idas koitev uus hommik. (Kärner 1931: 153)

Ka epigraafivääriline. Kurat küll Kärner lõpeta ära see sügavamõttelisus. Midagi head sellest ei tule.

"Näe, üsna terane teine veel," lausus Kivirähk.
"Võib-olla saab siiski terveks," vastas Kivirähk ja küsis siis: "Kuidas teil's nüüd läheb kah?"
"Mis ta läheb või on," lõi metsavaht käega. "Mis sel vaese teenija elul minna? Visiseb nagu tuli toores puus: ei saa sa edasi ega tagasi." (Kärner 1931: 159)

Nüüd juba teine kord kui kohtan seda kõnekäändu. Esimeses olevat üks noormees "elanud nagu tuli toores puus." (Madarik 1955: 9)

Meie inimesed on ju püsti hullud. Kõik on kangesti tähtsad ja ennast täis. Ja juhtud sa ühele säärasele ülema, et pole ta ühti oma ninaga maailma ülalhoidja ega ammugi mitte ainus ristiinimene maailmas, siis on ta sul kohe kätega karvus. (Kärner 1931: 161)

See metsavaht Tehvan ikka ei lõpeta. Aga eks mujalgi tolleaegses kirjanduses on juttu eestlase suurushullustusest. Kurb asi selle juures on, et varsti peaaegu sajandiga pole selles vallas väga palju justkui muutunud. Muust võib järeldada, et ilmatala on "maailma ülalhoidja".

Ta mõtles salaja värinaga tagasi tõelikkusele. Auto, lennuk, kino ja raadio, silmapilkne sex appeal. Kogu inimkonna on vallutanud mingi kihutamise maania, mingi kiiruse hullumeelsus. Kas ei kihuta ta nõndaviisi täie auruga kuristikku? Metsavaht Tehvan arvabki, et ega ta enam üle saja aasta kesta, kui ta samas suunas edasi läheb. Kas on see vanamoodsus, ebausk, tagurlus?
Kui inimhing oleks kella mehhanism, mida saaks lahti võtta ja parandada, kui ta on läinud rikki. Aga see'p see on, et mehaaniliste seaduste järjest pinevam rakendamine isiku ja inimkonna ellu aina rohkem segi paiskab nii üksikinimese kui kogu inimkonna hinge. Meeletu revanši-idee rahvuste ja klasside vahel. Hullumeelsuseni ulatuv rekordivaimustus. Võidujooks nugadega hambus. See on tänapäeva "terve egoismi" ning tehnilise elukäsituse tulemus. (Kärner 1931: 171)

Inglisekeelseid sõnu kohtab tollases kirjanduses tõesti harva (Gailiti Nipernaadis oli vist mingi seik kus teeseldi inglast, aga muist ei meenu midagi). Inihminge kohta käiv lause... mul pole tekste kuhu neid epigraafideks panna! Ehk tulekski Karnerist ja hullumeelsusest kirjutada midagi? Igatahes, selle lõigu lõpus hakkab ta arutlema ühiskonnaprobleeme mis kulmineerub katkendiga mis meenutab Konstantin Pätsi kuulsat "vihakõne". Ma ei olnud seda lugedes ära märkinud ümberkirjutamiseks, aga kuna see meelest ka ei lähe siis tuleb siiski ümber kirjutada:

Kas ennustab kanarbik õnnetust? Kas kuulutab suur kirjurähn haigust ja surma? Adalbert Laul igatahes kardab seda. Ta laskis oma maja katuseharjalt eemaldada kõik, mida rähnad varemini toksisid ning kasutasid oma alaseina. Aga kas on sestsaadik majast lahkunud haigused või sinna sattunud eriline õnn? Kas ei ole see tänapäevani jäänud õnnetuste majaks?
Rumalus ning ebausk puha. Ning tema mõtted hüppasid jällegi teisele ainele. Mac Donaldi, Brüningi ja Pätsu ringsõidud. Maailma majanduslik kriis. Fašistlikud ja kommunistlikud võimuhaarangud. Laostuva, degenereeruva inimkonna rahutu, kääriv igatsus pääseda ummikust. Enesepõletamisest ning alatisest ajujahist hullunud psüühi rabelev valus tung korra ja kokkukõla poole. Alateadlik tarve mingi lepitava jumala, kas või maapäälse diktaatori järele.
Aga kas ei ole usk mõne diktaatori või presidendi kõikvõimsusesse samasugune rumal ebausk kui usk mõne lille või linnu pahatoovasse mõjusse? Kas ei ole meeletu egoism, ääretu naudinguiha, keha- ja rahaorjus olnud see, mis meid on viinud ummikusse? Kas ei ole selle teenistusse rakendatud kõik need masinad, mootorid ja propellerid, mille igavene huugamine meid on väsitanud ja meie hinge laostanud? Oma sügavamas tuumas me oleme vaimselt laisad, iseloomult lõdvad ja kõlbeliselt jõuetud. Meil ei ole mingit suurt igatsust, mingit suurt kirge, mis kihutaks meid looma uut, õiglasemat ning paremat elu. Igaühte üksikult ja kõiki koos. Ootame kõike abi väliseilt võimudelt. Veeretame kõik ebaõnnestumise süü samuti väliseile mõjudele. Oleme oma erakonnarähnasid niikaua lasknud toksida oma katuseharjul, et nüüd otse karjatame diktaatori järele, kes peletaks need rähnad sootuks eemale. Aga kes ütleb, et selle järele küllus ja õnn meie majja asub?
Ei, ei, mingi pööre peab tulema. (Kärner 1931: 172-173)

Nüüd üle lugedes siiski tundub, et Kärner pigem vaidleb diktatuuri vastu kuiet poolt, ja võib-olla tekkis mul see assotsiatsioon üldse seepärast, et haigust, Pätsi ja diktatuuri on nimetatud samal leheküljel? Või see, et keegi on raamatus siinse eelviimase lõigu osa "Oma sügavamas tuumas" kuni "Aga kes ütleb" kõrvale hariliku pliiatsiga tõmmanud kriipsu, et seda välja tuua ja rõhutada. Siiski, nüüd pakuks ma, et võib-olla vaenas Konstantin Pätsigi tüpomaania ehk oma nime nägemine trükistes või avaldistes. Ehk toodi talle käesolev kirjakoht lugeda, sest teda oldi siin mainitud? Oletame, et Päts luges lehekülje viimasel real olevat nõudmist, "Ei, ei, mingi pööre peab tulema." ja põmm, üleriigiline kaitseseisukord ja vaikiv ajastu.

See on üks inimloomu kõige põhilisemaid, kõige tugevamaid omadusi: paheline uudishimu, mille eest ei ole keegi kaitstud. Mõnulev sorimine kõigis inimlikes toimingutes, kahjurõõmus ning parastav irvitamine selle üle, mida muidu vast võidaks pidada ilusaks ning pühaks. Et ärgu nad katku endid midagi kirjude hilpudega, me teame küll ja avastame kogu rahvale, mis on selle all. (Kärner 1931: 178)

Asjad mis ei muutu. Vt nude pictures of Justin Bieber.

Seda naeruväärsust ongi vist taibanud need meie diplomaadid, kes on põgenenud meie kitsaist piirest ja väljas enne kõige hoolitsevad oma püksi kantide eest. Nad on kahtlemata meie kõige suuremad riigimehed. Nad oskavad vääriliselt hinnata pükste tähtsust. Sest püksid on kõige tähtsam ese inimese elus, neid peab hoidma rohkem kui oma hinge, neid ei tohi kunagi kaotada. (Kärner 1931: 178-179)

Ma tean, et ta ironiseerib, aga see on omamoodi tõsi. Selle põhjal võiks isegi formuleerida pükste filosoofia, püksoofia.

