Ogden, C. K.; Richards, I. A. 1938. The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
In recent years, indeed, the existence and importance of this problem of Meaning have been generally admitted, but by some sad chance those who have attempted a solution have too often been froced to relinquish their ambition - whether through old age, like Leibnitz, or penury, like C. S. Peirce, or both. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 1)
Leibniz kirjutas elu lõpus midagi tähenduse probleemist?
But, he continues, speech (le langage), though concrete enough, as a set of events is not integral. Its sounds imply movements of speech, and both, as instruments of thought, imply ideas. Ideas, he adds, have a social as well as an individual side, and at each instant language implies both an established system and an evolution. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 4)
Täpselt ei saa aru mida siin mõeldakse 'kõne liikumiste': kas kõneliigutusi (häälepaelte võnkumine, suu ja keele liikumine jne) või kõneringlust (sõnumivahetust). Kui esimene, siis kuidas erineb kõnelemine ja kõneliigutus; kui teine, siis kuidas kõnehelid seda imply-ivad. Ideede sotsiaalne ja individuaalne külg meikib natuke rohkem senssi - Ferdinand de Saussure oli ka Durkheimi ringkonnaga seotud.
La langue is further "the sum of the verbal images stored up in all the individuals, a treasure deposited by the practice of speaking in the members of a given community; a grammatical system, virtually existing in each brain, or more exactly in the brains of a body of individuals; for la langue is not complete in any one of them, it exists in perfection only in the mass." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 5)
St keel on sotsiaalne fakt.
As a philologist with an inordinate respect for linguistic convention, de Saussure could not bear to tamper with what he imagined to be a fixed meaning, a art of la langue. This scrupulous regard for fictitious 'accepted' uses of words is a frequent trait in philologists. Its roots go down very deep into human nature, as we shall see in the two chapters which follow. It is especially regrettable that a technical equipment, otherwise excellent, should have been so weak at this point, for the initial recognition of a general science of signs, 'semiology,' of which linguistic would be a branch, and the msot important branch, was a very notable attempt in the right direction. Unfortunately this theory of signs, by neglecting entirely the things for which signs stand, was from the beginning cut off from any contact with scientific methods of verification. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 6)
St filoloogidel on komme klammerduda sõnastikumääratluste ja etümoloogiate külge. Selle kalduvuse tõttu kannatab elava keele uurimine ja keeleteaduse teaduslikkus - kui uurija ei hooli, mis objektid seisavad märkide taga, siis ta uurib ainult märke kui selliseid.
Philosophers and philologists alike have failed in their attempts. There remains a third group of inquirers with an interest in linguistic theory, the ethnologists, many of whom have come to their subject after a preliminary training in psychology. An adequate account of primitive peoples is impossible without an insight into the essentials of their languages, which cannot be gained through a mere transfer of current Indo-European grammatical distinctions, a procedure only too often positively misleading. In the circumstances, each field investigator might be supposed to reconstruct the grammar of a primitive tongue from his own observations of the behaviour of a speaker in a given situation. Unfortunately this is rarely done, [|] since the difficulties are very great; and perhaps owing to accidents of psychological terminology, the worker tends to neglect the concrete environment of the speaker and to consider only the 'ideas' which are regarded as 'expressed.' (Ogden; Richards 1938: 6-7)
Etnoloog üritab ka käitumisest järeldada grammatilisi kategooriaid? Malinowski, vähemalt, järeldas hoopis psühholoogilise hoiaku.
"All speech," says Dr Boas explicitly, "is intended to serve for the communication of ideas." Ideas, however, are only remotely accessible to outside inquirers, and we need a theory which connects words with things through the ideas, if any, which they symbolize. We require, that is to say, separate analyses of the relations of words to ideas and of ideas to things. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 7)
Ideed ühendavad sõnu asjadega. Lihtne! Aga mis on ideed? Platoonilised ideaalkujundid, Locke'i loogilised sõnaseosed (mees + vallaline = poissmees) või lihtsalt ettekujutus, igasugune mental imagery?
Further, much language, especially primitive language, is not primarily concerned with ideas at all, unless under 'ideas' are included emotions and attitudes - a procedure which would involve terminological inconveniences. The omission of all separate treatment of the ways in which speech, besides conveying ideas, also expresses attitudes, desires and intentions, is another point at which the work of this active school is at present defective. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 7)
Esiteks tundub, et autorid ajavad ise keele ja kõne segamini: kui jutt käib keelest, siis peavad ideed tõesti hõlmama emotsioone ja suhtumisi (kas õnn ja rõõm ei ole ideed?); kõne väljendab ka suhtumisi, soove ja kavatsusi, st ei vahenda ainult ideid, aga ideed peavad neid kõiki ju vahendama - valemis 'ideed ühendavad sõnu asjadega' on need (suhtumised, soovid, kavatsusid) ju asjad, mida sõnad peavad ideede kaudu vahendama.
In yet another respect all these specialists fail to realize the deficiencies of current linguistic theory. Preoccupied as they are - ethnologists with recording the details of fast vanishing languages; philologists with an elaborate technique of phonetic laws and principles of derivation; philosophers with 'philosophy' - all have overlooked the pressing need for a better understanding of what actually occurs in discussion. The analysis of the process of communication is partly psychological, and psychology has now reached a stage at which this part may be successfully undertaken. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 8)
Filosoofid tegelevad oma loogiliste abstraktsioonidega, filoloogid tegelevad keelemuutustega mis sünnitas ladina keelest itaalia, hispaania ja prantsuse keele, etnoloogid tegelevad väljasurevate keeltega, jne... Aga keegi ei tegele (veel) kommunikatsiooniprotsessi endaga.
Symbolism is the study of the part played in human affairs by language and symbols of all kinds, and especially of their influence on Thought. It singles out for special inquiry the ways in which symbols help us and hinder us in reflecting on things. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 9)
Semiootika.
But besides this referential use which for all reflective, intellectual use of language should be paramount, words have other functions which may be grouped together as emotive. These can best be examined when the framework of the problem of strict statement and intellectual communication has been set up. The importance of the emotive aspects of language is not thereby minimized, and anyone chiefly concerned with popular or primitive speech might well be led to reverse this order of approach. Many difficulties, indeed, arising through the behaviour of words in discussion, even amongst scientists, force us at an early stage to take into account these 'non-symbolic' influences. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 10)
Selle määratluse järgi on metalingvistiline funktsioon samuti referentsiaalne - reflekteerimise objektiks on lihtsalt keel ise. Poeetiline funktsioon tekitab samuti küsimusi - kui luulet vaadelda intellektuaalse stimulatsiooni, mitte afektiivse naudingu, seisukohalt, siis on ka luule mõeldud reflekteerimiseks ja järelikult referentsiaalne. Muidugi ei saa jätta märkamata, et fraasiga "populaarne või primitiivne kõne" viskavad autorid siin 'metslased' ja Läänemaailma vaesed inimesed ühte patta. Tavaline inimene tänaval on põhimõtteliselt metslane, intellektuaalselt.
This may be simply illustrated by a diagram, in which the three factors involved whenever any statement is made, or understood, are placed at the corners of the triangle, the relations which hold between them being represented by the sides. The point just made can be restated by saying that in this respect the base of the triangle is quite different in composition from either of the other sides. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 10)
Kolmnurga tippudes ei olegi (1) sõna, (2) idee ja (3) asi, nagu võiks arvata, vaid hoopis (1) sümbol, (2) referent ja (3) mõte või referents. Tähendab, samastatakse sõna/sümbol, idee/mõte/referents ja asi/referent. Uue ja vana terminoloogia koos-hoidmiseks pean nende kolmnurga rohkemate siltidega taaslooma:
Between a thought and a symbol causal relations hold. When we speak, the symbolism we employ is caused partly by the reference we are making and partly by social and psychological factors - the purpose for which we are making the reference, the proposed [|] effect of our symbols on other persons, and our own attitude. When we hear what is said, the symbols both cause us to perform an act of reference and to assume an attitude which will, according to circumstances, be more or less similar to the act and the attitude of the speaker. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 11)
No see on küll kummaline arusaam kausaalsusest. Kui me (1) kõneleme ehk toodame sümboleid, siis (2) mõte või viide määrab sümbolid, mida me kasutame; ja kui kui me (1) kuulame kõne ehk võtame sümboleid vastu, siis see (2) sunnib meid teostama viite-akti. Referent ise (3) siin justkui ei osale. Tavaliselt kui räägitakse märkidest ja kausaalsusest, siis märgi ja objekti vahel, ehk see sama alumine haar, mida siin ei taheta puudutada.
Between the Thought and the Referent there is also a relation; more or less direct (as when we think about or attend to a coloured surface we see), or indirect (as when we 'think of' or 'refer to' Napoleon), in which case there may be a very long chain of sign-situations intervening between the act and its referent: word - historian - contemporary record - eye-witness - referent (Napoleon). (Ogden; Richards 1938: 11)
Okei. (2) Mõtte ja (3) Asja vahel on 'rohkem või vähem otsene' või siis 'kaudne' suhe. Otsene kui asi on in presentia - kõnesituatsioonis kohalolev ese või isik; kaudne kui asi on in absentia - olev või olematu ese või isik. Märgi-situatsioonide ahelast ei saa ma veel aru, eriti miks just selline näide.
Between the symbol and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists in its being used by someone to stand for a referent. Symbol and Referent, that is to say, are not connected directly (and when, for grammatical reasons, we imply such a relation, it will merely be an imputed, [|] as opposed to a real, relation) but only indirectly round the two sides of the triangle. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 11-12)
Imputed/real tuleb alles 6. peatükis jutuks. Siin ilmneb autorite - kes on ise filoloogid - nõrkus: nad käsitlevad ainult sümbolit. Märgid millel on päris suhe (kus suitsu seal tuld) ei tule siin jutuks; räägime ainult sümbolitest (sõnadest), mille suhe asjadega on mõtte/viite kaudu vahendatud. Märgikasutaja on siin kolmnurga tipus. Alumine vasak nurk on tähistaja; alumine parem nurk on tähistatav. Referent on siin pigem tähistatav kui objekt.
