Landscapes of Power

Wichester, Hilary, P. M., Lily Kong and Kevin C. Dunn 2003. Landscapes: Ways of imagining the world. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
Power andthe domination it entails is multivalent, ranging from open command and authority, to veiled control via persuasive strategies, that is, the exercise of hegemony. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
Power here entails domination. This is not as solid as it might seem, because it could just as easily NOT entail domination; e.g. milders forms of power such as influence and manipulation. Power being "multivalent" comes close to Lukes' contention that power is "distributed pluralistically". E.g., there is no one single source of "Power" but it is "invisible" as Foucault holds. For Foucault it is more about relations between individuals or between a group, not a "thing" as such. In this article we have the issue of power being manifested in "things" - specifically landscape - which reflect the relationships between individuals and groups. Landscape is here the medium of power, so to say. Power's range from OPEN (overt) command and authority (audible and visible) to VEILED (covert) control via persuasive strategies seems correct. The latter - veiled control - is here identified with hegemony, which I am less in agreement (mainly due to being ignorant of the hegemony discourse). Peter Manning (1973: 204) identified hegemony with "control over meanings current in a society" - it is a "politics of reality". E.g., the "hegemonic situation" here is very similar to Bourdieu's "doxic situation": those who are "in power" have defined the reality of the society by influencing (controlling via veiled means) the meanings prevalent in society.
Often, the latter, when successfully used is more effective, as those dominated adopt the ideological positions of the dominating and powerful and are subejct to control without recognizing it. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
Yup, this seems th be the default definition of hegemony: those in power "create" meanings and those who are subordinated "adopt" these meanings (or "ideological positions") and if this process is effective, hold the meanings to be truthful without any doubt, seeing the state of the world as "it is supposed to be;" e.g., poor people are supposed to be poor as they have always been, or those in power are in power because they are in some sense better people than those not in power.
Power may be exercised by a range of groups, from states to capital to social groups such as gender, racial and religious groups. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
This is building towards the pluralistically distributed concept of power in which many or countless different groups have some degree of power or influence over important matters; or at least strive to have in the form of lobbying and influence groups. The distinctions here may be worthy to mark out: STATES (Estonia, Russia, U.S.), CAPITAL (?); and SOCIAL GROUPS (gender, race and religious representatives). Power being exercised by A GROUP CALLED CAPITAL seems unintelligible for me - presumably "capital" here is not the "center" (capital of a state) but in the sense or "means of production." I'm not that well versed in Marxist rederic so I'm not exactly sure how this is supposed to work. Presumably "the rich control everything" so those who hold capitla (means of production) have more saying in issues of power (e.g. the case of pollution in small industrial cities in Lukes (1973/2005).
The role of landscapes is frequently integral to the exercise of power. The direct control of landscapes for particular uses or non-use is apparent as a form of dominance as in the example of state closure of Tiananmen Square during several anniversaries of the 4 June demonstrations in 1989. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
Here is where the authors start outlining the relationship of landscapes and power. The "integral role" of landscapes for the exercise of power is something non-obvious that this article must clarify. E.g., without knowing much about landscapes this seems like something you could only guess at. The DIRECT CONTROl here is manifested in explicit USE or NON-USE. E.g., presumably, those in power (or owning more capital) can "allocate" more and more valuable landscapes for their own use (build an office complex where there used to be a public park) or "restrict" the use of specific landscapes. This latter point is interesting as it views owning land as a power operation, which it in some sense undoubtledly is. The specific example here of a Square not being allowed (restricted) for being used in a traditional celebration is a case wherein the landscape seems (without further knowledge it is hard to tell) to be used for this exact celebration as a common fact - "this is where we have always celebrated" - until "those in power" restricted its public usa of whatever reason (not told here by the authors, as this example is presumed to be widely known by the authors). Owning landscapes and restricting usage is an interesting point though, as it links up neatly with one of my intrest - how a landscape upon being demarcated (fenced off) becomes off-the-limits. It is an intresting problem because much of city landscape has been demarcated in some way and tells pedestrians "do not go there" or "you are not welcome here".
