A Critical Analysis of Malinowski

Fox, Robert Bradford 1944. Bronislaw Malinowski: A Critical Analysis. Masters Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas.

The author would like to express his gratitude to the following people: [...] To Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, of the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, for his brilliant article in Philosophy of Science, which directly stimulated this thesis. (Fox 1944)

This must be "The Place of Theory in Anthropological Studies" (Kluckhohn 1939).

Statement of the Problem: The purpose of this study is to carefully and critically examine the methodologies and preconceptions of Bronislaw Malinowski. [...] I am using "preconceptions" in the Veblenian sense; that is, to denote a priori, prejudiced beliefs - beliefs held in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary. (Fox 1944: 1)

Very well put. Malinowski's "preconceptions" (especially concerning "primitive mentality", moreover in "our own uneducated classes") are a constant source of trouble for anyone attempting a closer examination of his theories.

A brief discussion at this point of Wilhelm Wundt's theories and contributions might possibly clarify some of Malinowski's subsequent viewpoints. Wundt is best known in psychology as the father of "physiological psychology, a new and experimental psychology that should apply the methods of science to the problems of the mind" (Boring). Because "Wundt was probably the most complete expression in [|] his time of the scientific forces that were remaking psychology" (Murphy), he "approached the problem of primitive mentality with a far broader and deeper equipment in scientific method than did Spencer, Tylor, or Frazer" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, foreshadowing the social-psychological behaviorism of G. H. Mead, Dewey, Hull, and others, "realized that the psychological foundations of civilization cannot be sought in the isolated individual, but that the group always actively co-operates in the production of attitude and ideas" (Goldenweiser). His psychology, however, is broadly classified by Boring as associationistic sensationism. Wundt attacked the "rationalism" of Tylor and others; that is, he attacked the concept that the whole universe is rational and that man's mind is also rational, being a mere reflection of the rational environment. Wundt escaped the errors of philosophical "individualism," realized that "with reference to the individual, the group (the 'others') was the carrier of habit, of traditon. It set the pattern and held the individual to it. And patterns, historically transmitted, are culture. Culture, then Wundt taught, was a group product, a creation of the folk. As a culture-maker the individual was part of the folk, and only for purposes of analysis could he be separated from it, and then only with difficulty" (Goldenweiser). Wundt, unlike many of the contemporary American and English writers, was never a unilinear social evolutionist, always insisting upon the complexity of evolution. Furthermore, he did a great deal to purge the study of man of mysticism, insisting upon the "folk-psychological nature of language, art, mythology, religion" (Goldenweiser). Wundt's specific contribution to anthropology was, of course, Elements of Folk Psychology, published in 1916. (Fox 1944: 7-8; ff)

Not at all surprised to see anti-rationalism pop up yet again (this is a rather frequent occurrence in my recent readings related to Malinowski). Wundt was on my reading plan but now I know specifically where to begin.

In Sex and Repression in Savage Society, Malinowski expressed his indeptedness to such Gestalt psychologists as C. Lloyd Morgan and Köhler. (Fox 1944: 8)

Wolfgang Köhler, born in Reval (now Tallinn).

In conclusion, let us reiterate the five significant formative influences in Malinowski's life:

1. the influence of his cosmopolitan and aristocratic background;
2. the influence of his scientific training in physics and mathematics;
3. the early influence of the associationistic-sensationistic [|] psychology of Wundt;
4. the influence of comparative economics; and
5. the later influence of the Gestalt school and the behavioristic-functional trend in psychology, as well as the related pragmatic trend in philosophy. (This factor, altough of the greatest significance, is almost altogether overlooked in other criticisms.)

(Fox 1944: 13-14)

The aristocratic background accounts for his classism; his training in physics (e.g. Mach) for his idiosyncratic theory of action, Wundt (alongside McDougall and Shand, no doubt) for his primary interest in social psycology, comparative economics for his interest in the kula, and finally... Dewey.

Before discussing Malinowski's contributions to a science of anthropology, let us first question: "What is science to Malinowski?" In the first place, Malinowski does not consider mere fact gathering as science, but conceives of science as being an organized system of relationships. As G. H. Mead brings out in the following quotation:

Science always tries to state an organized system of relations, but it never states the character of the object in itself apart from its relations. [...] You cannot deal with a body just by itself and find out what it is and so build up a system; you have to state it in terms of its relation to some system there. Now it is these necessary relations between bodies with which science is occupied. (Mead 1938: 80)

It was such a conceptual basis that led Malinowski to reject the "atomic" or "piecemeal" work of Westermarck, Tylor, and others, and to formulate the so-called "functional" approach. (Fox 1944: 15-16)

This makes a lot of sense in light of how he formulates phatic communion: not as a thing in itself but in relation with (in fact, as a negation of) the pre-existing system of "mental functions", then re-formulated as speech functions by Bühler, Ogden & Richards, etc. Mead's The Philosophy of the Act still not freely downloadable.