It is noteworthy, however, that recent stirrings in psychology have been mainly if not altogether concerned with feeling and volition. The popular success of Psycho-analysis has tended to divert attention from the older problem of thinking. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 13)
Süüdistavad Freudi, aga mitte tema õpetajat, Brentanot, kes imo on tegelikult süüdi Bühleri mõjutamises.
The completeness of any reference varies; it is more or less close and clear, it 'grasps' its object in greater or less degree. Such symbolization as accompanies it - images of all sorts, words, sentences whole and in pieces - is in no very close observable connection with the variation in the perfection of the reference. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 15)
Mõte 'haarab' asja ainult 'adekvaatselt'.
Normally, whenever we hear anything said we spring spontaneously to an immediate conclusion, namely, that the speaker is referring to what we should be referring to were we speaking the words ourselves. In some cases this interpretation may be correct; this will prove to be what he has referred to. But in most discussions which attempt greater subtleties than could be handled in a gesture language this will not be so. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 15)
Kõnelejad ja kuulajad sageli 'haaravad' erinevaid referente (mõtlevad erinevatest asjadest).
We have not here in view the more familiar ways in which words may be used to deceive. In a later chapter, when the function of language as an instrument for the promotion of purposes rather than as a means of symbolizing references is fully discussed, we shall see how the intention of the speaker may complicate the situation. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 16)
Konatiivne 'eesmärkide edendamine'.
If we stand in the neighbourhood of a cross road and observe a pedestrian confronted by a notice To Grantchester displayed on a post, we commonly distinguish three important factors in the situation. There is, we are sure, (1) a Sign which (2) refers to a Place and (3) is being interpreted by a person. All situations in which Signs are considered are similar to this. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 21)
Siin jällegi on Sümbol (märk) ja Asi (koht), aga Mõtte asemel 'tõlgendav isik'. Autorite kolmnurga teeb keeruliseks ja kohmakaks see, et neil ei ole saatjale ja vastuvõtjale eraldi kohtasid määratud. Aga kui seda teha siis juhtub nagu Jakobsoni skeemiga - 'Mõte' (viide, referentsiaalsus) jääb õhku rippuma ja kuigi saatja ning vastuvõtja on kohal, ei ole selge, kummale see tõlgendus-akt seal tipus kuulub.
In the terminology of the present work, many of the analyst's 'symbols' are, of course, signs only; they are not used for purposes of communication. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 23)
Kasulik vihje: autorid kasutavad 'sümboli' mõistet kui nad peavad silmas kommunikatiivseid märke.
With the majority, and in matters of ordinary discussion, the influence of this legacy is all-pervasive, in language no less than in other spheres. "If we could open the heads and read the thoughts of two men of [|] the same generation and country, but at the opposite ends of the intellectual scale, we should probably find their minds as different as if the two belonged to different species. ... Superstitions survive because, while they shock the views of enlightened members of the community, they are still in harmony with the thoughts and feelings of others, who, though they are drilled by their betters into an appearance of civilization, remain barbarians or savages at heart." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 24-25)
Tavaline Lääne inimene on ikka veel põhimõtteliselt metslane. Eksplitsiitne väide. Allikas on J. G. Frazeri Psyche's Task, p. 169.
And from the structure of our language we can hardly even think of escaping. Tens of thousands of years have elapsed since we shed our tails, but we are still communicating with a medium developed to meet the needs of arboreal man. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 26)
Kui jätta kõrvale see, et Homo sapiens eksles Aafrikast välja juba 80,000-100,000 aastat tagasi, on siin päris tabav püänt: inimloom ronis puu otsast alla, aga suhtleb edasi nagu tal oleks vaja teise puu otsas turnijale midagi hõigata.
The greater part of mankind must once have believed the name to be that integral part of a man identified with the soul, or to be so important a portion of him that it might be substituted for the whole, as employers speak of factory 'hands.' (Ogden; Richards 1938: 27)
"Töökäed" on tõepoolest päris hea näide metonüümiast. Ainult käed vä? Eks ma saadan nad tööle ja ise jään koju.
[...] and finally the exploitation, for political and commercial purposes, of the printing press by the dissemination and reiteration of clichés. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 29)
Trükipress on klišeedes süüdi?
Jowett in comparing the Dialectic of Hegel with that of Plato remarks: "Perhaps there is no greater defect in Hegel's system than the want of a sound theory of language." - The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. IV., p. 420. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 29, fn 1)
See on tegelikult tõepoolest märkimisväärne, et Hegel ei tule semiootikas peaaegu üldse üles. (Kui siis kaudselt, a la Mukařovský esteetikas.)
So that, quite apart from the difficulties raised by his Ideal World where the Name-souls dwelt, and its relations with the world of mud and blood (to which entities on æsthetic grounds he hesitated to allow 'ideas,' much as theologians debated the existence of souls in darkes), Plato had every reason to be occupied by linguistic theory. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 33)
WTF
It is curious that in the De Interpretatione Aristotle puts forward views which are hard to reconcile with such a verbal approach. He there insists that words are signs primarily of mental affections, and only secondarily of the things of which these are likenesses. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 35)
Aristotelesel juba Sõnad, Mõtted ja Asjad.
In the De Interpretatione various branches of significant speech are deliberately excluded, and we are there invited to consider only that variety known as enunciative, which, as declaring truth or falsehood, is all that belongs to Logic; other modes of speech, the precative, imperative, interrogative, etc., being more naturally regarded as part of Rhetoric or Poetic. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 36)
Tuleb Cratylus ja De Interpretatione lähemasse lugemisjärjekorda lisada.
The appeal of the Heracliteans to language as evidence for the doctrine of Change was, as we know from the Cratylus, vigorously opposed by the Parmenidean logicians, as well as by believers in the Ideas. And an equal readiness to admit that the presuppositions of Language have to be combated was manifested by Plotinus. Language, in the Neo-Platonic view, "can only be made to express the nature of the soul by constraining it to purposes for which most men never even think of employing it"; moreover, "the soul cannot be described at all except by phrases which would be nonsensical if applied to body or its qualities, or to determinations of particular bodies." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 37)
Hing on ka apofaatiline.
But the carapace, the verbal husk, is not merely a valedictory point d'appui; it also has a certain bombic capacity, an 'affective resonance' which enables the manipulator of symbols such as the Absolute to assure himself that his labours are not altogether vain. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 42)
Pommilised väljendid.
From the symbolic use of words we thus pass to the emotive; and with regard to words so used, as in poetry, Ribot has well remarked that "they no longer act as signs but as sounds; they are musical notations at the service of an emotional psychology." So that though at this extreme limit "metaphysical reasoning [|] may be intellectually quite incomprehensible; though, that is to say, it may actually become 'vocem proferre et nihil concipere,' it acquires by way of compensation," as Rignano says, "an emotive signification which is peculiar to it, i.e., it is transformed into a kind of musical language stimulative of sentiments and emotions." Its success is due entirely to the harmonious series of emotional echoes with which the naïve mind responds - et reboat regio cita barbara bombum. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 42-43)
Ma eeldan, et Ribot' La Logique des Sentiments on tõlkes The Psychology of the Emotions.
Until recent times it is only here and there that efforts have been made to penetrate the mystery by a direct attack on the essential problem. In the fourteenth century we have the Nominalist analysis of William of Occam, in the seventeenth the work of Bacon and Hobbes. The discussion rises to an apex with the [|] Third Book of Locke's Essay and the interest of Leibnitz in a Philosophical Language - a Characteristica Universalis. Berkeley and Condillac kept the issue alive, and with Horne Tooke and his followers we reach the nineteenth-century movement, in which the work of Bentham, Taine, and Mauthner was especially significant. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 43-44)
Semiootika ajalugu. Minu jaoks (veel) võõrad nimed on John Horne Tooke (The Diversions of Purley) ja Fritz Mauthner (Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache).
For the rest, an endeavour has been made to give credit where credit is due - from Anselm's De Grammatico, through Delgarno (1661), Wilkins (1668), Freke (1693), to Silberer (1917) and Cassirer's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen (1923) - in the survey of man's progress towards verbal independence published in a separate volume, Word Magic, to which reference has already been made. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 44)
Kahjuks tundub, et see Word Magic jäigi avaldamata.
A. Ingraham, Swain School Lectures (1903), pp. 121-182, on "Nine Uses of Language." The nine uses are given as follows:(Ogden; Richards 1938: 46, fn 1)
- to dissipate superfluous and obstructive nerve-force.
- for the direction of motion in others, both men and animals.
- for the communication of ideas.
- as a means of expression.
- for purposes of record.
- to set matters in motion (magic).
- as an instrument of thinking.
- to give delight merely as sound.
- to provide an occupation for philologists.
Täispealkiri näikse olevat Mind, metaphysics and logic: Swain school lectures, aga ainus praegu kättesaadav versioon on .zip fail, milles iga lehekülg on eraldi .txt fail. (Need saaks tegelikult mingi lihtsa skriptiga üheks tekstifailiks kokku keevitada.)
With some of its senses (in which 'my meaning' = 'what I am thinking of') the question to be answered is, in brief, "What happens when we judge, or believe, or think of something: of what kind of entities does the something consist: and how is it related to the mental event which is our judging, our believing, our thinking?" The traditional approach to this question has been through introspection and through the logical analysis of Judgment, with the result that all the many answers which have been given from this angle will be found, in contrast to that which is outlined below, to be variants of one opinion. They agree, that is, in holding that, when we think of anything, we have to it (or sometimes to something else) a relation of a quite unique kind. In other words thinking is regarded as an unparalleled happening. Thus the problems of symbolization and reference come to be discussed in isolation as though there were no allied fields of inquiry. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 48)
Tähendus = see, millest mõeldakse. Tähenduse küsimust samastati vanasti hinnangu (Judgment) küsimusega. Eeldati, et Mõtte ja Asja vaheline suhe on eriline, ainulaadne - vs nt Peirce, kelle süsteemis sümbolisatsioon sisaldab indeksikaliseerimist, mis omakorda sisaldab ikoniseerimist - st mõtlemine, järeldamine ja tajumine on kontiinumis.
