The Hermeneutics of the Subject

Foucault, Michel 2005. The hermeneutics of the subject : lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982 / Michel Foucault ; edited by Frédéric Gros ... [et al.] ; translated by Graham Burchell. New York : Picador

I don't want to use the word culture in a sense that is too loose and will say that we can speak of culture on a number of conditions. First, when there is a set of values with a minimum degree of coordination, subordination, and hierarchy. We can speak of culture when a second condition is satisfied, which is that these values are given both as universal but also as only accessible to a few. A third condition for being able to speak of culture is that a number of precise and regular forms of conduct are necessary for individuals to be able to reach these values. Even more than this, effort and sacrifice is required. In short, to have access to these values you must be able to devote your whole life to them. Finally, the fourth condition for being able to talk about culture is that access to these values is conditional upon more or less regular techniques and procedures that have been developed, validated, transmitted, and taught, and that are also associated with a whole set of notions, concepts, and theories etcetera: with a field of knowledge (savoir). Okay. So, if we call culture a hierarchical organization of values that is accessible to everyone but which at the same time gives rise to a mechanism of selection and exclusion; if we call culture the fact that this hierarchical organization of values calls on the individual to engage in regular, costly, and sacrificial conduct that orientates his whole life; and finally, if the organization of the field of values and access to these values can only take place through regular and reflected techniques and a set of elements constituting a systematic knowledge: then, to that extent we can say that in the Hellenistic and Roman epoch there really was a culture of the self. It seems to me that the self effectively organized or reorganized the field of traditional values of the classical Hellenic world. (Foucault, Michel 2005: 179-180)

Kõneldes 1982. aasta 3. veebruaril loengus self-i kultuuri arengust, määratleb Foucault ka kultuuri mõiste, mis sobib tema arutelu jaoks. Siin on põhirõhk "väärtustel", mille võib über-semiootilisel tõlgendusel asendada "tähendusega". Neli tingimust mis on Foucault' jaoks vajalikud, et siin kultuurist rääkida:

1. On olemas hulk väärtusi, millel on vähemalt mingigi kooskõla, allumissuhted ja hierarhia.
2. Need väärtused on antud samaaegselt universaalsetena ja on ligipääsetavad vähestele.
3. Nende väärtuste saavutamiseks peab pingutusi ja ohvreid tehes järgima tervet hulka täpseid ja korrapäraseid käitumisvorme.
4. Ligipääs neile väärtustele on tingitud rohkem või vähem regulaarsete tehnikate ja protseduuride poolt mida on arendatud, kehtestatud, edastatud ja õpetatud ja nad on seotud terve hulga mõistete, kontseptide ja teooriatega jne ehk teadmiste väljaga.

Tartu-Moskva koolkonna terminitesse ümber asetatuna võib öelda, et kultuuri kirjeldab:

1. Hulk eritüübilisi ja erineva korrastusega semiootilisi moodustusi või märgisüsteeme.
2. Need näivad kultuuri enda vaatepunktist universaalsed, kuid on tegelikkuses piiritletud kultuuri enda väljaga.
3. Neid märgisüsteeme peab semiootiline subjekt õppima korrektselt lugema ja kasutama.
4. Ligipääs neile märgisüsteemidele on tingitud kultuuri piiri poolt ja sõltub ka enesekirjeldusest ja metakeelest.

Foucault' nimetatud "valiku ja välistuse" mehhanism on võrreldav piirimehhanismiga, mis jagab kultuuri "omaks ja võõraks". Järgnevas katkendis ilmneb, et see, mida on välja valitud, tuleb alal hoida läbi harjutuse, mis pärineb Marcus Aureliuse meditatsioonidest:

We must name, we must speak to ourselves, we must say it to ourselves. Even if it is internal, the real expression of the word, of the name, or rather of the name of the thing and the name of the things of which this thing is composed, is absolutely important in this exercise. This exercise of verbalization is obviously very important for fixing the thing and its elements in the mind, and consequently, on the basis of these names, for the reactualization of the whole system of values we will talk about shortly. One of the aims of expressing the names of things is memorization. Second, you see that this exercise of memorizing names must be simultaneous with and directly connected to the exercise of looking. We must see and name. Looking and memory must be linked with each other in a single movement of the mind that, on one side, directs the gaze towards things, and, on the other, reactivates the names of these different things in memory. Third, we should note - still with regard to this double-sided exercise, this partly double exercise - that, due to this double exercise, the essence of the thing will be displayed in its entirety, as it were. In fact, by looking we see the thing itself in the naked state, in its totality and in its parts, but by naming the thing itself and its different components, we see, and the texts says this clearly, what components make up the object and into what components it will be resolved. This is in fact the third function of this doubling of looking by naming. Through this exercise we can not only recognize how the object is currently composed, but also what its future will be, into what it will be resolved, when, how, and under what conditions it will come apart and be undone. Through this exercise, therefore, we grasp the complex plenitude of the object's essential reality and the fragility of its existence in time. That then is the nature of the analysis of the object in its reality. (Foucault 2005: 295-296)

Siin kõneleb Foucault "nimetamise ja vaatamise" harjutusest, mille eesmärk on fikseerida vaimus asi ja selle elemendid. Läbi selle nimetamise taasaktualiseerub kogu väärtussüsteem (mis eelneva põhjal on sünonüümiks "kultuurile"). Sel harjutusel on kolm eesmärki:

1. Asjade nimede meelde jätmine.
2. Nimetamine peab olema samaaegne ja otseselt seotud vaatamisega. Me peame vaatama ja nimetama. Vaatamine ja mälu peavad olema omavahel ühendatud samas vaimuliigutuses, et ühest küljest suunata pilku asjadele ja teisest käest taasaktiveerida mälus nende asjade nimed.
3. Nii avaldub asjade olemus oma terviklikkuses. Vaadates näeme asja oma paljas olekus, oma terviklikkuses ja oma osades, aga nimetades asja ennast ja selle erinevaid osiseid, näeme millistest komponentidest see objekt koosneb ja millisteks osadeks ta jaguneb. Kolmas funktsioon on seega mitte ainult ära tunda millistest komponentidest objekt praegu koosneb, aga ka mis selle tulevik saab olema, millisteks osadeks ta saab jaguneda, kunas, kuidas ja millistel tingimustel see laguneb osadeks. Läbi selle harjutuse saab seega haarata objekti olemasolu tegelikku keerulist paljusust ja selle habrast olemasolu ajas.

Ja seda harjutust tuleks rakendada mitte ainult asjadele ja tegevustele (nt tantsule), vaid ka iseendile:

...Marcus Aurelius adds: It is not enough to apply this method to things; we must also apply it to our own life and to ourselves. (Foucault: 2005: 305)

Mida Foucault' mõtleb "väärtuste" all?

And what is meant by "value" is the place, relations, and specific dimension of things within the world, as well as their relation to, their importance for, and their real power over the human subject insofar as he is free. (Foucault 2005: 308)

Siin on päris huvitav osa:

Second, this philosophical ascesis does not involve determining the order of sacrifices and renunciations you must make of this or that part or aspect of your being. Rather, it involves providing yourself with something you have not got, something you do not possess by nature. It involves putting together a defensive equipment against possible events in your life. This is what the Greeks called the paraskeue. The function of ascesis is to form a paraskeue [so that] the subject constitutes himself. Third, it seems to me that the principle of this philosophical ascesis of the practice of the self is not the individual's submission to the law. It's principle is to bind the individual to the truth. Bond with the truth rather than submission to the law seems to me one of the fundamental aspects of this philosophical ascesis. (Foucault 2005: 332)

"Teiseks, see filosoofiline askees ei sisalda ohverduste ja lahtiütlemiste korra määramist mida sa pead tegema ühe või teise aspekti kohta oma olemises. Pigem sisaldab see endale millegi sellise pakkumist mida sul ei ole, midagi mida sulle pole looduse poolt antud. See sisaldab kõikvõimalike elujuhtumite vastu astumiseks kaitsevarustuse kokku panemist. Seda nimetasid kreeklased paraskeueks. Akseesi funktsioon on moodustada paraskeue, et subjekt saaks iseennast kosntitueerida. Kolmandaks näib mulle, et see filosoofilise askeesi põhimõte, ehk enesepraktika, pole individuaali allumine seadusele. Selle põhimõte on siduda individuaal tõega. Seostumine tõega pigem kui seadusele allumine näib mulle olevat selle filosoofilise askeesi üks aluspõhimõtteid." Filosoofilise askeesi eesmärk on seega alluda tõesele diskursusele, mis on kuuldust ja loetust kohandatud iseenda jaoks.