In this thesis, I shall use the term "marginal peoples," "marginal groups," or "marginal societies," rather than the terms "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc. By "marginal peoples" is meant all peoples who have not yet acquired modern western technology to any significant degree. That is, "marginal peoples" are marginal to modern technological societies. This, I believe, to be the real distinction between the so-called "savage man" and the so-called "civilized man." This same distinction is implicit, although usually unrecognized, in all comparative anthropological works which deal with the subject of man. The term used in this sense does not have "geographical" implications. "Marginal peoples" is a more satisfactory terminology than "primitive peoples," "savage peoples," etc., precisely because it does imply technological differences rather than psychological differences. And, of course, the former is the actual locus of the differences. (Fox 1944: 24; ff)

Completely sensible.

The argument that theories are pernicious to valid field-work is repeatedly attacked by Malinowski. He first notes that "the field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory," and "foreshadowed problems are the main endowement of a scientific thinker, and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical studies." (Fox 1944: 36)

This, too, bears out in Malinowski's work as far as I'm concerned: for the concept of phatic communion relies less on field-observations (in fact contradicts these in several ways) than on theoretical formulations by the likes of Dewey and Trotter.

The functional approach, as has been noted briefly above, is concerned with the interaction between the organism and the environment. Before systematically analyzing Malinowski's use of functionalism, let us inquire into the relationship of functionalism in anthropology, as used by Malinowski, to the uses of functionalism in other fields of inquiry. This is important because, I believe, that the concept of functionalism as used by Malinowski was stimulated by fundamental developments in psychology and philosohpy. Support for this analysis will not be found in anthropological texts; not because it is untrue, but because the orthodox anthropologist is artificially departmentalized when it comes to philosophical and psychological questions. In other words, although anthropology is in many ways the least provincial [|] of the sciences because of its generalized nature, it has purposively overlooked for the most part methodological develpoments in psychology and philosophy. What were the developments in philosophy and psychology which stimulated the functional method in anthropology? In the first place, I do not believe that Malinowski's functional beliefs stem, as Lowie suggests Radcliffe-Brown's do, from Durkheim, but from the American school of functional psychology. (Fox 1944: 63-64)

"Fox specifically denied that Malinowski's functionalism was influenced by Durkheim and tried instead to prove that it was derived from the writings of Dewey and Mead" (Symmons-Symonolewicz 1959: 26; footnote 52).

Malinowski makes repeated referenc to the leaders of the "schools" mentioned above - John Dewey, G. H. Mead, Clark Hull, and others - which would substantiate the contention that he was influenced by the American school of functional psychology, and later on by the behaviorists and the pragmatists. The whole thesis of Sex and Repression in Savage Society is suggested in Dewey in Human Nature and Conduct, from which Malinowski took his frontispiece. In Coral Gardens and Their Magic, reference is made to Dewey's pragmatic treatment of language in Experience and Nature. Malinowski notes as complementary to his treatment of language that of G. H. Mead, who "expounds a general theory of language from a moderate behaviouristic point of view." (Malinowski 1935: 60) Mead's whole treatment of language is, incidentally, the most intensive and suggestive of the works in this field, and far exceeds in attainment that of Malinowski. (Fox 1944: 66)

This overview doesn't even include what Malinowski took from How We Think (Dewey 1910).

Compare this with Dewey's statement in Logic, p. 27: "Hunger, for example, is a manifestation of a state of imbalance between organic and environmental factors in that integration which is life. [...] A state of tension is set up which is an actual state (not mere feeling) of organic uneasiness and restlessness. This state of tension (which defines need) passes into search for material that will restore the condition of balance. [...] The matter ingested initiates activities throughout the rest of the animal that lead to a restoration of balance, which, as the outcome of the state of previous tension, is fulfilment." (Fox 1944: 69; ff)

Something to add to that "strange and unpleasant tension" which I'm dealing with.

New approaches are being tried in field-anthropology in order to eliminate the personal friction of a strange observer. One such approach is that recently used by Leo Simmons in presenting Sun Chief. (Fox 1944: 82)

This friction is another significant factor in my own particular research object, and pertains to what I should call the "unreliable informant" hypothesis (or something to this effect).