[...] and to the still more extraordinary phantasies of van Ginneken, a subtle linguistic psychologist who, influenced doubtless by Meinong as well as by Theology, advances thes ame view as a theory of 'adhesion.' No account of thinking in terms of verbal images and representations of things is, according to this author, sufficient. "We find ourselves confronted by a new force: something non-sensible, transcendental ... by means of which we understand and know in a new manner, and a more perfect one than we could through our animal nature. We ... adhere to the present reality, to that which is really and actually there ... and also to the possible, the essence." It is plain that on any such view a scientific account of thinking is ruled out from the very beginning. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 50)
See Principles de Linguistique Psychologique on nähtavasti tõlkimata. Küll aga on hulk inglisekeelseid artikleid tema teooriate kohta.
Attempts to provide this account have been given in many different vocabularies. The doctrines of the associationists, of apperception, of suggestion, have led up to restatements in terms of process rather than of content: 'instinctive sequences' taking the place of 'mental chemistry,' with advantage but without essential change in the views maintained. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 51)
David Hartley (Observations on Man) on assotsioanist, Karl Lange (Apperception: A Monograph on Psychology and Pedagogy) kirjutab appertseptsioonist, Irving Elgar Miller (The Psychology of Thinking, veel üks .zip fail) kirjutab suggestioonist ja C. Lloyd Morgan (Instinct and Experience) räägib instinkti-jadadest.
These otherwise valuable methods of approach tend to separate the treatment of fundamental laws of mental process from that of sign-interpretation, which is unfortunate for psychology. They have led not only to the discussion in isolation of problems essentially the same, but also ta a failure to realize the extent of the ground already covered by earlier thinkers. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 51)
Vs märgimeelde seisukoht, et vaimuelu kujutab endast põhiliselt märgiprotsesse.
We have still to give an account of misinterpretation, and to explain how unfounded beliefs can arise. To [|] begin with the first, a person is often said to have introduced irrelevant, or to have omitted relevant, considerations or notions when he has misinterpreted some sign. The notion of relevance is of great importance in the theory of meaning. A consideration (notion, idea) or an experience, we shall say, is relevant to an interpretation when it forms part of the psychological context which links other contexts together in the peculiar fashion in which interpretation so links them. An irrelevant consideration is a non-linking member of a psychological context. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 75-76)
Relevantsusteooria algmed.
He was much influenced by Kant, who, in spite of his disconcerting technique, seems constantly on the verge of approaching the central issues of interpretation, and who has been claimed as the most convinced Nominalist of modern times: but there is nothing particularly Kantian about the theory of signs which can be found in various parts of Helmholtz' writings. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 79)
Umbes selline mulje on ka mulle jäänud.
To make a statement is to symbolize a reference. What a reference is we have seen in the preceding chapter. However much we may try, we cannot go beyond reference in the way of knowledge. True reference is reference to a set of referents as they hang together. False reference is reference to them as being in some other arrangement than that in which they actually hang together. The advance in knowledge is the increase in our power of referring to referents as they actually hang together. This is all we can do. By no manner of make-believe can we discover the what of referents. We can only discover the how. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 82)
Lõpliku objekti kättesaamatus, referentsiaalses terminoloogias.
To resume our outline sketch of a systematic account of perception. Directly apprehended retinal modifications such as colours, are therefore initial signs of 'objects' and 'events' (or however we agree to symbolize [|] referents); characters of things which we discover by interpretation, such as shapes of cones or tables, are signs of second or third order respectively. On the other hand shapes of initial signs, e.g. retinal modifications, are first order signs. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 82-83)
Peaaegu nagu Esmasus, Teisesus ja Kolmasus. Vahetud tajumuljed vms on esmased märgid esemetest või sündmustest.
Logic, which may be regarded as the science of the systematization of symbols, has been preoccupied either with judgments which are psychological, or with 'propositions,' which were treated as objects of thought, distinct from symbols and not psychological. Modern mathematicians, who have done so much for the formal development of symbolic method, either tacitly assume these Canons, or when confronted by difficulties due to their neglect, introduce additional ad hoc complexities into their systems. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 87)
Loogika tegeleb tähtsusetuga, mitte põhilisega.
Others maintain with Rignano that mathematics throughout is merely the performance of imagined physical experiments, recorded and represented in symbols. This amplification of the view of James Mill and Taine, though it fits some parts of mathematics well enough, is less plausible for others. As Rignano develops it, too little importance is assigned to symbols; highly systematized sets of symbols such as those of mathematics are something more than a mere means of representing our mental performances. They become, as it were capable of performing on their own account. They become thinking machines which, suitably manipulated, [|] yield results which cannot be foreseen by any process of imagining physical experiments. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 89-90)
Juri Lotman arvab sümbolsüsteemide süsteemi - kultuuri - kohta sama.
Returning from this excursus, it is important to remember that a reference, as described above at page 62, is a set of external and psychological contexts linking a mental process to a referent. Thus it is extremely unlikely that any two references will ever be strictly similar. In asking, therefore, whether two symbols are used by the same reference - especially when the users thereof are two persons with their different histories - we are raising a question of degree. [|] It is better to ask whether two references have sufficient similarity to allow profitable discussion. When such discussion is possible the references are said to be 'the same.' No means are at present available for directly comparing references. We have to judge by indirect evidence derived mainly from observing the further behaviour of the parties concerned. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 90-91)
Mõtte ja Asja vaheline suhe saab olla ainult 'adekvaatne': meie referendid sarnanevad, aga ei pruugi olla samad.
Those complex symbos, known as propositions, which 'place' referents [...] can be either Contracted or Expanded. "Hamlet was mad" is a contracted symbol, needing to be expanded before it can be discussed. "Hamlet was mad on the stage" or "in my interpretation of the play" may be expanded symbols for what is referred to. The question is of the greatest importance because of its bearing on the distinction between true and false. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 93)
Hea näide. Just selle küsimuse kohta (kas Hamlet oli hull või mängis hullu) on sajandite jooksul kirjutatud terve raamaturiiuli jagu kirjandust.
Firstly, do we define things or words? To decide this point we have only to notice that if we speak about defining words we refer to something very different from what is referred to, meant, by 'defining things.' When we define words we take another set of words which may be used with the same reference as the first, i.e., we substitute a symbol which will be better understood in a given situation. With things, on the other hand, no such substitution is involved. A so-called definition of a horse as opposed to the definition of the word 'horse,' is a statement about it enumerating properties by means of which it may be compared with and distinguished from other things. There is thus no rivalry between 'verbal' and 'real' definitions. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 110)
Metalingvistiline vs referentsiaalne funktsioon.
For the stricter purposes we shall almost always require starting-points taken outside the speech situation; things, that is, which we can point to or experience. In this way we can utilize in our symbols the advantages of gesture languages mentioned above. Thus it is easier to point to an Antimacassar, when one of these safeguards is present, than to describe it. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 115)
Kõnesituatsiooni ümbruses, mitte sellest väljaspool. (Pidin järgi vaatama misasi on "Antimacassar".)
At the beginning of our inquiry we described the relation which could be said to hold between symbol and referent as an imputed relation. To have described it simply as an indirect relation would have omitted the important difference between indirect relations recognized as such, and those wrongly treated as direct. Thus the relation between grandfather and grandson is much more indirect than that between father and son, and can be analysed into two paternal relations - 'being the father of the father (or mother) of.' Few people would suppose that a direct relation was here involved, since all family relations are highly indirect. But love, hate, friendship, sympathy, etc., are very commonly spoken of and regarded as direct, though on examination their indirectness is at once discovered. The whole of social psychology is, however, infested with imputed relations of this type, for an explanation of which such hypotheses as that of group-consciousness are often invoked. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 116)
Omistatud (imputed) suhe ei ole lihtsalt 'mitte-reaalne', nagu Jakobson seda kohtleb, vaid kaudne suhe, mida koheldakse mitte-kaudsena. St mitte reaalne vs reaalseks-peetav, vaid otsene vs kaudne.
It is curious that some of these symbols for spatial relations are unsymmetrical. Thus we have 'on' = 'above and in contact with,' but no abbreviation for 'under and in contact with,' except such ambiguous words as 'supporting.' We may fruther note that most of the common uses of 'on' are so strangely metaphorical that it has even been doubted whether there is not some simple unanalysable relation which has not yet been noticed. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 118)
Below?
The most hihly systematized sciences are those which deal with the simplest aspects of nature. The more difficult and to many people, naturally, the more attractive subjects are still in a stage in which it is an open question which symbolization is most desirable. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 122)
Lihtsate asjade jaoks on kinnistunud keel, keeruliste asjade kohta rääkides ujume mõistesupis.
The distinction which is important is that between utterances in which the symbolic function is subordinate to the emotive act and those of which the reverse is true. In the first case, however precise and however elaborate the references communicated may be, they can be seen to be present in an essentially instrumental capacity, as means to emotive effects. In the second case, however strong the emotive effects, these can be seen to be by-products not essentially involved in the speech transaction. The peculiarity of scientific statement, that recent new development of linguistic activity, is its restriction to the symbolic function. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 124)
Kas sümboolne funktsioon allutab emotiivse funktsiooni või vastupidi. Funktsioonide hierarhia - "dominant" - on siin juba kohal. Jakobson sellest siin võib-olla kaugemale ei astunudki, sest allutamisest rääkides mainib ta ainult kahte - ülejäänud neli on implitsiitselt veel enam allutatud.
When on the other hand, we say 'This is red,' the addition of 'is red' to 'this' does symbolize an extension of our reference, namely, to some other red thing. But 'is good' has no comparable symbolic function; it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 125)
Siin erineb Ogdeni ja Richardsi emotiivne funktsioon Jakobsoni emotiivsest funktsioonist. Tema oma peab vastuvõtjale jätma mulje mingist suhtumisest; nemad rõhutavad aga emotsionaalse nakkuvuse (contagion) võimalust: kui ma väljendan oma suhtumist millessegi, võib pealtkuulaja omastada sarnase suhtumise.
