Plato 2004. Republic. Translated from the New Standard Greek Text, with Introduction, by C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. [Book 2]
You see, Glaucon, who is always very courageous in everything, refused on this occasion, too, to accept Thrasymachus' capitulation. (Plato 2004: 36, 357a)
Ei tea kas see on märgiline, et Glaukon on kõiges julge? Polemarchos pidavat ju esindama vahimehi?
GLAUCON: Well, then, you certainly are not doing what you want. Tell me, do you think there is a sort of good we welcome, not because we desire its consequences, but because we welcome it for its own sake - enjoying, for example, and all the harmless pleasures from which nothing results afterward beyond enjoying having them? (Plato 2004: 36, 357b)
Faatiline futiilsus! Näiteks seltskonnavestlus on selline asi, milles ideaalis ei osaleta selle pärast, et soovitakse selle "tagajärgi" (nö "tagamõtet" ei tohiks siin olla), vaid selle pärast, et seltskonnas vestlemine on iseenesest nauditav tegevus.
GLAUCON: And is there a sort of good we love for its own sake, and also for the sake of its consequences - knowing, for example, and seeing, and being healthy? For we welcome such things, I imagine, on both counts. (Plato 2004: 36, 357c)
Miks see kõlab nagu Archytas jt pütaagorlased? (1) asjad mis on head iseenesest, (2) asjad mis on head millegi muu jaoks, ja... (3) asjad, mis on mõlemat?
GLAUGON: And do you also recognize a third kind of good, such as physical training, medical treatment when sick, medicine itself, or ways of making money generally? We would say that these are burdensome but beneficial to us, and we would not choose them for their own sake, but for the sake of their rewards and other consequences. (Plato 2004: 36, 357b-c)
Iamblichose järgi peaks siin kolmandal kohal seisma haridus, sest teadmisi on hea omada iseenesest ja neid saab ka edasi anda neid ise ära kaotamata. Siin tundub Glauconil olevat hoopis teistsugune loogika. (1) kahjutu ja nauditav, millel ei ole tagajärgi, (2) teadmine, nägemine ja tervis on head iseenesest ja oma tagajargede tõttu, (3) asjad, mis ei ole väga nauditavad, on isegi koormavad, aga meile kasulikud, st ei ole iseenesest head, aga tasuvad ja oma tagajärgede tõttu ihaldatavad. Näib, et see kolmas (teadmised) on siin asetatud teisele kohale. Ühtlasi jäävad "nauditav" ja "kasulik" risttabelist siin välja asjad, mis ei ole nauditavad ega kasulikud, st mis ei ole hüved.
SOCRATES: I myself put it in the finest one - the one that anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness must love both because of itself and because of its consequences.
GLAUCON: That is not what the masses think. On the contrary, they think it is of the burdensome kind: the one that must be practiced for the sake of the rewards and the popularity that are the consequences of a good reputation, but that is to be avoided as intrinsically burdensome. (Plato 2004: 36, 358a)
Sokrate eelistab seda, mis on hea iseenesesest ja oma tagajärgedes (teadmine, nägemine ja hea tervis), aga Glaukoni järgi peavad inimesed seda koormavaks. Edasi, viimasest lauseosast, on raske aru saada. Kas see on koormav, sest neid asju peab harjutama ("the one that must be practised")? Või tahab Glaukon öelda, et parim hüve ei ole mitte see, mida Sokrates peab parimaks, vaid see, mis on koormav, aga tasuv? Pidin Griffithi tõlget piiluma ja seal on natuke selgem: enamus inimesi peaksid õiglaseimaks ebameeldivat hüve, mida meil tuleb kultiveerida selleks, et saada vastutasuks tasu (payment) ja tunnustust (reputation) tänu avalikule arvamusele, aga mida iseenesest tuleb vältida nagu katku.
[GLAUCON:] The best is to do injustice without paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer it without being able to take revenge. Justice is in the middle between these two extremes. People love it, not because it is a good thing, but because they are too weak to do injustice with impunity. Someone who has the power to do [|] it, however - someone who is a real man - would not make an agreement with anyone, neither to do injustice nor to suffer it. For him, that would be insanity. That is the nature of justice, according to the argument, Socrates, and those are its natural origins. (Plato 2004: 37-38, 359a-b)
Tõeline mees ei lepiks mitte mingil seadustega, mis keelavad tal karistamatult sooritada ebaõiglust! Griffithi joonealune märkus ütleb, et see siin on varajane ühiskondliku lepingu teooria.