The hegemonic role of landscapes, by way of contrast, relies on their naturalisation of ideological systems, made possible because of their dominance in everyday lives and their very tangible and visible materiality, making that which is socially constructed appeat to be natural order of things. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
Clearly the authors are brits, writing naturalisation instead of naturalization. By naturalisation the authors most likely mean the "givenness" of ideological positions: once adopted, they appear as "naturally given" (universal, undoubtable) but are in fact constructed and made to seem so via naturalisation. Of couse I could be wrong and the "naturalisation" could speak directly of landscapes; the phraseology is ambiguous. The argument rests on landscapes being DOMINANT in everyday lives and landscapes being TANGIBLE and visible materially. I would argue somewhat differently that the dominance of landscapes rests exactly on their non-tangible aspects, their non-visibility or rather non-noticeability. That is, I presume power to operate "invisibly" and people in their everyday life not paying much attention to the way landscapes are socially constructed to appear natural. That is because they "seem" natural unless one exits the city limits and takes note of the way natural landscapes are uninhibited. That is, I am limited by my lack of knowledge about landscapes in general; the city landscape does seem natural, insofar as it is not doubted in daily. I have started to doubt the naturalness of city landscapes only under altered state of consciousness (drugs, fatigue, flaneurish adventures, etc.). Undoubtedly the landscape is tangible and visible, but this materiality of landscapes in my opinion regularly goes without a notice, it remains "naturalised" unless one starts to doubt in it for whatever reason (perhaps because of reading a text such as this). To translate these thoughts into jargon: the hegemony of constructed landscapes is effective until a counter-hegemonic dispositions (altered state of consciousness or whatever) sets in. Until then the social construction landscapes "appear to be the natural order of things".

The concepts of 'ideology' and 'hegemony' are central to understanding the power of landscapes and landscapes of power. J.B. Thompson (1981:147) outlined three approaches to the understanding of 'ideology'. His preferred reference is to ideology as 'a system of signification which facilitates the pursuit of particular interests' and sustains specific 'relations of domination' without society. While acknolwedging two further definitions, Thompson (1981) criticised the first ('the lattice of ideas which permeate the social order, constituting the collective consciousness of each epoch') for being over-generalised and the second (a 'false' consciousness which 'fails to grasp the real conditions of human existence') for being too narrow and pejorative. In Landscapes, we utilise Thompson's preferred definition of a belief or meaning intended to benefit certain interests and to determine power relations. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66)
The first paragraph of this chapter was very thick, presumably now it will get more lax. The authors are starting to refer to more specific authors. J.B. Thompson's conceptions place him very close to Laclau on the conceptual map of power discourse. E.g., he refers to "a system of signification" which is most likely an offshoot of de Saussure's language system. And the problem I have with that is the same that Greimas (1982) and Lotman (1974) had: de Saussure's semiotic system is a "static" fiction. Lotman noted the lack of dynamism (of history) and Greimas the lack of... "systemism"? When Goffman noted that we rarely can tell "what is systematic about a system" then at least in de Saussure's case his notion of system is widely held to be non-systematic. I guess you could say that de Saussure's "signifying system" is a methodological tactic not an ontological being; an "ought" instead of an "is". This the very same problem one comes across in kinesics. So, besides J.B. Thompson resting on an approach I can not approve of, I can at least try to understand him; even more so when the authors here claim that "ideology" and "hegemony" are central to understanding the power of landscapes and landscapes of power (perhaps they simply did not have a better toolkit for it? I'm guessing people who speak of power even today still don't.) Okay, so the three approaches are: (1) a de Saussure-esque signifying system which facilitates the pursuit of particular interests, and sustains relations of domination; (2) an over-generalised "lattice of ideas which permeate the social order, e.g., the collective consciousness of each epoch; and (3) narrow and pejorative "false" consciousness. While J.B. Thompson criticised the latter two approaches he himself seemingly failed to criticise the figurative and fictional "systemic but not very systematic" approach towars particular interests. Presumably there are particular interests in both latter approaches (those for whom this "false" consciousness is beneficial, and the collective whose generalised consciousness is permeated by a lattice of ideas), yet only in the preferred approach is the notion of particular interests made explicit. In any case we have those "who are in power" or "who exercise power" OVER landscapes FOR particular interests.