The recognition that many of the most popular subjects of discussion are infested with symbolically blank but emotively active words of this kind is a necessary preliminary to the extension of scientific method to these questions. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 125)
Emotiivsed ja faatilised märgid on selles osas - sümboolse funktsiooni puudumises - samaväärsed.
Thus any reference to human activities which are neither theoretical nor practical tends to be symbolized by the word 'æsthetic'; and derivatively anything which we are not merely concerned either to know or to change tends to be described as beautiful. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 131)
Praktiline teisesus - asjade muutmine. (Kuldreegel, et teine või keskmine termin on kõige varieeruvam, ikka kehtib.)
This is reminiscent of Croce's dictum with regard to the Sublime: "the Sublime is everything that is or will be so called by those who have employed or shall employ the name." The chief function of such terms in general discussion is to act as Irritants, evoking emotions irrelevant to the determination of the referent. This is an abuse of the poetical function of language to which we shall return. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 135)
Luulelised Ärritajad.
But if there is no reason to suppose that people are talking about the same thing, a lack of correlation in their remarks need not cause surprise. We assume too readily that similar language involves similar thoughts and similar things thought of. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 140)
Raamatu põhiteema selge sõnastus.
The point would be made still more plain, if sentences from poetry were used for the experiment. What is certain is that there is a common and important use of words which is different from the [|] scientific or, as we shall call it, the strict symbolic use of words. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 148-149)
Referentsiaalne - sümboolne - teaduslik.
In ordinary everyday speech each phrase has not one but a number of functions. We shall in our final chapter classify these under five headings; but here a twofold division is more convenient, the division between the symbolic use of words and the emotive use. The symbolic use of words is statement; the recording, the support, the organization and the communication of references. The emotive use of words is a more simple matter, it is the use of words to express or excite feelingfs and attitudes. It is probably more primitive. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 149)
Funktsioone on rohkem, aga siin eristavad nad veel ainult sümboolset/referentsiaalset ja emotiivset. Hämmingusse jätab "the support [...] of references". Kuidas saab kasutada sõnu viidete toetamiseks? Talletamine, korrastamine ja edastamine on enam-vähem need, mida rõhutab isegi Lotman. Aga toetamine?
Under the symbolic function are included both the symbolization of reference and its communication to the listener, i.e., the causing in the listener of a similar reference. Under the emotive function are included both the expression of emotions, attitudes, moods, intentions, etc., in the speaker, and their communication, i.e. their evocation in the listener. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 149)
'The evocation of intentions in the listener' kõlab ikka väga veidralt.
In many cases, moreover, emotive language is used by the speaker not because he already has an emotion which he desires to express, but solely because he is seeking a word which will evoke an emotion which he desires to have; nor, of course, is it necessary for the speaker [|] himself to experience the emotion which he attempts to evoke. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 149-150)
Misasia? Kas see on päriselt sage? Lausud emotsiooni-sõnu, et endas vastavat emotsiooni esile kutsuda? Nii lihtsameelsest autosuggestioonist ma küll midagi ei tea.
And to take the most recent work upon the subject, Vendryes, in his chapter upon Affective Language, keeps equally strictly to the grammarian's standpoint. "The logical element and the affective element," he says, "mingle constantly in language. Except for technical languages, notably the scientific languages, which are by definition outside life, the expression of an idea is never exempt from a nuance of sentiment." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 152)
Elemendid suisa.
But that this is not the case will be evident to anyone who studies the Symposium in Mind (October 1920 and following numbers) on "The Meaning of 'Meaning.'" (Ogden; Richards 1938: 160)
But lest the uninitiated should suppose that Metaphysicians and Critical Realists are peculiar in their method, we may turn to the use made of the word by a psychologist. For over twenty years the writings of Professor Hugo Münsterberg exercised a powerful influence on thought in England and in Germany, no less than in America. His Eternal Values (1909) appeared first in German and then in an improved and revised form in English. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 169)
Kui mõjukas ta olla sai kui temaga nüüdiskirjanduses üldse kokku ei puutu?
A study of the utterances of Philosophers suggests that they are not to be trusted in their dealings with Meaning. With the material which they have provided before us, let us see whether more creditable results can be achieved by the technique which we have already elaborated. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 185)
'Filosoofe ei saa tähendusega usaldada'. Natuke kahju, et O&R kuhjasid eelnevatel leheküljedel hunniku tsitaate kokku erinevalt filosoofidelt (aga ka ajalehtedest ja autoritelt, kes päris kindlasti ei ole filosoofid, a la raamatud laste kasvatamisest ja abielust), aga ei viitsinud igaüht kommenteerida, et nende pahed välja tuua. Seetõttu jääb natuke mulje, et nad kas pidasid viise kuidas sõna "tähendus" neis tsitaatides on kasutatud nii ilmselgelt ekslikuks, et kommentaari ei olnud vaja, või siis lihtsalt ei mõelnud selle üle väga sügavalt. Mulle jääb küll mulje, et enamus neist on oma kontekstis õigustatud. Nt pundis on ka Dewey, Royce ja Baldwin, aga näited on võetud suvalistest raamatutest, mitte tekstidest kus nad päriselt tähenduse küsimusega tegelevad. Lühidalt, kahju, et O&R ei viitsinud natuke põhjalikumalt süüvida tähenduse-teooriatesse vaid noppisid juhuslikke näiteid, kuidas keegi kasutab sõna "meaning" või "mean".
Connotation (IV) the 'meaning' of traditional logic, and Essence (V) the 'meaning' of the Critical Realists who follow Dr Santayana as quoted above, may be considered together, for 'Essences' by those who do not let their realism overpower their criticism may best be regarded as Connotation hypostatized. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 187)
Nad on konnotatsiooni mõistet siin juba mitu korda kirunud.
The term Connotation has been adopted by those logicians who follow Mill in the practice of discussing as though they were primary and paramount two senses in which a symbol may be said to mean: (1) It means the set of things to which it can be correctly applied; and the members of this set are said to be denoted or indicated by the word, or to be its denotation. (2) It means the properties used in determining the application of a symbol, the properties in virtue of which anything [|] is a member of the set which is the denotation; these properties are said to be the connotation of a symbol, or sometimes simply its meaning. The relation of denotation to connotation has been conveniently summed up as follows: The connotation of a word determines its denotation which in turn determines its comprehension, i.e., the properties common to the things to which it can be applied. The term connotation is, however, often used with the same sense as comprehension. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 187-188)
Ikka ei saa hästi aru, missugused omadused. Sümboli välise märgikandja tunnused?
One further point amusingly shows the artificiality of the traditional account, namely, the impossibility of applying it to names, which without undue rashness may be regarded as the simplest symbols out of which all our other symbolic machinery has developed. Mill concluded that proper names are non-connotative. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 190)
Sellest siis johtub nimesemiootika.
If, as is usually the case when these phrases are used, we can substitute the word 'intend' for 'mean' it will be clear that we have a quite different kind of 'meaning' from any involved when 'intention' cannot [|] be so substituted. My 'meaning' or 'intention,' as that which I endeavour to promote, is something wished, as distinguished from something known or referred to ('intended,' or 'tended towards,' in the terminology of certain American writers). Thus between this sense and that with which we have to deal in such sentences as "'Chien' and 'Dog,' both mean the same thing," there is no contradiction. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 191-192)
Millegi edendamine või soovimine.
The intention of the speaker may very naturally be used in conjunction with reference in order to provide complex definitions of meaning for special purposes. To quote from a recent article: "Is the meaning of a sentence that which is in the mind of the speaker at the moment of utterance or that which is in the mind of the listener at the moment of audition? Neither, I think. [|] Certainly not that which is in the mind of the listener, for he may utterly misconstrue the speaker's purpose. But also not that which is in the mind of the speaker, for he may intentionally veil in his utterance the thoughts which are in his brain, and this, of course, he could not do if the meaning of the utterance were prceisely that which he held in his brain. I think the following formulation will meet the case: The meaning of any sentence is what the speaker intends to be understood from it by the listener." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 192-193)
Aga tsitaat ei ütle 'kõneleja kavatsus + viide' vaid 'kõneleja kavatsus selle osas, mida kuulaja peaks sellest aru saama', mis teeb kõneleka kavatsuse oluliselt keerulisemaks (see on teisele suunatud) ja ei pea sisaldama viidet - mida 'kõneleja mõistab' võib olla afektiivne. Siin on kena kooskõla Jakobsoni emotiivse funktsiooniga. Gardiner, Alan H. 1922. The Definition of the Word and the Sentence. British Journal of Psychology 12(4): 352-361. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1922.tb00067.x
'To be understood' is here a contraction. It stands for: (a) to be referred to + (b) to be responded with + (c) to be felt towards referent + (d) to be felt towards speaker + (e) to be supposed that the speaker is referring to + (f) that the speaker is desiring, etc., etc. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 193)
Pudru ja kapsad. Mis on "to be responded with" ja "to be felt towards speaker"? Klassikalised kolm (emotiivne, konatiivne ja referentsiaalne) on siin topeldatud, aga ma ei saa aru mis loogikaga. Näiteks (c) - kumma tunded viite suhtes, kas saatja või vastuvõtja? Samasugust segadust pakub (a) - viidatud kellele või millele? Mis mõttes "to be referred to"? Üldse ei saa aru. Loodetavasti Richards seletab kasvõi hilisemates teostes paremini seda segadust siin.
The realization of the multiplicity of the normal language function is vital to a serious approach to the problem of meaning. Here it is only desirable to point out that 'meaning,' in the sense of 'that which the speaker intends the listener to refer to,' and 'meaning,' in the sense of 'that which the speaker intends the listener to feel and to do,' etc., are clearly distinguishable. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 193)
Referentsiaalne funktsioon eristub selgelt emotiivsest ja konatiivsest. Küll aga komistan siin selle otsa, et referentsiaalne funktsioon käib jälle ringiga läbi vastuvõtja: 'mida kõneleja tahab, et kuulaja mõtleks' (millele viite-aktis osutab, st millise referendi kõneleja äsja kuuldud sõnadega ühendaks).