1982. aasta 3. märtsi loengu esimeses tunnis on alapeatükk "precise non-verbal communication and general demeanor of the good listener". Erinevalt eelnevast alapeatükist, "The ascetic rules of listening: silence", toob Foucault siin välja asjaolu, et hea kuulamine nõuab peale vaikuse ka mitte-verbaalset suhtlemist:

But of course this silence is not enough. More than silence, a certain active demeanor is called for. This demeanor is analyzed in different ways which are also quite interesting, despite their apparent banality. In part of the listener, a posture clearly described in the texts of the period. This precise physical posture has a double founction. First of all its function is to allow for maximum listening without any interference of fidgeting. The soul must take in the speech addressed to it without turmoil. Consequently, if the soul must be completely pure and undisturbed to listen to the speech addressed to it, then the body must stay absolutely calm. The body must express and as it were guarantee and seal the tranqulity of the soul. Hence a very precise physical posture is required, as immobile as possible. However, and at the same time, in order to stress the soul's attention, in order to express it and make it follow exactly what is being said, the body must demonstrate through a number of signs that the soul really does understand and take in the logos as put forward and conveyed to it. There is then both a fundamental rule of body's immobility, guaranteeing the quality of attention and the soul's transparency to what is going to be said, and at the same time a semiotic system which imposes tokens of attention by which the listener both communicates with the speaker and also assures himself that his attention is following the speaker's discourse. (Foucault 2005: 343)

"Kuulamise puhul on tähtis ka teatav aktiivne käitumisviis. Kuulajatelt on nõutud kindel poos või istumisviis, mida on ajakohastes tekstides kirjeldatud. Sel täpsel kehalist poosil on kahekordne funktsioon. Esimene neist on võimaldada maksimaalset kuulamist ilma vahelesekkuva nihelemiseta. Hing peab edastatud kõne vastu võtma liigse emotsionaalsuseta. Järelikult kui hing peab olema täielikult puhas ja häirimatu, et kuulata talle suunatud kõne, siis peab keha püsima absoluutselt rahulikuna. Keha peab väljendama ja justkui garanteerima ja kinnistama hingerahu. Seega nõutakse väga täpset ja võimalikult liikumatut kehalist poosi. Ometi, samal ajal, selleks, et rõhutada hinge tähelepanu, et väljendada seda ja panna see täpselt järgima öeldut, peab keha demonstreerima läbi paljude märkide, et hing tõepoolest saab aru ja võtab vastu sõnad mis on esile manatud ja sellele vahendatud. Korraga toimib nii fundamentaalne keha liikumatuse reegel, mis garanteerib tähelepanu kvaliteedi ja hinge läbipaistvuse sellele, mida öeldakse, ja samal ajal ka semiootiline süsteem mis edastab tähelepanu märke mille kaudu kuulaja samaaegselt suhtleb kuulajaga ja samas kinnitab talle, et tema tähelepanu järgib kõneleja diskursust."

Epictetus offers this advice: We should meditate (meletan), write (graphein), and train (gumnazein). You see then: meletan, the exercise of thought often supported by a text which one reads; then graphein, writing; and then gumnazein, that is to say, training in real life, trying to endure the trial, the test of reality. Or again, after writing a mediation on death, Epictetus concludes by saying: "May death take me while I am thinking, writing and reading these phrases." Writing, then, is a part of exercise with the advantage of two possible and simultaneous uses. The use for oneself, as it were. For simply by writing we absorb the thing itself we are thinking about. We help it to be established in the soul and we help it to be established in the body, to become a kind of habit for the body, or at any rate a physical virtuality. It was a recommended custom to write after having read something, and after having written it, to read it again and, necessarily, read it again out loud since, as you know, words were not separated from each other in Greek and Latin script. That is to say, there was a great difficulty in reading. The exercise of reading was not something easy: it was not a matter of just reading, like that, at sight. You had to stress the words properly, you had to utter them in a low voice. So the exercise or reading, writing, and rereading what you had written and the notes you had taken was an almost physical exercise of the assimilation to the truth and the logos you were holding on to. (Foucault 2005: 359-360)

"Epiktetus pakub järgmise nõuande: me peaksime mediteerima, kirjutama ja treenima. Me näeme siis, et mediteerimist, mõtte harjutamine, tihti toetatud tekstide poolt mida loetakse; siis kirjutama; ja seejärel treenima, see tähendab, treenida päris elus, üritada vastu pidada katset, reaalsuse testi. Või jälle, pärast surmal mediteerimise kohta kirjutamist, teeb Epictetus kokkuvõtte, öeldes: "Et surm võtaks mind kuniks ma mõtlen, kirjutan ja loen neid lauseid." Kirjutamine, seega, on osa harjutusest, kahe võimaliku ja samaaegse eelisega. Justkui enda jaoks kasutamisega. Sest lihtsalt kirjutamisega me omandame selle asja enda millest me mõtleme. Me aitame seda asutada hinges ja me aitame seda asutada kehas, saada kindlaks harjumuseks kehas, või igathes füüsilises virtuaalsuses. Oli soovitatav komme kirjutada pärast millegi lugemist, ja pärast kirjutamist, lugeda seda uuesti ja uuesti, hädapäraselt, lugeda seda valjult välja kuna, nagu sa tead, Kreeka ja Ladina kirjas ei eraldatud sõnu üksteisest. See tähendabb, lugemine oli suur raskus. Lugemise harjutamine ei olnud midagi kerget: see ei olnud lihtsalt lugemine, lihtsalt niisama, läbi vaatamise. Sa pidid rõhutama sõnu õigesti, sa pidid lausuma neid vaiksel häälel. Seega harjutamine või lugemine, kirjutamine ja enda kirjutatu ja tehtud märkmete ülelugemine oli peaaegu kehaline harjutus, mille kaudu omastati tõde ja sõnad millest sa kinni hoidsid."

