Piatigorsky, A. 2021. Preface. In: Understanding Cultural Tradition. Edited by Boris Oguibenine. Translated by Mikhail Yagupov. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House, x-xi.
In his letter to B. K. Matilal, dated February 20, 1977, the author of this book wrote about his work on Advaita-Vedanta: "... It was not to present Advaita in the light of current problems of the logic of scientific discovery and modern philosophy of language ... but just the contrary. [↩] I do not believe that any 'logic without metaphysics' or 'philosophy of language without thinking' is possible." This passage alone may serve as the clue to Zilberman's understanding and mode of explaining that specific and highly original approach to (not 'of'!) philosophy that he himself nicknamed modal. (Piatigorsky 2021: x)
St Zilbermani kavatsus on esitada teadusliku avastamise loogikat ja tänapäeva keelefilosoofiat hoopis Advaita-Vedanta valguses ja asetada mõtlemine tagasi neisse valdkondadesse, kust 20. sajandi esimene pool proovis mõtlemist justkui väärtusetut epifenomeni välja tõrjuda.
First, a philosophy cannot have 'anything un-thinking' as its object of investigation. Language, to Zilberman, is not a phenomenon of consciousness but a spontaneously working natural mechanism (like, for instance, 'mind' to some Buddhist philosophers). It may, of course, become used for and by consciousness; consciousness may see itself, so to speak, in language, but only secondarily, only as in one of its modifications, derivations or modalities. That is why to Zilberman linguistics - as to Kant psychology - cannot and must not figure as the primary ground for any philosophical investigation. (Piatigorsky 2021: x)
Vau, jah. Sellega võiks täitsa nõustuda. Keel on spontaanselt töötav loomulik mehhanism, mida teadvus võib kasutada, et iseennast näha, aga ainult ühes oma vormidest, tuletustest, või modaalsustest. See oleks justkui "keel on kõigest tööriist" jõuaks vaimufilosoofiasse (vrd Sapiri jt keel kui teadvuse vangla, või justkui tööriist, mis kunagi ei tee täpselt seda, mida tahaks sellega teha). Eriti meeldib mulle siin rõhk spontaansel loomulikkusel - keel on midagi, mida me suurim närvirakkude kogumik meie kehas teeb justkui iseenesest.
And the task is neither epistemological nor historico-philosophical, but merely methodological for, as he wrote to me in March 1976, "I have employed my thought in a certain way to investigate how various different philosophies (not philosopherS!), have employed theirs to establish the principles of organization of their own thinking activity with respect not only to thinking, but behavior and culture in general." (Piatigorsky 2021: x)
Zilbermani põhiküsimus on seega: Kuidas on erinevad filosoofiad kasutanud mõtlemist, et korrastada oma mõtlemise nö konstruktiivseid printsiipe, sh mõtlemine ise, käitumine, ja kultuur üldisemalt. H.T. ümberjutustest jäi tugev mulje, et Zilberman on üsna triaadiline, aga keskendub haaradele, mitte punktidele (üleminekutele, mitte seisunditele; protsessidele, mitte kategooriatele). Siin - alles Piatigorski eessõnas - ma pakuks, et Zilbermanil on ümberpööratud triaad, milles mõtlemine on esmane, käitumine teisene ja kõik muu - keha, taju, tunnetus, emotsioonid, esteetika, nauding, luksus, äri ja kaubandus on kõik hõlmatud kolmandajärgusesse "kultuuri üldiselt".
Grossly simplifying the problem we may, for example, assert that to the pre-Socratic Philosophers such a pont of departure could be seen in words, thoughts, and opinions of their predecessors or contemporaries or, say, in their very persons, through whom these words, thoughts and opinions were traditionally or non-traditionally conveyed. But, speaking of Indian philosophy on the whole, or of practically any particular Indian philosophy taken [|] separately, we cannot help but see that what it does essentially operate with, root in and identifies itself as, is the primary text. This text may, itself, be philosophical or non-philosophical, with or without the author, human or divine, extant or lost. But it figures as the conditio sine qua non of any philosophical activity, as that on which one thinks in one way or another, at one time or another, in one school or another, under one teacher or another. Thinking on a text produces thinking on thinking on a text, and this goes on in principle indefinitely, unless you stop doing it - then you are outside it and philosophy itself. That is what makes Indian philosophy unique and unrepeatable, and that is what makes it Indian. Or, putting it in a little different way, Indian philosophy was not what it was because it was Indian - such an ethnocentrist position would be totally impossible for Zilberman. On the contrary, it is that exceptionally and uniquely primarily textual character of it that constitutes its 'Indianism'. And more than that, it constitutes 'Indianism' in general. (Piatigorsky 2021: x-xi)
Väga konkreetselt meenutab seda: "Ei, me lugesime teda, aga Peirce'il on palju sõklaid, palju spetsiifilist ja jääb arusaamatuks, milleks see kõik vajalik on ja kuidas seda kasutada. Selline asi iseeneses. Tegelesime konkreetsete probleemidega ja Peirce ei sobinud neid lahendama. Ja üldse, me mõtlesime oma teooriad välja eelkõige lähtudes tekstist endast, materjalist." (Uspenski, vt Salupere 2002: 15) - Siin nähtub, et see Tartu-Moskva semiootikakoolkonna ad hoc tekstuaalne metodoloogia on... Indianism. Teisalt jälle see, et tekstist mõtlemine toodab mõtlemist tekstist mõtlemise kohta, ja see jätkub põhimõtteliselt lõputult, kui sa seda just ei lõpeta meenutab kangesti lõputut semioosi.
Philosophy could be seen as not only 'culture's thinking on itself' but as an activity which made and went on making their life cultural and culturally meaningful not only to an outside observer, but also and first of all to Indians themselves. And this is so, even if they had no idea of their philosophy, or if philosophy itself was in itself acultural or even anti-cultural. (Piatigorsky 2021: xi)
Piatigorski on siia tõenäoliselt sisse pikkinud need samad Zilbermani modaalsused: mõtlemine (filosoofia kui kultuuri enesekirjeldus), käitumine (filosoofia kui tegevus, mis muudab elu kultuurseks), ja kultuur üldiselt (tähenduslikkus üldiselt). Samuti on vahva näha kultuurisemiootika teesidest tuttavaid a- ja anti- vasteid.
Michnik-Zilberman, Ellena 2021. Biographical Notes on a Remarkable Life. Understanding Cultural Tradition. Edited by Boris Oguibenine. Translated by Mikhail Yagupov. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House, xii-xvii.
At the beginning of 1972 the time to present his PhD Thesis came to the fore. My husband had typed his nearly 900-page work within three weeks. Moreover, it was done in the revrse order starting from the end to the beginning. It is hard to imagine such likelihood, and many people do not believe me, saying that it is impossible. And I always replied that they did not know my husband. (Michnik-Zilberman 2021: xii)
900 lehekülge 3 nädalaga klõbistada ei ole Dvorakiga eriline probleem. Kirjutada raamat lõpust pihta hakates? No see nõuab juba Kanti tasemel arhitektoonilist läbimõtlemisoskust.
When leaving Moscow for a short while my husband usually stored his huge and heavy typewriter in Shragin's apartment. However, the date of the Thesis formal presentation was around the corner, so Zilberman decided to pick up his typewriter from Shagrin's place. It was a rainy day and my husband asked Boris for some cover for the typewriter. Zilberman got a blanket and used it to wrap the typewriter. My husband coped to carry the typewriter in his arms. It was rather heavy, and he was a lightweight as a feather. And he barely but consistently, though with often stops, moved toward the subway. Suddenly Zilberman realized that he was slowly followed by a police "jeep." As the car caught up with him, the policeman offered Zilberman to give him a lift to the metro station. My husband happily agreed. In the car he was instantly asked various questions about who he was and what his intentions were... It was a long ride and then the car finally stopped in front of the KGB entrance. There Zilberman was held overnight, being interrogated and threatened with the arrest. His bag was searched. His article on the Kabbalah was found among other papers, and it attracted the attention of the interrogators. Zilberman said that it was a chapter from his Thesis. The next morning some graduate students and staff members from IKSI came to help "releasing" Zilberman. He was released, but was commanded to leave for his home in Odessa. They threatened Zilberman that he wolud never be allowed working in the field of philosophy or sociology. (Michnik-Zilberman 2021: xiii)
Pani mõtlema, et me elame ikka kuldsel ajastul mil kaitsepolitseil on targemat teha kui intellektuaale kollitada ja mõni vana kasutatud sülearvuti, mis kõlbabki enam-vähem ainult trükimasinaks, saab mõnekümne euro eest kätte.
It was very characteristic of him to work on several projects at once. This time it was no different: Zilberman was translating into English from Sanskrit the materials on analogy - Treatise on Analogy and Upmana Khanda which is a part of the tetralogy Tattva-Cintamani of the great specialist in Indian logic, Gangeshopadhyaya. Then he continued developing his "modal methodology" as Zilberman used to call a new method of philosophical thinking. Zilberman developed this method in February 1972 while working on his doctoral thesis in Moscow. In Chicago Zilberman delivered a series of lectures on semiotics of M. Bakhtin, and also on the language of F. Dostoevsky. The latter topic was presented upon the initiative of Professor F. Gottschalk who headed the Department of Russian Language and Literature at the University of Chicago. Thanks to her, he got a contract for the next year in the Department of Russian Language and Literature. However, we went back to Massachusetts, where Zilberman was offered a contract of three years at the Brandeis University. (Michnik-Zilberman 2021: xiv)
Tervenisti kolm analoogiat Juri Lotmaniga: (a) mitu artiklit korraga kirjutamisel, pöörleval laual; (b) Bahtin, Bahtin, Bahtin; (c) Vene keele ja kirjanduse kateeder.
