A Habitual Curiosity

Walsh, P. G. 1988. The Rights and Wrongs of Curiosity (Plutarch to Augustine). Greece and Rome 35(1): 73-85. DOI: 10.1017/s0017383500028783

One of the more endearing of the seventy-eight treatises which make up the Moralia of Plutarch is one entitled 'On not minding your own business'. The Greek title, Περὶ Πολυπραγμοσύνης, reminds us momentarily of Plato's famous definition of justice in Republic 4, which is to do your own thing (μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν). Plutarch was indeed an ardent Platonist, but here he is concerned not with political philosophy but with social habits. (Walsh 1988: 73)

"This, then, my friend, provided it is taken in a certain way, would seem to be justice - this doing one's own work." (433a-c)

For Plutarch, after defining this nosiness or πολυπραγμοσύνη as 'an unhealthy and harmful state of mind, a fondness for learning the misfortunes of others, a disease apparently free of neither envy nor malice', condemns the common tendency to pry into the social origins of neighbours, their debts, and their private conversations. He likewise condemns people who read their friends' letters, and who watch sacred ceremonies which it is μὴ θέμις ὁρᾶν (pechaps he had in mind Clodius' gate-crashing of the rite of Bona Dea). Such inquisitiveness, says Plutarch, is invariably accompanied by a wagging tongue, for what these people gladly hear, they gladly blab about: ᾃ γὰρ ἡδέως ἀκούουσιν, ἡδέως λαλοῦσιν. Pascal in his Pensées says much the same thing: 'Curiosity is only vanity. Most often we only wish to know in order to talk about it.' (Walsh 1988: 73)

This looks like Plutarch is not taking "doing one's own work" or minding one's own business is the "certain way" in which Socrates intends it in Politeia, which amounts to his division of labour - everyone sticking to the one thing they are good at. The first part, "learning the misfortunes of others" is pertinent to our modern social media.

So Apuleius develops in a more philosophical and theological direction the theme of curiosity which he has taken over from the περιεργία of the Greek Metamorphoses and the πολυπραγμοσύνη of Plutarch. In this development, Apuleius is responsible for the growth in popularity of the word curiositas. The word appears only once before in extant literature, in a letter of Cicero; other writers use [|] circumlocutions such as cupiditas noscendi. (Walsh 1988: 75-76)

Every word has a history.

When the Isiac priest rebukes Lucius in the final episode on account of his earlier behaviour, he says pointedly: 'You slipped into slavish pleasures, and you obtained an ill-omened recompense for your unhappy curiosity' (curiositatis improsperae, 11.15.1). That curiosity was the attempt to unlock the secrets of the universe by recourse to magic, and the priest is indicating that there is a right and a wrong way to attain such knowledge. Lucius has a habitual curiosity (curiositas familiaris, 3.14.1), an inborn curiosity (genuina curiositas, 9.15.3), and he has misdirected it. The ultimate revelation of reality is possible only through admission to the Isiac mysteries, preceded by the necessary novitiate. It would be equally reprehensible to seek to ascertain the secrets of the cult without initiation; so in recounting his initiation-ceremony at the end of the book, Lucius tells the reader directly: 'Perhaps, eager reader, you are asking what was said and done next. I would speak if it were permitted to speak, and you would be informed if you were permitted to hear. But both your ears and my tongue would incur equal guilt for such rash curiosity' (temerariae curiositatis, 11.23.6). So the message of the novel is that it is impious to dabble in magic, and impious also to explore the mysteries unless initiated. (Walsh 1988: 76)

Fairly typical song and dance about the secret nature of the mysteries.

In this passage (9.13), he compares himself with Odysseus, who visited many cities and peoples and as a result of his experiences acquired the greatest virtues; in the same way he himself, Lucius suggests, has become multiscius, a polymath, though not a wise polymath (etsi minus prudentem). (Walsh 1988: 77)

Polymathy once again attended to by a negative connotation.