What I would like to emphasize now is that a fundamental theme in the practice of the self is that we should not let ourselves be worried about the future. The future preoccupies. We are praeoccupatus by the future. The expression is interesting. We are, as it were, occupied in advance. The mind is pre-absorbed by the future, and this is something negative. The fact that the future preoccupies you, that is absorbs you in advance and consequently does not leave you free, is linked, I think, to three things, to three fundamental themes in Greek thought and more especially in the practice of the self.
First, of course, is the primacy of memory. It is very interesting to see that thinking about the future preoccupies, and so is negative, whereas in general, except for a certain number of particular cases, among which is, of course, remorse, which is negative, memory, that is to say thinking about the past, has a positive value. This opposition between the negative value of thinking about the future and the positive value of thinking about the past is crystallized in the definition of an antinomic relation between memory and thinking about the future. There are people who are turned towards the side of the future, and they are reprimanded. And there are those who are turned towards memory, and these win approval. Thinking about the future cannot be a memory at the same time. Memory cannot be thinking about the future at the same time. When it became possible for us to think that reflection on memory coincides with an attitude towards the future was no doubt one of the great mutations of Western thought. And all the themes like progress, for example, or, let's say, the whole form of reflection on history, this new dimension of historical consciousness in the West, is acquired very late, I think, only when it became possible to think that looking at memory is at the same time looking at the future. I think the establishment of an historical consciousness, in the modern sense, will oscillate, will revolve around this. The other reason why thinking about the future is discredited is, if you like, theoretical, philosophical, and ontological. The future is nothingness: it does not exist, or at any rate not for man. Consequently we can only project on to it an imagination based on nothing. Or else the future pre-exists and, if it pre-exists, it is predetermined, and so we cannot control it. Now what is at stake in the practice of the self is precisely being able to master what one is, in the face of what exists or is taking place. That the future is either nothing or predetermined condemns us either to imagination or to impotence. Now the whole art of oneself, the whole art of the care of the self is constructed against these two things. (Foucault 2005: 464-465)

"Mida ma tahaksin nüüd rõhutada on see, et fundamentaalne teema enesepraktikas on see, et me ei peaks ennast laskma muretseda tuleviku pärast. Tulevik valdab. Me oleme täielikult haaratud tuleviku poolt. See väljendus on huvitav. Me oleme justkui ette okupeeritud. Vaim on eel-haaratud tuleviku poolt, ja see on midagi negatiivset. Fakt, et tulevik valdab sind, et see haarab sind ees ära ja seejärel ei lase sind vabaks, on seotud, ma arvan, kolme asjaga, kolme fundamentaalse teemaga Kreeka mõtteloos ja veel rohkem enesepraktikaga.
Esimene on muidugi mälu primaarsus. On väga huvitav näha, et tulevikust mõtlemine valdab ja on seega negatiivne, samas kui üldiselt, välja arvatud mõnel üksikul juhul nagu näiteks kahetsus, mis on negatiivne, on mälul, ehk minevikust mõtlemisel, positiivne väärtus. See vastandus tulevikust mõtlemise negatiivse väärtuse ja minevikust mõtlemise positiivse väärtuse vahel on kristalliseerunud mälu ja tulevikust mõtlemise antinoomilise suhte määratluses. On inimesi kes pöörduvad tuleviku poole ja neid manitsetakse. Ja on neid kes pöörduvad mälu poole, ja need võidavad heakskiidu. Tulevikust mõtlemine ei saa samal ajal olla mälu. Mälu ei saa olla samal ajal tulevikust mõtlemine. Kunas sai meil võimalikuks mõelda, et mälu üle reflekteerimine langeb kokku suhtumisega tulevikku, oli kahtlemata üks suuri mutatsioone Lääne mõtteloos. Ja kõik teemad nagu näiteks progress või kogu ajaloo üle reflekteerimise vorm, see uus ajaloolise teadvuse dimensioon Läänes, on minu arvates omandatud väga hilja, ainult siis kui sai võimalikuks mõelda, et vaadates mälu vaatame me samal ajal tulevikku. Ma arvan, et tänapäeva mõistes ajaloolise teadvuse asutamine võngub või pöörleb selle ümber. Teine põhjus miks tulevikust mõtlemist umbusaldatakse, on teoreetiline, filosoofiline ja ontoloogiline. Tulevik on mittemidagi: seda ei eksisteeri, või vähemasti mitte inimese jaoks. Järelikult saame me ainult kuvada sellele väljamõeldisi mis põhinevad mitte millelgi. Või vastasel juhul on tulevik juba ette olemas ja kui see on ette olemas, on see ette määratud ja me ei saa seda kontrollida. Mis nüüd on kaalul enesepraktikas on täpselt võime olla mis sa oled, selle valguses mis oli olemas või võtab aset. Tulevikus on kas mitte midagi või ettemääratud. Ta kas mõistab meid kujutlustesse või võimetusse. Kogu enesekunst, enesehoole kunst, on nüüd ehitatud nende kahe asja vastu."

Onto-Ethologies

Buchanan, Brett 2008. Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. State University of New York Press, Albany

Seda raamatut üritasin lugeda hiliskevadel, kuid piirdusin esimese osaga, mis käsitleb Uexkülli. Nüüd olen natuke rohkem tuttav ka ülejäänud mõtlejatega, niiet aeg selle lugemiseks on küps.

In studying the behavioral patterns of different animals, Uexküll noted that animals of all levels, from microorganisms to human animals, are capable of discerning meaning from environmental cues beyond a purely instinctual reaction. Such meaning is attributable to how organisms enter into relationships with other things and thus come to see the environment as laced not just with signs, but with significance itself. (Buchanan 2008: 8)

Natural selection is a dangerous idea for many reasons, perhaps the greatest of which is its ability to offer an observable, testable, and scientific account for evolution, where the repercussions extend into philosophical and religious beliefs. (Buchanan 2008: 11)

The animal, together with its environment, are observed to form a whole system that Uexküll called an Umwelt... (Buchanan 2008: 21)

It is true that one might and can grasp a door handle and think ‘This is a handle that I grasp and which allows this door to open such that I might enter the other room.’ But we don’t do this; we simply can’t live this way. Rather one simply grasps the handle and opens the door without thinking twice about it. This, incidentally, is what is wrong with many cognitive models in psychology that endlessly break down human behavior into functional bits (e.g., see handle, extend arm to handle, grasp handle, turn handle, pull, etc.). Merleau-Ponty in particular will critique a similar form of psychological reductionism by noting that human behavior is constituted by the whole body in the fluidity of its movements. If I want to kick a soccer ball, for example, I don’t think of all the steps required to kick the ball. Should I do so, my opponent would surely have already taken the ball away efore I had a chance to kick it for myself! The body acts as a whole in virtue of always already being in a world. (Buchanan 2008: 60)

After briefly recounting a day in the life of each, Clark arrives at three types of phenomena that may distinguish one type of being from the other: (1) experiential “feelings” such as hunger or desire; (2) thoughts and reasons; and (3) the “meta-flow” of thoughts about thoughts. (Buchanan 2008: 65)

Heidegger primarily highlights how behavior implies a certain self-retention, a mode of “driven performing” as opposed to the free “doing and acting” that human beings elicit. There are limits to behavior, but not just in the sense that one can behave this way and not that way. The limits are more fundamental in that an animal’s behavior is limited with respect to its own ‘self’-relation. The animal cannot get out of itself; it cannot, as Heidegger will claim elsewhere of human existence, transcend itself—neither temporally nor toward the world. (Buchanan 2008: 77)

If we are to find the totality of the organism in the phenomenon of behavior, then we must inquire into its meaning.6 But to look for an explicit definition of behavior may be an ineffective path. Merleau-Ponty doesn’t so much offer a clear formulation inasmuch as he offers a variety of different views. Accordingly, behavior is linked with a variety of other notions: behavior as structure, behavior as form, behavior as signification, behavior as a manner or attitude of existing. In each case, however, it is the ontological interpretation of the organism that is conveyed. Behavior demonstrates a relational enclosure insofar as the organism is structurally united with its world. (Buchanan 2008: 120)

Tulemus oli loodetust teistsugune. Mida ma lootsin? Käitumise käsitlemist. Sain aga ontoloogiate võrdluste, milles autor otsis välja nimetatud mõtlejate viited Uexküllile ja kuidas viimane on nende mõttetööd mõjutanud. Muidugi oli see raamat täis päris põnevat arutlelu ja faktoide (nt "organiteta keha" on muna), aga suur osa sellest on minu eesmärkide suhtes täiesti tarbetu (diskussioon sellest kuidas inimene, loom ja kivi "on").
Tekitas tahtmist kõnealuste mõtlejate endi tekste lugeda, kuid teisalt ähvardab seda teed minemine liiga filosoofiliseks muutumisega. Üle päris pika aja kasutan jälle silti Abstruse:

The World of Perception

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 2004 [1948]. The World of Perception. Translated by Oliver Davis. Routledge.