Gramsci (1973) argued that 'hegemony' is the means by which domination and rule is achieved. Hegemony does not involve controls which are clearly recognisable as constraints in the traditional coercive sense. Instead, hegemonic controls involve a set of ideas and values which the majority are persuaded to adopt as their own. So as to persuade the majority, these ideas and values are portrayed as 'natural' and 'common sense'. This is 'ideologicla domination'. Applied in the context of ruling political elites vis-á-vis the masses, for example, the masses' acceptance of the ruling group's ideology, hegemonically purveyed, gives the ruling group the power to shape the political and social system. Put another way, to stay in power, a ruling group must persuade it is working for their general good, a ruling group must persuade people to accept their definitions of what constitutes this general good. People must also be convinced that the ruling group's methods of attaining this 'public good' are the most natural, commonsensical ones. If policies and actions are supported, the power of the ruling group is uncontested. The most successful ruling group is the one which attains power through ideological hegemony rather than coercion. When hegemonic control is successful, the social order endorsed by the political elite is, at the same time, the social order that the masses desire. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 66-67)
Gramsci is quoted and cited so often yet I have yet to read his notebooks myself. Generally hegemony is "domination through consent" (Lash 2007: 55). Here the method of this consent-building is outlined in broad terms: is is the achievement of domination and rule via hardly recognisable controls which are not recognised as constraints in the coercive sense. That is, consent is achieved via "veiled" controls or "persuasive strategies". Presumably in Gramscian discourse these persuasive strategies have something to do with intellectuals but I don't know what. Perhaps intellectuals are those who produce the "set of ideas and values" ... "which the majority are persuaded to adopt as their own." Then we meet again the process of naturalisation: these ideas are "portrayed" (displayed, exhibited, made to look...) as "natural" and "common sense". Still I see in this Bourdieu's "doxic situation" (also, I just realized that the word "paradoxical" could mean "beyond belief"): the masses adopt the beliefs that are not beneficial to their interests only because they seem natural and commonsensical. This is how common knowledge works against the people; and Gramscian hegemony discourse should reveal how this is so. Too often, though, Gramsci's thoughts are quoted and made to imply something in the modern world without actually dwelling much on it. I'm guessing many people - just like me - have not read Gramsci very closely and only know the outlines of his ideas. In any case, "hegemonical ideology" is the means by which the ruling group (those in power are here presumed to constitute a "group" which may not actually be so) "shape the political and social system". The scary aspect about this is that the political and social system are very ambiguous terms (especially "social system") until it is identified with some actual configuration in the world (e.g., the state), in which case "the ruling group" becomes the political party, the ministry of this or that, etc. The problem here is that often enough these terms remain ambiguous because to apply them to the real world would be risky - it would constitute an actual attack against these groups. And this is difficult because we do believe (are in a "doxic situation") that the political party or the various ministries are at least "supposed to" work for the "general good" of the state, for example. It is so much simpler to bring an example from fictional worlds. In 1984 The Ministry of Love dealth with law and order and The Ministry of Truth with news, entertainment, education, and the fine arts. Were you to believe that these were the actual functions of these ministries you would be ideologically dominated, as the first in actuality dealth with torture and the second with constructing reality upon lies. Although these are not the only ministries in 1984 it is a neat coincidence that all 4 of the fictional ministries fit into Althusser's distinction of ideological and repressive state apparatuses. But I'm getting sidetracked. Presumably, "ignorance is strenght" (as Orwell put it) because being ignorant of how the people are persuaded to think favorably of factualliy repressive and harmful organizations makes it easier "to turn a blind eye" to all the bad stuff that is going on around us and to believe (para)doxically that the ruling elite is working for the general good. It seems here that being commonsensical is the equivalent of being ignorant, and that is the worst state a person could be in. The whole idea behind such power discourse seems to be in contesting these ideas to shift the support from policies and actions of the ruling elite. And of course this is difficult because using ideological tactics instead of coercive ones is claimedly more effective.
