Eco on Peirce and semes

Eco, Umberto 2005. Lector in fabula. Tõlkija: Ülar Ploom ; eessõna: Peeter Torop. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
Semeem on virtuaalne text ja tekst on mingi semeemi ekspansioon [paisutus]. Väide pole muidugi originaalne. See väljendab implitsiitselt (välja arvatud seal, kus seda eksplitsiitselt väljendatakse, võib-olla isegi niisuguses kontekstis, kus seda nagu ei oskakski otsida) Peirce'i semiootikateoorias ja see on täiesti kooskõlas piiramatu semiosise ja keskse interpretandi mõistega. (Eco 2005: 1)
Ohjah. Tulebki Eesti keeles lugeda seda seminariteksti. Mitte just kõige vahvam, sest leheküljenumbridki paistavad täiesti puuduvat (minu tsitaatides algab lk 1 põhimõtteliselt 2. peatüki esimesest leheküljest). "Semiosis" on kummaline tõlge; semiosis on justkui tõlkimata jäänud - Eesti keeles on see "semioos". Ja tõlketekste lugedes juhtub muidugi see mida ma kardan kõige rohkem: tõlgitud mõisted ei haaku originaal- või inglisekeelsete mõistetega; siin ei tea ma näiteks mis võiks olla "keskne interpretant". Mis puudutab väidet ennast, siis "semeem on virtuaalne text" läheb minu jaoks kaduma. Mina tean, et semeem on B. Pottieri järgi hulk seeme minimaalses märgis (või morfeemis); või Greimasi järgi lihtsalt mingi sõna "partikulaarne tähendus". Sisuliselt ütleb Eco siin, et "sõna on virtuaalne tekst" - mis ei meiki väga palju senssi. F* it. Pärast pikki otsinguid leidsin, et see peatükk on avaldatud ka kogumikus The Role of the Reader.

Eco, Umberto 1984. The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
An intensional semantics is concerned with the analysis of the content of a given expression. This kind of study assumed in the last two decades two forms, complementary and/or alternative to each other: the interpretive analysis with the format of a compositional spectrum of markers and the generative analysis in form of predicates and arguments. While the former approach seems to be exclusively concerned with the meaning of elementary lexical entities, the latter seems to fit the needs of a textual analysis which considers both the semantic and the pragmatic aspect of discourses. (Eco 1984: 175)
This makes more sense. Intensional semantics concerns content and is further divided into interpretive and generative approaches: generative with the syntax of language (predicates and arguments), of course, and interpretive with the meaning of lexemes.
I think, however, that such a clear-cut opposition should not be established. As it is proposed in Chapter 8 of this book, a sememe is in itselt an inchoative text, whereas a text is an expanded sememe. The author who has more clearly advocated such an assumption (implicitly as well as explicitly) is Charles Sanders Perice. Some elements of Peirce's thought can be reexamined in the light of such theoretical perspective: Peirce's theory of interpretant cannot but lead to a form of meaning analysis which fits both the requirements of an interpretative and a generative semantics and only from Peirce's point of view can many problems of contemporary text theories be satisfactorily solved. (Eco 1984: 175)
It is very clear that a lot got lost in the Estonian translation of this text. So much so that the Estonian translation seems more like the translator was pondering Eco's texts in his own mind and trying to make sense of it, instead of translating it. Perhaps this is the same problem that plagued Schleiermacher - if you write about interpretation and openness of interpretation then your text is going to be interpreted - instead of translated - itself. It is clear that the sememe is not a "virtual text", but an "inchoative text". define:inchoative - "Denoting an aspect of a verb expressing the beginning of an action, typically one occurring of its own accord." It is a very linguistic term. Wiki says that inchoative aspect refers to the beginning of a state. Thus, a sememe is something from which a text begins; and text in this sense is an "expanded sememe" - because it began from a sememe. Makes more sense.
According to the principles of compositional analysis, a semiotic expression (be it verbal item or any type of physical utterance) conveys, according to linguistic conventions, an organized and analyzable content, formed by the aggregate (or hierarchy) of semantic features. These features constitute a system, either closed or open, and belongs to different contents of different expresisons in different arrangements. Compositional analysis should describe and define a virtually infinite number of contents by means of a possibly finite ensemble of features, but this exigency of economy gives rise to many aporias. (Eco 1984: 176)
Already I'm reading this for my own nonverbalist purposes. Presumably, a "physical utterance" can be a nonverbal expression, as long as it is, in kinesic terms, organized (into meaningful patterns of finite elements, say kinemes) and conveys some kind of content (in kinesics this "content" is quite problematic).