The meaning (XIIb) of a sign adequately interpreted will be that to which it is actualyl related by the sign relation. But for the case of false interpretations the two 'meanings' will be different. Another point of interest is that this account removes the necessity for any 'Correspondence Theory of Truth' since an adequate reference has as its referent not something which corresponds to the fact or event which is the meaning of a sign by definition (XII) but something which is identical with it. We may if we please say that a reference corresponds with its referent, but this would be merely shorthand for the fuller account of reference which we have given. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 205)
Mõtte (reference) ja Asja (referent) vaheline suhe on 'adekvaatne' kui Mõte ja Asi on samad.
With these considerations before us we can now understand the peculiarities of Symbols with their twofold 'meaning' for speaker and hearer. A symbol as we have defined it (cf. pp. 11, 12 supra) symbolizes an act of reference; that is to say, among its causes in the speaker, together no doubt with desires to record and to communicate, and with attitudes assumed towards hearers, are acts of referring. Thus a symbol becomes when uttered, in virtue of being so caused, a sign to a hearer of an act of reference. But this act, except where difficulty in understanding occurs, is of little interest in itself, and the symbol is usually taken as a sign of what it stands for, namely that to which the reference which it symbolizes refers. When this interpretation is successful it follows that the hearer makes a reference similar in all relevant respects to that made by the speaker. It is this which gives symbols their peculiarity as signs. Thus a language transaction or a communication may be defined as a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar [|] in all relevant respects to those which are symbolized by them in the speaker. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 205-206)
Ma saan su sõnadest aru, et sa mõtled. Semioos on tavaliselt taustal, sest kõneleja ja kuulaja eeldavad, et nende sümbolid viitavad samadele referentidele. Eduka kommunikatsiooni puhul nende referendid ongi identsed.
From this point of view it is evident that the problem for the theory of communication is the delimitation and analysis of psychological contexts, an inductive problem exactly the same in form as the problems of the other sciences. Owing, however, to the difficulty of observing psychological events and the superficial nature of the uniformities hithero observed, the methods employed in testing whether communication has or has not taken place are indirect. Since we are unable to observe references directyl we have to study them through signs, either through accompanying feelings or through symbols. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 206)
Mind huvitab juba pikemat aega, kas "the theory of communication" esines siin juba 1923. aasta esmaavaldamisel või on see lisatud nt kaheksandaks väljaandeks 1948. aastal, mil kommunikatsiooniteooria oli juba mitmeid aastaid populaarne olnud. Kahjuks ei ole veel 1923. aasta esmatrükki kohanud - millegi pärast on kõik Internetiarhiivi skännid hilisematest väljaannetest.
These fixities in references are for the most part supported and maintained by the use of Dictionaries, and for many purposes 'dictionary-meaning' and 'good use' would be equivalents. But a more refined sense of dictionary-meaning may be indicated. The dictionary is a list of substitute symbols. It says in effect: "This can be substituted for that in such and such circumstances." It can do this because in these circumstances and for suitable interpreters the refernces caused by the two symbols will be sufficiently alike. The Dictionary thus serves to mark the overlaps between the references of symbols rather than to define their fields. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 207)
Metalingvistiline funktsioon. Lihtsustuse mõttes tuleb eeldada, et sõnastik sisaldab ainult sõnu ja mitte pilte sõnade referentidest, mis kujutab endast tehniliselt juba referentsiaalset funktsiooni (viitab objektile, mitte teistele sõnadele).
One of the chief distinctions also between poetry and strict scientific prose is that in poetry we must consciously attend to the sensory characters of the words, whereas in prose we need not do so. This conscious attention to words as sounds does, however, tend to impede our further interpretations. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 210)
Luule 'materiaalne' aspekt - luule tõmbab tähelepanu keelematerjalile endale, sõnade helikujule, häälikute korduvusele ja rütmile nende järjestuses jne.
Psittacism is the use of words without reference; and the fact that a word is necessary to a reference is, as will easily be seen, in no way an indication of an absence of reference. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 218)
Tänapäeval kurdetakse, et lapsed "räägivad" sageli mingisuguseid TikTokist kuuldud holofraase korrates. Nagu ütlevad küll sõnu, aga need ei viita millelegi.
Besides symbolizing a reference, our words also are signs of emotions, attitudes, moods, the temper, interest or set of the mind in which the references occur. They are signs in this fashion because they are grouped with these attitudes and interests in certain looser and thighter contexts. Thus, in speaking a sentence we are giving rise to, as in hearing it we are confronted by, at least two sign-situations. One is interpreted from symbols to reference and so to referent; the other is interpreted from verbal signs to the attitude, mood, interest, purpose, desire, and so forth of the speaker, and thence to the situation, circumstances and conditions in which the utterance is made. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 223)
Emotiivsuse pöörd: mitte kõneleja kavatsus jätta mulje mingist tundest või suhtumisest, vaid kuulaja tõlgendus kõneleja tundest või suhtumusest vms.
There are the situations which derive from attitudes, such as amity or hostility, of the speaker to his audience. In written language many of the most obvious signs for these attitudes are necessarily lost. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 224)
See on enam-vähem see, mida mõned (ekslikult?) peavadki faatiliseks funktsiooniks.
In a similar fashion our attitude to our referent in part determines the symbols we use. Here again complicated cases occur in which it may be uncertain whether our attitude is itself stated, or merely indicated through verbal signs. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 225)
Seda funktsiooni Jakobsonil ei ole, aga enam-vähem sellega tegeleb nö sentimendianalüüs.
The structure of our symbols is often determined by our Intention, the effects which we endeavour to promote by our utterance. If we desire a hearer to commit suicide we may, on occasion, make the same remarks to him whether our reason for desiring such action is benevolent interest in his career or a dislike of his personal characteristics. Thus the symbol modification due to the effect intended must not be confused with that due to the attitude assumed towards an interlocutor, although often, of course, they will coincide. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 225)
Konatiivne funktsioon. See on päris järsk, et 'saada vastuvõtja midagi tegema' näiteks on enesetapp.
Besides their truth, or farsity, references have a character which may be called, from the accompanying feelings, Ease or Difficulty. Two references to the same referent may be true but differ widely in this ease, a fact which may be reflected in their symbols. The two symbols, "I seem to remember ascending Mount Everest," and "I went up Everest," may, on occasion, [|] stand for no difference in reference and thus owe their dissimilarity solely to degrees of difficulty in recalling this uncommon experience. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 225-226)
Sellele ka ei ole head analoogi teistes keelefunktsioonide käsitlustes. Herbert Spenceri "Stiil" tuleb meelde, aga see on ka kõik.
Each of these non-symbolic functions may employ words either in a symbolic capacity, to attain the required end through the references produced in the listener, or in a non-symbolic capacity when the end is gained through the direct effects of the words. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 226)
See on natuke segadusttekitav, et need mitte-sümboolsed funktsioonid võivad võtta aset ka sõnade sümboolses funktsioonis? Kordamiseks:
- "strict symbolization" ehk referentsiaalne funktsioon pmst
- "attitude [...] of the speaker to his audience" - kuidas kõneleja suhtub kuulajatessse
- "our attitude to our referent" - kuidas kõneleja suhtub sellesse, millest ta kõneleb
- "the effects which we endeavour to promote by our utterance" - konatiivne või isegi Rueschi 7. "mõju" funktsioon
- "Ease or Difficulty" - pole vastet, kas tuleb kergelt või raskelt
See viimane võib-olla lähtub arutelust ~lk 218 ümber, kus on jutt sõna-sõltuvusest (word-dependence) ja sõna-vabadusest (word-freedom), mis üldjoontes meenutavad Jakobsoni kahte afaasia-tüüpi, ja sellele eelnevatel lehekülgedel Ogden ja Richards käsitlevadki põgusalt afaasiat.
The five functions have enumerated —appear to be exhaustive.
- Symbolization of reference; [|]
- The expression of attitude to listener;
- The expression of attitude to referent;
- The promotion of effects intended;
- Support of reference;
It is, of course, not difficult to mention other factors which modify the form or structure of symbols. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 226-227)
Okei. Ennist ülal küsisin, et misasi see "support" on. Nähtavasti midagi 'psühholoogilise konteksti' kättesaadavusega seoses: kas referendist on kerge või raske rääkida, kas jutt on lühidane või pikaldane, tõre või avav, jne.
A hiccup, for instance, may do this, or laryngitis or brachydactyly; so will the distance of the audience, and more seriously the character of the occasion; or if the speaker is excited or irritated for some extraneous reason, his diction may show traces of this affect. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 227)
Vaste 'situatsiooni kontekstile'.
But all these influences upon linguistic form, though the last is of paramount importance to the comparative linguist, are not language functions in the sense here considered. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 227)
Keele 'sotsiaalne funktsioon' ei saa selles mõttes olla keelefunktsioon.
The function we are examining are those necessarily operative in all communication, the ways in which the work of speech is performed, the essential uses which speech serves. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 228)
Jakobson ütleb enda omade kohta sama.
From this point of view we may note as typical a philologist content with merely a dual language function in his definitions of the word and the sentence.A word is an articulate sound symbol in its aspect of denoting something which is spoken about.Dr Gardiner's 'volitional attitude' would appear to be included in No. VI of our list of functions. It will be generally agreed that no use of speech can be admitted to be an attempt at communication unless this function is concerned. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 230)
A sentence is an articulate sound symbol in its aspect of embodying some volitional attitude of the speaker to the listener.
Selleks, et mingit sõnakasutust pidada kommunikatsiooniks peab see 'edendama mingit tahtlikku eesmärki'. Kahjuks väga üldine.