Russian friends also did not forget their friend and former colleagu. A book About Possibility of Philosophy (publishing house "Put") was published in Moscow in 2001. It comprised the correspondence between Zilberman and his friend, a gifted philosopher [|] Oleg Genisaretsky. That book also included correspondence between Zilberman and a famous philosopher Alexander Piatigorsky who was a close friend of Zilberman, and the correspondence with Eugene Schiffers, a deeply religious man and an incredibly talented thinker. Every letter by Zilberman was perceived like a gift, because it was more an essay on the most unexpected topic rather than a mere letter, a thorough essay which was written with deep knowledge of the topic and incredible broad erudition. In his letters Zilberman often expressed youthful ardor of a person in love with life who always seemed to be involved in "the process of thinking." (Michnik-Zilberman 2021: xv-xvi)
Kõlab nagu Zilbermani kirjavahetuste motoks võiks olla Intellektuaalne ongi faatiline. Mismõttes kuidas mul läheb? Luba ma kirjutan sulle terve põhjaliku artikli sellest või tollest.
Genisaretsky, Oleg 2021. A Few Words About David Zilberman and His Philosophizing. Understanding Cultural Tradition. Edited by Boris Oguibenine. Translated by Mikhail Yagupov. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House, xviii-xxiv.
Isn't that the same that Zilberman meant by his words: "You love the wisdom. But I'll love the love of wisdom!" Let's leave it to the readers to decide, whether they belong only to the eminent wits of the past, or to those who live today (who sometmies think of themselves as the thinkers anywhere, and anytime). And maybe they are addressed to that future time when the self-sufficing love of wisdom will be more veracious and feasible for the readers personally, than it is now? (Genisaretsky 2021: xix)
Metafilosoofia ja autokommunikatsioon.
The readers more or less familiar with the history of Indian philosophy may of course raise the question: how the six systems of Indian philosophy as were defined by Max Mueller are associated with six types of cultural traditions described by Zilberman? [↩] If we consider the first and the other dispositifs (in the sense of the archeology of knowledge of early M. Foucault), is easy to see that Mueller's philosophic systems are constructed in asymmetrical to each other and heterogeneously paired relations. [↩] And here according to Zilberman dispositif of cultural types is combinatorically symmetric: both in pairl and ternary, as if viewed from the hypothetical center out of the six, as well when viewed from its round periphery to the center. (Genisaretsky 2021: xxii)
Meenutab kahtlasel kombel seda kuidas ma ise kujutan ette Jakobsoni funktsiooniskeemi. Klassikaliselt laotakse saatja ja vastuvõtja vastavalt vasakule ja paremale, kaks üles ja kaks alla - nagu see käepidemetega ratas, millega põrandal-sõitmise harjutusi tehakse ülakeha treenimiseks. Minu ettekujutuses on pigem kuusnurk, milles on täpselt nagu siin öeldud, omavahel seotud paarid ja kaks üksteisega kohakuti triaadi. Kabbalah?
Zilberman, David B. 2021. Understanding Cultural Tradition. Edited by Boris Oguibenine. Translated by Mikhail Yagupov. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishing House.
To provide a general assessment of the current state of affairs in the sociological study of tradition is hardly a task of any great complexity. One's attention is instantly drawn to just how poorly the researchers' interest manages to accommodate for the width of scope and the sheer urgency of this issue in terms of existential relevance. As for the latter, the extent of public preoccupation with the problems and manifestations of tradition has always been quite considerable - with the exception of those relatively short periods of momentous revolutionary transformation of social relations when, instead of reflecting on their past, "men make their own history," as Karl Marx puts it. (Zilberman 2021: 1)
Zilberman tegeleb seega, väga üldiselt, traditsiooni sotsioloogilise uurimisega. Ühiskond on traditsioonide ülevalhoidmisest väga huvitatud, v.a. need võrdlemisi lühikesed perioodid, mil toimuvad üüratud muutused ühiskondlikes suhetes. See on ka vb Zilbermani iseärasus, et ta koondab poliitika, majaduse, ühiskonnakorralduse lihtsalt "ühiskondlike suhete" alla.
After all, Marx maintained that, although men make their history, "they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weights like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirit of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and customes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language" (Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire," Chapter 1). (Zilberman 2021: 1)
Zilberman suudab isegi kohustuslikus korras Marxi tsiteerimise asjakohaseks teha. Esimene rõhutatud lausung meenutab Rick & Morty lühemat kokkuvõtet "Tradition is just peer pressure from dead people". Marx paneb siin minu arvates ka sellega täppi, et revolutsioonide kui semiootiliselt üliaktiivsete perioodide jooksul tihtipeale lihtsalt remiksitakse vanemat kraami julgemalt selle asemel, et midagi tegelikult "uut" luua. Nüüd oleks huvitav näha, kas tal õnnestub Leninit ka siia sisse panna nii, et see on arusaadav ja asjakohane (*doubt*)
Tradition always engages us at a very deep level. We see this in how individual people, groups, and classes interact within the complex network of social relations, their every action, activity, and act of communication expressing their own acknowledged and established interests, perceived values, and ideals first and foremost. We also notice it when we shift our attention toward the substance of such transactions as reproduction of the current states of societies, manufacture of economic or cultural products, accumulation of knowledge, and perfection of the means used for expressing and communicating interests, values, and ideals. (Zilberman 2021: 1)
No ei olegi nii lihtne tema kolme põhimõistet triaadi suruda. Huvid ja väärtused oleks justkui mõlemad esmasuse ja teisesuse vahel vms. "Huvid" on ka väga laetud sõna ajalooliselt, a la "ärihuvid". Ainus triaad, millega see kolmik siin vb paremini sobituks oleks Diogenes Laertiose antud anekdoot Pythagorase olümpiamängudele-minejast; ja siis peaks ka täpsustama, et "väärtused" hõlmavad konkreetseid asju nagu au, kuulsus, tuntus, võim, mõjukus, jne. st just sellised väärtused, mis tiirlevad ümber sotsiaalse ambitsiooni. Kuniks ta täpsustab neid mõisteid enda kasutuses, võib neid vist niimoodi lugeda.
Taking all of the above into account, one is utterly dumbfounded by the sheer paltriness of theoretic conceptions and empirical implementations that would treat tradition as a sociological operative concept and object of research, as opposed to its playing the part of a social symbol. This state of affairs can be regarded as a direct consequence of a waning interest in tradition observable since the early twentieth century as an essentially steady trend - a trend considered indubitably determinate in its nature up until recently. (Zilberman 2021: 2)
Jällegi jään lootma, et sellele on kuskil siin raamatus või mujal mingi põhjalikum teoreetiline seletus. Praegu jääb mulje, et ta tahab öelda, et traditsiooni mõistet kasutatakse sotsioloogia valdkonnas mingis mõttes tühja tähistajana. Sellesse, et huvi traditsiooni just pärast 20. sajandi algust on langenud võib johtuda mõnest suuremast sõjast, mida tol ajal peeti. Need, noh, tülid kogu planeedil vol. 1 ja 2.
This is a direct consequence of impelled need and the social significance of the notion of tradition. Yet the usage of the actual term has virtually never been accompanied by its thorough theoretic comprehension or detailed formulation (this also concerns the associated mechanisms of social action in the context of research). (Zilberman 2021: 2)
Eelnev kirjeldab kuidas "traditsiooni" mõiste on laialivalgunud ja seda kasutatakse üha enam üha erinevamates valdkondades, aga mida ei ole on põhjalik teoreetiline mõisteanalüüs. Sama olukord on mul "faatika" valdkonnas ja tõenäoliselt kirjeldab iga mõisteloolise uurija suhtumist oma uurimisobjekti. (Mõistelugu oleks siis "history of concepts" vms. - Begriffsgeschichte)
Any such interpretation leads to an utter inability to identify the nature of tradition in any of the following ways:(Zilberman 2021: 3)
- As a social mechanism, or a means of reproducing society's norms and institutes in actual interaction between individuals, groups, organizations etc.;
- As the substance of everything that is transferred during such interaction (accumulated cultural phenomena of relevance, or social legacy);
- Finally, as a specific approach to social reality and culture related to the first two aspects of interpreting tradition - namely, validating and justifying the institutes, norms, and indeed the entire system of social relations as measured against known facts of their past experience, primarily by means of a selective view of culture.
Ülihea kraam. Siin on korraga "traditsiooni" kolm tähendust ja ühtlasi tema triaad: (1) traditsioon on mehhanism, mis kellegi huvides taastoodab olemasolevat ühiskonda; (2) traditsioon on üldnimetus kõigile väärtustele, mis selle taastootmise käigus tulevikku üle kantakse; ja (3) traditsioon on konkreetne arusaam sotsiaalsest reaalsusest, mis kinnitab ja õigustab olemasolevat korda valikuliselt, vastavalt kellegi ideaalidele.
However, the confusion that reigns within the epmirical research of tradition is exogenous by nature. Its cause is the lack of anything remotely resembling a coherent and consistent general theory of tradition or any methodological developments that could be employed in the analysis of its nature and its mechanisms. This omission is all the graver that the word "tradition" is not merely used in sociology - one encounters it much more often in social philosophy, literary theory, folkloristics, and other humanities, not to mention colloquial usage or the methodologically lamentable fact that tradition is often interpreted as a miscellaneous category of sorts, the word itself thus becoming used for referring to all kinds of social relations whenever one lacks the wherewithal to explain them in any other way. The notion is viewed as intuitively obvious, which, coupled with its substantial conceptual complexity and capacity for being used in a variety of vastly different contexts, may often lead an empiricist researcher, endeavoring to conduct a study of social phenomena associated with tradition and using some specific sub-theory for reference, to a fallacious perception. (Zilberman 2021: 3)
Vau, jälle, täpselt sama lugu faatikaga: "small talk" on niivõrd intuitiivne asi, et see, kuidas faatilisuse mõistet kuskil kasutatakse, võib ulatuda igasugusest puhtalt ühiskondlikust läbikäimisest (baaris koos õllejoomine, a la Karp 1986a: 35) kuni telefonitoru otsas mõmiseni märguandeks, et sa veel kuulad. "Traditsiooni" tõlgendamine "muu"-sa (varia) on ka arusaadav. Küll aga pani see üldise traditsiooniteooria poole pürgimine mõtlema, et võib-olla saaks Zilbermani traditsioonikäsitlust rakendada ka mõisteloolisse uurimusse, sest kõik kolm punkti eelnevast katkendist esinevad ka nö teadusliku traditsiooni juures. St võib-olla saab tema modaalmetodoloogiat rakendada ka teadusliku mõtteloo uurimisse.