[GLAUCON:] There was a violent thunderstorm, and n earthquake broke open the ground and created a chasm at the place where he was tending his sheep. Seeing this, he was filled with amazement and went down into it. And there, in addition to many other amazing things of which we are told stories, he saw a hollow, bronze horse. There were windowlike openings in it and, peeping in, he saw a corpse, which seemed to be of more than human size, wearing nothing but a gold ring on its finger. He took off the ring and came out of the chasm. He wore the ring at the usual monthly meeting of shepherds that reported to the king on the state of the flocks. And as he was sitting among the others, he happened to turn the setting of the ring toward himself, toward the inside of his hand. When he did this, he became invisible to those sitting near him, and they went on talking as if he had gone. He was amazed at this and, fingering the ring, he turned the setting outward again and became visible. So, he experimented with the ring to test whether it indeed had this power - and it did. If he turned the setting inward, he became invisible; if he turned it outward, he became visible again. (Plato 2004: 38, 359d-360a)
Sõrmuste Isand. Seda katkendit lugedes ärkab minu sees Iidsete Tulnukate Teoreetik, kes tahaks väita, et "akendega pronkshobune" on eelajaloolise kreeklase tõlgendus lendavast taldrikust, et inimesest suurem paljas olend, kelle laiba küljest ta sõrmuse võttis, on tulnukas, ja sõrmus ise on mingi tulnukate tehnoloogia.
[GLAUCON:] Now no-one, it seems, would be so incorruptible that he would stay on the path of justice, or bring himself to keep away from other people's possessions and not touch them, when he could take whatever he wanted from the marketplace with impunity, go [|] into people's houses and have sex with anyone he wished, kill or release from prison anyone he wished, and do all the other things that would make him like a god among humans. (Plato 2004: 38-39, 360b-c)
Mitte keegi ei peaks ahvatlusele vastu kui tal oleks nähtamatuse sõrmus. Harry Potter viskab oma mantli selga, kannab elektroonikapoe lao tühjaks, murrab Malfoy majja sisse ja jätab noa seina sisse tema voodi kohal, Cho Changil on väga huvitavad ööd ja kopsaka tasu eest hakkavad kurjategijad isegi Azkabanist välja saama.
[GLAUCON:] And our completely unjust person must be given complete injustice - nothing must be subtracted from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, he has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he does happen to slip up, he must be able to put it right, either through his ability to speak persuasively if any of his unjust activities are discovered, or to use force if force is needed, because he is courageous and strong and has provided himself with wealth and friends. (Plato 2004: 361a-b)
Fantastiline. Isegi ebaõiglase inimese ideaalis, mille üks olulisemaid punkte on see, et selleks, et olla "edukas" oma ebaõigluses või "täiuslikult" ebaõiglane, peab ta oma ebaõiglusega toime tulema ilma mingeid tagajärgi kannatamata. Täiuslikult ebaõiglane inimene sooritab ebaõiglust, aga teda peetakse sealjuures õiglaseks! Mis on minu jaoks äge selle juures on nimekiri vahenditest, mida ta võib kasutada, et oma ebaõigluse tagajärgede eest pääseda. Neid oma eelistatud järjekorda seades: (1) ta võib end vabaks osta või kasutada jõukate sõprade abi või muid väliseid vahendeid; (2) ta võib kasutada jõudu kui seda on vaja, sest ta on julge ja tugev; (3) ta on piisavalt intelligentne, et võib end keerulisest olukorrast lihtsalt välja rääkida.
[GLAUCON:] We must strip him of everything except justice, and make his situation the opposite of the unjust person's. Though he does no injustice, he must have the greatest reputation for it, so that he may be tested with regard to justice by seeing whether or not he can withstand a bad reputation and its consequences. (Plato 2004: 40, 361c)
Ja Glaukoni ideaal täiuslikult õiglasest inimesest jällegi eeldab, vastanduse kaudu, et kõik peavad teda ebaõiglaseks. Daniel Radcliffe'i tegelane filmis Horns tuleb meelde, aga samas ka HP-s kahtlustati tema tegelast "segavereliseks printsiks" olemises. Tundub nagu üsna tüüpiline kirjandus- ja filmitroop.
