The Explanation of Social Behaviour

Harré, Rom & Secord, P. F. 1976. The Explanation of Social Behaviour. Oxford : Blackwell

Viite sellele raamatule leidsin Argyle'i raamatu sissejuhatusest/tänusõnadest. Üks autoritest on sotsiaalpsühholoog ja teine on filosoof. Teose eesmärk näib olevat käitumise uurimiseks "uue meetodi" formaliseerimine. Sisaldab rohkesti kriitikat laborikatsetele ja behaviourismile (Skinner saab jälle vatti) ning laenab sellistelt autoritelt nagu Goffman, Garfinkel, Austin, Chomsky, Levi-Strauss jne.
Raamatu füüsilisel koopial näib olevat pikk ajalugu. Selles on mingi Soome kirjastuse/ülikooli templeid, rohkesti eesti/soome-keelseid harilikuga tehtud ääremärkusi (põhiliselt lõikude üldidee ühe-kahe sõnaga) ning Tartu Ülikooli psühholoogia- ja sotsiaalteaduste osakondade templeid. Mina sain ta sotsiaalteaduste osakonna raamatukogu hoidlast. Hoolimata sellest, et raamatu esimene kolmandik hakkab kergelt välja kukkuma kaante vahelt, leidsin sellest palju huvitavat. Sh on võimalik, et nende autorite "episood" ja Juri Lotmani "tekst" on võrreldavad. Arvan, et seda teost tuleks lugeda vanema-targemana uuesti.

"Mõistatuslikud" episoodid ei oma selget struktuuri ega selgitust (erinevalt paradigmaatilisest):

Most episodes cannot be clearly classified: they are enigmatic, having neither an explicit set of rules, nor produced by well-established causal mechanisms. Enigmatic episodes are explained by applying to them concepts used in the explanation of those paradigmatic episodes which themselves have clear explanations, be they formal or causal. The structure of episodes has two levels: overt and covert. The former consists of the act-action sequence, contained in the episode; the latter, of the permanent and transitory powers and states of readiness and the flux of emotions that underlie the episode. (Harré & Secord 1976: 12)

Social behavior must be conceived of as action mediated by meanings, not responses caused by stimuli. (Harré & Secord 1976: 29)

Ühiskondlik käitumine on tähenduslik käitumine ja muuhulgas suhtlemise tähtsus:

Social behaviour is meaningful behaviour. It involves an agent with certain intentions and expectations, an agent capable of deliberating and choosing from a variety of courses of action, and whose words and actions are understood by his fellows. A central part of this whole process is communication between people. (Harré & Secord 1976: 35)

Semiootilise reaalsuse algmed:

...if we consider people as agents, then we must connect their social behaviour to a network of concepts appropriate to the description of self-controlled actions in a world of agents who have interests and who follow rules and plans in their dealings with other agents. So, what we see in social reality, is not, for example, an arm moving upwards, but a man trying to attract attention, a man greeting a friend, and so on. When we see an action of a certain sort we thus connect what we see with a conceptual context uttely different from that involved in seeing movements, and this context determines the form of explanation that is appropriate. (Harré & Secord 1976: 38)

Siit tuleneb võimalus astuda edasi kehaliste liikumiste uurimisest ühiskondliku käitumise suunas:

In effect, the philosophers we referred to above are recommending a consideration of the kind of explanation of behaviour that is familiar to us as laymen, and that is naturally couched in the subtle and expressive medium of ordinary language. It is an explanation of action that is intentional and purposive. Actions are explained in terms of the ends for which they are performed. Objections to teleological forms of explanation that had once been considered definitive have been re-examined by philosophers and found to be neither as sound nor as final as they once seemed to be. This point of view also implies that the behaviourist programme of reducing complex actions to simple, independent behavioural elements, capable of independent explanation, is impossible, since psychologists would then be studying something quite different from the social life of human beings. It is complex and deliberate actions, unified through their contributions to the meaning of the total act, that constitute the true subject matter of human social behaviour.
Our view of man, which we elaborate still further as our investigation develops, may be summarized as follows:
1. A man is capable of initiating action, action that may take place only after deliberation and with a more or less clear end in view. The whole of the action sequence may be anticipated in a more or less clearly formulated plan.
2. Most human action cannot be, and may need not be traced to antecedent events linked to the actions in a regular, chain-like fashion in order to be explained in a satisfactory manner. An explanation is not unscientific because it makes reference to such items as plans and rules, or because it assumes the social actor to be one who deliberately follows them.
3. Action cannot be described reductively in terms of movements which are the vehicles for action, without losing its character and meaning. Human action is by nature psychological, and it cannot be reduced to physiological or physics, or even to simply observed behavioural elements without destroying it. (Harré & Secord 1976: 40-41)

