Approaches to Theories for Nonverbal Signs

Lange-Seidl, Annemarie 1977. Approaches to Theories for Nonverbal Signs. Studies in Semiotics, Volume 17. Lisse: The Peter De Ridder Press

For education at conservatories and academies of art, the use of models always went without saying. It was, however, associated with practical training, not with theoretical education. May we assume real sign competent only in art? Or, converesely: is the complete control of a communication event already art? Or artificial? As long as we believe in the unconscious use of nonverbal communication elements and not in intention concerning semiosis, we cannot use the notion 'competence'. Only after having once more considered the essential features of a sign, only after a theoretical reorientation will the notion 'sign competence' be used with justice. The prior condition for a system that is formalizable and formalized is that the notation and conservation of signs are normalized and standardized (cf. p. 38 and 39f). (Lange-Seidl 1977: 21)

psychology will have to help us to distinguish releasing signs from provoking ones, consoling signs from encouraging ones (cf. note 27). How do people become indifferent to signs because of their being used too often? The close connection of American semiotics with behaviorism can help us here; behaviorism may be instructive for a constitution, use and rejection of signs, but may not be so decisive that intentionality, meaning, and finality, which constitute the essence of the sign, should be neglected as is the case with many American studies. (Lange-Seidl 1977: 29)

Only as long as a sign-philosophic and sign-theoretic synopsis does not exist will one dare to speak about the 'prelingual' character of nonverbal signs. Sign competence is worth a theoretization as much as communicative competence, which cannot remain a lingual one, if it is not to ignore reality by being limited to a 'homo loquens'. (Lange-Seidl 1977: 29)

Bceause we are familiar with the actor as a prototype of the ability to slip arbitrarily into roles which he not only fills up verbally both also semiotically in many ways, some semioticians consider the signe arbitraire available for lies (cf. Sampson 1972). He who learns to control his movements, he who employs proxemics consciously, can programme them like language, and with their help is able to lie as he is by means of language. (Lange-Seidl 1977: )
[Sampson, G., 1972. "Natural Language and the Paradox of the Liar", Semiotica 5, pp. 305-23.]

[from Notes]
Corresponding to John L. Austin (1962), How to Do Things with Words, an essay "How to Do Things with Signs" should be written; especially the intersection between action by speech and action by nonverbal signs should be investigated (Lange-Seidl 1977: 45)

http://tartu.ester.ee/record=b1616166~S1*est