Suur rahu ümbritses kogu maja. Ühtegi inimest ei olnud näha. Ei kuuldunud ühtegi häirivat häält. Ainult heinaritsikas siristas rohus oma ühetoonilist, pisut melankoolset viisi. Ning seegi oli nii ebamäärane, nii tasaselt kumisev, et ta seda pigemini võis pidada omaenda kõrvade kuminaks.
Omaenda? Kas oli ta siis tõepoolest olemas? Talle näis silmapilgul kõik see, mis teda ümbritses, niivõrt kummaline, et ta enam ei tajunud oma minasust. Ta ei tundnud enam oma keha, oma reaalset asendit, oma ühtekuuluvust teiste inimestega. Ta tajus ainult ühte mõtet, üht fiktsiooni, mis rippus kuskil selles ebatõelises, viirastuslikus ruumis. (Kärner 1931: 184)

Kõlab nagu egosurm, või vähemalt mingiugune seotud häire. Loetavasti on inimesi kes püsivalt käivad ringi teadmata kes nad täpselt on, kus on nende kehapiirid, isiklik ruum, jne. "Minasus" teeb vist mõttetuks "isemuse" mõiste. Aga eks iseendale viitavate terminitega on alatine häda. Alles hiljuti õppisin Grinkerilt, et inglise keeles saab ka öelda "I-ness".

See on kunsti põhiprobleem: mõista inimest ja teha teda kaasinimestele mõistetavaks. Leida lihtne, siiras sõna selleks. Ma ei oska seda veel, järelikult: ma ei ole veel kuigi kaugele jõudnud. See oli mõte, mida ma ennist tahtsin ütelda. (Kärner 1931: 197)

Kärner oleks nagu Susanne Langerit lugenud. Aga eks mõlemad oletatavasti toetuvad sajandi alguse Saksa esteetikateooriale.

Neil oli veel raha, kuna see teiste kodanike käest juba hakkas kaduma. (Kärner 1931: 215)

Lõpetuseks veel üks keeleline tähelepanek. Sellest ajast saadik kui mu karm ja pedantne eesti keele ja -kirjanduse õpetaja kutsekoolis selle selgeks tegi olen ma andnud endast parima, et kasutada õiget vormi "kunas", a la "kunas sa saabud?" selle "kuna" asemel mis peaks olema põhjuslik "asjad on nii kuna see ja too". Siin näen ma esimest korda kasutust mis toob selle erinevuse teravalt esile. Kivirähu kõrtsiseltskonnal on veel raha, aga mitte selle pärast, et see teiste käest juba hakkas kaduma, vaid samal ajal kui see teistel hakkas kaduma. Ühtlasi, Augusti Gailiti Karge Meri mille märkmetega tegelen järgmiseks, sisaldab tõepoolest ainust kirjakohta kus ma olen päriselt trükimustas näinud sõna "kunas".

Talking politics

Latour, Bruno 2003. What if we Talked Politics a Little? Contemporary Political Theory 2: 143-165.

Complaints about a loss of interest in politics are heard all over. But what if the famous 'crisis of representation' stems simply from a new misunderstanding of the exact nature of this type of representation? As if, in recent years, we had begun to expect it to provide a form of fidelity, exactitude or truth that is totally impossible. As if talking politics were becoming a foreign language gradually depriving us of the ability to express ourselves. Could it be possible to forget politics? Far from being a universal competency of the 'political animal', might it not be a form of life so fragile that we could document its progressive appearance and disappearance? This is the hypothesis that I would like to explore in this paper. (Latour 2003: 143)

As a person who has lost interest in (at least local) politics, I find this relevant. In the 'crisis of representation' there is no specification of which type of representation is under discussion - it could be any type of representation; so it should read as 'a new misunderstanding of the nature of representation'. Perhaps faithful, exact and truthful representation, i.e. purely referential representation is as narrow as 'genuine or verifiable statements about the structure of the universe', and what talking politics really accomplishes is more phatic. The fragility of political talk reminds me of the fragility of the middle class, i.e. how it's a side-effect of capitalism that hasn't always existed. Perhaps political talk is just a side-effect of contemporary society and does fluctuate along with types of government, for example.

The idea can be formulated simply: by attempting to explain politics in terms of something else, we might have lost its specificity and have consequently forgotten to maintain its own dynamics, letting it fall into disuse. To retrieve the invaluable effectiveness of political talk, we need to start with the idea that, as Margaret Thatcher so forcefully put it, 'society doesn't exist'. If it does not exist, we have to make it exist, but in order to do so we need the means to do so. Politics is one of those means. (Latour 2003: 143)

In short, politics is one of the means of constituting society.

The recent resurrection of Gabriel Tarde allows a sharper contrast between two diametrically opposed types of sociology: that which assumes that the problem of the constitution of society has been solved, and that which studies the fragile and temporary construction of social aggregates. The former, a descendant of Emile Durkheim, uses social explanations to explain why some political forms of coordination are so sturdy. I call this type 'sociology of the social'. The latter type I call 'sociology of association' or 'of translation'. When political sociology sets out to explain politics through society, it renders politics superficial and replaceable. By contrast, when the other political sociology strives to explain the very existence of social aggregates through political discourse, that discourse immediately becomes irreplaceable. In the former instance, if we were to lose politics we would not lose much; in the latter, we would lose all means of social articulation - at least for all the associations in which the 'us' and 'they' is in question. (Latour 2003: 143-144)

Phatics undoubtedly approaches sociology of association.

It is clear that politics, like science, law or religion, forms heterogeneous institutions which simultaneously belong to all enunciation regimes. However, precisely, I would for the moment like to suspend any definition of institutions, subjects, genres or political agents likely to bind us to a certain type of content, and rather to focus on a regime of talk, a particular manner of speech. One can be a member of Parliament and not talk in a political way. Conversely, one can be at home with one's family, in an affocie, at work, and start talking politically about some issue or other even if none of one's words have any apparent link with the political sphere. (Latour 2003: 144-145)

It is as if Latour is here trying to establish the political function of speech.

Why do we regret that politicians 'don't tell the truth'? Why do we demand that they be 'more transparent'? Why do we want 'less distance between representatives and those whom they represent'? Even more absurd, why do we wish that 'politicians wouldn't change their minds all the time', 'wouldn't turn their coats for the slightest reason'? These demands, repeated throughout the press like a complaint, a rumbling, a shout or, rather, like a mort, are good sense in appearance only, for they all amount to judging the conditions of felicity of one regime of talk in relation to those of another. The denigration of political talk would never be possible without this ignorance of its key, of its own peculiar tone, of its spin as English-language newspapers so accurately (albeit, mockingly) put it. (Latour 2003: 147)

I think it's because no-one likes lies and deceit, especially from a person in power. We demand transparency because there is corruption. We want less distance because politicians have the habit of serving loyalties other than those they represent. And we demand stability because politicians are voted into office often on the basis of promises, and people are justifiably disappointed when those promises are broken. Imagine being in a personal relationship with a person who is a compulsivie liar, hides and obfuscates, remains distant and aloof, and goes where the wind blows. It would be difficult to remain in a relationship with such a person. But the political institution enables deceitful, corrupt politicians to stay in office. This paper seems to presume that this is just the way things are and that's how it's supposed to be.