Käesolev teos on Merleau-Ponty raadiosaate "Prantsuse kultuuritund" transkriptsioon. Koosneb seitsmest loengust, väga lühike ja kergesti loetav.

"post-modernism denies any special status to the natural sciences" (lk 14) - so that's what that is!

"The Cartesian position notoriously alienates us from others, since it implies that we can know them only indirectly via their behaviour, which is only a detached, contingent, expression of their thoughts and feelings, and one whose interpretation we can never validate since we have no other way of finding out about the other’s thoughts and feelings." (lk 26) - sounds about right

"...our relationship to space is not that of a pure disembodied subject to a distant object but rather that of a being which dwells in space relating to its natural habitat." (lk 55) - suhe ruumiga ei ole lihtne subjekti ja objekti vaheline suhe, vaid "olemine ruumis".

"...rather than a mind and a body, man is a mind with a body, a being who can only get to the truth of things because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things." (lk 56) - kehastumus

"This is why people’s tastes, character, and the attitude they adopt to the world and to particular things can be deciphered from the objects with which they choose to surround themselves, their preferences for certain colours or the places where they like to go for walks." (LK 63) - Midagi sellist, et inimese muusikamaitset saab dešifreerida muusika kaudu mida antud inimene eelistab kuulata.

"There is a Japanese engraving which shows an Elephant surrounded by blind men." (lk 76) - Ahhaa! Sealt pärinebki see stuff of psychology readers! Elevanti uurivad pimedad mehed ja kassipoeg kes näeb peeglist lõvi on psühholoogialugemike klassika.

"Descartes showed admirably that spirit is something altogether different. He demonstrated that its nature is quite other, for smoke and breath are, in their way, things – even if very subtle ones – whereas spirit is not a thing at all, does not occupy space, is not spread over a certain extension as all things are, but on the contrary is entirely compact and indivisible – a being – the essence of which is none other than to commune with, collect and know itself. This gave rise to the concepts of pure spirit and pure matter, or things. Yet it is clear that I can only find and, so to speak, touch this absolutely pure spirit in myself. Other human beings are never pure spirit for me: I only know them through their glances, their gestures, their speech – in other words, through their bodies. Of course another human being is certainly more than simply a body to me: rather, this other is a body animated by all manner of intentions, the origin of numerous actions and words. These I remember and they go to make up my sketch of their moral character. Yet I cannot detach someone from their silhouette, the tone of their voice and its accent. If I see them for even a moment, I can reconnect with them instantaneously and far more thoroughly than if I were to go through a list of everything I know about them from experience or hearsay." (lk 82) - Kogu lehekülg on väärt materjal. Kui intersubjektiivsuseni jõuan, tuleks seda kõike üle lugeda ja tõlgendada.

Kinesics and Context

Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1970. Kinesic and Context: Essays on Body-Motion Communication. Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania Press

Esimese lugemisega võrreldes leidsin seekord umbkaudu samavõrd palju tsiteerimisväärset materjali, mis annab lootust, et ka kolmas kord kuluks ära. Momenti mil Birdwhistell ütleb midagi laadis "käitumine ehk märk" ei leidnudki sel korral. Ja kineemitähestikust saan nüüd vististi halvemini aru kui varem.

...behavior never stands alone - it is always modified by other identification signals and by the structure of the context in which the behavior occurs. (Birdwhistell 1970: 45)

Teisest kultuurist pärit laste käitumist jälgides on liigutusi "kergem näha":

If we were watching children from another culture, whose behavior is very bizarre in our terms, it would be very much easier to see. (Birdwhistell 1970: 48)

Suhtlemise uurimisel on mitteverbaalset aspekti varem kas välditud või antud marginaalne positsioon:

A majority of all discussions of communication have thus been phrased in terms of the passage of words from wirter to reader, from speaker to auditor. The accompanying behavior, even when recognized as coterminous with the words, has been by and large relegated to a position of being, at best, a modifier of the messages carried by the words. More commonly, the accompanying behavior is seen to interfere with the transmission of meaning, and "good" communication depends upon the elimination or reduction of the extraneous circumlexical behavior. (Birdwhistell 1970: 67)

Suhtlemine, õppimine ja ühiskonnas elamine:

To be viable members of their social groupings, fish, birds, mammals, and man must engage in significant symbolization - must learn to recognize, receive, and send ordered messages. In other words, the individual must learn to behave in appropriate ways which permit the other members of the group th recognize and anticipate his behavior. Society is that way in which behavior is calibrated so that existence is not a process of continuous and wasteful trial and error. (Birdwhistell 1970: 74)

We think og communication as centrally verbal - centrally cognitive and centrally willful and only laterally and by imperfection influenced by the other modalities of interaction. It is no suprise that our research designs will mirror this structure of conventional reality. (Birdwhistell 1970: 87)

It has been our experience that even preliminary research, using structural linguistic and kinesic methods, lends confidence to a description of communication as being a continuous process made up of isolable discontinuous units. THese units are always multifunctional; they have distinguishable contrast meaning on one level and a cross-referencing function (meaning) on others. Under inspection, each level of behavioral activity is discontinous - that is, is made up of a series of discrete, arbitrary elements - and none of these elements has explicit or implicit social meaning in and of itself. (Birdwhistell 1970: 88)

Personaalne ja jagatud tähendus on siin idiosünkraatne ja institutsionaalne:

Unless the student of structural analysis of communication is so omnivorous in his conception of communication that he defines it to include all of culture, he must have distinct, or at least heuristically distinguishable, contexts for measuring the behavior which he is attempting to order. If he is going to study the communicated shifts of behavior in groups, he must know the contexts of these occurrences. Only in this way can he isolate the strictly communicational behavior from the idiosyncratic, on the one hand, and from the institutionally internalized, on the other. (Birdwhistell 1970: 95)

I stated above that I object to any attempt to subsume all social behavior under a linguistic, kinesic rubric. I do not think, as presently conceived, that all interactive behavior should be relegated to a communicational or "semiotic" frame. (Birdwhistell 1970: 98)

Extensive and technically difficult research reveals that there are four significant degrees of lid closure: "overopen," "slit," "closed," and "squeezed." There are besides these a series of circumorbital kinic complexes that have resisted analysis. For instance, contraction of the distal aspects of the circumorbital area gives us the familiar "laugh lines." We have not yet been able to determine whether this distal crinkling has kinemic status. It is clear that its absence significantly varies the "meaning" of a smile or laugh, but until we can demonstrate that it is not merely an allokine of lid closure, we must withhold its assignment. (Birdwhistell 1970: 100)

Teda nimetatakse alusetult relativistiks, sest tegelikult oli tal lihtsalt rõhuvamaid küsimusi millele vastata kui liigutuste päritolu:

There is no more evidence for this than there isthat syntactic activity is not ultimately a derivation from body movement. From my point of view, it is premature at this stage of analysis to conjecture about origins. Our central concern is how such behaviors operate, not where they came from. (Birdwhistell 1970: 125)

Siin jõuab Birdwhistell kummastavalt lotmaniaanlikule järeldusele, et märgisüsteemide läbipõimimine on suhtlemiseks vajalik:

My own research has led me to the point that I am no longer willing to call either linguistic or kinesicsystems communication systems. All of the emerging data seem to me to support the contiention that linguistics and kinesics are infracommunicational systems. Only in their interrelationship with each other and with comparable systems from other sensory modalities are the emergent communication systems achieved. (Birdwhitell 1970: 127)

Kineesika ja lingvistika analoogiat saab järeldada siit:

A phone or a kine, a word or a kinemorph, a sentence or a complex kinemorphic construction can be produced at will by a sufficiently skilled analyst or actor. (Birdwhistell 1970: 155)

Kui palju materjali on vaja?

