A Pervasive Set of Beliefs

Armaly, Miles T.; Buckley, David T.; Enders, Adam M. 2022. Christian nationalism and political violence: Victimhood, racial identity, conspiracy, and support for the Capitol attacks. Political Behavior 44(2): 937-960. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-021-09758-y [Springer Link]

In January 2021, a rally organized to protest the results of the 2020 presidential election escalated into the violent takeover of the United States Capitol building. While rioters utilized a wide variety of symbols and slogans in the planning and execution of those attacks, religious motifs were a regular fixture of what one reporter labeled "a Christian insurrection." Religion's appearance that afternoon was not unexpected, as prominent religious supporters of the Trump Administration framed electoral defeat as an anti-religious conspiracy even before the November election. In the days before the Capitol violence, supporters launched a "Jericho March" against alleged electoral fraud, intended to imitate the biblical siege of Jericho by Israelite forces. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 938)

Vägivaldne ülevõtt, mis õnneks nurjus - viimastel andmetel kaotasid kokku 7 inimest oma elud selle üritusega seoses (Babbitt sõi kuuli, keegi sai südameattaki, keegi trambiti surnuks, keegi sai insuldi, üks politseinik tapeti kohapeal ja 2tk sooritasid mõned päevad hiljem enesetapu). Praeguseks on selge, et kui julgeolekuteenistus ei oleks teda peatanud ja Valgesse Majja ära tirinud, oleks Trump marssinud kapitooliumisse ja ennast Putini ja Xi Jinpingi kombel igaveseks presidendiks teinud.

Neist religioossetest motiividest tahaks rohkem teada, mistõttu nüüd seda loen, sest kui mõned aastad tagasi oleks võinud seda pidada hüperbooliks, on USA ülemkohtu kaaperdamine nüüdseks näidanud, et "kristlik natsionalism" ei ole probleem, mida tuleks ignoreerida. See oli varem võib-olla hale-naljakas, et evangeelsed kristlased valisid oma juhiks mehe, kes on Mussolini kõnesid tõenäoliselt rohkem lugenud kui piiblit, ei oska selle raamatuid tsiteerida ja hoiab seda tagurpidi käes, aga enam ei ole väga naljakas.

Analytically, the role of religion in the 2021 Capitol attacks is the latest manifestation of a concept that has attracted significant recent attention in the social sciences: Christian nationalism. Leading scholars define Christian nationalism as a "pervasive set of beliefs and ideals that merge American and Christian group memberships," and have presented convincing evidence of its links to a spectrum of conservative politicians and policy positions, notably the election of President Donald Trump (Whitehead et al. 2018a, 2018b: 148; Perry, Whitehead & Grubbs 2021). While this body of work predates the 2021 violence, it comes with obvious implications for understanding the sources of support for the riots. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 398)

2021-01-06 tõi selle esile, aga "kristlikust natsionalismist" räägitakse tõepoolest väga paljudes teadusartiklites - neid näib olevat tuhandeid - aga enamus neist on pandeemiaaegsed ja keskenduvad sellele, et maski- ja vaktsiinivastased teaduse-eitajad toetusid kristlusele ja hakkasid Jeesuselt viirusekaitset paluma. See ei ole iseenesest märkimisväärne reaktsioon, aga kaugemalt vaadates näib, et pandeemiaaegne parempoolne propaganda pani paljudel pea pöörlema ja nüüd näeme, mis on nii ulatusliku radikaliseerumise tulemus.

• Whitehead, A. L.; Perry, S. L.; Baker, J. O. 2018a. Make America Christian again: Christian nationalism and voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Sociology of Religion 79(2): 147-171. DOI: 10.1093/socrel/srx070 [Oxford Academic]
• Whitehead, A. L.; Schnabel, L.; Perry, S. L. 2018b. Gun Control in the Crosshairs: Christian Nationalism and Opposition to Stricter Gun Laws. Socius 4: 1-13. DOI: 10.1177/2378023118790189 [SAGE journals]
• Perry, S. L.; Whitehead, A. L.; Grubbs, J. B. 2022. The Devil That You Know: Christian Nationalism and Intent to Change One's Voting Behavior For or Against Trump in 2020. Politics and Religion 15(2): 229-246. DOI: 10.1017/S175504832100002X [Cambridge Core]