Verbaalsete interaktsioonide ritualiseeritus:

A good many verbal interactions between strangers are constrained by highly developed rituals, as in many customer-salesman interactions, such as the rituals governing calls at service stations, purchases in a shop, paying conductors on buses and the like. In the cases just mentioned there is a clear role definition for each participant and that determines which ritual is performed. By adhering to the role definitions other aspects of the self are protected. Even when there are no clear role definitions interaction between strangers occurs under powerful conventions giving it a highly ritualstic character. Most, if not all cultures, have definite rituals by which this situation is handled. (Harré & Secord 1976: 62)

Veenmisel pööratakse tähelepanu aspektidele, millele varem tähelepanu ei pööratud:

The over-riding of the self-ascription of mentalistic predicated does occur, but not by confrontation with any bodily fact. It occurs by a restructuring of meaning. When we try to persuade the person to 'see' his situation differently, to attend to other aspects of a situation than those he was considering, and so on, we are trying to change the meaning of the situation for him. We are trying to get him to ascribe different meanings to things and situations from those he ascribed before which influenced his past choice of mentalistic predicates. If this is true, it must be possible for out subject to counter-persuade us to see the matter his way too. (Harré & Secord 1976: 113)

Kaks käitumist suunavat äärmust, väline ja sisemine mõju:

The regularities observed in the behaviour of people may be explained according to several different schemata. One of the most interesting and natural dimensions along which these explanatory schemata may be contrasted is the extent to which the person is regarded as an agent directing his own behaviour. At one extreme he may be seen simply as an object responding to the push and pull of forces exerted by the environment. At the other, he may be seen as an agent guiding his behaviour toward some explicit goal by some means of which he is thoroughly aware. We may think of the former as focusing upon environmental contingencies and biological mechanisms and the latter as emphasizing self-direction, often by such means as following a rule. (Harré & Secord 1976: 136)

Episoodi kontsept:

1. Any natural division of social life is an episode.
2. The content of a social episode includes not only overt behaviour, but the thoughts, feelings, intentions and plans, etc., of the participants. (Harré & Secord 1976: 147)

Kehalised liigutused, tegutsemine ja tegu:

A person makes all sorts of bodily movements in the course of an episode, contracting and relaxing muscles in various sequences. Some of these movements can be seen or heard or felt by others, some are known to others only through their effects. Some of these movements we wish to treat as actions, and in some of these actions we see acts performed. We watch a man's hand move toward the extended fourth finger of a woman and slip a gold ring on that finger. If this movement meets certain criteria it is an action in the performing of which, together with certain other actions, a marriage is achieved, that is, an act is performed. A movement is given meaning as an action by being identified as the performance or part of the performance of an act. (Harré & Secord 1976: 158)

Jagatud tähendused - sarnased käitumised:

On the Role-rule group of models similarities in people's behaviour does not necessarily derive from similarities in external manipulation or change of a parameter, or from internal modifications, but from shared meanings and commonly accepted conventions, rules and paradigms. (Harré & Secord 1976: 234)

Võimu peatükist leidsin midagi sümbolitega manipuleerimisest; lõpus esitatud väide, et mitteverbaalne interaktsioon ei ole refleksiivne pärineb Argyle'i raamatust "Social Interaction":

Thus possibility in the ethogenic context is related to such concepts as 'plan', 'foresight' and the like. These in turn can be referred to that very generla linguistic capacity or power to handle symbols. Such powers endow their possessors not only with the capacity to conceive plans and to discuss what might or could be done, but also endow them with the powers of symbolic interaction, which were seen by G. H. Mead as the basis of all social phenomena, among men and social animals. This entails the existence of capacities to understand symbols as well as to emit them, and is what enables us to use symbols reflexively, i.e., to understand what we are saying as well as to give ourselves orders. Non-verbal interaction is not reflexive since it need contain no element of awareness. (Harré & Secord 1976: 246-247)