Demanding that scientists tell the truth directly, with no laboratory, no instruments, no equipment, no processing of data, no writing of articles, no conferences or debates, at once, extemporaneously, naked, for all to see, without stammering or babbling, would be senseless. (Latour 2003: 147)

Why do we have popular science writers? Why do we have TED talks?

If we turn from the demand for transparent information and focus a little more directly on the conditions of felicity peculiar to political discourse, we discover an entirely different demand for truthfulness. Political discourse appears to be untruthful only in contrast with other forms of truth. In and for itself it discriminates truth from falsehood with stupefying precision. It is not indifferent to truth, as it is so unjustly accused of being; it simply differs from all the other regimes in its judgment of truth. What then is its touchstone, its litmus test? It aims to allow to exist that which would not exist without it: the public as a temporarily defined totality. Either some means has been provided to trace a group into existence, and the talk has been truthful; or no group has been traced, and it is in vain that people have talked. (Latour 2003: 147-148)

Instances spring to mind of politicians claiming to represent people, either all or most of the people. Even Bernie Sanders does this when he says that his views are those of most Americans.

But he who says 'I understand you', 'We're one big family', 'We won't tolerate this any more' or 'Our firm must conquer a bigger market share', those who chant 'All together, all together, all!', would be unable to withstand a true/false judgment of the same type. Yet they know what the difference is between true and false statements, but they detect that truth or that falseness not in the presence or absence of a reference, but rather - and we will understand this soon - in an entirely new phenomenon: the resumption or suspension of the continuous work of definition and materialization of the group that this talk intends to trace. Anything that extends it is true; anything that interrupts it is false. (Latour 2003: 148)

This is not entirely new. This is the conative function, specifically in its "vocative" aspect (something like Althusser's interpellation).

From the classical point of view I am auto-nomous (as opposed to hetero-nomous) when the law (nomos) is both what I produce through the expression of my will and what I conform to through the manifestation of my docility. As soon as this coincidence is broken, I leave the state of freedom and enter into that of dissidence, revolt, dissatisfaction or domination. (Latour 2003: 150)

Finally a definition of autonomy.

Systemics and Cybernetics

François, Charles 1999. Systemics and cybernetics in a historical perspective. Systems Research & Behavioral Science 16(3): 203-219..

Some systemic-cybernetic terms have remote origins. Hereafter they are traced back in time, but connections with more recent developments are signalled.
The Greek word 'sustema' stood for reunion, conjunction or assembly. 'Kubernetes' (helmsman) was used by Plato, already in the abstract sense of 'pilot' of a political entity.
The concept of system resurfaced during the seventeenth century, e.g. principally in a philosophical sense. Descartes' 'Discourse de la Méthodé' introduced a coordinated set of rules to be used to reach coherent certainty, i.e. an epistemic methodology of systematic and possibly in some sense systemic character. (François 1999: 203)

But - What is a system? Here - an answer.

After Descartes, practically all important philosophers did construct their philosophical system, starting from some basic interrelated postulates. Leibnitz, for example, stated his 'principle of pre-established harmony' between substances, according to which any change in one substance is necessarily correlated with every other. This is coherence in complexity through reciprocal constraints. It would already be a kind of conceptual homeostat, in Ashby's twentieth century terms! Moreover these Leibnitzian correlations could be eventually formulated in scientific laws. Thus are scientific theories heralded, as conceptual systems. (François 1999: 203-204)

This is one of the few aspects of systems that I was previously well-aware of: change in one part of the system necessarily effects change in the whole system.

Much later, the unavoidable necessity of correlations and mutual interdependence, associated with a complex causality, and leading naturally to the concept of system, reappeared in N. Hartmann's reconsideration of ontology (1912). Hartmann also developed a theory of stratification, i.e. hierarchy of levels of reality through his theory of categories. His ideas were quoted more than once by Bertalanffy (1949, 195) and seem to have filtered, directly or indirectly, for example, into the works of Miller on living systems (1978), those of Mesarovic et al. (1970) and other authorities on hierarchies, and possibly van Gigch's concept of metasystems (1987b). (François 1999: 204)

Reference: Hartmann, Nicolai 1943. Neue Wege der Ontologie. In: Systematische Philosophie. Stuttgart. This guy seems pretty interesting. Something to get into in future.

From 1854-1878, the French physiologist Bernard (see 1952) in a series of works established the existence of the 'internal milieu' in the living being, thus making clear difference between what happens 'inside' and what is now called the 'environment' (Vendryes 1942). (François 1999: 204)

Something to keep in mind for inlooking sensational perception.

Psychology also was in want of more global views. After Brentano's research on the relation of the subject with the object (Psychology from an empirical viewpoint, 1874, 1911), Wertheimer's research on the principles of perceptual organization (1923) led to the formulation of Gestalt psychology, i.e. psychology of perception of forms, widely developed by Kohler (1929) and Koffka (1935). (François 1999: 206)

Oh god damn. Of course Brentano's fingerprints are on Gestalt psychology. Of course.

It became obvious that perception must start by picking up static structures and dynamic interrelations between elements, i.e. is systemic. We have here yet another root of various systemic-cybernetic interpretations of reality. (François 1999: 206)

From Firstness to Secondness.

Another very important precursor was the Polish logician, psychologist and semanticist Korzybski, who published in 1933 (in the United States) his seminal work on Science and Sanity, wherein he developed a 'Non-Aristotelian' logic, with very significant implications in psychology and psychiatry. While his work is frequently ignored by systemic psychologists, he explained psycho-semantic pathologies in an obvious systemic way. Bateson and probably most of his direct intellectual heirs have had knowledge of Korzybski's work. It is obvious that no satisfactory conversation nor consensus can be reached if psycho-semantic pathologies are not understood. (François 1999: 208)

Who are Bateson's direct intellectual heirs? Apparently Korzybski influenced Bateson's "difference that makes a difference".

Von Bertalanffy's main contribution was neatly stated in his 1950 paper, in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. However, equally important was his role as a catalyst of the systems view. This is so in at least two different senses.
In the first place he clearly stated the central concept of systems. The same could be said of him that is said about Christopher Colombus and America: after him there was never anymore need to discover systems. On the other hand, he strongly insisted on the existence of 'isomorphic laws in science', giving convincing examples. From this fact he deduced the possibility of a new multidisciplinary approach and proposed a 'general systems theory', by generalizing some widely significant principles.
He presented the so-called theory as 'an important regulative device in science' which should lead to the 'unity of science'. However, he merely discussed some specific subjects as competition between parts, finality and equifinality, closed and open systems, and anamorphosis and catamorphosis. (François 1999: 209)

His paper is titled "An Outline of General System Theory" and I will finally get to read him (as there is a copy of his book in Tartu but it is in a restricted library).

The basic password for his [Von Förster's] work is probably the German word Eigen, i.e. self-, now incorporated into the systemic language as in eigenbehaviour, eigenelement, eigenfunction, eigenprocess, eigenvalue, and the like, not to mention the numerous expressions beginning with 'self-'. (François 1999: 210)

As a person very much taken by expressions beginning with self-, I am intrigued.

Some ethologists, not necessarily closely connected with the systems movement, made interesting contributions to the pool of transdisciplinary concepts. Already in 1934, von Uexkull had developed an understanding of the environment as a percept, different from species to species and even from individual to individual. Other ethologists, as for example Bonner (1955), investigated the general social aspects of animal life. Bonner explored, for instance, colonies of cells and microorganisms or, at a higher level of complexity, coordination and cooperation in animal societies (ants, termites, beavers, deer, monkeys, seals). As these studies widely expanded and are still going on nowadays, it seems possible that a very general systemic theory of sociality and its ways could finally emerge, possibly connected to the recent research in AL. Bonner also studied other systemic topics such as differentiation, morphogenesis, patterns and limits of growth, and symmetry. (François 1999: 212)

I was waiting for von Uexküll to be mentioned. Also, i think Ruesch & Bateson's (1951) contribution is a step towards a very general systemic theory of sociality.