One of the key ways in which power can be expressed, maintained and indeed, enhanced, is through the control and manipulation of landscapes and practices of everyday life. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 67)
Getting to the point. This may very well be the key argument of this article: that the control and manipulation of landscapes AND practices of everyday life is one of the key operations of power. Of course this could merely be so because the authors are writing about landscapes; when I write about body language I could make the same exact argument without there being any actual way of verifying this; ultimately it seems to be a matter of belief, of how well the article concinves or persuades you to believe that one or the other aspect is the key way in which power is expressed, maintained and enhanced. These verbs must also be considered. Does "expressing power" equal exercising power? Or is it the operation of making power visible and tangible? Because if power is most insidious in its invisible forms then "expressing" or "displaying" it could very well result in losing it. Maintaining and enhancing power seem to be commonsensical though: if you possess power (or, to be more exact, are positioned in favorable relations of power) you most likely seek to maintain your position and enhance the leverages you have in these relations. In this sense power is an ever-increasing quality, it is that which must be sought for, fought for, and taken to the extreme - and without external factors this most likely does happen, e.g. the case of totalitarian power wherein external competitions are explicitly barred by an "iron curtain" or whathaveyou. To return to the quote, it is significant that the authors implicitly make a connection between controlling and manipulating LANDSCAPES and the PRACTICES of everyday life. It is significant because just as with power there could be a hundred and one different aspects which are in some way connected with the practices of everyday life (in fact, most anything one could come up with is in some way connected with practices of everyday life because it is a catch-all notion).

In both urban and rural landscapes, the powerful social groups will seek to impose their own versions of relaity and practice, effecting their ideologies in the production and use of landscape, as well as dominant defintions of their meanings. What they produce are therefore landscapes of power, that is, landscapes that reflect and reveal the power of those who construct, define and maintain them. These could be landscapes crafted by the powerful state or by capital, often by males or heterosexuals, and by particular races. Once constructed, these landscapes have the capacity to legitimise the powerful, by affirming the ideologies that created them in the first place. This is achieved through their naturalising role. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 67)
It is very clear that here we have the victim attitude of power trickling down from elites. In general theorizing this is obvious but it fails to go beyond the commonsensical and showing the other side. Or am I rushing ahead into counter-hegemonic discourse? In any case it seems quite obvious that it is "the powerful social groups" who craft landscapes, as "powe" is here implicitly related to access to resources and in this sense only the powerful ARE ABLE to craft landscapes to a considerable extent. That is, the poor and powerless don't raise buildings and gardens and parks but rather - and this may be the ideological commonsense talking here - the poor and powerless trash buildings, litter gardens and parks and generally "destroy" that which is clean and beautiful. E.g., the case of graffiti, which in this sense is not seen as a counter-hegemonic way to impose "their own version of reality and practice" but as mere vandalism. That is, this quote doesn't exactly acknowledge that the powerless also act to impose their own versions of reality on landscapes. The problem is that without access to resources these realities and practices are more difficult to accept - they rather seem like something illegitimate. In short, power legitimises ideology. Without power (here: resources), the ideology projected (by the powerless) is illegitimate (e.g. vandalism). The definition of graffiti as a terrotorial sign or beautiful decoration is not, in this sense, "dominant". The main difference seems to be that when the powerful craft a landscape that reflects their power we accept it as a natural fact (of course they can and are supposed to do that!) while the poor craftmanship of the powerless is unnatural (e.g. graffiti is vandalism).
