Diskursuse kord

Foucault, Michel 2005 [1971]. Diskursuse kord: Collége de France'i inaugaratsiooniloeng 2. detsembril 1970. Prantsuse keelest tõlkinud Marek Tamm. Tallinn : Varrak

...asju, mida öeldakse üks kord ja seejärel pannakse tallele, sest neis usutakse peituvat mingi saladus või aare. (Foucault : 19)

...asjad, mida mina kirjutan märkmepaberitele ja peidan ära.

...piiramissüsteemide kõige pinnapealsema ja nähtavama vormi moodustab see, mida võib koondada nimetuse "rituaal" alla; rituaal määratleb kvalifikatsiooni, mida peavad omama indiviidid, kes kõnelevad (ja kes dialoogi, küsitluse ja retsiteerimise mängus peavad hõivama teatud positsiooni ja sõnastama teatud lausungeid); rituaal määratleb žestid, käitumised, olukorrad ja märkide rea, mis peavad diskursust saatma; viimaks fikseerib rituaal sõnade oodatud või pealesunnitud tõhususe, nende mõju inimestele, kellele nad on määratud, nende sundusliku toime piirid. (Foucault 2005: 31-32)

Alates sellest, kui välistati sofistide mängud ja kauplemine, alates sellest, kui suurema või väiksema enesekindlusega summutati nende paradoksid, näib Lääne mõte valvavat selle üle, et diskursusel oleks võimalikult vähe ruumi mõtte ja kõne vahel; et diskursus oleks pelgalt ühenduskoht mõtlemise ja rääkimise vahel; et diskursus oleks vaid mõte, mis rüütatud märkidesse ja mis muutub nähtavaks sõnades, või vastupidi - diskursus oleks vaid tööle rakendatud keelestruktuur, mis toodab tähendusefekti. (Foucault 2005: 37)

...milliste sundussüsteemide kaudu, kiuste või toel on diskursuste seeriad formuleerunud, milline on nende igaühe eripärane norm ja millised on nende ilmnemise, kasvamise ja varieerumise tingimused. (Foucault 2005: 48)

...Husserl seoses filosoofia kui lõpmatu ülesande teemaga, mis on ühenduses meie ratsionaalsusega. (Foucault 2005: 60)

On Aggression

Lorenz, Konrad 1966 [1963]. On Aggression. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

Unfortunately the working structure of the instinctive and culturally acquired patterns of behavior which make up the social life of man seems to be one of the most complicated systems we know on this earth. (Lorenz 1966: xi)

With H. Hediger, we call this third behavior pattern the critical reaction. The expression "fight like a cornered rat" has become symbolic of the desperate struggle in which the fighter stakes his all, because he cannot escape and can expect no mercy. This most violent form of fighting behavior is motivated by fear, the most intense flight impulses whose natural outlet is prevented by the fact that the danger is too near; so the animal, not daring to turn its back on it, fights with the proverbial courage of desperation. (Lorenz 1966: 28)

It is essential to consider the fact that all these opportunities for special careers, known as ecological niches, are often provided by the same cubic yard of ocean water. (Lorenz 1966: 33)

My teacher, Oskar Heinroth, used to say jokingly, "Next to the wings of the Argus pheasant, the hectic life of Western civilized man is the most stupid product of intra-specific selection!" The rushed existence into which industrialized, commercialized man has precipitated himself is actually a good example of an inexpedient development caused entirely by competition between members of the same species. Human beings of today are attacked by so-called manager diseases, high blood pressure, renal atrophy, gastric ulcers, and torturing neuroses; they succumb to barbarism because they have no more time for cultural interest. (Lorenz 1966: 41)

We can, however, here describe the part played by aggression in the structure of society among highly developed animals. Though many individuals interact in a social system, its inner workings are often easier to understand than the interaction of drives within the individual. A principle of organization without which a more advanced social life cannot develop in higher vertebrates is the so-called ranking order. Under this rule every individual in the society knows which one is stronger and which weaker than itself, so that everyone can retreat from the stronger and expect submission from the weaker, if they should get in each other's way. (Lorenz 1966: 44)

All social animals are "status seekers,", hence there is always particularly high tension between individuals who hold immediately adjoining positions in the ranking order; conversely, this tension diminishes the further apart the two animals are in rank. Since high-ranking jackdaws, particularly males, interfere in every quarrel between two inferiors, this graduation of social tension has the desirable effect that the higher-ranking birds always intervene in favor of the losing party. (Lorenz 1966: 45)

Some time ago, collaborators of Robert M. Yerkes made the extraordinarily interesting observation that chimpanzees, animals well known to be capable of learning by imitation, copy only higher-ranking members of their species. From a group of these apes, a low-ranking individual was taken and taught to remove bananas from a specially constructed feeding apparatus by very complicated manipulations. When this ape, together with his feeding apparatus, was brought back to the group, the higher-ranking animals tried to take away the bananas which he had acquired for himself, but none of them thought of watching their inferior at work and learning something from him. Then the highest-ranking chimpanzee was removed and taught to use the apparatus in the same way, and when he was put back in the group the other members watched him with great interest and soon learned to imitate him. (Lorenz 1966: 46)

Aggression elicited by any deviation from a group's characteristic manners and mannerisms forces all its members into a strictly uniform observance of these norms of social behavior. The nonconformist is discriminated against as an "outsider" and, in primitive groups, for which school classes or small military units serve as good examples, he is mobbed in the most cruel manner. (Lorenz 1966: 79)

It is perfectly right and legitimate that we should consider as "good" the manners which our parents have taught us, that we should hold sacred the social norms and rites handed down to us by the tradition of our culture. What we must guard against, with all the power of rational responsibility, is our natural incliation to regard the social rites and norms of other cultures as inferior. The dark side of pseudo-speciation is that it makes us consider the members of pseudo-species other than our own as not human, as many primitive tribes are demonstrably doing, in whose language the word for their own particular tribe is synonymous with "Man." (Lorenz 1966: 83)

Converesely, aggression and sexuality are quite compatible in the male; he can treat his partner roughly, chase her all around the tank, and betweenwhiles perform sexual movements and all possible mixed forms of motor patterns. The female may fear the male considerably without suppression of sexually motivated behavior pattern. The bride-to-be may flee before the male and at the same time make use of every breathing space to perform sexually motivated courtship movements. These mixed forms of behavior patterns of flight and sexuality have become, by ritualization, widespread ceremonies which are often called "coyness behavior" and which possess a very definite expression value. (Lorenz 1966: 104)

By "flock" or "herd" we do not mean that chance gathering of like individuals such as occurs when many flies or cultures crowd around a carcass, or when many winkles or sea anemones settle on a particularly favorable place in the tidal zone. The concept of the flock is determined by the fact that individuals of a species reacts to each other by attraction and are held together by behavior patterns which one or more individuals elicit in the others. Thus it is typical of flock formation when many individuals travel in close formation in the same direction. (Lorenz 1966: 139)

Generally, other conditions being equal, mere acquaintanceship with a fellow member of the species exerts a remarkably strong inhibitory effect on aggressive behavior. In human beings, this phenomenon can regularly be observed in railway carriages, incidentally an excellent place in which to study the function of aggression in the spacing out of territories. All the rude behavior patterns serving for the repulsion of seat competitors and intruders, such as covering empty places with coats or bags, putting up one's feet, or pretending to be asleep, are brought into action against the unknown individual only. As soon as the newcomer turns out to be even the merest acquaintance, they dissapear and are replaced by rather shamefaced politeness. (Lorenz 1966: 156)

This is a classical example of the process by which we call, with Tinberen, a redirected activity. It is characterized by the fact that an activity is released by one object but discharged at another, because the first one, while presenting stimuli specifically eliciting the response, simultaneously emits others which inhibit its discharge. A human example is furnished by the man who is very angry with someone and hits the table instead of the other man's jaw because inhibition prevents him from doing so, although his pent-up anger, like the pressure within a volcano, demands outlet. Most of the known cases of redirected activity concern aggressive behavior elicited by an object which simultaneously evokes fear. In this special case, which he called "bicycling," B. Grzimek first recognized and described the principle of redirection. The "bicyclist" in this case is the man who bows to his superior and threads on his inferior. The mechanism effecting this behavior is particularly clear when an animal approaches its opponent from some distance, then, on drawing near, notices how terrifying the latter really is, and now, since it cannot check the already started attack, vents its anger on some innocent bystander or even on some inanimate substitute object. (Lorenz 1966: 170)

It would seem that the partners to a triumph-ceremony group have to reassure each other all day long and at every opportunity that they do indeed belong together, forming an independent social entity. In reality the relationship of cause and effect is the other way around. The triumph ceremony is not caused by love and friendship between certain individuals, it is not "the expression of" these feelings, quite the contrary, the ceremony itself is instrumental in keeping the group members together. (Lorenz 1966: 206)

The second obstacle to self-knowledge is our reluctance to accept the fact that our own behavior obeys the laws of natural causation. Bernard Hassenstein has called this attitude the "anticausal value judgement." The reluctance of many people to recognize the causal determination of all natural phenomena, human behavior included, undoubtedly stems from the justifiable wish to possess a free will and to feel that our actions are determined not by fortuitous causes but by higher aims. (Lorenz 1966: 222)