[...] we argue that the effect of an ideology like Christian nationalism is likely to be conditioned by other individual characteristics that scholars have identified as particularly susceptible to elite cues. We focus on three such characteristics because of their links to threat perception and boundary construction: perceived victimhood, reinforcing racial and religious identity, and immersion in conspiratorial information sources. More succinctly, we argue that Christian nationalism is strongly related [|] to support for specific and abstract political violence on its own, but will be most potent when combined with certain individual-level characteristics that political elites have a hand in cueing. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 938-939)

Tajutud ohvriseisund - 71% USA elanikkonnast on kristlased, aga tuntakse ennast kohe-kohe väljasuremisohus olevat. Rassi ja religiooni seos on pädev, sest nähtuse täisnimi võiks olla White Christian Nationalism. Vandenõuteooria-kanalite osas on põhiliseks teguriks tõenäoliselt Alex Jones, kellesuguseid võib silmas pidada ka "eliitide" poolt antavate signaalide (cue) osas: Alex Jones räägib aastaid, kuidas Georgia Guidestones on satanistlik ja sellele kirjutatud soovitus hoida apokalüpsi järel rahvaarv alla 500 miljoni tähendab, et globalistid kavatsevad kohe-kohe ülejäänud 7 miljardit inimest ära tappa. Kandiss Taylor ja Marjorie Taylor Greene õhutavad seda prügilõket ja keegi tont lähebki ja laseb monumendi öösel õhku.

The 2021 Capitol attacks were unique in American history, but links between religion, extremism, and violence are well-trodden analytic ground in the social sciences, with empirical work on the United States and a host of global cases. Drawing on such work suggests links between essentially a bottom-up ideology like Christian nationalism and top-down elite discourse that, when combined, may result in violence. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 939)

Asi muutub vägivaldseks kui internetist informatsiooni saavad inimesed, kes usuvad napakaid asju, saavad tuge ja julgustust võimulolevalt poliitiliselt eliidilt. Eesti kontekstis tuleb eriti tähelepanelik olla nt Elvis Braueri suguste hullude suhtes, kes ühendavad Telegrami lugejaid-napakaid EKRE-ga. Praegu veel oli Brauer ehk liiga napakas isegi EKRE seltskonna jaoks - ta lihtsalt söödi välja - aga tulevik on tume kui mõni natukene intelligentsem, aga sama liini ajav, tüüp peaks võimule saama.

While ties between religion and American nationalism are not new (Bellah 1992), recent scholarship has focused on a more particular operationalization of "a unique and independent ideology" centered on "a symbolic defense of the United States' perceived Christian heritage" (Whitehead et al. 2018a, 2018b: 147). Christian nationalism not only affirms a uniquely American Christian history, but also highlights the alleged danger to that heritage from rapid demographic, legal, and political change. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 939)

Replacement theory. Sama kammajaad üritatakse ka siinmail mingil määral edendada, justkui mõned aastad siin viibiv mustanahaline välisüliõpilane, kes teenib Boltiga toitu transportides lisaraha, oleks suur oht Eesti rahvuse püsimajäämisele. USA-s on muidugi vähemalt poliitilise muutuse suhtes hirm õigustatud, sest Vabariiklastest presidendid ei ole juba peaaegu kaks aastakümmet võitnud rahva enamuse häält (popular vote) ja varsti ei aita isegi isegi valimisalade sisaliku-kujuliseks vorpimine (gerrymandering) ja hääletusjaoskondade sihilik vähendamine neil valimisi võita.

In a series of projects, Whitehead, Perry and coauthors have demonstrated an independent relationship between Christian nationalism and Trump support, even accounting for alternative explanations of Trumpism such as racism and socioeconomic status (Baker et al. 2020; Whitehead & Perry 2020). Gorsky (2019: 165) argues that "Trumpism, then, is a reactionary and secularized version of white Christian nationalism." Similar empirical work has extended Christian nationalism beyond electoral contexts, for example tolerance of racism (Davis & Perry 2020), anti-immigration attitudes (McDaniel et al. 2011), anti-Islamic sentiment (Shortle & Gaddie 2015), attitudes towards same-sex unions (Whitehead & Perry 2015), and even responses to COVID-19 (Perry et al. 2020a, 2020b). While not tied to extrajudicial political violence, Christian nationalism has been linked to tolerance of police violence against African-Americans (Perry et al. 2019), as well as opposition to gun control regulations (Whitehead et al. 2018a, 2018b). (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 940)

Meikib senssi. Võib tõmmata ajaloolise paralleeli Hitleri ja katoliku kiriku käsi-peseb-kätt sobitumisega. Fašistid on nõus religioossete äärmuslastega mõnda aega koos töötama, sest nad vihkavad samu inimgruppe (mustanahalised, immigrandid, moslemid, LGBTQ, jne). Kirjandust on siin ikka omajagu:

