A Fourth Virtue

Cornford, Francis M. 1912. Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato. The Classical Quarterly 6(4): 246-265. DOI: 10.1017/s0009838800015639

It is now generally recognized that Plato's whole theory of the Ideal State is based upon the principle that human society is 'natural' (φύσει). As against the antisocial doctrines of certain sophists, this proposition means, in the first place, a denial of the view that society originated in a primitive contract. But Plato does not merely reject this false opinion; he also sets up an alternative doctrine that the state is natural, in the sense that a human society constructed on ideal lines would be one that should reflect the structuce of man's soul, and give full play to the legitimate functions of every part of his nature. Accordingly, it is vital to his purpose in the Republic to show that the division of the Ideal State into three classes - Guardians, Auxiliaries, Producers - corresponds to the division of the soul into three 'parts' (μέρη), 'kinds' (γένη) or 'forms' (εἴδη) - the Reflective, Spirited, and Appetitive. (Cornford 1912: 246)

Plato is against the social contract theory. Constructing the ideal city in their imagination is more of a thought-exercise to elucidate the justice of the soul, I think. Thus, to "give full play to the legitimate functions of every part of his nature" eludes me - what is this part saying? Do the parts of the soul have illegitimate functions? As to the parts themselves, I'll have to start keeping a running tab (inserting entries into the table) of them from now because it turns out that looking for them after the fact is exceedingly tedious.

This correspondence between the ideal social structure and the tripartite psychology of Plato is obvious and familiar. The question I wish to reopen is this: Is the social structure deduced from the psychology, or the psychology from the social structure? What I hope to show is that, whereas it is commonly asserted, or taken for granted, that Plato arrived first at the triple division of the soul, and then built up his State in three corresponding stages, it is more probable that he began with the social structure, and then, being convinced that the microcosm of the soul must be reflected on a large scale in the 'natural' State, adapted his tripartite psychology to the framework of society. (Cornford 1912: 246)

This question leaves aside the over-historicizing possibility that Plato deduced these divisions from Philolaus or Aesara, exchanging love and friendship with lust and luxury but also the idealistic belief that this division is eternal and unchanging. Somewhat confusing again - the "stages" of the State? This is just a reference to classes, right? Or, more specifically, the stages in which Socrates deduces the necessity of this or that class?

The current view is clearly stated by Mr. E. Barker, who remarks that 'in constructing the State from which he proceeds to illustrate the nature of the soul, Plato presupposes a certain amount of psychology in advance [...] The State being a product of the human soul, its construction proceeds along lines suggested by a conception of the human soul as a threefold thing.' After enumerating the three parts of the soul, Mr. Barker goes on: 'In the light of this threefold division we may expect to find, and we do find, two features in Plato's political construction. The State which he constructs will grow under his hands in three stages: the constructed State will be marked by the [|] presence of three classes or functions. But the growth of the State will not be determined on historical lines: there will be no attempt, such as is made in the Laws, to show the natural steps by which the State has developed. On the contrary, Plato proceeds by a psychological method in the Republic. He takes each of the three elements of the human mind, beginning with the lowest and proceeding to the highest, and shows how each of these in its turn contributes its quota to the creation of the State.' (Cornford 1912: 246-247)

I'll assume that the historical grounding in Laws is what inspired Liiw.

This is a true and satisfactory description of the course of argument in the Republic; it is certain that the psychological doctrine of Book IV is presupposed from the outset in Book II. But when it has been admitted that Plato had worked out the correspondence between the State and the soul before he began to write this part of the Republic, the question I have raised is still open: which of the two theories - the psychological and the social - was derived from the other. Probably because the old view was that the Phaedrus, which contains the tripartite psychology, was an earlier work than the Republic, it seems to be still universally assumed that the psychology came first, and presumably was arrived at by direct introspective analysis. Now that the Phaedrus is held to be later than the Republic, it is time that this assumption were called in question. (Cornford 1912: 247)

Hmm. I should read the Phaedrus. The beginning of Book II did indeed break down the parts of the soul in advance (cf. 357c and following), though a little hidden behixind a dialectic of types of goods.