The scientist who considers himself absolutely "objective" and believes that he can free himself from the compulsion of the "merely" subjective should try - only in imagination, of course - to kill in succession a lettuce, a fly, a frog, a guinea pig, a cat, a dog, and finally a chimpanzee. He will then be aware how increasingly difficult murder becomes as the victim's level of organization rises. The degree of inhibition against killing each one of these beings is a very precise measure for the considerably different values that we cannot help attributing to lower and higher forms of life. To any man who finds it equally easy to chop up a live dog and a live lettuce I would recommend suicide at his earliest convenience!(Lorenz 1966: 226)

By virtue of the molecular structure of the living matter in which they take place, the processes of life fulfill a great number of very particular functions, such as self-regulation, self-preservation, acquisition and storage of information, and, above all, reproduction of the structures essential for these functions. These, though in principle causally explicable, cannot take place in other, structurally less complex matter. (Lorenz 1966: 228)

In human evolution, no inhibitory mechanisms preventing sudden manslaughter were necessary, because quickly killing was impossibe anyhow; the potential victim had plenty of opportunity to elicit the pity of the aggressor by submissive gestures and appeasing attitudes. No selection pressure arose in the prehistory or mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing of conspecifics until, all of a sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium of killing potential and social inhibition. When it did, man's position was very nearly that of a dove which, by some unnatural trick of nature, had suddenly acquired the beak of a raven. (Lorenz 1966: 241)

I have already said that the dynamics of instinctive drives, of phyletically and culturally ritualized behavior patterns, together with the controlling force of responsible morality, form a very complicated systemic whole which is not easy to analyze. However, the recognition of the mutual functional interdependence of its parts, even at the present incomplete stage of our knowledge, helps us to understand a number of phenomena which otherwise would remain completely unintelligible. (Lorenz 1966: 254)

Even in the less tragic case of rather closely related and roughly equivalent cultures mixing, there usually are some undesirable results, because each finds it easy to imitate the most superficial, least valuable customs of each other. The first items of American culture imitated by German youth immediately after the war were gum chewing, Coca-Cola drinking, the crew cut, and the reading of color comic strips. More valuable social norms characteristic of American culture were obviously less easy to imitate. (Lorenz 1966: 262)

As it is, we do not know enough about the function of any system of culturally ritualized norms of behavior to give a rational answer to the perfectly rational question of what some particular custom is good for, in other words wherein lies its survival value. When an innovaor rebels against established norms of social behavior and asks why he should conform with them, we are usually at a loss for an answer. (Lorenz 1966: 264)

A fourth, and perhaps the most important, prerequisite for the full eliciting of militant enthusiasm is the presence of many other individuals, all agitated by the same emotion. Their absolute number has a certain influence on the quality of the response. Smaller number at issue with a large majority tend to obstinate defense with the emotional value of "making a last stand," while very large numbers inspired by the same enthusiasm feel the urge to conquer the whole world in the name of their sacred cause. Hence the laws of mass enthusiasm are strictly analogous to those of flock formation described in Chapter Eight; here, too, the excitation grows in proportion, perhaps even in geometrical progression, with the increasing number of individuals. This is exactly what makes militant mass enthusiasm so dangerous. (Lorenz 1966: 273)

The first, the most obvious, and the most important percept is the old [...heatou], "Know thyself": we must deepen our insight into the causal concatenations governing our own behavior. The lines along which an applied science of human behavior will probably develop are just beginning to appear. (Lorenz 1966: 276)

If laughter is in fact directed at an outsider, as in scornful derision, the component of aggressive motivation and, at the same time, the analogy of certain forms of the triumph ceremony become greatly enhanced. In this case, laughter can turn into a very cruel weapon, causing injury if it strikes a defenseless human being undeservedly: it is criminal to laugh at a child. (Lorenz 1966: 294)

Pride is one of the chief obstacles to seeing ourselves as we really are, and self-deceit is the obliging servant of pride. (Lorenz 1966: 296)

The expression of the emotions in man and animals

Darwin, Charles 1998 [1872]. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. With an introduction, afterword, and commentaries by Paul Ekman. 3rd ed. New York : Oxford University Press, Inc.

Introduction to the Third Edition by Paul Ekman. pp. xxi--xxxvi

We want to touch with our faces those we love; we can bite affectionately - not only humans do this; so do dogs and cats. Pleasure is demonstrated in quite different ways in our domesticated animals, Darwin reminds us: cats purr and rub against us, while dogs lick us and wag their tails. In anger that tail acts quite differently in dogs, cats and horses. These are just a small sample of the fascinating observations Darwin describes in each chapere. (Ekman 1998: xxi)

to bite affectionately - seda kuulutab ka raamatu sleeve ja Ekman vihjab, et sellistele küsimustele leiab siit raamatust "miks?" stiilis vastuseid, kuigi minul sellele vastust leida ei õnnestunud.

The distinction between emotional expressions and gestures has been incorporated in current work on non-verbal communication. While gestures can refer to nearly anything - thoughts, plans, actions, wishes, fantasies, and so forth - the expressions pertain simply to the emotions. Expressions typically involve the face and the voice and, to a much lesser extentm body movement or posture. Darwin focuses most on facial expressions, although he gave some attention to other expressions. (Ekman 1998: xxii)

Väljenduste ja žestide vahel seega selge eristus (esimene seotud emotsioonidega, teine ka kõige muuga). Ma ei ole veel valmis seda eristust rangelt omaks võtma.

There is disagreement today among those who study animal behavior about whether expressions should be considered signs of emotion, related to internal physiological changes. Some maintain that it is more useful to consider the expressions as simply communicative signals, and many studies have done that, describing only what animals do. (In the Afterword I explain why this is a false dichotomy. We don't have to choose whether an expression is part of an emotion or a communicative signal. In reality, it is both.) (Ekman 1998: xxx)

This was Darwin's evidence that expressions are innate, that these signs of our emotions are the product of our evolution and are therefore part of our biology. This was completely incompatible with the reigning dogmas. Watson, the founder of behaviorism, rejected the notion that inheritance played nay part in explaining our social behavior. He claimed that we need only consider what is learned to understand man. Learning, he said, is the only proper focus for psychology. (Ekman 1998: xxxiv)

Today most scientists reject such absolute relativism: nature and nurture both play a role in all human behavior. Emotions are both the product of our evolution, particularly their physiology and expression, and of what we have learned, especially our attempts to manage our emotions, out attitudes about our emotions and our representations of them verbally. THere are still some who disagree - cultural relativist or social constructionists - but they no longer dominate scientific thinking. The intellectual climate has changed; it is now much more hospitable to Darwin's Expressions. (Ekman 1998: xxxv)

The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals

The study of expression is difficult, owing to the movements being often extremely slight, and of a fleeting nature. A difference may be clearly perceived, and yet it may be impossible, at least I have found it so, to state in what the difference consists. When we witness any deep emotion, our sympathy is so strongly excited, that close observation is forgotten or rendered almost impossible; of which fact I have had many curious proofs. Our imagination is another and still more serious source of error; for if from the nature of the circumstances we excpect to see any expression, we readily imagine its presence. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: )

The power of association is admitted by everyone. Mr Bain remarks, that 'actions, sensations, and states of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way that when any one of them is afterward presented t the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea'. It is so important for our purpose fully to recognize that actions readily become associated with other actions and with various states of mind, that I will give a good many instances, in the first place relating to man, and afterwards to the lower animals. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 36-37)

A man when going out of doors puts on his gloves quite unconsciously; and this may seem an extremely simple operation, but he who has taught a child to put on gloves, knows that thisis by no means the case. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 37)

Professor Beer, of Bonn, is said by Lewes (Physical Basis of Mind, 1877, p. 377) to have had the power of contracting or dilating the pupils at will. 'Here ideas act as motors. When he thinks of a very dark space the pupil dilates, when of a very bright spot the pupil contracts.' (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 47)

Man not only uses inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language; if, indeed, the word invented can be applies to a process, completed by innumerable steps, half-consciously made.(Darwin 1998 [1872]: 63)

Many signs, moreover, which plainly stand in opposition to each other, appear to have had on both sides a significant origin. This seems to hold good with the signs used by the deaf and dumb for light and dark, for strenght and weakness, etc. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 65)

I have described, in the second chapter, the gait and appearance of a dog when cheerful, and the marked antithesis presented by the same animal when dejected and disappointed, with his head, ears, body, tail, and chops drooping, and eyes dull. Under the expectation of any great pleasure, dogs bound and jump about in an extravagant manner, and bark for joy. The tendency to bark under this state of mind is inherited, or runs in the breed; greyhounds rarely bark, whilst the spitx-dog barks so incessantly on starting for a walk with his master that he becomes a nuisance. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 121)

Music has a wonderful power, as I have elsewhere attempted to show, of recalling in a vague and indefinite manner, those strong emotions which were felt during long-past ages, when, as is probable, our early progenitors courted each other by the aid of vocal tones. And as several of our strongest emotions - grief, great joy, love, and sympathy - lead to the free secretion of tears, it is not surprising that music should be apt to cause our eyes to become suffused with tears, especially when we are already softened by any of the tenderer feelings. Music often produces another peculiar effect. We know that every strong sensation, emotion, or excitement - extreme pain, rage, terror, joy, or the passion of love - all have a special tendency to cause the muscles to tremble; and the thrill or slight shiver which runs down the backbone and liombs of many persons when they are powerfully affected by music, seems to bear the same relation to the above trembling of the body, as a slight suffusion of tears the power of music does to weeping from any strong and real emotion. (Darwin 1998 [1872]:216 )

