Plato 2004. Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. [Book IV]
SOCRATES: I think we will discover what to say if we follow the same path as before. You see, our reply will be this: it would not be at all surprising if these people were happiest just as they are. However, in establishing our city, we are not looking to make any one group in it outstandingly happy, but to make the whole city so as far as possible. For we thought that we would be most likely to find justice in such a city, and injustice, by contrast, in the one that is governed worst. ANd we thought that by observing both cities, we would be able to decide the question we have been inquiring into for so long. At the moment, then, we take ourselves to be forming a happy city - not separating off a few happy people and putting them in it, but making the city as a whole happy. (Plato 2004: 103, 420b-c)
Sokratese eesmärk siin on konstrueerida kõige õnnelikuim võimalik linn. Kui vahimehed saavad vaid toimetulekutoetust ning neil ei ole võimalik reisile minna, oma tüdruksõpradele kinke teha jne siis olgu nii.
SOCRATES: This: do you think that a potter who has become wealthy will still be willing to devote himself to his craft?
ADEIMANTUS: Not at all.
SOCRATES: Won't he become idler and more careless than he was?
ADEIMANTUS: Much more.
SOCRATES: Then won't he become a worse potter?
ADEIMANTUS: Yes, much worse.
SOCRATES: And surely if poverty prevents him from providing himself with tools, or any of the other things he needs for his craft, he will make poorer products himself and worse craftsmen of his sons or anyone else he teaches.
ADEIMANTUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: So poverty and wealth make the products and the practitioners of the crafts worse.
ADEIMANTUS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: It seems, then, that we have found other things that our guardians must prevent in every way from slipping into the city undetected.
ADEIMANTUS: What things?
SOCRATES: Wealth and poverty. For the former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; and the latter for illiberality, bad work, and revolution as well. (Plato 2004: 105, 421d-422a)
Jällegi suhteliselt keskpärane katkend sellest, kuidas äärmine rikkus ja vaesus mõlemad teevad käsitöökunstile liiga. Mis on selle juures märgiline on kõigest see, et sama võib leida Archytase fragmendist, mille järgi
SOCRATES: Well, then, what if they sent an envoy to another city with the following true message: "We use no gold or silver. It is against divine law for us to do so, but not for you. So join us in this war and you can have the property of our enemy." Do you think that anyone who heard this message would choose to fight hard, lena hounds, rather than to join the hounds in fighting a fat and tender sheep? (Plato 2004: 106, 422d)
Mitte rikastumine ja hästi treenitud vahimeeste kultiveerimine peaks hoidma ära sõdasid, sest kui mõni rikas linn ründab, võib kutsuda kellegi appi, kes hea meelega rööviks rikka linna paljaks?
SOCRATES: Really, my good Adeimantus, the orders we are giving them are neither as numerous nor as difficult as one would think. Indeed, they are all insignificant provided, as the saying goes, they safeguard the one great thing - or rather not great but adequate.
ADEIMANTUS: What's that?
SOCRATES: Their education and upbringing. For if a good education makes them moderate men, they will easily discover all this for themselves - and everything else that we are now omitting, such as the possession of women, marriages, and the procreation of children, and how all [|] these must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb that friends share everything in common. (Plato 2004: 107-108, 423d-424a)
Õige haridus võib tagada selle, et kõik ülejäänu loksub paika. Sj, et ka naiste, abielu ja laste osas "sõprade vahel kõik on ühine". Griffithi joonealune märkus osutab selle ütluse tähtsusele: "The proverb was 'friends will hold things in common', and is said to have originated in the unusually close-knit Pythagorean communities of southern Italy." (2000: 116, fn 6)
SOCRATES: Those dealing with things like this: the silence appropriate for younger people in the presence of their elders; the giving up of seats for them and standing up in their presence; the care of parents; hairstyles; clothing; shoes; the general appearance of the body; and everything else of that sort. Don't you agree? (Plato 2004: 109: 425a-b)
Laps räägib siis kui kana kuseb.
SOCRATES: And isn't it another charming feature of theirs that they think their worst enemy of all is the one who tells them the truth - that until they give up drinkenness, overeating, sexual indulgence, and idleness, then no drug, cautery, or surgery, no charms, amulets, or anything else of that sort will do them any good? (Plato 2004: 110, 426a-b)
Siin tahaks küsida, kas need 4 on sümboolsed - on nad seotud konkreetsete voorustega?