It would, of course, be unreasonable to maintain that no attempt at theoretic cognition of tradition has ever been made. We find numerous examples of very profound analysis of the traits and attributes of tradition at the very root of social and religious philosophy - within the history of European thought as well as without. Many constructive ideas concerning sociological mechanisms and the forms of tradition were voiced by the Pythagoreans and Plato. (Zilberman 2021: 4)
Muidugi. Esimene on üks neist raamatutest, mida pole Eestis ega internetiarhiivis, aga kuskil kolmandas kohas (kellegi isikliku skänneerimise tulemus) on. Teine on venekeelne artikkel, mis tundub pealkirja järgi piisavalt huvitav, et talletaks siia ka:
- Vogel de, Cornelia J. 1966. Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism: An Interpretation of Neglected Evidence on the Philosopher Pythagoras. Assen: Van Gorcum. [lg]
- Trubetskoy, Evgeniy Nikolaevich 1908. Social'naya utopiya Platona [Social Utopia in Plato]. Voprosy Filosofii I psihologii 91(1): 92(2). [in Russian]
Any attempt to establish the historical circumstances of how the sociological theory and method came into being will benefit from an in-depth study of New European conservatism and traditionalism, taking into account the actual problems that sociology faced during the first stages of its institutionalization as a science. First experience always plays a decisive role in the formation of the structural organization and "inner tradition" of subject knowledge. The fact that the theoreticians of conservatism were privately vehement opponents of the French Revolution of 1789 and tended to gear toward Catholic counterreformation in their religious views should by no means deny us the opportunity to use the knowledge constructs that they had created in completely different historical contexts. One of the advantages of theoretic knowledge is the ease of disengaging it from what can be referred to as an "axiological hale" - an inevitable byproduct of its genesis. Historical memory of this "halo" tends to foment false ideological connotations, which become associated with said knowledge and method. Nevertheless, the associated set of values can experience a transformation into the opposite of the "judgmental background" correlating to its origins, depending on the social classes or groups that take advantage of this knowledge. (Zilberman 2021: 5)
Kas aksioloogiline halo või väärtushinnanguline pühapaiste? Igal juhul on varajase sotsiaalfilosoofia, konservatismi ja Prantsuse-revolutsiooni-vastasuse teema väga täppis (vt Britannica artiklit Intellectual roots of conservatism). Aksioloogiline halo ja mingi teadusvaldkonna nö "esimene kogemus" pani mind mõtlema sellele, kuidas faatilisus sündis konkreetselt Malinowski enda eelarvamustest ja väärtushinnangutest (metslane ei ole eriline metafüüsik, et mõtiskleda jumalate ja unenägude üle, nagu E. B. Tylor arvas, vaid tahab niisama hängida ja ajaviiteks teistega juttu ajada), mis on kandunud sajandi jooksul implitsiitselt edasi selles, kelle suhtlemist me nimetame faatiliseks (who you callin' a phatic?).
One might think that individual rationalism would pave the way for pluralistic conceptions of social relations. However, the tyranny of reason had left no place to account for many other human needs and tendencies of the most natural sort, and rationalism kept becoming ever more monastic and authoritarian. On the other hand, conservatism gave rise to such pluralistic concepts as different types of human temperament and the natural temperamental inequality of people, which is the reason why artificially inculcated egalitarianism ends up limiting individual liberties, and so on. (Zilberman 2021: 6)
Ah, yes, some people are poor not because the social system is screwing them over but because their temperament is such (they were too lazy to be born into one of the families that owns all the land and resources). / Inimvajaduste pluralismis ei oleks iseenesest midagi viga, kui seda ei kasutataks olemasolevate ühiskondlike suhete õigustamiseks.
A comparatively autonomous body of literature has been written where historical materials were interpreted solely in the context of anthropology. On the other hand, the sociological approach has always been essentially oriented toward modern social relations, institutes, organizations, and forms of behavior that lend themselves to immediate observation, measuring, and modeling. (Zilberman 2021: 8)
Asjad käivad kolmekesti, aga kas nad moodustavad triaade? Kui raamat on tagurpidi kirjutatud, siis võib alles lõpus selles selgusele jõuda (seda häda tajusin Puhta Mõistuse Kriitika juures, et kõigepealt kasutatakse uusi mõisteid ja hulk lehekülgi hiljem neid seletatakse).
Theoreticians of sociology only paid as much attention to tradition as they needed for using it as a metaphorical pier for shoving off their research. This would be accomplished in a variety of ways, which include:The waning interest in tradition that we observe on the part of the theoreticians of sociology can be explained in two different ways. Firstly, we can assume there is a certain dominant tendency in how the social processes develop, which inculcates an orientation toward modernity in the public mind, the actual motif of tradition fading into the background as a result. Secondly, it can be postulated that this is an effect of the internal development logic of the sociological theory itself. Thus, the problems of a social system's functioning and its structural organization have been studied in greater depth and detail than the problems of social processes (in particular, tradition in one of its primary interpretations). (Zilberman 2021: 9)
- Assuming phenomenological equivalence between tradition and custom as is typical for F. Tönnies (1909, 11);
- Likening tradition to a certain type of "mechanical" social solidarity that serves as the "foundation" for the division of labor in a society, but fails to actually affect it in any tangible way as done by É. Durkheim (1965a, 104);
- Reducing tradition to a specific type of social activity that strongly resembles a residual category, which impedes its usability and relegates it to the status of mere inertia in comparison with a different type of rational action aimed at achieving a specific goal as suggested by M. Weber (1961, 260);
- Classifying the effects of tradition to "illogical remainders," or inexplicable components of social processes in the vein of V. Pareto (1935, 191) etc.
(1) meenutab sõna custom kasutust E. R. Clay'l, kuhu ise tahaks panna culture, aga viimane on tal millegi pärast justkui moraalne kategooria; (2) Durkheimi ühiskondliku solidaarsuse "mehhaaniline" käsitlusviis häiris Malinowskit nii väga, et ta pidi leiutama faatilise osaduse, vastuväiteks, et kui inimesed kogunevad, ei tähenda see automaatselt tundmuste ühildamist; (3) traditsioon on aeglustav, tagasihoidev tegur; (4) traditsioon on üleliiane jäänuk. Huvi traditsiooni suhtes hääbus ~1866-1933 vahel Zilbermani järgi, sest (b) sotsioloogiat huvitab pigem struktuur kui protsess ja (a) isegi kui seda huvitab protsess, siis pigem nende areng modernsuse poole, mitte protsessid, mis taastoodavad traditsioonilisi ühiskondlikke suhteid, institutsioone ja organisatsioone.
It can therefore be assumed that the current phase is one of a growing, and not diminishing, interest in tradition - the theoretic aspect in particular, since the emergence of new concepts is a direct result of the study of social challenge. Those include the theory of tradition as a mechanism for "the institutionalization of institutions" formulated by M. Levy (1968) and E. Shils's view of tradition as a means of defining relations between different social groups (1961a). J. R. Gusfield's model of distribution of roles based on a given attitude toward tradition (1967, 351-362) is also of interest in this respect, as well as the one that views tradition as a vehicle for implementing innovation as devised by B. F. Hoselitz (1961, 80-113), likewise J. Szacki's theory of tradition as a tripartite mechanism that transmits culture, the substantive element of culture, and the systems of values that define behavior (1970, 137-157), and a number of others. (Zilberman 2021: 10)
Just see viimane kõlab nagu see, mida ta ülal korraks vilgutas, aga see on kahjuks poolakeelne. Esimene tundub jube huvitav selle poolest, et tollest entsüklopeediast on internetiarhiivis saadaval ainult 1. köide, nagu narritamiseks.
- Levy, Marion J. 1968. Structural-Functional Analysis. International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, vol. VI. N.Y. [9780028659701]
- Shils, Edward A. 1961a. The Calling of sociology. In: Parsons, T.; Shils, Edward; Naegele, Kaspar D.; Pitts, Jesse R. (eds.), Theories of Society: Foundations of Modern Sociological Theory. Volume II. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1405-1448. [Internet Archive]
- Gusfield, Joseph R. 1967. Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change. The American Journal of Sociology 72(4): 351-362. DOI: 10.1086/224334 [JSTOR]
- Hoselitz, Bert F. 1961. Tradition and Economic Growth. In: Braibanti, R.; Spengler, J. J. (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 83-113. [Internet Archive]
- Szacki, Jerzy 1970. Trzy pojęcia tradycji. Studia Socjologiczne 1. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydaw. Naukowe. [???]
Different editions of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences contain solidly-written articles on tradition by R. Lowie (1936) and M. Radin (1949) - however, their definition of tradition is rather vague and pertains wholly to the field of humanities, interpreting tradition as "cultural heritage" and thus restricting it [|] merely to the substantive content of tradition. (Zilberman 2021: 10-11)
See ütleb võib-olla midagi selle kohta, kuidas Zilberman "kultuuri" mõistab - traditsiooni substantiivse (tegeliku/olulise/ainelise?) sisuna.
It has already been pointed out that anthropologists specializing in the study of primitive and near-primitive societies view the concept of tradition as finite. In other words, when applied in theoretical or practical analysis, it unfolds into a multitude of forms of social action, symbolic representation of its relevant content, various assessments of this content etc., depending on the level and the scale of social organization. (Zilberman 2021: 12)
Karvane tunne, et siin on veel üks iteratsioon tema nö "triaadist", aga ei oska veel näppu peale panna mis on mis - käitumine, representatsioon (?) ja hinnangud?
A peculiarity of the anthropological method is that all phenomena of a primitive culture are considered to originate from established traditional patterns of some sort, which obviates the need to distinguish between ideal structures of the mind and actual structures of behavior, or intentionally differentiate between the aspects of tradition associated with activity, subject, and judgment. (Zilberman 2021: 12)
Okei. Korraks tõmbas nagu vaiba jalge alt, aga maandusime kohmakalt, aga vähemalt püstijalu: (a) tegevus; (b) subjekt kui tegevuse olulise sisu sümboolne representatsioon; ja (c) hinnang tegevusele. - Kohmakalt, sest see ei ole (vist?) sama triaad, mida tuvastasin ülal. Siin on häda selles, et kõik kolm kuuluksid justkui teisesuse alla, moodustaksid nagu käitumise alamtriaadi: (a) tegevus ise, (c) hinnang tegevusele, ja (b) tegija enda mõtlemine või ratsionaalne arusaam tegevuse sisust - siin tegin (subjekt) "kui" (sümboolne representatsioon) problemaatiliseks, sest veel ei saa aru, mis on tema subjektikäsitlus.