A man may be absorbed in the deepest thought, and his brow will remain smooth until he encounters some obstacles in his train of reasoning, or is interrupted by some disturbance, and then a frown passes like a shadow over his brow. A half-starved man may think intently how to obtain food, but he probably will not frown unless he encounters either in thought or action some difficulty, or finds the food when obtained nauseous. I have noticed that almost everyone instantly frowns if he perceives a strange or bad taste in what he is eating. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 220)

If we have suffered or expected to suffer some wilful injury from a man, or if he is in any way offensive to us, we dislike him; and dislike easily rises into hatred. Such feelings, if experienced in a moderate degree, are not clearly expressed by any movement of the body or features, excepting perhaps by a certain gravity of behaviour, or by some ill-temper. Few individuals, however, can long reflect about a hated person, without feeling and exhibiting signs of indignation or rage. But if the offending person be quire insignificant, we experience merely disdain or contempt. If, on the other hand, he is all-pwerful, then hatred passes into terror, as when a slave thinks about a cruel master, or a savage about a bloodthirsty malignant deity. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 234)

The partial closure of the eyelids, ad Duchenne insists, or the turning away of the eyes or of the whole body, are likewise highly expressive of distain. These actions seem to declare that the despised person is not worth looking at, or is disagreeable to behold. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 251)

Professor Cleland (Evolution, Expression and Sensation, 1881, p. 55) points out that concealment or deceit is expressed by the face being directed downwards, while the eyes are turned upwards. 'The culprit sheltering himself by a lie ... hangs his head over his secret, while he steals upwards glances to see the effect which he distrusts'. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 262)

THe nature of the mental states which include blushing. These consist of shyness, shame, and modesty; the essential element in all being self-attention. Many reasons can be assigned for believing that originally self-attention directed at personal appearance, in relation to the opinion of others, was the exciting cause; the same effect being subsequently produced, through the force of association, by self-attention in relation to moral conduct. It is not the simple act of reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinkning what others think of us, which excites a blush. In absolute solitude the most sensitive person would be quite indifferent about his appearance. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 324)

Strangers neither know nor care anything about our conduct or character, but they may, and often do, criticize our appearance; hence shy persons are particularly apt to be shy and to blush in the presence of strangers. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 327)

If, then, great ignorance of details does not prevent our recognizing with certainty and promtitude various expressions, I do not see how this ignorance can be advanced as an argument that our knowledge, though vague and general, is not innate. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 355)

The relaxation of the small arteries of the surface, on which blushing depends, seems to have primarilt resulted from earnest attention directed to the appearance of our own persons, especially of our faces, aided by habit, inheritance, and the ready flow of nerve-force along accustomed channels; and afterwards to have been extended by the power of association to self-attention directed to moral conduct. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 358)

The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns dissaproval. We readily perceive sympathy in other by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strenghtened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified. (Darwin 1998 [1872]: 359)

• Margaret Mead's review of Ekman's Darwin book (Journal of Communication, 25, 1975, 205-13)
• Sight, Sound and Sense, T. Sebeok (ed.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978
• The Mechanism of Human Facial Expression by G.-B. Duchenne de Boulogne, translated and edited by R. A. Cuthbertson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990

The Swiss Pioneer in NVCS Heini Hediger

Sebeok, Thomas A. 2001. The Swiss Pioneer in Nonverbal Communication Studies, Heini Hediger (1908-1992). New York ; Ottawa : Legas

Kena lugemine, paeluvad pildid ja huvitavad allmärkused, aga Sebeoki enda tekstist midagi märkimisväärset tsiteerimiseks ei leidnudki. Liiga lühike ja argine. Danesi eessõnast leidsin aga kaks kasulikku katkendit. Muu hulgas sain teada, et Danesi jaoks on PMS (Primary Modeling System), SMS ja TSM samaväärsed Perice'i esmasuse, teisesuse ja kolmasusega. Igatahes, modelleerimisest:
Danesi, Marcel 2001. Hediger through Sebeok: An Introduction to the Biosemiotic Paradigm

In this framework, the notion of modeling is pivotal. This is definable as the species-specific ability to produce forms to stand for referents that have some relevance to species continuity. In the human species, the form may be imagined, in which case it is called by psychologists a mental image, or it may be something externalized, in which case it is called by semioticians and philosophers, a representation. Semiotic research has identified four basic types of forms: (1) signs (words, gestures, etc.); (2) texts (stories, theories, etc.); (3) codes (language, music, etc.); and (4) figural assemblages (metaphors, metonyms, etc.). More specifically, a model can be defined as a form that has been imagined or made externally (through some physical medium) to stand for an object, event, feeling, etc., known as a referent, or for a class of similar (or related) objects, events, feelings, et.c, known as a referential domain. (Danesi 2001: 8)

The ability to make models is, actually, a derivative of semiosis. When an infant comes into contact with a new object, his or her instinctive reaction is to explore it with the senses, i.e. to handle it, taste it, smell it, listen to any sounds it makes, and visually observe its features. This exploratory phase of knowing the object constitutes a sensory modeling stage. The resulting internal model (metnal image) allows the infant to recognize the same object subsequently without having, each time, to examine it over again "from scratch" with his or her sensory system (although the infant often will examine its physical qualities for various other reasons). (Danesi 2001: 10)

Ja kasulik viide: Mitchell, W. Robert and Nicholas S Thompson, eds. Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ah, ja Desmond Morris oli 1986. aastal avaldanud raamatu nimega "Catwatching".

Nonverbal communication of aggression

Pliner, Patricia, Lester Krames, and Thomas Alloway, editors. Nonverbal communication of aggression: proceedings of the fourth annual Symposium on Communication and Affect held at Erindale College, University of Toronto, March 28-30, 1974. Symposium on Communication and Affect (1974, Erindale College). Advances in the Study of Communication and Affect, v. 2. New York: Plenum Press, c1975.
või:
Pliner, Patricia (ed) 1975. Nonverbal Communication of Aggression (Advances in the Study of Communication and Affect, Vol. 2). New York : Plenum Press

Sarles, Harvey 1975. "Language and Communication-II: The View from '74". In: . pp. 1-19.

THe field of human ethology has gained a literature, if not exactly a substance. In fact, there may be two fields splitting and emerging - one which is essentially psychological-individual, the other more anthropological-social - as they tend to approach the same apparent subject matter from two quite different perspectives. (Sarles 1975: 2)

Teachers seem to get a great deal of their feedback about what's going on in their students' heads from watching their faces. Teachers must make rapid judgements about whether a point is understood, and by whom. Their data are primarily facial expressions. So a student who either looks stupid in some static overarching sense, or whose look is interpreted as confused or stupid, will have some effect on the conduct of any class. Depending on the teacher, his or her mood, patience, etc., that stupid-looking student may get a lot more teaching energy - or more likely, apparently, he will begin to be treated differently from the bright-looking students. (Sarles 1975: 11)

Exline, Ralph V., Ellyson, Steve L., Long, Barbara 1975. "Visual Behavior as an Aspect of Power Role Relationships". In: . pp. 21-52.

This book is concerned with the nonverbal communication of aggression, and our discussion will focus on the darker side of eye engagements, though we will deal more with power and control than with aggression pwr se. Power, control, aggression - the concepts are closely linked, for how often is one who gives little indication of interest in influencing or controlling the actions of others likely to be described ad infringing or encroaching on another's rights or territory? (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 22)

To say that the eye "takes" is to say that we use our eyes to obtain information about the other. This information is useful either in gauging his reaction to our speech and/or behavior, or in using his nonverbal behavior to better understand or to evaluate the validity of the message he provides us in words. Thus one function of looking is to obtain information from and about the speaker which cannot be derived from his words alone. Such information would seem to be relevant to our personal concerns of communication or comprehension. (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 24)

The second factor, i.e. the "norm of attention," is operative in both speaking and listening roles, for convention of courtesy would seem to require that both the speaker and listener give evidence of "paying attention" to the other. Looking at another is a conventional way of indicating such attention. (Exline, Ellyson & Long 1975: 30)

Ellsworth, Phoebe C. 1975. "Direct Gaze as a Social Stimulus: The Example of Aggression". In: . pp. 53-75.