As a further criticism we can add that a compositional analysis in terms of universal features does not say satisfactorily in which linguistic environments the item can be inserted without producing ambiguity. There are rules of subcategorization, establishing the immediate syntactic compatibility of a given item, and there are selectional rules establishing some immediate semantic compatibility, but these instructions do not go beyond the normal format of a dictionary. Some scholars have proposed a semantic representation with the format of an encyclopedia, and this solution seems to be the only one capable of conveying the whole information entailed by a given term; but the encyclopedic representation excludes the possibility of establishing a finite set of metasemiotic features and makes the analysis potentially infinite. (Eco 1984: 176)
Here I can remark on the Greimasian undertones of this text: compositional analysis is what Greimas dealt with and ultimately it was quite fruitless (or so my linguist supervisor claims). In any case it is clear that he is referring to Hjelmslevian metasemiotics and the problem of establishing semantic congruence - e.g., using appropriate words in appropriate discoursive contexts. Indeed, on page 177 he explicitly refers to Greimas.
I have elsewhere demonstrated that Peirce offers the theoretical opportunities of extending the problem of compositional analysis to every semiotic phenomenon (Eco, 1976), including images and gestures.
Nevertheless, in order to maintain a certain parallelism between the two poles of our inquiry, I shall limit the subject of section 7.2 and 7.3 to Pericean proposals and examples concerning verbal language, even though this methodological decision obliges me to underestimate the important relationship between symbols, icons and indices. Someone could object that this limitation is imposed by the very nature of my subject matter: Peirce has said that only symbols (not icons and indices) are interpretable. "Pragmaticism fails to furnish any translation of meaning of a proper name or other designation of an individual object" (5.429); qualities have "no perfect identities, but only likenesses, or partial identities" (1.418). Only symbols seem to be isntances of genuine Thirdness (since they can be interpreted), whereas icons are qualitatively degenerate and indices are reactionally degenerate, both depending on something else without any mediation (the icon from a quality, the idnex from an object) (2.92 and 5.73). Moreover, "it is not all signs that have logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like" (5.482). (Eco 1984: 178)
This is extremely intresting because I did now know about this (I'm not that familiar with Perice). In a weird way it justifies why I'm beginning my semiotic research of nonverbal communication with literary interpretation (body language in literature), as in literature there are symbols, Thirdness, that can be interpreted. This is not to say that semiotics couldn't deal with body motion in real-life social interaction but merely that it is easier to begin with textualizations of interactions.
The self-sufficiency of the universe of content, provided by a given culture, explains why signs can be used in order to lie. We have a sign-function when something can be used in order to lie (and therefore to elaborate ideologies, works of art, and so on). What Peirce calls signs (which to somebody stand for something else in some respect or capacity) are such just because I can use a representamen in order to send back to a fictitious state of the word. Even an index can be falsified in order to signify an event which is not detectable and, in fact, has never caused its supposed representamen. Signs can be used in order to lie, for they send back to objects or states of the world only vicariously. In fact, they send immediately back to a certain content. I am thus asserting that the relationship between signifiant and signifié (or between sign-vehicle and significatum, or between sign and meaning) is autonomous in itself and does not require the presence of the referred object as an element of its definition. Therefore it is possible to elaborate a theory of signification on the grounds of a purely intensional semantics. I am not saying that an extensional semantics is devoid of any function; on the contraty, it controls the correspondence between a sign-function and a given state of the world, when signs are used in order to mention something. But I am stressing the fact that an extensional semantics can be elaborated (and that processes of reference or mention can be established) only because na intensional semantics is possible a sa self-sufficient cultural construct (that is, a code or a system of codes). (Eco 1984: 179)
define:vicariously - "indirectly, as, by, or through a substitute; "she enjoyed the wedding vicariously"." More very useful stuff. Nonverbal communication via text, or what I call concursive communication is based exactly on this fabrication. The descriptions of bodily behaviour in literary text has no reference to a given state of the world, it has reference to a lie.