He [Apuleius] presents himself as a mélange of experimental scientist like Aristotle, medical researcher like Hippocrates, and Middle Platonist of religious bent like Plutarch. (Walsh 1988: 78)

Some context for who Plutarch is.

So Cicero in his De Officiis 1, where he is conspicuously influenced by Stoic theory, begins with the Aristotelian dictum 'We are all drawn and led towards a desire for learning and knowledge'. [|] But then he adds: 'In this honourable pursuit two vices are to be avoided. First, we must not regard things unknown as known, and lend rash assent to them. And the second vice is that some people devote too much study and too much attention to things which are obscure, difficult and unnecessary' (1.18-19). Cicero is distinguishing here between sophia, the wisdom which unites contemplation with action, and phronesis, the abstract thought which can be sought from mere curiosity, and which can become a vice. (Walsh 1988: 78-79)

Now I know what the name of the academic journal Phronesis signifies.

And again: 'Do we not see how boys are not deterred even by beatings from study and enquiry? When driven off they rush back; they are delighted to acquire some knowledge, and eager to pass it on to others. Or again, take people who find pleasure in liberal arts and studies; don't we see them ignoring considerations of health and family-property, and patiently enduring everything because they are captivated by enquiry and knowledge?' (Cicero, De Finibus, 5.48). (Walsh 1988: 80)

Connected to the theme of how "private affairs deteriorate" (Plato, Rep. 343e) when one seriously takes up philosophy.

We can now turn to an examination of Christian views of the controversy. One of the leading fascinations of study of the Christian Fathers lies in the conscious adaptation of current attitudes of the Greco-Roman philosophical schools to harmonize with the Hebraic teaching of the Bible. Curiosity is not, however, a prominent motif in the Old Testament. (Walsh 1988: 80)

Noted. I've just recently had a debate on this topic (mostly on whether the Greco- or the Roman influence was more significant).

As we shall see, Augustine visualizes curiositas not merely as an intellectual vice, the pursuit of false ro unworthy knowledge, but also as that concupiscence [|] of the eyes, concupiscentia oculorum, which is condemned in the first epistle of St John (2.16). (Walsh 1988: 82-83)

"Sest kõik, mis on maailmas - lihahimu ja silmahimu ja elukõrkus -, ei ole Isast, vaid maailmast." (Jh 2.16)

It is here that he [Augustine] identifies such curiosity with 'the concupiscence of the eyes' condemned by St John, and he proceeds to offer a bizarre range of examples of such unhealthy curiosity: lingering over the sight of a mangled corpse, or over freaks exhibited in passing circuses, is condemned first, and then Augustine passes from such curiosity of the eyes to the curiosity of the mind. (Walsh 1988: 83)

"Leontius, the son of Alglaeon, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some corpses with the public executioner nearby. He had an appetitive desire to look at them, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned himself away. For a while he struggled and put his hand over his eyes, but finally, mastered by his appetite, he opened his eyes wide and rushed toward the corpses, saying: "Look for yourselves, you evil wretches; take your fill of the beautiful sight."" (Plato, Rep. 439e-440a)

It comes as no surprise to find that in his Commentary on the Psalms he claims that the three generic vices which embrace all sins are voluptas carnis, et superbia, et curiositas (8.13). In view of Augustine's enormous influence on the development of moral theology in the West, it is no surprise to find that Thomas Aquinas devotes an entire Question to curiositas considered as a species of intemperance; it is the vice whose corresponding virtue is studiositas, properly motivated devotion to learning. By pairing and contrasting studiositas and curiositas, St Thomas is able to present a synthesis of the approaches of the two giants who bestride the Summa Theologiae, Aristotle and Augustine.
In view of this track-record of curiositas, it seems surprising that it never became one of the seven deadly or capital sins; certainly Augustine's two other generic vices, pride (superbia) and lust (voluptas carnis) make their appearance in the traditional list, but curiosity does not make the top seven. (Walsh 1988: 13)

Finally a triad: (1) lust, voluptas carnis; (2) pride, superbia; (3) curiosity, curiositas.