A Full Explication

Bobonich, Christopher 1994. Akrasia and Agency in Plato's Laws and Republic. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 76(1): 3-36. DOI: 10.1515/agph.1994.76.1.3

A full explication of the Republic's theory of parts of the soul would require a monograph of its own: here I shall only sketch the broad [|] features that are most relevant to the topic at hand. The Republic divides the soul into three parts: the Reason part, the Spirited part and the Desiring part (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). Each of these three parts is agent-like: each is the subject of psychic states, activities and capacities that are normally attributed to the whole person. In particular, each part

1. has its own desires (ἐπιθυμίαι), and can want and wish (βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν),
2. has its own pleasures,
3. has cognitive and linguistic capacities:
   1. each has beliefs,
   2. each can communicate with the others: one part can persuade another and they can all agree, and
   3. each can engage in some forms of reasoning.

I share the view of many other recent commentators that we should not treat as merely metaphysical or read away these attributions of psychological states and activities to the parts of the soul. For better or worse, Plato's moral psychology in the Republic is committed to the idea that every person is a compound of agent-like parts. (Bobonich 1994: 3-4)

A breakdown of the "Partition Theory". Substantiated as follows: "For desires and pleasures, see, e.g., 580D3-587E4; for βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν, e.g., 437B1-C10 and 349A1-D2. For beliefs, e.g., 442B5-D1 and 574D1-575A7; for persuasion and agreement, e.g., 442B5-D1, 554C11-E5 and 589A6-B6." (ibid, 4, fn 3)

The Partition Theory plays a fundamental role throughout the Republic. For example, in Book 4 the virtues are defined in terms of parts of the soul, and the fact that certain pleasures belong to certain parts of the soul plays a role in Plato's argument in Book 9 that the philosopher's life is the most pleasant possible life. What is most important for my present purposes is that the parts of the soul are essential to Plato's explanation of akratic action in the Republic. In every instance of akratic action and every case of successful resistance to akratic action, an essential part of wha tis going on inside the agent is a conflict between at least two parts of the soul. In book 4 of the Republic, Plato offers two ways of describing this conflict and its resolution. He thus offers two ways of describing what goes on inside an akratic agent. I, for reasons that will soon become evident, shall call one the 'Command Model', and the other the 'Force Model'. (Bobonich 1994: 5)

Akrasis is apparently "being weaker than oneself", i.e. when one fails at self-control.

Nevertheless, as we have already noted, the Force Model is only one of Plato's models of akratic action. Starting at 439C2, Plato offers another description of the case of the thirsty man. The two opposed parts of the soul are now described as the one which commands and the one which forbids (τὸ κελεῦον and τὸ κωλῦον 439C5 f.). The parts, as conceived here, thus seem to issue imperatives, e.g., "Drink!" and [|] "Don't drink!". But the question is: to whom are the imperatives addressed? We cannot say that they are addressed to the whole person if we conceive of the whole person as an entity above and beyond the parts of the soul: like Plato's city, his person is nothing more than a compound of its parts. (Bobonich 1994: 10-11)

Damn. This is so much ahead of where I currently am that it is a bit dizzying. All these generalizations and so much damn literature.

Since I think that the Laws abandons the theory of parts of the soul and offers a new and more attractive theory of akratic action, let me close this section by pointing to some of the more general problems [|] facing the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. (Bobonich 1994: 14-15)

Bummer. I fully expected all of his dialogues to subscribe to this theory, at least implicitly.

There are two especially important problems here: first, even if we grant that conflicts of desire show that the soul is divided into parts, it is not clear that Plato is entitled to the conclusion that there are only three parts of the soul. Conflicts of desire may establish th edivision of the soul, but Plato does not make it clear why it is not the case that every conflict of desire establishes two new parts of the soul and certainly does not satisfactorily show that the facts about conflicts of desire produce only these three parts. A second and related problem is that Plato offers a rich characterization of each of the parts of the soul without ever providing clear justification for these characterizations. (Bobonich 1994: 15)

Why these three?

Indeed, several recent philosophers, including Daniel Dennett and Derek Parfit, have offered strong arguments which undermine both sorts of unity and have also offered theories to explain the apparent unity of the person. But it is not clear how much comfort Plato can draw from these theories, since, unlike Dennet and Parfit, Plato is committed to the strict unity of at least one subagent. He is committed at least in the case of the Reasoning part, and perhaps in the case of the other parts as well, to the idea that a part of the soul is a subject of experiences which is a "separately existing entitiy, distinct from a brain and a body, and a series of physical and mental events". (Bobonich 1994: 16)

It does seem to be the case that the Reasoning part is the most constant; the Courageous part he appears to have invented or contrived, as per Cornford (1912); and the Desiring part he may have transformed from Aesara's love and friendship into his own odd lust and luxury.

But, finally, perhaps the most important consideration is that the parts of the soul do not do any philosophical work in the Laws. Akrasia is explained and a strategy for avoiding it outlined which does not commit Plato to the existence of the parts of the soul. Plato defines the virtues and argues for the claim that the most virtuous life is the most pleasant life again without invoking the parts of the soul. Yet even if I am wrong and Plato did continue to believe in parts of the soul, even if they are merely off stage in the Laws, my fundamental point still holds firm: they are no longer thought by Plato to be necessary for framing or solving the philosophical problems surrounding akratic action. (Bobonich 1994: 27)

Probably in the background. The alternative solutions outlined here (the puppet thing, etc.) went straight over my head. Most likely will have to return to this paper after I've read Laws, too.