In his 1962 paper on 'The architecture of complexity', Simon successfully tried to throw more light on the concept of complexity, until then merely a not very clear password. Of course, systems, as made of numerous interacting components, and more generally identifiable sets of specifically interacting components, are to be clearly differentiated from simple unorganized collections of elements. Simon gave a variety of examples in his paper, but most of all made the difference crystal clear with his famous Hora and Tempus parable of two watchmakers, one of them working in a systemic way, and the other merely in a linear sequential way. (François 1999: 212)

Why does this remind me of the distinction between hypo- and hypersemiotic communication?

Chaos tehory as the study of the irregular, inpredictable behaviour of deterministic non-linear systems is one of the most recent and important innovations in systemics. Complex systems are by nature non-linear, and accordingly they cannot be perfectly reduced to linear simplifications. (François 1999: 214)

"The immanent laws of literary evolution form an unresolvable equation" (Jakobson & Tynyanov 1928).

Another outstanding French cybernetician and systemist, active since 1950, Vallée has constructed during the last 40 years under the general name of 'epistemo-praxeology' an elaborate mathematical and logical theory of cognition as related to systems (1993, 1995). This work, based on a very wide knowledge of the relevant authors in the field (as for instance von Förster, Maturana, McCulloch, Pitts and Wiener), introduces the notions of observation operator, inverse transfer and epistemo-praxeological loop in order to clarify the deeper nature of the interrelations between the observer and that which is observed. (François 1999: 215)

How does this compare to Rusech's loop between knowledge and action, and his insistence on the observer's position?

As the editor of my recent Encyclopedia of Systems, I included in this work some very generally unknown concepts, which seem, however, of a quite systemic nature and, as such, potentially uneful. Tree of the most significant among these are:

• the 'aura' (Prat), i.e. whatever traces remain of the system after its demise (petrified wood, a ship's wreck, Hammurabi's and Justinian's code, Aristotle's logics);
• 'stigmergy' (Grassé), i.e. the alternate and reciprocal transfer of structural and/or functional information from individuals to the system they are part of, or conversely;
• 'invisibility' (de Zeeuw), i.e. the non-perception of some objects, features or situations due to the insufficiency of our observational competence.

I am convinced that there must still be a number of other concepts or models of potentially systemic generality scattered in some (un)fairly unknown works of disappeared or living researchers. We should dive for them in the deeps of literature. (François 1999: 217)

Aura sounds like a potential contender for Kalevi Kull's challenge to find a proper term for signs that remain from disappeared Umwelten. The definition of stigmergy here doesn't seem to do justice for the concept. Wikipedia writes: "The principle is that the trace left in the environment by an action stimulates the performance of a next action, by the same or a different agent." In other words, it's as if the aura determined consequent behaviour. Invisibility sounds strained, much like Cesar Janello's cesia. I've found more suitable concepts from an (un)fairly unknown work: E. R. Clay's The Alternative (1882) proposes abditive and inabditive indistinctness for invisibility due to insufficient competence or invisibility as such. All in all this was one of the best papers I've read in a while.

To Un Th Hu Be

Grinker, Roy Richard (ed.) 1956. Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior. New York: Basic Books.

Because this is an old and rare book there's a good chance that I'll never gain unmediated access to it. So instead I'll take the next best thing and read the reviews of it available on JSTOR. The significance of it consists of it containing a paper by Jurgen Ruesch - one of the few that Roman Jakobson has cited (ergo, has read).

Sprott, W. J. H 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker.. American Sociological Review 22(1): 110-111.

IN 1951 Jurgen Ruesch, a psychiatrist, and Roy Grinker, the Director of an Institute for Psychosomatic and Psychiatric Research, got together some seventeen representatives of allied disciplines - a zoologist, some sociologists, an historian and so on, making a committee of nineteen, who set out to hold bi-annual week-end conferences at which they were to discuss the possibilities of a "Unified Theory of Human Behavior'. A report of the first four conferences is presented in this book. (Sprott 1957: 110)

Apparently Ruesch took to Morris in attempting something like unified science.

They discussed the possibilities of a unified theory of human behavior. But what could that mean? That, alas, was not a question to which they addressed themselves for any length of time. The setting of the problem is straightforward: social systems are "run" by humans, humans have personalities, they are also physical organisms and therefore allied to all living organisms. Now does a "unified theory" mean a set of rules from which one can deduce the rules of biology, psychology and sociology? This was scarcely discussed, and to be sure the nature of such rules is obscure. Does it mean a new-Spencerean statement of evolutionary process? This was touched on and provided the bright idea that in social development it is symbols that ensure continuity and changes, performing thus the same role that genes do in the history of physical organisms. More extensive and rewarding was another line: are there concepts which apply to all these fields, and if so do they mean the same wherever they are used? Much is said about homeostasis and the discussion of this by Emerson and Anatol Rapoport is well worth reading. (Sprott 1957: 110)

So an amalgamation of psychosomatics and social sciences? The idea of change and continuity effected by symbols in analogy with genes precedes the idea of "memes".

Is there, it is asked, a set of rules, or a mode of analysis of communication, which applies to the signals that flash from cell to cell, to communications from id to ego, and to the communications from man to man in society? The concepts are discussed and, if nothing else, communication theory is clarified in the process. But then, as one may imagine, all sorts of difficulties of a basic nature reveal themselves. Systems may have some homeostatic control to keep them intact, their parts are in a communication net-work and systems communicate with one another. But - what is a system? What are boundaries, and how permeable are they? The discussions on this question are among the most valuable in the book. Another even more fundamental problem loomed up. Speigel presents is with a diagram of systems related to one another: the soma, the psyche, the group, the society, and - obscure indeed - the universe. Perhaps the concepts of homeostasis and communication theory apply to them all - except the last. Perhaps, suggests Morris, they are linked by a system of common symbols in any given society that - to take his example - "policeman" has a meaning in the communication system, and it has a meaning in the social system in that it defines a role; it also has a meaning in the personality system in that if a person becomes a policeman and now symbolizes himself as a policeman, he has become a policeman," and he might have added that when he became a policeman he may become flat-footed. (Sprott 1957: 110)

The communication matrix of Ruesch and Bateson is here pretty apparent - intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, and society are here soma, psyche, group, society - and universe. Clarifying communication theory is pretty much what Ruesch does at every step. And the question, "What is a system?", still looms large to this day. The Morris here, it turns out, is the self-same Charles Morris. And now that I dared to dream a little and looked this title up in our library system it turns out that Sebeok's collection does indeed have it. So I will actually gain unmediated acces to it, but reading these reviews cannot hurt, so I'll continue.

Each system can be dealt with independently, but the link between them is the system of common symbols. All this seems to help us on a bit, but we constantly hear, particularly from Ruesch who presented a paper on it, disturbing references to "the observer." This is both salutory and irritating. All our theories are the views of observers; how far does his perspective contaminate objectivity? (Sprott 1957: 111)

The former part is what sociosemiotics is all about. Ruesch's insistence on the perspective of the participant-observer is also Jakobson's takeaway from this book.

Deutsch, Morton 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy. R. Grinker. Administrative Science Quarterly 1(4): 543-546.