Without longer stretches of film, say an hour, and without perspective on the social and cultural matrix in which the activity occurs, such a record provides little more than an extended set of candid closeups or, at best, a piece of ethnographic curiosae. But in a familiar context even very brief pieces of behavior provide us with extensive generalizations which can be systematically tested. (Birdwhistell 1970: 157)

Veel üks hoiatus "märgikandja" ahvatluse suhtes:

The recognition that communicational behavior can be congruent in one setting and incongruent in another should serve as a warning against any theory of meaning which suggests that the particles carry meaning in and of themselves. (Birdwhistell 1970: 179)

Kineesilise uurimise põhieeldused:

1. Like other events in nature, no body movement or expression is without meaning in the context in which it appears.
2. Like other aspects of human behavior, body posture, movement, and facial expression are patterned and, thus, subject to systematic analysis.
3. While the possible limitations imposed by particular biological substrata are recognized, until otherwise demonstrated, the systematic body motion of the members of a community is considered a function of the social system to which the group belongs.
4. Visible body activity, like audible acoustic activity, systematically influences the behavior of other members of any particular group.
5. Until otherwise demonstrated such behavior will be considered to have an investigable communicational function.
6. The meanings derived therefrom are functions both of the behavior and of the operations by which it is investigated.
7. The particular biological system and the special life experience of any individual will contribute idiosyncratic elements to his kinesic system, but the individual or symptomatic quality of these elements can only be assessed following the analysis of the larger system of which his is a part.

(Birdwhistell 1970: 183-184)

Idiokineesiline süsteem:

The idiokinesic system of any actor is derived from a multiple of experiences with a wide variety of exposures to often quite differing systems. (Birdwhistell 1970: 185)

viis ahvatlust:

1. "Märgiandja" ahvatlus - tuleneb lingvistilisest naiivsusest mis eeldab, et igale žestile vastab "päris" tähendust just nagu sõnadel peaks olema.
2. "Loomulikuma" ahvatlus - eeldused, et keha liikumine on primitiivsem ja seega lähemal bioloogilisele loomusele kui verbaalne käitumine ning on seetõttu mustritu; ja et imikute käitumine on loomulikum kui täiskasvanute käitumine.
3. "Muutja" ahvatlus - eeldus, et sõnad kannavad tähendust ja mittesõnaline käitumine ainult muudab seda. Usk, et suhtlemine on põhiliselt verbaalne.
4. "Keskse liikumise" ahvatlus - uurija eeldus, et üks kehaosa "kannab tähendust" ja teine "muudab" seda.
5. "Analüütilise informaatori" ahvatlus - informaatori selgitused pakuvad edasisi andmeid, mitte tegelikke selgitusi.

(Birdwhistell 1970: 1986-191)
Käituma õppides õpime ka mitte teadvustama õpitut:

Kinesics is concerned with the abstraction of those portions of body motion activity which contribute to the process of human interaction. Much, if not the overwhelming proportion, of such behavior is learned by a member of any society without being aware of the learning process. It is my belief that not only is much of such behavior not within the range of easy recall but that the learning pattern may carry within it positive prohibitions to such recall. Kinesics is not concerned, as such, with the movement potential of the human species, but rather with those portions of the movement spectrum which are selected by the particular culture or patterned performance and perception. At the same time, as is strue with other cultural behavior, much of what happens and which is necessary to the proper performance of a social act cannot be recalled by the actor or the untrained spectator. I have long had the belief that as the child is taught to move, to view and meaningfully to reproduce movement, an integral part of his education is concerned with enhancing or preventing recall of much of this activity. (Birdwhistell 1970: 190-191)

Mis Kendoni arvustuses oli "transfix", on Birdwhistelli enda sõnades tegelikult "stance":

Stance is a term designed to cover a pattern of toal body behavior which is sustained through time, within which one or a series of constructions takes place, and which contrasts with a different stance. Stance subsumes position (p), (which is a statement of the relative position of all the body parts in space), locomotion (l), (the movement of the body through space), and velocity (v) (which covers sustained velocity of movement of the total body). (Birdwhistell 1970: 200)

Käitumistüüpide vastandused, mida võiks jaotada Mehrabiani semantilise ruumi alusel kolmeks, kui võimalus avaneb.

1. Unilateral-Bilateral: Mover favors right or left side of body, contrasts with inclusion of both sides in performance (not just handedness).
2. Specific-Generalized: Mover tends to utilize one body area for major proportion of kinesic activities as contrasted to more extensive utilization.
3. Rhythmic-Disrhythmic: Mover tends to adobt a definite rhythm within which he moves (often marked by kinemorphic or stance shift junctures) as contrasted to a clearly defined pattern of rhythm interruption (not just nonrhythmic).
4. Graceful-Awkward: Mover tends to make major proportion of movements in a directed, minimally interrupted manner, as contrasted to a start-stop-proceed action with a series of abortive inclusions. (Grace is characterized as containing minimal "searching" behavior in contrast to awkwardness where searching is maximized.)
5. Fast-Slow: (Not to be confused with the duration qualifier.) Mover tends to high velocity of production of kinemorph and kinemorphic constructions as contrasted to a low production rate.
6. Integrated-Fragmented: Integrated mover tends toward harmonic organization of various body parts (whether generalized or specific) whereas fragmented mover may divide body into nonharmonic - even apparently contradictory - parts. A finger, a hand, or an eye may seem to have existence independent of remainder of body activity. May involve the full division of the body into two spheres as: above and below pelvic girdle or (in one case) right through the middle of the body, leaving a right and left sphere.
7. Intertensive-Intratensive: Intertensive mover tends to be highly responsive to behavior of other communicants - engages in consistent check and modification behavior as contrasted to the intratensive mover, who appears to engage in extended autostiumlation but with minimal apparent strenuous rejection. At first these seemed aspects of the encounter-interaction process but, as research continued, it became clear that such behavior continued even after interaction was clearly in progress. As in the case of the "self-possessed-self-contained" type which follows, this typology has special significance for clinical observation.
8. Self-possessed-Self-contained: The self-possessed mover is characterized by a reduction of qualifier width without incongruence, by the harmonic organization of the body parts, by minimal searching behavior, and by what might be loosely characterized as "poise." Only the fact that self-possession seems to appear intermittently within or beyong and apparently quite independent of the qualities persuades me that this is a category of another order than quality. Self-possession appears to relate to social "ease" and "confidence" in interaction (neither of which terms have more than impressionistic value in this presentation). Our description of self-containment is equally impressionistic, characterized by seeming intratension: the general feeling is one of restraint and "avoidance" of stimuli. Category by category the behavior is congruent, but it is best characterized as systematically resistent to anychange in the interaction beyond narrowly established limits.
9. Mirror-Parallel: Mirror behavior is characterized by one or more actors acting in mirror image of a central actor. Parallel behavior occurs when two or more actors move in parallel.
10. Rhythmic-Disrhythmic: WHen the interactional behavior of two or more actors contains a clearly perceptible beat, introduced either in parallel or in series, such interaction is termed rhythmic. Disrhythmic interaction occurs when established rhythms are repeatedly interrupted.
11. Open-Closed: An interaction is termed open when the behavior is characterized by searching the environment for other stimuli. To the extent that the participants are so highly interactive that they do not respond appropriately to other stimuli in the milieu, the interaction is closed.