Professor Burnet, on Phaedo 68c φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, says that the tripartite psychology of the Republic is here implied (in a dialogue earlier than the Republic); and that it is 'doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to the Pythagorean doctrine of the "Three Lives."' He quotes the evidence of Poseidonius to the same effect. Poseidonius (ap. Galen. de Hipp. et Plat. pp. 425, 478) says that the doctrine originally belonged to Pythagoras, but was worked out and completed by Plato; and this is stated to be an inference (τεκμαιρόμενος) from the writings of certain Pythagoreans. Poseidonius may have drawn his inference, like Professor Burnet, from the sermon of the Three Lives; but I am not sure that this implies a definite division of the soul into three parts. At Rep. 435 E Socrates says that there are obviously three outstanding types of temperament (φιλομαθές, θυμοειδές, φιλοχρήματον). There is no difficulty in seeing that (τοῦτο μὲν [...] οὐδὲν χαλετὸν γνῶναι); the difficulty begins when we ask whether we exercise the corresponding functions 'with the whole soul' or with three different parts of it; ταῦτʹ ἔσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἀξίως λόγου. Then follows a long and intricate proof of the second alternative. The natural impression produced by this passage is that the Three Lives were a commonplace, but that no one had (at least ἀξίως λόγου) based the doctrine on a tripartite psychology.
But, even if Professor Burnet is right, the argument of this paper is unaffected; for I hope to show that the tripartite psychology is ultimately based on a social structure older than Pythagoras himself, and it does not matter at what date, or in whose hands, the psychology took shape. (Cornford 1912: 247, fn 2)

I have assumed the same connection as Burnet. Should look up Poseidonius. "The sermon of the Three Lives" is what I frequently call my favorite anecdote (cf. Iamblichus 1818: 28). Whether the whole soul or a part is exercised at any given time I'll try to avoid for the time being but I've seen some recent literature indicating that this question has really spawned a lot of tedious analysis. As to "a social structure older than Pythagoras himself" I'm anticipating something like Georges Dumézil.

Every reader of the [|] Republic is startled by the assumption, explicitly laid down at p. 427 E, that these four virtues - Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice - cover the whole field of virtue, so that, if we can discover and identify the first three of them, we may be sure that the one left over will be Justice. This is said to be 'the earliest passage in Greek literature where the doctrine of four cardinal virtues (if by cardinal virtues we mean those which make up the sum of perfect goodness) is expressly enunciated.' Plato gives no proof whatever that this list of virtues is really exhaustive; and speculation as to its origin has yielded no satisfactory result. We have here a new factor in our problem which may throw light upon the main question. (Cornford 1912: 247-248)

My own impression as to why there should be 4 cardinal virtues (cf. 428a) amounted to little more than well, 4 is a symbolic "godly" number in pythagoreanism. Whether there could be any conceivable connection between the tetractys and the four cardinal virtues, I have as of yet no clue.

Two of them - Wisdom (εὐβουλία) and Courage (ἀνδρεία) - present no difficulty. They are the peculiar excellences of the two higher, or ruling classes in the State - the philosophic Guardians and the Auxiliaries (ἐπίκουροι) or Fighting Class, whose function is to defend the city from external attack and to maintain internal order. (Cornford 1912: 248)

Noting down the Greek equivalents.

Sophrosyne is distinctly declared to be unlike Wisdom and Courage, in that it does not reside in any one part of the State only, but, like Justice, extends throughout the whole. It consists in an agreement (όμὁμόνοια, ὁμοδοξία) or concord (συμφωνία) between the naturally higher and lower parts (whether of the State or of the individual) upon the question which of them is to rule the other (432 A). The difficulty has been to distinguish this virtue from Justice, which is also a virtue of the whole State or soul, and not of any one part only. (Cornford 1912: 248)

A passage (cf. 431e-432a) I noted as quite possibly one of the most important one in the whole book, and promptly let slip my mind.