One approaches a book like this with mixed feelings: it has such an imposing list of contributions but such a pretentious title. To speak of a general theory of human behavior at this stage of the development of the behavioral sciences, when the more mature physical sciences have no "general theory," smacks of grandiosity. Our situation is that there are hardly any well-developed small theories, and the linkages between empirical research and theoretical statements are most often weak or lacking. Yet I suppose it is these very lacks and uncertainties in the field, combined with the urgent feeling that "something ought to be done about something," which give rise to the earnest searchings for an all-embracing formulation. Something of the same motivation led me to look forward to reading this volume, hoping that some salvation from the tension of intellectual uncertainty might be offered by the distinguished group of contributors. (Deutsch 1957: 544)

The situation is not much different almost 60 years later. Only the linkages between empirical research and theoretical statements are more tangential than ever.

The focus of the conferences was the concept of "system," and the basic theme was that a unified theory could be developed which subsumed the various systems that are relevant to the study of human behavior, for example, the organic, the psychological, the social, the cultural. (Deutsch 1957: 544)

Aren't we still looking for a viewpoint that would integrate these systems coherently?

The discussion of boundaries centered around an outline presented by Ruesch which classified boundaries in terms of a host of miscellaneous characteristics and in terms of the physiological, psychological, social action, and communication universes. Ruesch's classification has a richness of detail which is appealing, but on closer inspection it looks like a trop in which stretched analogies could ensnare one in rather fruitless discussion if they are taken seriously. (Deutsch 1957: 545)

Curiously, I have the same feeling with Ruesch's theory of communication (or synopsis of it). It looks beautiful on paper, but it feels threatening to put it into any meaningful action. Perhaps that is why there is so little follow-up to Ruesch's work? (But then again, the same could be said for both Morris and Jakobson.)

Useem, John 1957. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. Social Forces 35(4): 376.

The individual scholars, one may infer, were not expected to act, nor did they conceive of themselves as acting, in the capacity of formal representatives of their own disciplines (an illusion not uncommon in many interdisciplinary meetings); hence they were free to explore whatever theoretical aspects of their fields were of interest to them personally and to those present. (Useem 1957: 376)

This is ideally the everyday life of a semiotician.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of this book lies primarily in the insights it offers those sociologists who are curious about the development of theoretical models and the methodological problems involved in the formulation of appropriate concepts. These can be explored with profit with respect to such areas as schemes for linking of the intrapersonal and interpersonal, the significance of the observer for what is observed, the connections between the principles of stability and change within systems, boundaries between systems, etc. In these and comparable topics, the analyses are characterized by sophistication, erudition, and a sensitivity to the frontiers of our total fund of theory about man's behavior. (Useem 1957: 376)

I am interested in appropriate concepts, linking intra- and interpersonal communication, and whatever these scholars (especially Morris and Ruesch, whom I did not dream to meet between the same book covers) have to offer.

Stephenson, William 1959. Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. American Journal of Sociology 64(5)

The first of the conferences had before it brief formulations by Spiegel (that everything is interdependent on everything else); by Shakow (there are needs, which may or may not be gratified); Ruesch (that communication theory has much to offer, but all observers must be psychoanalyzed first, otherwise facts are distorted); Talcott Parsons (who provides a neat account of his general theory of action); Laura Thompson (who interjects core values); and by Florence Kluckhohn (who recommends value orientation and a questionnaire as a framework for the comparison of cultures). In the discussion, Weiss remarks that all, so far, is "rationalization," "schemes and diagrams," merely "a statement of the facts." What is missing, he adds, is quantification, to reduce the immense variety of facts to a few more common ones. (Stephenson 1959: 524)

That everything may be dependent on everything else is something E. R. Clay finds to be not inconsistent. That Ruesch holds psychoanalyzing observers up as a contingency seems dubious, but I'll see if I read it. And I'm a bit excited to read "a neat account" of Parsons' theory, which has thus far eluded me.

Jules Henry in a richly good-humored paper asks who in a maternity ward is being kept in a steady, homeostatic state, the new-born baby, the mother, the hospital, American society as a whole, or the world? However, Deutsch restores the serious note and provides, in a paper entitled "Autonomy and Boundaries According to Communication Theory," the first approach to unification of a kind. It would be such as invites the behavioral sciences to talk the language of boundaries, decision points, memory pools, higher-order feed-backs, homeostasis, and the like. (Stephenson 1959: 524)

I wonder how this metalanguage compares to Lotman's boundaries, bifurcation points, texts, self-descriptions, heterogeneity, and the like.

Those of us who are privileged, through this volume, to look in upon the day-by-day (more or less) thinking of so many authorities can at least draw the conclusion that, if a brew of experts in the behavioral sciences is concocted, it will have a polyglot taste. It is difficult otherwise to understand how, after the mixing, the basic results are homeostasis, transaction, information theory, metabolism, reproduction, irreversibility, goal-seeking, sex differentiation, and permanent coupling. (Stephenson 1959: 524-525)

From this selection I'm most interested in transaction and irreversibility - will keep an eye on these.

Gillin, John 1957. General and Theoretical: Review of Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior edited by Roy R. Grinker. American Anthropologist 59(6): 1092-1093.

For those who wish a neat package or a finished theoretical system, the present volume will probably prove tiresome and irritating, although Grinker provides a summary at the end. However, the book explicitly represents work in progress and for those, like the present writer, who are interested in the development of such unfinished business it is very stimulating. (Gillin 1957: 1092)

With reviews like these emphasizing the book's irritability it's no wonder that it's not so well known outside of its own era. But alas I am also intested in the development of these ideas (especially, as mentioned above, by Ruesch and Morris).

Fairly general agreement was achieved on three broad "principles" applying to all types of systems having to do with human behavior. The first is the principle of homeostasis, conceived as stability or trend toward stability or equilibrium. The second is the principle of transaction, meaning a reciprocal relationship among all parts of the field and not merely interaction, which is regarded as a relationship between only two systems. The third area of agreement is on communication of information as it operates in various types of systems ranging from the biological to the social and cultural. (Gillin 1957: 1092)

Well, Ruesch was a transactionalist. I'm interested in if and how these principles could be reconciled by the views of Jakobson and Tynyanov (1928).

Phatic Jakobson

Jakobson, Roman 1981[1960d]. Linguistics and poetics. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings III: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry. The Hague (etc.): Mouton de Gruyter, 18-51.

There are messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works ("Hello, do you hear me?"), to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention ("Are you listening?" or in Shakespearean diction, "Lend me your ears!" - and on the other end of the wire "Um-hum!"). This set for CONTACT, or in Malinowski's terms PHATIC function, may be displayed by a profuse exchange of ritualized formulas, by entire dialogues with the mere purport of prolonging communication. Dorothy Parker caught eloquent examples: "'Well!' the young man said. 'Well!' he said. 'Well, here we are', he said. 'Here we are', she said, 'Aren't we?' 'I should say we were', he said, 'Eeyop! Here we are'. 'Well!' she said. 'Well!' he said, 'well'." The endeavor to start and sustain communication is typical of talking birds; thus the phatic function of language is the only one they share with human beings. It is also the first verbal function acquired by infants; they are prone to communicate before being able to send or receive informative communication. (Jakobson 1981[1960d]: 24)

I've been working on this passage for a long time now, but today I'd like to take up the Dorothy Parker excerpt. My intention is too look into how much David Abercrombie might have influeced this section of the definition of the phatic function. I've ordered the latter's book through interlibrary loans. Until it gets here, I'll revisit Roman Jakobson's use of the term "phatic". For although I have read several of his Selected Writings in full, and manually searched for notes on "phatic" in several others, I've yet to use automated seach for this task. Thus, this time around I installed Recoll, a desktop full-text search tool, and let it index all of Jakobson's Selected Writings that I previously had downloaded from De Gruyter when it was available for my university for a few weeks. // Also, I finally took up comparing this passage in "Metalanguage..." and this one, and the former is different by only a few words: "thus the phatic function of language is the only one they share with human beings when conversing with them." The bold part is missing here but present in "Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem" (Jakobson 1985[1976e]: 115). This could have been a relevant piece of information when I wrote my paper about the "talking birds" note and the work of Hobart Mowrer.

