Buchanan, Brett 2008. Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. State University of New York Press, Albany

Seda raamatut üritasin lugeda hiliskevadel, kuid piirdusin esimese osaga, mis käsitleb Uexkülli. Nüüd olen natuke rohkem tuttav ka ülejäänud mõtlejatega, niiet aeg selle lugemiseks on küps.

In studying the behavioral patterns of different animals, Uexküll noted that animals of all levels, from microorganisms to human animals, are capable of discerning meaning from environmental cues beyond a purely instinctual reaction. Such meaning is attributable to how organisms enter into relationships with other things and thus come to see the environment as laced not just with signs, but with significance itself. (Buchanan 2008: 8)
Natural selection is a dangerous idea for many reasons, perhaps the greatest of which is its ability to offer an observable, testable, and scientific account for evolution, where the repercussions extend into philosophical and religious beliefs. (Buchanan 2008: 11)
The animal, together with its environment, are observed to form a whole system that Uexküll called an Umwelt... (Buchanan 2008: 21)
It is true that one might and can grasp a door handle and think ‘This is a handle that I grasp and which allows this door to open such that I might enter the other room.’ But we don’t do this; we simply can’t live this way. Rather one simply grasps the handle and opens the door without thinking twice about it. This, incidentally, is what is wrong with many cognitive models in psychology that endlessly break down human behavior into functional bits (e.g., see handle, extend arm to handle, grasp handle, turn handle, pull, etc.). Merleau-Ponty in particular will critique a similar form of psychological reductionism by noting that human behavior is constituted by the whole body in the fluidity of its movements. If I want to kick a soccer ball, for example, I don’t think of all the steps required to kick the ball. Should I do so, my opponent would surely have already taken the ball away efore I had a chance to kick it for myself! The body acts as a whole in virtue of always already being in a world. (Buchanan 2008: 60)
After briefly recounting a day in the life of each, Clark arrives at three types of phenomena that may distinguish one type of being from the other: (1) experiential “feelings” such as hunger or desire; (2) thoughts and reasons; and (3) the “meta-flow” of thoughts about thoughts. (Buchanan 2008: 65)
Heidegger primarily highlights how behavior implies a certain self-retention, a mode of “driven performing” as opposed to the free “doing and acting” that human beings elicit. There are limits to behavior, but not just in the sense that one can behave this way and not that way. The limits are more fundamental in that an animal’s behavior is limited with respect to its own ‘self’-relation. The animal cannot get out of itself; it cannot, as Heidegger will claim elsewhere of human existence, transcend itself—neither temporally nor toward the world. (Buchanan 2008: 77)
If we are to find the totality of the organism in the phenomenon of behavior, then we must inquire into its meaning.6 But to look for an explicit definition of behavior may be an ineffective path. Merleau-Ponty doesn’t so much offer a clear formulation inasmuch as he offers a variety of different views. Accordingly, behavior is linked with a variety of other notions: behavior as structure, behavior as form, behavior as signification, behavior as a manner or attitude of existing. In each case, however, it is the ontological interpretation of the organism that is conveyed. Behavior demonstrates a relational enclosure insofar as the organism is structurally united with its world. (Buchanan 2008: 120)

Tulemus oli loodetust teistsugune. Mida ma lootsin? Käitumise käsitlemist. Sain aga ontoloogiate võrdluste, milles autor otsis välja nimetatud mõtlejate viited Uexküllile ja kuidas viimane on nende mõttetööd mõjutanud. Muidugi oli see raamat täis päris põnevat arutlelu ja faktoide (nt "organiteta keha" on muna), aga suur osa sellest on minu eesmärkide suhtes täiesti tarbetu (diskussioon sellest kuidas inimene, loom ja kivi "on").
Tekitas tahtmist kõnealuste mõtlejate endi tekste lugeda, kuid teisalt ähvardab seda teed minemine liiga filosoofiliseks muutumisega. Üle päris pika aja kasutan jälle silti Abstruse:


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