Some nonverbal behaviors may have reliable diagnostic significance for psychologists, although here the evidence is much less clear. Finally, there remain a great many nonverbal behaviors which do not have an invariant significance, but which may nonetheless be influential stimuli in social interactions. The "meaning" of these behaviors changes from one situation to another and from one interpersonal relationship to another. (Ellsworth 1975: 54)

Most studies that have dealt with the meaning of nonverbal behavior in social interaction have concentrated on the meanings inferred by an observer of the behavior. Similarly, in this discussion, the "meaning" which changes when the same cue occurs in different contexts refers to the observer's reaction to the cue and his interpretation of it, since as yet we have very little information about other types of social meaning. (Ellsworth 1975: 55)

Taken together, these studies provide fairly strong support for the proposition that the meaning of a look is not intrinsic to the look but derives in large meaning from the context. Thus a stare is not just a threatening signal that triggers flight, and a downcast gaze is much more complicated than a simple appeasement gesture. However, this flexibility of interpretation across contexts does not imply that visual behaviors are unimportant social stimuli. On the contrary, within each social context studied, the direct gaze had powerful and fairly consistent effects, effects which differed from those of gaze aversion. It was, as we have argued, a salient, arousing, and involving stimulus, a stimulus which demanded a response. If no appropriate response could be found, the person who was gazed at tried to escape from the demand by fleeing from the situation. (Ellsworth 1975: 69)

Between the face and the atmosphere of the situation lies a huge range of factors - posture, status relationships, degree of acquaitance, purpose, setting and formality of interaction, cultural factors, and so on, and so on. Few of these have received much empirical attention in relation to visual behavior, with the exception of Birdwhistell's observations of subcultural differences (1970), explorations of status relationships by Mehrabian (1969) and Exline (this volume), and Rubin's research on romance (1970). (Ellsworth 1975: 70)

Izard, Carroll E. 1975. "Patterns of Emotions and Emotion Communication in "Hostility" and Aggression". In:. pp. 77-101.

It is no accident that we speak of the "heat of anger"; the flushed face of the angry individual feels and looks hot. Aggression that occurs in anger is more likely to be direct result of relatively intense emotion in an individual whose enegry has been highly mobilized. On the contrary, contempt can be considered the "cool" emotion in the "hostility" triad. It seems reasonable that it is the contempt situation in which the "cold-blooded" aggressor operates, since contempt is a distancing and devaluing emotion. This description also has validity in the language of common usage, as indicated by such phrases as "murder in cold blood," or "cold-blooded killer." (Izard 1975: 84)

Menzen, E. W. Jr. 1975. "Communication and Aggression in a Group of Young Chimpanzees". In: . pp. 103-133.

Biologically speaking, thee is just as much competition within a goup as between strangers, but the rules become more subtle and shared by all, and they are less apt to entail bloodshed and useless expenditure of energy. In other words, societies (almost by definition) develop conventionalized forms of competition over resources (Wynne-Edwards, 1962). The conventions provide relatively orderly and efficient (cooperative?) means of determining who will get what, and when. (Menzen 1975: 119)

Miller, Robert E. 1975. "Nonverbal Expressions of Aggression and Submission in Social Groups of Primates". In: . pp. 135-160.

A feature of most primate groupings is a social dominance hierarchy. While the behavioral expression and the degree of control exerted by the most dominant animal shows considerable variability from species to species, close observation reveals that some individuals are accorded unusual respect by the other members of the group and that they often control movements of the troop during the foraging expedition, limit the aggressive activities within the group, and coordinate defense of the troop against predators or intrusions by other groups of the same species. The most dominant animal is generally an adult male, or, in some cases, a group of two or three adult males who cooperate and share the leadership position. It is clear from many studies and in many species of animals from the rat to primates the male hormone, testosterone, is a factor influencing aggressive behavior. (Miller 1975: 138)

We have suggested that the complete lack of nonverbal fluency in isolates is a most important factor in their inadequacy and distorted social behavior and, further, that social experiences during the first year of life are required for the monkey to acquire the essentials of nonverbal behavior. (Miller 1975: 50)

These psychoactive drugs, which altered the course and nature of group social interactions, also changed the transmission and reception of nonverbal cues in the cooperative conditioning task, lending support to the notion that effective nonverbal behavior is the sine qua non of successful group interactions. (Miller 1975: 150)

The young child must learn to be instructed by his elders to control aggression and to express assertiveness in socially acceptable ways. Inherent in this view is that the child must recognize and respond appropriately to those subtle, expressive cues that reveal hostility and rising anger in associates so that his own behavior can be modified to avert an outbreak of violence. (Miller 1975: 155)

One might anticipate that the study of nonverbal fluency in man may similarly reveal that aggression is importantly related with the failure of subjects to perceive and interpret subtle expressions of irritation and annoyance in others so that behavior can be modulated in time to prevent an escalation to anger. It would be particularly interesting to study the developmental course of the sending and receiving of nonverbal expressions so that one could relate early social experience with subsequent nonverbal performances. Since aggressive behavior almost invariantly is accompanied by highly visible nonverbal as well as verbal responses, the study of the gradations of expressions that culminate in overt hostility would seem to be important for the understanding of human aggression. (Miller 1975: 157)

Ginsburg, Benson E. 1975. "Nonverbal Communication: The Effects of Affect on Individual and Group Behavior". In: . pp. 161-173.

For us as verbal beings, there is a premium on communication by spoken language. However, at the level of affect, the verbalizations are redundant. If I have never felt whatever it is that you feel, your words will not communicate your feelings to me in the same sense that they would had I experienced them. Even if I have shared in the emotions you are expressing verbally, I must still judge whether you feel them and mean them or whether you are dissembling, and I will use other and often nonverbal cues in order to make this decision. One may say that he or she loves another, but the truth of this statement will be judged by a multitude of other cues: a glance, a smile, a touch, and certain consistencies of behavior over time. (Ginsburg 1975: 162)

The association of the signal with the mood or affect and, in turn, with the appropriate act, is established by experience in these contexts, whether the eye of the beholder belongs to a human investigator or to a conspecific. We have, for example, reared a female cub in complete visual isolation from the age of 3 weeks to 10 months. When she was first introduced to other wolves, she did not recognize their threats, greetings, or dominance posture and reacter inappopriately. Her own vocalizations and body postures contained a suitable repertoire of wolf behavior, but she did not use these in appropriate combinations or contexts and was thus not "understood" by other wolves. By being forced to interact with them under restraint from the time she emerged from isolation, she managed to put her communication system in place in 4 or 5 days. She had the genetic potential, but this way, by itself, no sufficient to insure that she would be able either to communicate or to understand. (Ginsburg 1975: 164)

Ratner, Stanley R. 1975. "Animal's Defenses: Fighting in Predator-Prey Relations". In: 175-190.

Notice that mimicries only sometimes involve postures and movements when the prey takes a posture to look like something else. Thus, only in some cases does this defense involve a signal to the predator. (Ratner 1975: 181)

SKÄNNID:

Hermeneutics and Social Science

Bauman, Zygmunt 2010 [1978]. Hermeneutics and Social Science. New York : Routledge Revivals

Men and women do what they do on purpose. Social phenomena, since they are ultimately acts of men and women, demand to be understood in a different way than by mere explaining. Understanding them must contain an element missing from the explaining of natural phenomena: the retrieval of purpose, of intention, of the unique configuration of thoughts and feelings which preceded a social phenomenon and found its only manifestation, imperfect and incomplete, in the observable consequences of action. To understand a human act, therefore, was to grasp the meaning with which the actor's intention invested it; a task, as could be easily seen, essentially different from that of natural science. (Bauman 2010: 12)

This realization has been reflected in philosophical hermeneutics in the notion of 'hermeneutic circle'. Understanding means going in circles: rather than a unilinear progress towards better and less vulnerable knowledge, it consists of an endless recapitulation and reassessment of collective memories - ever more voluminous, but always selective. It is difficult to see how any of the successive recapitulations can claim to be final and conclusive; still more difficult would be to substantiate this claim. The plight came to be seen as specific to the study of the social, presenting the 'understanding' sciences with problems unknown to the science bent on mere 'explaining'. (Bauman 2010: 17)

The individual psyche still reserved as their prototype, but it coult be accommodated to the new purpose only if subjected to a subtle transformation: what had been an individual's property became a supra-individual power; what had been the individual Steele turned into a collective Geist, and later Kultur; what had been a name for individual autonomy and freedom became the theoretical expression of the individual's submission to a larger community, the Volks- or Zeit-geist which no individual could transcend, as only inside it could he fulfil his individuality. (Bauman 2010: 24)

Hegel gave historical dimension to the two revolutionary ideas of Kant: that the 'object of knowledge' is essentially distinct from the 'object of reality' (and not its passive reflection, copy or replica); and whose impact no object of knowledge can be cleansed. The subject has been promoted from a distorting and unwanted factor of the cognitive act to a role as an indispensable condition of all knowledge. Subjectivity was shown to be inseparable from cognition; and objective knowledge, therefore, could not be reached, if at all, only through this subjectivity. (Bauman 2010: 48)

Social nature must mediate human understanding in so far as the true nature of human relations is mediated by distorting appearances.(Bauman 2010: 49)

Social action is only that action which is oriented towards other human beings, i.e. a part of social intercourse; but it must be a part of normatively regulated intercourse (e.g., economic activity is only social if, and then only in so far as, 'the actor's actual control over economic goods is represented by others'). And it must be motivationally oriented towards relations with other people, and hence be amenable to understanding. Thus the mass fury of a crowd, in which thoughtful control of behaviour is for a time suspended, is not a social action. Or, rather, both types of behaviour stand 'on the indefinite borderline of social action'. Somebody can, just, make imitation of conscious and deliberate principle of his conduct; for instance, a nouveau riche may wish to be accepted by the aristocracy of inherited wealth, and for this purpose to imitate their style of life lavishly. Somebody else may consciously seek in the anonymity of the crowd an escape from the responsibility which otherwise he would have to take individually and which he finds unbearable. Thus the specific cases of crowd behaviour and imitation can cross the boundary between social and non-social action in both directions. (Bauman 2010: 80)