Can we say that the texts of Peirce entitle us to accept this perspective? Obviously, in the Pericean framework, when signs are applied to conrete experiences or haecceitates, they are related ot the indicated objects. (Eco 1984: 179)
In the Estonian translation this is completely incomprehensible: "On päris selge, et teises tekstis pole interpretant enam idee, vaid teine märk. Või kui siin ongi tegemist ideega, siis on see teise märgi idee, millel peab olema omaenda representamen tollest ideest sõltumata. Lisaks tuleb idee sisse selleks, et kitsendada tolle antud objekti haeccitas't: objekt on selline ainult niivõrd, kuivõrd sellest mõeldakse mingis kindlas profiilis. Sellest mõeldakse kui millestki abstraktsest, kui võimaliku (ja väga isikliku) kogemuse mudelist." (Eco 2005: 2) - Perhaps these are two different texts? In any case, this English version is lenghtier andmore elaborate (not to mention making much more sense). In any case, Haecceity (Latin ) translates as "thisness": "[it] denotes the discrete qualities, properties or characteristics of a thing which make it a particular thing. Haecceity is a person or object's "thisness". It is also remarked on wiki that "Charles Sanders Peirce later used the term as a non-descriptive reference to an individual." This term was also used in Studies in Ethnomethodology and A Thousand Plateaus so it might be one of those philosophical concepts that are worth getting into.

But it is not by chance that in 1.540 Peirce established a difference between sign and representamen; when he says that he uses the words 'sign' and 'representamen' differently, he means that the sign is the concrete, token element (the utterance) used in the conrete process of communication and reference, whereas the representamen is the type to which a coding convention assigns a certain content by means of certain representaments. "By sign I mean anything that conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. ... In particular all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know of no reason why every representamen should do so." I read this passage as the proposal of a difference between a theory of signification and a theory of communication. Representamens are type-expressions conventionally correlated to a type-content by a given culture, irrespective of the fact that they can be used in order to communicate effectively something to somebody. (Eco 1984: 180)
This is not as far off from later nonverbal communication theorizing as one might think. E.g., the distinction between behaviour, information and communication can follow this very logic: behaviour initself can be quite irrelevant-insignificant-inconsequent, information is what we glean from behaviour (that is, if we associate behaviour-token with some kind of information-type), and communication occurs when intentional behaviour conveys the same information to the addressee as the addresser intended (they have shared interpretants). Also, this is definitely the same (source) text from which the Estonian translation originates: the bit about haecceitates and a certain profile occurs on page 181. It is the case that the Estonian translation has merely thrown a lot out (and in the process, become unintelligible for me).
It is absurd to maintain that Perice intended by object a given concrete things. This would be possible, at most, when considering the expression 'that dog' (and in this case only the object is a hecceity, 5.434). But according to Peirce even 'to go, 'up', and 'whenever' are representamens. Obviously, for a realist such as Peirce, even these expressions are referred to concrete experiences; and also from the point of view of a theory of signification oppositions such as 'up' vs. 'down' or 'to go' vs. 'to come' are established as elements of the content insofar as they reflect and legitimize our conrete experiences of space and time relations. But according to Peirce 'to go' is an expression that has no identity other than the agreement between its several manifestations; therefore its object is only the natural existence of a law, and an idea is a thing even though it has not the mode of existence of a hecceity (3.460). As for an expression such as 'Hamlet was insane', Peirce says that its object is only an imaginary world (therefore the object is determined by the sign), whereas a command such as 'Ground arms!' has as its proper object either the subsquent action of the soldiers or 'the Universe of things desired by the Commanidng Captain at that moment" (5.178). The fact that in this passage Peirce mixes up the response of the soldiers and the intention of the captain by defining both as objects shows that there is something ambiguous in is definition of object. In fact, the first case represents an interpretation of the sign, as we shall see later. But in either case it is clear that the object is not necessarily a thing or a state of the world but a rule, a law, a prescription; it appears as the operational description of a set of possible experiences. (Eco 1984: 181)
Yet another point for concursivity: this is where the object is determined by the sign. Although my own original distinction went the other way also: when the verbal description is of an imaginary world it is creation, but when it reflects and textualizes events of the real world it is a form of recreation. In the first the described behaviour is "invented", in the second it is "modified". For future reference I leave here Peirce's 5.177 and 5.178:
177. [My definition of a sign is:] A sign is a Cognizable that on the one hand, is so determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt,) by something other than itself, called its Object, while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign, that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object.