SOCRATES: I expect, then, to find justice in the following way. I think our city, if indeed it has been correctly founded, is completely good.
GLAUCON: Yes, it must be.SOCRATES: Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, temperate, and just. (Plato 2004: 112, 427d)
"Clearly, then, it is wise, courageous, self-disciplined and just" (2000: 121).
SOCRATES: Therefore, as in the case of any other four things, if we were looking for one of them in something and recognized it first, that would be enough to satisfy us. But if we recognized the other three first, that itself would enable us to recognize what we were looking for, since clearly it could not be anything other than the one that remains. (Plato 2004: 112, 428a)
Kui eeldada, et asju on ainult "täiuslik arv" ehk 4, siis muidugi.
SOCRATES: Then is there some knowledge in the city we have just founded, which some of its citizens have, that does not deliberate about some particular thing in the city, but about the city as a whole, and about how its internal relations and its relations with other cities will be the best possible. (Plato 2004: 113, 428c-d)
Jälle "terviklikkuse" küsimus. "Täiuslikel vahimeestel" on teadmisi linnast tervikuna, selle sisemistest suhetest ja suhetest teiste linnadega.
SOCRATES: I mean that courage is a sort of preservation.
GLAUCON: What sort of preservation? [|]
SOCRATES: The preservation of the belief, inculcated by the law through education, about what things, and what sorts of things, inspire terror. And by its preservation "through everything," I mean preserving it though pains, pleasures, appetites, and fears and not abandoning it. (Plato 2004: 114-115, 429c-d)
Julgus või söakus säilitab veendumust, et ainult need asjad, mille kohta õpetatakse, et need peaksid hirmu äratama, äratavad hirmu. Hmm.
SOCRATES: Temperance is surely a sort of order, the mastery of certain sorts of pleasures and appetites. People indicate as much when they use the term "self-mastery" - though I do not know in what way. This and other similar things are like tracks that temperance has left. Isn't that so? (Plato 2004: 116, 430e)
Eesti keeles otse, "enesevalitsemine". Kreeka keeles aga iseendast-tugevam-olemine: "The literal meaning of the phrase translated 'master of himself' here and throughout this passage is 'stronger than himself', which is an idiom in Greek but not in English. Correspondingly, the phrase translated 'slave of himself' has the literal meaning 'weaker than himself'." (Griffith 2000: 124-125, fn 13)
SOCRATES: Furthermore, pleasures, pains, and appetites that are numerous and multifarious are things one would especially find in children, women, household slaves, and in the so-called free masses - that is, the inferior people.
GLAUCON: Yes.
SOCRATES: But the pleasures, pains, and appetites that are simple and moderate, the ones that are led by rational calculation with the aid of understanding and correct belief, you would find in those few people who are born with the best natures and receive the best education. (Plato 2004: 117, 431b-c)
Parimatel meestel on vähesed ja väikesed rõõmud. Naised, lapsed ja orjad tahavad "mitmesuguseid asju". Men only want one thing...
SOCRATES: Do you see, then, that the hunch we had just now - that temperance is like a sort of harmony - was quite plausible?
GLAUCON: Why is that?
SOCRATES: Because its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, each of which resides in one part and makes the city either courageous or wise. Temperance does not work like that, but has literally been stretched [|] throughout the whole, making the weakest, the strongest, and those in between all sing the same song in unison - whether in wisdom, if you like, or in physical strength, if you prefer; or, for that matter, in numbers, wealth, or anything else. Hence we would be absolutely right to say that this unanimity is temperance - this concord between the naturally worse and the naturally better, about which of the two should rule both in the city and in each individual. (Plato 2004: 117-118, 431e-432a)
Ilmselt kogu raamatu olulisim moment. Mõõdukus on harmoonia, mis erinevalt söakusest või tarkusest ei asu kuskil konkreetses kohas (nagu söakad vahimehed ja targad täiuslikud vahimehed), vaid läbistab kogu linna ning ühendab nõrgad tugevamatega ja kujutab endast üksmeelt selle osas, kes peaks valitsema.