...the instrumentality, or purposefulness of conduct (and therefore the possibility of viewing it as a quasi-rational behaviour), is taken by Weber as the defining feature of action as distinct from mere behaviour. (Bauman 2010: 81)

All this having been said and considered, the structure of the instrumental-rational action emerges as the only framework in which sociological study as an activity aimed at the objective understanding of human behaviour can take place. Human behaviour can be the subject-matter of sociology in so far as, and to the extent in which, it can be considered portrayed as having such a structure. In this, sociology is at one with the dominant tendency of modern society, which renders only instrumental-rational action socially relevant and therefore subject to normative regulation. Thus the stage has been set for a methodical analysis of the process of understanding itself. (Bauman 2010: 82)

Weber goes out of his way to make the distinction he promised in the preface as strict as possible. He tells us that 'the ideal type of meaningful action where the meaning is fully conscious and explicit is a marginal case'. Indeed, 'in the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness of its subjective meaning'. As it were, 'the "conscious motives" may well, even to the actor himself, conceal the various "motives" and "repressions" which constitute the real driving force of action'. (Bauman 2010: 85-86)

And so the old problem, first brought to our attention by the allegory of the cave, is still with us: if I grasp the truth which resides outside the cave, how can I pass it over to the rest of the cavedwellers? Or, for this matter, how can I myself use it in my later life in the cave? Plato light-heartedly bypasses the question. Husserl asked it explicitly, but offered no answer. Instead, he proposed that we remain forever outside. Only the chosen few can afford to take up his offer. The rest will remain largely unaffected. They will have to continue to struggle with their misunderstandings using the self-same old and crude methods Husserl so distaintfully rejected. (Bauman 2010: 127)

As a motto for The Structure of Social Action, his first and most seminal of books, which launched his 'coluntaristic theory of action' as a foundation for a new sociology, Parsons selected a sentence from Weber stating that any thoughtful reflection on the ultimate elements of meaningful human action is above all related to the categories of 'means' and 'ends'. The selection is indeed a frank statement of the major message of the book and, for this matter, of the guiding idea of the entire majestic system of sociology which Parsons later developed. (Bauman 2010: )

This is nothing less than a statement of the logical necessity of society. Indeed, if interaction is a relation involving actors' responses to each other's expectations, a certain 'stability of meaning which can be only assured by "conventions" observed by both parties', as well as 'generalization from the particularity of specific situations' become the indispensable preconditions of action, in as far as the action is oriented towards the gratification of actors' interests. Therefore, the necessity of society (generalization of typical patterns of inter-situations) and cultural system (stability of meanings) are logically contained in the means-end scheme of action. (Bauman 2010: 141)

What Weber would portray as a resultant of the play of historical forces is for Parsons a stern and unquestionable requirement of reason. If rational action is a value, here are the unavoidable consequences, up to the requirement of 'apportioning sufficient power and prestige' to 'allocative and integrative roles' in society, i.e. to the people who are appointed (or self-appointed) to distribute differentially rewards and punishments and to spread the dominant ideas. (Bauman 2010: 144)

Heidegger's concept of historicity leaves many a problem unsolves. The sociologist would ascribe paramount importance to one, the role of human interaction, to which Heidegger pays only cursory attention. He satisfies himself with settling his differences with Husserl and declares 'the other' as originally and unavoidably present in my existence. But here his interest in 'the other' lapses. The fact that there are many people co-existing and engaged in manifold relations (linguistic exchanges being an aspect of virtually all of them, but only an aspect) does not seem to strike him as a profound or fateful feature of existence - and, consequently, of the practice of understanding. His Dasein is engaged in the dialogue with history, with the past and the future, much more often, much more intensely and passionately, than with his contemporaries. Heidegger effectively did away with most timeless essences attributed to man. (Bauman 2010: 168)

Other people are present in my world not just as other existences - a constant invitation to, and potential objects of, communication. What happens between us is not just linguistic exchanges. But Rede and Grede - speech and chatter - is the only typology of interhuman relations Heidegger is concerned with. We vainly search his writings for an account, or at least an acknowledgement, of the rich variety of ways in which one human existence can enter the existence of another: conflict ranging from quarrel to war, physical violence, political and economic subordination, barring access to information, etc. Are all these typoes of inter-human relations devoid of significance in the shaping both actiality and potentiality of understanding? Can the most acute and stubborn problems of understanding be truly posited if no account is taken of them? (Bauman 2010: 169)

As one of the most original of Shutz's follower, Aaron V. Cicourel, would say, 'Participants in social interaction apparently "understand" many things . . . even though such matters are not mentioned explicitly.'
The above statement can be only interpreted in one way: actors' understanding does not take the form of thoughts actually thought, brought by the actors themselves in the light of consciousness. If the word 'understand' is put in inverted commas, it is because this understanding, which is clearly not an empirical 'event' in time and space, is not what we usually mean by understanding: a purposeful act of consciousness. It appears in our analysis of action rather than in the heads of actors, and it appears as a necessary condition of the actors' occurrence, rather than as a report of what has actually happened 'out there'. If we say that actors 'apparently' understand many things they do not give any account of, what we mean is that, unless those things were 'understood', we would not be able to give a logical account of the action we observed. The action would not make any sense. (Bauman 2010: 178)

If it is some definition-like knowledge in the head of the speaker which gives words their meanings, what are we to do about the only-too-common cases of when we are supposed to give account of it'? Surely it follows that 'to know' in the sense of the first part of the sentence is not the same thing as 'to know' in the sense of the second part: to understand the meaning is not the same thing as to be able to give account of it, for instance to define the word, or to tell the motive of my action. What is it, then? (Bauman 2010: 179)

The stock of knowledge, as we already know, includes the information that other people like us exist and that their conduct has the same structure which we 'know' from the experience of our own behaviour. This knowledge renders other people potential partners in communication viewed as a 'trade of meanings', as a mutual effort to grasp the message conveyed by words, gestures, facial expressions, etc. Other people (again a piece of knowledge being an indispensable part of natural attitude) differ from all other types, and from inanimate objects in particular, in that they are to be understood; that is, their conduct is to be interpreted as a basically voluntary and purpose-oriented action. (Bauman 2010: 184)

Thus the manor and the village remained for centuries within each other's reach; there is no doubt that their respective 'world definitions' and behavioural codes were sharply distinct; still, the highly ritualized and otherwise restricted communication between the two, cast into a tight and stiff frame of inviolable etiquette, effectively preventing the possibility of the clash of meanings from ever actualizing in a way which could jeopardize the smoothness of mutual exchange. The village was allowed glimpses only of the outer, 'public' fringes of the manor; manor and village spoke different languages; tha manor could be approached and addressed only on special, strictly determined occasions and in equally strictly defined manners. These and many other simple cultural rules kept the manor and the village, however close to each other physically, in watertight compartments; on the whole, leakages which could spill meanings kept in one container over the content of the other were effectively controlled. (Bauman 2010: 198)

As long as it remains unchallenged, a dominance attained and guarded by force allows the dominant group to dispose of the problem of cultural variety by viewing other styles of life as either condemnable deviations from the right pattern, or patterns as inferior as they are strange. This view - the point demands repeated emphasis - would never suffice unless supported by the actual superiority of power or physical force. Viewing a pattern as superior can remain effective as a means of suspending communication (and, consequently, minimizes the chance of understanding being posited as a task) only as long as it supplements and reflects the actual relation of subordination. Alternatively, though for a relatively brief period, a similar view may draw its strenght from the aspirations of a group aiming at establishing its own dominance. (Bauman 2010: 199)

Positing another person or another culture as a subject to be understood, rather than an object whose behaviour is to be causally explained (i.e. reduced to external, objectified, circumstances), presupposes a degree of respect, and acceptance of an equality, however relative. (Bauman 2010: 202)

Wishing to learn 'how to go on', the ego accepts the alter's intentions as essentially unalterable conditions of action. He treats them as one treats natural phenomena, except for the acknowledged symbolic status of the observable human acts and, consequently, an allowance for possible deception, insecurity, or technical ineptness. The motive which triggers off the effort of understanding in this sense is the ego's intention to adjust his or her behaviour to requirements laid out by the alter's unquestionable power over the ego. This remains true even if, in the end, the ego seeks to use the acquired knowledge of the alter's intentions to manipulate the alter's conduct in his own interest. (Bauman 2010: 203)

It is being said that sociology must be an 'understanding' science since human behaviour is 'symbolic'. Symbols are objects which send us to something other than themselves. They, so to speak, have a meaning which resides outside them; only the person who is aware of the 'invisible link' between the symbol and the object for which it stands can grasp this meaning. Thus, for example, only a person who knows the Highway Code 'understands' a white triangle with walking silhouettes on it as a warning that children are crossing the road. Only a peasant of East Poland, well versed in local customs, will understand that his offer of marriage has been turned down when he is served a bowl of black gruel. The argument from symbols seems, however, unconvincing. Symbols may serve the twin purposes of understanding and control only if the link with the objects they symbolize is regular and reasonably stable. But the same applies to symptoms which help us to comprehend natural events. Thus for everybpdy but a permanent dweller in the desert a wet pavement 'means' recent rainfall. For every person versed in basic chemistry the redness of a litmus strip 'means' acidity of a solution. (Bauman 2010: 206)