[ADEIMANTUS:] Musaeus and his son claim that the gods give just people even more exciting goods than these. In their account, they lead the just to Hades, seat them on couches, provide them with a symposium of pious people, crown them with wreaths, and make them spend all their time drinking - as if they thought eternal drunkenness was the finest wage of virtue. Others stretch even further the wages that virtue receives from the gods. For they say that someone who is pious and keeps his promises leaves his children's children and a whole race behind him. (Plato 2004: 41, 363c-d)
Ettekujutus pärastelust, milles jumalad juhatavad sind Hadesesse, istutavad sind diivanile, ümbritsevad sind huvitavate inimestega, kroonivad sind pärjaga ja terve aeg te ainult joote ja olete purjus. Pani mind mõtlema, kas kristlaste ettekujutus "taevast" on midagi analoogset; st koht, kus nad saavad lõpuks purjus või muudmoodi joobes olla. Või on "taevas" kainekas ja mängite ülejäänud igaviku mingeid lauamänge kellatiksumise saatel? Viimane lause tekitas siinses tõlkes segadust - esimene mõte oli, et kas nende "teiste" all peetakse silmas pütaagorlasi, kelle järgi jumalate poolt ette nähtud korra järgi elades võid lõpuks ise jumalaks saada ja nende seltskonnaga liituda, minna tšillida päikesel või kuul. Griffithi tõlkes on asi selgem: teiste sõnutsi on vooruste tasu hunnik lapselapsi ja endast terve järglaste hõimu siia ilma tekitamine.
[ADEIMANTUS:] With one voice they all chant the hymn that justice and temperance are fine things, but difficult and onerous, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are only shameful by repute and convention. (Plato 2004: 42, 364a)
Õiglus ja mõõdukus on kenad asjad, aga rasked ja tüütud.
[ADEIMANTUS:] [...] they dishonor and disregard those who happen to be in any way weak or poor, even though they admit that they are better than the others. (Plato 2004: 42, 364a-b)
Kehvuse triaad: (1) vaene, (2) nõrk, ja (3) loll.
[ADEIMANTUS:] And the poets are brought forward as witnesses to all these accounts. Some harp on the ease of vice, on the grounds thatVice in abundance is easy to get,and a road that is long, rough and steep. (Plato 2004: 42, 364c-d)
The road is smooth and begins beside you,
But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue
Mul ei õnnestu leida praegu üles seda Wikipedia lehekülge maalist, millel kujutatakse põrgusse viivat langevat (sloping) teed ja aeda, milles on auk vms millest pääseb väikesele jalgrajale, mis viib taevasse; küll aga leidsin selle: "the gates of Hell are open night and day, Smooth the descent, and easy is the way;" (Dryden, vt Taylor 1818: 212) // Leidsin versiooni, mis ei kujuta täpselt seda mida ma kirjeldasin, aga mis mulle meeldib kõige enam oma värvilisuse tõttu: "The broad and narrow way".
[ADEIMANTUS:] And they present a noisy throng of books by Musaeus and Orpheus - who are the offspring, they claim, of Selene and the Muses - on which they base their rituals. (Plato 2004: 43, 364e)
Oluliselt parem kui Griffithi "a host of books". Mitte ainult hunnik raamatuid, vaid lärmikalt tunglev raamatumass.