As DUncan and Duncan (1988) argue, landscapes naturalise ideologies and social realities because they are 'so tangible, so natural, so familiar ... unquestioned'. In other words, they not only reflect and articulate ideologies and social relations, they actively institutionalise and legitimise them by reifying them in concrete form, thus contributing to the social constructedness of reality. They therefore contribute to the social construction of ideologies - often, of racial and gendered ideologies - and analysis of landscapes from this perspective foregrounds the social constructedness of categories through landscapes. Understanding this then focuses attention on the nexus between the cultural and political and spotlights the argument that power relations do not simply involve political and economic coercion/resistance but also ideological and cultural impositions/oppositions which are often inseparable from the material. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 67)
In this paragraph I feel as though the authors lack an example: the theoretical construction seems solid but only insofar as it doesn't speak of any particular landscape but of the general idea behind landscapes of power: that the landscapes constructed by the powerful reflect and reveal the power of those who constructed it. Also, I feel as though the ideology/hegemony approach is a bit too narrow. That is, I consider both ideology and hegemony to be too abstract concepts. It feels like a hate speech against people who craft landscapes but doesn't actually point the finger and doesn't deliver any results: we end up talking about how the powerful are powerful and that's where the discussion ends. Aside from this seeming fruitless at this point, let's continue the train of thought in this article. Landscapes naturalise ideologies and social realtions - this seems to be the opposite of what was said in the first paragraph: that ideological hegemony naturalises constructed landscapes. I guess it works both ways (a classic Foucaultian reversal). At least the reason seems valid: because landscapes are tangible (material), natural ("given" a priori as a matter of factness), familiar (from a subjective position) and unquestioned. Now this is where it gets interesting as it links up nicely with what I talked about before in relation with altered states of consciousness: until something changes the state of consciousness (be it a drug, being tired or adventurous, or reading this article) the naturalness of landscape and the hegemonical ideology that undergirded the construction of it remains UNQUESTIONED. There is no reason to doubt what seems natural and commonsensical in our everyday life; it is only when a certian shift occurs that we start to look at the world from a different perspective, noticing aspects that beforehand remaind unnoticeable. The main points of the Duncans seems to be that the CONCRETE FORM of the landscape: (1) reflects the power of the powerful; (2) articulates ideologies and social relations that underlied it's construction; and (3) actively institutionalizes and legitimises the power and ideologies of the powerful. I'm not very familiar with the notion reification so my point-by-point conclusion could be way off. I'll presume it's not. Let's try it out: the "white heterosexual male" (WHM) has: (1) constructed a landscape that reflects the power of the WHM (how?); (2) the landscape articulates the ideologies and social relations of the WHM (how?); and (3) it actively institutionalizes and legitimizes the power of the WHM (how?). Thus I end up with a yearning for more concrete examples, and presumably there will be such examples in the rest of this article. This is the problem with "deep reading" - I really should (next time) skim before I start analysing the content with such depth. In any case it remains ambiguous HOW EXACTLY does a landscape reflect, articulare and reify power. It seems that the authors are desperately trying to prove that cultural impositions/oppositions are important to such a degree that their propositions end up seeming "too obvious".
Multiple sites of power can be identified. For Karl Marx, best known for his iconoclastic work, Das Kapital (1957), capital and power were inseparable and power is defined in terms of control over the means of production. But power is not only tied to economy. Foucault argued that disciplinary power, exerted at the level of the human body, affects the individual's ability to act. Power is also believed to reside in the state, in religious systems and in radicalised and gendered ideologies, socially constructed. In this chapter, our focus is on the power of the state, capital, religious systems and racial ideologies. While we deal with them independently in the first part of the chapter, in later sections we emphasise the intersections of various ideological and power systems and the mutually reinforcing effects of such intersections. For example, we examine intersections of capital and race, state and capital and state and religion - and the resultant landscapes of power. At appropriate points, we illustrate such intersections using multiple scales of space: the nation, the city, the region, as well as the space of the object, building and even human being. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 67-68)
I can already state that I am most interested in the latter, which - because it is named last - will most likely be treated less than others. Which is a pity. But it does seem like my plea for concrete examples will be heeded. Now as to the paragraph itself. No, beforehand, I have to remark that I'm not sure what the authors mean by Das Kapital being "iconoclastic" - did it incite people to grab for their crowbars and head to churches to break icons? Also, in the metaphorical sense, I'm wondering if Iconfree shoul have been Iconoclast instead. But whatever. Multiple sites of power outline here are capital, human body, state, religious system, ideologies, etc. Too bad they don't treat the bodyily site in this chater very much (or so it seems). Foucault's disciplinary power is here mentioned but what is lacking is a reference to regularity power (biopower, biopolitics), most likely due to translations of his lectures on the subject not being available to the English reader until a few years after this book was published. Here's the problem with power discourse - there could already today be a better intellectual toolkit available for dissecting power, but we do not know about it because it is just beginning to be written about. Who knows. Important for me here is that disciplinary power affects "the individual's ability to act" which is pretty much what Goffman seems to talk about in Asylums on self-mortification (losing the ability to act freely due to bodily discipline). The phraseology here is beneficial and applied to my work I am emphasising the intersection of various ideological and power systems and the mutually reinforcing effects of such intersections with the human body as the nexus of these intersections. For these authors, the human being is merely one "scale of space" of these intersections among many, for me it is the main one around which all others revolve (the human body in relation with national idendity, the city it inhabits, the region it is surrounded with, the objects it interacts with, and the buildings it dwells in and passes by).