• Baker, J. O.; Perry; S. L.; Whitehead, A. l. 2020. Keep America Christian (and White): Christian Nationalism, Fear of Ethnoracial Outsiders, and Intention to Vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election. Sociology of Religion 81(3): 272-293. DOI: 10.1093/socrel/sraa015 [Oxford Academic]
• Whitehead, A. L.; Perry, S. L. 2020. Taking America Back for God: Christian Nationalism in the United States. Oxford University Press. [lg]
• Gorski, P. 2019. Why evangelicals voted for Trump: A critical cultural sociology. Springer. [pp. 165-183]
• Davis, J. T.; Perry, S. L. 2020. White Christian Nationalism and Relative Political Tolerance for Racists. Social Problems 68(3): 513-534. DOI: 10.1093/socpro/spaa002. [Oxford Academic]
• McDaniel, Eric Leon; Nooruddin, Irfan; Shortle, Allyson Faith 2011. Divine Boundaries: How Religion Shapes Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants. American Politics Research 39(1): 205-233. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X10371300 [SAGE journals]
• Shortle, A. F.; Gaddie, R. K. 2015. Religious Nationalism and Perceptions of Muslims and Islam. Politics and Religion 8(3): 435-457. DOI: 10.1017/S1755048315000322 [Cambridge Core]
• Whitehead, A. L.; Perry, S. L. 2015. A More Perfect Union? Christian Nationalism and Support for Same-sex Unions. Sociological Perspectives 58(3): 422-440. DOI: 10.1177/0731121415577724 [SAGE journals]
• Perry, S. L.; Whitehead, A. L.; Grubbs, J. B. 2020. Culture Wars and COVID-19 Conduct: Christian Nationalism, Religiosity, and Americans’ Behavior During the Coronavirus Pandemic. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 59(3): 405-416. DOI: 10.1111/jssr.12677 [Wiley Online Library]
• Perry, S. L.; Whitehead, A. L.; Davis, J. T. 2019. God’s Country in Black and Blue: How Christian Nationalism Shapes Americans’ Views about Police (Mis)treatment of Blacks. Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 5(1): 130-146. DOI: 10.1177/2332649218790983 [SAGE journals]

Although this movement is typically explained through political affiliation with Donald Trump, QAnon lor - which shares many similarities with claims made during the "Satanic panic" of the 1980s - is littered with eschatological "end times" and Manichean imagery regarding a final war (called "the Storm") between a corrupt, evil elite and a virtuous, good people. The linkage between religion, conspiracy thinking, and extremist political movements is nothing new (Barkun 1997, 2017). Although less well developed in scholarly literature, initial evidence seems to indicate that Christian nationalism may be tied to support for the QAnon movement and related conspiracy theories. [.|.] Members of the Proud Boys knelt in prayer to Jesus for "reformation and revival" in the United States. Protest signs linked conspiratorial allegations of voter fraud to biblical passages, and protester interviews featured references to the end times and scriptural prophecy about Trump's election. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 940-941)

Ikka ja jälle tuleb esile see, et kristlus on apokalüptiline religioon, mis tervitab kaost ja vägivalda lootuses, et see toob kaasa Jeesuse teise tulemise, maailma lõpu ja jumalariigi. Sellise ülla eesmärgi nimel ollakse valmis ülistama ka šarlatani, kes vägistas 13-aastase tüdruku (kes loobus kohtukaebusest, sest teda ja tema perekonda ähvardati vägivallaga). Nagu artiklis uuritav korrelatsioon osutab, sellise tüübi võimul hoidmise nimel ollakse valmis tapma.

In theorizing links between religious nationalism and support for violence, there is reason to suspect that victimhood, of either variant, would work in the same direction to strengthen that association. For example, systemic victimhood resonates with [|] extensive social psychological research on "chosen trauma" in the study of group identity, whereby "[participants] feel that [their] side is under personal attack and are compelled to defend their large group" (Volkan 2011: 87). (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 944-945)

See kõlab juba nagu huvitav lugemine - puudutab korraga nii faatilise osadusega seotud "ühtsustunde" küsimust ja Eesti puhul meie "orjarahva" narratiivi.