[ADEIMANTUS:] To remain undiscovered we will form secret societies and political clubs. And there are teachers of persuasion to make us clever in dealing with assemblies and law courts. Therefore, partly by persuasion, partly by force, we will contrive to do better than other people, without paying the penalty. (Plato 2004: 43, 365d)
Nüüd ei leia üles, kus ma täpselt 1. raamatus seda kohtasin, aga mulle jäi mulje, et kogu see õigluse teema on tugevalt seotud ahnusega - sooviga omada rohkem (raha, võimu) kui teised. Siin on need kolm omavahel läbi põimunud: selleks, et (1) saada rikkamaks kui teised, võib kasutada (2) füüsilist jõudu, st vägivalda või (3) veenvalt kõnelemist ehk retoorikat, mida õpetavad sofistid. The first principle of justice is equality (vt Iamblichus 1818: 89-90)
[ADEIMANTUS:] "But surely we cannot hide from the gods or overpower them by force!" Well, if the gods do not exist, or do not concern themselves with human affairs, why should we worry at all about hiding from them? On the other hand, if they do exist, and do care about us, we know nothing about them except what we have learned from the laws and from the poets who give their genealogies. But these are the very people who tell us that the gods can be persuaded and influenced by sacrifices, gentle prayers, and offerings. Hence, we should believe them on both matters, or on neither. (Plato 2004: 43, 365d-e)
No ei leia Iamblichose (Taylori tõlkes) tekstis üles kohta, kus "tema ise" olevat öelnud midagi sellist, et kui sa usud, et jumal on olemas, aga ei usu, et ta inimeste üle valvab, siis see teeb sama välja kui olla ateist.
[ADEIMANTUS:] So given all that has been said, Socrates, what device could get someone with any power - whether of mind, wealth, body, or family - to be willing to honor justice, and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised? (Plato 2004: 44, 366b-c)
Siin meeldib mulle alternatiivne tõlge jälle paremini: "what could induce anyone with any force of personality, any financial resources, any physical strength or family connections, to be prepared to respect justice" (2000: 47). Üha enam tekitab küsimust, et kas jõukus ja perekonnatutvused tuleks, koos nt ametipositsiooniga, lahterdada kõik esmasuse alla nö eksternaalidena, nagu neid mingites fragmentides nimetatakse.
[ADEIMANTUS:] No one has ever adequately described what each does itself, through its own power, by its presence in the soul of the person who possesses it, even if it remains hidden from gods and humans. No one, whether in poetry or in private discussions, has adequately argued that injustice is the greatest evil a soul can have in it, and justice the greatest good. (Plato 2004: 44, 366e)
Mulle jäi enne ka silma sõnastus kui Glaukon ütleb: "For I want to hear what justice and injustice are, and what power each has when it is just by itself in the soul" (lk 37, 358b). Toon selle üles, sest see näib ennetavat ülejäänud teoses lahtirulluvat arutelu hingest kui linnast. Küsimus on selles, et (a) jumalaid ei pruugi olemas olla või neid ei pruugi inimmutukad huvitada, (b) teiste inimeste arvamus võib olla petlik, a la täiuslikult ebaõiglase inimese kohta arvatakse, et ta on õiglane, aga (c) milline on inimene iseenda ees, kui tema hinge valitseb õiglus või ebaõiglus?
[ADEIMANTUS:] You agree that justice is one of the greatest goods, the ones that are worth having for the sake of their consequences, but much more so for their own sake - such as seeing, hearing, knowing, being healthy, of course, and all the others that are genuine goods by nature and not simply by repute. This is what I want you to praise about justice. How does it - because of its very self - benefit its possessor, and how does injustice harm him? Leave wages and reputations for others to praise. (Plato 2004: 45, 367c-d)
"You agreed that justice [belongs to] that finest class of goods, those which are good by their very nature, and not because of the reputation they bring" (2000: 96). Ühesõnaga, Sokrates, ära seleta mulle kuidas õiglus on tulus (nagu väitis Thrasymachus - kes tugevam, sellel õigus, sellel õnnestub panna teised enda kasuks tööle) ega kasulik hea maine jaoks (mis omakorda võib aidata poliitikukärjääri või hästi abielluda) vaid räägi, kuidas on õiglus inimese hingele hea iseenesest.
SOCRATES: And a city is larger than a single man? (Plato 2004: 46, 368e)
Kids ask the darndest things.
SOCRATES: Well, then, would one person do better work if he practiced many crafts or if he practiced one?
ADEIMANTUS: If he practiced one.
SOCRATES: And it is also clear, I take it, that if one misses the opportune moment in any job, the work is spoiled.
ADEIMANTUS: It is clear.