[SOCRATES:] And surely what we laid down and often repeated, if you remember, that each person must practice one of the pursuits in the city, the one for which he is naturally best suited.
GLAUCON: Yes, we did say that.
SOCRATES: Moreover, we have heard many people say, and have often said ourselves, that justice is doing one's own work and not meddling with what is not one's own.
GLAUCON: Yes, we have.
SOCRATES: This, then, my friend, provided it is taken in a certain way, would seem to be justice - this doing one's own work. And do you know what I take as evidence of that?
GLAUCON: No, tell me.
SOCRATES: After our consideration of temperance, courage, and wisdom, I think that what remains in the city is the power that makes it possible for all of these to arise in it, and that preserves them when they have arisen for as long as it remains there itself. And we did say that justice would be what remained when we had found the other three. (Plato 2004: 119, 433a-c)
"Õiglus" on lõpuks see, et igaüks teeb oma ühte asja korralikult ja ei sega teisi kui nad teevad sama. Õiglus on justkui alusvoorus, sest see võimaldab teistel voorustel esile tulla. Seda muidugi 'teatud vaatepunktist' (taken in a certain way).
SOCRATES: But I imagine that when someone who is, by nature, a craftsman or some other sort of moneymaker is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, and attempts to enter the class of soldiers; or when one of the soldiers who is unworthy to do so tries to enter that of judge and guardian, and these exchange their tools and honors; or when the same person tries to do all these things at once, then I imagine you will agree that these exchanges and this meddling destroy the city.
GLAUCON: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: So, unmeddling and exchange among these three classes is the greatest harm that can happen to the city and would rightly be called the worst evil one could do to it. (Plato 2004: 120, 434a-c)
Kuidas? Kui ühiskonnaklassid seguneksid, kukuks kogu ühiskond kokku. Aga miks? Mis selleks täpselt juhtuma peaks?
SOCRATES: Well, isn't it absolutely necessary for us to agree to this much: that the very same kinds of things and conditions exist in each one of us as exist in the city? After all, where else would they come from? You see, it would be ridiculous for anyone to think that spiritedness did not come to be in cities from the private individuals who are reputed to have this quality, such as the Thracians, Scythians, and others who live to the north of us; or that the same is not true of the love of learning, which is mostly associated with our part of the world; or of the love of money, which is said to be found not least among the Phoenicians and Egyptians. (Plato 2004: 122, 435e-436a)
Põhjas on söakad rahvad, lõunas on ihalevad rahvad ja nende vahel on oma õppimisarmastusega kreeklased. Griffithil: "the spirited element, "love of learning" ja "the commercial instinct" (2000: 131).
SOCRATES: But this, now, is difficult. Do we do each of them with the same thing or, since there are three, do we do one with one and another with another: that is to say, do we learn with one, feel anger with another, and with yet a third have an appetite for the pleasures of food, sex, and [|] those closely akin to them? Or do we do each of them with the whole of our soul, once we feel the impulse? That is what is difficult to determine in a way that is up to the standards of our argument. (Plato 2004: 122-123, 436a-b)
Kuidas inimese kolm hingejagu koos peaksid toimima?
SOCRATES: Now, wouldn't you consider assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it way [sic], as all being pairs of mutual opposites - whether of opposite doings or of opposite undergoings does not matter? (Plato 2004: 124, 437a-b)
Erandkorras on siin oluliselt selgem tõlge kui Griffithil: "things like saying "yes" and saying "no", desire and rejection, or attraction and repulsion" (2000: 132).
SOCRATES: It would not be unreasonable for us to claim, then, that there are two elements, different from one another; and to call the element in the soul with which it calculates, the rationally calculating element; and the one with which it feels passion, hungers, thirsts, and is stirred by other appetites, the irrational and appetitive element, friend to certain ways of being filled and certain pleasures. (Plato 2004: 127, 439d)
"He [Pythagoras] also said, that there are two motions of the body and the soul; the one being irrational, but the other the effect of deliberate choice" (Iamblichus 1818: 70).