It can be said that culture only exists in actuality (as translated into actions, and not in the shope of a library-like vault of cultural values) within individuals. Individuals performing their cultural functions, thereby (and also therein and therefore) satisfying their needs, can potentially find themselves at the center of a bundle that will contain any combination of functions represented in culture. However, an individual is far from being aware of all of them as they act within a system of social relations - nor do they need to be, since one is certain that some of the functions will be performed by others. It is impossible to imagine a human being that would only perform the cognitive function or the function of will, as it is impossible to imagine a living person with one half a head and half a heart. However, a social being can only perform specific functions, whereas a specific individual can only manifest their traits in a finite number and in a specific combination. Changing conditions of social complementarity that affect interaction call for reshuffling the content of culture in a variety of sets, and this represents the active function of social circumstance in relation to culture. (Zilberman 2021: 14)
Kultuuri eksisteerimine individuaalides, mitte raamatukogu-laadses kultuuriväärtuste kogumis, meenutab nö informatsiooni probleemi (kas raamatukogu hoidlas, kuskil kastipõhjas lamav raamat, mida keegi pärast avaldamist pole lugenud, sisaldab informatsiooni või on informatsioon "midagi uut" individuaali jaoks). Kultuuriliste funktsioonide "kimp" on päästikustav, sest niimoodi määratleb ka Lotman nii isiksust kui ka kultuuri, või kultuuri kui isiksust: "Niisiis on kultuur ajalooliselt kujunenud semiootiliste süsteemide (keelte) kimp, mis võib moodustada ühtse hierarhia (ülemkeel), kuid võib endast kujutada ka iseseisvate süsteemide sümbioosi" (Lotman 2010c[1970]: 32). Zilberman teadvustab siin (3) kognitiivset funktsiooni ja (2) tahtejõu funktsiooni, aga kus või mis on tema esmasus? Kui kujundlikult on (3) pea ja (2) süda, siis kus on... kõht?
Theorists of sociological structural functionalism (first and foremost, T. Parsons (1964a, 336-347)) have tried to base their explanation of the mechanism of individual action on Freud's theory of unconscious drives (something that exists at a more primordial level than the individual and cannot be individualized in a human mind, even one aware of this mode of its existence). This was a major methodological simplification, given that the notion of structurally organized system of culture, having actually become reflected unhindered in this amorphous existence as a result of a real "inverse perspective," led to the concept of the structure of an individual being de facto isomorphic to the structure of the culture, which does not account for the individual's own typological uniqueness and autonomy. (Zilberman 2021: 14)
Oijummel. Sama teeb Lotman, aga tõenäoliselt mitte Freudi alateadlike ajenditega, vaid semiootilise tüpoloogiaga (sõna ja teksti aninoomia?). Mul on tunne, et tema artiklid Kultuuritüpoloogiast tuleb ka üle lugeda, kui ma juba selle sarja raamatutega šongleerin. Igatahes, väga pädev punkt Zilbermanilt, mis võib väga kasulikuks ühenduslüliks osutuda autokommunikatsiooni ja "kulturi/isiksuse" isoloogia teemal jätkamiseks.
However, the members of these societies, who possess the same mental traits as modern people, (Lévi-Strauss 1962) only have them manifest as those of a group mind (or an active form of realizing individual intentions in social relations) in a restricted number of ritualized situations, which result from the nature of a primitive culture's existential activities and organization. In other words, tradition as a mechanism of immediate social interaction is represented by everyday behavior and manifests subjectively as custom in such societies. (Zilberman 2021: 14)
Analoogsele järeldusele jõudis George Wolf ainuüksi Malinowski "situatsioonikonteksti" mõiste analüüsist. Faatiline osadus on üks neist piiratud arvust "ritualiseeritud" (kõne)situatsioonidest, milles valitseb omaette keelekasutusviis. Zilbermanil on vägagi õigus, et selline tõlgendus lähtub antropoloogide oma teooriate rägastikust, mis üritab metslaste käitumises näha kultuurisüsteemi funktsionaalseid avaldumisviise. Väga, väga hea kraam.
But subjective manifestation does not imply objective equivalence, given that objective behavior of people is neither instinctive, nor automatic, no matter how primitive the society - one's awareness thereof exists in a potential continuum of some sort, which means it can be conceptualized as an operative goal in a specific situation, taken into account before a decision, actively modified, and so on. However, what the finality of the concept of tradition implies for such societies is a high degree of isomorphism between an individual mind and the type of mentality embodied in [|] its natural traits, interests, and temperament, which reflects in the form of social action after a phenomenological superimposition of individual typology over the structure, content, and functions of culture. Culture can only be observed immediately in primitive societies as it assumes the forms of ritualized behavior (which is socially-oriented and possesses a particular purpose) for the reason that the form and the content of a living tradition are inversed into the individuals who strictly follow the mental structures of the established cultural patterns as they perform their functions. Thus, the tradition of a primitive society continuously "folds" into culture de facto by proxy of mechanisms of personal action. (Zilberman 2021: 14-15)
Esiteks, küsimus individuaali teadlikkusest iseenda eesmärgipärasest käitumisest. Faatilise osaduse puhul jällegi nähtav Haverkate'i pseudo-faatilise osaduse küsimuses, aga ka nö üleüldises "metafaatilisuses" (kas inimesed sildistavad enda peas või niisama jutuajamise käigus niisama jutuajamist "niisama jutuajamiseks"). Teiseks, leidsin tema esmasuse üles ja see on jällegi justkui alamtriaad: loomulikud kalduvused, huvid ja temperament. See Florensky "inversed perspective" teema läheb üle minu pea, aga see on päris huvitav viis kuidas kultuuri ja isiksuse isomorfismi üleüldiselt ette kujutada... Ja võib-olla on sel midagi pistmist sellega, miks tema nö kultuuriline triaad on ümberpööratud (vt Piatigorsky antud tsitaat, ülal) - aga isiklikus kirjavahetuses antud nope ei ole muidugi põhjapanev.
There are many culture theorists who identify the entirety of culture with social heritage without specifying what this heritage constitutes and what the term stands for. This approach stems from the view of culture as a "universal receptacle" of some sort, which is capable of containing all and any social content. The 1930s were the heyday of this approach - a "glorification of culture," as A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn put it (1952, 6). It appears to have been associated with a widespread awareness of social instability, a feeling that the established social relations were breaking down, the reality of the "new vandalism" menace as embodied by fascism and similar social trends, the problem of culture attaining the traits of popular culture in bourgeois society. (Zilberman 2021: 17)
Vaat, et seletus sellele nähtusele, et 1920ndatel ja eriti 1930ndatel oli väga aktuaalne eristada tsivilisatsiooni (a la kino) ja kultuuri (a la teater) vahel - millest Tammsaare kirjutas oma esseistikas eksplitsiitselt ja mida mina kõrvutaksin A. Huxley ja J. C. Powys'e kirjutatuga.
In order to understand the researchers' motivation, we have to consider the genesis of the word "culture." When it was brought into usage by the European social philosophers during the early Renaissance, the word stood for cultivating human character and human abilities, being much closer to "tradition" in actual usage. It was only after its appropriation by the ethnographers, and subsequently also sociologists and anthropologists that the word "culture" ceased to refer to self-perfection. (Zilberman 2021: 17)
Niimoodi kasutab seda sõna ka Clay, nt "To the uncultured mind non-certive knowledge that originates in intuition seems to be exhaustive" (1882: 52), "We should regard it as an embryo which culture is in process of maturing, and hope perfect explanatoriness from the maturity of the idea" (1882: 160), "Because of man's poverty as regards benevolence, Christ set Christendom upon behaving for Christ's sake as though it were benevolent, - to the end that the practice might ultimately bring home to human intuition the beauty dignity and utility of benevolence, and so lead to an intentional culture of true charity, - a direct culture of benevolence" (1882: 352).
The first known instances of the terms "culture" and "tradition" treated as synonyms can be found in the works of J. von Herder. Herder views culture, which is discussed in the eighth and ninth volumes of his Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, as the process of enlightenment and of cultivation of human abilities, and uses this term for defining the stage of humanity's relative historic development and for characterizing the highest values of society and the level of education in the absolute sense. He deems "tradition" to be an equivalent term. (Zilberman 2021: 17)
Vt Herder, Johann Gottfried von 2019. Mõtteid inimkonna ajaloo filosoofiast (ESTER).
Likewise, when M. Dufrenne focuses his attention on the psychological aspects of the continuity of beliefs, customs, and institutes as parts of the same "essence," this thematic reference is by no means an arbitrary definition of tradition, but rather a reflection of R. Linton's and A. Kardiner's concept of a "basic personality," which he refers to in his characterization of culture (Dufrenne 1947, 158-159). (Zilberman 2021: 19)
Tuttav tegelane - La Barre õpetaja. Järelmärkusest: "A. Kardiner - Abram Kardiner (1891-1981) was an American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst known for extensive usage of anthropological research materials in his work. He is considered the founder of American Neo-Freudianism and psychological anthropology; he influenced the School of Culture and Personality (M. Mead and R. Benedict). His "basic personality" concept became popular in the post-war period." (Oguibenine 2021: 32; jm 34)
The Polish sociologists L. Krzywicki (1951, 41-149) and K. Dobrowolski (1967, 6-51) made a remarkable attempt to create a theory of social heritage (or "historical substrate") that would be free from the single-sidedness of "culture studies." they base their conjectures on the historical and sociological perspective rather than correspondence with culture theory. Krzywicki's main postulates are as follows: [|]Krzywicki's concept represents an attempt to bring forth an integrative sociological theory of "social legacy" without a compulsory orientation toward culture. However, it demonstrates the negative traits of evolutionism in too obvious a manner - it ascribes explanatory potential to the notion of "anachronism," and has a strong tendency for equating progress with the "detraditionalization" of society. (Zilberman 2021: 19-20)
- Every phase of historical development leaves behind an intelligible "residue" that interweaves and merges with the "residues" of contemporary social concepts;
- This "historical substance" provides a foundation for various relations, as well as legal and political tenets, ethics, views on aesthetics, philosophical systems, customs of everyday life, and even individual habits and temperamental traits;
- Some of these relations are preserved due to "irrational whims," whereas others receive a rational interpretation (albeit a wholly new one);
- "historical substrate" plays an important part in social life by limiting the possibility of change as well as one's freedom of choice;
- The factors that are at play within this substrate have a passive influence - namely, they fail to instigate any new developments, but rather serve as an obstacle, inhibiting their progress;
- "Historical substrate" is the bedrock of every conservative social movement;
- The importance of "historical substance" in modern societies is in decline (1951, 146-147).