Indeed, when I say, 'I do not understand', when confronted with an unfamiliar human gesture, a sentence of a strange language, or an implement I cannot attach to any known function, I tacitly assume that there is something to understand, that I would be led to its referent if only I knew the link between them. I assume, in other words, that the link exists in much the same objective way as between the we pavement and rainfall. It is exactly because of this assumption that understanding becomes a viable project. (Bauman 2010: 206)

Thus perceiving an object as human boils down to assuming that the object has its own 'inner reality' structured in the same way as ours. That is to say, that the object sets purposes to its activity, intends to 'express' something in the fashion of results of action, controlts the course of action in thoughts, reacts emotionally to situation and the changes introduced by the action, etc. Above all, we believe that the object's control over its own 'inner' reality is as limited as ours; that is, that the link between his 'overt' purposes, i.e. purposes as he sees them and gives account of, and the actual content of his action is somewhat less than perfect; that he cannot give a full and cogent account of the 'true' motives which guide his action; that he is incapable of conceptualizing all the contents of his 'inner' reality. Whenever account is given of the impact of 'inner' reality upon the actual conduct, the question of 'veracity' arises, different from the question of 'truth' in that it cannot be answered (if at all) by discourse and negotiation only, rather than by objective testing. (Bauman 2010: 211-212)

Do we in fact need insight into the psychical process in the mind of the actor in order to understand his behaviour? Do we actually reconstruct this mental process when engaged in the effort of understanding? It is true that we normally refer to such mental processes when accounting for out interpretation. We articulate our version of other people's conduct in terms like 'he thinks that', 'he does not like it', 'he does not wish, 'he wanted to', 'what he meant was', etc., all implying that we have penetrated the 'inside' of our partner's mind and found the meaning of his behaviour there. The question is, however, whether these are only the terms which we use to couch our interpretation, or whether they are a true expression of what we have actually done. (Bauman 2010: 213)

The paramount obstacle standing in way of true consensus is the structure of dominance, which defies both conditions of rational agreement. The discussion of the grounds of validity of behavioural norms is suppressed, replaced by sacred or secular, but always ideological legitimations of the authority of the source. (According to Michel Foucault, constitutive parts of the 'discursive formation' responsible for the socially accepted meanings are the question, 'Who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language?' and the 'institutional sites' from which contributions to the discourse are made. This is, in Habermas's theory, an attribute of a distorted communication; an attribute which most ethnomethodologists tend to leave out of sight altogether.) (Bauman 2010: 244)

• Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method
• Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia; Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge
• Florian Znaniecki, Cultural Sciences: Their Origin and Development
• Florian Znaniecki, The Method of Sociology
• Zygmunt Bauman, Towards a Critical Sociology
• Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, Essays in Hermeneutics
• Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action
• Talcott Parsons, The Social System
• Alfred Schuts, Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World
• Aaron V. Cicourel, Cognitive Sociology
• Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind
• Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology
• Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Scope of Anthropology
• Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage Mind
• Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests

hea, parem, kõige parem

Semantika (Tenjes)

Tenjes, Silvi 2010. Semantika. Tartu : Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus

See on vististi ainus kaanepilt siinses blogis, kus on nii eksplitsiitne ideologeem: "Eesti tuleviku heaks". Siin pole aga midagi imestada, Euroopa Sotsiaalfondi rahastatud ja "Tasuta jaotatav tiraaž". Minu jaoks samavõrd kummastav kui Õimu raamatu esimestel lehekülgedel "Sarja ühiskondlik toimetuskolleegium".
Ka siin oli Paivio katsest väljavõte, aga viide Paiviole oli kaduma läinud. Ikka juhtub. Meeldis, et alguse poole väga palju semiootilist teksti. Tuli tahtmine lisada siltide hulka semiootika, aga siiski hoidun.

Sotsiaalne tähendus viitab keele kasutamisele selleks, et luua ja reguleerida sotsiaalseid suhteid ja säilitada sotsiaalseid rolle. Niisugust keelekasutuse tüüpi kirjeldatakse alternatiivselt ka kui sotsiaalset või faatilist (ingl phatic) kommunikatsiooni (Lyons 1997, 1981). Mõiste faatiline kommunikatsioon rõhutab sotsiaalse osaduse, kaasluse, huviühisuse kogemust ja osalust sotsiaalsetes keelelistes rituaalides (ingl social linguistic rituals). Faatilises suhtluses on verbaalse interaktsiooni informeeriv roll väike, seevastu on tal oluline roll sotsiaalse diskursuse elavdamiseks. Sotsiaalne tähendus tuleb esile suhtluse rituaalse keelekasutuse kaudu, mille alla kuulub ka nt tervitamine, vabandamine, õnnistamine või kaastunde avaldamine. Milline on järgmiste lausete informatiivne väärtus ja milline on nende roll sotsiaalses diskursuses? Kuidas käsi käib? Vabandage, et ma hilinesin. Palju õnne uue töökoha puhul! Kahju, et sinuga see õnnetus juhtus. Nt tervitamine on lihtsalt igasuguse vestluse tavaline algus. (Tenjes 2010: 38)

Siin lõpu poole näivad "väärtus" tähendusega ning "roll" funktsiooniga äravahetatavad. Nende sõnade üle tuleks mõtiskleda.

Assotsiatiivne tähendus sisaldab nii palju läbikaalutlemata faktoreid, et neid saab uurida süstemaatiliselt ainult umbkaudsete statistiliste vahenditega. Psühholoogid C. E. Osgood, G: Suci ja P. Tannenbaum esitasid oma töös Tähenduse mõõtmine (ingl The Measurement of Meaning, 1957) ühe assotsiatiivse tähenduse mittetäieliku analüüsi, kasutades statistilise mõõtmise meetodit. Nad mõõtsid afektiivset tähendust - emotsionaalseid reaktsioone, mis olid seotud sõnadega. Autorid kasutasid nn eristustesti (Kas see on hea või halb? kiire või aeglane? väike või suur?). Nad asetasid mõiste multidimensioonilisse semantilisse ruumi, kasutades andmeid kõneleja otsustuste kohta, mida salvestati seitsmepunktilisel skaalal. (Tenjes 2010: 61)

See "umbkaudsed statistilised vahendid" on päris täpne kirjeldus semantilise ruumi meetodist. Tartu raamatukogudes on "The Measurement of Meaning" kõik kordustrükid olemas. Kunagi võiks isegi sisse vaadata, et Mehrabiani katseid täielikumalt mõista.

Uurijate üks kokkuvõtvaid tulemusi ütleb, et konkreetse tähenduse jaoks olid olulised kolm dimensiooni: väärtuslikkus (hea - halb), tõhusus (kõva - pehme) ja aktiivsus (aktiivne - passiivne). (Tenjes 2010: 62)

Peab ju olema mingi mõistuslik selgitus, miks Mehrabian otsustas nt "väärtuse" seostada "staatusega". Isegi pinnapealselt tundub, et ühildada mõisted "hea" ja "kõrge staatusega" ning "halb" ja "madala staatusega" avab võimaluse sotsiaalse võimu olemuse üle arutlemiseks.

Tähendusülekannete juures on oluline kogemuslikkuse dimensioon. Semantilise sfääri aluseks on inimese meeleline ja sotsiaalne kogemus ning tähendused tuletatakse kogemuslikkusest kindlate struktuuride, kindlate protsesside alusel (millest üks on metaforisatsioon). (Tenjes 2010: 76)

Siin meenus aeg mil ma käisin ringi, taskus välja prinditud ja lamineeritud (Ekmani raamatust pärinevad) "näoilmete õppimise harjutused" ja palusin tuttavatel näoilmeid nimetada või kirjeldada. Suur osa vastuseid pärinesid isiklikest kogemustest, näiteks "ta sepistab minu seljataga midagi" või "üleolev".

Modaalne tähenduskiht sisaldab hinnangulisust. Tavaliselt mõeldaksegi modaalsuse ja modaaltähenduste all hinnangu modaalsust. On olemas ka nullmodaalsus. Nullmodaalne väitelause on pelgalt mingit situatsiooni väljendav konstanteering:
Tõnu on saarlane.
Tõnu sõidab kokkutulekule.
(Tenjes 2010: 96)

. Nullmodaalne väide on seega mitte-normatiivne aksioom. Ma ei ole multimodaalsusega eriti tuttav, aga selle tsitaadi valguses näib, et mis eristab multimodaalset näiteks multikanalilisest on just see hinnangulisuse moment, mis minu jaoks seostub ristviidatavusega (cross-referencing): ühe modaalsuse kaudu saab teisele anda hinnangu. See erineb vasturääkivast suhtlemisest (mida Mehrabian uuris) selle poolest, et erinevad modaalsused ei anna mitte vastukäivat informatsiooni, vaid mõjuvad üksteise vastuvõttu hinnanguliselt. Tegelikkus on kindlasti midagi muud, multimodaalsus on veel valge laik minu kaardi peal.