Waugh, Linda R. and Monique Monville-Burston 2002[1990]. Introduction to Roman Jakobson, Selected Writings: On Language: The Life, Work and Influence of Roman Jakobson. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings I: Phonological Studies. Third edition. Introduction by Linda R. Waugh & Monique Monville-Burston. Berlin; New York: Mouton, v-lxiii.

The two additional functions, then, are (5) the metalingual (metalinguistic) function, corresponding to focus on the code, and (6) the phatic function, focus on the contact. (Waugh & Monville-Burston 2002[1990]: xxiii)

Here we have Waugh and Monville-Burston affirming that the phatic function focuses on the communicative contact.

Scholars now believe that not only should the learner be taught the code of the target language but also should be made aware of practical importance of the emotive, conative, and phatic functions and of pragmatic and social factors. (Waugh & Monville-Burston 2002[1990]: xlix)

And here they add that phatic utterances have practical importance and are involved with pragmatic and social factors. Also, this is probably where I first got the impression that metalingual and phatic functions were the latest additions to the scheme (anyone familiar with Bühler and Mukarovsky could have deduced this). My further hypothesis is that both of these later additions were inspired by Gregory Bateson, whose metacommunication covers the meta- aspect of both code and relationship (cf. Ruesch & Bateson 1951).

But that seems to be all! The only other occurrences of "phatic" in Roman Jakobson's Selected Writings are the following:

• In the "Index of Subjects" of SW VII, referring to uses in "Metalanguage as a Linguistic Problem".
• In the "Index of Subjects" of SW III, referring to uses in "Linguistics and Poetics".
• Listed among "The cardinal functions of language - referential, emotive, conative, phatic, poetic, and metalingual [...]" in "Language in Relation to Other Communication systems".
• In the "Index of Subjects" of SW II, referring to the above mention.
• Listed when Jakobson recalls that in his study "Linguistic and Poetics" he "attempted to outline the six basic functions of verbal communication: referential, emotive, conative, poetic and metalingual" in "Verbal Communication".
• Listed among "the assemblage and reversible hierarchy of diverse concurrent verbal functions and operations (referential, conative, emotive, phatic, poetic, metalinguistic)" in "Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences".

So, basically, Jakobson named the phatic function as one of the cardinal functions of language, wrote one single paragraph about it, and later merely referred back to it. It is possible that he elaborates his definition of phatic elsewhere in another language, perhaps in the paper about Polish illustrations of language functions, but without knowing Polish it is impossible to access. This is a dead end. Another possible route is to search for the use of "contact" and look for instances where it might elaborate his definition of the phatic function.

Jakobson, Roman and Linda R. Waugh 1987[1967e]. Language and Culture. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VIII: Major Works 1976-1980. Completion Volume 1. Berlin; New York: Mouton, 101-112.

Yet if we accept the standpoint that cultural values are transmitted by learning, then what is to be said about language? Is it a cultural fact? Evidently language is transmitted by learning, and of course the acquisition of the child's first language implies a learning contact between the infant and his parents or adults in general. If, moreover, one has to learn a second or further language, it requires a relation between people who learn one from the other. Among the definitions of culture current in anthropological literature, we also find an assertion that the principal way of diffusion for cultural goods is through the word, through the medium of language. Does this statement apply also to language itself? Of course, language is learned through the medium of language, and the child learns new words by comparing them with other words, by identifying and differentiating the new and previously acquired verbal constituents. (Jakobson 1987[1967e]: 103)

This may be valuable for elaborating how the phatic function is "the first verbal function acquired by infants; they are prone to communicate before being able to send or receive informative communication" (above, in the original definition).

Linguists see now, with an ever greater clarity, that the study of a language cannot stop at its limits, and that we are faced with the vital phenomenon of languages in contact. The further experience of linguistic science reveals that interlingual ties are not confined to a territorial contact, since, furthermore, there exists a cultural contact between languages, independent of geographical contiguity. Such contact becomes an even stronger international and universalistic bent and force, both in cultural and in linguistic aspects. (Jakobson 1987[1967e]: 112)

Although abundant in tokens of "contact", this excerpt is valuable for cultural semiotics, because this is exactly what cultural semiotics deals with (mostly in semiospheric terms).

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1969c]. Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 655-696.

The question of presence and hierarchy of those basic functions which we observe in language - fixation upon the referent, code, addresser, addressee, their contact, or, finally, upon the message itself - must be applied also to the other semiotic systems. (Jakobson 1971[1969c]: 661)

This is exactly the kind of stuff I'm looking for when searching for "contact", as sometimes he refers to the phatic function through the so-called "factor" (i.e. phatic function is set on the contact factor, just as the metalingual function is set on the code factor). But, still, this is something I already know by heart - Jakobson urges us to study these functions in other communication systems but refrains from doing so himself. The end result being that since no-one really understands Jakobson clearly enough to undertake the kind of analysis he had in mind, people took his scheme of linguistic functions, viewed it as a communication model, and did very little with it.

The variable radius of communication, the problem of contact between the communicants - "communication and transportation" - aptly advanced by Parsons as the ECOLOGICAL aspect of the systems, prompts certain correspondences between language and society. Thus, the striking dialectal homogeneity of nomads' languages bears an obvious relation to the wide radius of nomadic roaming. In hunting tribes, for long periods hunters remain out of communication with their women but in close contact with their prey. Hence, their language undergoes noticeable sexual dimorphism reinforced by the multiform taboo changes which hunters introduce in order not to be understood by animals. (Jakobson 1971[1969c]: 669-670)

The radius of communication is one of the most likeable aspects of Jakobson's writings. For me it links up neatly with the "different levels of abstraction" Ruesch (1951a: 4) talks about.

However, the hierarchy of both factors is opposite: learning for children, and heredity for fledgelings, cubs, or other young animals acts as the determining factor. The infant cannot begin to talk without any contact with speakers, but as soon as such contact is established, then whatever the environmental language is, the child will acquire it, provided he has not passed his seventh year, whereas any further language can be learned also during the adolescence or the mature age. (Jakobson 1971[1969c]: 674)

Again, the role of linguistic contact in child language acquisiton. With such numerous mentions, one could think that this might have been the true stuff of the phatic function for Jakobson. Is it not possible that when writing about contact between communicants what Jakobson really had in mind was something more akin to the metalingual function, but on a grander scale?

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1944a]. Franz Boas' Approach to Language. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 477-488.