Olles värskelt läbi töötanud Lotmani ja Uspenski järelsõna ühisteesidele, tundub mulle, et see, kuidas iga ajaloolise arengu faas jätab oma "jäägi", on vägagi ühildatav selle mehhanismiga kuidas "samad tekstid [saavad] erinevatel ajalooetappidel erineva tõlgenduse" (3.3.1). Ajalugu kuhjub. Zilberman viitab tema Krzywicki poolakeelsele teosele Studia socjologiczne (1951), aga inglise keeles näib sellelt autorilt olevat ainult Primitive society and its vital statistics (1934). (Tema raamatuid on vene keeles Eesti raamatukogudes päris palju.)
Szacki proposes to consider the heritage of a social group with the inclusion of patterns, of somatic, psychological, and intellectual reactions that define the general disposition of group members, but excluding artifacts. (Zilberman 2021: 21)
Kena triaad isegi õiges järjekorras: (1) somaatilised e kehalised, (2) psühholoogilised e hingelised, ja (3) intellektuaalsed e vaimsed reaktsioonimustrid.
This interpretation of the role of social heritage does not only enable us to render obsolete the concept of its conservative or inertial influence, but also establish the contrary - namely, that it implies an active attitude toward tradition and emphasizes the importance of selection and use of individual elements of this historical heritage for establishing new traditions in the process of social developments when such elements assume a new corresponding social meaning. (Zilberman 2021: 22)
Hea kraam ja jällegi analoogne sellega kuidas järelsõnas ühiteesidesse käsitletakse välise mõju tõlkimist kultuuri sisemisse keelde, eriti enesekirjeldustega seotud transformatsioonide osas (3.2). Sama võiks öelda kultuuri oma vanavara uuskasutamise kohta, et sellest tehakse endale meelepäraseid valikuid ja antakse neile uus tähendus.
Secondly, the facts of transmission and preservation of culture as a link between generations merit the assumption that it possesses communicative properties; thus, the system of language can be used as a prototype of the structure of culture. This view is characteristic for the American school of cultural anthropology (see Segal 1969). Its acceptance was conducive to a widespread implementation of the operative methods of semiotics, structural linguistics, and mathematics in culture studies - in particular, after E. Sapir introduced the concept of the semantic levels of culture (see Preston 1966) and C. Lévi-Strauss introduced the term "social structure" to represent the sum total of abstract "communication codes," symbolically representing different types of social interaction as universal forms of exchange (1958, pp. 68, 98, and 326). (Zilberman 2021: 2)
Sama taotles Tartu-Moskva kultuurisemiootika koolkond oma primaarsete ja sekundaarsete modelleerivate süsteemidega. Sapiri semantilistesse tasanditesse pean ka sisse vaatama.
- Preston, Richard J. 1966. Edward Sapir's Anthropology: Style, Structure and Method. American Anthropologist 68(5): 1105-1128. DOI: 10.1525/aa.1966.68.5.02a00010 [JSTOR]
In other words, we need to establish how the subjectively perceived meanings, symbols, and contexts of events that take place in reality are objectified by means of intent for social action into such anthropological characteristics as temperament, character, and interest, and what is their catual relation to such constitutive elements of culture as norms, values, and ideas. (Zilberman 2021: 27)
Huvidest on saanud normid. Väärtused ja ideed püsivad paigal. Ei tea, kas sündmuste tähendused, sümbolid ja kontekstid järgivad nendega seotud loogikat? // Ühtlasi tasub rõhutada, et N-V-I on kultuuri "konstituiivsed elemendid" (vt constructive principles Vene formalismis).
Let us adhere to the following definition: "Tradition is the reproductive mechanism of social institutes and norms, whereby the sustenance of the latter is rationalized and justified by the very fact of their prior existence" (Levada 1970, 253). (Zilberman 2021: 37)
"Pärismaalane võib alati väljendada maagilise riituse eesmärki, aga usutseremoonia kohta ütleb ta, et seda viiakse ellu, kuna selline on tava või kuna see on niimoodi määratud, või siis jutustab ta seletava müüdi." (Malinowski 2020: 40)
It contains the following three implications. Firstly, there is a specific means of reproduction of social institution whose mechanics differ from the rest. Apart from tradition, the social proces is also set motion by a variety of other mechanisms that we can group together within the general category of "non-tradition," thus exhausting the list of the components comprising the mechanics of the social process. Secondly, culture comprises specific institutes and norms whose distinctive qualities actually stem from their reproduction, or tradition. Thus, there are also institutes and norms that exist for different reasons. Finally, a distinctive characteristic of the mechanism itself and the elements or units of culture that it reproduces (but does not engage anew) is a specific attitude toward the latter. (Zilberman 2021: 37)
Raskestimõistetav. Esimene on enam-vähem arusaadav: kui traditsioon on ühiskondlike institutsioonide ja normide taastootmine, millel on varasema olemasolu õigustus, siis peab eksisteerima ka taastootmisviise, millel on paremad õigustused. Teine punkt on täiesti arusaamatu - Levada määratluses ei ole kultuuri kohta sõnagi; kui ta seostab seda määratlust eelmise (ala)peatüki sisuga ja ütleb siin sisuliselt, et kultuur on seisneb traditsioonis ja kuna traditsioon on selline taastootmisviis, mis õigustab ennast selliselt, siis järelikult on kultuuri eripära samasugune õigustatus - me taastoodame kultuuri, sest see on varasemalt olemasolev, muud midagi. Ja kolmandast punktist ei saa üldse midagi aru - traditsiooni kui taastootmismehhanismi, ja kultuuriühikute või elementide, mida see taastoodab, eristav tunnus on konkreetne suhtumine... kultuuri? St kultuuritoodete iseloomulik eripära on see, et me suhtume neisse kui kultuuritoodetesse? Tundub taotluslikult tautoloogiline.
The distinctive qualities mentioned in the above definition are by no means nominal - they are real. (Zilberman 2021: 37)
Erinevalt faatilisest osadusest, mis minu arvates on puhtalt nominaalne - Malinowski teoreetilise raamistiku unikaalne tulemus, mis täpselt oma kirjeldusele vastaval kujul esineb pärismaailmas üliharva, kui mitte üldse.
The justification of traditional institutes and norms does more than confirm their existence (as well as that of the associated mechanisms). Its very nature is active and selective - characteristics of a controlling relation. Substantiation by the past translates into a specific way of using the units and mechanisms of culture in the present. The definition implies functionality of the traditional institutes and norms, and a harmonious relation between the mechanics of their reproduction and the other mechanisms of the social process. (Zilberman 2021: 37)
Enam-vähem sama teema, mis mulle sissejuhatuses meeldis - traditsiooni taastootmine on valikuline. Siin justkui lisandub, et traditsioon ei ole mitte ainult selektiivne, vaid ka aktiivne ja regulatiivne (kontrolliv). Mineviku põhistamine/õigustamine tähendab/tõlgendub-kui olevikus kultuuriühikute ja -mehhanismide konkreetset kasutusviis(i). St kultuuri-kui-traditsiooni taastoodetakse kindlatel eesmärkidel, mis on kuidagi (harmooniliselt) seotud teiste ühiskondlike protsesside mehhanismidega. See kõlab peaaegu nagu väide, et kultuur on sotsioökonoomiliste protsesside tuletis või culture is downwind from politics vms.
The claim that a social fact must exist in the present does not suffice for said fact's [|] existence. Obligation shifts the confirmation of reality into the future, which is where the failure to comply with the imperative requirement will be discovered and followed by the corresponding sanction. Therefore, every postulation about exisetence is but a mythologem. The apodicticity of scuh postulations conceals a reference to a symbolic notion, revealing an ideal meaning therein, which allows one to assess that which happens as something that ought to have happened if it concurs with the symbolic notion or as something that ought not to have happened if there is no such concurrence. Thus, no present events can be unambiguously described as non-accidental (whether actually or potentially). (Zilberman 2021: 37-38)
"Zilberman uses the traditional names of logical modalities attributing his own meaning to them. In this instance, apodictic postulatinos pertain to actual existence as opposed to obligation." (Oguibenine 2021: 175, jm 1) - Millegi paljas olemasolu (Z. tähenduses "apodiktilisus") ei ole piisav õigustus selle olemasolul. Muidu on selle sõna määratlus "clearly established or beyond dispute" ehk 'selgelt kindlaks tehtud või vaieldamatu'. Paljas, selge ja vaieldamatu olemasolu on siin vastandatud kohustusele (obligation), mis - just nagu käsk (konatiivsus) - nihutab tegelikkuse kinnitamise tulevikku (käsu ja kohustuse kohta ei saa öelda, kas see on tõene - sest seda ei ole iseenesest veel täidetud). Sisuliselt ütlebki ta siin, et kohustust saab kontrollida ainult tuleviku - kas nõudmist on täidetud, seda saab avastada ainult tulevikus ja kohustuse täitmatajätmist karistada vastavalt. Seega iga postulaat (tõeväide?) eksistentsi kohta on kõigest mütologeem. Selliste postulatsioonide apodiktilisus varjab viidet sümboolsele mõistele, paljastades selles mingi ideaalse tähenduse, mis lubab hinnata seda, mis juhtub kui midagi, mis oleks pidanud juhtuma kui see vastab sümboolsele mõistele või kui midagi, mis oleks pidanud juhtuma kui seal ei ole sellist vastavust. Suhteliselt arusaamatu, ikka. Saan aru vaid nii palju, et kui keegi ütleb midagi stiilis "nii lihtsalt on" (it is what it is), siis sellega varjatakse tegelikke ootusi või põhjendusi selle suhtes, mis peaks olema.