Semantika (Õim)

Õim, Haldur 1974. Semantika. Tallinn : Valgus

See raamat läks lappama just nagu eelmine lingvistikateemaline. Algus hea ja tuttav ning lõpus pikk ja tüütu joru mingist kindlast valdkonnast (siin generatiivne grammaatika, Lyonsil foneetika). Sellest hoolimata oli enamus käesolevast mõnus lugemine. Võib-olla selle pärast, et enamus selle sisust on ühel või teisel moel kas loengutes või teistes teostes rohkemal või vähemal määral juba antud. Ilmselt mõjukas raamat. Tsiteerimisväärtus aga kahjuks madal.

Mõned teadlased on vaadelnud seda ka omaette distsipliinina, nimetades seda zooseminootikaks. (Õim 1974: 13)

Võin ainult oletada, et neil lehekülgedel käsitles ta tuntud zooseminootiku Thomas Sebeoki teemat. Kahjuks ei ole ma ise veel zooseminautikaga tutvust teinud.

Emotsioonid nõuavad vahetut reaktsiooni. Mõtlemine pole aga eriti võimalik seal, kus sunnitakse otsekohe tegutsema. Keele abil teatatav informatsioon ongi enamasti selline, mis ei nõua mingit vahetut tegutsemist. Teatava informatsiooni eesmärgiks pole muuta mitte niivõrd inimese käitumist, kuivõrd tema teadmisi. (Õim 1974: 17)

Tahan sellele vastu vaielda. Käitumine ja mõtlemine või teadmised ja emotsioonid on omavahel ikka tihedalt seotud. Leian, et teadmine ei ole väärtuslik iseenesest, vaid ikka edasise käitumise koordineerimiseks. Sellist seisukohta võib ilmselt nimetada etopoeetiliseks.

Mälus oleva tähenduste süsteemi mõneti teistsugune aspekt tuleb esile katsetes, mis viis läbi A. Paivio. Ta oletas, et on teatud erinevus konkreetsete ja abstraktsete tähenduste kodeerimisviisis: abstraktsete tähenduste esitus sõltub hoopis suuremal määral sõnastusest, milles informatsioon teatatakse, kui konkreetsete tähenduste esitus. Viimased kodeeritakse mingis mitteverbaalses koodis, kujunditena, piltidena, kuna esimesi on raske sel viisil talletada. (Õim 1974: 64)

Siin on pikem kirjeldus Paivio väitest, millega mina kohtusin esmakordselt siin. Kirjelduse järgi on Paivio järeldused minu jaoks liialt seotud verbaalse kanaliga. Mitteverbaalse mälu küsimus on märksa olulisem kui seda lausungite meenutamise kaudu võib avastada. Seostub see ju üldisema küsimusega kuidas me töötleme informatsiooni teiste ja enda käitumise kohta.

Introduction to theoretical linguistics

Lyons, John 1968. Introduction to theoretical linguistics. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press

The Greek philosophers debated whether language was governed by 'nature' or 'convention' was a commonplace of Greek philosophical speculation. To say that a particular institution was 'natural' was to imply that it had its origin in eternal and immutable principles outside man himself (and was therefore inviolable); to say that it was 'conventional' implied that it was merely the result of custom and tradition (that is, of some tacit agreement, or 'social contract', among the members of the community - a 'contract' which, since it was made by men, could be broken by men). (Lyons 1968: 4)

Täpselt nagu vaidlused universalistide ja relativistide vahel näoilmete üle.

...the traditional term 'paradigm' is merely the Greek word for 'model' or 'example'. (Lyons 1968: 7)

Püha müristus! Etymo is Greek for 'true' or 'real'!

That the dispute between the 'analogist' and the 'anomalists' was not settled once and for all by Greeks is hardly surprising. In the first place, the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive (or normative) grammar was not clearly drawn (that is to say, the distinction between describing how people actually speak and write and prescribing how they ought to speak and write: we shall discuss this distinction in some detail later: cf. 1.4.3). (Lyons 1968: 7)

Kõlab analoogiliselt erinevusega akadeemilise mitteverbaalse suhtlemise kirjanduse ja aimekirjanduslike kehakeeleõpikute vahel.

There are more important differences between spoken and written language than those brought about by the development of homophony and homography. No writing-system represents all the significant variations of pitch and stress which are present in spoken utterances; and the conventions of punctuation to distinguish different kinds of sentences (e.g. the use of an exclamation-mark or question-mark, rather than a full-stop) and the practice of italicizing words for emphasis constitute, at best, an indirect and imperfect means of supplying this deficiency. Moreover, in the typical situations in which the written language is used there is no direct, face-to-face confrontation of writer and reader; information which might be carried by the gestures and facial expressions accompnaying speech must therefore be conveyed verbally. The fact that there are invariably such differences as these between speech and writing means that written language cannot be regarded as merely the transference of spoken language to another medium. (Lyons 1968: 40)

Väga ilmne, aga siiski meeldiv kohata trükis. Lisaks veel meediumite küsimus ja Birdwhistelli tähelepanek, et nii lingvistiline kui kineesiline on infrakommunikatiivsed süsteemid - "päris suhtlemine" kasutab kõiki kanaleid.

Although spoken language may be associated with various conventional gestures and facial expressions, these gestures and expressions do not realize formal units of the same level as those realized by the constituent sounds of the accompanying words: that is to say, a particular gesture does not combine with sounds to make a word in the way that two or more sounds combine to make a word. (Lyons 1968: 61)

Väga julge väide. Kindlasti võib leida ka erandi mis seda ümber lükkab.

...by 'functional' is to be understood 'relevant for the purpose of communication'... (Lyons 1968: 99)

Hästi öeldud!

The organ (or that part of it) which is brought into contact with (or close to) the point of articulation is called the articulator... (Lyons 1968: 104)

Foneetikas on "artiklaatori" mõiste päris kena, aga mis oleks "selle organi" üldnimetus MVS-s?

...the native speaker has learned to respond to certain phonetic differences as functional in his language and to neglect others as irrelevant for the purpose of communication. (Lyons 1968: 113)

Sensory gating.

Pole paha! Märksõnade (siltide) hulka lisandus lingvistika. Nüüd järgmise juurde...

Filosoofilise hermeneutika klassikat

1997. Filosoofilise hermeneutika klassikat. Ilmamaa

Mitte keerukas, aga - võttes Andrus Tooli tõlkeharjumustest matti - intrikaatne:

Selle köite sisu tsiteerida oleks kummaline, aga kunagi ei või teada, olen näinud sellele (vähemalt Tooli saatele) viidatavat. Selleks puhuks jätan siia ka sisse skanneeritud avalehed. Ja Tooli saatesõna pealkiri on "Hermeneutika ja filosoofia. Saateks. Lk 251-328".

Friedrigh Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher

Kunst kõnelda ja kunst mõista seisavad (vastavalt) teineteise vastas. (lk 10)

Nii nagu iga kõne omab kahekordset suhet keele tervikusse ja oma autori mõtlemise tervikusse, nii koosneb ka igasugune mõistmine kahest mõmendist: mõista kõnet keeles esile tooduna [grammaatiline] ja mõista teda faktina mõtlejas [psühholoogiline]. (lk 12)

Vaid tähtsusetu puhul rahuldume me ühekordse lugemisega. (lk 33)

Wilhelm Dilthey

Meie tegevus eeldab kõikjal teiste inimeste mõistmist; suur osa inimlikust õnnest tekib järeletundmisest (Nachfühlen) võõraile hingeseisundeile; kogu filosoofia- ja ajalooteadus põhineb eeldusel, et ainult sellist järelemõistmist (Nachverständnis) saab ülendada objektiivsuseni. (lk 41)

Võõras olemasolu on meile kõigepealt antud aga üksnes väljaspoolt meelefaktides, žestides, helides, tegudes. Alles selle, mis niiviisi üksikute märkidena meeltesse langeb, jäljendamise (Nachbildung) kaudu täiendame seda sisemist. Kõik - selle täienduse aine, tema struktuuri, tema individuaalseimad jooned - peame üle kandma omaenese elususest (Lebendigkeit). (lk 42)

Mõistmisel on erinevad astmed. Selle põhjuseks on eelkõige huvi. Kui huvi on piiratud, on seda ka mõistmine. Kui käsitult me kuulame mõnda seletust: me paneme selles tähele vaid mõnd meile praktiliselt tähtsat punkti ega tunne huvi kõneleja siseelu vastu. Seevastu teistel juhtudel me püüame pingsalt tungida kõneleja sisemusse iga ilme, iga sõna kaudu. (lk 43)

Martin Heidegger

Maailmas-olemise olemusliku visandi olemisviisiga olev omav oma olemist olemismõistmist konstitueerivana. (lk 134) [I don't speak heidegger.]