178. This involves regarding the matter in an unfamiliar way. It may be asked, for example, how a lying or erroneous Sign is determined by its Object, or how if, as not infrequently happens, the Object is brought into existence by the Sign. To be puzzled by this is an indication of the word determine being taken in too narrow a sense. A person who says Napoleon was a lethargic creature has evidently his mind determined by Napoleon. For otherwise he could not attend to him at all. But here is a paradoxical circumstance. The person who interprets that sentence (or any other Sign whatsoever) must be determined by the Object of it through collateral observation quite idnependently of the action of the Sign. Otherwise he will not be determined to thought of that object. If he never heard of Napoleon before, the sentence will mean no more to him than that some person or thing to which the name "Napoleon" has been attached was a lethargic creature. For Napoleon cannot determine his mind unless the word in the sentence calls his attention to the right man and that can only be if, idnependently, [a] habit has been established in him by which that word calls up a variety of attributes of Napoleon the man. Much the same thing is true in regard to any sign. In the sentence instanced Napoleon is not the only Object. Another Partial Object is Lethargy; and the sentence cannot convey its meaning unless collateral experience has taught its Interpeter what Lethargy is, or what that is that 'lethargy' means in this sentence. The Object of a Sign may be something to be created by the sign. For the Object of "Napoleon" is the Universe of Existence so far as it is determined by the fact of Nepoleon being a Member of it. The Object of the sentence "Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molotion expressed in teh command. It cannot be understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. At any rate, it determines the Sign although it is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Unvierse is relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer.
I think I need to return to this passage numerous times again.
The meaning of a proposition, as well as its interpretant, does not exhaust its possibilities of being developed into other assertions and in this sense is "a law, or regularity of indefinite future" (2.293). The meaning of a proposition embraces "every obvious necessary deduction" (5.165).
So the meaning is in some way entailed by the premise, and, in more general terms, meaning is everything that is semantically implied by a sign. One could thus say that, according to Peirce, the meaning of a sign inchoatively contains all the texts within which that sign can be inserted. A sign is a textual matrix. (Eco 1984: 184)
This is of course only true of verbal signs and verbal signs necessarily have semantic content. With nonverbal signs the matter is different. Also, it sounds just a bit too philosophical: the meaning of a sign inchoatively contains all the texts within which that sign can be inserted. Hmm. In nonverbal terms, would... the meaning of a behaviour inchoatively contain all the contexts within which that form of behaviour can be found? Here I am of course implying that verbal and nonverbal semiosis should follow the same logic, which they obviously do not.
This set of features (or marks) is destined to grow along with the growing of our knowledge of the objects; the rheme attracts, so to speak, as a lodestone, all the new marks that the process of knowledge attributes to it: "every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of speech. The body of the symbol changes slowly, but its meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off old ones" (2.222). All this seems to suggest that the term is in itself an encyclopedia containing every character it can aquire in every new general proposition. But all this is something more than a mere suggestion. (Eco 1984: 186)
Umberto is trying to drive home the point that a word is an encyclopedia of it's own meaning. Yet it remains very ambiguous, to what ontological degree: does a word become an encyclopedia in language (or culture) or in the person who uses it? Because my entry for the word "lodestone" is minimal. If I would have to explain it's meaning I would most likely fail.
TO generate a further question, it should be remembered that in some cases also the Dynamic Object of a sign can act as its interpretant. The most typical case is the command Ground arms! which has as its proper object either the subsequent action of the soldiers or "the Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment" (5.178); a very ambiguous definition, since the response of the soldiers seems to be at the same time both the interpretant and the object of the sign. Undoubtedly, many subsequent behavioral responses, verbal asnwers, imagest inrepreting a caption, and vice versa are interpretants. Are they characters? (Eco 1984: 190)
The presumption is that "even though characters are interpretants - not all interpretants are mere characters." I'm not so sure what the difference is but hopefully it will become clear in the future.
On the other hand, the very fact that some soldiers, in different circumstances, accomplish a given regular action every time Ground arms! is uttered by an officer means that this behavior is already subsumed under a concept, has become an abstraction, a law, a regularity. In order to be inserted into this relation, the behavior of the soldiers has become, just as the quality of redness, something general, insofar as it is intended as a character. (Eco 1984: 191)
The automatic response to a command has become a "general" habit.