Nor can individual events of the past listed one after another be described as non-accidental. Furthermore, the idea of "pastness" seems to deny past facts the property of necessity - necessity literally cannot be "detoured" in order to become the past. But the very idea contains the assumption that certain events ought to have happened. (Zilberman 2021: 38)
Okei. Kanti "modaalsused" on Possibility, Actuality (existence), ja Necessity. Võimalikkus on esmane; apodiktilisus ja aktuaalsus on teisesused; paratamatus on kolmasus. Kui me lihtsalt rivistame minevikusündmusi, siis ettekujutus nende "minevikulisusest" näib eitavat minevikule paratamatuse omadust - paratamatust sõna otseses mõttes ei saa "ringi sõidutada" selleks, et saada minevikuks. Aga see ettekujutus ise sisaldab eeldust, et kindlat sündmused peaksid juhtuma.
The deonticity of postulations concerning the past shifts the confirmation of their reality into the present. When a traditionalist vows, "This is how my forefathers behaved; I shall behave likewise" they do not only justify their behavior by patterns of the past, but also implies that the ancestors actually behaved in a given manner. A traditionalist gives a positive sanction (or "approval") to the deeds of the ancestors by confirming their authenticity likewise the authenticity of their deeds will be confirmed by the sanctions of the future. However, those sanctions can also be negative, whereas the traditional consciousness appears to always mark the correspondence between past events and the imperative requirements of the present. (Zilberman 2021: 38)
Mul õnnestus nii kaua vältida deontilisuse mõistet - 'seotud kohuse ja kohustuse eetiliste mõistetega', "käskude ja keeldudega tegelev". Kui traditsionalist vannub, et niimoodi toimisid ka tema esivanemad, siis ta mitte ainult ei õigusta mineviku käitumismustreid vaid eeldab ka, et tema esivanemad päriselt käitusid sellisel viisil. Hea näide on maskulinistid, kes igatsevad idealiseeritud versiooni 1950ndate Ameerikast, ehk esimeste sitcom'ide aega tagasi, hoomamata, et päriselu ei olnud selline nagu ta telesaadetes oli. Traditsionaalne teadvus näib alati märgistavat vastavust minevikusündmuste ja oleviku tungivaid nõudmisi. 'Nii nagu oli, nii peab olema.'
Such an attitude to past events, combined with the formal perception of them as being sequentially preferential, ledas a traditionalist mind to the certainty that past events happened because they ought to have happened. They combine the catual dimension of behavior with the ideal dimension of behavioral obligation. (Zilberman 2021: 38)
See oli vist Lotmani Kultuur ja Plahvatus, kus esines samasugune motiiv: pärast plahvatust tundub (traditsionalisti jaoks), et muud võimalust ei olnudki - mis juhtus (apodeiktiline aktuaalsus - nö teisesus) viiakse sellises mõtlemises vastavusse sellega, mis pidi juhtuma (deontiline ideaalsus - nö kolmasus) ja seeläbi eitatakse muid võimalusi - mis oleks võinud juhtuda (võimalikkuse modaalsus - esmasus). See meikib üllatavalt palju senssi, et traditsionalisti jaoks ei eksisteeri võimalikkust (millekski muuks, milleksi uueks, milleksi paremaks).
A non-traditionalist cannot deny the sequential preferentiality of past events, but will remain disinclined to accept them as norms of behavior. Therefore, they adhere to the norms of a different tradition, or do without any norms whatsoever. In that case, their behavior will be random and they will be incapable of making a definite assessment, since they adhere to patterns that cannot be identified and exist outside culture. (Zilberman 2021: 38)
Kirjeldab mind - normid jätavad mind külmaks.
To a Hindu, the task of maintaining the social institutes and norms is not justified [|] by their past existence, but rather their eternal existence. The Sanātana Dharma (the Eternal Maintenance) is what justifies them to a Hindu consciousness. "This exists because this is eternal." Thus, tradition is not perceived as obligatory, but rtaher as necessarily present. The Sampradaya, or the content of the tradition, is placed substantially lower than the eternal Dharma. (Zilberman 2021: 38-39)
Indias on spirituaalne neljasus.
Thus, the past, the present, and the future are all subordinate to the eternal within the consciousness of the representatives of the Hindu tradition. (Zilberman 2021: 39)
"Igavik" trumpab kõik teised ajamodaalsused.
Nor should we disregard the mechanism of tradition wherein the present acts as the legitimizing agent. "That's how it's done" is less a reference to a certain past way of action and more of an expression of actual demonstrability, effectiveness, and obviousness, which do not appeal to the past in any way. (Zilberman 2021: 39)
Samuti üks kena triaad. Efektiivsus on siin kõige ilmsem, teiste osas peaks oma seletuse andma. Ilmselgus - vastavalt mõttelisele ideaalile. Demonstratiivsus - näidatavus - jällegi seotud võimalikkusega.
Let us refrain from discussing the justifiability of such postulations and the possibility of their realization and attempt to construe the type of control employing the mechanisms of tradition wherein their specific nature is defined by the relation between the hypothetical and the apodictic modality, or related to postulations concerning the present and the future. (Zilberman 2021: 39)
Mõtlesingi ülal, mis on Zilbermani silt esimesele modaalsusele. Hüpoteetiline, apodeiktiline ja deontiline. (Loodetavasti on nii ja mitte, et ma klopsin siin suvalisi asju kokku.)
The three modes of tradition that we have considered have but one common characteristic capable of giving us a sufficient definition. (Zilberman 2021: 40)
Uute mõiste ja teksti immanentsete keerukustega jageledes jäi tähele panemata, mis need kolm traditsiooni "moodi" täpselt on. Noneh, jääb teistkordsel lugemisel avastada.
This postulation will only be meaningful if the effects of the mechanisms of tradition are tested against a certain typology of cultures that would be constructed for the specific purpose of intercultural comprehension of the instances of interaction between societies with different traditions. (Zilberman 2021: 40)
Tema enda tüpoloogia keerukusi mäletan artiklist. Siinkohal mõtlen, kas tema väheseid, aga kõnekaid samasusi Lotmanig annaks utiliseerida, et Lotmani kultuuritüpoloogiaid (mis põhinevad duaalsel, mitte triaadsel, loogikal) Zilbermani omaga ühildada. Igal juhul saaks neid vähemalt võrrelda.
However, a reduction to binary opposition would not be sufficiently justified in this instance, since it would lead to the implication that there may be only two mechanisms of social transmissions. (Zilberman 2021: 40)
Duaalsed mudelid on ebarahuldavad.
In that case, we shall be able to represent any social process as a countable multitude of models of interacting social organizations whose cultures invariably contain the traditions of transformation of the same type supported by corresponding mechansims (for a mechanism is always a means of transformation). (Zilberman 2021: 41)
Hea tähelepanek. Lotmani ja Uspenski järelsõnas kultuurisemiootika teesidele käivad ka mehhanism ja transformatsioon käsikäes, a la "teisest küljest tõlgitakse see mõju oma sisemise struktuuri keelde ja sellega seoses läbib erinevaid transformatsioone, sealhulgas ka ülalmainitud kultuuri enesekirjelduste aktiivset mõju" (3.2), mis puudutab nö väliste tekstide tõlkimise (nö "tõlkeploki") mehhanismi.
The principle of the preservation of tradition is only realized if we consider the structure of intercultural comprehension isomorphic to the structure of intersocietal intercation. This does not mean that societies change in the way they interact; on the contrary, their interaction and mutual understanding are only possible inasmuch as the structural similarity of their immutable traditions permits it. (Zilberman 2021: 41)
Veel üks kokkulangevus tolle järelsõnaga: "Selle seadistuse piires saab kultuuri arengut kindlast vaatekohast kujutada kui elementide süstemaatilise ümbernimetamisena muutumatute vastanduste ulatuses" (3.3) - siin on muidugi muutumatu traditsiooni (immutable tradition) asemel muutumatute vastanduste (invariantsete binaarsete opositsioonide) struktuur, aga iva jääb samaks - kultuurid võivad omavahel kommunikeerida, üksteist mõjutada, aga see mõju tõlgitase alati kultuuri enda traditsiooni/struktuuri keelde.
In that case, the researcher's comprehension will be isomorphic to the potential extent of social contact and the interpenetration of cultures. This extent may prove rather insignificant when there are profound differences between the mechanisms of tradition, but it will nonetheless reflect the real state of affairs in the natural course of the social process, or the situation when a given social formation is not forced to stop behaving as itself and when all the changes in the social existence and the subjective views held by its representatives depend solely on their initiative. (Zilberman 2021: 41)
Siin ma ei protesti isomorfismi mõiste vastu; kultuuri ja üksikisiku vahel on minu arvates pigem isoloogia, aga uurija arusaama ja kultuuride lõikuvuse vahel võib olla tõesti isomorfism. Selle osas, et ühiskondlikku moodustist ei sunnita lõpetada käitumast iseendana on järelsõnas autonoomia mõiste: "Just täpselt selles hetkes, mil argised ja juhutised kultuurikontaktid, milles kumbki kontaktis olev osapool säilitab oma autonoomia, loovad teed ühtsusele ja varem üksteisest eristuvad kultuurid moodustavad teatud kehami, milles nendevahelised semiootilised-strukturaalsed erinevused ei vähene vaid süvenevad." (2.2.)