Selle eksistentsiaalselt esmase kuulatamisvõime (Hörenkönnens) alusel on võimalik midagi sellist kui kuuletumine, mis ise on fundamentaalselt veel algupärasem kui see, mida psühholoogias määratletakse "eelkõige" kuulamisena - kõlade tajumine ja helide kuulmine. Ka kuuletumine omab mõistva kuulamise olemisviisi. "Eelkõige" ei kuule me ilmaski mürasid ja helikogumeid, vaid kriuksuvat vankrit, mootorratast. Kuulatakse kolonne marsil, põhjatuult, toksivat rähni, praksuvat tuld.
Vajaks juba väga kunstlikku ja komplitseeritud hoiakut, et "kuulata" "puhast müra". Et me aga eelkõige kuuleme mootorratast ja vankrit, on fenomenaalne tunnistus selle kohta, et olemasolemine maailmas-olemisena viibib ikka juba maailmasiseselt käepärase juures ja eelkõige üldse mitte "aistingute" juures, mille tunglus peaks esmalt vormitama, et anda hüppelauda, millelt subjekt end lahti tõukab, et lõpuks "maailmani" jõuda. Olemasolemine on olemuslikult mõistvana eelkõige mõistetu juures. (lk 157)

Hans-Georg Gadamer

Iga ütlus omab eeldusi mida ta välja ei ütle. (lk 177)

Kui antiik poleks klassikaliseks saanud, see tähendab eeskujupäraseks iga lausumise, mõtlemise ja loomise jaoks, siis poleks ka klassikalist filoloogiat. Kuid see kehtib ka iga muu filoloogia jaoks, et temas toimib lummatus teisest, võõrast või kaugest, mis end meile avab. (lk 180)

Nagu kõik võrdpildid, nii lonkab ka see. Kuid ühe võrdpildi lonkamine pole puudus, vaid tema poolt teostatava abstraktse tulemuse pöördkülg. (lk 231)

Kõigi inimestevaheliste elusuhete sisemine ajaloolisus seisneb selles, et vastastikuse tunnustuse pärast tuleb pidevalt võidelda. (lk 223)

Armastuse tee, mida Diotima õpetab, viib kaunitelt kehadelt kaunite hingedeni ja sealt kaunite tavade, kommete ja seadusteni, lõpuks teadusteni (näit. kaunite arvuvahekordadeni, mida õpetab arvuõpetus), selle "kaunite kõnede laia mereni" - ja viib üle kõige selle väljapoole. (lk 234)

...metafoorika... (lk 242) [Okei.]

Andrus Tool

...blameerivat... (lk 269) [Ei.]

Eluobjektivatsioonid on sfäär, milles inimene leiab end olevat sünnist peale. "Veel enne, kui ta kõnelema õpib, on ta juba täiesti sisse kastetud ühisuste (Gemeinsamkeiten) meediumisse. Žeste ja ilmeid, liigutusi ja hüüatusi, sõnu ja lauseid õpib ta mõistma vaid seetõttu, et need tulevad talle ette üha nendesamadena ja sellessamas suhtes tollesse, mida nad tähendavad ja väljendavad. Nii orienteerub üksikisik objektiivse vaimu maailmas". Niisugust orienteerumist nimetab Dilthey "elementaarseks mõistmiseks". (lk 299)

Towards semiotic theory of hegemony

Ventsel, Andreas 2009. Towards semiotic theory of hegemony. Tartu University Press

Esmakordsest lugemisest erines seekordne metsikult. Kui tõestust ei oleks, mõtleksin, et esimesel korral nagu ei lugenudki, nii palju läks minust mööda. Muidugi on tõenäoline, et aasta pärast üle lugedes loen siit veel hoopis midagi muud välja. Praegusel korral lugesin siit välja poliitsemiootika algmed. Enne väljavõtete juurde minemist tahan vaagida selle üle, et päris pikalt pidasin pealkirja esimest sõna kummaliseks, aga selgituse leidsin googeldades. Selle järgi on mõlemad õiged, aga towards rohkem Briti ja toward rohkem Ameerika Inglise sõnad. Eeldan, et Ventsel oli oma tööd pealkirjastades Essexi koolkonna mõjuväljas, niiet kõik on ikkagi coherent.

...in many cultural spaces the word "politics" has, for certain reasons, acquired a negative connotation and thus many discursive practices hide their true political character (identity). (Ventsel 2009: 9)

Hea point. Selgitab seda, miks ideoloogiline tähistuspraktika alatasa väldib eksplitsiitset poliitilisust, aga implitsiitselt on seda vägagi. Ühtlasi avab akna paljude ühiskondlike nähtuste tegeliku poliitilise motiveerituse uurimiseks. Võib oletada, et sellisel "peidetud poliitilisusel" on siiski mingid välised tunnused ja väljendused, mis võivad olla ka mitteverbaalsed.

For the most part, the mechanisms of the functioning of power are not based on justice, law, and the threat of punishment, but rather on techniques, ideals that express normality and various mechanisms of control (Foucault 1990: 89-90). (Ventsel 2009: 10)

See ühenduslüli võimu ja normaalsuse vahel pärineb Foucault' seksuaalsuse ajaloost (pole veel lugenud). Seostub mõttega, et võim toodab "õiget" käitumist, on ühiskonna toimimise seisukohalt üheaegselt piirav ja produktiivne.

Richard H. Brown has made use of the metaphor of experience and knowledge as language and text - the entire human experience, as well as social reality that he describes, is a rhetorical enterprise (Brown 1987). In his later works he uses the metaphor of textuality, which according to Brown has two sources: structural semiotics and the hermeneutics of meaning. The first would specialize on the syntax and grammar of knowledge and society, whereas the latter would concentrate on semantics and pragmatics, on meanings that are manifested through activities on a particular background. Politics, institutions and identities are constructed, negotiated or altered by acts of persuasion, which can be understood in rhetorical terms (Brown 1994: 44-45)

Esimene viide on esseekogumikule "Society as text" (Tartus kahjuks pole). Idee kõlab huvitavalt: kogemus ja teadmine kui keel ja tekst. Eeldan, et järjekord on ikka selline, et kogemus on tekst ja teadmine on keel, millega kogemust "loetakse". Võib-olla tuleks seda teost lugeda, kui Friebeli mitteverbaalse retoorikani jõuan.

This particular signifier - the 'empty signifier' in Laclau's signifiers, or discourse, subordinating to a greater or lesser extent all other members of the discourse by letting them appear as equivalent and by undermining their mutual differences. (Ventsel 2009: 31)

Lõpuks meikib sõna "samaväärsusahel" senssi. Kohe leidsin ka endale tuttava näite: kristlase jaoks on kõik "paganate" usundid samaväärsed. See on muidugi erijuht, aga leidub ka radikaalsem näide: Jehoova tunnistajate suhtumine "maailma" - kõik, mis paikneb väljaspool nende oma diskursust, on ühtemoodi Saatanast.

...discourse or text (semiosphere)... (Ventsel 2009: 33)

Milline meeldiv üllatus! Kui ma eelmisel kevadel semiosfääri uurisin ja lõpuks nimekirja tegin, mis ühe või teise autori jaoks on semiosfäär, jäi tekst välja. Oleksin pidanud aimama, et kui Mihhail Lotmani jaoks on semiosfääriks keel, siis kellegi jaks on semiosfäär ka tekst (või diskursus).

Ventsel, Andreas 2007. The construction of the 'we'-category: Political rhetoric in Soviet Estonia from June 1940 to July 1941. Sign System Studies 35. ½, 249-267

The focus of studying political power moves away from the sovereign forms of power like state or administrative apparatus and the hithero systematically concealed forms of power enter the center of attention in the social sciences. In this framework politics can be conceptualised as "a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social relations" (Laclau, Mouffe 1985: 153) that can always be seen as an expression of the powers of discourse. One of the possibilities for constructing a power relation is through the use of deictics. (Ventsel 2007: 252)

Ventsel, Andreas 2009. The role of political rhetoric in the development of Soviet totalitarian language. Russian Journal of Communication, Vol. II, No. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 2009), 9-26

Scientific discourse is characterised by attempts to minimise the ambiguity of the lexicon, which should ideally halt the drift of signifiers in relation to the signified. (Ventsel 2009: 10)

Täpselt see põhjus, miks erialakirjandust on kergem lugeda kui ilukirjandust; terminid korduvad ja kannavad ideaalis täpselt sama tähendust, sellal kui ilukõne üritab tähendust kohale toimetada entroopilisema keelekasutusega.

A semiotic view to ideology is to be found in Reis's semiotic theory of ideology (1993). (Ventsel 2009: 10)

Mainitud teose pealkiri on sarnane käesolevaga: Towards a semiotics of ideology. Peab olema hea, kui mõlemad koopiad on käesoleval hetkel välja laenutatud.

Ideologem - ideologically loaded word or expression (Kupina 1995, p. 13). (Ventsel 2009: 15)

Pärineb venekeelsest teosest. Meeldib, et ideologeem võib olla nii sõna kui ka väljendus, ehk ka mitteverbaalne märk. Saluudid, näiteks.

Kolm vahepealset artiklit ei toonud seekord ühtegi tsitaati, kuigi ka need siin on enamjaolt tsiteerimise tsiteerimised. Võib olla on asi selles, et Ventseli originaalsed mõtted, Laclau ja Lotmani ühildamine ja muu, on juba liiga selged, et neid märgata. Küll aga märkasin, et siin toimiti täpselt Rueschi sõnade vastu, kui viimane väitis, et mõisted nagu digitaalne ja analoogne, ehk Lotmani diskreetne ja kontinuaalne, sobivad ainult kirjeldamiseks, mitte seletamiseks. Seepärast tundus minu jaoks osa Laclau ja Lotmani ühildamisest meelevaldne, aga samas pole mul midagi täpsemat kosta, sest ma ei ole Laclaud ise lugenud peale ühe seminariteksti. Arvan, et tulevikus uuesti lugemine kulub ikkagi ära.