SOCRATES: And don't we often notice on other occasions that when appetite forces someone contrary to his rational calculation, he reproaches himself and feels anger at the thing in him that is doing the forcing; and just as if there were two warring factions, such a person's spirit becomes the ally of his reason? But spirit partnering the appetites to do what reason has decided should not be done - I do not imagine you would say that you had ever seen that, either in yourself or in anyone else. (Plato 2004: 128, 440a-b)
Väga huvitav eellane sellele, kuidas 19. sajandi lõpu ratsionalistlikus filosoofias samade kategooriatega mängitakse.
SOCRATES: Is it also different from this, then, or is it some kind of rationally calculating element, so that there are not three kinds of things in the soul, but two - the rationally calculating element and the appetitive one? Or rather, just as there were three classes in the city that held it together - the moneymaking, the auxiliary, and the deliberative - is there also this third element in the soul, the spirited kind, which is the natural auxiliary of the rationally calculating element, if it has not been corrupted by bad upbringing? (Plato 2004: 129, 440e-41a)
Siin on lõpuks näha selle hinge-linna analoogia põhilist iva: vahimehed teenivad valitsejaid, et hoida käsitöölisi jm alamklasse kontrolli all.
SOCRATES: I imagine, then, that we call each individual courageous because of the latter part - that is, when the part of him that is spirited in kind preserves through pains and pleasures the pronouncements of reason about what should inspire terror and what should not. (Plato 2004: 131, 442b-c)
Veendumuste säilitamisest hea alternatiivne tõlge: "when the spirited element in him, through surrounded by pleasures and pains, keeps intact the instructions given to it by reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared" (2000: 139).
SOCRATES: For example, if we had to come to an agreement about whether a man similar in nature and training to this city of ours had embezzled gold or silver he had accepted for deposit, who do you think would consider him more likely to have done so rather than men of a different sort?
GLAUCON: No on.
SOCRATES: And would he have anything to do with temple robberies, thefts, or betrayals of friends in private life or of cities in public life?
GLAUCON: No, nothing.
SOCRATES: And he would be in no way untrustworthy when it came to promises or other agreements. [|]
GLAUCON: How could he be?
SOCRATES: And surely adultery, disrespect for parents, and neglect of the gods would be more characteristic of any other sort of person than of this one. (Plato 2004: 131-132, 442e-443a)
Loeb nagu nimekiri pütaagorlaste eetilistest taakadest Kuldvärssides.
SOCRATES: And in truth, justice is, it seems, something of this sort. Yet it is not concerned with someone's doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside; with himself, really, and the things that are his own. It means that he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three elements together, just as if they were literally the three defining notes of an octave - lowest, highest, and middle - as well as any others that may be in between. He binds together all of these and, from having been many, becomes entirely one, temperate and harmonious. Then and only then should he turn to action, whether it is to do something concerning the acquisition of wealth or concerning the care of his body, or even something political, or concerning private contracts. In all these areas, he considers and calls just and fine the action that preserves this inner harmony and helps achieve it, and wisdom the knowledge that oversees such [|] action; and he considers and calls unjust any action that destroys this harmony, and ignorance the belief that oversees it. (Plato 2004: 132-133, 443e-444a)
Lõpuks, õiglus on võrdsus, aga mitte inimeste, vaid inimese hingejagude vahel.
SOCRATES: So be it, then. I take itwe must look for injustice next.
GLAUCON: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Mustn't it, in turn, be a kind of faction among those three - their meddling and interfering with one another's jobs; the rebellion of a part of the soul against the whole in order to rule in it inappropriately, since its nature suits it to be a slave of the ruling class. We will say something like that, I imagine, and that their disorder and wandering is injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, ignorance, and, in a word, the whole of vice. (Plato 2004: 133, 444a-b)
Ebaõigluses nende vooruste vastandid. Griffithil "indiscipline, cowardice, ignorance" (2000: 141). Distsipliini puudumine ehk parem vaste kui litsentside omamine.
SOCRATES: Virtue, then, so it seems, is a sort of health, a fine and good state of the soul; whereas vice seems to be a shameful disease and weakness. (Plato 2004: 134, 444e)
Siinses tõlkes ei näi üldse olevat kolmiklik, Griffithil küll: "virtue would apparently be some sort of health, beauty and vigour in the soul, while vice would be disease, ugliness and weakness" (2000: 142). Mitte küll ilus, hea ja tark, aga "terve, ilus ja jõuline".
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