The formation of notions is associated with getting connected with the procedure of explaining specific sets of symbols and the associated established social (or, rather, cultural) notions of "that which transpires." This connection will affect the researcher's assessment of that which transpires due to its sheer technology. (Zilberman 2021: 43)
Mõistete moodustumine on seotud ühendusse-saamisega teaduslike sümbolite hulkade seletamise protseduuriga ja seotud harjumuspäraste ühiskondlike (või, pigem kultuuriliste) mõistetega "sellest, mis toimub." - Kogu lõik läheb natuke arusaadavamaks, aga sellest esimesest lausest ei saanud seitse korda üle lugedes ka mitte tuhkagi aru. Jutt käib üldiselt sellest, kuidas inimesed üldse mõtestavad ühiskondliku protsessi vms. Eriti näib olevat rõhk sellel, et sotsioloogi hinnangut oma uurimisobjektist mõjutavad ka kultuurilised ettekujutused sellest, mis ühiskonnas aset võtab.
Indeed, analytical diagrams and scientific jargon are not unique means of forming the concept of sequential states of society (and, therefore, the corresponding problems of their study). Commonplace consciousness and the language of common sense also possess this concept, albeit in a less distinct form. Public opinion and scientific postulation share the same modality, for they represent differently shaped apodictic statements, or statements about the existence of "something," which makes them "mythologemss" to a greater or a lesser extent. The verification of a scientific postulation by connecting them to the explanation of those sets of symbols whose representation is highly consensual (which occurs on the level of common sense) in particular is, after all, a trivial procedure. (Zilberman 2021: 43)
Põhimõiste, millest jutt käib, näib olevat midagi sellist nagu 'ühiskonna arenemine', st ettekujutus ühiskonna järjestikkustest seisunditest. Ka mitte-teadlasel on mingi ettekujutus ühiskonna arenemisest, aga vähem-selge või vähem-eritletav (raskem näppu peale panna, milline see täpselt on). Nüüd see osa, mis mulle meeldib: avalik arvamus ja teaduslik seisukoht on samas modaalsuses, sest nad esindavad erinevalt kujunenud apodeiktilisi väiteid, või väiteid "millegi" eksistentsi kohta, mis teeb neist rohkemal või vähemal määral "mütologeemid".
The only nontrivial aspect is that the way of formulating the problem, the dissection of the process continuum, and different ways of representing reality, will all result in the use of different channels fro engaging symbols in scientific explanation and in different sets of said symbols. In other words, the nontrivial problem is that of how language norms affect scientific thought. The purpose of methodology is the objectification of this nontriviality. This is achieved by means of systematic semantic destruction of all the expressive tools inherent in a language on different levels of expression - the significative, the symbolic, and the intentional. (Zilberman 2021: 43)
Selle (eeldatavasti) 'ühiskonna arenemise' protsessi kontiinumi lahkamine või osadeksvõtmine on küsimuse all - eelnevast meenub näide, et India ühiskonnas on peale mineviku, oleviku ja tuleviku ka konkreetne igavik. (Modaalse) metodoloogia eesmärk on esemestada seda mitte-tühist küsimust, kuidas keelenormid mõjutavad teaduslikku mõtlemist. Zilbermani arusaam keele sisemistest väljendusvahenditest erinevatel väljenduse tasanditel on jälle mingi triaad, mis esmapilgul ei meiki mingit senssi (tähenduslik, sümboolne ja tahtlik) ja tuleb lootma jääda, et varem või hiljem, vb isegi midagi muud seletades, kukuvad ka nende kategooriate selgitused.
the systematic semantic destruction of all the expressive tools inherent in a language - on the levels ascribed in the text this was conducted by Zilberman in his [1972] article [Shankara Aparoksha Anubhuti (Nezaochnoe postizhenie), perevod i Kommentarii [Shankara Aparoksha Anubhuti (Self-Realization), translation and Commentary]. Voprosy Filosofii No. 5: 109-116.] with the aid of the materials from Adi Shankara's Aparokṣānubhūti (Self-Realization) treatise. (Oguibenine 2021: 176, jm 9)
Kui Venemaa oleks normaalne riik siis oleks Вопросы философии tervikuna juba ammu ära digitaliseeritud.
Indeed, objects involved in an experiment are not always available for observation or experimentation - for instance one does not prove the flammability of a house by burning it down. In particular, this applies to the objects of social theory - the area for experimentation is known to be rather narrow here, while certain objects are impossible to observe by definition due to their complete obscuration by symbolsi. (Zilberman 2021: 44)
Harjumuspärane arusaam sümbolitest on avalikustav - sümbol vahendab midagi, annab midagi edasi; siin (ja ka La Barre-l, aga teistel põhjustel) on sümbolid vastupidi varjavad - nad peidavad midagi, seisavad millegi ees nii, et me ei näe selgelt, mis asub nende taga.
This influence cannot be neutralized by the concept of clarity of theoretic concepts. If we recollect that theory can also be regarded as a particular variety of observation, we shall have to admit that its terminology will a priori be unobservable if it turns out to be non-operational. We should therefore demand something other than clarity - the possibility of indirect clarification. In our case, the term in question happens to be "tradition." (Zilberman 2021: 44)
Teoreetikuna see vaade muidugi kõditab mind.
For instance, by treating culture as a residual category we invariably end up with a static model of the social system and the idea of an individual that si isomorphic to culture. If the residual category is that of individuality, which becomes perceived as an endlessly irrational or independent element of will, it will be impossible for us to construct an analytic model of culture. (Zilberman 2021: 45)
Huvitaval kombel on Zilbermanil justkui individuaal kultuuriga isomorfne, st inimene sarnaneb kultuurile (siinses kontekstis kui "jäänuk" või "ülejääk"), aga Lotmanil on vastupidi kultuur isomorfne individuaaliga, täpsemalt isegi isiksusega.
Since the concept that we study (tradition) is impossible to demonstrate or describe it within knowledge, theories concerning it serve the peculiar function of "secondary (philosophical) myths" in approximately the same sense as introduced by Plato when he had to deal with an emergent object that cannot be conceptualzied within knowledge (such as "soul" in the Phaedo dialog). In this sense, theories presented as "secondary myths" are but second-level discursion experiments. This approach does not require us to consider theories in their entirety - it suffices to focus on specific parts if the interests of the discussion itself are also of a specific character. (Zilberman 2021: 46)
Zilberman otsib traditsiooni nagu mina otsin hinge.
In a linear continuum [A] the social process unfolds over the course of time. Its symbol is a straight line, a vector with a single direction that rules out the possibility of moving in reverse. Such a continuum can, in principle, be subjected to discretization at any point by isolating two or more sequential social states in such a way that they could be viewed in opposition to each other, compared structurally, with polar signs assigned to them within some system of measurement, considered as indicators of measure or as the polar meanings for a variety of freely arranged intermediate states, etc. Their examples are as follows: "community" vs. "society;" "mechanical solidarity" vs. "organic solidarity;" "rural society" vs. "urban society;" "traditional society" vs. "modern society;" "primitive society" vs. "evolved society;" etc. All such continua imply a certain degree or relativity of [|] certain qualities as they become less manifest or more manifest in the development of the social process, which has but a single direction. (Zilberman 2021: 49-50)
Kultuur → antikultuur.
In a circular continuum [B] the social process unfolds in space. It is symbolized by a circle, where every motion is reversible. The reversibility of the view of the system's internal process eliminates the notion of the systems internal time. If even circular motion can be oriented towards something, it is obvious that we shall still be unable to distinguish between the previous and the subsequent movements in the notion of a period. The relation between the elements of a circle, or arc segments, as well as points on the circumference, is one of placement rather than one of sequentiality, which makes it purely spatial. This is why it is claimed that individual social states are placed rather than order in time within a continuum of this type. This fact is important, since the customary descriptions of the life of societies within such continua are taxonomical rather than chronological, and the concept of the system's internal time is replaced by the idea of taxonomy of own meanings (or norm), while the idea of time that is external to the system, including physical time, becomes symbolic in nature and is used for the expression and communication of social states in a circular continuum. (Zilberman 2021: 50)
Tsenter → perifeeria.
In a pulsating continuum [C] the social process unfolds within a unified framework of time and space. This can either happen when a tradition changes subjectively, but not substantively (the phenomenon of "historical consciousness," or when this happens substantively, but not subjectviely (the phenomenon of "traditionalist" consciousness). (Zilberman 2021: 50)
Kuidas erinevad subjektiivsus vs substantiivsus ja sisu vs väljendus?
A pulsating continuum is characterized by a high extent of randomness in the original condition of the social process in some cross-esctions. Similarly to sudden flares of quietly oscillating variable stars, such continuum representations allow for irrational infractions capable of destroying the entire system of traditional relations. (Zilberman 2021: 51)
Vrd. Kultuur ja plahvatus.
The paradigm's second requirement is the assumption that all the social theories under study can be distinguished by the character of control which, according to the explanatory scheme of these theories, is involved in the mechanics of the social process. Control is considered inverse (represented symbolically as ↺) if it is directed from society in general toward its constitutive elements up to the level of individual people, or as diverse (↻) if it is directed from people and other constitutive units toward the society in general. (Zilberman 2021: 51)
Top-down ja bottom-up.
Within the [circular] B-1 continuum, the sum total of tradition remains immutable as an institutionalized social structure. Its immutability leads to an ordering of situationally reorganizing interpersonal relations, where this structure serves as the primary foundation. Concrete social organization is defined as the sum of constant that we end up with a "role-based insertion" of actors into the structural formula of tradition with variable functions. In other words, the integrity of the social system remains intact institutionally, but the functions of the institutions may change. (Zilberman 2021: 52)
Siinkohal jääb mulje, et "substantiivne" tähistab ühiskondlikku struktuuri ja "subjektiivne" tähistab ühiskondlikku funktsiooni.
It is significant that the latter has no associated type of consciousness, or else we would have ended up with a continuum of the third type. (Zilberman 2021: 52)
Isekeskis jättis mind mõtlema, et tal on justkui (a) aeg, (b) ruum, ja (c) aeg-ruum; vs nt Peirce'il (1) kehaline/ruumiline, (2) ajaline/hingeline, (3) ajalis-ruumiline/vaimne. Mulle meeldiks selline järjestus rohkem ka Zilbermani üleminekute puhul, sest nö topoloogiline B tundub kronoloogiliselt eelnev lineaarsele A-le: eelajalooline hajus ühiskond, milles hulg külakesi rääkisid enam-vähem üksteisele mõistetavat keelt, aga poliitilist korraldust ei olnud, vs juba korrastatud ühiskonna lineaarsed üleminekud (nt Rooma üleminek vabariigist impeeriumiks jne).