(Birdwhistell 1970: 215-219)

Tähenduse asemel kõneleb ta "tuletatud funktsioonist":

In other words, while the punctuational behavior can be located in the speech context in certain positions, the analysis has not yet reached a point where we can posit obligatory binding between linguistic and kinesic events. With this caveat, we may list a series of derived functions that markers play in the interaction sequence. By "derived function" I mean an observable set of behaviors in a given context which can be abstracted and interpreted as related. Since my condidence in such interpretation is, at the moment, relatively low, I prefer to use "derived function" rather than some kind of "meaning." (Birdwhistell 1970: 222)

Kineemi mõiste:

At the present writing, a kineme is:
a class of allokines which can be demonstrated in kinemorphs to be substitutable.
Note: If more than one allokine is discovered to be present in the same structural neighbourhood, the kine representing it may be either:

1. a mamber of more than one kinemic class
2. an insufficiently refined kine, or,
3. the morphology has been insufficiently analyzed and we are probably dealing with an intersection of levels in the behavioral stream.

(Birdwhistell 1970: 229-230)

Loomuomaselt kodeeritud käitumisest:

In the Cigarette Scene, the acts of lighting the cigarette, Gregort's manipulation of the match, and Doris' adjustment of her shoe strap may be termed instrumental behavior. Moreover, the fact that Doris and Gregory are seated for an extended conversation is, at one level, instrumental. To say that an act is instrumental, however, does not define it, in itself, as without signal or message value. The performance of any act in the presence of others must be comprehended as having the stamp of individual and social practice. Yet, at this writing, acts such as walking, smoking, eating, knitting, woodworking, still must be filed as "instrumental" and/or "task oriented" until we know more about their communicatice structure. (Birdwhistell 1970: 231)

Oo püha multimodaalsus:

Any discourse analysis, conversation analysis, communicational analysis, or interactional analysis which would attent to but one modality - lexical, linguistic, or kinesic - must suffer from (or, at least, be responsible for) the assumption that the other modalities maintain a steady or noninfluential state. (Birdwhistell 1970: 250)

Kineesika ja konteksti arvustused

Järgnevad on raamatuarvustuste lugemistest kogutud infokillud Birdwhistelli teose kohta. Antud valik arvustusi pärineb internetiarhiivist jstor.org

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication by Ray L. Birdwhistell
Review by: Edward E. Hunt, Jr.
American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Aug., 1971), pp. 948-950
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/671381 .

Kultuurilisti mustreid uurivatest teadlastest kõneles ka Margaret Mead Semiotica esimeses köites ja seal tõi ta üles sama ülemineku:

Kinesics, linguistics, and ethology are now undergoing what Birdwhistell calls a "phenomenological revolution" through the use of cinema, television, and tape recordings, and particularly equipment for replaying events in slow motion and still pictures. This instrumentation reveals a wealth of subtle, almost instantaneous kinesic patterns and allows the study of body regions both piecemeal and in combination with each other and with speech. (Hunt 1971: 948)

Birdwhistelli notatsioonisüsteemi võib nimetada ka "kinegraafiliseks tähestikuks".

Birdwhistell rightly considers kinesics as more than "paralinguistic" behavior. To him, communication has many channels such as body contact, olfaction, taste, and proprioception, but speech and kinesics so far are the most feasible channels for study. Indeed, he uses somewhat similar concepts in linguistics and kinesics, which I interpret as follows: Kine: a limited class of motion in one body region (equivalent to phone in linguistics); Kineme: a class of alternative, substitutable kines (allokines), not necessarily in the same body region (analogous to phoneme); Kinemorph: an assemblage of kines in a given body region (comparable to natural class in the theory of sound production); Kinemorpheme: one or more kinemes which contribute minimal isolable meaning to a kinesic communication (similar to morpheme in linguistics). (Hunt 1971:949)

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication. by Ray L. Birdwhistell; Erving Goffman; Dell Hymes
Review by: Weston La Barre
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 5 (Mar., 1972), pp. 999-1000
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776944 .

The fear of data is the beginning of wisdom. And these data are formidable indeed, with a virtually clinical complexity. The reader ready to protest at the horrendously difficult kineme-notation system should keep this complexity in mind and remember that serious involvement with kinesics is no easy amateurism but often sheer hard work. (La Barre 1972: 999)

Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication by Ray L. Birdwhistell
Review by: Adam Kendon
The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Sep., 1972), pp. 441-455
Published by: University of Illinois Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1420845

By this systemic view of communication, anything that anyone does in the presence of another must be considered as potentially part of the system. Speech and gesture, posture and orientation, touch and relative position in space - all must be taken into account if we are to comprehend communication. We cannot at the outset of our investigations decide not to attend to certain aspects of behavior. So long as it is detectable by the other, it must be presumed communicative until proven otherwise. That is, though we must exclude nothing at the outset, one of the outcomes of our work would be to show what aspects of behavior are not part of the system. (Kendon 1972: 442)

In Birdwhistell's approach, one begins not with an interest in the emotions but with an interest in the face itself. One would ask first, What are the various things the face does? One would then proceed to determine, by careful observation, the various settings in which repeatedly observed units of facial behavior can be seen to occur, and the question would always be, WHat functions for the interaction do these differentiable units of facial behavior have? From this point of view, in other words, the question of what inner state is supposedly made manifest in the face is not relevant. What is relevant is what difference different facial displays make to the organization of the occasions of interaction in which they occur. (Kendon 1972: 444)

Birdwhistell himself, in the book here reviewed, offers an essay on the smile. In it he points out how the smile in itself ia s highly complex phenomenon, with a wide variety of social functions, and that to consider it merely, in this phrase, as a "visible transform of an inner physiological state" would be to miss entirely its significance as a social signal. He also refers, in various places in the book, to how movements in the face may be brought into play in association with speech, and to how these movements, along with movements of the head and libs, have a complex relationship both with the structuring of the speech as an activity and also with its content. Facial displays can serve to mark out points of emphasis in speech, they can serve to mark off whole segments of speech as distinct units or as contained or embedded units, and they can also provide a sort of commentary on what is being said. If we watch the faces of listeners, too, we can see that nods, smiles, frowns, raised eyebrows, appear frequently in some circumstances and are an important part of the repertoire of the listeners' behaviors and serve to regulate the behavior of the speaker. (Kendon 1972: 445)

Siit ilmneb oluline punkt: eristus nö traditsioonilise (afekte uuriva psühholoogilise) lähenemise ja Birdwhistelli rajatud interaktsioonilise lähenemise vahel:

...Ekman's investigations follow the traditional approach - that he is interested in the face only insofar as it seems to allow one to apprehend the inner states of the individual. He does not ask, as Birdwhistell would, How is the face used in interaction? Nor do his findings contribute to any answer to this. When Ekman uses the phrase 'expression of emotion,' he uses it in the traditional sense that the emotion is something 'inside' the individual that 'comes out' on the face in a particular way. Birdwhistell, on the other hand, approaching behavior in terms of its communicative function, rarely discusses emotion as such. (Kendon 1972: 445-446)

Siit ilmneb, et kineemilistel konstruktsioonidel on raamistik, ehk pidevad aspektid käitumisest nagu poos ja suhteline positsioon ruumis. See meikib väga palju senssi ja teisalt ütleb, et Judi Jamesi tõlgendus, et transfix on "vesteldes liikumatuks jäämine kui teine vahele segab", on kineesika seisukohast väär:

A stance, it will be seen, is not a construction of smaller elements but an element in its own right, an element which, as I have indicated, functions to 'frame' sequences of constructions. It is important that this be brought out, for some readers of Birdwhistell get the impression that he regards all of body motion, as it functions in communication, as beuing built up of elementary units, or kinemes. On the contrary, the constructions that do emerge from combinations of kinemes must be joined together and they must always occur within a 'transfixing' frame, which is supplied by such enduring aspects of behavior as posture and relative position in space. (Kendon 1972: 449)

In some ways, Birdwhistell's view of meaning is closest to that known as the context-of-situation theory, originally stated by Malinowski (1923) and later developed by J. R. Firth (1957). (Kendon 1972: 454)

Kirjandus:

• Dittman, A. T., and Llewellyn, Lynn A. 1969. Body movement and speech rhythm in social conversation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 11:98-106
• Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. 1970. Ethology: The biology of behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson
• Malinowski, B. 1923. The problem of meaning in primitive languages. In The meaning of meaning, by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, appendix 3. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
• Scheflen, A. E. 1964. The significance of posture in communication systems. Psychiatry 27:316-331
Scheflen, A. E. 1965. Stream and structure of communicational behaviour. Philadelphia: Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute.

Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power

Page, Edaward C. 1985. Political Authority and Bureaucratic Power: A Comparative Analysis. Knoxville : The University of Tennessee Press

Hmm... Kui võtta arvesse ainult pealkirja esimene ja viimane sõna, ilmneks selle raamatu üldine kirjeldus: Political Analysis. Õigemini on kogu teos "võrdlev analüüs" nelja riigi (USA, Inglismaa, Prantsusmaa ja Saksamaa) bürokraatlikest süsteemidest, ehk kokkuvõte paljudest poliitanalüüsidest. Kaaneserval on selline tekst:

Page compares the role of state and local government in service delivery and the organisational structures of governmental departments. He argues that the main danger of beaucratic government is not that it produces bad, ineffective or illiberal government, but rather a system over which there is no public control.

Lugesin seda nagu ilukirjandust, sest 25-aasta vanust poliitanalüüsi ei saa mitte kuidagi tõsiselt võtta. Raamat on kirjutatud Max Weberi vaimus, mistõttu on pentsik lugeda nt kuidas sellest, kuidas Weber osutas liiga vähe tähelepanu survegruppidele. On imetlusväärne, et Weberi kirjutistest niigi palju klappis autori kaasajaga. Teose lõppkokkuvõte oligi vist mõte, et üheski neist neljast riigist ei ole poliitilise juhi iseloom selline, nagu Weber seda kirjeldas. Eeldan, et palju läks ka arvustajale kaotsi, sest kaaneservalt pärinev "kokkuvõte" on tegelikult tõlgendus raamatu viimasest kahest leheküljest. Igatahes, lugemine ise oli tänuväärsem, kui mingi lõplik point.
Page oli esitanud täitsa asjalikud käsimused: nt kuidas eristada poliitikuid ja ametnikke millise väljaõppe saavad tippametnikud nimetatud riikides? Sain teada midagi, mida oleksin pidanud juba teadma: eelarved on inkrementaalsed. Tähendab, eelneva aasta eelarve võetakse aluseks millele parlament arvutab juurde kasvu, mis on enamjaolt "lagi" ehk kõige kõrgem võimalik summa. USA poliitsüsteemis on huvigruppide liiasus, igale grupile on ka oma vastu-grupp. Ja fakt, et Adenaueri üritus luua 1961. aastal rahvuslikku telekanalit kuulutati mittepõhiseaduslikuks, paneb mõtlema kuidas meie riigis õnnestus tekkida telekanal pealinnale (Tallinna TV?). Sisutäiteks mõned tsitaadid:

For Weber, politics is the struggle of personal power. Political activity involves building up coalitions and popular following, making compromises and being accountable for one's own ideas. Political leadership exists where one can find a politician at the apex of a state authority. A politician has the authority and skill to assert his own preferences and priorities desipte the constraits of bureaucratic government. (Page 1985: 135)

There are two broad conditions for the existence of political leadership, and the degree to which they are present or absent shapes the type of limitations which in turn may characterise the constraints upon political leadership in different bureaucratic systems. First, the supply of political leaders - men who have made their careers out of the political struggle for power with the capacity to mobilise political support for their preferred policy initiatives, and second, the existence of a comprehensive, hierarchically-structured governmental organization. There are differences between each of the four countries on each of these two dimensions, and it is possible to use these two conditions to pinpoint the specific problem for the exercise of political leadership within each of the four countries. (Page 1985: 142)

Headey distinguishes between five different types of ministers. Policy initiators are those who promote their own policy initiatives; policy selectors are those who accept the objectives of the department and see their role as choosing between alternatives presented to them by officials; executive ministers are concerned with particular aspects of the management of their ministry and in maintaining morale; ambassadors see their function as representing the department in relations with interest groups and parliament, and minimalists conceive of their role as simply the person who signs official documents, bats for the department in Cabinet and makes sure that he does not make any blunders in parliament. (Page 1985: 156)

Kinesics and Context

Birdwhistell, Ray L. 1971. Kinesic and Context: Essays on Body-Motion Communication. Allen Lane The Penguin Press

Käesolev on esimene lugemine. Essee kirjutamiseks lähen peagi teiselegi ringile. Tuleb arvestada, et käesolevat raamatut loen ma veel mitu korda.

Kuidas laps õpib kehalise suhtlemise repertuaari selgeks. Tsitaadi lõpus on kirjeldus metakommunikatsioonist:

Even with our present limited knowledge about the process, which admittedly has been gathered by a dual process of limited observation and questionable extrapolation backward from the behavior of older children, we can generalize that the child learns his communication behavior through the incorporation of a series of modifying and interlocking patterns. Intimately associated with his enculturation and socialization, his language and his motion system provide him with contact with the problems of his environment and often with their solutions. Through this system he finds out who he is in relation to others and what his expectancies and responsibilities are. In short, it is through the various modalities of his communication system that he structures, anticipates, and is rewarded or failed by his environment. Through out-of-awareness, but clearly discrete, signals he learns the directives, the prohibitions, the encouragements, and the warnings which govern his consistent association with other members of his society. His language and his body motion system are flexible and malleable, yet, at the same time they are adaptive and functional only because they are so systematically organized. Not only do they carry instructions and descriptions and responses - reaffirmation of old understandings and directions which result in the acceptance of new ones - but also these messages are cross-referenced by statements about the messages themselves. For this insight I am particularly grateful to Gregory Bateson. The messages are cross-references by explicit and analyzable behavior which instructs as to whether the message is to be taken literally or metaphorically, as a joke, or as an unavoidable prescription. (Birdwhistell 1971: 10)

Suhtlemine on ühiskonna eeltingimus:

Most students of animal or human behavior are now prepared to agree that social life, or society, to put the statement in a different form, is absolutely an adaptive necessity for human existence. Communication, in this sense, is that system of coadaption by which society is sustained, and, which in turn, makes human life possible.
Viewed from this perspective, communication is that system through which human beings establish a predictable continuity in life. Far from being a process centrally devoted to change, most of social interaction is concerned with maintaining an ongoing equilibrium. (Birdwhistell 1971: 14)

Naeratuse tähendusest:

Insofar as I have been able to determine, just as there are no universal words, no sound complexes, which carry the same meaning the world over, there are no body motions, facial expressions, or gestures which provoke identical responses the world over. A body can be bowed in grief, in humility, in laughter, or in readiness for aggression. A "smile" in one society portrays friendliness, in another embarrassment, and, in still another may contain a warning that, unless tension is reduced, hostility and attack will follow. (Birdwhistell 1971: 34)

Teiste kohalolu tähtsus:

All kinesic research rests upon the assumption that, without the participant's being aware of it, human beings are constantly engaged in adjustments to the presence and activities of other human beings. As sensitive organisms, they utilize their full sensory equipment in this adjustment. Any particular sensory modality may have paramount definitional power in a particular communicationsituation, but these modalities may only be heuristically abstracted for study and analysis. That is, although at any punctiform moment a person may be seen to be moving or vocalizing, the study of communicational scenes reveals that all the abstractable modalities are necessary to understanding the communication situation. (Birdwhistell 1971: 48-49)