Steinthal's insistence on the part played by the listener in the origin and development of language is also well known; and de Saussure in his standard treatment of speech functions which, as we saw in our first chapter, was otherwise unsatisfactory, goes so far as to draw pictures of the listener attending to the speaker and so completing the 'language circuit.' A similar circuit for volitional signs is diagrammatically completed by Martinak through the fulfilment of the wish by the listener; while Baldwin devotes over seventy pages of the second volume of his Thought and Things to language as affected by its functions in intercourse, and the relations of speaker and listener in what he calls "predication as elucidation" and "predication as proposal." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 232)
Sama, nagu ma aru saan, saavutab Austini kõneaktiteooria.
Unlike the majority of linguists, Professor Brunot is fully aware that a purely psychological analysis of the speech situation lies behind this [|] functional approach to language, and it is interesting to find that his exhaustive account of French idiom is in accordance with the fivefold division proposed above. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 232-233)
Tõsi. Kahjuks on see psühholoogia... fenomenoloogia.
Most writing or speech then which is of the mixed or rhetorical kind as opposed to the pure, or scientific, or strictly symbolic, use of words, will take its form as the result of compromise. Only occasionally will a symbolization be available which, without loss of its symbolic accuracy, is also suitable (to the author's attitude to his public), appropriate (to his referent), judicious (likely to produce the desired effects) and personal (indicative of the stability or instability of his references). The odds are very strongly against there being many symbols able to do so much. As a consequence in most speech some of these functions are sacrificed. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 234)
(I) Sümbol peab täpselt sümboliseerima referenti; oma sümboolses või mitte-sümboolses capacity-s võivad sümbolid (II) sobivalt väljendada suhtumist publikusse, (III) kohaselt väljendada suhtumist referenti, (IV) kaalutletult saavutada soovitud mõju, ja (V) isiklikult toetada referenti - näidata, et see on stabiilne või ebastabiilne.
In 'good morning' and 'good-bye' the referential function lapses, i.e., these verbal signs are not symbols, it is enough if they are suitable. Exclamations and oaths similarly are not symbols; they have only to satisfy the condition of appropriateness, one of the easiest of conditions at the low-level of subtlety to which these emotional signs are developed. The only contexts required here would [|] seem to be of the simplest order possible in psychology, as simple as the toothache-groan context. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 234-235)
Tervitused ei viita millelegi, vaid (II) väljendavad suhtumist neisse, keda tervitatakse. Hüüatused ja vanded (?)... ee.. Siin jookseb mul juhe kokku. Hüüatustel tõepoolest ei pea millelegi viitama, sama lugu vannetega, mis on lihtsalt sõnalised vormelid. Aga kuidas nad saavad samal ajal mitte viidata millelegi ja (III) väljendada kohast suhtumist viitesse? Siin on küll mingi segadus.
Orders or commands must satisfy reference and purpose conditions, but may, indeed often must, avoid both suitability and appropriateness in the senses used above, as for instance in many military orders. Threats on the other hand can easily dispense with reference, i.e., be meaningless, and may be governed only by the purpose intended. Questions and requests are similar to commands in the respects above mentioned and differ from them merely in the means through which the effects desired are sought. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 235)
Käsud ja küsimused on korraga viitelised (mida sa käsid teha? mida sa tahad teada?), aga ähvardused võivad tõepoolest mittemilllelegi viidata, nagu too Bergeri ja Luckmanni näide, kus sa hommikul ärkad üles ja leiad, et su voodi päitsesse on löödud nuga - sinu hirmutamiseks (sa oled ligipääsetav - see sama nuga oleks samahästi võinud sul kõri läbi lõigata), aga mitte informeerimiseks. Mis on samuti tegelikult natuke kahtlane, sest hirmutamisel on ka sageli ju mingi objekt - mille pärast hirmutatakse (vaigistamiseks, eemalepeletamiseks, jne). St niisama nalja pärast ei ärgata hobusepeaga voodis.
There are three factors involved when any statement is made, or interpreted.(Ogden; Richards 1938: 243)
- Mental processes.
- The symbol.
- A referent - something which is thought 'of.'
Tõlgendist on saanud 'vaimsed protsessid'.
We must begin therefore with Interpretation.Our Interpretation of any sign is our psychological reaction to it, as determined by our past experience in similar situations, and by our present experience.If this is stated with due care in terms of causal contexts or correlated groups we get an account of judgment, belief and interpretation which places the psychology of thinking on the same level as the other [|] inductive sciences, and incidentally disposes of the 'Problem of Truth.' (Ogden; Richards 1938: 244-245)
Kas 'mõtlemise psühholoogia' ei ole lihtsalt analüütiline psühholoogia? (Mitte psühhoanalüüs vaid filosoofiline psühholoogia.)
Considering the medley of verbal superstition, obsolete philosophy, and ill-comprehended logic, which we have found in the course of these pages doing duty for a theory of verbal function, it is not surprising that the best-informed philologists should feel that no words can be too strong for the grammatical fare on which the twentieth-century child is still nourished. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 251)
Kena fraas.
The understanding of the functions of language, of the many [|] ways in which words serve us and mislead us, must be an essential aim of all true education. Through language all our intellectual and much of our social heritage comes to us. Our whole outlook on life, our behaviour, our character, are profoundly influenced by the use we are able to make of this, our chief means of contact with reality. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 261-262)
Primaarne.
Aenesidemus himself may not have gone beyond the demonstration that (in the words of Photius) "there are no signs, manifest and obvious, of what is obscure and latent," and there are those who think it probable that Sextus himself was chiefly responsible for the distinction familiar to the later Sceptics between two classes of signs - signs 'commemorative' and signs 'demonstrative.' According to this distinction "there are signs which act, as we should say, by the law of association, reminding us that in past experience two phenomena were conjoined, as smoke with fire, a scar with a wound, a stab to the heart with subsequent death. If afterwards one of the two phenomena is temporarily obscured and passes out of immediate consciousness, the other, if present, may serve to recall it; we are justified in calling the one which is present a sign, and the other, which is temporarily absent, the thing signified. With the term 'sign,' as thus understood, the sign commemorative or reminiscent, Sextus has no quarrel." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 267)
Kokkuleppelised märgid tegelikult mälu-märgid.
"Sextus reserves his hostility for another class of signs which we may call the sign demonstrative. When one of two phenomena assumed to be the thing signified never has occurred in actual experience but belongs wholly, by its own nature, to the region of the unknown, the dogmatists nevertheless maintained that, if certain conditions were fulfilled, its existence was indicated and demonstrated by the other phenomenon, which they called the sign. For instance, according to the dogmatists, the movements of the body indicate and demonstrate [|] the existence of the soul; they are its sign. It is 'sign' then, in this latter sense, the indicative or demonstrative sign, whose existence Sextus disputes and undertakes to refute." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 267-268)
Hinge näitest saan aru - hing on oletus - aga kas sellest on veel näiteid?
"In the proper line of its explication lies the development of the originally 'egological' (referred to the ego of the philosophizing subject for the time being) phenomenology into a transcendental sociological phenomenology having reference to a manifest multiplicity of conscious subjects communicating with one another. A systematically consistent development of phenomenology leads necessarily to an all-comprehensive logic concerned with the correlates; knowing-act, knowledge-signification, knowledge-objectivity."(Ogden; Richards 1938: 270)
Husserl kõlab siin nagu ta tegeleks lihtsalt massikommunikatsiooniga.
By far the most elaborate and determined attempt to give an account of signs and their meaning is that of the American logician C. S. Pierce [sic], from whom William James took the idea and the term Pragmatism, and whose Algebra of Dyadic Relations was developed by Schroeder. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 279)
Muidugi saksa keeles.
A sign, it is there stated, "has an Object and an Interpretant, the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. But it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, and more than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate Object, which is the object as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 280)
Tunne, pingutus või märk.
"A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening, or a Single Object of a thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such an event being significant only as occurring when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. An indefinite significant character such as the tone of voice, can neither be called a Type nor a Token. I propose to call a Sign a Tone." (Ogden; Richards 1938: 281)
(1) Toon, (2) Tooken ja (3) Tüüp.
"My insertion of 'upon a person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. I recognize three Universes which are distinguished by [|] three Modalities of being. One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present to its entire Being." The objects of this Universe he called Ideas or Possibles, the objects of the second or actual Universe being Facts, and of the third Necessitants. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 288-289)
(1) Võimalikkused, (2) Tõsiasjad, (3) Paratamatused.
Similarly it should now be obvious that though propositions containing negative elements differ, qua propositions, from those devoid of nots, the distinction does not imply parallel differences in the objects referred to, or a special class of negative objects. (Ogden; Richards 1938: 294)
Njaa. Praegu räägitakse sellest, et LLM-id ei saa "not"-ist aru. Millegi mitteolemine on masinale mõistmatu.
Malinowski, Bronisław 1938. The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages. In: Ogden, C. K.; Richards, I. A., The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 296-336.
Language, in its developed literary and scientific functions, is an instrument of thought and of the communication of thought. (Malinowski 1938: 297)
Keel on korraga mõtte tööriist ja tööriist mõtete kommunikeerimiseks. Mis on puudu on mõtete talletamine.
The laying down of rules, the testing of their validity, and the attainment of perfection in style are undoubtedly important and comprehensive objects of study, especially as Language grows and develops with the advancement of thought and culture, and in a certain sense even leads this advancement. (Malinowski 1938: 297)
Primaarsus: keel 'juhib' kultuuri arengut.
It is enough to mention the names of W. von Humboldt, Lazarus and Steinthal, Whitney, Max Müller, Misteli, Sweet, Wundt, Paul, Finck, Rozwadowski, Wegener, Oertel, Marty, Jespersen and others, to show that the Science of Language is neither new nor unimportant. In all their works, besides problems of formal grammar, we find attempts at an analysis of the mental processes which are concerned in Meaning. (Malinowski 1938: 297)
Ainult umbes neljandik neist nimedest on mulle tuttavad (W. von Humboldt, Whitney, Max Müller, Wundt, Marty ja Jespersen).