The historical and field-data act as a check on the introspective nature of the individual's description and interpretation. Material collected in this manner provides a wealth of knowledge about social-psychological behavior. Simmons could provide, for example, a "situational analysis" of most [|] of Don's actions. From the autobiograhic sketch could be drawn the motivation and "tone" of each act. The autobiographic approach is certainly an excellent manner for investigating personality problems - to find out how an individual feels, thinks, behaves; the approach will become more valuable as the studies become more numerous. (Fox 1944: 82-83)

Something clearly lacking in the analysis of the "context of situation".

Far more interesting and significant theoreticall than the relationship of language to "Functionalism" is Malinowski's "pragmatic" treatment of language. The term "pragmatic" as used here by Malinowski means "that words in their primary and essential sense do, act, produce and achieve." To my knowledge Malinowski's first thorough "pragmatic" treatment of language is found in the Supplement of The Meaning of Meaning. Here Malinowski states egotistically that he had arrived at the concept of language "as a mode of action" through separate field inquiry, realizing independently as did "Messrs. Ogden and Richards, Dr. Head, Dr. Gardiner" the basic psychological considerations of language and treating it as an "indispensable element of concerted human action." Despite Malinowski's boast, we suspect that he was already under the influence of the pragmatic and functional schools at the time that he wrote the Supplement. (Fox 1944: 94)

Who's Head?

Malinowski, first of all, considers language as an active mode of human behavior rather than as a reflective or cognitive mode. Words, for example, should be studied for their dynamic rather than for their intellectual functions. Language is a tool, and like all tools when in use, involves action. Language is primarily an instrument of action. (Fox 1944: 94)

It appears that Fox did not catch that the notion of reflection, too, came from Dewey.

Malinowski states that "the sacredness of words and their socially sanctioned inviolability are absolutely necessary to the existence of social order," and that "if promises and contracts were not regarded as something more than flatus vocis, social order would cease to exist in a complex civilization as well as in a primitive tribe." (Fox 1944: 100)

And "so with equal necessity will he have to heed of his foot ready for the lean and empty jackasses, who promise when they have no business to do so" (Nietzsche 1921: 43-44).

Malinowski clearly showed the connection between language and activity. "Meaning" arises through doing. Language is a form of social behavior. That is, words can be understood only in the stimulus-response situation. (Fox 1944: 107)

A general truism.

Both fundamentally agree that the goal of anthropology is to establish "laws," or generalizations if you wish, about cultural behavior. Generalizations which will have universal validity. Malinowski, however, remained an "ethnographic provincial" despite his intentions, while Radcliffe-Brown, at one time or another, formulated many provoking generalizations. It has been suggested that Malinowski's interest in establishing generalizations was stimulated by Radcliffe-Brown. (Fox 1944: 121)

Make generalizations that apply to the savage and civilized alike.

Malinowksi, on the contrary, in his early work (consistent with his German philosophical and psychological training) was primarily interested in the "Weltanschauung." The feelings and opinions of the individual are prominent in Malinowski's work. This led each to approach a problem in somewhat of a different fashion. (Fox 1944: 124)

I would rather attribute this to his liking of British social psychology (e.g. McDougall and Shand).

However, the psycho-analyst has not tested his theories comparatively, he has only assumed their universal validity. (Fox 1944: 133)

Phraseology.

By the objective test of acton, we can state that Descartes did not really believe what he was saying - he wa smerely verbalizing. Descartes did actually talk to other individuals and enter into activity with them; he did eat, drink, etc.; he did dodge balls, stones, etc. In other words, Descartes behaved as a social being and his own activities are a condemnation of his busy theorizing. If Descartes had really believed his own theory, he would not have ducked in the face of an oncoming blow, but we know that he did. (Fox 1944: 141)

Flatus vocis - uttering words is not really "saying" anything. Austin's speech act theory follows naturally (verbalization has no sense or reference).

Instincts: Because Malinowski was interested in the interactional process between the organism and its environment, he was necessarily led to consider the genetic propulsions of the organism. His early attempts to describe the genetic characteristics of man were crude and generalized. He utilized the psychological terminology of his day, which was limited and inadequate. Throughout his work we find Malinowski using such vague phrases as "human impulses," "natural [|] propensities," "fundamental tendency," "natural inclinations," "innate desire," "natural sentiments," "natural desires," and "instinctive cores," but never do we find a clear definition of any of these terms. However, as modern experimental psychology developed, such loose phraseology as "instinct," etc., was discarded for more specific and meaningful terminology, and Malinowski was able to clarify this genetic aspect of man. (Fox 1944: 160-161)

Very well put. It has been my misfortune to zero in on a piece of his writing that is full of such crudities. Reading McDougall and Shand has only partially ameliorated the situation, for Malinowski is essentially paraphrasing them, retaining an unavoidable a margin of error when approximating his statements to the authorities. All in all, good work.