I should state the difference as follows: Considered as virtues of a whole consisting of distinct parts, Justice and Sophrosyne are complementary. Justice is a principle of differentiation and specialization of the parts: Sophrosyne is a principle of agreement, harmony, unity. A State with three classes, which had only Justice, would not be united: it would be a mere aggregate of three separate classes, each doing its own work and not interfering with the rest. Justice thus keeps the parts distinct; Sophrosyne is needed also to hold them together. It is, or involves, the sense of solidarity which links the three parts to one another and makes them form one whole. The two principles are analogous to the Neikos and Philia (Harmonia) of Empedocles. Justice is like [|] Neikos, which draws like to like and divides the elements into distinct, internally homogeneous groups. Sophrosyne is like Philia, which is an attraction between unlikes, tending to fuse them all in the unity of the 'sphere.' As Heracleitus says, 'Combinations are wholes and not wholes; drawn together and drawn asunder.' Plato's State is a 'combination': it is a 'whole' 'drawn asunder' into parts by Justice, which maintains th edifferentiation of specialized, departmental activities; it is 'not a whole' in so far as it consists of these distinct parts, and would fall asunder if it were not 'drawn together' by Sophrosyne. (Cornford 1912: 248-249)

This makes a lot of sense. Basically, centripetal and centrifugal forces in the realm of virtues.

Such is Sophrosyne, considered as a virtue of the whole State; but it is remarkable that already in Aristotle we find another view attributed to Plato, according to which Sophrosyne and Continence, of the Appetitive; Justice, Liberality, and Highmindedness, of the whole soul. Aristotle himself, in the Nicomachean Ethics, iii. 10, 1117 b 23, starts his discussion of Sophrosyne from the 'current view' that this virtue and Courage are 'virtues of the irrational parts,' i.e. Courage, of θυμός; Sophrosyne of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. If the text is sound, we must agree with Burnet's note on the psasage: 'Aristotle starts as usual from τὰ δοκοῦντα, in this case the Platonic view. Aristotle did not himself believe in "parts of the soul."' It seems clear that Aristotle understood Plato to have held that Sophrosyne is specially the virtue of the third and lowest part. This testimony cannot be lightly dismissed. (Cornford 1912: 249)

"Gentleness" and "Liberality" are especially welcome additions.

Accordingly, the State is divided (431 C to D) into these two parts. The better part consists of a small class of those who 'have the best natural dispositions and have received the best education.' These will have 'simple and moderate desires and feelings, guided as they are by reflection with the help of Reason and Right Opinion' - ἁπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας (ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας), αἵ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῷ ἄγονται, 431 C. The worse part consists of children, women, slaves, and the mass of uneducated freemen. These have a great 'multitude and variety of desires and pleasures and pains.' The city as a whole is σώφρων when the smaller class rules this larger mass; it is then 'master of its pleasures and desires and of itself,' 431 D. (Cornford 1912: 250)

The few are fit to rule the many because they are able to keep their desires in check and thus want little.

The Auxiliaries have Sophrosyne μετʹ ὀρθῆς δόξης. They take their orders and their convictions on trust from the philosophic rulers. Their virtue is not of the highest kind, but comes of habituation and discipline in the lower stages of education described in Books II and III. So, ὀρθὴ δόξα is the intellectual basis of their Sophrosyne, as it is of their peculiar virtue of Courage. (Cornford 1912: 251)

Only now realizing that orthodoxy is literally "right opinion".

The lowest class has neither νοῦς nor ὀρθὴ δόξα. Hence its Sophrosyne is of a quite different type. This class, having no inward principle of control, is ruled from outside by the other two classes. Its Sophrosyne is, therefore, not 'self-mastery' at all, but consists in mere obedience to external authority, emanating from the Guardians and enforced by the Auxiliaries. This class is irrational; Reason cannot rule it by persuasion, but needs a police force to compel submission. The only internal checking force is, not reason or right belief, but another emotion - the fear of punishment. This is only a rudiment of virtue. Yet this obedience, or orderliness, is all the virtue (apart from its share of Justice) attainable by this lowest class. (Cornford 1912: 251)

Yeah, this is not good. It reduces most human beings to automatons.