It is easy enough to see that we can isolate three types of transformation in different conceptual approaches - the three types of the mechanics of social transmission, namely, tradition preserved in ideas, norms, and values, depending on which structure of culture is recorded in immediate social transmission (see Fig. 2.1). Indeed, continuum A lacks the discretization of ideas; the same is true for continuum B and norms, and continuum C and values. Thus, we end up with what comprises the content of social activity in the form of the transmission of tradition. Therefore, tradition is implemented in the acts of conceptualization, regulation, and evaluation. (Zilberman 2021: 54)
Mida see "diskretisatsioon" siin tähendab? Hävitamist? Samuti tekitab segadust, et I=A1, N=B2, V=C1. Mis toimub samade denominatsioonidega A2, B1 ja C2 puhul?
However, this typology, arranged in a linear continuum in a way that implies a chronological sequence of types where one type follows another, has a substantial methodological flaw. It creates a pseudo-historical perspective of unilinear development of social processes, which assumes the resemblance of a sociological law and does not allow for a satisfactory assessment of social differentiation. Tönnies himself participated in popularizing this misconception. Real social groups can differ in the degree of their resemblance to a Gemeinschaft- or the Gesellschaft-type societies; thus, in general, this typology can be used as a basis for establishing the order of social variation. (Zilberman 2021: 55)
Metslaste kogukonnast areneb lõpuks paratamatult osake tsiviliseeritud ühiskonnast.
However, this sequence is not implied by his own suggested principles of basing a typology on two types of will. One might initially assume that the two types of will recognized by Tönnies, Wesenwille ("natural will," or "intrinsic will"), and Kürwille, or "rational will" are similar to M. Weber's typology of action, and that the distinction made by Tönnies is merely a rough sketch thereof. He describes "natural will" as arising immediately from an individual's character or temperament, whereas the rational variety manifests itself when one has a proportional view of one's ends and means when one acts - the expression of will is regulated by thought. (Zilberman 2021: 55)
Clay'l laias laastus sama teema: instinktiivne tahe, mis ei ole tema järgi tegelik tahe, sest inimene ise ei tahtnud - tema keha tahtis - mida ta nimetab nö ase-tahteks, ja siis päris tahe, milles inimene on appertseptiivselt teadlik omaenda tahteliigutustest. Joonealune märkus täpsustab: "The speculations of Tönnies were also stimulated by W. Wundt's differentiation between the concepts of Zweckwille ("ends-oriented will") and Triebwille, or "instinctive will" (Wundt 1896)." (samas, 55, jm)
In that case, though, we would have to classify the theory of Tönnies as an A-2 continuum. However, this would be erroneous - in the concept of Tönnies the type of action does not define the social situation, but is, on the contrary, defined thereby. This is made clear by the inclusion of the basic concept of "collective will" in his explanation, an attribute of a "collective person," or an organization made up of individuals (1940, 10). The organic "collective will" manifests differently in explicitly defined situations. For example, in economic exchanges it always assumes the form of "rational will," and in kinship, that of "natural will." (Zilberman 2021: 56)
Meenub situatsiooni konteksti (siin "sotsiaalse situatsiooni") ja kõnetüübi (siin "sotsiaalse tegevuse tüübi") seost, aga kumb kumba peaks määrama läheb juba üle minu pea.
We have to distinguish two tyes of tradition: one has the mechanics of transforming norms into ideas while values remain unchanged, and the other has the mechanics of values transforming into ideas while norms remain unchanged. (Zilberman 2021: 56)
See näib olevat Zilbermani dünaamika üks põhieeldusi, et N, V ja I vahel toimuvad sellised muutused (üleminekud või transformatsioonis), milles ühed saavad teiseks ja kolmandad jäävad iseendaks. Loodetavasti teistkordsel ülelugemisel on see kild juba sobitunud suuremasse pilti.
The third part of the present book will demonstrate at length that the experience of an idea as described by Durkheim can be identified with a known type of cultural tradition provisionally named "Tibetan," since [|] the intrinsic patterns of this tradition can be represented as the mechanism manifesting the semantics of the Tibetan culture under specific circumstances where text serves as a means of normative influence. The characteristics of this culture resemble those of any authoritarian organization or society wherein the individuals' capacity for expressing themselves via value-oriented endeavors is repressed to such an extent that judgmental statemests altogether fail to be perceived by the mind as instances of independent activity, and the mind itself is organized so completely along the lines of cultural norms in terms of one's semantic perceptions that the very idea fo a person capable of sentiments representing "anomie" is obliterated by normative pressure - one's mentality and behavior fully reflect the system of norms. One's "conscientiousness" is evolved so much that a person has no individuality and is unfamiliar with the concept of free choice. Imposing freedom upon such a person may result in anomic phenomena. In this situation, the theory of "collective representations" finds its natural implementation in the codex of behavior. (Zilberman 2021: 61-62)
See konkreetne näide meikib isegi senssi, isegi kui Durkheimi teooria seda veel ei tee. Kui normid on saanud ideedeks, ei ole isiklikel väärtushinnangutel mingit kohta.
It is, perhaps, thus unnecessary to isolate the subsystems of culture and individuality within a social systems of this type. This distinction looks contrived in a society whose organization is authoritarian. Durkheim suggests that this should be avoided in case of societies only possessing repressive sanctions. (Zilberman 2021: 62)
Paneb mõtlema kas Lotmani kergeloomuline/kerglane isomorfism kultuuri ja isiksuse vahel tulenes just selles, et ta mõtles/kirjutas autoritaarse süsteemi liikmena.
However, "collective representations" are anything but abstract ideas. Withni the current of a specific tradition they translate into desires, fears, or knowledge (when such traditions become subjectivized in individuals). (Zilberman 2021: 63)
Hirmud = normid, ihad = väärtused?
In particular, the idea of the free appraisal of norms characterizes the essence of the capitalistic economic system, wherein everything is subject to reappraisal with the exception of the economic principle of profitability. "Family" serves as the equivalent of capitalist "profitability" in the old Chinese society. The attitude toward other norms is similar in both cases. (Zilberman 2021: 64, jm)
Samuti meikib senssi. Kui sa mõtled ainult kasumist (ületootmise/majanduskasvu väärtusest on saanud kogu idee-plaan), lendavad kõik muud normid ja ideed aknast välja. Kui hiinlase jaoks on kõik peale perekonna ükskõik, siis kapitalistlikus ühiskonnas võib kasumi kõrval olla ka perekond ükskõikne asi (vt lõputult ajaviiteartikleid töö- ja koduse elu tasakaalustamisest jne).
After all, values can be transformed into "ideas" as well as norms; also, one can assess a norm as well as an idea. Thus, to completely characterize the social process, it is not sufficient to have knowledge of its structure. We also need knowledge of ideas and methods of assessment. This knowledge can also be represented within the mechanisms of the corresponding traditions and woven into the general context of interaction. (Zilberman 2021: 65)
Siit loen välja, et struktuur on Zilbermani jaoks normatiivne. Ise ma selle peale ei tuleks (ei tea normidest midagi).
This is one of the avenues for exerting effort when the problem of normative order (a single order and not two alternatives) rises as a wave in the interfering current of events, and the ideology of conservatism has a practical interest in obliterating this wave. An interest is thus the protection of an idea into a plan of action. (Zilberman 2021: 66)
Ma ei näe kuidas eelnevast arutelust järeldub see huvi-määratlus. Tekib kõhe tunne, et kõik tema mõisted on niimoodi määratletud, täiesti suvalistes kohtades, kõrvalmärkusena mingile suurejoonelisele mõttelennule.
Therefore, neither Radcliffe-Brown, nor Kroeber managed to come up with any theories that would account for the processes of interpersonal interaction, which is where specific cultural traditions of different scale and significance are actually formed, or the processes used for establishing communication between different cultural tradition (local or temporal) as they become generalized into national traditions. (Zilberman 2021: 70)
Radcliffe-Brown ja Kroeber ei jõudnud kommunikatiivse arusaamani kultuurist, mis on kultuurisemiootikale niivõrd tüüpiline.
The expansion of the cultural scope of references (primarily as a result of anthropological research) was conducive to the transformation from earlier ideas of the processes of social change and the transformation of tradition being unilinear and irreversible to a more complek and pertinent picture. It turns out that instead of a single changing tradition one can consider a veritable bundle of immutable traditions that converge or diverge, woven together to resemble a fugue of sorts, with numerous variations constructed around a single leitmotif. This unity is the "great tradition" that spreads across the changing relations of a "little" ones. It manifests itself in institutionalized interactions of a specific kind of characteristic for the subjects of a given culture. Tradition inhabits two dimensions, one changing, and the other static, and the propinquity between the former and the latter depends on the nature of the "leitmotif" and the intentions of the "performers." (Zilberman 2021: 71)
Muutumatud traditsioonid ise varieeruvad ühe leitmotiivi raames. Selles mängivad staatiline (arhaism) ja muutuv (neologism) ja nende omavaheline lähedus (propinquity) sõltub "mängija" kavatsustest. - Natuke müstiline muusikaline metafoorika. Järgmine lõik seletab, et see ühtne suurem protsess, mida niimoodi võib käsitleda, on traditsiooni(de) ühiskondlik ülekandemehhanika (the mechanics of social transmission).
This idea provides the basis for most of the collective monograph (Evers 1969), where Thailand as a society with a "loose structure" is seen as the opposite of societies with a "rigid structure" such as China, Japan, Vietnam, etc., and this opposition is used in the tatempt to analyze social mobility accompanied by the preservation of tradition as a result of cultivating traditional Buddhist (Hinayana) individualism, where variation from the norm is permitted, as practiced deliberately and confirmed statistically, etc. This is used as the explanation of the country's relatively stable political life. (Zilberman 2021: 74, jm2)
"Throughout the era of Western imperialism in Asia, Siam [Thailand] remained the only nation in the region to avoid colonization by foreign powers" (Wikipedia). Normist varieeruva individualismi lubatusega seoses meikib senssi ka riigi tänapäevane maine "kombelõtvuse" osas.
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