By producing series of immediate responses (energetic interpretants), a sign establishes step by step a habit, a regularity of behavior in the interpreter or user of that sign. A habit being "a tendency ... to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances in the future" (5.487), the final interpretant of a sign is, as a result, this habit (5.491). This is the same as to say that the correspondence between meaning and representamen has assumed the format of a law; but this also means that to understand a sign is to learn what to do in order to produce a concrete situation in which one can obtain the perceptual experience of the object the sign refers to.
But the category of 'habit' has a double sense, a behavioral (or psychological) sense and a cosmological one. A habit is a cosmological regularity: even the laws of nature are the results of habit taking (6.97), and "all things have a tendency to take habits" (1.409). If a law is an active force (a Secondness), order and legislation are a Thirdness (1.337): to take a habit is to establish or assume an ordered and regulated way of being. (Eco 1984: 192)
Explanation of what "habit" meant for Peirce.
It is true that signs cannot give us a direct acquaintance with objects, since they can only prescribe to us what to do in order to realize ths acquaintance. Signs have a direct connection with Dynamic objects only insofar as objects determine the formation of a sign; on the other hand, signs only 'know' Immediate Objects, that is, meanings. There is a difference between the object of which a sign is a sign and the object of a sign; the former is the Dynamic Object, a state of the outer world; the latter is a semiotic construction and should be recognized as a mere object of the inner world, except that, in order to describe this 'inner' object, one should make recourse to interpretants, that is, to other signs taken as representamen, therefore experiencing other subjects of the outer world. (Eco 1984: 193)
This if very useful indeed. It can quite easily be applied to literary semiosis.

A sign can produce an emotional and energetical interpretant. if we consider a musical piece, the emotional interpretant is our normal reaction to the charming power of muisc, but this emotional reaction may elicit a sort of muscular or mental effort. This kind of response is the energetic interpretant. But an energetic response does not need to be interpreted; rather, it produces (I guess, by further repetitions) a change of habit. This means that, after having received a series of signs and having variously interpreted them, our way of acting within the world is either transitorily or permanently changed. This new attitude, this pragmatic issue, is the final interpretant. At this point the unlimited semiosis stops (and this stopping is not final in a chronological sense, cine our daily life is interwoven with those habit mutations). The exchange of signs produces modifications of the experience. The missing link between semiosis and physical reality as practical action has been found. The theory of interpretants is not an idealistic one. (Eco 1984: 194)
In this exciting passage I meet for the first time notions such as emotional and energetic interpretants (it seems to be influenced by what Darwin wrote about music), and the energetic intepretant produces a change of habit and this change is assumed by Eco to be the link between semiosis and physical activity. Whether this is so I am not sure, because it seems more lika a partial answer, not a final one.
"...The habit conjoined with the motive and the conditions has the action for its energetic interpretant; but the action cannot be a logical interpretant, because it lacks generality." Thus, through pragmaticism, Peirce has joined His Scotist realism: the action is the place in which the haecceitas ends the game of semiosis. (Eco 1984: 195)
Here semiosis seems to be that which precedes and determines action.
In this sense Peirce verifies the behavioristic hypothesis in semiotics, to the extent that it can be useful: if one hears a strange sound in an unknown language and detects that, every time it is uttered, its receiver reacts with a facial expression of rage, one can legitimately infer that that word is a nasty one; the conventional behavior of the receiver becomes an interpretant of the meaning of the word. I do not know what it precisely means but I can begin to list it among insults, therefore acquiring a first definition of hyperonimy. In this dialectical opposition between semiosis and concrete action, Peirce displays what he calls his 'conditional idealism' (5.494): any sufficient inquiry in principle can lead to a sort of objective agreement on the concrete results of semiosis. The final interpretant is at the same time a result and a rule. (Eco 1984: 195)
This is one of the ways that nonverbal behaviour and language acquisition can be related.

Eco, Umberto 2010 [1979]. Lector in fabula: La cooperazione interpretative nei testi narrativi. Milano: Tascabili Bompiani.
[Eco] In tal modo (e questo si intende per teoria testuale di seconda generazione) teoria del codici e teoria del testo risultano strettamente interrelate: in una semantica orientata alle sue attualizzazioni testuali il semema deve apparire come un testo virtuale e un testo altro non è che l'espansione di un semema (di fatto è il risultato dell'espansione di molti sememi, ma è teoreticamente produttivo assumere che esso possa essere ridotto all'espansione di un solo semema centrale: la storia di un pescatore altro non fa che espandere tutto ciò che un'enciclopedia ideale avrebbe potuto dirci del pescatore).