SOCRATES: That, I take it, is because the thing that has to be done won't wait until the doer has the leisure to do it. No, instead the doer must, of necessity, pay close attention to what has to be done and not leave it for his idle moments. (Plato 2004: 48, 370b-c)
Ongi καιρόν. Griffithil "the right moment".
[SOCRATES:] They will recline on couches strewn with yew and myrtles and feast with their children, drink their wine, and crowned with wreaths, hymn the gods. They will enjoy having sex with one another, but they will produce no more children than their resources allow, lest they fall into either poverty or war. (Plato 2004: 51, 372b)
Rõhutatud koha asemel on Shorey-l "singing hymns to the gods in pleasant fellowship, not begetting offspring beyond their means"; Griffithil aga "singing the praises of the gods, they will live quite happily with one another." (2000: 54-55) - Ühel elatakse meeldivas vendluses, teisel elatakse õnnelikult koos, kolmandal nauditakse seksi.
[SOCRATES:] You see, the things I mentioned earlier, and the way of life I described, won't satisfy some people, it seems; but couches, tables, and other furniture will have to be added to it, and relishes, of course, and incense, perfumes, prostitutes, pastries - and the multifariousness of each of them. (Plato 2004: 51, 372e-373a)
Äge nimekiri. Griffith eelistab p tähe asemel c-d ja annab "incense, perfumes, call-girls, cakes" (2000: 55).
[SOCRATES:] And there will have to be craftsmen of multifarious devices, including, among other things, those needed for the adornment of women. (Plato 2004: 52, 373b)
Griffithil vb natuke paremini: "and the makers of all sorts of goods, especially those used for making women look beautiful" (2000: 56).
SOCRATES: Then to the degree that the guardians' job is most important, it requires the most freedom from other things, as well as the greatst craft and practice. (Plato 2004: 53, 374e)
Hakkab juba pihta see vahimeeste poputamine.
SOCRATES: Do you think that there is any difference, when it comes to the job of guarding, between the nature of a noble hound and that of a well-bred youth?
GLAUCON: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I mean that both of them have to be sharp-eyed, quick to catch what they see, and strong, too, in case they have to fight what they capture. (Plato 2004: 54, 352a)
Vahin ja mõtlen tükk aega, kas need moodustaksid teisesuse alamtriaadi: (1) kärme - vb midagi pistmist kirgedega? - see on kõige ebarahuldavam osa; (2) tugev - lihtne; ja (3) teravapilgulisus ehk selles mõttes, et nägemine on seotud teadmisega, nagu Lepajõe (2022: 17) seletab.
SOCRATES: Now, don't think that our future guardian, besides being spirited, must also be, by nature, philosophical?
GLAUCON: How do you mean? I don't understand.
SOCRATES: It too is something you see in dogs, and it should make us wonder at the merit of the beast.
GLAUCON: In what way?
SOCRATES: In that when a dog sees someone it does not know, it gets angry even before anything bad happens to it. But when it knows someone, it welcomes him, even if it has never received anything good from him. Have you never wondered at that?
GLAUCON: I have never paid it any mind until now. But it is clear that a dog does do that sort of thing.
SOCRATES: Well, that seems to be a naturally refined quality, and one that is truly philosophical. [|]
GLAUCON: In what way?
SOCRATES: In that it judges anything it sees to be either a friend or an enemy on no other basis than that it knows the one and does not know the other. And how could it be anything besides a lover of learning if it defines what is its own and what is alien to it in terms of knowledge and ignorance? (Plato 2004: 55-56, 375e-376b)
See on küll üks väga imelik arutelu. Vahimehed peavad olema filosoofid, sest vahikoerte loomuses on võõraste peale hakuda, aga tuttavaid tervitada. Siin jääb mulje, et filosoofia on tuletatud justkui sõbra-tundmisest või sõbra-teadmisest. Sellist kummalist pseudoetümoloogilist kahtlust tekitab ka Pythagoras, kellele samuti omistatakse filosoofia mõiste vermimist selliseks nagu me seda teame, aga kelle filosoofias on sõprusel (filia-l) oma eriline ja vaat, et läbiv roll, mis paneb mõtlema, kas see ei võinud algselt olla umbes midagi sellist nagu "sõpruseõpetus" (sofistika filia-st).