Perhaps the long inattention of his colleagues to Boas' favorite idea was partly his own fault. He often presented his discoveries as a mere criticism of current theories. News on the discovery of America would be given by Boas as a refutation of the hypothesis of a shorter route to India, while data on the new part of the world would be mentioned only casually. He fervently insisted on "the limitations of the comparative method", but he did not strive to make clear that in fact his outlook upon diffusion was designed first of all to widen the scope of historical comparison and to develop a historical geography of the linguistic world. Historical research, as Boas recognized perfectly well, "remains equally valid, whether we assume purely genetic relationship or whether we ask ourselves whether by contact languages may exert far-reaching mutual influences" (1936). (Jakobson 1971[1944a]: 486)

Exactly the kind of thing that provokes the above hypothesis. But that is that. This here precedes the suggestion that "there exists a cultural contact between languages, independent of geographical contiguity" (above). Also, this: Vogt. H. 1954. Contact of Languages. Word 10: 365-374.

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1970d]. Language in Relation to Other Communication Systems. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 697-708.

The structural characteristics of language are interpreted in the light of the tasks they fulfill in the various processes of communication, and thus linguistics may be briefly defined as an inquiry into the communication of verbal messages. We analyze these messages with reference to all the factors involved, namely, to the inherent properties of the message itself, its addresser and addressee, whether actually receiving the message or merely meant by the addresser as its virtual recipient. We study the character of the contact between these two participants in the speech event, we seek to elicit the code common to the sender and to the receiver, and we try to determine the convergent traits and the differences between the encoding operations of the addresser and the decoding competence of the addressee. Finally, we look for the place occupied by the given messages within the context of surrounding messages, which pertain either to the same exchange of utterances or to the recollected past and to the anticipated future, and we raise the crucial questions concerning the relation of the given message to the universe of discourse. (Jakobson 1971[1970d]: 697)

There is a lot to unpack here. First of all, the reason why Jakobson practically forsake the phatic function after defining it may be that he did not find structural characteristics of language that are "phatic". Unlike "expressive features" and other such structural characteristics pertaining to the emotive function, the "phatic features" are largely invented by later authors (e.g. pragmatic markers like backchannels, contact checks, and vocatives/dysphemisms). Nevertheless, phatic utterances do fulfill various tasks in processes of communication (i.e. establish, prolong, or discontinue communication). Secondly, the actuality or virtuality of the addressee or recipient seems like a phatic matter - in case of autocommunication, the addresser intends to be his or her own addresse (achieving "contact" with oneself). But it is also the case that "the character of the contact" is under-theorized by Jakobson himself, and seeking "to elicit the code common to the sender and to the receiver" is more akin to his competence, which yet again poses the question whether really he might have meant "linguistic contact" instead of "communicative contact" when speaking of phatics. But let that be, yet again (there is little to substantiate this hypothesis beyond the topic of "Languages in contact and linguistic borrowing", which is best embodied in Uriel Weinreich's 1953. Languages in Contact). And lastly, the part about context once again affirms my interpretation that context is a purely linguistic construct in Jakobson's view. It pertains to surrounding messages, either in the recollected past or in the anticipated future. It is markedly not about the nonverbalized situation (e.g. the extra-linguistic realm in which the speakers find themselves but about which they do not talk - in other words, the airplane loudly flying above the speakers does not belong to the context in Jakobson's sense if it's not remarked upon).

When envisaging the roles of the participants in the speech event, we have to discern the several essential varieties of their interconnection, namely, the fundamental form of this relationship, the alternation of the encoding and decoding activities in the interlocutors, and the cardinal difference between such a dialogue and a monologue. A question to be studied is the increase in the "radius of communication", e.g. the multi-personal exchange of replies and rejoinders or the extended audience of a monologue which may even be addressed "to whom it may concern". (Jakobson 1971[1970d]: 697)

The problem here is that although he talks about interconnection and relationship, he is dealing with the narrow situation of verbal communication. These are "linguistic roles" - whether you are the one talking or the one listening. Nevertheless, the radius of communication is an inherently phatic issue, concerning the nature of contact.

Jakobson, Roman 1981[1964e]. Language in Operation. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings III: Poetry of Grammar and Grammar of Poetry. The Hague; Paris; New York: Mouton, 7-17.

Here a further oxymoron, a new contradiction, is advanced by the poet: he assigns to this solitary speech the widest radius of overt communication, but realizes at once that this exhibitionistic widening of the appeal may "endanger the psychological reality of the image of the enlarged self confronting the notself", as it was later to be formulated by Edward Sapir. (Jakobson 1981[1964e]: 14)

This is indeed one of the very few papers that are explicitly useful for untangling the phatic function, since it contains a reference to Mowrer. But it neglects to use the term, and any other usefulness must be elicited from metaphors and analysis. Here, for example, he presents same phrases that may be very useful for studying so-called "phatic media culture". Is Twitter not at once the widest radius of overt communication as well as an exhibitionistic widening of the appeal? (Let it be understood that the "appeal" here is Bühlerian term for the addressee's apex, e.g. appeal to a receiver.)

It may be recalled once more that the supreme effect of "The Raven" lies in its daring experimentation with intricate problems of communication. The dominant motif of the poem is the lover's irrevocable loss of contact with the rare and radiant maiden; henceforth no common context with her is conceivable, either on this earth or within the distant Aidenn (the fanciful spelling is needed as an echo for maiden). (Jakobson 1981[1964e]: 14)

Notice the use of "context" in this context. By "common context" he means a speech event, i.e. the lover cannot speak with the maiden anymore.

Jakobson, Roman 1985[1954b]. Slavism as a Topic of Comparative Studies. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VI: Early Slavic Paths and Crossroads. Part I. Comparative Slavic Studies. The Cyrillo-Methodian Tradition. Berlin; New York; Amsterdam: Mouton, 65-85.

The study of verbal behavior includes not only speech, not only language as it is used by the speech community, but also the attitude of the speakers to their own language, to other languages with which they come into contact, and to language in general. The development of a language and of the society integrated by it may largely depend upon such attitudes. (Jakobson 1985[1954b]: 69)

God damn. These are the kinds of snippets that no-one deals with, since this volume of SW is practically untouched by both linguists and semioticians. It cannot be ignored that Jakobson keeps developing parts of his linguistic theory throughout his works, even on those that deal with slavic mythology. This excerpt here should be the proper matter of metalinguistics.

Studies of Slavism must consider both the linguistic premises and the intellectual, religious and political responses to them, and must treat all these factors in their centripetal and centrifugal aspect (integration sought and counteracted). (Jakobson 1985[1954b]: 85)

Centripetal force seeks integration; centrifugal force counteracts integration. Invaluable insight for the integrationist!

Jakobson, Roman and Linda R. Waugh 1987[1979d]. The Sound Shape of Language. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings VIII: Major Works 1976-1980. Completion Volume 1. Berlin; New York: Mouton, 1-315.

It is worthy of note that even in the unique case of a girl who first came in contact with human language as a teenager, her initial acquisition of speech involved a regular substitution of /t/ for /k/, /n/, and /s/ in all word positions (Fromkin et al. 1974: 89). (Jakobson & Waugh 1987[1979d]: 166)

A philosophical interpretation of all that I've revisited in this post would allow for an elucidation of the phatic function of language as "coming into contact with language as such". In other words, it would appear that it is not the case that the addresser comes into contact with the addressee, but that the addressee comes into contact with the addresser's language, and vice versa.

Universal propensities may be traced in the growth of children's language from its earliest beginnings. It becomes increasingly evident that the production and recognition of contoural features such as intonation which impart an emotional coloring, in particular an expression of displeasure or pleasure, to a sentence, or rather to an entire utterance, and which signal the end of an utterance, appear universally "as the first of the true language periods, following the stages of crying, cooing, and babbling" (Weir 1966: 156ff.). (Jakobson & Waugh 1987[1979d]: 166)

Huh, I didn't expect to find anything phatic here, but in contrast to my complaint above that there don't appear to be any "phatic features", here it appears that these "contoural features" may be exactly that. In other words, these contoural features would contribute to "the detailed management of interpersonal relationships during the psychologically crucial margins of interaction" (Laver 1975: 217). In another sense, these "intonation contours" (as they are called on the next page) form yet another link between the phatic and the emotive functions.