But there is an even more deeply reaching though subtler difficulty: the whole manner in which a native language is used is different from our own. In a primitive tongue, the whole grammatical structure lacks the precision and definiteness of our own, though it is extremely telling in certain specific ways. (Malinowski 1938: 300)
[Doubt]
This last-mentioned feature explains also the emotional nature of the utterance: it is not a mere statement of fact, but a boast, a piece of self-glorification, extremely characteristic of the Trobrianders' culture in general and of their ceremonial barter in particular. (Malinowski 1938: 301)
Tõepoolest unikaalne - Lääne inimeste keelekasutuses ei ole teragi uhkustamist või enese-ülistamist.
The metaphorical use of wood for canoe would lead us into another field of language psychology, but for the present it is enough to emphasize that 'front' or 'leading canoe' and 'rear canoe' are important terms for a people whose attention is so highly occupied with competitive activities for their own sake. (Malinowski 1938: 301)
Lääne kanuusõitjad ja muud sportlased õnneks ei ole võistlemisest võistlemise enda nimel nii väga huvitatud.
This latter again, becomes only intelligible when it is placed within its context of situation, if I may be allowed to coin an expression which indicates on the one hand that the conception of context has to be broadened and on the other hand that the situation in which words are uttered can never be passed over as irrelevant to the linguistic expression. We see how the conception of context must be substantially widened, if it is to furnish us with its full utility. In fact it must burst the bonds of mere linguistics and be carried over into the analysis of the general conditions under which a language is spoken. Thus, starting fro mthe wider idea of context, we arrive once more at the results of the foregoing section, namely that the study of any language, spoken by a people who live under conditions different from our own and possess a different culture, must be carried out in conjunction with the study of their culture and of their environment. (Malinowski 1938: 306)
Siit ei ole hästi aru saada kui spetsiifiline see 'situatsiooni kontekst' on: kas (a) ta mõtleb ütlust ümbritsevat sotsiaalset situatsiooni või, nagu osutab katkendi lõpp, (b) kõnelejate kultuuri ja keskkonda.
It is present in the form of written documents, naturally isolated, torn out of any context of situation. In fact, written statements are set down with the purpose of being self-contained and self-explanatory. A mortuary inscription, a fragment of primeval laws or precepts, a chapter or statement in a sacred book, or to take a more modern example, a passage from a Greek or Latin philosopher, historian or poet - one and all of these were composed with the purpose of bringing their message to posterity unaided, and they had to contain this message within their own bounds. (Malinowski 1938: 306)
See tundub ka kahtlane. Üksikud tsitaadid jm katkendid ei ole ajakapslid. Pompei seinade sodijad ei saanud teada, et nende pila on kaks tuhat aastat hiljem filoloogide maiuspala või, et nad võiksid neid mõista ilma igasuguse kontekstita. "Alexamenos kummardab oma jumalat" ei meikiks mingit senssi kui me ei tunneks kristluse ajalugu ja Jeesuse eesli seljas ratsutamise lugu.
A statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered. For each verbal statement by a human being has the aim and function of expressing some thought or feeling actual at that moment and in that situation, and necessary for some reason or other to be made known to another person or persons - in order either to serve purposes of common action, or to establish ties of purely social communion, or else to deliver the speaker of violent feelings or passions. Without some imperative stimulus of the moment, there can be no spoken statement. (Malinowski 1938: 307)
Keelefunktsioonid selle arutelu järgi: (1) parktiline, (2) faatiline, (3) katartiline.
The former has to reconstruct the general situation - i.e., the culture of a past people - from the extant statements, the latter can study directly the conditions and situations characteristic of a culture and interpret the statements through them. (Malinowski 1938: 307)
Väljasurnud kultuuri peab rekonstrueerima, aga elavat kultuuri ei pea (re)konstrueerima - see on käegakatsutavalt kohal ja lausungid saab sellest läbi lasta nagu masinast.
I have written the above in my own terminology, in order to retrace the steps of my argument, such as it was before I became acquainted with the present book. But it is obvious that the context of situation, on which such a stress is laid here, is nothing else but the sign-situations of the Authors. Their contention, which is fundamental to all the arguments of their book, that no theory of meaning can be given without the study of the mechanism of reference, is also the main gist of my reasoning in the foregoing paragraphs. (Malinowski 1938: 308)
Ma pean kogu raamatu jälle otsast peale üle lugema, sest praegu küll ei hooma kuidas 'situatsiooni kontekst' ja 'märgi-situatsioon' on samastatavad.
This attitude in which the word is regarded as a real entity, containing its meaning as a Soul-box contains the spiritual part of a person or thing, is shown to be derived from the primitive, magical uses of language and to reach right into the most important and influential systems of metaphysics. (Malinowski 1938: 308)
Varikätk?
The Ethnographic view of language proves the principle of Symbolic Relativity as it might be called, that is that words must be treated only as symbols and that a psychology of symbolic reference must serve as the basis for all science of language. Since the whole world of 'things-to-be-expressed' changes with the level of culture, with geographical, social and economic conditions, the consequence is that the meaning of a word must be always gathered, not from a passive contemplation of this word, but from an analysis of its functions, with reference to the given culture. (Malinowski 1938: 309)
Siin on jälle mõlemad äärmused kohal: 'sümboolse referentsi psühholoogia' viitab ikkagi keelekasutuse situatsioonile (a), kultuur (b) ei ole iseenesest 'situatsiooni kontekstis' kohal, vaid ümbritseb seda.
The analysis of this context should give us a glimpse of a group of savages bound by reciprocal ties of interests and ambitions, of emotional appeal and response. There was boastful reference to competitive trading activities, to ceremonial overseas expeditions, to a complex of sentiments, ambitions and ideas known to the group of speakers and hearers through their being steeped in tribal tradition and having been themselves actors in such events as those described in the narrative. (Malinowski 1938: 310)
Siin jääb mulje, et Malinowski triaad on (1) tundmused, (2) huvid ja ambitsioonid, ja (3) ideed.
Take for instance language spoken by a group of natives engaged in one of their fundamental pursuits in search of subsistence - hunting, fishing, tilling the soil; or else in one of those activities, in which a savage tribe express some essentially human forms of energy - war, play or sport, ceremonial performance or artistic display such as dancing or singing. The actors in any such scene are all following a purposeful activity, are all set on a definite aim; they all have to act in a concerted manner according to certain rules established by custom and tradition. In this, Speech is the necessary means of communion; it is the one indispensable instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible. (Malinowski 1938: 310)
Kõigis nendes tegevustes on 'kõneline osadus', sest keele vahendusel koordineeritakse ühistegevust, aga faatilises osaduses on 'puhtalt kõneline osadus', st koordineeritakse ainult kõnelemist ennast, mitte muud tegevust. (See on iseenesest kummaline, et Malinowski 'osadust' selliselt tarvitab.)
Are our conclusions about the nature of language correct, when faced with this use of speech; can our views remain unaltered when, from speech in action, we turn our attention to free narrative or to the use of language in pure social intercourse; when the object of talk is not to achieve some aim but the exchange of words almost as an end in itself? (Malinowski 1938: 312)
Almost?
The case of language used in free, aimless, social intercourse requires special consideration. When a number of people sit together ta a village fire, after all the daily tasks are over, or when they chat, resting from work, or when they accompany some mere manual work by gossip quite unconnected with what they are doing - it is clear that here we have to do with another mode of using language, with another type of speech function. Language here is not dependent upon what happens at that moment, it seems to be even deprived of any context of situation. The meaning of any utterance cannot be connected with the speaker's or hearer's behaviour, with the purpose of what they are doing. (Malinowski 1938: 313)
No see on küll täielikus vastuolus näidetega - tervitamine ja ilmast rääkimine.
A mere phrase of politeness, in use as much among savage tribes as in a European drawing-room, fulfils a function to which the meaning of its words is almost completely irrelevant. Inquiries about health, comments on weather, affirmations of some supremely obvious state of things - all such are exchanged, not in order to inform, not in this case to connect people in action, certainly not in order to express any thought. (Malinowski 1938: 313)
Hiljuti nägin vilksamisi uurimust, mille järgi ootamatult suur osa inimeste kirjavahetust möödunud sajanditel pöörles ümber inimeste tervise - mis see nädal valutab, kui kaugele tubekuloos on arenenud, mis on põletikus, kes on üldse maha surnud, jne. Sellest seisukohast tundub küll kummaline öelda, et 'tervist rääkides' on meie sõnad tähendusetud.
It would be even incorrect, I think, to say that such words serve the purpose of establishing common sentiment, for this is usually absent from such current phrases of intercourse; and where it purports to exist, as in expressions of sympathy, it is avowedly spurious on one side. (Malinowski 1938: 313)
Nagu Durkheimi puhul sageli, tuleb ka siin küsida: mis on üldse tundmused?
What is the raison d'être, therefore, of such phrases as 'How do you do?' 'Ah, here you are,' 'Where do you come [|] from?' 'Nice day to-day' - all of which serve in one society or another as formulæ of greeting or approach? (Malinowski 1938: 313-314)
See on küll õnnetu näide. 'Kust sa pärit oled?', kui see esitatakse võõrale, on ju päris selgelt informatsiooni-päring! Kas eksisteerib mingi kultuur, kus 'kust sa tuled?' on tervitus nagu Nepalis on 'kas sa riisi oled juba söönud?'? Isegi sellisel juhul peab eeldama, et küsitakse informatsiooni viisil, mis erineb inglaste 'How do you do?'-st, mis ei nõua ausat/siirast vastust.
I think that, in discussing the function of Speech in mere sociabilities, we come to one of the bedrock aspects of man's nature in society. There is in all human beings the well-known tendency to congregate, to be together, to enjoy each other's company. Many instincts and innate trends, such as fear or pugnacity, all the types of social sentiments such as ambition, vanity, passion for power and wealth, are dependent upon and associated with the fundamental tendency which makes the mere presence of others a necessity for man. (Malinowski 1938: 314)
See on iseenesest märgiline, et ta seostab inimeste koondumist (nö seltskonnavajadust) oma 'teisesusega' - huvi ja ambitsiooniga. Ühiseid tundmusi ta eitab, ideede vahetamist ta eitab, aga 'sotsiaalsetele sentimentidele' (mis tegelikult on nende näidete põhjal self-regarding sentiments) teeb ta ruumi.