SOCRATES: By Zeus, in that case, my dear Adeimantus, we must not abandon it, even if it turns out to be a somewhat lengthy affair.
ADEIMANTUS: No, we must not.
SOCRATES: Come on, then, and like people in a fable telling stories at their leisure, let's in our discussion educate these men. (Plato 2004: 56, 376d)
"Let's imagine we are telling a story, and that we have all the time in the world." (2000: 60)
ADEIMANTUS: Indeed, I do. But I do not understand at all what more significant ones you mean.
SOCRATES: The ones Homer, Hesiod, and other poets tell us. After all, they surely compose false stories, which they told and are still telling to people.
ADEIMANTUS: Which stories do you mean? And what is the fault you find in them?
SOCRATES: The first and most important fault that one ought to find, especially if the falsehood has no good features.
ADEIMANTUS: Yes, but what is it?
SOCRATES: Using a story to create a bad image of what the gods nad heroes are like, just as a painter might paint a picture that is not at all like the things he is trying to paint. (Plato 2004: 58, 377d-e)
Ma vaatasin, et Hesiodos on alla 400-l leheküljel, kreekakeelse tekstiga pöördel ja allalaetav. Homeros aga võtab üle 800 lehekülje, ilma tõlketa pöördel, ja on laenutatav, mitte allalaetav. Ühtlasi tšekkisin lg-d: Hesiodose ja Platoni kohta on ainult üks raamat kirjutatud, aga Homerose ja Platoni kohta vahemalt 3, mida kõlbaks kunagi lugeda.
SOCRATES: First, the biggest falsehood about the most important things has no good features - I mean Hesiod telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his own son. But even if these stories were true, they should be passed over in silence, I would think, and not told so casually to the foolish and the young. And if, for some reason, they must be told, only a very few people should hear them - people who are pledged to secrecy and have had to sacrifice not just a pig, but something so large and scarce that the number of people who hear them is kept as small as possible. (Plato 2004: 58, 377e-378a)
Võib-olla jah lugu kastreerimisest ning laste- ja isatapust ei ole kõige kohasem unejutt.
[SOCRATES:] On the contrary, if we are somehow going to persuade our people that no citizen has even hated another, and that it is impious to do so, then those are the things their male and female elders should tell them from childhood on. (Plato 2004: 59, 378c)
"The path to success in their relations with one another was to treat their friends as if they would never be enemies, and their enemies as if they would soon be friends" (Iamblichus 1989: 16).
[SOCRATES:] Nor will we allow the young to hear the words of Aeschylus: "A god makes mortals guilty, when he wants to destroy a house utterly." (Plato 2004: 60, 380a)
Ja Sokratese ennustus läks täide, sest me ei tea kust see tsitaat pärineb või mis põhjusel otsustas jumal surelikke süüdlaseks teha ja nende kodusid hävitada. Jumal teeb ainult head, sest kõike halba mida ta teeb, otsustasime me mitte mäletada.
SOCRATES: Don't you know that all gods nad humans hate a true lie, if one may call it that?
ADEIMANTUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: I mean that no one intentionally wants to lie about the most important things to what is most important in himself. On the contrary, he fears to hold a lie there more than anything.
ADEIMANTUS: I still don't understand.
SOCRATES: That is because you think I am saying something deep. I simply mean that to lie and to have lied to the soul about the things that are, and to be ignorant, and to have and hold a lie there, is what everyone would least of all accept; indeed, they especially hate it there.
ADEIMANTUS: They certainly do.
SOCRATES: But surely, as I was saying just now, it would be most correct to say that it is truly speaking a lie - the ignorance in the soul of the one to whom the lie was told. For a lie in words is a sort of imitation of this affection in the soul, an image of it that comes into being after it, and not an altogether pure lie. Isn't that so?
ADEIMANTUS: Yes, it is.
SOCRATES: A real lie, then, is hated not only by the gods, but also by human beings. (Plato 2004: 63, 382a-c)
Suurt essugi ei saa siin aru. Reeve kirjutas sellest kohast oma sissejuhatuses. Tõenäoliselt saab veel rohkelt lugeda sekundaarkirjanduses seletusi sellele kohale. Talletan siia, et oleks kerge üle vaadata.
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