So, too, Phintys, the Pythagorean lady, whose tract περὶ γυναικὸς σωφροσύνας is preserved in part by Stobaeus (Flor. 74, 61) says: γυναικὸς μάλιστα ἀρετὰ σωφροσύνα, for it will enable her to honour and love her own husband. 'Many perhaps think that it is not fitting for a woman to philosophize, any more than to ride on horseback or to make public speeches. But I think that certain things belong specially to man, others to woman; others again are common to both, though some may be more manly, others more womanly. Peculiar to man are the conduct of war and politics and public speaking; peculiar to woman, minding the house, staying at home, and looking after her husband. But I hold that Courage and Justice and Wisdom (φρόνασιν) are common to both, for man and woman must alike have the excellences of the mind, just as they have in common the excellences of the body. Some, however, of these are more proper to a man, others to a woman. Manliness (ἀνδρότατα) and Wisdom belong rather to a man, because of his habit of body and the power of his mind; Sophrosyne to a woman.' Among five principal conditions of Sophrosyne, Phintys ranks first conjugal fidelity. (Cornford 1912: 252)

The most intriguing element here is that Sophrosyne has 5 conditions. Both men and women must have excellences of the mind and body, so the other things (war, politics, public speaking; housework and care for spouse) look like externals. The most egregious thing here is "staying at home" as a thing peculiar to women; consider the hikikomori.

It thus appears that the basis for the distinction of these three cardinal virtues was originally the division of society into three classes by age:

1. γέροντες	σοφίία, βουλή.
2. ἄνδρες	ἀνδρεία.
3. παῖδες (and γυναῖκες)	σωφροσύνη.

This analysis is signally confirmed by a passage in Pindar, which has been much debated. In Nemean III, 70, in honour of the Aeginetan Aristocleides, Pindar says: 'In the moment of trial there shines through the perfection of those powers in which one may prove superior and stand out above the rest, as a boy among young boys, a man among men, and third [|] among those or riper age, according to the several parts of human kind. But there is a fourth virtue too, that mortal life drives in his team (?), bidding us take heed of that which lies before us.' (Cornford 1912: 254-255)

The preceding analysis contained too many greex excerpts to make sufficient sense, but the point is that: (1) temperance properly belongs to women and children; (2) courage to men of military age; (3) wisdom to older men; and (4) justice may pertain to afterlife or whatever lies ahead (the spindle of Necessity).

The fourth virtue, φρονεῖν τὸ παρκειμένον, seems to be common to all three ages, and to hold a position correspoding to that of Plato's Δικαιοσύνη. If φρονεῖν τὸ παρκειμένον means 'taking thought about what lies nearest to one,' it is not very different from Justice, defined by Plato as 'doing your own work and not meddling with other people's business.' (Cornford 1912: 255)

What lies nearest to you? Huh?

We must also reverse the statement of Zeller, that 'the basis for the plurality of Virtues is sought by Plato - and just herein lies the peculiarity of his theory - not in the variety of the objects to which moral activity is related, but in the variety of the spiritual powers operative in virtue (or, as he puts it, "parts of the Soul"); and it is by this way that he reaches the four acknowledged primary virtues.' It now seems more probable that Plato argued in his own mind just as Socrates argues in the Republic. The State has three main classes, each with its special function (ἔργον), and therefore its special excellence (ἀρετή, see Rep. I, fin.). 'Are we not bound, then, to admit this much - that there must be in each of us the same forms and characters of soul that there are in the State? For where else can those in the State have come from? It would be absurd to suppose, for instance, that the element of passion or spirit had not come from the individuals, wherever it is present in a State.' (Cornford 1912: 259)

To be honest, the argument here eludes me. I can only admire the general designations for the parts of the soul.

The new and peculiar feature of this psychology is the invention of the part called τὸ θυμοειδές, intermediate between Reason and Desire. Reason has its virtue of Wisdom, like that of the γέρων βουληφόρος; Desire has its Sophrosyne, like that of the child or youth. The virtue of ἀνδρεία demands a part of the soul to correspond to it. To meet this demand, Plato (or his Pythagorean predecessors) invented τὸ θυμοειδές. This view of the genesis of his triple psychology will become more probable, if we can show that the scheme is artificial and false, and not such as a philosopher working independently by direct introspective analysis would be likely to reach. With this view, I propose to examine the analysis of the soul in Rep. 436 A to 441 C - a somewhat intricate argument, which has not been quite satisfactorily understood. (Cornford 1912: 259)

The accusation is understandable - the intermediate position in later triads is always the one that varies the most. If any one of them were considered "artificial" - regardless of Plato - it would be that one.