Now speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for, to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring factor, but, on the contrary, something alarming and dangerous. The stranger who cannot speak the language is to all savage tribesmen a natural enemy. To the primitive mind, whether among savages or our own uneducated classes, taciturnity means not only unfriendliness but directly a bad character. This no doubt varies greatly with the national character but remains true as a general rule. (Malinowski 1938: 314)
Milline on 'loomulik inimene'? Inimene väljaspool ühiskonda? (St 'loomuseisundis' inimene?) - Kust ta neid leiab?
The breaking of silence, the communion of words is the first act to establish links of fellowship, which is consummated only by the breaking of bread and the communion of food. (Malinowski 1938: 314)
Vennaskondlikud sidemed ei hõlma ühiseid tundmusi? Isegi mitte vastastikkust austust vms?
After the first formula, there comes a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious. Such gossip, as found in Primitive Societies, differs only a little from our own. Always the same emphasis of affirmation and consent, mixed perhaps with an incidental disagreement which creates the bonds of antipathy. (Malinowski 1938: 314)
Sama küsimus: kuidas saab rõhutada kinnitamist ja nõustumist ilma ühiste tundmusteta? Kuidas saab proovida teisele inimesele meeltmööda olla kui sul ei ole vähimatki aimu, kuidas ta millegi suhtes tunneb?
Or personal accounts of the speaker's views and life history, to which the hearer listens under some restraint and with slightly veiled impatience, waiting till his own turn arrives to speak. For in this use of speech the bonds created between hearer and speaker are not quite symmetrical, the man linguistically active receiving the greater share of social pleasure and self-enhancement. But though the hearing given to such [|] utterances is as a rule not as intense as the speaker's own share, it is quite essential for his pleasure, and the reciprocity is established by the change of rôles. (Malinowski 1938: 314-315)
Oota, kuidas saab ühepoolset naudingut pidada sidemeteks?
There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of linguistic use - phatic communion I am tempted to call it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention - a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words. (Malinowski 1938: 315)
Mis on 'ühendussidemed'?
Let us look at it from the special point of view with which we are here concerned; let us ask what light it throws on the function or nature of language. Are words in Phatic Communion used primarily to convey meaning, the meaning which is symbolically theirs? Certainly not! They fulfil a social function and that is their principal aim, but they are neither the result of intellectual reflection, nor do they necessarily arouse reflection in the listener. Once again we may say that language does not function here as a means of transmission of thought. (Malinowski 1938: 315)
Kas Ogdeni ja Richardsi kogu iva ei olnudki just see, et sõnadel ei ole tähendust, mis 'sümboolselt' kuulub neile, vaid sõnade ja referentide vahel on mõtlemine, referentsiaalne akt? St mitte ühelgi sõnakasutusel ei ole 'tähendust, mis sümboolselt kuulub neile' ja isegi tervitus, rääkimata puhtalt sotsiaalsest vestlusest, eeldab 'intellektuaalset reflektsiooni'? Kuidas muidu tunneb inimene, keda tervitatakse, ära, et tegu oli tervitusega?
But can we regard it as a mode of action? And in what relation does it stand to our crucial conception of context of situation? It is obvious that the outer situation does not enter directly into the technique of speaking. (Malinowski 1938: 315)
Kui ma ütlen nt võõrale kõrvalseisjale jutualgatuseks "Ilus ilm täna", siis 'siseneb väline situatsioon minu kõnetehnikasse' kaudselt? Nagu mis mõttes.
But what can be considered as situation when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of sociability and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some secial sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action. (Malinowski 1938: 315)
Kuidas erineb 'ühine tundmus' ja 'ühiskondlik tundmus'? Kogu situatsioon seisneb 'seltskondlikus õhukkonnas', mis ei ole ühine? Tunded, mis moodustavad convivial gregariousness-i ei ole ühised? Pelgalt ühiskondlikud? Mis mõttes?
I have chosen the above from a Savage Community, because I wanted to emphasize that such and no other is the nature of primitive speech. (Malinowski 1938: 315)
Primitiivsetel inimestel on ainult ühiskondlikud tundmused. Ühiseid tundmusi neil ei ole.
It is only certain very special uses among a civilized community and only in its highest uses that language is employed to frame and express thoughts. In poetic and literary production, language is made to embody human feelings and passions, to render in a subtle and convincing manner certain inner states and processes of mind. In works of science and philosophy, highly developed types of speech are used to control ideas and to make them common property of civilized mankind. (Malinowski 1938: 316)
Pärismaalased ei kasuta keelt, et väljendada mõtet? Nad ei filosofeeri? Seda on küll raske uskuda. Seda enam, et alles ta ise laitis 'surnud sõnu' ja kiitis 'elavat keelt', aga nüüd tuleb välja, et ainult filosoofilistes ja teaduslikes kirjutistes kasutatakse kõrgelt-arenenud kõne-tüüpe selleks, et ideid kontrollida. Sokrates ei kirjutanud ise midagi peale luuletuste, järelikult ta ei väljendanud mingit mõtet.
Even in this function, however, it is not correct to regard language as a mere residuum of reflective thought. And the conception of speech as serving to translate the inner processes of the speaker to the hearer is one-sided and gives us, even with regard to the most highly developed and specialized uses of speech, only a partial and certainly not the most relevant view. (Malinowski 1938: 316)
Sisemonoloogi tõlkimine väliseks kõneks on ühekülgne. Okei. Mis on need teised küljed?
This perspective has allowed us to class human speech with the active modes of human behaviour, rather than with the reflective and cognitive ones. But this outside view and wholesale conception must be still supplemented by some more detailed, analytic considerations, if we want to arrive at a clearer idea of Meaning. (Malinowski 1938: 317)
Kõnelemine on mõttetu tegevus.
The Authors reject, and rightly so, the explanations of meaning by suggestion, association or appreciation, urging that such explanations are not sufficiently dynamic. Of course new ideas are formed by apperception and since a new idea constitutes a new meaning and receives in due course a new name, apperception is a process by which significance is created. But that happens only in the most highly developed and refined uses of language for scientific purposes. From our previous discussion it should be well established that such a type of formulation of meaning is highly derivative and cannot be taken as the pattern on which to study and explain significance. And this not only with reference to savages, but also in our own linguistic life. (Malinowski 1938: 317)
Mis pagana asi on appertseptsioon?
Returning to the above examples of a group of natives engaged in a practical pursuit, we see them using technical words, names of implements, specific activities. A word, signifying an important utensil, is used in action, not to comment on its nature or reflect on its properties, but to make it appear, be handed over to the speaker, or to direct another man to its proper use. The meaning of the thing is made up of experiences of its active uses and not of intellectual contemplation. (Malinowski 1938: 321)
Intellektuaalne sümbolism hõlmab ainult asjade olemuse ja omaduste üle reflekteerimist?
In developed functions of speech, such as are, or at least should be, used in philosophical speculation or scientific language (and it is chiefly with these functions that the Authors are concerned in this book) the gulf of Meaning, as it could be called, is bridged over only by the Act of Thought - the bent line of the two shoulders of the triangle. (Malinowski 1938: 323)
Järgneval leheküljel näitab Malinowski skeemidega, et tema arvates on "Speech in Action"-is sümboli ja referendi vahel järjepidev joon. St Malinowski justkui arvab, et praktilist tegevust saatev keelekasutus ei ole mõttetegevusega seotud. Ainult filosoofiat ja teadust kirjutades inimene mõtleb, ülejäänud aja toimib nagu automaat.
Meaning, as we have seen, does not come to Primitive Man from contemplation of things, or analysis of occurrences, but in practical and active acquaintance with relevant situations. The real knowledge of a word comes through the practice of appropriately using it within a certain situation. The word, like any man-made implement, becomes significant only after it has been used and properly used under all sorts of conditions. Thus, there can be no definition of a word without the reality which it means being present. (Malinowski 1938: 325)
Primitiivne inimene ei mõtiskle ega analüüsi, sõnad omandavad tema jaoks tähenduse ainult tegevuses. (Nii järeldab Malinowski oma pärismaalaste tegevust jälgides?)
Crookshank, F. G. 1938. The Importance of a Theory of Signs and a Critique of Language in the Study of Medicine. In: Ogden, C. K.; Richards, I. A., The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 337-355.
In fact, for these gentlemen, 'diseases' are Platonic realities: universals ante rem. This unavowed belief, which might be condoned were it frankly admitted, is an inheritance from Galen, and carries with it the corollary that our notions concerning this, that, or the other 'disease' are either absolutely right or absolutely wrong, and are not merely matters of mental convenience. (Crookshank 1938: 342)
'Mental conveniences' kõlab hästi.
In a word, medical statistics relate to the usage of symbols for general references, whether or no the symbolization is correct and the references adequate, rather than to things, occurrences, or happenings. They have no necessary value, other than as analyses of symbol-frequency, unless the relation of the symbols to the reference and of the reference to the referents be agreed after that process of discussion, so abhorrent to the medical mind, and so generally stigmatized as unprofitable word-chopping. (Crookshank 1938: 344)
See autor on nähtavasti Ogdeni ja Richardsi kolmnurga omastanud, mitte lihtsalt ei kiida neid igal kolmandal leheküljel ilma asjaloo iva mõistmata, nagu Malinowski puhul jääb mulje.
One or two essays were therefore written, which have been since reprinted, wherein it was suggested that safety lay in the adoption of the Conceptualist position ascribed to William of Occam in the Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed., arts. 'Occam' and 'Scholasticism.') There (Vol. 24, p. 355) we are told that "the hypostatizing of abstractions is the error against which Occam is continually fighting": that for him "the universal is no more than a mental concept signifying univocally several singulars" and "has no reality beyond that of the mental act by which it is produced, and that of the singulars of which it is predicated." (Crookshank 1938: 346)
Universaalid eksisteerivad ainult mõttes.
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