Kommunikatsioonisüsteem on mitmekanaliline:

We get an entirely different picture of communication if we recognize that communication is not just what happens in one channel. We cannot investigate communication by isolating and measuring one channel, the acoustic (that is, the sound-sending and sound-receiving channel). Communication, upon investigation appears to be a system which makes use of the channels of all of the sensory modalities. By this model, communication is a continuous process utilizing the various channels and the combinations of them as appropriate to the particular situation. (Birdwhistell 1971: 70)

Suhtlemise funktsiooniks pole ainult informatsiooni loomine ja edastamine, vaid ka interaktsiooni säilitamine:

...the conveyance of new information is no more important than what we call the integrational aspect of the communicative process. In the broadest sense, the integrational aspect includes all behavioral operations which:

1. keep the system in operation
2. regulate the interactional process
3. cross-reference particular messages to comprehensibility in a particular context
4. relate the particular context to the larger contexts of which the interaction is but a special situation

(Birdwhistell 1971: 86-87)

Tähendus sõltub kontekstist ja valitud koodist:

We do not, as yet, know enough about words or gesture or their association to know the shapes and sizes of the presently only vaguely conceptualized semiotic or communicational units. Nor do I believe that we are going to be able to weigh the effect of their words or body motion complexes in interaction until we know enough about the matrices of their occurrence to study them. As our studies approach the point where we must deal with social meaning, we need clear statements regarding the structure of the social contexts of communicational occurrences. It is difficult, if not impossible, to answer the question: What does this symbol or that gesture mean? Meaning is not immanent in particular symbols, words, sentences, or acts of whatever duration but in the behavior elicited by the presence or absence of such behavior in particular contexts. The derivation and comprehension of social meaning thus rests equally upon comprehension of the code and of the context which selects from the possibilities provided by the code structure. (Birdwhistell 1971: 96)

Kõne ja kehaliigutuste seos:

Inspection of the wrorking transcript of the linguistically and kinesically recorded data revealed repetitive and apparently systematic body of behaviors directly associable with the vocalic stream. That is, there seemed to be some systematic regularity in the movements people made when they talked. These in both shape and structural activity seemed distinguishable from the clearly structural kinesic particles which occur both concurrently and apart from the flow of speech. (Birdwhistell 1971: 116-117)

Sõnadesse "üleuskumine":

What I am trying to say is that men have not communicated with each other by spoken language alone any more than they have lived by metabolism. Speech contributes to the total communication process; the metabolic process is but one aspect of the vital process.
One last, practical note: if this is so, there is a good reason why Johnny has so much trouble learning to write. Writing must derive and abstract both spoken and body motion activity. If Johnny is taught that he is only dealing with lexicallu bound speech material, he has to deny reality to be literate. The multimodal universe of television may teach him this and he may very well revolt against the teacher who overbelieves in words. If our formulations are correct, the grammarian must turn to body motion for data to make sense out of a number of areas now hidden in the parts of speech. (Birdwhistell 1971: 127)

While body motion behavior is based in the physiological structure, the communicative aspects of this behavior are patterned by social and cultural experience. The meaning of such behavior is not so simple that it can be itemized in a glossary of gestures. Nor is meaning encapsulated atomistically in particular motions. It can be derived only from the examination of the patterned structure of the system of body motion as a whole as this manifests itself in the particular social situation. (Birdwhistell 1971: 173)

Birdwhistell haarab ka prokseemikat:

Interpersonal space variations are in part extensions of kinesic activity and are often definitional of communication situations. (Birdwhistell 1971: 177)

Siin nimetab ta denotatiivse sõnaraamatu koostamist (nagu tehakse kehakeele aimekirjanduses) esimeseks "kandja" (nagu märgi-kandja) ahvatluseks (The "Carrier" Temptarion):

This derives from a linguistic naiveté which assumes that each gesture, whether as gross as a thumbed nose or as tiny as a first-degree right lid droop, has a "real" meaning just as "words" are supposed to have. If the investigator succumbs to this, his attention is directed into a kind of "lexicon" wherein he draws up lists of moves and their meanings only to discover that most human being are kinesically illiterate and move improper English. (Birdwhistell 1971: 186)

Kineesika:

A product of systematic social interaction, the kinesic system is a social system. Out of the range of muscular adjustments produced by a human being, some are utilized by the social system for communicational purposes. Thus, to say it simply, no human body produces a kine (least kinesic unit); it moves or adjusts in a set of muscular relationships. In social interaction, certain of these have demonstrable special utility in the communicational process. That is, under analysis, they emerge as kines. Every visible body movement, accordingly, is not a kine any more than every audible noise made by the vocal apparatus is a phone. Only after analysis has revealed that the presence or absence of a given movement in a particular context systematically affects the interactional process do we assert that that movement has kinesic significance. (Birdwhistell 1971: 193)

Kultuur, korrastus, süsteem:

A kine is an abstraction of that range of behavior produced by a member of a given social group which, for another member of that same group, stands in perceptual contrast to a different range of such behavior. While, theoretically, within certain limits provided by the physiological structure, a given complex of muscular reactions may produce a continuous series of positions, in actuality, any social system patterns these into a discontinuous or discrete series for reception or reproduction. Thus, while, for example, the membership of culture A will report only 2 degrees of lid closure, culture B may recognize as many as five. As a skilled spectator under optimal conditions, I can record or reproduce 15 degrees of lid closure quite distinct from each other, but most middle majority informants "see" only three. (Birdwhistell 1971: 193)

The final answers to "What does X mean" can only be arrived at when all of the other social systems interacting in any situation are equally thoroughly analyzed. (Birdwhistell 1971: 227)

Immenentselt (loomuomaselt) kodeeritud käitumine näib Birdwhistelli käsitluses kandvat nime instrumentaalne käitumine:

In the Cigarette Scene, the acts of lighting the cigarette, Gregory's manipulation of the match, and Doris' adjustment of her shoe strap may be termed instrumental behavior. Moreover, the fact that Doris and Gregory are seated for an extended conversation is, at one level, instrumental. To say that an act is instrumental, however, does not define it, in itself, as without signal or message value. The performance of any act in the presence of others must be comprehended as having the stamp of individual and social practice. Yet, at this writing, acts such as walking, smoking, eating, knitting, woodworking, still must be filed as "instrumental" and/or "task oriented" until we know more about their communicative structure. (Birdwhistell 1971: 231)

Kirjandust:

• Bateson, F., and Mead, M. 1942. Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis. New York: Special Publications of the New York Academy of Sciences. Vol. II
• Harris, Marvin, 1964. The Nature of Cultural Things. New York: Random House.
• Caroll, J. C. 1953. The Study of Language: A Survey of Linguistics and Related Disciplines in America. Cambridge: Hardward University Press
• Kluckhohn, C. 1949. Mirror for Man. New York: Whittlesby House, McGraw-Hill. London: McGraw-Hill, 1963
• Knapp, P. H. 1963a. Expression of Emotion in Man. New York: International Universities Press
• LaBarre, W. 1954. The Human Animal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• McLuhan, M. 1962. Gutenberg Galaxy. London: ROutledge & Kegan Paul
• Luria, A. R. 1961. The Role of Speech in the Regulation of Behavior. London: Permagon Press
• Morris, C. W. 1938. Foundations of the Theory of Signs. London: University of Chicago Press
• Ogden, C. K., and Richards, I. A. 1938: The Meaning of Meaning. 5th ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949.
• Ruesch, J. 1951. COmmunication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry. New York: Norton.