The interrogative intonation combines a cadence with a semicadence - the intonation of the end and that of the continuation: the utterance is finished but requires the response-utterance of the interlocutor. (Jakobson & Waugh 1987[1979d]: 167)

Is this not phatic?

Since I'm already taking up searching "contact", I'll also record some instances that are off-topic but may be useful instances of metalanguage for writing my paper on these issues. (Especially since I'm ultimately intending to write about the imputed contact between Jakobson and Abercrombie.)

• "While manifold and close connections bind the Slovo with the udel'naja Rus', its language, literature, art (as A. N. Grabar palyably demonstrated), and the entire spiritual and material culture, as well as the historical background and environment, no real points of contact between the Slovo and Catherine's age were detected."
• "In their reports about the final, disastrous stages of Igor's raid and his rout, the Hypatian Chronicle and the Slowo show particularly distinct and dense points of contact."
• "Slovo 73 [...] offers two textual points of contact with the end of this battle as recounted in Hyp."
• "The scholar tangibly demonstrated that if we go this way we inevitably lose all contact with historical reality and then may admit anything [...]"
• "One may recollect the contact and convergences between the research of F. de Saussure and E. Claparede, the explorer of parts and wholes [...]"
• "In 1908-1909 the young Scerba (1880-1944) visited Paris, came into direct contact with the leaders of the International Phonetic Association [...]"
• "In the preface to his book [...] Scerba stated that the conception of linguistic phenomena which he had acquired under the influence of long and close contact with Baudouin de Courtenay was considerably strengthened thanks to A. Meillet's lectures and conversations [...]"

Now I've exhausted the "contact" search results. The radius of communication seems like something that might have potential for phatic theorizing, so I'll search "radius" next.

Jakobson, Roman 1971d. Retrospect. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 711-724.

The uniformity of the code, "sensibly the same" for all members of a speech community, posited by the Cours and still recalled from time to time, is but a delusive fiction; as a rule, everyone belongs simultaneously to several speech communities of different radius and capacity; any overall code is multiform and comprises a hierarchy of diverse subcodes freely chosen by the speaker with regard to the variable functions of the message, to its addressee, and to the relation between the interlocutors. (Jakobson 1971d: 719)

That is, the subcode of language you employ when speaking with a given person depends on your relationship with that person.

In Saussure's opinion, as soon as we approach the question of spatial relations of linguistic phenomena, we leave 'internal' and enter 'external' linguistics. However, the entire development of linguistic geography, areal linguistics, and study of affinities between adjacent languages: this all compels us to consider the spatio-temporal pattern of verbal operations as the integral part of each 'idiosynchronic' system, corresponding to Saussure's coinage. The assidious fieldwork of contemporary linguists has prompted the conclusion that the code used by any representative of a given language or dialect is convertible: it involves different subcodes compliant with the extant variations in the radius of communication. It becomes ever clearer that the code as well as the circuit of messages exhibits a perpetual interplay of conformism and nonconformism (or, in Saussure's terms, force unifiante and force particulariste) both in the spatial and in the temporal aspects of language. (Jakobson 1971d: 721-722)

In other words, any given use of language has a "centripetal and centrifugal aspect (integration sought and counteracted)" (cf. above).

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1969c]. Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 655-696.

The diversity of interlocutors and their mutual adaptability are a factor of decisive importance for the multiplication and differentiation of subcodes within a speech community and within the verbal competence of its individual members. The variable "radius of communication", according to Sapir's felicitous term (154, p. 107) involves an interdialectal and interlingual exchange of messages and usually creates multidialectal and sometimes multilingual aggregates and interactions within the verbal pattern of individuals and even of entire communities. (Jakobson 1971[1969c]: 668)

It would seem that the choice of code does indeed depend on the linguistic competence of interlocutors. That's obvious enough, one would presume. And apparently "the radius of communication" is Sapir's term and originates from his Selected Writings (1963).

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1964d]. Results of the Ninth International Congress of Linguists. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings II: Word and Language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 593-602.

Yet one can hardly view the socio-linguistic influences on language as merely extrinsic factors. If we approach linguistics as just one among the conjugate sciences of communication, then any difference in the role of communication may evidently have "a potent effect" upon verbal communication. Thus the role assigned to the wider radius of communication by a nomadic society leads both to technological improvements in transportation and to a coalescence of language. (Jakobson 1971[1964d]: 598)

He seems to argue that the "external" linguistics should not be ignored. Phatics is relevant at this point because it originates from an undeniably socio-linguistic viewpoint.

Jakobson, Roman and Morris Halle 1962[1956a]. Phonology and Phonetics. In: Rudy, Stephen (ed.), Selected Writings I: Phonological Studies. s-Gravenhage: Mouton, 465-504.

The phonemic adjustment may cover the whole lexical stock, or the imitation of the neighbor's phonemic code may be confined to a certain set of words directly borrowed from the neighbor or at least particularly stamped by his use of them. Whatever the adjustments are, they help the speaker to increase the radius of communication, and if often practiced, they are likely to enter into his everyday language. Under favorable circumstances they may subsequently infiltrate into the general use of the speech community, either as a particular speech fashion or as a new pattern fully substituted for the former norm. Interdialectal communication and its influence on intradialectal communication must be analyzed from a linguistic, and particularly, from a phonemic point of view. (Jakobson & Halle 1962[1956a]: 501)

This is eerily similar to Tynyanov's model of literary evolution and Lotman's dynamics of cultural semiotics.

The problem of bridging space stops neither at the borders of distant and highly differentiated dialects, nor at the boundaries of cognate or even unrelated languages. Mediators, more or less bilingual, adapt themselves to the foreign phonemic code. Their prestige grows with the widening radius of their audience and may further a diffusion of their innovations among their monolingual tribesmen. (Jakobson & Halle 1962[1956a]: 501)

What are "translation blocs" (Lotman), or, in some sense, even "phatic experts"?

Jakobson, Roman 1971[1961b]. Linguistics and Communication Theory. In: Selected Writings II: Word and language. The Hague; Paris: Mouton, 570-579.

Obviously "the inseparability of objective content and observing subject", singled out by Niels Bohr as a premise of all well-defined knowledge, must be definitely taken into account also in linguistics, and the position of the observer in relation to the language observed and described must be exactly identified. First, as formulated by Jurgen Ruesch, the information an observer can collect depends upon his location within or outside the system. Furthermore, if the observer is located within the communication system, language presents two considerably different aspects when seen from the two ends of the communication channel. Roughly, the encoding process goes from meaning to sound and from the lexicogrammatical to the phonological level, whereas the decoding process displays the opposite direction - from sound to meaning and from features to symbols. While a set (Einstellung) toward immediate constituents takes precedence in speech production, for speech perception the message is first a stochastic process. The probabalistic aspect of speech finds conspicuous expression in the approach of the listener to homonyms, whereas for the speaker homonymy does not exist. (Jakobson 1971[1961b]: 575)

This is where it appears that the sender has the code and constructs the message, and the receiver has the message but must reconstruct the code. Jurgen Ruesch's paper appears in Grinker, Roy Richard (ed.) 1956. Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior. Since there's little more to be gained from scanning Jakobson's writings (at least for now), I'll turn to reviews of this book.