• Volkan, Vamik D. 2001. Transgenerational transmission and chosen traumas: An aspect of large-group identitiy. Group Analysis 34(1): 79-97. DOI: 10.1177/05333160122077730 [SAGE journals]

Importantly, we describe victimhood that is perceptual in nature. No meaningful suppression of Christianity or the individual's life prospects needs to have occurred for individuals to feel like victims and bring those feelings to bear on their attitudes about the appropriate use of violence. [↩] We not only expect higher levels of perceived victimhood to relate to support for violence, but also hypothesize that victimhood will enhance the links between Christian Nationalism and support for political violence because of its role in increasing receptiveness to elite cues. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 945)

USA-s on pigem vastupidine probleem - paljudes osariikides on ikka veel kehtivad seadused, mis keelavad ateistidel astuda valitsusse. Ameerika kristlaste kohta käib ütlus, et nad tunnevad ennast tagakiusatuna kui nad ei saa teisi (eelnimetatud inimrühmi) taga kiusata.

We further hypothesize that white identity should strengthen the link between Christian nationalism and support for violence, because of white identity's susceptibility to inframmation vis-a[qcqca\]-vis elite cues. Christian nationalism is overwhelmingly a white phenomenon and, as Baker et al. (2020) show, those high in Christian nationalism fear racial and ethnic "outsiders." (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 946)

Siin on käegakatsutav iroonia selles, et inimesed, kes nominaalselt järgivad tüüpi, kes ütles, "armasta oma naabrit nagu iseennast", ootavad pinevalt seda päeva, mil nad saavad oma naabri maha lüüa, kui ta on teist nahavärvi või pärit kuskilt mujalt.

We also find that Christian nationalism is significantly higher among evangelicals than other (non)religious groups (p<0.05), and higher among conservatives and Republicans than Democrats, liberals, Independents, or moderates (all p<0.05). (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 948)

Ülla-ülla, kristlik natsionalism on levinud just evangeelsete kristlaste, konservatiivide ja vabariiklaste hulgas. Kristliku natsionalismi põhiklauslid, nende autorite küsitluse järgi, on "valitsus peaks kuulutama [riigi] kristlikuks rahvuseks" ja "[riigi] edu on osa Jumala plaanist" (samas, 948).

As Christian nationalism, perceived victimhood, and white identity are all positively correlated, this toxic blend strikes us as an empirical reality rather than a hypothetical. A similar warning note applies to other religious characteristics. While religious affiliation and attendance are not strong statistical predictors once Christian nationalism is included in multivariate analysis, several of those measures are highly correlated with Christian nationalism beliefs, indicating the interplay between religious nationalist belief and other dimensions of religiosity. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 952)

Kristlikud natsionalistid on inimesed, kes tajuvad, et nad on ohvrid, ja kelle põhiliseks isikuomaduseks on nende valge nahk. Kristlikku natsionalismi pooldavad siinöeldu järgi, kui ma õigesti aru saan, ka mõned sellised inimesed, kes ise ei käi kirikus ega pea ennast kristlaseks - ehk siis õige rumalukesed, kes ei saa arugi, mida nad pooldavad.

6% of whites in our sample, 11.5% of white evangelicals, and 17.7% of white weekly church goers fall into the joint top quartile of justification of violence. Christian nationalist beliefs, perceived victimhood, white identity, and support for QAnon. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 954)

Peaaegu viiendik USA valgenahalistest kirikukäijatest arvavad, et poliitiline vägivald on õigustatud. See sündmus, mille tõttu 7 inimest kaotasid täiesti mõttetult oma elud, ja mis ähvardas tappa demokraatlikult valitud esindajaid ning panna punkti vanimale demokraatiale maailmas - see oli õige asja eest, palun veel.

With that said, the events of January 6 were [|] undeniably partisan in nature, with a closely contested election at their root. The Jericho March was founded not by established religious leaders, but individuals formerly nominated as Republican political appointees. Focusing on the linkages between elite cues and popular attitudes may present opportunities in this regard, for instance testing messenger effects when cues stoking violence are delivered by partisan sources as opposed to religious authorities. (Armaly, Buckley & Enders 2022: 956-957)

See'p see põhjus, miks tekkis tahtmine sellist artiklit lugeda. Öeldakse, et praegused Vabariiklased ei ole enam samad Vabariiklased, kes olid 10 aastat tagasi. USA parempoolsed on nii kaugele paremale liikunud, et nende põhiliseks ideoloogiaks on saanud seesamune "valge kristlik natsionalism", mis mängis rolli 6. jaanuari riigipöördekatses ja mängib aktiivset rolli "üksikute huntide", massitulistajate ajendites. See on ideoloogia, mille lõppeesmärk näeb tõepoolest olevat "rassisõda", mitte-valgete USA kodanike genotsiid, ja teokraatliku valitsuse sisseseadmine - Y'all Qaeda.