States often have direct control over landscapes, using planning laws and other legal and fiscal devices. Sometimes, authoritarian regimes simply rule by fiat. Yet, in order to be effective in the purveyance of particular ideologies, landscapes are often put to hegemonic use. In what follows, we offer illustrations of authoritative authorship of landscapes in a colonial context, followed by examples of symbolic manipulation of landscapes in two different contexts: one in which landscape inscriptions can be made afresh and another in which negotiations with existing landscapes are necessary in the exercise of hegemonic power. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 68)
There are of course those who consider any and all states illegitimate and see no problem in declaring "direct control" via "planning laws and other legal and fiscal devices" an illegitimate power operation. As far as state power is considered legitimate there seems to be no problem with this: the law says so thus it must be so. It is when the intersection of legal and fiscal devices becomes apparent as has happened in Estonia with the party funding scandal that people start to doubt in the legitimacy of laws themselves as it becomes understood that laws can be bought by businesses (the case of corruption). The periphery prolematic is rampant in cases where the rural lands and people who inhabit them are not part of the core culture and the state sends troops to evacuta people against the will from their native homes so that the (rain) forests can be cut down and profited from, for example. But this is not what this article is about, it seems. The "authoritative authorship of landscapes" here is way too culturalistic, dealing with "symbolic manipulation" if inscriptions. I presume that inscriptions in this sense constitute any form of ownership or "right to use" indicator, be it a street sign or the form of the landscape or whatever. There are many ways in which one can symbolically demarcate the landscape for special uses or simply transform the landscape for this end. An example - of doubtful exactitude but still - is of an image of Iraqi street/marketplace "before and after 'democracy'": before it was a clean street with symbols of Husseins government (a monument) and the street being littered by cars and pedestrians; after it was covered with a cloud of dust and rubbish lying around, civilian cars replaced with military/patrol cars and people haggling in shabby-looking marketplaces where before people had simply walked. In this sense the American occupation reduced a normal working street to a place of business for the countless poor people the war had created. War is of course an extreme example and here we are talking with more subtle transformations (negotiations, manipulations).
The power of the colonial state is nowhere more apparent than in the shaping of colonial cities, which the foremost scholar Anthony King (1976) defines as non-western cities resulting from contact with western industrial colonialism. Such cities are shaped by cultural contact, levels of social, economic and technological development and the power structure of colonialism. In particular, the power structure of colonialism was reinforces by the creation of the segregated city with a colonial sector and an indigenous sector for economic, social, political and racial reasons. This was achieved through legal means or implicitly with residential areas marked by cultural and economic deterrents. The segretation of areas was designed to achieve particular ends, the first of which was to minimise contact between colonial and colonised populations. For the colonial state, segregation acted as an instrument of control, both of those outside as well as those within their boundaries. It helped the colonial community to maintain its self-identity as 'master', thought to be essential if it were to perform its role. At the same time, segregation of the indigeneous population made for easier control of 'native affairs'. Economically, it was also useful as it cut down the total area that had to be maintained and developed (the colonial quarters). Furthermore, it helped to preserve the existing social structure. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 68)
Finally a more concrete example, although even this is quite general. I had figured that at some point in discussing landscapes and power segregation had to show up. Here is is emphasised how colonial power SHAPES cities via Cultural contact, levels of Social, Economic and Technological development and the power structure of colonialism. Presumably Culture, Society, Economy and Technology all intersect with the Power structure - all are merely different facets of this structure, different perspectives. Segregation is here justified with exactly these reasons: economic, social, political and racial. It is interesting that the list of factors changes a little: culture is not considered a reason for segregation - why? Is it an overall part of other aspects, a "substrate"? Is "culture" here embedded in the racial factor? In any case it is evident that the authors oppose legal means and implicit (cultural and economic) deterrents. Whatever could these be? It is very revealing that the "particular end" is to minimise contact (no contact, no problem!) and this kind of regulation is used as an instrument of control (forbidden areas, segregated sectors, "you cannot go there"). The regulation of contact is of course part of the maintenance of essential maintenance of self-identity. "We define ourselves by who we do not interact with." The self-description as a master is necessary for performing the role of the master as it justifies and legitimises this role (a case of verbal magic). It is also interesting that the colonial quarters had to be MAINTAINED and DEVELOPED as a way to reinforce (PRESERVE) the existing social structure. The inward-directed development is indicative that the colonial quarters are Developed, that is, it must be bettered in some way; while the rest of the colonised population may squander in poverty, their quarters develop "as the wealth trickles down" (which it doesn't). So we can say that the "particular end" of segregation is self-interest; and it should be kept in mind that this was the first aspect of "politics" demarcated by interactionist social psychologists (Hewitt 1979: 192); the second being power. By leeway it could be stated that one of the main operations of politics in terms of interacting human bodies is the regulation of contacts; perhaps not explicit segregation as in colonial cities but contacts in the practices of everyday life. I should return to this problem later.