We pass next to the definition of the third 'form' of soul, intermediate between the other two, with the words: 'Let us take it, then, that we have distinguished two forms contained in the soul. Now take the principle of indignation (or anger), the thing that makes us angry (or, in a passion). Is that a third form, or is it of the same nature as either of the two others? It is noticeable that by putting the question in this way, Plato assumes that the third part must be θυμός or τὸ θυμοειδές; the only question is whether it is a distinct part. (Cornford 1912: 262)

The main question about courage and manliness is what makes you angry?

Such is the argument by which the famous tripartite psychology is established. When we consider it, we see at once that it is not a complete psychology: faculties such as sensation and perception are not even mentioned. It is arrived at by the analysis merely of one complex state of mind, the conflict of motives, which is compared to a strife between two factions in a State. The whole description figures (so to say) a political condition of the soul, in which the worse part rebels against the rule of the better, and θυμός steps in, as the ἄνδρες in the State intervene to enforce the authority of the γέροντες upon the third unruly class. (Cornford 1912: 262)

I need to return to the past few pages that attempt to explain Plato's reasoning later on. For now my take-away is that in Cornford's opinion the parts of the soul are figured out after a social-political model rather than vice versa.

We may fairly ask: Is the psychological scheme the sort of scheme that would naturally be reached, from unbiassed introspection, [|] by a philosopher who set himself to analyze human nature, in order subsequently to construct a form of society based upon his results? The weak point of the scheme is τὸ θυμοειδές. The distinction between Reason and Appetite, a rational part and an irrational, is well established, and there is some evidence for its being of Pythagorean origin. But this third, intermediate part is novel, and, when we look into it, factitious. It has all the air of being invented to suit some foregone conclusion. (Cornford 1912: 262-263)

An the pythagorean connection the footnote reccomends: "Rohde, Psyche, ii, 173. I believe that Empedocles distinguished an immortal migrating part of soul from the mortal part, see my From Religion to Philosophy, 1912, § 124." (ibid, 263, fn 1)

If we ask what actual psychological elements Plato is attempting to describe in his account of τὸ θυμοειδές, it will appear that he is confusing two quite distinct things, and also that neither of these has any real claim to be set up as one of three 'parts' of the soul.
Θυμός in Homer includes all the life-powers which distinguish a living man from a corpse. It covers desires, feelings, will, spirit, courage, thought. These various senses survive in compounds: thought in ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, to ponder over a thing; spirit, courage, eagerness, in πρόθυμος, ἄθυμος, ῥᾴθυμος; desire in ἐπιθυμία, 'having a mind to something' (θυμός ἐστί μοι, Herod.). In fifth-century writers (apart from the poets, who keep up the Homeric usages) it narrows down to mean 'anger,' 'passion,' or 'spirit.' In Thucydides ii, II, 7 we find it opposed to λογισμός: ὀργὴ προσπίπτει, καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται. Thus, in the ordinary view, it was a passion or emotion, which, so far from being always the ally of reason, needed to be suppressed like any other. (Cornford 1912: 263)

How can thymos aid reason if it has a mind of its own?

All this manifestly describes the primary emotion of anger, which belongs to the elementary instinct of pugnacity. As such, it is simply one among many primary emotions, such as fear, curiosity, disgust, etc. The only possible ground for singling it out from the rest is that the nistinct of pugnacity is the native basis of the virtue of courage. For that reason it was singled out and described in the first sketch of the Guardian's innate disposition at 375 A. But this means that Plato started with the virtue of the fighting man or class, and deduced the distinct part of the soul from it. (Cornford 1912: 263)

This is fairly convincing. He needed a part of soul for the guards, and pulled one out of his behind.

It is now clear that this triple psychology is artificial, and really comes to no more than an analysis of the factors involved in one particular state of mind - the conflict of motives. Further, this state of mind is selected for analysis because of its 'political' character, as a faction-fight in the soul; the whole inquiry is suggested by the political analogy, and its results are predetermined by the need of finding a part of the soul which may act as a police-force to help reason in its rule, and can have ἀνδρεία for its characteristic virtue. (Cornford 1912: 264)

Put this way it's almost sad. Cornford really robbed the intermediate part of the soul of its mystery.