[GT] In this way (and this is based on textual theory of second-generation) theory of codes and theory of the text are closely interrelated in a semantic-oriented update to its sememe the text should appear as a virtual text and a text is nothing more than the 'expansion of a sememe (in fact the result of the expansion of many sememes, but it is theoretically productive to assume that it can be reduced to the expansion of a single central sememe: the story of a fisherman does nothing but expand everything ideal encyclopedia could tell the fisherman).
Kooditeooria ja tekstiteooria on omavahel tihedalt seotud ja semantiliselt orienteeritud uuenduse läbi peaks semeem ilmnema virtuaalse tekstina ja tekst kui mitte midagi muud kui semeemi laiendus. See laiendus toimub tegelikult paljude semeemide põhjal, aga on teoreetiliselt tootlikum eeldada, et selle võib taandada ühe ainsa keskse semeemi laienemisele: lugu kalamehest ei tee midagi muud kui laiendab kõike mida ideaalne entsüklopeedia võiks öelda kalamehe kohta.
[Eco] Poco rimane da aggiungere prima di approfondire i vari punti qui proposti. Se non che - come già si era ampiamente detto nel Trattato - una volta assunta tale nozione, ampiamente comprensiva, di competenza enciclopedia, la nozione di Sistema Semantico Globale, some insieme strutturato di informazioni enciclopediche, diventa molto astratta, postulato della teoria e ipotesi regolativa dell'analisi. Il Sistema Semantico Globale teoricamente precede le sue realizzazioni testuali ma in pratica può essere ridotto alle sue descrizioni parziali solo quando si ha a che fare con un dato testo o gruppo di testi (vedi Eco, 1971 e 1975, 2.13; Schmidt, 1976b,
[GT] Little remains to be added before we delve into the various points here proposed. If you do that - as was widely reported in the Treaty - once assumed that notion, widely inclusive, pertaining encyclopedia, the notion of Global Semantic System, some structured set of encyclopedic information, it becomes very abstract postulate of the theory and assumptions regulatory analysis. The System Global Semantic theory precedes his accomplishments text but in practice can be reduced to its partial descriptions only when it has to do with a text or group of texts (see Eco, 1971 and 1975, 2.13; Schmidt, 1976b, 4.4 .2.1).
Kui kord juba eeldada, et meil on kõikehaarav entsüklopeedia või Globaalne Semantiline Süsteem, mingi stuktureeritud hulk entsüklopeedilist informatsiooni, saab sellest meie teooria väga abstraktne postulaat ja eeldab reguleeritud analüüsi. Globaalse Semantilise Süsteemi teooria ei eelne tekstidele vaid praktiliselt saab seda taandada osalisteks kirjelduseks ainult siis kui sellel on pistmist teksti või tekstide grupiga.
[Eco] Come vedremo le stesse "sceneggiature" ipercodificate sono il risultato di circolazione intertestuale precedente. La società riesce a registrare una informazione enciclopedica solo in quanto essa è stata fornita da testi precedenti. Enciclopedia o thesaurus sono il distillato (sotto forma di macroproposizioni) di altri testi.
Così semiotica del codice e semiotica del testo sono dialetticamente interdipendenti. Si tratta di una circolarità che non deve scoraggiare una ricerca rigorosa: il problema è solo di stabilire procedure rigorosa per dar conto di questa circolarità.
[GT] As we will see the same "scripts" overcoded are the result of previous intertextual circulation. The company is able to record a encyclopedic information only insofar as it has been provided by previous texts. Encyclopedia or thesaurus are the distillate (in the form of macroproposizioni) other texts.
So semiotic code and semiotics of the text are dialectically interrelated. It is a circularity that should not discourage rigorous research: the problem is only to establish rigorous procedures to account for this circularity.
Need samad "stsenaariumid" on ülekodeeritud eelnenud intertekstuaalse ringluse tagajärjel. Ühiskond on võimeline registreerima neid entsüklopeedilisi informatsioonikilde ainult nii palju kui neid ühendusi on pakkunud eelnevad tekstid. Entsüklopeediasse on salvestatud makropropositsioonid teistest tekstidest.
Semiootiline kood ja semiootiline tekst on dialektiliselt omavahel seotud. See on ringlus mis ei peaks tagasi hoidma metoodilist uurimist: probleem on ainult saavutada metoodilised protseduurid mis arvestaksid seda ringlust.


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