Singapore's landscape under colonial rule exemplified these ideologies (see Perry at al., 1997). To regulate the appropriation of land for specific purposes, Sir Stamford Raffles, founder of modern Singapore, instructed the town committee to focus on remodeling the town according to principle which would facilitate public administration and maximise mercantile interest, inscribe public order in space and also cater for the accommodation of the principal races in separate quarters.
Central to Raffles' plan was an expansive central space on the north bank of the Singapore River devoted solely to public purposes and dominated by grand edifices such as a church, government offices and a court house opening out to a central square. These colonial structures, which epitomised the ideals of British governance, were flanked on the east by an equally expansive 'European Town', carved out as a residential area for the European administrative and mercantile community. Raffles also ordered that the swampy south bank of the Singapore River, hithero occupied by Chinese traders and raft houses, be draind to make way for a line of wharf and warehouses along the bank. In time, this became the principal commercial heart of the town. In planning his new town, Raffles stressed that the mercantile community should have first priority in claiming advantageous sites. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 68-69)
By regulating the appropriation of land for specific purposes I presume the authors mean exactly the "construction of landscape" talked about in the first paragraphs of this article. That is, the social construction of landscape here is literally constructing (appropriating or remodelling) the town according to some principles (particular interests). Through this the governmental administration "inscribes public order in space" - that is, the expansive central space (notice the centrality) is appripriated for "public use" and by "public use" is meant administrative and mercantile interests. On some level it seems commonsensival that any administration, in doing it's regular work, focuses on self-interested, so why should it be surprising that a colonial administration is tightly involved with the mercantile community? Politics and business are tightly involved almost everywhere. In any case, the hegemonic ideology here is embodied here as "the ideals of British governance." It is remarkable that the last sentence in this quote, that "the mercantile community should have first priority in claiming advantageous sites" is very much in accord with van Dijk's definition of ideology. That, ideology enables people as a group (the administrative and mercantile communities) organize and evaluate numerous social beliefs for themselves in their own lives and in the surrounding world (in Singapore). It is very difficulty to back-translate van Dijk but the essence of the argument rests on ideology serving self-interests (either material or symbolic). What we have here in Raffles stressing the self-interests of his own group is ideology par excellence.
In the laying out of public spaces, Raffles emphasises the importance of open, orderly arrangement, uniformity and regularity. In essence, a gridiron system of streets with separating rectangular plots formed the basis of Raffles' plan. Not only did the gridiron provide an equitable method of dividing the land in a new city formed by colonialism, for the colonist unfamiliar with the lie of the land, it was a means of simplifying spatial order in order to provide for a swift and rough division of territoriy (Mumford, 1961:224). Raffles was keenly conscious that careful allocation of land was crucial to the orderly growth and prosperity of his new city. (Winchester, Kong and Dunn 2003: 69)
This is what characterises a landscape of power: it is open, orderly arranged, uniform and regular. No individuality, no creativity, no irregularity. I have to notice here that I somehow tend to identify closed and chaotic with "individual" and "creative". The justification for this gridiron system of streets is fairly easy to understand though: "simplifying the spatial order" for the colonist and "careful allocation of land" in accord with adminsitrative and mercantile interests.


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